the ai causes and consequences

8/12/2019 The AI Causes and Consequences

1/32

The Arab-Israeli ConflictCauses and Consequences

Causes

1. Jewish vs Arab NationalismThe Arab-Israeli ConflictCauses and Consequences

Causes

1. Jewish vs Arab Nationalism

2. British decision to end mandate. !N role" #artition $lan%. Israel&s declaration of inde$endence'. Arab re(ection of the state of Israel). Israel&s control of the area*. +ise of #alestinian Nationalist movements

Consequences

1. #rotracted conflict, 1%/ 1')/ 1)*/ 1*2. Increased su$er$ower influence in 0iddle ast

. +ole of the #3%. 4rowth of e5treme 6rou$s'. Increase in $olitical activism and violence). 7ardliners on both sides*. 8low #eace #rocess.6. Cam$ 9avid Accords. !N o$erations in 0id ast3slo 0ediation. :ailure of 2;;; Cam$ 9avid

CA!88

1. J/ where anational identit> too= roots amon6 the Arabic-s$ea=in6 $o$ulations ofthe 3ttoman m$ire. B> -

fled6ed revolutionar> movement/ a revolt a6ainst the 3ttoman m$ire.


2/32

7owever/ it was onl> after education of >oun6 Arabs.

7owever/ Arabs had different identities and lo>alties to tribe/ sect/re6ion/ and reli6ion. / there was tension betweenIraqi/ 8>rian/ 6>$tian/ and other re6ional identities. There weredifferences in lan6ua6e and reli6ion also. Therefore it was hard to 6etsome form of unit>.

would be for6ed on the anvil of war a6ainst the common enem>.

#an-Arabism is a movement for unification amon6 the Arab $eo$les andnations of the 0iddle ast. It is sim$l> defined as the desire to for6e asin6le Arabian su$er state. #an-Arabism has tended to be secular andoften socialist/ and has stron6l> o$$osed colonialism and toward ?ionist aims in #alestine was a ma(orrall>in6 $oint for Arab nationalists. The movement found officiale5$ression after 1);s was the Baath $art>/ which was active in most Arabstates. 4amal Abdul Nasser of 6>$t/ who was not a Baathist/e5$ressed similar ideals of Arab unit> and socialism. The defeat of theArabs in the Arab-Israeli . 9ue to anti-semitism/ Jews have faced$ersecution and numerous massacres/ such as the slau6hter b> theCrusaders/ burnin6 at the 8ta=e durin6 the 8$anish Inquisition and inthe Nai 7olocaust. These actions have been made on several $rete5ts/such as social/ economic/ reli6ious or even national.

Alon6side these/ the> have been e5$elled from almost ever> uro$eancountr>. There came a need to have a land of their own/ a $lace where

no more $ersecution ta=es $lace D their 4od-6iven homeland/ Israel.


3/32

This area is =nown as the famous and of Israel. Accordin6 to the Bible/$articularl> in 4enesis/ the and of Israel was $romised as aneverlastin6 $ossession to the descendants of 7ebrew $atriarchsAbraham/ Isaac and Jacob b> 4od/ ma=in6 it the #romised and.

3n that da>/ 4od made a covenant with Abram/ sa>in6, ETo >ourdescendants I have 6iven this land/ from the river of 6>$t as far as the6reat river the u$hrates. The land of the Fenites/ Feniites/Fadmonites" the 7ittites/ #eriites/ +efaim" the morites/ Canaanites/4ir6ashites and Jebusites.E - 4enesis 1',1-21

?ionism also $romoted a reassertion of Jewish culture. An im$ortantelement in this reawa=enin6 was the revival of 7ebrew/ lon6 restrictedto litur6> and literature/ as a livin6 national lan6ua6e/ for use in6overnment and the militar>/ education and science/ the mar=et and thestreet.

9es$ite =nowled6e that #alestine @the and of Israel had an Arab$o$ulation/ few re6arded the Arab $resence as a real obstacle to thefulfillment of ?ionism. At that time in the late 1th centur>/ Arabnationalism did not >et e5ist in a stron6 form/ and the Arab $o$ulation of#alestine was s$arse. :riction between it and the returnin6 Jews wasbelieved to be easil> avoided.

Contraril>/ the renewed Jewish $resence in the and met with militantArab o$$osition. It was a clash between two $eo$les both re6ardin6 thecountr> as their own - the Jews b> virtue of their historical and s$iritualconnection/ and the Arabs because of their centuries-lon6 $resence inthe countr>.

7avin6 faced much re(ection and lon6in6 for a land where their $eo$leare free from $ersecutions as the> have e5$erienced before/ the Jewsnaturall> feel a stron6 nationalist emotion for Israel.

2. B+ITI87 9CI8I3N T3 N9 0AN9AT

9urin6 had been led to believe the Britishwould su$$ort a #alestinian state/ was shattered b> two events whichtoo= $lace in November 11*. In +ussia the Bolshevi=s seied $ower.The> bro=e off fi6htin6 the 4ermans and $ublished the 8>=es-#icotA6reement to show the tric=er> of the Im$erial +ussian 6overnmentsallies. The Arabs were furious when the> realised that the A6reement

had been made onl> a >ear after 0c0ahon had $romised Britishsu$$ort for their inde$endence.


4/32

s afterthe British :orei6n 8ecretar>/ Arthur Balfour/ wrote to ord +othsGchild/the leadin6 ?ionist in Britain,

:orei6n 3ffice November 2nd/ 11*.9ear ord +othschild/I have much $leasure in conve>in6 to >ou/ on behalf of 7is 0a(est>s4overnment/ the followin6 declaration of s>m$ath> with Jewish ?ionistas$irations which has been submitted to/ and a$$roved b>/ the Cabinet.E7is 0a(est>s 4overnment view with favour the establishment in#alestine of a national home for the Jewish $eo$le/ and will use theirbest endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this ob(ect/ it bein6clearl> understood that nothin6 shall be done which ma> $re(udice thecivil and reli6ious ri6hts of e5istin6 non-Jewish communities in#alestine/ or the ri6hts and $olitical status en(o>ed b> Jews in an> othercountr>.EI should be 6rateful if >ou would brin6 this declaration to the =nowled6eof the ?ionist :ederation.Hours sincerel>/Arthur James Balfour

This letter became =nown as the Balfour 9eclaration and was the basisof British $olic> towards the settlement of Jews in #alestine. As for the#alestinian Arabs who made u$ about 2 $er cent of the $o$uGlation/

all that the> 6ot was a $romise that the British would $rotect their civiland reli6ious ri6hts.The ?ionists saw the 9eclaration as a 6reen li6ht to set u$ a nationalhome in #alestine. To the Arabs/ it was another act of treacher>.

British 0andate of #alestine

The !nited Fin6dom was 6ranted control of #alestine b> the ersailles#eace Conference which established the ea6ue of Nations. 9urin6 coverin6most of the Arab 0iddle ast/ in e5chan6e for their su$$ortin6 theBritish" and Britain had $romised to create and foster a Jewish nationalhome as laid out in the Balfour 9eclaration/ 11*.

The 1* #eel +e$ort ar6ued for a further $artition of #alestine/se$aratin6 it into se$arate Arab and Jewish states. The 1


5/32

to de$ort interce$t ille6al immi6rants to their countries of ori6in/ notabl>4erman>. The 1%) 0orrison #lan advocated the se$aration of#alestine into two se$arate states for Jews and Arabs/ with Britishcontrol over =e> areas. This was re(ected/ and the !nited Nationsconvened on A$ril 2nd/ 1%* to determine #alestine&s fate. The !Nvoted for a se$aration of #alestine into two se$arate states/ with control6iven to Trans(ordan. The ?ionist-led Jews tentativel> a6reed to the$lan/ while the Arabs considered it unacce$table. This led to futureconflict in late 1%* and earl> 1% that $receded the


6/32

Commission the administration of #alestine durin6 the transitional$eriod/ and decided to terminate the British mandate of #alestine on0a> 1'th/ 1%. The failure of the British 6overnment and the !nitedNations to im$lement this $lan/ $rior a6reement between the JewishA6enc> and Fin6 Abdullah to divide #alestine between them/ andre(ection of the $lan b> the Arabs resulted in the 1% Arab-Israeli once =nown as #alestine was now divided into three $arts/each under se$arate $olitical control. The 8tate of Israel encom$assedover ** $ercent of the territor>. Jordan occu$ied ast Jerusalem andthe hill countr> of central #alestine @the $t too= controlof the coastal $lain around the cit> of 4aa @the 4aa 8tri$. The#alestinian Arab state envisioned b> the !N $artition $lan was neverestablished.

The res$onse b> #alestines nei6hbors was overwhelmin6l> ne6ative.Intent on $reventin6 an> Jewish entit> in the re6ion/ the> re(ected the$lan/ and in what was to be a $recursor to man> more wars/ the armiesof ebanon/ 8>ria/ Jordan/ 6>$t and Iraq invaded the new countr> withthe declared intent of destro>in6 it.

%. Israel&s declaration of inde$endence and Israel&s control of the areaand the stablishment of 8tate of Israel

The 9eclaration of Inde$endence of the 8tate of Israel was $ublicl>read in Tel Aviv on 0a> 1%/ 1%/ before the e5$iration of the British0andate of #alestine at midni6ht. The new state and its 6overnmentwas reco6nied de facto minutes later b> the !nited 8tates and threeda>s later de (ure b> the 8oviet !nion. It was/ however/ o$$osed b>

man> others/ $articularl> Arabs @both the surroundin6 Arab states andthe #alestinian Arabs/ who felt it was bein6 established at theire5$ense.

In 1';/ the Fnesset@le6islative branch of the Israeli 6overnment$assed the aw of +eturn which 6ranted all Jews the ri6ht to immi6rateto Israel. This/ to6ether with the influ5 of Jewish refu6ees from uro$eand the later flood of e5$elled Jews from Arab countries/ had the effectof creatin6 a lar6e and a$$arentl> $ermanent Jewish ma(orit> in Israel.:uthermore/ the Absentee #ro$ert> aw that was $assed in the same

>ear $rovided for confiscation of the $ro$ert> and land left behind b>de$artin6 #alestinians/ the so-called EabsenteesE. Arabs who never left


7/32

Israel/ and received citienshi$ after the war/ but sta>ed for a few da>sin a nearb> villa6e had their $ro$ert> confiscated. About ;/;;;-'/;;;#alestinians became E$resent absenteesE - $eo$le $resent at the timebut considered absent.

Jerusalem

After establishment/ Israel $roclaimed Jerusalem as its ca$ital in 1';and all the branches of Israeli 6overnment @#residential/ e6islative/Judicial and Administrative are seated in Jerusalem. In 1';/ 6iven thatthe cit> was divided between Israel and Jordan/ this $roclamationrelated onl> to western Jerusalem.7owever/ after the 8i5 9a> of Jerusalem/and ma=in6 it a de facto $art of its ca$ital. Israel enshrined the status ofunited Jerusalem/ west and east/ as its undivided ca$ital/ in Israels1; Basic aw, Jerusalem/ Ca$ital of Israel.

The Tem$le 0ount/ 6round ero in Jerusalem/ to Jews and someChristians /or Al-7aram As-8harif @the noble sanctuar> to Arabs and0uslims/ was the site of the first and second Jewish Tem$le inJerusalem. Accordin6 to Judaism/ it is to be the site of the third and finalTem$le to be rebuilt with the comin6 of the 0essiah. It is also the site oftwo ma(or 0uslim reli6ious shrines/ the 9ome of the +oc= and Al-Aqsa

0osque. It is the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest site inIslam

Treatment of Arabs @#alestinians in re6ionIsrael established a militar> administration to 6overn the #alestinianresidents of the occu$ied basic $olitical ri6hts andcivil liberties/ includin6 freedom of e5$ression/ freedom of the $ress andfreedom of $olitical association. #alestinian nationalism was

criminalied as a threat to Israeli securit>/ which meant that evendis$la>in6 the #alestinian national colours was a $unishable act. Allas$ects of #alestinian life were re6ulated/ and often severel> restrictedb> the Israeli militar> administration. :or e5am$le/ Israel forbade the6atherin6 wild th>me @atar/ a basic element of #alestinian cuisine.Israeli $olicies and $ractices in the institutions.7undreds of #alestinian $olitical activists have been de$orted to Jordanor ebanon/ tens of thousands of acres of #alestinian land have been

confiscated/ and thousands of trees have been u$rooted. 8ince 1)*/over ;;/;;; #alestinians have been im$risoned without trial/ and over


8/32

half a million have been tried in the Israeli militar> court s>stem. Tortureof #alestinian $risoners has been a common $ractice since at least1*1/ and doens of $eo$le have died in detention from abuse orne6lect. Israeli officials have claimed that harsh measures and hi6hrates of im$risonment are necessar> to thwart terrorism. Accordin6 toIsrael/ #alestinian terrorism includes all forms of o$$osition to theoccu$ation @includin6 non-violence.Israel has built hundreds of settlements and $ermitted hundreds ofthousands of its own Jewish citiens to move to the occu$ation of forei6n territor> onthe 6rounds that the Eoccu$iedE because the> were never $art of the soverei6n territor> ofan> state. Therefore/ accordin6 to this inter$retation/ Israel is not aforei6n Eoccu$ierE but a le6al EadministratorE of territor> whose statusremains to be determined. The international communit> has re(ected theIsraeli official $osition that the there. But littleeffort has been mounted to enforce international law or hold Israelaccountable for the numerous violations it has en6a6ed in since 1)*.

'. +I8 3: #A8TINIAN NATI3NAI8T 030NT8

A dis$la> of the Arabs resistance to the formation of the state would bethe 1% Arab-Israeli launched a three-da> $roteststri=es and insti6ated riots on the Jewish $o$ulation/ claimin6 the livesof )2 Jews. The violence/ however/ escalated as the da>s went b>. 3n Januar> 1%/ a$$ro5imatel> 1/;;; Arabs @mainl> #alestinian startedattac=in6 the Jewish communities in Northern #alestinian with the hel$from volunteers from nei6hbourin6 countries.

). A+AB +8I8TANC

Naturall>/ the Arabs were an6ered that a $art of their land was 6iven tothe Jews without bein6 informed beforehand. ven if the> wereinformed earlier/ the> would also be unha$$> about such a6reement.:irstl>/ both 6rou$s faced the $roblem of reli6ious differences. TheArabs were 0uslims and the Jews were Christians. Besides this/ man>Arab-#alestians became stateless @2Ed class citiens. :urthermore/Israeli settlements were seen as insults on #alestinian di6nit> and

freedom of movement. Not onl> that/ the> were also seen as a threat totheir ho$es for an inde$endent #alestinian nation. astl>/ the Israelis


9/32

too= most of the best areas for themselves and left the #alestinians withthe less desirable areas.

In reaction to these causes which were seen as unreasonable treatmentto them/ the> started an or6aniation also =nown as the #alestineiberation 3r6anisation @#3. The> use terrorism to tr> ma=in6 theJews afraid of them and thereb> 6ivin6 them bac= the land. :ore5am$le/ the Arabs used leftover British vehicles durin6 the war anddrive into Jewish-filled $laces and bomb $racticall> an>thin6 the> feelworth bombin6 li=e buildin6s/ $eo$le. 3ther than this t>$e of e5tremeactions/ the> also or6anie stri=es/ refuse to $a> ta5es and 6o a6ainstthe 6overnment thereb> causin6 civil unrest within the countr>. Thesituation was so bad that even the British and :rench found it hard tocontrol. 7owever it seems that the more the Arabs resist/ the more the>6et hurt. The Israelites were also unwillin6 to 6ive u$ the land for whichthe> fou6ht so hard to 6et.

In a situation with both $arties unwillin6 to 6ive u$ their own stru66leand ideals/ the> thou6ht b> fi6htin6 it out/ the> could resolve thin6s.7owever/ these onl> made the hatred more dee$ and casualties to bothsides.

C3N8K!NC8

1. #rotracted Conflict

not to beoffered Jerusalem. 3n the other hand/ the Arabs re(ected the $lanbelievin6 that the !N had acted under ?ionist $ressure.

vent3n November 1%*/ the !N 6eneral Assembl> voted to acce$t the $lanand within da>s/ militar> and 6uerilla conflicts eru$ted between smallJewish and Arab forces.


10/32

declared the foundin6 of the state of Israel. 8oon after/ nei6hborin6Arab countries includin6 6>$t/ 8>ria/ Trans(ordan/ ebanon/ 8audiArabia and Iraq invaded the new state.

The Israeli forces were seemin6l> fewer in stren6th but were bettertrained and or6anied. the other Arab states and Israel/former #alestine was divided into three $arts. Israel controlled **L of it/while ast Jerusalem and the $t.

b The 8ue Crisis @2 3ctober to ) November 1')

CausesAfter an arm> cou$ in 1'2 which overthrew the 6>$tian monarch>/4amal Abdul Nasser emer6ed as the countr>&s leader. Nasserintensified the cam$ai6n a6ainst Israel and at the same time/ wanted toend the remainin6 British influence in the 0iddle ast.

In Jul> 1')/ Nasser nationalied the 8ue Canal. The tolls that he canchar6e on the shi$s $assin6 throu6h the canal would be a valuablesource of revenue for 6>$t. Nasser also closed the canal andbloc=aded the 8traits of Tiran to Israeli shi$s/ a move which strainedrelations between 6>$t and Israel. 7e had also made enemies ofBritain and :rance who had ma(or economic and tradin6 interests in thecanal.

ventThe Israelis saw an o$$ortunit> to wea=en an over-$owerful and hostile

nei6hborin6 state. An a6reement was made under the table amon6Israel/ Britain and :rance. It was a6reed u$on that Israel would invade6>$t and that Britain and :rance would intervene and as= the Israeliand 6>$tian armies to withdraw from the canal one.0eanwhile/ the An6lo-:rench troo$s would then ta=e control of thecanal.

3n 2 3ctober/ 1')/ Israel invaded the 4aa 8tri$ and the 8inai#eninsula/ while advancin6 towards the canal one ra$idl>.As $reviousl> a6reed/ the British and :rench arm> offered to occu$> the

canal actin6 as a mediator/ which Nasser disa6reed. As such/ Britainand :rance launched a (oint invasion.


11/32

But before the invasion could be carried out/ !8A $ut $ressure onBritain and :rance to withdraw their forces from the canal/ fearin6 the$ossible escalation of the conflict after the 8oviet !nion threatened toenter the war on 6>$t&s side.

Consequences9urin6 the conflict/ Israel conquered both the 8inai #eninsula as well asthe 4aa 8tri$.

7owever/ in 0arch 1'*/ it was forced b> the !N to return to its$revious borders.Israel failed to win bac= its shi$$in6 ri6hts in the canal but mana6ed tore6ain the freedom to use the 8traits of Tiran.

Throu6h mani$ulation of the media/ 6>$tian #resident Nasser$ersuaded his $eo$le/ and other Arabs/ that 6>$t had won. The Canalwas more 6>$tian than before/ and he 6ained 6reat su$$ortthrou6hout the Arab world.

A demilitaried one was set u$ e5tendin6 from the 4aa to 8harm el-8hei=h/ $oliced b> !N forces.

c The 8i5 9a>


12/32

Inter$retin6 this as an act of a66ression/ Israeli #rime 0inister/ evish=ol be6an its offensive at *.%'am on ' June 1)* after bein6informed that the !8A would not intervene.

Israeli&s initiative started with a sur$rise attac= on the 6>$tian Air :orcewhich was the most modern and best-equi$$ed of the Arab air forces.The $oorl> defended 6>$tian air bases were bombed and in less thanthree hours/ the entire air force was virtuall> destro>ed. This 6rantedIsrael air su$eriorit> for the entire war.

The Israeli 9efense :orce @I9: then started movin6 into the 4aa 8tri$and the 8inai #eninsula. After a defeat of at Abu Awei6ila/ 6>$tiantroo$s retreated and the Israelis com$leted their conquest of the 8inai.

Nasser/ des$erate for hel$ from Jordan/ sent a messa6e to Fin67ussein on ' June in which he $retended that the 6>$tians werehavin6 the u$$er hand in the war. 7ussein then 6ave orders to attac=and the Jordanian arm> be6an firin6 at Israeli $ositions in Jerusalem. destro>ed the tin> Jordanianair force and soon/ conquered the ria was an air stri=e that destro>ed two thirds ofthe 8>rian air force and forced the remainin6 third to retreat to distant

bases. rian forcesbe6an to retreat and soon/ Israel controlled the 4olan 7ei6hts also.

!88+ worried for 8>ria/ a firm all> and sent a tele6ram to American#resident/ >ndon Johnson threatenin6 militar> action a6ainst Israeliunless the> ceased fi6htin6.

ConsequencesBoth the !8 and the !N ur6ed Israel to sto$ their advance fearin6 theescalation into a far more serious confrontation.

In 1;th June 1)*/ the Israeli ordered a ceasefire at ).;$m.

Israel emer6ed as a dominant Arab force in the re6ion/ defeatin6 acombined Arab force that was far more su$erior in wea$ons andequi$ment.

Israel anne5ed the 4aa 8tri$ and the 8inai #eninsula from 6>$t. Theria.

MThe 8i5-9a> with the lar6est #alestinian


13/32

$o$ulation, In round fi6ures/ %;;/;;; lived within its $re-1)* borders@the Israeli Arab minorit>/ and 1.1 million in the now-occu$ied territories-- );;/;;; in the deniens ofrefu6ee cam$s/ had fled durin6 the war and its immediate aftermath tothe ast Ban=/ *;/;;; in ast Jerusalem/ and ';/;;; in the 4aa8tri$. 3f the );/;;; now lived in cam$s" inthe 4aa 8tri$/ some 21;/;;; had refu6ee status/ 1*;/;;; of them incam$s. The traumatic demolition of the status quo reawa=ened#alestinian identit> and quic=ened nationalist as$irations in theconquered territories and in the Arab states.

The !N also $assed +esolution 2%2 on Nov 22 which called for thewithdrawal of Israel from the occu$ied re6ions. 7owever/ the Arabsbecame u$set at the increasin6 lac= of enforcement of the +esolutionfrom the !8A and the !N.

d Hom Fi$$ur @) 3ctober to 22 3ctober 1*

CausesAfter the death of Nasser/ the 6>$tian leadershi$ was handed over toAnwar 8adat/ who sou6ht 6enuine $eaceful relations with Israel. In:ebruar> 1*1/ 8adat announced that if Israel $artiall> withdrew theirforces from the 8inai/ 6>$t would reo$en the 8ue Canal and si6n a$eace a6reement with Israel.

Israel&s new #rime 0inister/ 4olda 0eir/ refused the 6>$tian offerdes$ite $ressure from the Americans to acce$t. Israel now receivin6 !8militar> aid/ felt itself in a su$erior $osition to 6>$t.

Israel then started to im$lement resettlement $olicies in the 8inai andhad $lans to build a 0editerranean #ort near in 8inai.This worried 8adat and he felt that the onl> wa> to recover the territor>was to sta6e an attac= on 6>$t.

vent3n ) 3ctober 1*/ 6>$t and 8>ria launched a (oint invasion of Israel.The> chose the da> deliberatel> as it was Hom Fi$$ur/ or the da> ofAtonement/ the holiest da> in the Jewish calendar. The Israelis werecau6ht com$letel> off 6uard and soon the forces mannin6 the out$ostsof the canal were destro>ed.s/ the 6>$tians had successfull> recovered the westernban= of the 8inai #eninsula.

Israeli&s forces in the north were also outnumbered b> 8>rian tan=s and

artiller>. The arrival of the Israeli reserve forces in the nic= of timemana6ed to $revent the 8>rian&s ca$ture of the 4olan 7ei6hts. 8oon/


14/32

Israel was bac= on the offensive advancin6 within artiller> ran6e of the8>rian ca$ital/ 9amascus.

mana6ed to cut off the 6>$tian su$$lies/ the>advanced with 6>$t and came to within 1;; =m of Cairo.

!nder $ressure from the !8A and !88+/ both sides a6reed to aceasefire on 22 3ctober 1*/ returnin6 to the $re-war borders.

ConsequencesAfter bein6 cau6ht so badl> off 6uard/ the Israeli forces mana6ed ara$id recover> and reca$tured nearl> all the territories.

7owever/ the war also shown the 6overnment&s lac= of $re$arednessand under-estimation of the enemies which led to the resi6nation of4olda 0eir and the 9efense 0inister/ 0oshe 9a>an.

e 3ther crises

i 1*; D clashes between 6>$t and Israel occurred intermittentl> fromthe end of the 8i5-8a> the 6>$tian arm> in 0arch 1)/

cou$led with Nassers renunciation of the !.N.-9ecreed cease-fire thatmar=ed the be6innin6 of the after therelocation of #alestinian armed elements from Jordan to ebanon OseeBlac= 8e$temberP. #alestinian commando o$erations a6ainst Israel andIsraeli re$risals a6ainst #alestinian bases in ebanon intensified. 3n 110arch 1*/ a commando attac= in Israel resulted in man> dead andwounded amon6 the Israeli $o$ulation" the #alestine iberation3r6aniation @#3 claimed res$onsibilit> for that raid. In res$onse/Israeli forces invaded ebanon on the ni6ht of 1%Q1' 0arch O1*P/ and

in a few da>s occu$ied the entire southern $art of the countr> e5ce$t forthe cit> of T>re and its surroundin6 area.


15/32

3n 1' 0arch 1*/ the ebanese 4overnment submitted a stron6$rotest to the O!.N.P 8ecurit> Council a6ainst the Israeli invasion/ statin6that it had no connection with the #alestinian commando o$eration. 3n1 0arch O1*P/ the Council ado$ted resolutions %2' @1* and %2)@1*/ in which it called u$on Israel immediatel> to cease its militar>action and withdraw its forces from all ebanese territor>. It alsodecided on the immediate establishment of the !nited Nations Interim:orce in ebanon @!NI:I. The first !NI:I troo$s arrived in the areaon 2 0arch 1*.

This war had a hu6e im$act on the #3 and the #3 militar>infrastructure in southern ebanon was destro>ed and was driven out ofBeirut. 7owever/ the #3 was not destro>ed or mortall> wounded/ asIsraeli 9efense 0inister 8haron and Israeli #rime 0inister Be6in hadho$ed and $lanned. Indeed/ it could well be ar6ued that the drubbin6the or6aniation received drove it/ in the end/ to moderate its $ositions/a $rocess that culminated in Arafats 1 declaration reco6niin6 Israeland re$udiatin6 terrorism. Thus/ instead of demolishin6 the #3...it canbe ar6ued that the invasion of ebanon had/ albeit ver> violentl>/6roomed the #3 for #artici$ation in the di$lomac> and $eace $rocessthat was to characterie the 1;s and was to $ave the wa> for itsassum$tion of authorit> in $arts of the tied to the formation of 7ebollah @#art>of 4od and the rise of this terrorist or6aniation.

2. +ole of #3

The #alestine iberation 3r6aniation @#3 is a broad national front/ oran umbrella or6aniation/ com$rised of numerous or6aniations of theresistance movement/ $olitical $arties/ $o$ular or6aniations/ andinde$endent $ersonalities and fi6ures from all sectors of life. The Arab8ummit in 1*% reco6nied the #3 as the Rsole and le6itimate

re$resentative of the #alestinian $eo$le& and since then the #3 hasre$resented #alestine at the !nited Nations/ the 0ovement of Non-Ali6ned Countries @NA0/ the 3r6aniation of the Islamic Conference@3IC/ and in man> other fora. In addition to its broad national and$olitical 6oals/ the #3 has dealt with numerous tas=s with re6ard tothe life of the #alestinian $eo$le in their main communities andthrou6hout the world throu6h the establishment of several institutions insuch realms as health/ education/ and social services. As such/ the#3 is more than a national liberation movement strivin6 to achieve thenational 6oals of the #alestinian $eo$le/ includin6 the establishment of

a #alestinian state with Jerusalem as its ca$ital.The #3&s belli6erent rhetoric was matched b> deeds. Terrorist attac=s


16/32

b> the 6rou$ 6rew more frequent. In 1)'/ ' raids were conducteda6ainst Israel. In 1))/ the number increased to %1. In (ust the first fourmonths of 1)*/ * attac=s were launched. The tar6ets were alwa>scivilians.

0ost of the attac=s involved #alestinian 6uerillas infiltratin6 Israel fromJordan/ the 4aa 8tri$/ and ebanon. The orders and lo6istical su$$ortfor the attac=s were comin6/ however/ from Cairo and 9amascus.6>$tian #resident Nasser&s main ob(ective was to harass the Israelis/but a secondar> one was to undermine Fin6 7ussein&s re6ime inJordan.

Fin6 7ussein viewed the #3 as both a direct and indirect threat to his$ower. 7ussein feared that the #3 mi6ht tr> to de$ose him withNasser&s hel$ or that the #3&s attac=s on Israel would $rovo=eretaliator> stri=es b> Israeli forces that could wea=en his authorit>. B>the be6innin6 of 1)*/ 7ussein had closed the #3&s offices inJerusalem/ arrested man> of the 6rou$&s members/ and withdrewreco6nition of the or6aniation. Nasser and his friends in the re6ionunleashed a torrent of criticism on 7ussein for betra>in6 the Arabcause. 7ussein would soon have the chance to redeem himself.

#olitical 7istor>i The #3 was established b> the Arab ea6ue in 1)% with Arab

su$$ort durin6 a summit in Cairo. At that time/ the #3 was headed b>0r. Ahmed Al-8hu=air> and/ since then/ has under6one si6nificantchan6es in its com$osition/ leadin6 bodies/ $olitical orientation/ andeven the locales of its headquarters. The leadin6 bodies of the #3 arethe #alestine National Council @#NC/ the Central Council/ and the5ecutive Committee. S In 1)/ the or6aniation witnessed thebe6innin6 of the en6a6ement of the :eda&i>een or6aniations @armedstru66le or6aniations/ $articularl> :ateh. In 1)/ Hasser Arafat/leader of :ateh/ became the Chairman of the 5ecutive Committee ofthe #3 and/ in 1*1/ he became the 4eneral Commander of the

#alestine :orces. 7is name has been s>non>mous with the #alestiniannational movement.

ii In the 1);s/ the #3s $rimar> base of o$erations was Jordan. In1*;-*1/ fi6htin6 with the Jordanian arm> drove the #3 leadershi$ outof the countr>/ forcin6 it to relocate to ebanon.


17/32

refused to ne6otiate with the #3/ ar6uin6 that it was nothin6 but aterrorist or6aniation/ and insisted on dealin6 onl> with Jordan or otherArab states. It re(ected the establishment of a #alestinian state/ insistin6that #alestinians should be incor$orated into the e5istin6 Arab states.This intransi6ence ended when Israeli re$resentatives entered intosecret ne6otiations with the #3/ which led to the 3slo 9eclaration of#rinci$les

iv The Arab defeat in the 1)* war enabled >oun6er/ more militant#alestinians to ta=e over the #3 and 6ain some inde$endence fromthe Arab re6imes.

v The #3 was 6ranted observer status b> the !N 4eneral Assembl>on 22nd November 1*%. In 1*)/ their status in the !N is furtherelevated to $artici$atin6 in the 8ecurit> Council debates but withoutvotin6 ri6hts. In numerous +esolutions b> the 4eneral Assembl> the#3 was declared the Esole le6itimate re$resentative of the #alestinian#eo$leE. This was also reco6nised b> Israel in the 3slo Accords from1. Thus/ the #3 $la>s an im$ortant $art in ne6otiations re6ardin6the #alestinian $eo$le.

8ince the establishment of the #alestinian National Authorit> @#NA andthe convenin6 of 6eneral elections in Januar> 1) in the 3ccu$ied#alestinian Territor>/ includin6 Jerusalem/ which were $receded b> the

return of most #alestinian leaders to their homeland/ the Authorit>&s roleand res$onsibilities continue to increase/ in some wa>s at the e5$enseof the #3. The #NA is the 6overnin6 bod> of the #alestinian urbancenters in the / as well as outside/ Islamic6rou$s remain outside the #3/ which traditionall> has not mi5edreli6ion and $olitics.

v In 6eneral/ the current #alestinian situation is constantl> chan6in6

and $ro6ressin6 towards the establishment of a state and the buildin6 ofa #alestinian democrac>. These chan6es will affect the #3/ but thereis no doubt that/ at least for some time/ the #3 will continue its role asa ver> im$ortant #alestinian structure for the #alestinian $eo$le in the3ccu$ied Territories/ in the refu6ee cam$s/ and throu6hout the world.

. 5tremist [email protected]. In its earl> >ears/ the #3 was one of these

:eda>een

This 6rou$ is made u$ of >oun6 male #alestinian refu6ees who became6uerilla fi6hters and raided Israel from bases in 4aa 8tri$ and Jordan.


18/32

:atahThis feda>een or6aniation was founded in the late 1';s b> a 6rou$ of#alestinian students/ includin6 Hasser Arafat/ in Cairo/ 6>$t. :atahmeans Rconquest&. It was on friendl> terms with 8>ria/ since it found it a6ood $lace to launch attac=s on Israel/ doin6 so for the first time inJanuar> 1)'. B> 1)/ it o$erated from Jordan.

#o$ular :ront for the iberation of #alestine @#:#ed b> 4eor6e 7abbeash/ it was made u$ of 0ar5ists who wantedrevolution throu6hout the Arab world and believed in liberatin6 #alestinefrom Israel throu6h terror acts in uro$e and !8.

7amasCreated in 1* b> 8hai=h Ahmed Hassin of the 4aa win6 of the0uslim Brotherhood at the be6innin6 of the :irst Intifada/ 7amas is=nown outside the #alestinian territories for its suicide bombin6s andother attac=s directed a6ainst Israeli civilians/ as well as militar> andsecurit> forces tar6ets. 7amas charter calls for the destruction of the8tate of Israel and its re$lacement with a #alestinian Islamic state in thearea that is now Israel/ the ears of the#alestinian u$risin6.8ince then/ 7amas has conducted man> attac=s onIsrael/ mainl> throu6h its militar> win6 - the I ad-9in al-KassamBri6ades. These attac=s have included lar6e-scale suicide bombin6sa6ainst Israeli civilian tar6ets/ the most deadl> of which was thebombin6 of a Netan>a hotel on 0arch 2*/ 2;;2/ in which ; $eo$lewere =illed and 1%; were wounded.

8ince the death of #3 leader Hasser Arafat/ 7amass $olitical win6has entered and won man> local elections in 4aa/ Kalqil>a/ and

Nablus. In Januar> 2;;)/ 7amas won a sur$rise victor> in the#alestinian $arliamentar> elections/ ta=in6 *) of the 12 seats in thechamber/ while the rulin6 :atah $art> too= %.

7ebollah and Al Kueda@see below

%. 7ardliners on both sides

The Arabs

E#alestinian state.


19/32

$s>cholo6ical warfare and $o$ulation e5$losion... thin6/ includin6 all of Jerusalem.E -- Hasser Arafat/Chairman of the #3

Initiall>/the #3 re$resents the core of the Arab e5tremists. The 1)#3 Charter endorses the use of violence/ s$ecificall> Earmed stru66leEa6ainst what the> call E?ionist im$erialism.E Article 1; of the #alestinianNational Charter states ECommando @:eda>&ee action constitutes thenucleus of the #alestinian $o$ular liberation war.

7owever/with the a$$roval of the Ten #oint #ro6ram/7amas comes intore$resentin6 the e5tremists in #alestine. The slo6an of 7amas is E4odis its tar6et/ the #ro$het is its model/ the Kuran its constitution, Jihad isits $ath and death for the sa=e of 4od is the loftiest of its wishes.EArticle1 of the 7amas Covenant states that, EThere is no solution for the#alestinian question e5ce$t throu6h Jihad. Initiatives/ $ro$osals andinternational conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.The #alestinian $eo$le =now better than to consent to havin6 theirfuture/ ri6hts and fate to>ed with.E

Toda>/Arab e5tremism too= in a new form,terrorism. The 8e$tember 11/2;;1 attac=s b> Al-Kaeda became the most devastatin6 in Americanhistor>/ with almost /;;; $eo$le =illed. 3ther or6aniations such as7ebollah in ebanon/ Jemaah Islami>ah in 8outheast Asia be6an the

use of more e5treme measures such as suicide bombin6s/ aircrafthi(ac=in6/ =idna$$in6 and assassinations to reach their 6oals. 3f alltheir 6oals/ mostl> revolves around Mradication of . It became a much lar6er or6aniation

encom$assin6 nearl> all the >outh and adults in the Jewish settlements/as well as thousands of members from the cities. It also acquiredforei6n arms and be6an to develo$ wor=sho$s to create hand 6renadesand sim$le militar> equi$ment. It went from bein6 an untrained militia toa ca$able arm>.

7owever/ the 7a6anah was mostl> defensive in nature/ which amon6other thin6s caused several members to s$lit off and form the militant6rou$ Ir6un @initiall> =nown as 7a6ana Bet in 11. The Ir6un adheredto a much more active a$$roach/ which included attac=s and initiation of

armed actions a6ainst the British/ such as attac=in6 British militar>headquarters/ the Fin6 9avid 7otel/ which =illed 1 $eo$le. 7a6anah/


20/32

on the other hand/ often $referred restraint. A further s$lit occurredwhen Avraham 8tern left the Ir6un to form ehi/ @also =nown as the8tern 4an6 which was much more e5treme in its methods. !nli=e theIr6un/ the> refused an> co-o$eration with the British durin6 dissolved and inte6rated into the Israeli 9efense :orces on 0a> 1/1%/ with its leaders 6ettin6 amnest> from $rosecution or re$risals as$art of the inte6ration.

'. The slow $ace of $eace $rocess

Introduction

As a result of the Intifada/ which is a wides$read cam$ai6n a6ainst thecontinuin6 Israeli occu$ation of the 4aa 8tri$ and to doso was $rovided in 11 b> the #ersian 4ulf


21/32

withdrawals. These develo$ments a6ain stalled the $eace $rocess anddela>ed ne6otiations on the final status of the are su$erior and one of the western nations.

:or e5am$le/ >ou 6o into someone else&s house and drive them out/afterwards/ >ou act li=e it&s >ours and >ou boss ever>one else aroundand do not even bother to ma=e friends with the owners of the house.

Cam$ 9avid Accords/ 1*

In 1*/ 4eneva/ there had been meetin6s to ne6otiate about ceasefirelines and while the> mana6ed disen6a6ements/ there was no lastin6$eace8>ria declined to come/ leavin6 onl> 6>$t/ Israel and Jordan#alestinians were not re$resentedCarter tried to rei6nite the failed ne6otiationsS

But nothin6 till 1**/ when Anwar 8adat visited Jerusalem in Nov/which was historic

In 8e$tember 1*/ #resident Jimm> Carter invited 8adat and Israeli#rime 0inister 0enachem Be6in to Cam$ 9avid/ a $residential retreatin 0ar>land. The> wor=ed out two a6reements, a framewor= for $eacebetween 6>$t and Israel/ and a 6eneral framewor= for resolution of the0iddle ast crisis/ i.e. the #alestinian question.

The Cam$ 9avid Accords was a $eace a6reement si6ned b> 6>$tian

#resident Anwar 8adat and Israeli #rime 0inister 0enachem Be6in on8e$tember 1*/ 1*.

The first a6reement formed the basis of the 6>$tian-Israeli $eacetreat> si6ned in 1*. The second a6reement $ro$osed to 6rantautonom> to the #alestinians in the ear interim $eriod/ after whichthe final status of the territories would be ne6otiated.

Consequences

3nl> the 6>$tian-Israeli $art of the Cam$ 9avid accords wasim$lemented. The #alestinians and other Arab states re(ected the


22/32

autonom> conce$t because it did not 6uarantee full Israeli withdrawalfrom areas ca$tured in 1)* or the establishment of an inde$endent#alestinian state. In an> case/ Israel sabota6ed ne6otiations b>continuin6 to confiscate #alestinian lands and build new settlements inviolation of the commitments 0enachem Be6in made to Jimm> Carterat Cam$ 9avid.

The #3 and most of the Arab states denounced it. This was becausewithout 6>$t/ Arab states unable to fi6ht bac=. abided b> the a6reements since 1*/ inthe followin6 >ears/ a common belief emer6ed in Israel that the $eacewith 6>$t is a Ecold $eace.E There is wides$read disa$$ointment with6>$t/ which is seen as adherin6 onl> to letter and not the s$irit of thea6reement/ $articularl> with the clauses concernin6 normaliation ofrelations between the two countries. An additional view is that the#eace a6reement was between the Israeli $eo$le and 6>$ts $residentAnwar 8adat/ rather than with the 6>$tian $eo$le/ who did notnecessaril> su$$ort it in ma(orit>.

vidence su$$ortin6 this claim is the fact that althou6h Israeli touristsfloc=ed to 6>$t/ onl> few 6>$tians return the6esture.:uthermore/6>$tians visitin6 Israel are often ostracied in

6>$t/ sometimes even receivin6 death threats" anti-Israel and anti-8emitic incitment can still be found in 6>$tian media.

Accordin6 to an 6>$tian 4overnment 2;;) $oll of 1;;; 6>$tians/2L of 6>$tians still view Israel as an enem> nation.

:ailure of Cam$ 9avid Accords!nder the $eace treat> si6ned in 0arch 1*/ 6>$t re6ained the 8inai#eninsula/ which was $artiall> demilitaried. Israel and 6>$t enteredinto normal di$lomatic relations as forei6n observers were $laced into

$eninsula to maintain the treat>&s $rovisions. :or its $art/ Israelachieved $eace with what had been its lar6est enem> at the cost ofevacuatin6 Israeli settlers from the 8inai and losin6 some investment inthe area&s infrastructure/ such as roads and housin6. The Cam$ 9avidAccords/ however/ did nothin6 for 8>ria and onl> advanced the#alestinian cause in the va6uest of terms. :or these reasons/ the Arabea6ue e5$elled 6>$t and the rest of the Arab world widel>condemned the accords. In 11 8adat was assassinated b> a 6rou$ ofIslamic fundamentalists within the 6>$tian arm>. 6>$t continued tomaintain relations with Israel after 8adat&s death.

:ollowin6 Cam$ 9avid/ 8>ria maintained its warli=e $osture and


23/32

demanded the unconditional surrender of the 4olan 7ei6hts/ and the#3 continued its terrorist assaults on Israel. In 12 Israel tried to wi$eout the #3 b> attac=in6 its bases in ebanon/ which had been $lun6edinto its own civil war in 1*'. The assault on the #3/ which Israelcalled 3$eration #eace for 4alilee/ quic=l> escalated into 6round battlesin ebanon and full-scale en6a6ements between the Israeli and 8>rianair forces. After a sie6e on Beirut the #3 leadershi$ evacuated fromebanon and relocated to Tunisia. Arabs were frustrated that Israel hadoccu$ied an Arab ca$ital with little intervention from the rest of theworld/ and the #alestinians of the Israeli-occu$ied 1'/ thou6h it continued to maintain a self-declared securit> one inside ebanon alon6 the Israeli border.

0adrid

This was the first $eace tal=s that included most of the Arab states.

now and not at Cam$ 9avid1. The Cam$ 9avid Accords/ meant that 6>$t seemed to be favourin6!8 aid/ and the Arab felt isolated.

2. The Iranian +evolution in 1*. 8ome Arabs saw 6>$t as acounter$oint to this new fundamentalist movement.. !$risin6s in 4aa and and the residents in the re6ionwere clamourin6 for $eace. 8o even b> 1/ Jordan 6ave u$ allclaims/ and allowed the #3 to be seen as the sole re$resentative of#alestinian $eo$le.%. nd of Cold


24/32

some feel that the states that hel$ed !8A were the Mhaves/ the restwere the Mhave nots

0adridTried to 6et all nei6hbours of Israel but also aims to broaden it to all.3nl> 6>$t is at $eace with Israel. s$eciall> with deals aboutenvironment/ refu6ees/ arms control. s$eciall> when Israel seemshard to ne6otiate with.:or 6>$t this Conference is im$ortant because it would show that itwas ri6ht to start $eace even thou6h man> felt it had betra>ed the ArabCause.

:or the other states,Jordan, Fin6 7ussein wants to ma=e $eace with Israel but onl> withothers. and since man>Jordan citiens are #alestinian refu6ees/ an> $eace that other Arabstates a6ree too will ma=e life easier for him

:or the #3, the> seem to be able to acce$t this/ even thou6h the> hadre(ected Cam$ 9avid. This is es$eciall> because of the differin6 $oliticalrealities @see above

8>ria, nterin6 into ne6otiations even without the Israeli commitment toreturn 4olan 7ei6ht. !nli=e some others had never had ne6otiations

with Israel D so a chan6e. 8>ria had become increasin6 isolated inre6ion/ es$eciall> sidin6 with Iran @due to ideolo6> and historicalreasons.

Israel, 7as to acce$t the !8 invite because if it does not/ it loo=s li=e itdoesn&t want $eace. But man> are fearful that the> will be forced to 6iveu$ their most $ried $ossessions.

The 3slo Accords/ 1

The wea=ness of the #3 after the 4ulf directl> with #3 re$resentatives who had been e5cluded fromthe 0adrid and on Au6ust 2;/ 1/ and


25/32

subsequentl> officiall> si6ned at a $ublic ceremon> in @#A with Eself-6overnin6E @i.e. munici$al $owers in the areas from which Israeli forceswere rede$lo>ed.

!ltimate $ower/ however/ remained with Israel/ which e5ercised itscontrol b> sealin6 off the #alestinian-6overned areas from the rest ofthe 3ccu$ied Territories and from Israel for e5tended $eriods of time/an action that devastated a #alestinian econom> alread> wea=ened b>>ears of occu$ation. In addition/ Israel continued to confiscate land andto build settlements and roads that served to se$arate #alestinian cities/towns/ and villa6es from each other/ e5acerbatin6 the fra6mentation ofthe 1)/ elections were held for a #alestinian e6islativeCouncil and for the $residenc> of the #A/ which was won handil> b>

Hasir Arafat. The =e> issues such as the e5tent of the territories to beceded b> Israel/ the nature of the #alestinian entit> to be established/the future of the Israeli settlements and settlers/ water ri6hts/ theresolution of the refu6ee $roblem and the status of Jerusalem were setaside to be discussed in final status tal=s.

8ubsequent a6reements in 1% @Cairo A6reement/ 1' @3slo II/1 @e +iver I/ and 1 @e +iver II failed to address thefundamental wea=nesses of the 9o#. The 1% $a6es of the 3slo IIa6reement/ for instance/ e5tended #alestinian civilian (urisdiction over

ma(or $o$ulation areas/ s$ecified the form that #alestinian elections fora le6islative council and $resident would ta=e/ and set 0a> %/ 1)/ asthe deadline to be6in final status ne6otiations that would deal withoutstandin6 issues. It did not/ however/ indicate the consequences of afailure to meet the 0a> deadline. Nor did 3slo II contain $rovisions tohalt the creation of new Efacts on the 6roundE that would influence thefinal form of an> eventual a6reement. The e I a6reement/ which too=nineteen months to achieve in $art due to the assassination of Israeli#rime 0inister Hitha= +abin b> a Jewish Israeli/ sim$l> rearticulatedhow Israel and the #alestinians were to carr> out what the> had alread>

a6reed to in 3slo II and were su$$osed to have finished more than a>ear earlier.


26/32

ConsequencesThe #3 acce$ted this dee$l> flawed a6reement with Israel because itwas wea= and had little di$lomatic su$$ort in the Arab world. BothIslamist radicals and local leaders in the Arafat had the $resti6e andnational le6itimac> to conclude a ne6otiated a6reement with Israel.

The 3slo accords set u$ a ne6otiatin6 $rocess without s$ecif>in6 anoutcome. The $rocess was su$$osed to have been com$leted b> 0a>1. There were man> dela>s due to Israels reluctance to relinquishcontrol over the occu$ied territories/ unwillin6ness to ma=e the =inds ofconcessions necessar> to reach a final status a6reement/ and $eriodicoutbursts of violence b> #alestinian o$$onents of the 3slo $rocess/es$eciall> 7A0A8 and Jihad. 9urin6 the i=uds return to $ower in1)-/ #rime 0inister Ben(amin Netan>ahu avoided en6a6in6seriousl> in the 3slo $rocess/ which he distrusted and fundamentall>o$$osed.

A abor-led coalition 6overnment led b> #rime 0inister hud Bara=came to $ower in 1. Bara= at first concentrated on reachin6 a $eacea6reement with 8>ria. rians to si6n ana6reement that would restore to them less than all the area of the 4olan7ei6hts occu$ied b> Israel in 1)*/ Bara= turned his attention to the

#alestinian trac=.

9urin6 the $rotracted interim $eriod of the 3slo $rocess/ Israels aborand i=ud 6overnments built new settlements in the occu$ied territories/e5$anded e5istin6 settlements and constructed a networ= of b>$assroads to enable Israeli settlers to travel from their settlements to Israel$ro$er without $assin6 throu6h #alestinian-inhabited areas. These$ro(ects were understood b> most #alestinians as mar=in6 out territor>that Israel sou6ht to anne5 in the final settlement. The 3slo accordscontained no mechanism to bloc= these unilateral actions or Israels

violations of #alestinian human and civil ri6hts in areas under its control.

:inal status ne6otiations between Israel and the #alestinians were tohave be6un in mid-1)/ but onl> 6ot underwa> in earnest in mid-2;;;.B> then/ a series of $ainfull> ne6otiated Israeli interim withdrawals leftthe #alestinian Authorit> with direct or $artial control of some %; $ercentof the


27/32

$rinci$al com$romises at the be6innin6/ whereas Israels $rinci$alcom$romises be>ond reco6nition of the #3 were to be made in thefinal status tal=s.

The Accords became the first successful attem$t to discuss thenecessar> elements and conditions for a future #alestinian state.:ortheir efforts/ Israels #rime 0inister Hitha= +abin / Arafat and 8himon#eres were awarded the 1% Nobel #eace #rie. 7owever/ after theassassination of Hitha= +abin in 1'/ the $eace $rocess slowed to a6rindin6 halt.

9ee$ :laws in the 3slo #rocessNor is it sur$risin6 that #rime 0inister Bara=/ and less directl>/#resident Clinton blamed #alestinian Authorit> #resident Hasir Arafatfor the failure of the summit. In remar=s followin6 the brea=u$ of thetal=s/ Clinton $raised Bara= for movin6 much farther from his initial$ositions than Arafat durin6 the ne6otiations. Clinton a$$arentl>e5$ected that both $arties would meet midwa> between their o$enin6$ositions at Cam$ 9avid. This is a dee$l> flawed understandin6 of whatcan $roduce a (ust and stable #alestinian-Israeli $eace a6reement.Clintons unreasonable e5$ectations stem directl> from the structure ofthe 3slo $rocess and the !8 alliance with Israel.

All international $arties e5ce$t the !nited 8tates were e5cluded from anactive role in the ne6otiations. The 1 3slo 9eclaration of #rinci$lesonl> nominall> ac=nowled6ed the relevance of !N resolutions 2%2 and requirin6 Israel to withdraw from the territories it occu$ied in 1)*.3ther !N resolutions--reco6niin6 the #alestinian ri6ht to statehood/censurin6 Israels anne5ation of ast Jerusalem/ affirmin6 the#alestinian refu6ees ri6ht of return and condemnin6 Israels ille6alactions in the 11 and 2%/ under the aus$ices of #resident Clinton/ #rime0inister Bara= and Chairman Arafat met at Cam$ 9avid in an effort toreach an a6reement on $ermanent status. were not able tobrid6e the 6a$s and reach an a6reement/ their ne6otiations wereun$recedented in both sco$e and detail. Buildin6 on the $ro6ressachieved at Cam$ 9avid/ the two leaders a6reed on the followin6

$rinci$les to 6uide their ne6otiations,


28/32

1 The two sides a6reed that the aim of their ne6otiations is to $ut anend to decades of conflict and achieve a (ust and lastin6 $eace.

2 The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts toconclude an a6reement on all $ermanent status issues as soon as$ossible.

Both sides a6ree that ne6otiations based on !N 8ecurit> Council+esolutions 2%2 and are the onl> wa> to achieve such ana6reement and the> underta=e to create an environment forne6otiations free from $ressure/ intimidation and threats of violence.

% The two sides understand the im$ortance of avoidin6 unilateralactions that $re(ud6e the outcome of ne6otiations and that theirdifferences will be resolved onl> b> 6ood faith ne6otiations.

' Both sides a6ree that the !nited 8tates remains a vital $artner in thesearch for $eace and will continue to consult closel> with #residentClinton and 8ecretar> Albri6ht in the $eriod ahead.

:AI!+ 3: CA0# 9AI9 IIThe failure of the #alestinian-Israeli-American summit at Cam$ 9aviddid not sur$rise most #alestinians or those who understand #alestiniano$inion on the issues. Israeli #rime 0inister hud Bara=s well-

$ublicied Ered linesE 6oin6 into the ne6otiations delineated a $ositionver> far from the minimum that the #alestinian national consensus couldacce$t as a resolution of the #alestinian-Israeli conflict.

Bara= loudl> announced that Israel would not return to its $re-1)* warborders. 7e sou6ht to anne5 settlement blocs containin6 about ;L ofthe 1;/;;; Jewish settlers in the Israeli leader since 1)*/ Bara= demanded that the#alestinians acce$t all of Jerusalem as Israels Eeternal ca$ital.E AndBara= insisted that Israel would acce$t no moral or le6al res$onsibilit>

for the creation of the #alestinian refu6ee $roblem. In essence/ Bara=demanded that the #alestinians 6ive their blessin6 to Israels man>violations of the :ourth 4eneva Convention and doens of !Nresolutions since 1)*--most notabl> the confiscation of land for civilian$ur$oses/ settlin6 civilians in occu$ied territories/ the unilateral andinternationall> unreco6nied anne5ation of ast Jerusalem and theinstallation of some 1*'/;;; Jewish settlers there.

The distance between the two $arties/ es$eciall> on the issues ofJerusalem and refu6ees/ made it im$ossible to reach an a6reement at

the Cam$ 9avid summit meetin6 in Jul> 2;;;. Althou6h Bara= offered afar more e5tensive Israeli withdrawal from the other


29/32

Israeli leader had $ublicl> considered/ he insisted on maintainin6 Israelisoverei6nt> over ast Jerusalem. This was unacce$table to the#alestinians and to most of the 0uslim world. Arafat left Cam$ 9avidwith enhanced stature amon6 his constituents because he did not >ieldto American and Israeli $ressure. Bara= returned home to face $oliticalcrisis within his own 6overnment/ includin6 the abandonment of coalition $artners who felt he had offered the #alestinians too much.

7owever/ the Israeli taboo on discussin6 the future of Jerusalem wasbro=en. 0an> Israelis be6an to realie for the first time that the> mi6htnever achieve $eace if the> insisted on im$osin6 their terms on the#alestinians.

). INC+A8 IN !8Q!88+ IN:!NC IN T7 +4I3N

!nited 8tates

In 0arch 1'*/ the new instrument of American $olic> became the

isenhower 9octrine. B> its terms/ he $resident was authoried toe5tend economic and militar> assistance/ includin6 troo$s to an> 0iddleastern nation that requested it a6ainst the threat of internationalcommunism. 7owever/ no Arab countr> e5ce$t ib>a and ebanon wasea6er the embrace the doctrine. The !nited 8tates was seen asattem$tin6 to wea=en Arab unit> b> insistin6 Arab countries line u$ onone side or the other in the Cold in 1'*.

!nited 8tates +elations with Israel and #alestinians

#resident 7arr> Truman declared reco6nition of Israel on 0a> 1'/ 1%/minutes $rior to Israeli inde$endence was declared. After the 8econd&s 6rowth/ maintainin6

communications and trade and ensurin6 Israel&s securit>.


30/32

Both !8 and Israel a6reed that !8 should have the $redominant role asa $eace-ma=er/ however/ the bul= of Israelis wanted !8 to su$$ort onl>$ro-Israeli $ositions. #ast !8 arms transfers to Arab nations are alsocausin6 the friction in Israeli-!8 relations.

The !8 have alwa>s re6arded the #alestinians as one of the $roblemsto be solved in the Arab-Israeli dis$ute/ rather then $artici$ants of the$eace $ro6ress/ not until recentl> that is. The series of terrorist attac=sadded the label Rterrorist& to #alestinian&s Rrefu6ee& ima6e. #residentJimm> Carter shifted this $erce$tion in 1** when he mentioned thatthe #alestinians deserve a homeland. In 1*'/ 8ecretar> of 8tate to#resident 4erald :ord 7enr> Fissin6er told ensured Israel that the !8will not ne6otiate with #3 unless the> acce$ted the !N resolutions/and acce$ted Israel/ re(ectin6 terrorism in the $rocess.

7owever/ #3 head Hasser Arafat a6reed and the !8 o$eneddialo6ues in 1. The tal=s were maintained until 1; when #residentBush 8enior ended it on accounts that #3 did not denounce terrorattac=s in Tel Aviv in 1;.

!nited Nations

Throu6hout the twentieth centur>/ various efforts were made to arbitratethe dis$ute between #alestinians and Israelis. The !nited Nations washeavil> involved in the >ears followin6 its vote to $artition #alestine. Itcreated the !nited Nations +elief and to ta=eres$onsibilit> for #alestinian refu6ees/ sent mediators to the re6ionthrou6hout the 1%;s/ 1';s/ and 1);s/ and $assed doens of4eneral Assembl> and 8ecurit> Council resolutions callin6 for cease-fires/ condemnin6 a66ressive actions b> each of the $arties/ andsu66estin6 a$$roaches for conflict resolution.

In recent decades/ the !nited 8tates has attem$ted to ta=e a leadin6role in mana6in6 the conflict and has wor=ed to e5clude the !nitedNations from $artici$ation. The close relationshi$ between Israel andthe !nited 8tates has ham$ered the abilit> of the !nited 8tates to serveas a neutral mediator/ however. :urthermore/ for 1 >ears/ the !nited8tates refused to ac=nowled6e or deal officiall> with the #3 becauseof a $romise the !nited 8tates made to Israel in 1*',

The !nited 8tates will continue to adhere to its $resent $olic> with

res$ect to the #alestine iberation 3r6aniation O#3P/ whereb> it willnot reco6nie or ne6otiate with the #alestine iberation 3r6aniation so


31/32

lon6 as the #alestine iberation 3r6aniation does not reco6nieIsraels ri6ht to e5ist and does not acce$t 8ecurit> Council +esolutions2%2 and .

The two !N 8ecurit> Council resolutions referred to-2%2 and -mar=ed the end of the June 1)* and 3ctober 1* Arab-Israeli wars/res$ectivel>. #alestinians maintained these resolutions were aninadequate basis for ne6otiation because/ amon6 other issues/ the> didnot address #alestinian demands for self-determination/ referrin6instead onl> to a Esettlement of the refu6ee $roblem.E ater/ in 1%/Con6ress wrote the 1*' $led6e into law and added that the #3 hadto renounce the use of terrorism before there would be an> formaldi$lomatic discussions between the two $arties. In the absence ofrelations with the #3/ the !nited 8tates was forced to rel> on otherArab states to re$resent #alestinian interests" a tas= these countries did$oorl> and without enthusiasm. After Arafats conciliator> statements in9ecember 1/ the !nited 8tates o$ened direct contacts with the#3.

After the 4ulf the Iraqioccu$ation was instantl> condemned while Israels occu$ation of#alestinian lands was i6nored and/ in the case of the !nited 8tates/im$licitl> su$$orted throu6h !.8. economic and militar> assistance toIsrael. In order to build a broad coalition a6ainst Iraq-one that included a

number of Arab states-the !nited 8tates committed itself to addressin6the Israeli-#alestinian conflict once the war ended. These concludedwith the ma(or brea=throu6h of the 0adrid Conference.

!ne5$ectedl>/ at the end of Au6ust 1/ the Israeli 6overnment andthe #3 announced the> had been meetin6 secretl> in Norwa> and hadreached an interim a6reement for #alestinian self-6overnment. The9eclaration of #rinci$les @9o#/ si6ned in 8e$tember/ outlined a$rocess for transformin6 the nature of the Israeli occu$ation but leftnumerous issues unresolved/ includin6 the status of Jerusalem/ the

ri6ht of return for #alestinian refu6ees/ the dis$osition of Israelisettlements/ securit> arran6ements/ and final borders between Israeland a #alestinian state.

et be6un/ !.8. #resident Bill Clinton called a summit at Cam$ 9avid inJul> 2;;;.

!88+

Althou6h the !88+ was the second countr> to reco6nie officiall>Israel&s creation in 1%/ 0oscow found it e5$edient to side a6ainst


32/32

Israel. Callin6 Israel the linch$in of sidin6 with the Arab cause/ the 8oviet!nion 6ained entr> into the 0iddle ast/ cultivated Arab re6imes of allideolo6ical stri$es undermined the !.8. $osition in the Arab world b>isolatin6 it as Israel&s chief bac=er/ stren6thened radical anti- the $ort ofTartus in 8>ria and 8outh Hemen&s $orts in Aden and the island of8ocotra. Indeed/ the 8oviet !nion was the chief beneficiar> of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This interminable stru66le enabled 0oscow to build$atron-client relationshi$s with Arab states that otherwise would havelittle need for a 8oviet connection/ 6iven the lac=luster a$$eal of 8ovietideolo6>/ technolo6>/ and economic assistance. B> fuelin6 the Arab-Israeli arms race/ 0oscow was able to ta$ its $rinci$al source ofnational $ower - militar> stren6th.

A watershed event in 8oviet 0iddle ast $olic> was the 8e$tember1'' 2;; million Cech arms transfer to 6>$t/ orchestrated b>0oscow. It was 0oscow&s first militar> commitment to an Arab state.8ubsequent arms deals were arran6ed with 8>ria @1')/ Hemen@1')/ Af6hanistan @1') and Iraq @1'.

In e5chan6e for arms the 8oviets 6ained $olitical influence and strate6icadvanta6e throu6h militar> coo$eration and access to Arab militar>

facilities.0oscow si6ned classic lon6-term friendshi$ and coo$eration treatieswith 6>$t in 1*1/ Iraq in 1*2/ 8omalia in 1*%/ thio$ia in 1*/Af6hanistan in 1*/ 8outh Hemen in 1*/ and 8>ria in 1;. 5$ertswere also sent in to hel$ the Arabs.

the ai causes and consequences

Documents