the afghan-pakistan war: casualties, the air war, and “win, hold, … · 2020. 4. 17. · traffic...

The Afghan-Pakistan War:Casualties, the Air War,and “Win, Hold, Build”

Anthony H. CordesmanArleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

May 15, 2009

1800 K Street, NWSuite 400

Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 1.202.775.3270Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Web:www.csis.org/burke/reports

2

Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan May 2003 to March 2009

GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.11.

3

Insurgent Attacks

Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009

4

A War Without Resources: USSpending

A War Without Resources: ISAF Troop Levels

6

Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014(Authorized Personnel)

Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230,Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp.33.

Security Summary: Jan-April 2008 vs.Jan-April 2009


8

UN Accessibility Map 2008

9

UN Sec Gen’s Assessment: March 2009• 2008 most violent year in Afghanistan since 2001, with 31 per cent more incidents than in 2007. • Second half of 2008 saw an average of 857 incidents per month, against 625 per month during the first six months. • M ild winter provided an environment for high levels of violence. Specifically, there were 42 per cent more incidents in

December 2008 than in December 2007, and 75 per cent more in January 2009 than in January 2008. • Two trends worsened: attempts by insurgents to destabilize previously stable areas and increased use by insurgents of

more sophisticated asymmetric attacks, with an increasing disregard for the lives of civilians. • These attacks included assassinations, intimidation, abductions, stand-off attacks, use of improvised explosive devices

and suicide attacks, increasingly targeted civil servants, religious scholars, the aid community and road construction projects.

• D i rect targeting of international aid organizations by insurgents continued. • I n s u rgents continued to expand their presence in previously stable areas. The north-western province of Badghis and

the neighbouring province of Faryab became a battleground through the winter, with a significant increase in insurgent action.

• I n c rease in insurgent presence severely hampered humanitarian and development efforts in previously accessible areas. Freedom of movement of unarmed civil servants was reduced by the intensified fighting and the increased campaign of intimidation and assassination.

• As of December 2008, 231 of the country’s approximately 400 districts continued to report near-total accessibility, while 10 were considered completely beyond the Government’s control and access to 165 remained difficult or problematic.

• W h i le the number of districts that are nearly or completely inaccessible to civil servants did not change significantly since 2007, about 30 districts are in danger of losing accessibility.

• T h e re are currently no indications that the security situation will improve before the summer of 2009.

Report by the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications forinternational peace and security, A/63/751–S/2009/135, March 10, 2009, pp. 4-5

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The Strategy: “Clear, Hold, Build”

In pursuit of the strategic goals, the U.S. and its Allies and partnersare pursuing a comprehensive COIN strategy that brings togethermilitary, diplomatic, and economic assets of the U.S. and theinternational community. The key elements of the COIN strategyare sometimes described as “clear, hold, and build” The objective ofthese elements is to:

•Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given areaor region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and thepopulation;

• Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom ofmovement within the given space; and,

• Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief andimplement reconstruction and development initiatives that willconnect the Afghan population to its government and build andsustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

MONTHLY CASUALTIES IN IRAQ AND

AFGHANISTAN: 2008

11

12

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan: First Six Monthsof 2007 versus 2008

(Killed)

UN Estimate, reported by AP, June 29, 2008

13

NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008

0

50

100

150

200

250

Jan07

Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul07

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan08

Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul08

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan09

Feb

ISAF/OEF Responsible Insurgent Responsible

Civilian Deaths• Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09),civilian deaths are down 9%

• Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 79% of civilian deaths

Civilian Casualty TrackingCell Formed in CJOCStandardizes process to

investigate incidents of reportedcivilian casualties

Year 2008214 CIVCAS Events

ISAF/OEF Responsible

ND*3%

CAS5%

Road Traffic

Accident16%

Indirect Fire14%

Direct Fire21%

ROE /Escalation of Force

41%

*ND = Negligent Discharge

Year 2008260 Civilian Deaths

ISAF/OEF Responsible

ND0%

CAS60%

ROE / EOF13%RTA

2%

Direct Fire7%

Indirect Fire18%

*ND = Negligent Discharge

Source: CJOC, CIVCAS Cell

Feb 08 level

-55%

Feb 09

Civilian Deaths

15

Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan


16Source: : NATO/ISAF, May 12, 2009

COMISAF on Civilian Casualties - III

17Source: : NATO/ISAF, May 12, 2009


18

COMISAF on Civilian Casualties - II

Source: : NATO/ISAF, May 12, 2009

19



20

NATO/ISAF on Casualties - I


21

NATO/ISAF on Casualties - II


22

NATO/ISAF on Casualties - III


23

NATO/ISAF on Casualties - IV


24

CFACC Air Activity Data forIraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009

Source: : NATO/ISAF and AFCENT (CAOC), May 12, 2009; As of April 30, 2009

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CFACC Close Air Support Sorties inIraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009


26

CFACC Close Air Support Sorties inIraq: 2004-2009


27

CFACC Close Air Support Sorties inAfghanistan: 2004-2009


28

Enabler Sorties in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009(Number of Sorties)


29

Airlift for Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009(Cargo and Passengers)(Cargo and Passengers)


30

Tanker Role in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009(Number of Sorties and Millions of Lbs. of Fuel)


31

Airdrops in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2009(Cargo in 1,000s of Lbs.)(Cargo in 1,000s of Lbs.)


32

Allied, Coalition, or US Munitions Dropped by Conflict/Operation (Tons of Munitions)

Source: : NATO/ISAF and AFCENT (CAOC), May 12, 2009, As of April 30, 2009

33

Allied, Coalition, or US Munitions Dropped by Conflict/Operation by Month (Tons of Munitions)

Source: : NATO/ISAF and AFCENT (CAOC), May 12, 20o9; As of April 30, 2009

34

AFCENT Munitions Drops OPERATIONS ENDURINGFREEDOM & IRAQI FREEDOM


35

Munitions Dropped in Afghanistan versus Iraq:First Six Months of 2008

(Bombs and Missiles)

New York Times, July 23, 2008, p. 1..

36

AFCENT Munitions Dropped 2004-2008 OPERATIONENDURING FREEDOM (Tons)


37

AFCENT Munitions Dropped 2004-2008 OPERATION IRAQIFREEDOM (Tons)


38

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences withUS/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009

Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009

39

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF AirStrikes: Acceptability & Blame

Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS Feb. 11, 2009

40

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attackson Coalition Forces are Justified : 2-2009


41

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll:Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09


42

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan PositiveRatings of Local Security: Feb 09


43

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experienceswith Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009


Civilians hurt by(Net 38%)

44

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with TalibanViolence by Province: 2009/2


Violence by Province: 2009/2Violence by Province: 2009/2

45

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Biggest Danger toAfghanistan : 2-2009

Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009 45

Afghanistan : 2-2009Afghanistan : 2-2009

Source: Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, ““Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS Feb. 11, 2009 Feb. 11, 2009

Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area inthe past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent reportcivilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either toU.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti- government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghangovernment forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number ofAfghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from apeak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent,expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’sprospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country,measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghangovernments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year,well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.

46

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Who Afghans MainlyBlame for Violence: 2007 vs. 2009-2


47

Rising Use of Fixed Wing Airpower: 2006-2008(Human rights Watch Estimate)

Human rights Watch, , “Troops in Contact, Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” September 2008, http://www.hrw.

Afghanistan CAS and Pounds of Munitions Dropped by Month

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Jan-0

6

Feb-0

6

Mar-06Apr-

06

May-06

Jun-0

6Ju

l-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-0

7

Feb-0

7

Mar-07Apr-

07

May-07

Jun-0

7Ju

l-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-0

8

Feb-0

8

Mar-08Apr-

08

May-08

Jun-0

8Ju

l-08

Month and Year

CAS

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

lbs

Mun

ition

s D

ropp

ed

CAS lbs Munitions Dropped

Graph created from data from Human Rights Watch Website, TROOPS IN CONTACT: Airstrikes & Civilian Deathsin Afghanistan, 9 October 2008, data available at: http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan_tic/index.html

49

Wing Airpower and Civilian Casualties: 2006-2008(Human rights Watch Estimate)

Human rights Watch, , “Troops in Contact, Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” September 2008, http://www.hrw.

Afghanistan CAS and Casualites by Month

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Jan-0

6

Feb-0

6

Mar-06Apr-

06

May-06Ju

n-06Ju

l-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06Ja

n-07

Feb-0

7

Mar-07Apr-

07

May-07

Jun-0

7Ju

l-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07Ja

n-08

Feb-0

8

Mar-08Apr-

08

May-08

Jun-0

8Ju

l-08

Month and Year

CAS

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Cas

ualti

es

CAS Casualties

Graph created from data from Human Rights Watch Website, TROOPS IN CONTACT: Airstrikes & Civilian Deathsin Afghanistan, 9 October 2008, data available at: http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan_tic/index.html

51

Air Attacks: Human Rights WatchRecommendations

Source: Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/14/afghanistan-us-should-act-end-bombing-tragedies, May 14, 2009

Human Rights Watch urges the United States to:

* Take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian loss of life and property. Airstrikes on populatedvillages should be avoided. Area-effect weapons such as howitzers and other heavy artillery also shouldnot be used against targets in populated villages - their blast and fragmentation radius is so large thatthey have indiscriminate effects. * Refrain from using airstrikes in densely populated areas. * Make greater efforts to ensure that intelligence is highly reliable, and avoid reliance on singlesources of human intelligence. * Avoid carrying out airstrikes without an adequate Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE). * Use precision-guided, low-collateral-damage munitions whenever possible, especially on targets inpopulated areas. * End use of area-effect weapons such as 105mm howitzers against targets in densely populated areas. * Reduce reliance on Special Forces operations in civilian areas that are likely to result in "troops incontact" situations requiring close air support. * Reconsider the value of kill/capture operations against replaceable commanders when civilian lossis likely. * Provide accurate and timely information on civilian casualties in military operations in all cases. * Impartially, thoroughly, and transparently investigate all incidents of civilian casualties, takeresponsibility when warranted, and take appropriate disciplinary or criminal action. * Stop publicly claiming that Taliban use of "human shields" was responsible for civilian casualtieswhen untrue or unproven.

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