the 1980’s in the
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Julkinen
Julkinen
Managing financial deregulation: lessons
from the 1980’s in the Nordic countries* Seppo Honkapohja, Bank of Finland
![Page 2: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Julkinen
Outline
I. Introduction: the aftermath of WWII in Europe
II. Close look at the Nordic countries
- Nordic financial systems in early 1980’s
- Financial deregulation, main aspects
III. Central issues in financial deregulation
- Problems in Nordic deregulations
- Lessons
IV. Managing the Nordic financial crises
- Crisis management
- Lessons
2
![Page 3: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Julkinen
I. The aftermath of WWII
• Destruction from the war and earlier instabilities in
1930’s.
• Main concern: How to generate adequate savings to
fund reconstruction and industrial development.
– Often focus on priority sectors such as basic industries,
exports and the housing sector.
• Regulatory frameworks to protect financial services
industry were kept unchanged.
– Rationing and controls of the financial system
– Interest rates were kept stable and below the market
levels.
– Public debt levels were very high after WWII.
3
![Page 4: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Julkinen
• Gradual lifting of financial controls.
– Some marketable financial instruments in 1950’s to 1970’s
(treasury bills, certificates of deposit, commercial paper).
– Interest rate controls were gradually lifted, especially
during 1980s.
• This led to tightening of interest margins.
• Time tables differed a lot between countries.
• Other (gradual) developments
– Deregulation of financial services (fees).
– Removal of direct lending controls and investment
regulations.
– Strengthening of competition among financial institutions.
– Financial assistance (low-rate financing, tax incentives
etc.) gradually reformed or removed.
4
![Page 5: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Julkinen
I.1 External dimensions
• Exchange controls in some countries in 1930s and
in majority of countries right after WWII.
• Fixed exchange rates regime, capital controls.
• Bretton Woods institutions
– IMF for loan facilities for countries in temporary difficulties.
– OEEC (later OECD) for trade liberalization.
– European Payment Union: clearing balances and credit.
• EEC led to liberalization of real economies.
• OECD engaged countries in process of liberalization
of capital movements in 1961.
– Some countries without exchange controls: Canada, USA,
Switzerland, Germany (after 1958).
5
![Page 6: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Julkinen
• Breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971.
– In Europe, creation of the ’Snake’ for exchange rates in 1972
– The European Monetary System in 1978
• ERM: fixed and adjustable exchange rates, mutual support
• Big inflation differentials => realignments in the first years, but few realignments in 1980s.
• Renewed efforts to capital account liberalizations in 1980’s.
– EU: some countries (Germany, UK, Denmark) liberalized before 1986 EU Directive. Netherlands joined at the end of 1986. France joined in 1988.
• Maastricht Treaty in 1992 made free movement of capital a cornerstones of EU.
– EMS crisis in 1992-93 led to realignments and wide bands for exchange rates.
– Road to EMU (started in 1999). New ERM for outsiders. Also floaters (Sweden, UK…)
6
![Page 7: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Julkinen
I.2 Liberalization of banking and
financial systems
• Timing of domestic liberalization varied among
countries.
• EU legislation: important steps from 1989 onward. – Single EU banking licence,
– Single passport for investment services,
– Single market in financial services etc.
Banking crises in Europe (before the current one):
– Problems with individual banks: BCCI, Banesto, Barings,
Credit Lyonnaises and various small banks.
– Systemic banking crises: 3 Nordic countries in early 1990’s
and Spain in early 1980’s
• among the ”big five crises” of advanced market economies
before the current crisis (Reinhard & Rogoff)
7
![Page 8: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Julkinen
II. Close look at the Nordic countries
• Why important? – Three out of four countries developed very big financial crises
from liberalization.
• Background on Nordics: – Small open economies, total population over 22 million:
• Wide-spread ties, e.g., common labor market since 1954.
• Sweden wealthiest in 1970s, Finland weakest (suffered heavily in WWII).
• Foreign trade and associated payments liberalized early by the end of 1950’s.
– Egalitarian, socially cohesive countries with democratic tradition: • Big public sector, strong influence on the economy.
– Financial repression was an instrument of growth and industrialization policies.
• More rapid inflation than in much of the western world.
8
![Page 9: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Julkinen
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark Euro area
1985 = 100
Source: Eurostat.
26487
GDP
9
![Page 10: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Julkinen
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark Germany USA
January 1960 = 1
Source: OECD.
26486
Consumer prices
10
![Page 11: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Julkinen
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Finnish mark Swedish krona Norwegian krona Danish krona
Mark or krona
Source: Bank of Finland.
Nordic currencies against German mark
11
![Page 12: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Julkinen
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1980 1985 1990 1995
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
% of GDP
Source: European Commission.
25125@Chart2_2 (en)
Current account
12
![Page 13: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Julkinen
II.1 Nordic financial systems in early
1980’s
• Denmark had a more liberal system.
– Details will not be discussed.
• Financial systems were tightly controlled:
– Interest rate controls by the Central bank.
– Central Bank controlled credit flows in the economy.
• Banking system dominated by a few large banks
and many smaller banks.
– Mostly private ownership of banks,
• capital largely raised from the private sector
– Banks rationed credit to households and firms.
13
![Page 14: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Julkinen
Exchange rates pegged to currency baskets.
Capital account controls: – Permits for long-term movements,
– no short-term financial movements,
– Foreign trade finance relatively free,
– Foreign exchange for travel rationed.
• Non-bank systems: – Stock, bond markets and insurance sector kept small,
– no major non-bank intermediaries (except special finance companies),
– activities of foreign banks very restricted.
Supervision focused at compliance in lending and accounting, no risk supervision.
14
![Page 15: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Julkinen
Competition restricted by regulation of interest rates,
entry into financial market, etc.
– Also new bank branches restricted.
– Subsidiaries of foreign banks not allowed.
• Strong legal system (”Rule of law”)
– e.g. bankruptcy procedures.
• Very stable banking systems:
– Very low loan losses,
– inefficiencies: large personnel and branch networks.
• Tight controls protected independent monetary
policy.
15
![Page 16: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Julkinen
II.2. Main aspects of Nordic deregulation
• Growth of international trade and internationalization of firms. – This created pressures to liberalize.
• Growth of international financial markets. – IMF, OECD, EU sought liberalizations of markets and
capital flows.
• Leakages and loopholes in the controls emerged. – ”grey” domestic financial intermediation in late 1970’s and
1980’s.
• Liberalization involved numerous individual acts – see slide for Finland.
– Volatility in macroeconomic developments from the liberalization.
16
![Page 17: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Julkinen
Source: Englund & Vihriälä (2003)
17
![Page 18: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Julkinen
III. Central issues in financial
deregulation
• Liberalization of financial and foreign exchange
markets limits the leeway of domestic economic
policy.
• Impossible trinity: with free markets one cannot fix
exhange rate, domestic interest rate and quantity of
finance.
• Order of liberalization:
– Domestic market before international capital movements
or vice versa?
– Which order for different markets in terms of maturity,
sector finance, derivatives etc.
18
![Page 19: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Julkinen
• Other issues: – Which order for currency denomination (domestic vs.
foreign)?
– Which order for exports and imports of capital?
– Should there be response to market pressure?
– When might deregulation steps be reversed?
• Nordic countries liberalized domestic and currency markets and capital movements in tandem.
• Decisions about taxation of finance: – Is debt finance favored?
19
![Page 20: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Julkinen
III.1 Problems in Nordic liberalizations
• Bad timing, espec. for Sweden and Finland – big steps were taken in 1985-86, when business cycle suddenly
turned upward.
– Collapse of OPEC cartel -> lower oil prices. (Norway)
• A boom developed in Sweden and Finland. – It turned into a systemic banking, currency and economic
crisis at the start of 1990’s. • Collapse of Soviet Union was a big shock for Finnish exports.
• Norway experienced only a banking crisis.
• Denmark had banking problems but no systemic crisis.
• Other problems: – Narrow focus on executing the acts of liberalization was
insufficient.
– There was little aid to markets, firms, households and banks in adjustment toward competition with flexible prices.
20
![Page 21: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Julkinen
• Problems continued: – Very little realization that liberalization to market-based finance
implied increased risks.
• Risk management viewpoint became important for banks.
• No reform of financial regulation: – Not only compliance regulations,
– risk assessments and systemic viewpoint were missing.
• Macroeconomics: – The fixed exchange rate systems came under pressure.
– Nordics moved to floating of Forex rates in 1992 and adoption of inflation targeting.
21
![Page 22: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Julkinen
III.2 Lessons
• Dangers from lack of financial knowledge
– Traditional way of thinking becomes a trap.
– This reform is much more than technical adjustments.
A cautious and gradual approach is probably better than
a ’big bang’.
Important to time well acts of liberalization:
To avoid pro-cyclicality.
Strengthen capital ratios of banks well before.
Reform the supervisory system in advance.
22
![Page 23: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Julkinen
• Macroeconomic aspects: – Reforms for the taxation system.
– Make exchange rate flexible before opening capital movements.
• Liberalization has long-run benefits for growth and development. – But there are limits. A fully laissez faire financial system is likely
to be unstable.
• In case a financial crisis emerges:
– Take swift action to maintain stability and confidence of the banking system.
– Contain moral hazard when dealing with banking crisis.
23
![Page 24: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Julkinen
IV. Managing the Nordic financial crises
• At the start of 1990’s the boom turned into systemic
banking, currency and economic crisis.
– Denmark had banking problems but no systemic
crisis.
– Norway experienced only a banking crisis.
– Finalnd experienced a big shock in exports which
deepened the crisis.
• Financial crises (see slides):
– Big declines in real estate and share prices.
– Bank lending turned negative after rapid growth.
– Loan losses and negative operating profits for banks
24
![Page 25: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Julkinen
0
50
100
150
200
1980 1985 1990 1995
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Index, 1980 = 100
Nominal house prices deflated using the consumer price index.
Sources: Statistics Finland, Statistics Sweden, Norges Bank, StatisticsNorway and Bank of Finland. 25125@Chart4_2 (en)
Real house prices
25
![Page 26: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Julkinen
0,5
5
50
1980 1985 1990 1995
Finland Sweden Norway Denmark
Index 1985 = 1, log scale
Nominal share prices deflated using the consumer price index.
Sources: IMF, ECB and Bank of Finland.25125@Chart5 (en)
Real share prices
26
![Page 27: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Julkinen
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Finland Sweden Norway
%
Sources: OECD and Bank of Finland.
Figure 6. Lending growth
27
![Page 28: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Julkinen 28
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Finland Denmark Norway Sweden
% of average total assets
Source: National central banks.
23631
Nordic banks' loan losses
![Page 29: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Julkinen 29
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Finland Denmark Norway Sweden
Source: National central banks.
Nordic banks' operating profits
% of average total assets
![Page 30: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Julkinen
IV.1 Crisis management
• Finland
– 1st measure: Bank of Finland took control of Skopbank in
September 1991.
– Government set up the crisis management agency.
– Public support: preferred capital certificates to banks, with
strict requirements.
– Policy-makers made promises to guarantee banks’
obligations, also further public support.
– Support to be converted into shares if not repaid.
30
![Page 31: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Julkinen
• Finland (continued)
– Banks became profitable again in 1996
– Improved efficiency (staff was halved, etc.)
– Major restructuring of banking system:
• savings banks largely disappeared,
• one big commercial bank was merged to another.
– Nowadays 60 percent of banks owned by foreigners
=> Biggest part of the crisis was in the Savings Banks
system.
31
![Page 32: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Julkinen
• Sweden
– Crisis erupted in autumn 1991 with Första
Sparbanken; government gave a loan and FS merged
with other savings banks.
– Nordbanken (3rd largest comm. bank) was 71% govt
owned and had to be recapitalized.
– Many banks made heavy credit losses.
– In autumn 1992 blanket creditor guarantee by
government.
– Crisis resolution agency set up, public support with
strict criteria in risk reduction and efficiency.
32
![Page 33: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Julkinen
• Sweden (continued)
– Some banks did not need public support.
In the end nearly all support went into two banks,
Gotabanken and Nordeabank.
- Nordeabank became a pan-Nordic bank ”Nordea”.
33
![Page 34: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Julkinen
• Norway
– Crisis erupted in autumn 1988.
– Initially private guarantee funds provided support and
bank mergers took place.
– In late 1990 private funds were exhausted, so
government guarantee funds set up in early 1991.
– Support had to be converted into solvency support.
– In autumn 1991 capital support needed.
– In Spring 1992 several banks, incl. three biggest
commercial banks were nationalized
34
![Page 35: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Julkinen
• Norway (continued):
– no blanket guarantee by government, but specific
announcements about securing depositors and
creditors.
– Banks situation started to improved in 1993.
– One of nationalized banks was sold in 1995 and two
other banks were sold later.
– Government still owns over 30 percent of one bank.
=> In the end the Norwegian tax payer made money out
of the crisis (not so in Finland and Sweden).
35
![Page 36: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Julkinen
Gross cost Net cost
Finland 9.0 (% of 1997
GDP)
5.3 (% of 1997
GDP)
Norway 2.0 (% of 1997
GDP),
3.4 (present
value , % of
2001 GDP)
-0.4 (present
value, % of
2001 GDP)
Sweden 3.6 (% of 1997
GDP)
0.2 (% of 1997
GDP)
36
![Page 37: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Julkinen
IV.2 Lessons
Prevention of major crisis is the first priority.
stability-oriented macro policies
• How to diagnose an overheating situation?
– rapid credit expansion
– strong increase in leverage
– big external deficits in open economies
Political-economy reasons can be a major obstacle in
crisis prevention.
37
![Page 38: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Julkinen
• Crisis management:
– Maintaining confidence in banking system is crucial.
– Broad political support; political guarantees to banks’
obligations in Finland and Sweden but not in Norway.
• Role of central banks:
– Liquidity support in Norway and Sweden.
– Bank of Finland had to take over a problem bank.
38
![Page 39: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Julkinen
Crisis resolution agencies in all three countries - Administrative separation from central bank and ministry of
finance,
- capital injections to banks,
- guiding the restructuring of the banking system,
- Treatment of ”old shareholders” was mixed.
• Asset management companies (”bad banks”) to deal
with non-performing assets
– Norway: banks had their own bad banks,
– Finland and Sweden had public agencies.
=> Nordic practices in crisis resolution have been
praised afterwards.
39
![Page 40: the 1980’s in the](https://reader031.vdocuments.net/reader031/viewer/2022021109/6205c7411207151e1d27848e/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Julkinen
Thank you !
For more detailed discussion see:
• Honkapohja, S., 2014. Lessons from the Financial
Liberalization in the Nordic Countries in the 1980s,
in Woo, W.T., Pan, Y. , Sachs, J., Qian, J. (Eds.),
Financial Systems at the Crossroads, World
Scientific Publishing, Singapore, pp.135-163.
• Honkapohja, S. 2014. Financial Crises: Lessons
from the Nordic Experience, Journal of Financial
Stability, forthcoming.
40