passing the town of Changdan onthe north bank of the Irnjin Riverand the bridges across that stream.The main battle position thencrossed to the south bank of theImjin, which it followed to the con-flux of that river and the Hanbefore shifting to the Han's southbank and continuing westward.The 5th Marines occupied theground north of the Imjin, organiz-ing strongpoints that in effect func-tioned as an outpost line for therest of the division. The 7thMarines dug in south of the Imjinand the 1st Marines provided areserve. The South Korean Marinesformed the left of the line, south ofthe Imjin and along the Han.

From the end of the 72-hourperiod until the 45-day deadline of13 September, the infantry compa-nies north of the Imjin sent outeach day work parties of from 25to 100 men to finish the salvageeffort begun immediately after theceasefire took effect. By the timethe task ended, the 5th Marineshad retrieved some 12 tons of mis-cellaneous equipment, 2,000 milesof telephone line, 2,850 rolls ofbarbed wire and 340 of concertinawire, 19,000 pickets for use withthe wire, 339,000 sand bags, and150,000 linear feet of timber. Mostof the salvaged items were incor-porated on the positions beingbuilt by the regiment to defend thebulge north of the Irnjin.

Maintaining Order in theDemifitarized Zone

At the outset of its salvage oper-ation, the 5th Marines marked theadjacent portion of the Demilita-rized Zone and began controllingaccess to it. After constructing a so-called No-Pass Fence some 200yards south of the near edge of theDemilitarized Zone, the regimentmarked the fence with warningsigns, engineer tape, and panels

of the line of demarcation.

visible from the air. Next, the 5thMarines established 21 crossingstations into the DemilitarizedZone, each one manned by at leasttwo Marines who denied access toanyone carrying weapons or lack-ing authorization. As the work ofsalvaging material drew to a close,the regiment closed the crossingstations it no longer needed.

Each person entering theDemilitarized Zone through thearea held by the 5th Marines hadto show a pass issued by the regi-

590

ment. The salvage operation gen-erated heavy traffic, especially inits earlier stages; indeed, vehiclespassed through the crossing sta-tions more than 3,500 times. After13 September, when the salvageproject ended, I Corps assumedresponsibility for issuing passes.

Controlling access through itslines to the Demilitarized Zone andmaintaining order there becamecontinuing missions of the 1stMarine Division. The ceasefire

(Continued on page 596)

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

Marine Sgt RichardJ. Thompson checks in on his radio at one of the checkpointsthroughout the 1st Marine Division 'sfront while patrolling the buffer zone south

The Prisoners Return

Processing the Freed Prisoners

Besides helping evacuate the sick or wounded, Marinehelicopters played the principal role in an airlift designedto placate President Rhee. who believed that India's refus,lIto send troops to help defend his nation demonstrated sup-port fur North Korea and China. The United States soughtro ensure his cooperation with Big Switch by promising tl1:11no Indian troops would set fOOL on SOUlh Korean soil. As aresult. the Indian contingent involved in taking custody ofthe prisoners who refused repatriation flew by helicopterfrom ship~ anchored in Inchon harbor to :l calllp in theDemilitarized Zone.

Like the earlier exchange of sick and wounded prison-ers, Operation Litue Switch, the process of repatriationfollowing the ceaseflrc took place within the sectorheld by the 1st Marine Division. Because the finalexchange, appropriately named Big Switch, involved morethan 10 times the number repatriated earlier, the medicalfacilities L1!'ed in April could not rneet the new challenge. Alarge Anl1Y warehouse at MUllsan-ni, converted into a hos-pital by Marine engineers, replaced the old treatment cen-ter. A newly created administrative agency, the MUllsan-niProvisional Command, assumed overall responsibility forBig SWitch, with the 1st Marine Division carrying out theactual processing.

When Operation Big Switch got undenvay on 5 August,a Marine receipt and comrol section, functioning as pal1 ofthe provisional command, accepted the first group of pris-oners at Panmunjom. checked them against the names ona roster the captors had submitted, and began sending themsouth along the Panmunjom Corridor. Returnees not inneed of imrnecliate medical care hoarded ambulances forthe drive to the Freedom Village complex at Munsan-ni.Those requiring prompt or extensive care were flown 1OFreedom Village in Marine helicopters; the 1110st seriouscases were then rushed either fO hospital ships off Inchonor directly to hospitals in Japan.

Ambulances canyi1lB sick and wOllnded United Natiollsprisoners of war arrive at Freedom Village. 71Je seriolisly

At Freedom Village-Soulh Korea operated a LibertyVillage for its returnees-the newly freed prisoners under-went a medical evaluation, brought their recorclti up Ladate, receivecl ne\v uniforms, lllail, newspapers, and maga-Zines, and ate :l light meal. The steak that many or themcraved would have shocked weakened digestive sy:;temsand had to waiL umil they had readjusted to American farc.Those former caplives judged healthy enough could meetwith repoI1ers at Freedom Village and answer questionsabout their experience~. After a brief period of recupem-lion, the former pri:,oners embarked for the United States.

injured were transferred directly to bospilal ships at Inchonor air-evacuated 10 japan.

DCP:lllOlClll of Ikren'>t' Photo (lS\IC) AI""·lj""Sr-----------------------------..-----~--'---- ..~.,J

591

... --. .

N;uional Ar

NOl1h Korean or Chinese. South Koreans, both soldiers andMarines, totaled 7,862, and those repatriated to other coun-tries in the United Nations cmdilion numbered 4,91). 3.597of them Americans. including 197 Marines.

Although the overwhelming majorily of prisoners agreed(0 repatriation, more than 22,000 did not, entrusting thelll-sclvc:'i to the custody of the Indian troops overseeing theprocess on behalf of the five officially neutral nations. TheIndi~l1ls released 22,467 former prisoners; two-thirds of themChinese, after a final attempt at persuasion allowed by thearmistice agreement was made. Most of the Chinese wereveterans of the Nationalist forces, who had been capturedon the mainland and impressed into the service of thePeople's Republic. Once released. these veterans joined theNationalists who had ned the mainland and establishedthemselves on Taiwan and its satellite isles. The NorthKoreans disappeared into the populace of the South.

A IOtaI of 357 United Nations troops refused repatriation,333 of them South Korean. Only 23 Americans-none ofthem a Marine--ehose to Slay behind, along with one Britishserviceman, a Royal Marine. Two of the American soldiers,swayed by the final effon' at persuasion, changed theirminds at the last minute. Over the years. another 12 recon-sidered their decision and returned to the United States.

JlIajGen Vernon E. Megee. cente1; Commanding General,lsI Marille AircraJi l\'Iillg, in/roc/uces former prisoner oflI'CII; CajJ/ Geralc/ Fink, 10 MajGe" Randolpb McC. Pale,

Behind Barbed Wire

As had happened in previous wars, Americans capturedin Korea endured mistreatment from their captors, whetherinflicted deliberately or (he result of callousness. In (his war.unlike the earlier ones, prisoners served as pawns in an ide-ological contest in which the Chinese and North Koreanstried to convert them to Communi,')m or, failing that, toforce them to make statements that would further theCommunist cause in its world-wide ,')truggle against capital-ism. The methods of conversion or coercion varied fromunceasing lectures extolling Communism 10 threats and tor-ture, with the harshest treatment meted out for acts of resis-tance. By using these techniques. the prison staffs sought avariety of objectives that included maintaining order, per-suading prisoners to embrace Communism, obtaining mili-tary information, or cxtoning confessions (0 alleged warcrimes. statement,; designed to (Urn worldwide public opin-ion against the United States. By 1952. the enemy wasfocusing in p::uticular on forcing captured fliers of ~1I1 theServices to confess to pat1icip~lling in germ warfare.

The vigor of the persuasion or punishment variedaccording to (he camp. the whim of the guards, or lhe pol-icy of the moment. In July 1951, for example, the Chinese,

Commanding General, 1st Jl1arinf! Di£lision, at FreedomVillage.

Department of Ddl..:n~ Photo (US~lCl A 17'1180

593

Department of Dekn!'oe PhOlo (l'S\) 62-09tUaline prisoner oj /I.'ar 1stLt Richard Bell is dusted ll'itbDDT pr;or/O bis departur" Jor/ucbon. Dlistiug lcilb DDTwas mandatmyJor all Afarines leadng Korea Jor tbe UnitedStates.

who had assumed custody of the pri!'toners, announced apolicy of leniency that offered organized athletic competi-tion :t1TIong the prisoners and promised better treatment inreturn for cooperation. The new policy aimed at winningover world opinion while converting ~rL~ctionariesw---thoseprisoners who resisted ind(Ktrinalion-imo ~progressives,'"\V ho did not.

The m~'\\ leniency did not apply to Lieutenant Colonel\X7illiam G. Thrash, an arch-reactionary. Accused of"Criminal Acts and Hostile Attitude." he spent eight monthsin solitary confinement. In January 1952. he was beaten,dragged outside. and exposed overnight to the deadly cold.an ordeal that nearly killed him.

To facilitate the indoctrination of the prisoners. a proce.5!'tthat came to be called brainwashing. the enemy tried toshatter the chain-of-command. He separated officer~ fromenlisted men and tried 10 place progre.ssives in place!'t ofleader>hip. The reactionaries fought back by creating a net-work of their own [Q fru~tratt: the Chinese tactics by retitor-ing military discipline.

Lieulenant Colonel Thrash of Ihe 1st '\1~lrine Aircr"J.ftWing and Major John 'I. McLaughlin of the 1st i-IarineDivbion proved e,o,pccially ~ucce.s~flll in creating o,olidarityalllong the prisoners. After reco\'ering frolll the effects ofhis confinement, Thrash stirred up resistance 10 the indoc-trination effon and to a related aLLcmpt to encourage thewriting of leLLers that might serve at-; Chinese propaganda,lie abo warned that interrogators would try to pressureaccused rcactionarie.s into implicating feJlo\v prio,oners whoshared reactionary views. ~lcLaughlin created a chain-of-command using five \'etehln .\Iarine C()rp~ noncommis-sioned officer> and. like ·nuash. helped form the escapecOffilnillees that lOok shape shonl)" before the armistice.

Resistance to the Chinese might be passive. essentiallyan inlernal rejection of Communisl attempb ~11 indoctrina-tion, or active, with a range of aClions lhat varied frolll sym-bolic to practical 10 defiant. Symbolic gestures included :1celebration of the Marine Corps birthday on III i':Q\·ember1952. featuring a cake made frol11 eggs, sugar. and flourstolen from the hinese. A 22-il1ch crucifh. carved byCaptain Gerald Fink with improvised tools and gi\'en Ihetitle -Christ in Barbed \\'ire"· symbolized both hope andresistance. Captain Fink also fashioned practical imple-ments, an altificial leg for an Air Force officer, ~IajorThomas D. llarrison. injured when his plane was shotdown, and crude stethoscopes for the medical personnelamong the prboner~.

Captain Fink's handiwork aiso played a part in an effort10 keep tr

ing 10 obtain food. After one unsuccessful u)', puni,hed asusual by 3 period of solitary confinement, First LieutenantRobert J. Gillelte, accompanied for a time by a Soutb Africanpilot, MICceeded in remaining at large for 10 dars.Lieutenant Colonel Thmsh and ,\Iajor l\lcLaughlin. together\\itb Fif't Lieutenant Richard Bell, gOI beyond the barbed\\ ire, only to be cornered and forced to try to sneak hackinto Ihe compound; Bell. ho\\ever. was caughl and pun-ished with :-io!itary confinemenL Captain f\.lanelli. who wasreported killed but liter-Illy returned from Ihe dead as aresult of Big Switch. escaped and evaded reGlplUre for 10days. The nnal auempt, the product of one of the recenllyformed escape commillees, look place on 1 .July 1953, bUIthe e:'icapees remained at large for only a ~hon time. W'ilh ;1cea~efire. and presumably an exchange of pri:-.oner~. elm\\"-ing nearer, ct-.eape planning was .suspended.

On rare occasions, special circumstances enabled cap-tured f\larines to escape and rejoin the L'nilcu "at ionsforces. In August 1950. Private FiN Class Richard E. Barnell,

driving a jeep. took a \\ rong turn and """ caplured by'orth Korean soldie"" \\ ho confined him in a cellar. When

his Glptor, look lum along on a night attack. he managed10 lag behind, threw a rock to distmct the guard nearesthim, and holted into the darkness. He avoided recaptureand rejoined his embanled unit before it had reported himmissing.

Other successful escapc.::~ took place in May 195 I. On the15lh, four days after Iheir caplure. Corporal Ilaroid L. Kiddand Private First Class Richard R. Grindlt:, both fromCompany 13, 1st Battalion, 7th brines, made their way toUnited "ations lines. L1ter that momh, a group of 18Marinc~ and an Army interpreter as.,,>igned to the bt larineDh-ision were forced to join Chinese troops near the 38thI'amllel. As the prisone", approached the frontlines. theArmy interpreter. Corporal Saburo ShimamurJ, reponed 10the senior ,\Iarine, FiN Lieutenanl Fmnk E. Cold Ihal theircaplOfS planned (Q rclea.,e Ihem near Marine line~. TheChinese i"isued safe-conduct pa'ises, lending credence to therepol1, but rather than wait to see if the Chinese would doas Lhey :;aid, lhe group took adv~lntage of the distractioncaw'ied by United Nations artillelY registering nearby andned into Ihe hills. They evaded Ihe patrols looking for them;spread out improvised signal panels, and caught the atten-tion of an aerial observer who reported their location. On2) J\lay, the day after their escape, two AmlY tank~ clatteredup to the men and eM:orted them ro the neareM UniteclNalions posilion.

In the spring of 1951. Ihe enemy aClually did release twoprboner~. presumably as an ovenure to the poliq of lenien-g' announced shortly aflerw"rd. Wh"le\'er the reason.Corpoml William S. Blair and Privale First Ckts.s Bernard W.Insco were turned loose ne~lr the frontlines. Caplured on 24April, they regained Iheir freedom on 12 ~Iay.

At times, G:lptured J\larines sought to invclll fictitiousstatcmclllS that would ease lhe pressure on them by creal-ing an illusion of coopemtion. Master Sergeant .lohn T. Cain,

an enli..,led pilot, had the mbfonune of being mbtaken fora .,enior officer because of hb age and miliulr) bearing. Ihusbecoming a prizt."

(Continued from page 590)agreement specified that each side,Communist and United Nations,maintain a force of 1,000 "civilpolice" to preserve the status ofthe demilitarized buffer. Since nocivilian law enforcement agenciesexisted to provide this manpower,troops had to function as police.For maintaining the security of theDemilitarized Zone along its por-tion of the main battle position, thedivision on 4 September activatedthe 1st Provisional De-militarizedZone Police Company, drawingmen from its infantry regiments.Attached to the 5th Marines, thepolice company, which initiallynumbered 104 men under CaptainSamuel G. Goich, took over thecrossing stations, manned observa-tion posts to monitor the demilita-rized Zone, and escorted membersof the Military Armistice

enter the zone. According to aMarine Corps journalist, the aver-age enlisted man assigned to thepolice company had to know"map reading on an officer level,first aid, radio, and understand thefine print of the ceasefire agree-ment like a striped-trouser diplo-mat."

Besides providing armed es-corts—usually one-half-dozenMarines carrying rifles and pis-tols—and staffing fixed observa-tion posts, the police companyoperated roving patrols. Travelingin radio-equipped jeeps thesegroups reported any unusual activ-ity in the Demilitarized Zone. Incase of a genuine emergency, aplatoon, standing by as a mobile

596

reserve, would respond.Marine Demilitarized Zone

police manning the observationposts monitored aerial activity aswell as events on the ground.Besides keeping a record of allflights, they made sure that lightreconnaissance planes had anappropriate clearance and thathelicopters operating in front ofthe 5th Marines also had obtainedpermission for each flight. Heli-copters responding to medicalemergencies need not obtain spe-cific approval from the groundcommander.

The truce specified that prison-ers of war who had refused repa-triation to North Korea and Chinawould enter the DemilitarizedZone, where their fellow country-men, joined by Polish and Czechmembers of the Neutral NationsSupervisory Commission, could try

Commission, the Joint ObservationTeams, and the Neutral NationsSupervisory Corn-mission alongwith other persons authorized to

to persuade them to return. TheCommunist persuasion teamsrequired escorts from the policecompany, which therefore had tohe tripled in size.

Main Battle Position

After the fighting ended, the 1stMarine Division formed the left ofthe line held by I Corps. TheCommonwealth Division dug in onthe right of the Marines then, in

succession, the 1st Republic ofKorea Division and the U.s. 7thInfantry Division. The Imjin Rivercontinued to challenge the abilityof the Marines to move men andcargo, perhaps to a greater degreethan before the armistice. A shal-lower and less defensible crescentof Marine-controlled ground laynorth of the stream, which separat-ed the supply center at Munsan-nifrom the lines manned by the 5thMarines and forced the division to

rely on bridges and fords to trans-port material and reinforcementsacross the Imjin. Because thesalient was more vulnerable thanbefore, the division would have toreact faster and in greater strengthto repulse any new attack there.

The main battle position beganat the No-Pass Fence, whichserved in effect as a trip wire towarn of an attack across theDemilitarized Zone, and consistedof successive lines of mutuallysupporting strongpoints, eachstronger than the one to its front,that extended from the near edgeof the Demilitarized Zone to thevicinity of the old Kansas andWyoming Lines. Indeed, whereverpossible, Marine engineers incor-porated portions of these two linesin the new battle position. North ofthe Imjin, the 5th Marines mannedthe equivalent of an outpost line ofresistance, in which firepowerfrom large numbers of automaticweapons took the place of man-power. Within the northern salient,Colonel Tschirgi, the regimentalcommander, placed the 3dBattalion on the right, the 1stBattalion in the center, and the 2dBattalion on the left. South of theImjin, the 7th Marines defendedthe right of the line, with the 1stRegiment of South Korean Marinesin the center and the 1st Marines,the division reserve, manning aseries of positions behind theSouth Koreans. The 11th Marinesemplaced its howitzers behind the7th Marines and prepared to fire ingeneral support of the division.

In October, however, a majorreshuffling took place south of theriver. The ongoing exchange ofprisoners—which brought to theDemilitarized Zone large numbersof North Koreans and Chinesewho had refused repatriation,along with their former comradeswho were trying to persuade thedefectors to return—raised the

Machine gunners stand-by with loaded belts as riflemen take positions on the for-ward line. When the "Black Alert" siren sounded, Marines did not know whetherit was "Jbr real," but truce or not, they were always ready.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A349038

597

Department of Defense Photc) (IJSMC) A365246

Ma/Gen Randolph McC. Pate breaks ground for a new Polished brass plaque, bearing a Marine Cops emblem andtuberculosis hospital donated and built by the 1st Marine the words "Built by the First Marine Division."Division. The completed hospital eventually bore a highly

specter of another South Koreanattempt to disrupt the settlement.To guard against this eventuality,troops from the reserve regiment,the 1st Marines, took over the sec-tor manned by South KoreanMarines.

Clearly, the strongpoints man-ned by the 5th Marines formed themost vulnerable portion of thenew battle position. The regimentheld a frontage of 36,000 yards,about three times the usual widthduring the Korean War. UnderColonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins,who assumed command on 2

August, the 5th Marines fortifiedhills that included wartimeOutposts Marilyn and Kate, alongwith Boulder City and the Hook.Behind this arc of mutually sup-porting strongpoints, the regimentestablished bridgehead positionsto protect the vital river crossings.

Maintaining an adequate supplyof ammunition to defend thesalient posed a problem becauseof the reliance on automaticweapons and the range at whichthey would have to open fire. Notonly did the large number ofmachine guns devour .30-caliber

598

ammunition faster than the usualmix of these weapons, rifles, andautomatic rifles, the gunners wouldhave to open fire sooner than nor-mal if they were to close the gapsbetween outposts. As a result, theamount of ammunition at the out-posts had to be increased and thereserve stocks moved forwardfrom regimental to battaliondumps. These changes, however,could not solve the problem ofdividing a finite supply of ammu-nition among the regiments andreplenishing the 5th Marines bybridges or ferries vulnerable to

Courtesy of Leatherneck MagazineMen of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, poke holes in afrozen clothing before stowing it in their sea bags for the trip backKorean stream and ignore the icy waters to scrub their to the States.

flood, ice, or—if the fighting re-sumeci—hostile fire.

The ceasef ire provided an op-portunity for training to hone thecutting edge of the Marine forces.Within the division, individualsand small units practiced theirskills, and all but two of theinfantry battalions took part inlanding exercises. Besides remain-

ing on alert in case the fightingresumed, Marine airmen alsotrained, sometimes in conjunctionwith Air Force squadrons. Theypracticed bombing and ground-controlled intercepts and support-ed an amphibious exercise atTokchok-to Island involving the 1stBattalion, 7th Marines.

The division, as part of the

599

Armed Forces Assistance to Koreaprogram, also undertook 51 build-ing projects—42 to them schools.As each school was completed itreceived kits containing instruc-tional supplies and athletic gear.These extras were made possiblesolely by the donations of 1stDivision Marines and matchingfunds from CARE, the Cooperative

Two Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine.s;show men of the U.S. Army's 24th Infantry Division theirnew positions near the Demilitarized Zone. The division 's

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A366243

attitude about returning to Korea from Japan was summedup by two disillusioned privates: 'Man, sixteen months inthis forsa ken place."

for American Remittances toEurope.

The post-armistice activityincluded athletics that provided abreak from training and routinehousekeeping. Athletic competi-tion took place among Marineunits and between organizationsand bases. Indeed, some Marinesstationed at Pyongtaek played onan Air Force softball team repre-senting that airfield.

Routine housekeeping contin-ued, however. Each day, for exam-ple, latrines had to be burned out,primarily to prevent disease but

also to eliminate foul odors. AMarine poured a quart or so ofgasoline into the privy, tossed in alighted match, and stepped out-side. Too much gasoline couldproduce spectacular results, asCorporal Lee Ballenger recalled. Abuddy of his grew impatient whena succession of matches seemed tofizzle, poured gasoline directlyfrom the can and was knockeddown by a blast that splintered thewooden structure. Luckily, theflame did nothing worse thansinge the Marine's hair and eye-brows.

600

The 1st Marine I)ivisionmanned its portion of the mainbattle position for almost twoyears after the ceasefire. GeneralPate, in command at the time ofthe truce, was succeeded by MajorGeneral Robert H. Pepper (12 May1954 to 22 July 1954), MajorGeneral Robert E. Hogahoom (23July 1954 to 17 January 1955), andMajor General Merrill B. Twining,who took over on 18 January 1955and would bring the divisionhome.

The first hint of the d.ivision'sredeployment came from the

White House when a reporter"blandly asked the President if hecould lend official credence to the'authoritative sources' announce-ment that the First Division wouldhe pulled out of Korea." Thereporter gained a "grinning admis-sion" from President Dwight D.Eisenhower that the Marines wouldhe moved in the near future.

When the news hit Korea, it wasgreeted with mixed enthusiasmand skepticism—every Marineknew that "in the near future"could mean months or years. Butsoon clippings sent by mothers,wives, and girl friends began toarrive, lending credibility to themove. Marines who had been warynow became convinced. However,there was little spontaneous rejoic-

ing; few celebrations or sayonaraparties were planned.

Soon there was a gradual switchfrom hours spent on training to thepacking and crating of gear. Mosttrucks, tanks, tents, clothing, andother "common" gear would stayin Korea, while all Marine Corps"peculiar" gear would accompanythe division to Camp Pendleton,California. Despite contemporarynewspaper reports to the contrary,there was no massive swapping oftroops from the 1st to the 3dMarine Division in Japan. The onlyexceptions were a Rocket Batteryand an Armored AmphibianCompany.

In mid-March 1955, the divisionturned its sector of the demarca-tion line over to the U.S. Army's

24th Infantry Division. EveryMarine hoped that lugging waterup steep, slimy hills, helmet baths,rations, sleeping bags, pot-bellystoves, long-handled skivves,parkas, DDT, and Mongolian "pisscutters" would become just memo-ries.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,now commanded by BrigadierGeneral Samuel S. Jack, beganwithdrawing some of its compo-nents from South Korea in June1956. The wing remained in theFar East, however. General Jackestablished his headquarters• atIwakuni Naval Air Station, Japan.Some of the wing's elementsmoved to Japan, but others contin-ued to operate from bases in SouthKorea.

The 7th Marines rode trucks to the Munsan-ni railhead landing teams, the 7th Marines followed the 5th Marines,where they wait to board trains for Inchon. Divided into which was the first Marine unit to arrive in Korea.

Courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

601

and rifle. They were homeward bound.

The War in Perspective

Marine participation in theKorean War began with the des-perate defense of the PusanPerimeter, continued when the 1stMarine Division spearheaded adaring amphibious assault atInchon, and, after the Chineseintervention forced the UnitedNations to withdraw from the YaluRiver to the vicinity of the 38thParallel, ended in static warfarefought along a battle line thatextended across the width of theKorean peninsula. A highly mobileamphibious assault force thusbecame tied to fixed positions, acondition that lasted from thespring of 1952 until the armistice inJuly of the following year. Indeed,

by January 1953, defense over-shadowed the offense, eventhough defensive operations re-quired frequent and often bloodycounterattacks to maintain thepositions held by the UnitedNations. The Chinese succeeded incapturing and holding several out-posts, but the 1st Marine Divisionclung tenaciously to its segment ofthe main line of resistance, helpingforce the enemy to agree to theceasefire, with provisions for theexchange of prisoners of war, thathad become the overridingAmerican objective of the war.

Before North Korea invaded theSouth, American strategy focusedon the defense of Western Europeagainst the Soviet Union and itssatellites. The aggression in Asia

602

presented an unexpected chal-lenge, which the Truman adminis-tration decided to meet, althoughnot at the expense of weakeningthe newly formed North AtlanticTreaty Organization. As a result,the United States fought a limitedwar in Korea, withholding nuclearweapons and relying with fewexceptions on the weapons ofWorld War II or improved versionsof them.

In Korea, the Marines used todeadly effect the weapons theyhad, whether old or improved,massing artillery, supplementingthe howitzers with rockets, andwhen necessary employing tanksas pillhoxes on the battle line, hutnew weapons lay just over thehorizon. The weight of the stan-dard infantry weapons of WorldWar IT—for example, the Ml rifleweighing 9.5 pounds, and theBrowning automatic rifle almosttwice as heavy—aroused interestin lighter, fully automatic weaponslike the sub-machine guns used byChinese infantry. A lightweightautomatic rifle, the M16, was there-fore developed hut did notbecome the standard weapon forMarine infantrymen until theVietnam War. Although the steelhelmet remained essentially un-changed since World War II, bodyarmor had undergone improve-ment because of experience inKorea, as had the original antitankrocket launcher or Bazooka.

Infantry tactics changed to meetthe evolving demands of the waron the ground. Fighting at night,especially patrol actions, receivedgreater emphasis, for instance.Also, by the time of the battles forBerlin, East Berlin, and BoulderCity in July 1953, the 1st MarineDivision was committed to adefense in depth, made up ofmutually supporting strongpoints,a principal followed in establishingthe post-armistice main battle line.

CoLirtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

Packed on board small landing craft like sardines, Marines were carried out towaiting Navy transports where they easily climb the cargo net with a full pack

The construction of the bunkers

Courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

('ol Raymond L. Murray, who commanded the 5th Marines during its first actionin Korea almost five years hefore greets the regiment's current commandingofficer, C'ol Robert H. Ruud, upon his arrival at San Diego, calfornia, in March1955.

and covered fighting positions thatmade up these strongpoints hadimproved greatly since the Marinestook over their segment of theJamestown Line in the spring of1952.

The most dramatic changes tookplace in aviation. The new jetfighters, which had barely seenaction against the enemy duringWorld War II, proved their worthin support of the 1st MarineDivision and also in aerial combat.Fourteen Marine pilots, flying air-craft of the 1st Marine AircraftWing downed 16 hostile airplanes,ranging from biplanes engaging innighttime harassment to modernjets. Eleven other Marine pilots,flying North American F-86 jetfighters in U.S. Air Force squad-rons, were credited with downing21 Chinese jet fighters. Moreover,the helicopter showed tremendouspotential in limited use during theKorean fighting; this potential,however, would not be realized

Marines of the 1st Division parade through downtown San was furnished the combat-clad veterans as they marched upDicgofi.llowing their return from Korea. A hero's welcome Broadway to Balboa Park.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

603

fully until the Vietnam conflict.Because the Korean War had

demonstrated the importance ofintegrated action between air andground components, the MarineCorps in January 1953 establishedthe 1st Provisional Air-GroundTask Force at Kaneohe in Hawaii.This unit, built around an infantryregiment and an aircraft group,stood ready for deploymentthroughout the Pacific.

In short, the Marine Corps hadresponded quickly and effectivelyto the peculiar demands of theKorean War without losing sight ofits amphibious mission and its roleas a force in readiness. To Marineeyes, the use of one of its amphibi-ous divisions in an extendedground campaign seem-ed anaberration, a misapplication of

resources, no matter how well thatdivision had fought. Because ofthis commitment to amphibiousoperations, the 1st Marine Divisionparticipated in landing exerciseswhenever possible during thecourse of the fighting, activity thatmay well have reminded theenemy of the abiding threat ofanother assault like the victory atInchon.

After the truce went into effect,amphibious training continued inthe Far East for the 1st MarineDivision, until its return of theUnited States. In. August 1953, asthe Demilitarized Zone took shape,the 3d Marine Division, teamedwith two aircraft groups, arrived inJapan. A program of amphibioustraining, which included regimen-tal landings at Iwo Jima and Ok-

inawa, got underway while the 3dMarine Division was based inJapan and continued after its rede-ployment to Okinawa.

The continued existence of aforce, normally one battalion,afloat with the Sixth Fleet in theMediterranean provided a furtherdemonstration of the abiding ori-entation of the Marine Corpstoward amphibious warfare. Since1949, a succession of battalionsdrawn from the 2d Marine Divisionat Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,had embarked with the Sixth Fleet.Clearly, the Korean fighting in1952 and 1953 had not convertedthe Marine Corps from amphibiousoperations to extended groundwarfare, from assault to attrition, oraffected its dedication to the air-ground team.

A Douglas F3D is hauled on board ship after being ferriedout by two amphibious trucks, as the 1st Marine AircraftWing transferred its headquarters and most of its aircraft

from Korea to Iwakuni, Japan, in June 1956. Postwar planscalled for the wing to occupy bases in both Korea andJapan.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A39563

604

About the AuthorBernard e. Nalty, a member of the Marine

Corps historical program from October 1956to September 1961, collaborated with Henry I.Shaw, Jr., and Edwin T. Turnbladh on CentralPacific Drive, a volume of the History of U S.Marine Corps Operations in World War II. He alsocompleted more than 14 short historical studies,some of which appeared in Leatherneck maga-zine or the Marine Corps Gazette. He joined thehistory office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961,transferred in 1964 to the Air Force history pro-gram, and retired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written

or edited a number of publications, includingBlacks in the Military: Essential Documents,Strength for the Fight: A History of BlackAmericans in the Military, The Vietnam War,Tigers Over Asia, Air Power and the Fight for KheSanh, and Winged Shield, Winged Sword: AHistory of the us. Air Force. In addition to con-tributing to this series on the Korean War by writ-ing Stalemate: US. Marines from Bunker Hill tothe Hook, he took part in the Marines in WorldWar II commemorative series, completing twopamphlets, Cape Gloucester: The Green Infernoand The Right to Fight: African-AmericanMarines in World War II.

ourcesTh I e, t account of op ra-

tion b Marin s during 1953th ir ral in e tabli hing thDemilitariz d Zone, and theire entual ithdra ... al fr m'outh orea app ars inOperal ion in We t Korea, vol-ume fi e f . . Marine CorpsOperation, in Korea, 1950-]953 ( a hingt n D.e.:IIi torical Divi ion, Head-quart r , arine Corp ,1972, by LtCol Pat Meid,

MCR, and Maj Jame M.Yingling, Me.

Th Marin Corps hi toricalprogram aloha dealt thor-oughly \i ith the treatmentreceived b arine held apri on r' far, their r actionto deprivation and ho tilpre ur, and their repatria-ti n. Jam ngu MacDonaldha mad exten, iv u ofiot rvi w: with former pri on-er in hi The Problem oj U. .Marine Corp Pri oner. of \.\Irarin Ko,. a, published by thHi tory and Mu eum Di-

i ion H adquart r.arin rp , in 19 8.

alter . Herme di cu eMarin orps op rations in hicontribution to the fficial hi -

tory of rm acU lty duringth Korean ar, Truce Tenland Fighting Front( ashington, D.e.: Office ofthe Chi f of Military History1966), a olum that d alwith n gotiati n a ... 11 afighting.

Martin Ru'", a artimMarine Corps infantryman ha

rinen the b t kno nandm t revealing memoir c ver-ing the final m nth of thfighting, T7Je La t Parallef: AMarine' War Journal ( eY rk: Rin hart, 19-7).

P ronal accounts by otherMarine appear in KoreanVignettes: Face oj War(Portland R: ArtworkPublica-tions, 1996), a compi-lation of narrati and pho-tograph' b 201 veteran fth Korean aI', pr par d bArthur i1son and ormanL. 'tickbin .

aluable in ight and fir, t-hand account ar al 0 a ail-abl in The Korean War: T7Je

ncertain ictory; TheConcluding olume oj an

ral Hi to f)' (e York:Har ourt Bra e Jo an vich,198) by Donald Kno ithadditional t t by IfredC pp 1.

605

illiam H, Jantzen, a palti -ipant in on f th fi rc ractions of 1953, 11'1 writt n ariveting acc unt of that fightin" Bad ight at RenoBlock" in the Mar 'h 199i, u f Leatherneck maga-zine.

The Marine Corps Gazelleha analyzed the ta tic. and1 , on, learn d of the Kor an

ar in thre e, peciall u fularti Ie,: Pet r Brae tru p',"Outpo t Warfar " (T mb r19-3) and "Back to thTr nche " (March 1955); and"Random ot s on Korea"( 0 mb r 19-5) by LtColRo . Batterton. AJ 0 of uwas th ~llti I by M, gt Paularokin, "Going I1m,' in thay 195- is.ue of

Leatherneck.Th p r' nal papers colI c-

tion of the Marin orp hi to-ry program ontains journal ,ph tograph', len rs, memoirs,and at lea t on acad micpap r, a ma t 1", th sL onoutpO"t warfare by a MarineMaj orman \1, Hi k. For

v nt of the year 1953, tIlmo t aluable f the, e item.

r the ubmi. i n bEldon D. 11 nand Gen

ern n E. Megee.

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