THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB:

A Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment of the SunkenFleet of Operation Crossroads at Bikini and Kwajalein AtollLagoons

U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICESUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNITNATIONAL MARITIME INITIATIVE

THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB:

A SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT OF THE

SUNKEN FLEET OF OPERATION CROSSROADS

AT BIKINI AND KWAJALEIN ATOLL LAGOONS

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Prepared for:

The Kili/Bikini/Ejit Local Government Councii

By:

James P. DelgadoDaniel J. Lenihan

(Principal Investigator)Larry E. Murphy

Illustrations by:

Larry V. NordbyJerry L. Livingston

Submerged Cultural Resources UnitNational Maritime Initiative

United States Department of the InteriorNational Park Service

Southwest Cultural Resources Center Professional Papers

Number 37

Santa Fe, New Mexico

1991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, Jr.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Daniel J. Lenihan

—.. . . .—.Yroject Mandate andMethodology . . . . .Activities . . . . . . .

CHAPTER TWO: OperationJames P. Delgado

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Concept ofa Naval Test Evolves, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Preparing for the Tests . . . . . .The Able Test . . . . . . . . . . .,The Baker Test . . . . . . . . . . .Decontamination Efforts . . . . . .The Legacy of Crossroads . . . .The 1947 Scientific Resurvey . . .

CHAPTER THREE: Ship’s Histories forJames P. Delgado

USS Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...,,, . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

the Sunken Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HIJMSNagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HIJMSSakawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSPrinzEugen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Larson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSApogon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Pilotfish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSGilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ARDC-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .YO-160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LCT-414, 812, 1114, 1175, and1237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER FOUR: Site Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .James P. Delgado and LarryE. Murphy

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Reconstructing the Nuclear Detonations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

i

...111

vii

ix

1

147

11

14182327293134

43

4352555960646670727374767677

85

8586

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Able Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSGilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Carlisle....,..,.,., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Baker Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I.JSS Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSSaratoga . . . . . . ..e... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Pilotfish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSApogon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .YO-160 .,.....,.,...,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HIJMSNagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LCT-1175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost After the Test . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSPrinz Eugen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Final Observations,.,,,.. , ., .,, , .,, ,,, ,,,,.,, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9090929393100124125127128132134134136

CHAPTER FIVE: The Significance of the Sunken Vessels of Operation CrossroadsJames P. Delgado ..,...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...143

Monuments and Memorials to the Dawn of the Atomic Age . . , . , , . . . . . . . . .Insuring the Navy’s Survival in the Age of the Bomb , . . . , . . , , . . . . . , . . . . .ADemonstration ofWealth and Power .,, .,, .,.....,, .,, ., ..,.,..,,Crossroads as a Spectacle and Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .Learning to Live with the Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Reality of the Bomb: Radioactive Fears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Crossroads at the Bottom of the Sea, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Confronting the Atomic Age., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

144145148150153154157158

CHAPTER SIX: Nuclear Park Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Daniel J. Lenihan

Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Park Appeal ., ..,.,,.,. ., .,.,,,...,,,.,.,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Park Protection .,.,,,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Interpretive/EducationalDevices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .DivingSafety/Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Special Diving Hazards: Explosives, Radiation , . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Hazards Posedby Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mooring Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,,Conclusions and Recommendations , .,, ,,, ,, ., .,,,...,. . . . . . . . . . . . .

163163165166168169170170170

APPENDIX I: Target Vessels at Bikini and Their Disposition , , . . . . . . . , . . , . , . . 173

APPENDIX II: Relics of Operation Crossroads , . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . , . . . , 177

APPENDIX III: Estimates of Radiological Dose at Bikini (W. L, Robison, 1990) . , . . . , 179

APPENDIX IV: Archeological Site Record Forms for the Documented Shipwrecks . . . . . 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,, ...,....,,,..,...,..197

SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT REPORTAND PUBLICATION SERIES... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

ii

II

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Able Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSGilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..” ’”s”sss ““.””.”””””USS Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..”” .””” ”s””” ““”””””,’

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost During the Baker Test , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USS Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s””. s”.” ..”.”””””’.USS Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. s”.””””.. .“”.””.”.’”USSPiloifish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....”””’”””.”””.””.”USSApogon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..”s”” s”’ .“””””””.”YO-160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..’.”.s ““”c”””””HIJMSNagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......c.’””oo””s””os ““LCT-1175 . . . . . ! . . . . . . . . . .$ ., $$. .$ . ..$. ..”” $””” ““”o”””””

Site Descriptions: Vessels Lost After the Test . . . . , . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .USSPrinz Eugen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...”””” s“.”””.””’””

Final Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s ...”.”””””.””””

9090929393100124125127128132134134136

CHAPTER FIVE: The Significance of the Sunken Vessels of Operation CrossroadsJames P. Delgado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s s.”””” C..”0..0”””0.14343

Monuments and Memorials to the Dawn of the Atomic Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Insuring the Navy’s Survival in the Age of the Bomb . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .ADemonstration ofWealth and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Crossroads as a Spectacle and Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Learning to Live with the Bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..*o.The Reality of the Bomb: Radioactive Fears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Crossroads at the Bottom of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Confronting the Atomic Age.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

144145148150153154157158

CHAPTER SIX: Nuclear Park Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Daniel J, Lenihan

Precedent, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Park Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Park Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Interpretive/Educational Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Diving Safety/Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Special Diving Hazards: Explosives, Radiation . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Hazards Posed by Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mooring Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

163163165166168169170170170

APPENDIX I: Target Vessels at Bikini and Their Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

APPENDIX II: Relics of Operation Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

APPENDIX III: Estimates of Radiological Dose at Bikini (W. L. Robison, 1990) . . . . . . 179

APPENDIX IV: Archeological Site Record Forms for the Documented Shipwrecks . . . . . 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...197

SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT REPORTAND PUBLICATION SERIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

ii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

Bikini Atoll, from a1947 Navy Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. xiiCommander David McCampbell locates and plots the wreck locations . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 3The Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Demolition Unit One safes a 350-lb. depth bomb . . . . . . . 3Lengthy oxygen decompression stops were required . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Boat launching by front-end loader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0..6Daniel Lenihan, Larry Nordby and Jerry Livingston compare notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 6The Bikini Council’s dive team takes measurements on Saratoga . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The system of trilateration used to map the wrecks is discussed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 10

CHAPTER TWO

Target area at Bikini, 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...11Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, commander of Joint Task Force One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 13The Able Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16The Baker Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17AMark III’’Fat Man’’ bomb casing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...18Press release chart depicting “scrap” costs of Operation Crossroads , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2iTwogoats aboard USS Niagara.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...22Nevada, thetarget vessel for Able. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...23Journalists aboard LCT-52 inspect USS Independence after Able . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 24Able’smushroom cloud towers over Bikini Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Able, from Bikini Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...25LSM-60 suspended the bomb detonated during Baker . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Baker blasts outofthe lagoon after detonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Navy tugsprays down USS New York after Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Decontamination efforts aboard Prinz Eugen e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Pennsylvania isscuttled off Kwajalein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...32The Bikini Scientific Resurvey teams lands at Bikini, 1947 . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 35Divers prepare to descend on an unidentified sunken ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

CHAPTER THREE

Saratoga in drydock at Hunter’s Point, San Francisco, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Bowview of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...45Saratoga off Iwo Jima, February 21,1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...47Saratoga arrives at San Francisco on a Magic Carpet voyage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 48Saratoga being prepared for Operation Crossroads , . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Saratoga sails for Bikini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,, . . . . . . . . . . ...50Saratoga sinks at Bikini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...51Arkansas onitstrials,1912 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...52Stern view of Arkansax,1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...53Arkansas’ bow........,,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...54Nagatounderway inthe1920s .,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...56Nagato’s A and B turrets and distinctive superstructure, at Bikini, May 1946 . . . . . . . . . . 57The “capture” of Nagato at Yokasuka, August 30, 1945 58Sakawa, circa 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :::: :::: ::::: :.59

...111

Sakawa sinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SS. .”. ”S. SS. .””60Prinz Eugen at the Krupp yard in Kiel, circa 1939-1940 . , . . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . 61Prinz Eugenat Philadelphia, March 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...61Artist’s perspective of Prinz Eugen at Kwajalein, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. s..... ...””””..”””.q”...” “65Lamsonoff Yorktown, Virginia, April 1939, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...67Depiction of the destruction of Lamson during Able . . . . . . . . , . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 69Thestern ofsunken Lamson alterable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...69Apogon surfaces after a test submergence at Bikini, 1946 . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 71Pilotfish enters San Francisco Bay, November 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 73Gilliam,1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s. .” s”””.”’. ““74Depiction of Able’s detonation over Gilliam and Carlisle . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751946 drawing of the sunken Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..”. ”. ’75

CHAPTER FOUR

Actual positions of the sunken ships at Bikini, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Themost famous photograph of Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...88Wreckage ofmidships house, Gilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...90Gascylinders in No. lholdof Gilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...91Stern of Carlisle . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s. ”s’ ””.”’ S93Stern of Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. s.....”..”.” ““94Capsized battleship New York.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,.,””*95Perspective sketch of Arkansas.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...95Daniel Lenihan swims forward past the port bilge keel of Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Port aircastle of the capsized Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...97Two ROV views of the barrels of the 14-inch guns of Arkansas’ No. 1 turret . . . . . . . . . . 98Inside Arkansas’ port aircastle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . ..s . . . . ..s” .99Inside Arkansas’ port aircastle,1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s99Saratoga, hit bythefirst blast generated wave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Saratoga’s island, stack, and No. 1, 5-inch mount after stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Thesame view today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..o”s”o1O1Saratoga’s flight deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...’ .,. .,. ..”oo1O3The secondary conning position on the forward edge of Saratoga’s collapsed stack . . . . . . . 104

Perspective painting of Saratoga.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..e. . . . . . . . . . . . ...105Perspective drawing of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...106Profile views of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ’”” 107Plan view of Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...109Mark 37 director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...111No, l,5-inch/38 caliber mount... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...111Guntub, with quad 40mm mount. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..s .112Single 5-inch/30 caliber AA gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...112Live 5-inch/38 caliber cartridges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...113Five-inch cartridge case, showing the cartridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Divers illuminate the bow and mooring cables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Army 155mm antiaircraft gun... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...115Installing a ruptured foil peak pressure gauge on a “Christmas Tree,” in 1946 . , . . . , , . . , 116Aft’’Christmas Tree’’ blast-gauge tower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...116Lead indentation pressure gauges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...117Catherine Courtney inspects the blast covers on Saratoga’s bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Helm position on Saratoga’s bridge, showing the binnacle, helm, and radar . . . . . . . . . . . 118

A500-lb. bomb on USS Yorktown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..”” s119Five general purpose 500-lb. bombs, AN-Mk 64, on their bomb carts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119Twoviews of the Helldiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...120

iv

ABC-Television divers illuminate an SBF-4E “Helldiver” on the hangar deck . . . . . . . . . . . 120Pilot’s cockpit instrument panel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...121Asingle Mk13aerial torpedo, ona cradle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...121A Mk 13 torpedo suspended beneath a TBM-3E on USS Yorktown . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 122Daniel Lenihan illuminates an unbroken light on the overhead inside +$’aratoga . . . . . . . . . 122Radio equipment in the emergency radio equipment compartment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122Perspective sketch of Pilotjfish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...123Jerry Livingston hovers over the sail of PiJo&ish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124ROVview of Apogon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..+ . . . . . . ...126Apogon’s stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. OOOOOO. ., ..,4,....,.....127YO-1600n thesurface alterable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...128Daniel Lenihan swims past the rudders and toward two of Nagato’s four screws . . . . . . . . 129Daniel Lenihan inspects the muzzle of one of Nagato’s 16.1-inch guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Catherine Courtney hovers over the superstructure of IVagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 130Perspective sketches of Nagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...131Bowofthe capsized Nagato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..O . . . . . . . ..+ . ...60132Larry Nordbymaps theaftdeck of LCT-1175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Anchor mount LCT-1175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . ...134Prinz Eugen’s stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,......ae~35e.ae~35Pn”nz Eugen’s rudder, ashaft, and ascrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...135Daniel Lenihan inspects a partially buried “Christmas Tree” blast gauge tower . . . . . . . . . 136

CHAPTER FIVE

Able and Baker day stamp cancellations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...142USSSkate intheaftermath of Able. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...146USS Skate makes its triumphant, yet radioactive return to the fleet after Able . . . . . . . . . 146Breech and the muzzles of Nagafo’s 16.1-inch guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149Celebrating theend of Operation Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152A sailor paints a mushroom cloud for Able on Pensacola’s battle record . . . . . . . . . . , . . 154Independence at San Francisco in January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Certificate issued to the 42,000 participants in Operation Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156Prinz Eugen’s hell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...157Journalists inspect burned test materials on the foredeck of Pensacola . . , . . . . . . . . . . , 158Battle record painted on Saratoga’s island, 1945 . ., . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

CHAPTER SIX

Underwater visitation by nondivers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...164Underwater monument ...,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I66Interpretative exhibits in avisitor center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0166Package of materials experimented with at Isle Royale National Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Foldout brochure to be consulted by visitor before diving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Three-dimensional models of shipwrecks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...167Special earphones allowing visitors to hear wireless communications . , . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 168Daniel Lenihan takes radiation readings on the lagoon bottom next to Saratoga . . . . . . . . 169Mooring buoys with appropriate visitor use guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

v

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1991

This assessment reportPark Service underwater

FOREWORD

compiled by a special team of Nationalarchaeologists sheds liqht on the

historical importance of the sunken s-hips i.n Bikini ~goon.

The information provided here will assist the people of Bikinito make informed decisions concerning these sunken ships. I hope

that it will also serve to open new areas of interest and increaseawareness to inform readers the world over of the importance ofevents at this historic place.

6&v”.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Foremost, we wish to thank the Bikini Councilforinviting the National Park Service (NPS) towork at Bikini.

Jonathan Weisgall, attorney for the Bikinians,has conducted considerable research on Bikini;his voluminous files made research a mucheasier task. We are grateful for hls and hisresearch associate Alison MacDonald’s hardwork. Jack Niedenthal served as liaison forthe Bikini Council during the period NPSoperations took place.

William Livingston and Lee McEachern arepreparing a documentary on Bikini for ABCtelevision. Lee shared his research, includingfootage of the tests that provided a clearerunderstanding of the effects of the blast onSaratoga.

The field operations at Bikini Atoll were inpart funded by the United States Departmentof Energy (DOE), Pacific Area Support Office,J. H. Dryden, Director. Holmes and Narver,Inc., DOE’s contractors and managers of theBikini Field Station, coordinated and hostedthe National Park Service (NPS) team. KentHiner, Project Manager; Dr. CatherineCourtney, Project Coordinator; John “Alan”Brown, Holmes and Narver representative onKwajalein, and his assistant Lance Yamaguchitackled and ultimately removed every obstacle,from transporting equipment to arrangingflights and making arrangements. In the field,the staff of the Bikini Field Station providedone of the most comfortable workingenvironments the team has ever had. RichardGiles, the station manager, Stephen Notarianni,Eric Hanson, Wayne Olival, Edward Maddison,John Lajuan, Roger Joel, Thompson Johnson,Harry Nashon, Wilma Riklon, and Kane Janerprovided invaluable assistance. The captainand crew of the DOE research vessel G. W.Pierce provided logistical support which wascritical to the success of the project.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of theInterior for International and Territorial Affairs

ix

supported the project; we particularly wish tothank Larry Morgan of the Assistant Secretary’soffice. In the National Park Service, presentDirector James M. Ridenour, former DirectorWilliam Penn Mott, Southwest Regional OfficeDirector John Cook, Western Regional DirectorStan Albright, Associate Director Jerry L.Rogers, Associate Director Rick Smith, PacificArea Director Bryan Harry, Deputy AssociateDirector Rowland T. Bowers, ChiefAnthropologist Doug Scovill, and ChiefHistorian Edwin C. Bearss lent their supportand released the team for work at Bikini.

The United States Navy, through the auspicesof the Supervisor of Salvage and Mobile Divingand Salvage Unit One (MDSU 1), providedlogistical support. Help was provided by theCommander-In-Ch~ef, Pacific Fleet; by Capt.Dave McCampbell, commander of MobileDiving and Salvage Unit One; and by Lt. DaveRattay, commander of the Explosive OrdnanceDisposal Unit One, Detachment 63, at PearlHarbor, as well as by the men of MDSU 1 andEOD Mobile Unit One in locating the targetships, buoying them, safing ordnance, andproviding detailed coverage of the shipsthrough dive observations and remote operatedvehicle surveys.

The issue of radiation was a concern for theteam. Dr. W. L. (Bill) Robison of theUniversity of California, Lawrence LivermoreLaboratory, provided data on radiation levels atBikini, as well as an appendix to this report.Jim Sprinkle, a lab specialist in radiationmonitoring and detection, also provided apersonal assessment of the radiation hazards--an independent source second opinion--toproject director Lenihan. Cdr. Roger Chatham,Director of the U.S. Navy’s NuclearSurvivability Program at the Pentagon alsoprovided an assessment and opinion of theradiation hazards associated with theCrossroads ships.

Considerable information about OperationCrossroads and the ships involved in the tests

was provided by a number of persons.Informative discussions were held with severalstaff members of the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL), Roger Meade, Historianand Archivist at the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory provided archival sources,photographs, and helped us contact LosAlamos veterans of Operation Crossroads.Interviews with Crossroads participants RobertW. “Bob” Henderson, Albuquerque, NewMexico, the chief engineer of the Los AlamosGroup at Crossroads; Leon D, Smith, also ofAlbuquerque, the “Able” weaponeer; andWoody P. Swancutt of San Antonio, Texas, thepilot of “Dave’s Dream,” were very helpful inanswering questions not addressed by thewritten record.

The generosity of Battleship Cove in Fall River,Massachusetts, particularly Mark Newton, isespecially appreciated. Mr. Newton providedhistorical references, photographs, and technicalmanuals for radar, ordnance, and armamentand was present in spirit at Bikini as a valuedmember of the team, Russell Booth, managerof USS Pampanito (SS-383) in San Francisco,California, provided information on Mark 13torpedoes and shipboard radar systems andgave an informative tour of his submarine thatanswered many questions about Apogon andPilotfish. B. J. Dorman, Museum Director, andJeffrey L. Crawford, Assistant Museum Directorfor the Pacific Fleet Submarine MemorialAssociation, provided material on Pi/otfish,Parche, Balao-class submarines, JP sonar, and20 and 40mm weapons, as well as aninformative tour of USS Bow~in (SS-287) inHonolulu, Hawaii. Sue Moss and CarolynScheffer of the Texas Department of Parks,Fish, and Wildlife, provided a tour of USSTexas while the battleship was in the drydockin the Todd Shipyard in Galveston, Texas.That tour was invaluable in providing a betterunderstanding of Arkansas. Mark Pinselprovided a tour of USS Cabot (CVL-28) inNew Orleans, Louisiana, that served as anexcellent orientation of carrier operations andcharacteristics. Ironically, Cabot, sole survivorof the Independence-class carriers, shares acommon origin with Saratoga--both were builtat the same yard, and more importantly, werecarriers converted from cruiser hulls. TimothyRizzuto, curator of USS Kidd (DD-661) inBaton Rouge, Louisiana, provided a tour of his

destroyer that greatly assisted ourunderstanding Anderson and Lamson; amongthe bonuses of the tour was a greasy butinformative foray into the Mark 37 directoratop the bridge. John Smith, Vice President ofMerchant Marine Veterans of WWII, Inc., gavean excellent tour of SS Lane Victory in SanPedro, California, that helped us betterunderstand Gilliam and Carlisle. DennisDitmanson, Superintendent, White SandsNational Monument, Nancy S. Dumas, PublicAffairs Officer, and Robert J. Burton,Archaeologist, White Sands Missile Range,provided a tour of Trinity Site that proved tobe very helpful in understanding thedevelopment of the bomb and early testinstrumentation.

Linda Jackman of the Navy’s Naval Sea SystemCommand’s Shipbuilding Support Officeprovided a listing of the Crossroads ships andtheir fates as well as other information. Thestaff of the Naval Historical Center inWashington, D, C., were as usual a tremendoushelp; among those who provided support andassistance were John Reilly of the ShipsHistory Branch, Mike Walker in OperationalArchives, and Charles Haberlein, thephotographic archivist in the Curatorial Branch,Henry Vadnais, the Navy’s Chief Curator,helped track down items removed from theships prior to the tests, such as Saratoga’s belland Lamson’s homeward bound pennant, whichis on display in the Navy Memorial Museum atthe Washington Navy Yard. Paul Stillwell atthe United States Naval Institute, Annapolis,Maryland, provided access to oral histories thatincluded reminiscences of OperationCrossroads. Paul also provided the address ofCapt. Dick Laning, former Commanding Officerof Pilotfish, who put us in touch with the otherskippers of the target submarines at Bikini.Joe Fetherston, one of Saratoga’s ship’sphotographers, loaned his postwar “mugbook”and history of Saratoga and several originalphotographs of Sara’s trying hours off IwoJima. Roy Alton, president of the USSArkansas (BB-33) Association, loaned his“mugbook” and arranged for a meeting withArkansas’ crew at the ship’s fourth annualreunion. Kevin Foster, formerly with theNational Maritime Initiative, providedconsiderable information on the tests and faxedneeded documents to the team in the Pacific.

x

Lawrence E. Wilson, Research Technician atthe National Air and Space Museum,Smithsonian Institution, identified three of theaircraft in the hangar of USS Saratoga asHelldivers before the BuAer report was locatedand provided reference materials on theSB2C/SBF Helldiver for this report. NormanPolmar read the text, made many criticalsuggestions, and provided information from hisfiles. This report also was reviewed by BettyPerkins and Roger Meade of LANL. Theirassistance and review is appreciated.

Linda Cullen of the U.S. Naval Instituteopened her photographic files on theCrossroads ships and tests. The staff at thePhiladelphia Maritime Museum, particularlycurator Jane E. Allen and librarian AnnWilcox, provided access to the photographicarchives of the New York ShipbuildingCorporation, which assisted the task ofassessing Saratoga and Arkansas, both productsof that shipyard. Steve Hailer, archivist at SanFrancisco Maritime National Historical Park,directed our attention to the recently processedSan Francisco Call-Bulletin photographicarchives, which included a few dozen invaluableviews of Saratoga, including photographs of theship being prepared for the tests and underwayto Bildni. Bruce McElfresh and Alice Hall,National Geographic Society, are gratefullythanked for arranging underwater photographyby Bill Curtsinger for National Geographic inAugust 1990. Mr. Curtsinger is thanked forthe use of selected photos in this report.

The staffs of the following organizations andinstitutions are also here acknowledged: LosAlamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NewMexico; Military History Branch and StillPictures Branch, National Archives, Washington,D, C.; Naval Historical Center, Washington,D. C.; Pacific Fleet Submarine MemorialMuseum, Honolulu, Hawaii; J. Porter ShawLibrary, San Francisco Maritime NationalHistorical Park, San Francisco; USS ArizonaMemorial, Honolulu, Hawaii; War in the PacificNational Historical Park, Agana, Guam; U.S.Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland; UnitedStates Naval Academy Museum, Annapolis;National Air and Space Museum, SmithsonianInstitution; Philadelphia Maritime Museum.

Robbyn Jackson of the NPS Historic AmericanBuildings Survey/Historic American EngineeringRecord, redrafted the Able and Baker arraysand plotted and drafted the sunken shipposition chart from data supplied by the U.S.Navy. Tom Freeman granted permission, withall rights reserved, to publish his painting ofSaratoga on the bottom. The painting was firstpublished in the U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings in October 1990.

Drafts of this document were prepared by theNational Maritime Initiative with the assistanceof Fran Day of the Submerged CulturalResources Unit. Design, layout, and finalproduction of the camera-ready text wasundertaken by J. Candace Clifford of theNational Maritime Initiative staff.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Daniel J. Lenihan

In June 1988, while returning from acooperative NPS/Navy diving operation inPalau, Dan Lenihan, Chief of the National ParkService Submerged Cultural Resources Unit(SCRU) was approached regarding a potentialsunken ship survey at Bikini Atoll. Dr.Catherine Courtney of Holmes and Narver,representing her client, the Department ofEnergy (DOE), described the nature of theresearch problem in a presentation at theheadquarters of U.S. Navy Mobile Diving andSalvage Unit One in Honolulu. Cdr. DavidMcCampbell, Unit Commander, had been incommunication with Dr. Courtney about theproject for some time and recommended ajoint effort using NPS and Navy personnel--acombination that had proved effective innumerous prior operations known collectively asProject SeaMark.

As formal requests for assistance were initiatedand arrangements were made for a fieldoperation in the summer of 1989, the NPSunderwater team began preparations for one ofthe most challenging and compelling projects ithas ever been asked to undertake. The shipsof Operations Crossroads lying at the bottomof Bikini Atoll Lagoon and Kwajalein Lagoonare the remains of a fascinating event inAmerican history, an event with internationaldimensions, including implications for therestructuring of geopolitical alliances in thelatter part of the 20th century.

The notion that these ships might beconsidered as the focus for a marine park,which is the specific forte of SCRU, onlyfurther fueled the team’s interest. Efforts toevaluate the ships as historical, archeological,and recreational resources for disposition bythe Bikinian people began in August 1989 andresulted in the completion of this report inMarch 1991.

Although “ghost fleets” related to World WarII exist at Truk Lagoon, etc., nowhere in the

world is there such a collection of capitalwarships, augmented by a largely intact aircraftcarrier, USS Saratoga, and the flagship of theJapanese Navy at the time of the attack onPearl Harbor, Nagato. Through chance orintent, vessels of great symbolic importance tothe history of World War II were included inthe test array and now reside at the bottom ofthe lagoon. These ships, all within a fewhundred yards of each other, comprise anincomparable diving experience.

During the course of the project the teammembers, without exception, were impressednot only with the extraordinary cultural andnatural resources of Bikini but with thecompelling human dimension of the problem ofdisplacement and resettlement of the Bikinianpeople. We hope the discussions in this reportwill help expand the range of options availableto the Marshall Islanders in reestablishing theircommunity on Bikini and other islandsimpacted from nuclear testing.

PROJECT MANDATE AND BACKGROUND

Under the terms of the Compact of FreeAssociation between the Government of theUnited States and the Governments of theMarshall Islands and the Federated States ofMicronesia (Public Law 99-239), the UnitedStates, in Section 177, accepted responsibilityfor compensating the citizens of the MarshallIslands, the Federated States of Micronesia, orPalau, for “any losses or damages suffered bytheir citizens’ property or persons resultingfrom the U.S. nuclear testing program in thenorthern Marshall Islands between June 30,1946, and August 18, 1958.” The U.S. and theMarshall Islands also agreed to set forth in aseparate agreement provisions for settlement ofclaims not yet compensated, for treatmentprograms, direct radiation-related medicalsurveillance, radiological monitoring, and forsuch additional programs and activities as may

1

be mutually agreed. (99 Stat. 1812) In section234, the United States transferred title to U.S.Government property in the Marshall Islandsto the government of the Marshall Islandsexcept for property which the U.S. Governmentdetermined a continuing requirement. (99 Stat.1819)

Based on section 177, an agreement betweenthe U.S. and the Government of the MarshallIslands relating to the nuclear testing programswas reached. Under the terms of thisagreement, the U.S. Government reaffirmed itscommitment to provide funds for theresettlement of Bikini Atoll by the people ofBikini, who were relocated during the firstnuclear weapons testsCrossroads in 1946.have focused on theBikini have beenundertaken.

In July-August 1989team from the U.S.

in the Pacific; OperationSince then, studies thateventual resettlement ofand continue to be

and April-May 1990, aNational Park Service

traveled to Kwajalein and Bikini atolls todocument ships sunk during the OperationCrossroads atomic bomb tests. The team wasinvited by the Bikini Council, the United StatesDepartment of Energy, Pacific Region, andHolmes and Narver, DOE’s primary contractorin the Pacific and operator of DOE’s BikiniField Station.

The sunken ships at Bikini are the property ofthe people of Bikini. Title was transferred inthe U.S. Marshall Islands agreement in accordwith Article 177 of the Compact of FreeAssociation; according to Article VI, Section 2of the agreement:

Pursuant to Section 234 of the Compact,any rights, title and interest theGovernment of the United States mayhave to sunken vessels and cable situatedin the Bikini lagoon as of the effectivedate of this Agreement is transferred tothe Government of the Marshall Islandswithout reimbursement or transfer offunds. It is understood that unexpendedordnance and oil remains within thehulls of the sunken vessels, and thatsalvage or any other use of these vesselscould be hazardous, By acceptance ofsuch right, title and interest, the

Government of the MarshallIslands shall hold harmless theGovernment of the UnitedStates from loss, damage andliability associated with suchvessels, ordnance, oil and cable,including any loss, damage andliability that may result fromsalvage operations or otheractivity that the Government ofthe Marshall Islands or thepeople of Bikini take or causeto be taken concerning suchvessels or cable. TheGovernment of the MarshallIslands shall transfer, inaccordance with itsconstitutional processes, title tosuch vessels and cable to thepeople of Bikini.

Under the Agreement, the U.S. Department ofEnergy conducted a study of the sunken shipsin Bikini Atoll, in particular assessing leakingfuel and oil that may pose long-termenvironmental impacts that would result fromthe sudden rupture of tanks containing oil orfuel. Recommendations for the finaldisposition of the ships depended onassessments of their structural integrity andhistoric significance. The DOE requested theassistance of the U.S. Navy, Mobile Diving andSalvage Unit One, headquartered at PearlHarbor, Hawaii, to (1) determine thegeographic location (latitude and longitude) ofeach ship; (2) mark the bow, stern, andmidships section of each ship with spar buoys;(3) make a preliminary description of thecondition of each ship; and (4) determine ifthe condition of the ships warranted anassessment of historical significance.

The U.S. Navy deployed MDSU 1 at Bikinibetween August 5-17, 1988. This activity, aswell as general footage of Bikini and the ships,was filmed by Scinon Productions, whichproduced a special for PBS and for KGO-TV,San Francisco. Following this exercise and theconcurrence of the Bikini Council, onDecember 21, 1988, the Department of Energyrequested the services of the National ParkService to conduct an evaluation of thehistorical significance, marine park potential,and diving hazards associated with the sunken

2

\ i~

$

Commander David McCampbell, USN (left), ledthe Navy effort to locate and plot the wrecklocations. (NPS, Larry Murphy)

fleet at Bikini. Because the ships and testequipment submerged in Bikini Lagoon are animmensely valuable cultural resource deservingthorough study, and the Service’s SubmergedCultural Resource Unit is the only U.S.Government program with experience in thiswork, the National Park Service agreed toassist DOE. At the same time, MDSU 1 wasredeployed at Bikini with EOD Mobile UnitOne to continue marking wrecks and to assessand safe live ordnance in, on, and around theships.

The National Park Service team was led byDaniel J. Lenihan, Chief of the SubmergedCultural Resource Unit, and included as teammembers NPS Maritime Historian James P.Delgado, Head of the National MaritimeInitiative; SCRU Archeologist Larry E. MurphjqArchaeologist Larry V. Nordby, Chief of theBranch of Cultural Research, SouthwestRegional Office; and Scientific Illustrator JerryL. Livingston of the Branch of CulturalResearch. The same team assembled in

Honolulu, Hawaii, in early August 1989 andfrom there traveled to Bikini by way ofKwajalein. The team returned for a secondand final field season in late April-early May1990.

Of the original array of target vessels, 21 ships(counting eight smaller landing craft) were sunkin Bikini Lagoon during the Able and Bakeratomic bomb tests of July 1 and 25, 1946. Anumber of the remaining vessels, among themthe former German heavy cruiser Pn”nz Eugen(IX-300), which “survived the tests, were towedto Kwajalein Atoll for decontamination andoffloading of munition. Progressive floodingfrom leaks, however, led to the capsizing andsinking of Pn”nz Eugen in shallow waters inKwajalein Atoll Lagoon in 1946. Anothertarget vessel, LCI-327, was stranded and“destroyed” on Bascombe (Mek) Island inKwajalein Atoll in 1947. These two vesselscomprise a secondary deposition of Crossroadstarget ships that are accessible for study.

The NPS team was able to visit nine of these23 vessels and document them to varying

One saf;d a ~50-lb. depth bomb by ‘~aggz”ng”itslive @se. (NPS, Lariy Murphy)

3

degrees. The team subsequently evaluated twoother vessels utilizing the Navy’s RemoteOperated Vehicle (ROV) video coverage ofthem, The major focus of the documentationwas the aircraft carrier Saratoga (CV-3) atBikini; a lesser degree of documentation wasachieved for the battleships Nagato andArkansas (BB-33), the submarines Pilotfish(SS-386) and Apogon (SS-308), YO-160, LCT-1175, LCM-4, and the attack transports Gilliam(APA-57) and Carlisle (APA-69) at Bikini, aswell as the cruiser Prinz Eugen at Kwajalein.In every case, the NPS found sufficient causeto determine that these vessels are indeedhistorically and archaeologically significant.

This report documents the pre-sinkingcharacteristics of each of the vessels, as well asan assessment of their careers and participationin Operation Crossroads, In the case of thenine vessels visited by the NPS team and thetwo ROV-dived vessels, a site description basedon the assessment dives and documentationefforts is included. The report includes theresults of several weeks of research thatprovided more concise information pertainingto target vessel characteristics, specificallyCrossroads modifications and outfitting.Among the more interesting archival discoverieswas that the firing assemblies for some testordnance on the test ships were incomplete,with inert elements (plaster) replacing eitherthe main or booster charges,

METHODOLOGY

Background Research

In preparation for the project, backgroundmaterial on Operation Crossroads and theindividual target ships included in the tests wasobtained by historian James Delgado throughseveral sources. Historical information abouteach vessel’s characteristics, history,participation in the tests, and the circumstancesof its sinking were obtained, as were materialspertaining to test planning, logistics, andresults.

In preparation for field activities, the plansmost likely to reflect the final configuration ofarmament and deck features present onSaratoga were sought. A set of microfilmed

plans showing Saratoga’s last pre-Crossroadsrefit at Bremerton Naval Shipyard in May 1945was obtained, From these and published plansof the ship, a deck plan and starboardelevation of the carrier as it was configured atthe end of the Second World War wereavailable. The scale of these drawings was toosmall to serve as a basis for field work, so theywere expanded using a Map-O-Graph machineto a final scale of l/8-inch per foot (1:96).This selection was based on the preference ofillustrators, who found this scale ideal whenmapping Arz”zona and other ships of similarsize.

Finally, scale drawings of ordnance and radarequipment were gleaned from naval manuals.Drawings of aircraft known to be aboardSaratoga were obtained from books. Thesewere mechanically reproduced and the scalechanged to match the deck plan. The resultwas a rough approximation of what the vesselwould have looked like on the eve ofOperation Crossroads, expressed in drawings ofthe deck plan and starboard elevation, eachmore than nine feet long. Mylar tracings ofsmall sections of their conjectural drawingswere carried on each dive by the illustratorsand altered to fit the archeological reality ofthe ship’s present appearance.

Site Description and Analvsis

To develop a narrative presentation of findingsfrom the research, archeologists Dan Lenihanand Larry Murphy, and historian JamesDelgado, swam through each site and recordedobservations or notes after the dive or onvideotape during the dive, To permit filming,a special experimental hookup was designedbefore the project to connect a full face mask(AGA) to a small underwater video camera.The mask was installed with a microphone thatpermitted the diver to speak directly onto avideotape as he panned the site with thecamera, This permitted onsite recording offield observations and also permitted mucheasier referencing of the viewer to the locationof the image on the site. On large sites,recording the location of the camera image hasbeen a consistent problem.

In addition to personal observation on the site,the Navy’s Bureau of Ships 1946 description of

4

some of the vessels helped separate primarydeposition from later site formationprocessions. Information on biologicalcommunities now present on the site wasobtained through video imaging for examinationboth at Bikini and on return to Santa Fe.

Information generated in this manner was alsoused for assessing recreational potential.Although the team was well equipped to assessnormal sport diving hazards (given theextensive shipwreck diving backgrounds of themembers), it was not qualified to evaluate thevolatility or status of live ordnance in thevessels or address the issue of residualradiation hazards without help from specialists.Cooperation with U.S. Navy ExplosiveOrdnance Demolition (EOD) personnel on sitewas very useful in gaining such anunderstanding of the former, and LawrenceLivermore Labs provided extensive insights intothe latter.

“Ima~ing the Shius”

Information for drawings that are part of thereport was generated through sketching thesites and comparing the results to plansobtained through the archival research. Somevideotape obtained in the dives was takenprimarily as an aid to illustration. Unlike mostother situations in which physical baselines havebeen used by SCRU to map sites, there wasenough integrity to the vessel fabric thatfeatures of the ships themselves could be usedas integral reference points.

Operational Diving Procedures

Given the 180-foot maximum depth of the shipsand the intensity of the diving operationsneeded to accomplish the objectives ofassessing and documenting the ships at aworking depths usually well over 100 feet, ifnot deeper, certain deep diving procedureswere implemented. Special dual manifoldswhich permitted total redundancy of first andsecond stages of breathing systems weretransported to the job site from Santa Fe.These were used to arrange cylinders suppliedby DOE into double tank configurations. Thediving day was divided into two dives per teamwith staged decompression anticipated on both

dives. The first dive of the day was alwaysplanned to be deeper or as deep as the seconddive.

An in-water oxygen decompression system wasalso brought from Santa Fe to allow a largemargin of safety in decompression profiles.Standard U.S. Navy air tables were used indecompression, but oxygen was substituted asthe breathing gas for 30-, 20-, and 10-footstops. Emergency evacuation procedures wereestablished and after the Navy arrived on thescene during the first field session, a routinesystem for accident management wasestablished that involved the use of their DivingMedical Officer and recompression chamber.During the 1990 field session no Navy medicalfacilities or chamber were available, soevacuation to Kwajalein would have beennecessary.

5

A routine was also established that every fourthday of operation there would be a 24-hourperiod during which no diving took place, e.g.,from “up” time of last dive on day 4 tobeginning of the first dive on day 5. This wasto help mitigate effects of “Safari Syndrome” inwhich the 12-hour decompression model of theU.S. Navy tables is pushed past its designlimits for multi-day repetitive diving. Thesespecial precautions were deemed particularlyimportant when no chamber was available onsite,

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ACTIVITIES

1989 Field Season

August 8-10: The team traveled from theirduty stations in Santa Fe, NewMexico, and Washington, D. C.,to Kwajalein, Marshall Islands.

August 11: Layover in Kwajalein. Teamtraveled around Kwajalein withpublic affairs liaison officervisiting WWII sites.

August 12: Prepared for departure toBikini, but Air Marshall Islandscame in overbooked and wouldnot take the team to Bikini,Obtained access to a boatduring latter part of the dayand snorkeled the wreck ofPrz”nz Eugen,

August 13: The plane did not come, so theHolmes and Narverrepresentative arranged for teamto dive on Prinz Eugen. Theteam conducted areconnaissance survey of thesite, obtaining video footage,photographs, and a sketch. Itwas discovered that thedescription of the ship in Jane’sFighting Ships was incorrect inthat it stated the ship had fourscrews rather than the three ithas. On the basis of this dive,a section on Pn”nz Eugen wasincluded in the results sectionof this report and specificmanagement recommendationswill be made for transmissionto the Base Commander.

August 14 Once again Air Marshall Islands(AMI) decided not to fly. KentHiner, Holmes & Narver’sproject manager, radioed anAM I plane en route toKwajalein from some otherpoint and negotiated a flight toBikini before they took theirscheduled return flight toMajuro in the Marshall Islands.

August 15:

August 16:

August 17:

August 18:

August 19:

August 20:

August 21:

After lunch, a first assessmentdive was made on the wreck ofSaratoga to a maximum depthof 100 feet.

During the first full day of diveoperations at Bikini, the teammade an assessment dive onSaratoga and commenced takingobservations for the site planand starboard profile of theship. The starboard side wasreconnoitered at 140 feet; theelevator was entered and itsimmediate area investigated, aswas the forward section of theship, particularly the 5-inch gunmount.

Dives on Saratoga focused onassessments of the island,including the penetration of theflag plot and bridge, a surveyof the port side of the ship,and the penetration of thehangar.

Mapping of the after area ofthe ship disclosed the firstmajor damage to Saratoga fromthe tests. A reconnaissance ofthe bottom of the lagoon at thestern and additional penetrationof the bridge were completed.

Additional dives were made onSaratoga to continue themapping of the wreck.

Saratoga’s island was morethoroughly investigated.

Dives on Saratoga began tofocus on mapping the starboardside of the ship for the profiledrawing.

Dives completed thepreliminary mapping ofSaratoga, focusing on theforward section, midships area,and island.

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August 22: Entire team dived on Arkansas,resulting in video and a sketchof the wreck. The diveassessed the more intact portside of the battleship at the160-foot level and the keel atthe 140-foot level.

August 23: A dive was made on Pilotfish,using for the first time theexperimental AGA-videohookup. Delgado narrated hisnotes on the dive directly ontoa tape at 150 feet, accompaniedby Lenihan, while the otherteam members sketched andphotographed the boat. Thesecond dive of the day, withDelgado again in the AGA,visited Nagato, exploring theafter section of the ship.

August 24: The only dive of the day wasmade to Gilliam, the accidentalzeropoint ship for the Able Testbomb’s detonation. The teamswam the length of the ship,sketching and photographing it.Larry Murphy departed with themajority of the equipment tocatch a Military Air Command(MAC) flight to Honolulu inorder to assure loading of thatequipment for another operationin the Aleutians.

August 25: The team made the last dive of1989 on Saratoga, penetratingthe hangar and more extensivelydocumenting the aircraft inside.That afternoon, remainingequipment was packed fordeparture.

August 26: The team made an earlyafternoon departure from Bikini,flying via AMI to Kwajalein.From Kwajalein, the teammembers separated--Lenihanand Nordby to Santa Fe;Livingston and Delgado toGuam.

1990 Field Season

April 25-27:

April 28:

April 29:

April 30:

May 1:

May 2:

May 3:

The team travelled from theirduty stations in Santa Fe, andWashington, D. C., to Honolulu,and then to Kwajalein.

Layover in Kwajalein. Theteam made a dive on PrinzEugen and obtained additionalphotos and information for amap of the wreck.

The team boarded the DOEresearch vessel G. W. Pierceand sailed from Kwajalein forBikini.

At sea most of the day, Bikiniwas sighted at 4:00 p.m., and at5:20 p.m., anchor was droppedoff the island. The team wasshuttled ashore.

First dives were made with teammembers working on the islandand in the hangar of Saratoga.

Mapping Saratoga continued.Lenihan and Murphy penetratedthe hangar to its aft bulkhead,locating additional torpedoes,rockets, and homing torpedoes(depth of 130 feet). Five-inchshells in the handling roomsand the open twin 5-inch/38mount were explored aft of thestack by Delgado. Afternoondives focused on the bow; thewindlass and emergency radiocompartments were penetrated.Delgado and NationalGeographic Society writer JohnEliot dove on a shallow waterinshore wreck, which proved tobe LCT-1175,

Documentation of Saratogacontinued. Arkansas was divedon and port cas em atepenetrated by Lenihan andMurphy at a depth of 170 feet.Wreck of LCM-4 snorkeled and

e Bikini Council sent a dive team to pardcipate in the documentation of the ships. Here, the teamtakes measurements to the corner of the blast gauge tower next to Saratoga’s elevator. (NPS, LarryMurphy)

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identified near that of LCT-1175by Delgado.

May 4: Lenihan, Delgado, and Murphyswam under Nagato from sternto the aft end of the bridge(depth of 170 feet). Nordbyand Livingston continuedmapping operations on Saratoga,and Lenihan and John Eliotdived on YO-160 in afternoon,videotaping deck machinery.

May 5: Lenihan, Murphy, and Delgadocontinued documentation ofNagato, videotaping andphotographing upturned bridge,forward turrets, and stern.Livingston and Nordbycontinued mapping operationson Saratoga (portside). Entireteam worked on Saratoga inafternoon.

May 7: Lenihan and Murphy worked onNagato bow; Delgado,Livingston, and Nordby workedon port bow of Saratoga.

May 8: Entire team conducted “blitz”dive on Nagato stern (depth of170 feet) obtaining sketches,video, and photography. Inafternoon, focus shifted back tocompletion of work on Saratoga.

May 9: Murphy conducted training divefor Bikinians, teaching themunderwater oxyarc cuttingtechniques using car battery andoxygen. Lenihan was able tomeet briefly with Bikinian eldersand Jack Niedenthal (BikiniLiaison) during layover of AMIflight on Enyu. Some of theproject results includingdrawings were reviewed.

May 6: Entire team worked ondocumentation of LCT-1175.

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CHAPTER TWO: OPERATION CROSSROADS

James P. Delgado

The end of the Pacific War, and hence WorldWar II, was brought about by the surrender ofJapan following the dropping of atomic bombson the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.These were, respectively, the second and thirdnuclear detonations on the surface of theplanet. The first bomb was detonated atAlamagordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, at5:30 a.m. The second bomb was detonatedover Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m.

The third bomb was detonated over Nagasakion August 9, 1945, at 10:58 a.m. The fourthand fifth bombs were detonated during theatomic tests at Bikini Atoll in the MarshallIslands.

The first large-scale atomic weapons effectstests conducted by the United States, the“Able” test detonation of July 1, 1946, at 9:00a.m. local time at Bikini, and the “Baker” test

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detonation of July 25, 1946, at approximately8:35 a.m. local time, were the first two of thethree-part “Operation Crossroads” tests. (Thethird detonation, the “Charlie” test, wascanceled.) Formulated at the war’s end andapproved by President Harry S Truman onJanuary 10, 1946, Operation Crossroads was notonly the first of more than 850 publiclyannounced at omit weapons tests. It was amajor demonstration of the power of the bomband of the nation that had produced and usedit, the United States. The name was selected

because the atomic bomb represented a“crossroads’’--f rom conventional to nuclear war.

The tests involved assembling a fleet of 242ships, 42,000 men, 156 airpla;es, and tens ofthousands of tons of equipment, ordnance, andmaterial at Bikini, as well as relocating the 162residents of the atoll--beginning an odyssey thathas earned for these displaced people thesobriquet of “nuclear nomads” of the Pacific.Observers from Congress, from other nations(including the Soviet Union), andrepresentatives of “U.S. press, radio, pictorialservices, magazines, etc.” made these tests themost public and the most reported of anynuclear weapons tests.’ The inherent messageof nuclear weapons was underscored at Bikini,and has since become increasingly the subjectof public debate and concern as the progeny ofthe Manhattan project multiplied until by 1986,according to one nonofficial estimate, theUnited States had manufactured 60,000warheads of 71 types for 116 different weaponssystems.2

Initially, the development and use of atomicweapons was welcomed and celebrated in theUnited States because the destruction of twoJapanese cities had brought a fierce enemy tohis knees through the fear of rapidannihilation. The toll of fighting at Palau, IwoJima, and Okinawa was still vividly recalled.Many thousands of American lives would havebeen lost in a bloody invasion of the Japanesehome islands. Consciences were salved whenthe death toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whileterrible, was less than the number of Japanesecivilians killed in the B-29 fire-bombing raidson Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe. Soon, however,as historian Paul Boyer has noted, a grim

realization set in. Moral implications of the

use of the atomic bomb troubled someobservers. More pragmatically, many realizedthat the bomb was a world-threatening weapon,The spectre of nuclear Armageddonovershadowed the globe, and in the UnitedStates, the understanding that the bomb couldalso someday be used against the United Statesbrought the first chills to the Cold War.General H, H. “Hap” Arnold, head of the U.S.Army Air Forces, was the first to publiclyprophetize that World War 111 would not lastas long as World War II; World War 111 wouldbe over in hours, with no one left to determinewho had won,

Widespread comprehension of the bomb’s grimreality was not immediate. It took many years,the detonation of a nuclear bomb by the SovietUnion, and the development of vast arsenals ofmore potent nuclear weapons with the capacity

to kill every living thing on earth several timesover, for fear to set in. Yet until then, peopleaccepted the bomb as a deadly and powerfulbeneficial force. At the very beginning, though,the message was clear, In 1946, a press reportnoted that while “a large number of scientistsare looking forward to the forthcomingexplosion... [the] least curious.., are the atomicscientists. They take a poor view of the entireoperation, maintaining that the explosions atHiroshima and Nagasaki have perfectly welldemonstrated the basic fact that the atomicbomb is too powerful a weapon to leaveoutside the confines of international controland that Operation Crossroads will simplyunderline this truth ....”3 The commander ofJoint Task Force One which conductedOperation Crossroads was Vice Adm. WilliamHenry Purnell Blandy. Blandy, writing in theforeword to Bombs at Bikini, the “official”public report on the tests, noted “the atomicbomb is definitely not ‘just another weapon;’ itsdestructive power dwarfs all previous weapons.Observers at Bikini saw the bomb sink greatsteel warships and, with its penetrating nuclearradiation, reach into ships’ interiors to kill testanimals, The explosions in air and underwaterwere very different spectacles, but their endresults mean the same: death and destructionon an enormous scale.”4

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Operation Crossroads was interpreted as adefensive measure to the American public.Testing the effect of the atomic bomb onwarships and their crews would specifically“improve our Navy.” According to Bombs atBikini,

We want ships which are tough, evenwhen threatened by atomic bombs; wewant to keep the ships afloat, propellersturning, guns firing we want to protectthe crews so that, if fighting is necessary,they can fight well today and returnhome unharmed tomorrow . . ..theunequaled importance of the atomicbomb ....shakes the very foundations ofmilitary strategy.5

However, the concept of the bomb’sdeployment against ships was as an offensiveweapon.Committee1946, “The

Admiral Blandy told the Senateon Atomic Energy on January 24,ultimate results of the tests, so far

13

as the Navy is concerned, will be theirtranslation into terms of United States seapower. Secondary purposes are to affordtraining for Army Air Forces personnel inattack with the atomic bomb against ships andto determine the effect of the atomic bombupon military installations and equipment.”e

The history of the war, beginning with thesurprise attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor,and a hard four-year fight at a tremendous costinstilled a strong sense of the best defensebeing offense. The atomic bomb provided thestrongest offensive capability available, andnuclear deterrence and the Cold Warinvocation of the necessity of nuclear capabilitywere first aired for Operation Crossroads:

The tests stand out clearly as a defensivemeasure. We are seeking to primarilylearn what types of ships, tacticalformations and strategic dispositions ofour own naval forces will best surviveattack by the atomic weapons of othernations, should we ever have to facethem. By no stretch of the imaginationcan such steps of caution and economybe taken as a threat of aggression. If,because of such a false assumption, wefailed to carry out these experiments, tolearn the lessons which they can teachus, our designers of ships, aircraft andground equipment, as well as ourtacticians, strategists and medical officerswould be groping their way along a darkroad which might lead to another andworse Pearl Harbor.’

In April 1946, Admiral Blandy, reporting that“some of our leading scientists” agreed that“other nations with even a moderate degree ofindustrialization can manufacture atomic bombsin a few years ....our Armed Forces must bekept modern, and one of the first steps inmodernizing them is to learn the fullcapabilities of any new weapon which may bebrought against them.”8 Among the moreinteresting aspects of Operation Crossroads wasthe inclusion of foreign observers from 11countries, among them the Soviet Union, arival for global influence.

THE CONCEPT OF A NAVAL TESTEVOLVES

The news of the atomic bombing of Hiroshimastarted discussions among naval circles as tothe new weapon’s effect on ships; this questionwas posed on the floor of the Senate onAugust 25, 1945, when Senator Brien McMahonof Connecticut stated:

In order to test the destructive powersof the atomic bomb against naval vessels,I would like,,,Japanese naval ships takento sea and an atomic bomb dropped onthem. The resulting explosion shouldprove to us just how effective the atomicbomb is when used against the giantnaval ships. I can think of no better usefor these Jap ships.g

The idea of using the bomb against ships wasnot new; “even in 1944, Los Alamos scientistswere looking into the possibilities of eventuallyatomic-bombing Japanese fleet concentrations,”specifically the Japanese naval base at TrukLagoon, but by that late date the ImperialJapanese Navy was already decimated byconventional warfare.’ 0 American submarineswaged a terrible war of attrition: disastrous seabattles and bombing raids sank most Japanesecapital ships, leaving a pitiful remnant of theonce formidable fleet at war’s end.

The destruction of the 48 surviving surfacewarships of the Imperial Japanese Navysurrendered at war’s end was guaranteedregardless of whether or not the atomic bombwas used.ll The new Japan would bedemilitarized and its remaining vessels sunk orscrapped. On August 28, 1945, Fleet Adm,Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of theU.S. Fleet, recommended that the remainingJapanese vessels be destroyed. Lt. Gen. B. M.Giles, on MacArthur’s staff in Tokyo, followedSenator McMahon’s lead and proposed onSeptember 14, 1945, that atomic bombs be usedto sink the Japanese ships. The proposal wassupported by Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay,architect of the fire-bombing raids on Japan.Gen. H. H. “Hap” Arnold concurred, andasked the Navy on September 18 that “anumber of the Japanese vessels be made

available to the Army Air Forces for use intests involving atomic bombs and otherweapons.”12

This proposal met with a positive responsefrom the Navy. As early as June 1945, theNavy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) and Bureauof Ordnance (BuOrd) had recommended a“comprehensive program for testing highexplosives against merchant and warship hulks,captured enemy vessels, and United States Navycombatant ships about to be stricken from theactive list. ”ls The Underwater Explosion

Program had been approved by the Chief ofNaval Operations, but the deployment of theatomic bomb changed the scope of the effort.On August 28, the same day Admiral Kingrecommended destroying the Japanese ships,the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Vice Adm.E. L. Cochrane, informed the UnderwaterExplosion Program staff that they “must beprepared to undertake broad-scale experiments

with the atomic bomb to clear up its majorinfluence on naval warfare” as their firstpriority. The Chief of Naval Operations wasnotified by BuShips and BuOrd that “full-scaletesting...both underwater and above water,against ships of various types” using the atomicbomb was imperative. 14 At the same time, theUnited States Navy, which had built aformidable fleet of more than 1,200 shipsduring the war, was scaling down.

At the end of August 1945, Secretary of theNavy James Forrestal suggested that the Navywould be reduced to a 400-ship force with8,000 aircraft, with the remaining ships held inreserve. This situation provided the Navy witha large number of potentially expendable shipsfor weapons testing, Questioned about theatomic bomb, Forrestal strongly underscoredthe fact that the bomb would ultimately be putto use at sea, noting that “control of the sea bywhatever weapons are necessary is the Navy’smission.” The next day, The New York Times,reporting on the Navy’s opposition to mergingthe War and Navy Departments, noted that theNavy was probably amenable to joint operationsregarding “scientific development s,” andprophesied that “it would not at all besurprising” within the next six months for aproposal “to test the effects of the new atomic

14

bomb against warships. There has beenspeculation...whether the atomic bomb... mightcause the bottoms of steel ships to disintegrateand thus sink the entire fleet...some Navyauthorities say they would like to see such atest conducted against some of our oldbattleships, for, if the atomic bomb works thisway, they want to know it .“15

Given the Navy’s strong interest in the bomband its commitment to the UnderwaterExplosion Program and that program’s prioritybeing atomic testing, and with the Army AirForces’ proposal in hand, Admiral King agreedon October 16, 1945, to atomic bombing of theJapanese ships as a coordinated action of theArmy and Navy under the control of the JointChiefs of Staff, with “a few of our own modernnaval vessels... included in the target array” forair and underwater detonations, following theadvice and plans of the Underwater ExplosionProgram staff.’e On October 24, The New YorkTimes reported that the Navy was to test thebomb to assess its effect on ships bothdispersed and “massed at anchorage as in PearlHarbor on Dec. 7, 1941.’”7 It was not untilDecember 10, 1945, however, that an officialannouncement of joint Army-Navy tests of thebomb was made. The New York Times,

covering the announcement, stated that thedetails had yet to be worked out, specificallynoting that the Army Air Forces “have beenworking aggressively to get a leading role inthe experiment to make sure it would not bean all-Navy affair.’”e While hotly denied, theissue of Army-Navy competition was continuallyraised throughout the tests; a July 30, 1946,article in The New York Times quoted anunnamed Army officer’s attacks on the“battleship mentality” of “die-hard” navalofficers, noting “in the event of a future war...aNavy as we know it now will be utterly helplesson either side.”

The concept of the tests was appealing formore than technical reasons; while “it is indeedroutine to test each new weapon in all majorapplications,” including against naval targets,“the novelty of the proposed test of the atomicbomb against naval vessels would lie in theunprecedented scale and world-wide importanceof the tests.’”9 Even more attractive was the

overt symbolism of the atomic bomb destroyingthe surviving capital ships of the JapaneseNavy; one early 1946 newspaper account,accompanied by an Associated Pressphotograph of 24 battered-looking submarinesand destroyers, crowed “Trapped Remnants ofJap Fleet Face Destruction in United StatesNavy Atom-Bomb Tests.” Another symbolicand significant aspect of the tests was ademonstration that the United States was nowthe world leader; it alone possessed the secretof nuclear power, it had a stockpile of atomicbombs capable of being used again, and it wassufficiently wealthy to expend three (theoriginal number of planned detonations) ofthese bombs and nearly a hundred ships in themost costly and elaborate weapons testsperformed on earth up to that time.

Considerable interest in the tests by scientistsassessing the weapon’s effects was publiclytouted. In July 1946, Life magazine reportedthat “a large number of scientists are lookingforward to the forthcoming explosion ....neverhaving had a chance to test the effects ofatomic energy in their own areas ofknowledge,” because they would have “alaboratory example of what may happen to theworld and the animate and inanimate things onit in the event that war comes again. ”2°Throughout Operation Crossroads, and well

after, “scientific benefits” of the tests werestressed. These benefits were for the military,which learned from Crossroads and thehundreds of tests that followed to makestronger, deadlier nuclear weapons:

At Hiroshima and Nagasaki a fewphotographs and pressure measurementswere made of the explosions, but almostnothing of value to physicists waslearned. Physicists wanted actual valuesof the following: pressure, impulse,accelerations, shock-wave velocity, rangesand intensities of gamma radiation,decrease of the gamma radiation duringthe first few hours. And medical men,arriving at the scene late, found itdifficult to tell what the early symptomsof the injured persons had been, andwhether the injuries resulted primarilyfrom flash burn, gamma radiation, or

15

(1) DD Anderson (11) ARDC”13 (21) APA Catron

(2) Ss Apogon (12) YO-160 (22) APA Crittenden

(3) BB Arkansas (13) LCT-1114 (23) APA Dawson

(4) APA Carlisle (14) APA Banner (24) SS Dentuda

(5) APA Gil/iam (15) APA Barrow (25) APA Fal/on

(6) DD Lamson (16) APA Bracken (26) APA Gasconade

(7) BB Nagato (17) APA Briscoe (27) DD Holmes

(8) SS Pilotfish (18) APA Brule (28) CVL Independence(9) CL Sakawa (19) APA Butte (29) DD Mayrant(10) CV Saratoga (20) APA Carteret (30) DD Mustin

\@\@ ,@ @

\

The Able Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation. Shaded vessels sank as a result of the

blast.

16

(41) ss Wpja~~

(31)BBh@WYork (42)DD $@c~

(32) BB Nevada (43) I)D ~db~~(33) Ss F’arcfie(34) BB Pennsylvania

(44) DD TtiPPe

(35) CA Pensacola(45) ss ?i~nu

(36) IX Prinz Eugen(46) DD Wainwtight

(37)DD Rfii~~(47) DD l?’ib~n

(38) CA Salt hke Ci@(4s) LCM-1

(39) SS Searaven(49)LST”52

(40) SS Skate(50) LSM-60

(51) YOG-83(52) LsT-133(53) LcT-327

(54)Lc’r-332(55)LCT-674(56) LCT-816(57) LCT-818

\@

The Baker Target Array, showing the actual point of detonation.Shaded vessels sank as a result of the

blast. Both i[iustrations were redrawn by Robbyn Jackson of the NPS Historic American EngineeringRecord from JTF-I sketches.

17

from secondary factors such as fires, andfloods, and lack of food, over-exertion,and lack of medical attention.21

The Trinity detonation at the Alamagordo AirBase Range (now White Sands Missile Range)in July 1945 was a weapons proof shot;Hiroshima and Nagasaki were combat uses thathad to be scrupulously analyzed after the factfor effect determinations. OperationCrossroads was of particular importance to themilitary; it was an opportunity for weaponsscientists to assess, under a controlledenvironment, the effects of the bomb.

The bombs for Crossroads were delivered bythe Los Alamos scientists who had alsoprovided the bombs used for Trinity andagainst Japan. According to one report, theCrossroads bombs were drawn from the U.S.stockpile of nine implosion-type core devices;these weapons were nearly identical to the MkIII “Fat Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki.22These weapons reportedly yielded a 23-kilotoneffect, equal to 23,000 tons of TNT. (“Official”yield credited at the time was 20 kilotons,)The bombs “contained a proximity-fuze systemof extremely great reliability, sensitivity, andabsolute accuracy. The detonation system wasset for an altitude of 515 feet.”2a

Initially three tests were planned in order toassess the effects of pressure, impulse,shock-wave velocity, optical radiation, andnuclear radiation particular to the bomb. Theair burst was reportedly to duplicate theconditions of the drop on Hiroshima, this timeover water. The second shallow underwaterblast was to simulate an attack on a fleet atanchor. The third test (cancelled) was to takeplace in the lee of Oruk Island, off the atoll,in 1,000 to 2,000 feet of water, with a smallnumber of vessels moored above the blastsolely to test the underwater effect of thebomb.

A variety of preparations were made to handlelogistics, relocation of the Bikinians, and thevarious scientific studies and tests that wereperformed at the atoll. The 242 vesselsinvolved in Operation Crossroads were thesubject of the most preparation: organized in

I \A Mark ZH “Fat Man” bomb casing. (&PyCandace Clifford)

three groups--target ships (combatant), targetships (auxiliaries), and support ships. Thesevessels were placed “in the best possiblematerial condition” at Pearl Harbor, Bremerton,Terminal Island, Hunter’s Point, Philadelphia,and at Bikini.24

PREPARING FOR THE TESTS

Preparations for the tests involved surveys ofstructural and watertight integrity, installationof test equipment, stripping of armament andother items not required as test equipment, theremoval of “certain items of historical interestor of a critical nature” from each ship--usuallybells, nameplates, commemorative plaques,ship’s silver sets--and their transfer to “theCurator of the Navy Department” inWashington, D.C. 25 The target ships were thenloaded “with specified amounts of ammunition,fuel oil, gasoline, water ....Ships were loaded asclosely as possible to the battle or operatingdisplacement of the ships. Varying percentagesof the wartime allowance of ammunition and ofthe normal capacity of fuel oil and gasolinewere carried in the ships’ magazines andbunker tanks. All gasoline drums, airplanesloaded with gasoline, and similar items wereplaced in pans with coamings approximately 18inches high to prevent dispersal of thegasoline.”2e In some cases emergency repairswere made to battIe-damaged ships for thetests. USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), for example,had a cofferdam patch on the hull where a

18

torpedo had holed the ship in August 1945.This patch was reinforced and tightened, and

a special watertight box was built around asteam steering engine shaft which, if flooded,would be damaged if the shaft bearings wereimmersed in salt water.27 Other preparationsincluded the establishment of vertical andhorizontal reference lines for list and twistdetermination, installation of deck compressiongauges, installation of special boarding ladderson the shell plating from waterline to deckedge, and painting of frame numbers on thehull and decks. A full photographic recordwas made of all “special installations.”28

Factors involved in selecting the ships rangedfrom specific types and methods of construction

to specific materials, In its enabling directive,Joint Task Force One was instructed to includenot only captured enemy vessels in the targetarray but to also test vessels “representative ofmodern U.S. naval and merchant types ....”However, “it was not feasible to include vesselsof all U.S. naval types--especially the mostmodern types. ” A range of vessels wereselected to include welded and rivetedconstruction and the evolution of shipcompartmentalization; “although the oldervessels have extensive subdivision, recent shipshave more complete transverse water-tightnessto high-level decks and incorporate principlesof longitudinal framing.”2g Therefore, the finaltarget array included for the most part vesselsthat were “over-age or of obsoletedesign--which would otherwise have beendecommissioned and sold for scrap. However,a modern aircraft carrier and several modernheavy-hulled submarines were included also.”3°Five battleships were selected, one being theJapanese Nagato, which was presumablyincluded solely to sink it. The U.S. battleships,all of a type made obsolete by the newerclasses, were included because “although not ofmost modern design [they] possessed greatresistance to battle damage” because of heavyhulls, torpedo-protection systems of multiplelongitudinal bulkheads, heavy armor, double ortriple bottoms, and some 600 watertightcompartments.31

Four cruisers--two U. S., one German (PrinzEugen), and one Japanese (Sakawa)--were

included. The American-built ships were“excellent examples of prewar rivetedconstruction, with structure somewhat heavierthan any cruisers up to the latest 8-in. cruisersbuilt during the war.” Sakawa and Prinz Eugenwere selected because “they represented thelatest in cruiser design of Germany and

Japan.”32 Sakawa was intended to sink, as wasNagato; both vessels were moored within a1,000-yard perimeter of the designatedzeropoint for both tests, while Pn”nz Eugen wasmoored outside of the immediate blast area.Saratoga and Independence, the two carriers,were selected to include an old, pre-war carrierand a modern, but less than satisfactory lightcarrier. (The Independence class, a wartimenecessity, were light, hastily constructed ships.)

Saratoga’s selection was justified as follows:

Subdivision of the Saratoga was unusuallycomplete; she had approximately 1000watertight compartments. There were 22main transverse bulkheads and twocontinuous longitudinal bulkheadsextended 70 percent of the length. Twowatertight platforms extended fore andaft of the machinery spaces. Theunderwater protection was very similar inarrangement to that of modernbattleships and large carriers. An innerbottom above the bottom shell was fittedbetween the innermost torpedo bulkheadsfor about 80 percent of the length?3

The 12 target destroyers selected representedthree immediate prewar types--the Mahan,Gridley, and Sims classes. The attacktransports were “typical of modernmerchant-ship practice, with good transversesubdivision..,. These vessels were designed andbuilt during the war and were essentially ofall-welded construction, with very few rivetedjoints.”34 Target landing craft were included“more for the purpose of determining theeffects of wave action than for determiningdirect effects of pressure on the huIls.”35

Three reinforced concrete vessels wereused--ARDC-l3, YO-160, and YOG-83. Thesethree vessels were selected for dispersal withinthe target array from a group of craftscheduled for disposal to satisfy the Navy’s

19

1I

J_____________________ ___________ __ _-—_ _

I

I

/Bureau of Yards and Docks’ interest “in the

damage to reinforced concrete structures at

Hiroshima and Nagasaki_ The lack of suitableland areas at Bikini made construction ofsimilar installations impractical, even if there

had been time,”a” The eight target submarineswere “selected from those scheduled for the

reserve fleets or for disposal by scrapping.

They represented the two major types [the

Gato and Balao classes], light and heavy hullconstruction, built in recent years by [~mong

others] the three submarine building yards of

the Electric Boat Company and the naval

shipyards at Portsmouth and Mare Island.”37

Some vessels were individually selected becauseof age, previous battle damage, and,occasionally, to replace ships selected but notavailable. LCT-705 and LCT-1013 were placedin the Able target array to serve as “catchersto collect samples of any fission products whichmight fall out of the atomic cloud.”sa The

selection of 35 “major” vessels--from the

battleships and carriers to the submarines--waspublicly announced on January 24, 1946, at the

first Crossroads press conference in

Washington,39

Opposition to the tests surfaced for a varietyof reasons, among them the destruction of theships. One objection was to the cost of the

various target ships: in March 1946, Admiral

Blandy testified before the Senate Naval AffairsCommittee that the construction costs for thetarget ships totaled $450 million, but noted thatall the ships were obsolescent except for fivesubmarines and the light carrierIndependence. 40 Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois

criticized the tests as a “grandiose display ofatomic destruction” and argued that the targetships, if no longer useful for naval purposes,could be converted “into temporary homes forveterans.”41 One citizen, writing to protest the

tests, was angry not over the loss of ships, butof valuable steel, and noted that airplaneengineers tested models in wind tunnels andthus “do not need to destroy full size planes tosee just what the planes will do under certainconditions .... Scientists do not need to killelephants to determine the reaction ofchemicals and drugs. They use small mice.”42

h response to criticism over the cost, Blandyresponded on April 16 that the total costs ofthe tests would probably not exceed the totalcost of “one large new ship,” since the obsoletetargets had been declared surplus and even ifsunk “the cost for at least 90 percent would be

only their scrap value,” which the admiralestimated at $100 million,4s In response toletters protesting the use of the target ships,Joint Task Force One’s form letter responsewas that the ships were either obsolescent or“in excess of the number required to keep our

post-war Navy at its proper strength.” Theletter emphasized that not all ships would bedestroyed; even “those badly damaged..,may betowed back to the United States and sold asscrap. Still others may be placed back intoservice,.. .“44 One letter writer wanted to placetarget ships in personal service: n-year-oldMax Ladewasser “and gang” wanted some ofthe ships presented to the children of thecountry; specifically “I would like to have areal P,T, boat which we could run on LakeMichigan.”45

Some protests focused on the selection ofindividual ships as targets, specifically thebattleships New York and Pennsylvania. WhenNew York sailed from its namesake city inJanuary 1946 for Bikini, the loss of the shipwas lamented as veterans’ groups and the statechamber of commerce lobbied to save it. “NewYork may lose forever its most useful andfitting war memorial unless something is doneto prevent destruction of our century’s OldIronsides as an atom bomb target. This shipshould be permanently on display in NewYork.,.,” An unnamed officer stated that “Idon’t see why she couldn’t have been given tothe State, just as her sister ship, the Texas, wasgiven to that State.”4E The response from Joint

Task Force One was that while “it is regrettedthat such ships as the New York cannot bespared and exhibited as memorials, it is feltthat this gallant battleship could perform nomore valuable or distinguished service for ourpost-war Navy than it will render in thehistoric tests ....”47 It was also noted that “many

other ships of the target group have equallyglorious battle records and are similarly

..

20

OPELATION CROSSm~Ds.-.XRAP VALUE OF TARGET S1-i I IX3

4 SB

~3,700,m-.

unt 1asicForce une press release Chartdeptcting ‘kcrap”costs of Operation Crossroads. (U.S. Naval Institute

distinguished historically in their respectiveclasses. It is sincerely regretted that such shipswhich have served with distinction in our Navyfor so many years cannot be spared ....”48

The criticism by some nuclear scientists thatthe tests would add little or nothing to theunderstanding of the bomb was in part basedon their assertion that ships, as mechanicallystronger structures than buildings, would remainafloat and undamaged, lessening fear of thebomb by people who expected the totaldestruction of the fleet prophesied by thepress, thus creating a “feeling of false security.”Two explosive weapons had already beendetonated--Able and Baker’s bombs wereidentical to the Nagasaki weapon. The“greatest weakness” of the tests, however, was

that as of early February 1946,

no provisions are indicated for studyingthe effects of the bomb’s radiation on

ships’ crews. What might happen in areal case, is that a large ship, about amile away from the explosion, wouldescape sinking, but the crew would bekilled by the deadly burst of radiationsfrom the bomb, and only a ghost shipwould remain, floating unattended on thevast waters of the ocean. If not killedoutright, the crew may well suffer suchstrong radiation damage, as to become

critically ill a few days later.4g

This prescient comment’s various implicationswere in part answered by the decision to placeanimals on the target ships to study the bomb’seffects on them. Protests against the use ofthe animals were numerous; among the lettersreceived were a few that grimly reflected onthe use of enemy vessels as targets, with theaddition of “Germans and Japanese who havebeen condemned to death by proper courts ofjurisdiction.”5° One writer suggested that “in

21

Considerable protest arose over the exposure of animals aboard the taqet shtjm. Two goats aboard USSEk?IZQZ (National Archives)

lieu of the 4000 innocent animals...a like orgreater number of war criminals be usedinstead. It would seem to me to be more inkeeping with the principles of justice andhumanity to punish those responsible for theagonies the world was plunged into throughtheir actions rather than to cause suffering tocreatures whose only sin is existence at a lowerbiological level than our own.”51

The target vessels were assembled at Bikinibetween May and June, 1946. They weremoored at numbered berths, carefully arrangedaround the projected surface or groundzeropoint so that graduated scales of damagewould be inflicted on the ships. A largenumber of vessels were required “in order togain the greatest amount of usefulinformation.,, and... determine the completerelationship between ship damage and distancefrom the explosion,” The necessity of a largetarget fleet for Able test “was especially clearafter it had been decided to drop the bombfrom an airplane.,.it was clear that there wouldbe uncertainty as to the point of detonation.”52Ninety-five naval vessels, representing theproducts of U. S., Japanese, and Germanshipyards, were selected as the target fleet forOperation Crossroads. This fleet consisted of

two aircraft carriers, five battleships, fourcruisers, twelve destroyers, eight submarines,nineteen attack transports (APAs), six LCVPS,five LSTS, one LSM, sixteen LCTS, seven LCIS,six LCMS, and three auxiliary barges, namelyone YO, one YOG, and one ARDC.53 It isimportant to note that 88 vessels, not the fullnumber of target ships, were deployed in theAble target array. The number of U.S.combatant vessels used as targets was limitedto 33 ships by Congressional legislation (H.Res, 307) authorizing the tests; “considerablepublic feeling developed to the effect thatvaluable vessels were going to be destroyed;Congress reacted by putting an upper limit tothe number of U.S. combatant ships. ”54Though the landing craft and auxiliaries werenaval vessels, they were not commissioned andhence were not counted; nor were the attacktransports, which arguably were also not“combat ant” ships, making 28 American-built“combatant ships” counting only the carriers,cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and submarines.Disappointment not withstanding, the pressproudly reported at Bikini that the target fleetformed the world’s fifth or sixth largest navy,with only the navies of the U. S., Great Britain,the Soviet Union, France, “and perhapsSweden” surpassing it.5G

22

THE ABLE TEST

The target arrays were selected “to provide thebest instrumentation possible, rather than beplaced in a tactical formation. This policy wasapproved for both tests.”56 The vessels wereclosely grouped together near the center of thearray “because of the... decrease of pressurewith increase in distance from the zeropoint.”57The test array for the Able test included 24vessels within the 1,000-yard radius of Nevada,the designated zeropoint, while 21 vessels wereplaced within the l,OOO-yard radius of the pointof detonation for the Baker test.

Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requiredthe target arrays to graduate the level ofdamage; “this involved dispersing the targetfleet so that individual ships of each major

type would be placed in positions ranging fromclose... for major damage... to appreciabledistances...for light damage.”56 Since sufficientnumbers of each type of vessel were notavailable, the best layout, geometric lines, bow

adhered to only for those ships that werepresent in large quantities--landing craft,destroyers, and attack transports. These shipswere berthed at regular intervals along a single,curved (to keep one ship from partiallyshielding another) line extending radially fromthe designated zeropoint, which was 5,400 yardsoff the beach of Bikini Island. The battleshipNevada was selected as the zeropoint “target”for Able because it was “the most rugged ship

available.”5g

The target arrays were different for each test.The Able target array consisted of 78 vessels;the Baker array consisted of 75. After theseveral vessels sank in the Able test, some ofthe ships in the “fringes” of the test area wereshifted closer to the zeropoint to replace thelost vessels. Additionally, other vessels wereplaced farther out in the Able array to sparethem from major damage since they were to bethe primary targets in the Baker test; amongthese ships was the carrier Saratoga.60 TheAble test detonation, originally scheduled for.-

and stern on, and broadside to the blast, was May 15, was postponed s~ weeks to allow,

according to some opinions, for Congressionalobservers to be on the scene. The Able testbomb, nicknamed “Gilds” for the recent RitaHayworth motion picture of that name, andstenciled with the likeness of Miss Hayworth,was dropped from the B-29, “Dave’s Dream,”on the morning of July 1, 1946. The bombmissed the designated zeropoint, Nevada,probably because of, according to some experts,poor aerodynamics caused by its high-drag tailfin structure, detonating instead 2,130 feet fromthe target and 518 feet directly above and 50yards off the bow of the attack transportGilliam .61

The Able burst sank five vessels: the attacktransports Gilliam and Carlisle, closest to thedetonation, sank almost immediately. Twonearby destroyers, Anderson and Lamson, werealso severely damaged and sank within hours,followed by the Japanese light cruiser Sakawa,which sank on July 2. Other vessels wereseverely damaged, the most dramatic damage

occurring to the light carrier Independence andthe submarine Skate, both of which were for allintents and purposes wrecked. Six ships wereimmobilized, and 23 small fires were started onvarious ships, The badly damaged ships wereall within a 1000-yard radius of the zeropointalong with Hughes (DD-41O), which was amongthe more damaged destroyers and laterrequired beaching to avoid its sinking, thebattleships Arkansas and Nagato, ARDC-13,and YO-160, all badly burnt and battered. Thefears of the physicists opposed to the tests--that contrary to expectations the results wouldbe less than cataclysmic, thus creating a falsesense of security--were realized. The New YorkTimes’ account of Able noted that while thebomb had exploded with a flash “ten timesbrighter than the sun” over the target ships,“only two were sunk, one was capsized, andeighteen were damaged. ”e2 The foreignobservers were unimpressed, reported the press;the Russian observers shrugged their shouldersand the Brazilian observer said he felt “so so”

24

25

about the blast. es Of the 114 pressrepresentatives at Bikini, only 75 stayed for theBaker test.

Following the Able detonation, Navy teamsmoved in to fight fires, reboard the ships, andtow sinking vessels to Enyu for beaching. Asthis work progressed, diving commenced on thesunken ships for “a full assessment of thedamage done by the air blast.”E4 The firstdives were made on July 7, when Gilliam wasdived on, followed by Carlisle, Anderson, andLamson. Inspection of the ships, recovery oftest gauges (particularly from Gilliam, whichwas the highest priority for instrumentationrecovery because the ship was the accidentalzero~oint for the blast). and underwater

attention turned to the preparations for theBaker test.65 Expectations for greater damageduring the Baker test were high; Secretary ofthe Navy James Forrestal, touring the targetships after Able, when asked why the firstdetonation had not sunk the entire fleet,remarked that “heavily built and heavilyarmored ships are difficult to sink unless theysustain underwater damage,”G6 News reports

and military and public interest focused onblast effect. The effect of radiation was for themost part ignored; a short news item filed bythe Associated Press on July 15 noted that thetest animals were “dying like flies .... Animalsthat appear healthy and have a normal bloodcount one day, ‘drop off the next day,’ anofficer said ....”G7 This scarcely noted account

phot~graphy continued ~ntil July 14, when was a harbinger of the future.”

F ‘.+ &s.

26

Baker blasts out of the lagoon a haZfsecond after detonation. SaratoEa is visible in the white blast slick asthe column forms nearby. (U.S. Naval Historical Center)

THE BAKER TEST

The Baker test bomb, nicknamed “Helen ofBikini, ” was placed in a steel caissonmanufactured by Los Alamos from the conningtower of USS Salmon (SS-182) which had beenscrapped in April 1946. With “Made in NewMexico” chalked on its side by Carl Hatch,U.S. Senator from New Mexico and anobserver at the tests, the caisson wassuspended 90 feet below the well in the steellanding ship LSM-60.es The bomb wasdetonated on the morning of July 25, 1946.The blast displaced 2.2 million cubic yards andcreated a 25-foot deep crater with a maximumdiameter of 1,100 yards and a minimumdiameter of 600 yards; the segment of thecrater deeper than 20 feet covered an area 250to 700 yards in diameter. It was estimated thatabout 500,000 cubic yards of material fell backinto the crater, with the remainder dispersed

throughout the lagoon. “A layer of sand andmud several feet thick was deposited on thebottom...” and a diver working on the port sideof Arkansas after the blast reportedly sank intosoft, pulverized coral and mud up to hisarmpits .69 The Baker blast--or the two milliontons of displaced water from the cloud that fellback into the lagoon--sank an additional ninevessels, some almost immediately. LSM-60 wasdestroye~ except for a few fragments of theship that fell on other vessels, no trace of thelanding ship was ever found. The bomb’sdetonation point was within 500 yards of thelocation of the sunken Lamson and Sakawa.The failure to locate these vessels duringsubsequent dive surveys of the lagoon indicatesthe bomb, moored at a depth of 90 feet in a180-foot deep lagoon, probably did considerabledamage, or possibly completely destroyed them,depending on each wreck’s exact location.

27

Arkansas, the submarines Apogon, Pilotfish, andSkipjack, and the auxiliaries YO-160 andARDC-13 sank almost immediately, The badlydamaged carrier Saratoga, listing but tooradioactive to be boarded by salvage teams,sank within hours, followed by the Japanesebattleship Nagato, and LCT-1114. Within thenext few days, five other landing craft thatwere damaged in the Baker test were scuttledin Bikini lagoon; another was taken outside ofthe atoll and sunk. The destroyer Hughes andthe attack transport Fallen, badly damaged andsinking, were taken in tow and beached. Thedetonation effect of Baker was greater thanAble; reports and interest were rekindled,although total destruction by the bomb hadonce more been averted. One reporter,William L. Laurence, the “dean” of atomicreporters who had witnessed the detonation ofthe Trinity test bomb, the Nagasaki bomb drop,and the two Bikini blasts, described a newpublic attitude as a result of OperationCrossroads. Returning to the United States,Laurence found that while “before Bikini theworld stood in awe of this new cosmicforce... since Bikini this feeling,.. has largelyevaporated and has been supplanted by a senseof relief unrelated to the grim reality of thesituation.” Laurence felt this was because of

the desire of the average citizen “to grasp theflimsiest means that would enable him to regainhis peace of mind. He had expected one

bomb to sink the entire Bikini fleet, kill all theanimals...make a hole in the bottom of theocean and create tidal waves. He had evenbeen told that everyone participating in the testwould die. Since none of these happened, heis only too eager to conclude that the atomicbomb is, after all, just another weapon,’”o

Laurence himself, as well as nearly everyoneelse involved in the tests, failed to realize orreport the insidious effect of the bomb. Fardeadlier than the actual blast, in that time of“limited yield” nuclear weapons, was the lastingeffect of radiation, confirming once again thefears and prophecies of the nuclear scientiststhat even seemingly “undamaged” vessels couldand would suffer from radioactivecontamination. Decontamination by scrubbing

the ships “clean” was only partially successful.The effort to decontaminate the targetbattleship New York was a case in point:

The main deck forward had not beentouched as yet ....I made a careful survey

of the deck, finding the intensity to varya great deal in a matter of feet. Onegets the impression that fission productshave become most fixed in the tarrycaulking of the planking and in rustyspots in the metal plates. When thesurvey was complete the Chief turned hisbooted, sweating, profane and laughingcrew loose with brushes, water, and abarrel of lye. Yet when the hydraulicswere done and the deck rinsed cleanagain, another survey showed theinvisible emanations to be present,... Theportly Chief stood watching the dial ofmy Geiger counter, completelybewildered. The deck was clean,anybody could see that, clean enough forthe Admiral himself to eat his breakfastoff of. So what was all this goddamradioactivity?’i

While no extensive deposit of long-liferadioactive materials were found on the targetships after the Able test, the Baker testdetonation generated more radiation; even thesalt in the water, for example, was transformedinto a short-lived radioactive material.However, plutonium and other long-lived fissionproducts that emitted beta and gamma rayswere the major problem. The reboarding ofships after Able was undertaken after a fewhours in some cases, After Baker, only fivevessels at the extreme ends of two vesselstrings could be boarded. Access to the restof the target array was denied. By July 26 and27, crews were able to beach Hughes andFallen, which were sinking, “but both vesselswere radioactive to the extent that taking themin tow... required fast work. The forecastle ofHughes, for example, had a tolerance time ofabout eight minutes.’”z By July 27 and 28,surveys of all remaining target vessels weremade from distances of 50 to 100 feet.

2a

DECONTAMINATION EFFORTS

Initial efforts to decontaminate the ships werehampered by the fact that no plans had beenprepared for organized decontamination; “thenature and extent of the contamination of thetargets was completely unexpected.”73 The firstefforts, with the beached Hughes, employedNavy fireboats to wash down the exteriors ofthe ships because “water might take up some ofthe radioactive materials in solution.” Washingdown reduced the radioactivity some fiftypercent on Hughes, bringing the exposureRoentgens rates on it down to 9.6 R/day onthe forecastle and 36 R/day at the stern!Subsequent washings had no measurable effect.Foamite, a water-mixed firefighting foam, wasapplied and washed offi two washings onHughes reduced the radiation to levels varyingbetween 2.0 to 8.5 R/day.’4

Radioactive material adhered to the ships’wooden decks, paint, tar, canvas, rust, and

grease; while some of it could be washed off,the only effective means of removal wassandblasting the ships to bare metal, strippingoff every piece of planking, and bathing brassand copper with nitric acid. Washing, as theexperience with New York demonstrated, didnot significantly reduce radiation levels,particularly with crews limited to short periodsof exposure. Only complete removal of thecontaminated surface area reduced theradiation. The Navy discovered, too, that“painting over the surface produced noreduction in [beta gamma] activity ....”75 Theproblem of decontamination was serious; theNavy required a reduction of radiation intensityto allow reboarding for instrument recovery andinspection for periods of at least two hours.At the same time, it was hoped that in two-hour shifts crew members could “apply detailedscrubbing, abrasive, and paint removal action asnecessary to reduce the radioactivity sufficientlyto permit continuous habitation of the ships.”7e“Lightly” contaminated ships--Conyngham,

29

“l%e chief turned his booted, sweating ._profane,and laughing crew-loose with brushes, wate~ and a barrel oflye.” Decontamination eflorts aboard Prinz Eugen, (National Archives)

Wainwright, Carteret, and Sait Lake City--werethe first vessels subjected to “detaileddecontamination” on July 30.

By August 5, several ships were being pumpedout and “secondary decontamination” of othersfollowed. On August 24, inspection effortscommenced on several target ships, includingdives made on Saratoga, Arkansas, and Pilotfishthat continued until August 30, The submarineSkipjack was successfully raised by divers onSeptember 2, and some instruments wererecovered from the sunken ships, but work timewas limited by radiation hazards. On August10, orders were issued to ceasedecontamination efforts at Bikini and preparethe target ships for towing to Kwajalein. Thedecision was rqached when it was discoveredthat decontamination generally was not working

and was extremely hazardous; the final strawwas “the discovery of alpha emitters fromsamples inside Prinz Eugen” which were notdetectable with the monitoring instruments inuse at Bikini. Further investigation showed“probable widespread presence of the alphaemitters . . . even in spaces not obviouslycent aminat ed. Since no alpha detectors forgeneral field use were available and the alphaemitters are one of the most poisonouschemicals known, their presence was considereda serious and indeterminate menace ....”77 Thepriority of work shifted “toward recovery ofinstruments and clearance of those shipsdesignated for use in Test Charlie,”78 Thisten-vessel test (five submarines and five capitalships) at the southwestern end of the atoll andseaward of Oruk Island, scheduled for March1947, was later cancelled by the President.

30

The “severe” contamination problem was keptas quiet as possible; according to an August 10memorandum from the Manhattan EngineerDistrict of the Army Corps of Engineersobserver, Col. A. W. Betts, to his boss, Brig.Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, “the classification ofthk memo can only be explained by the factthat the Navy considers this contaminationbusiness the toughest part of Test Baker. Theyhad no idea it would be such a problem andthey are breaking their necks out here to findsome solution.”7g Gross decontamination effortscontinued that enabled the Navy to completethe removal of test instruments and records,technical inspections, and salvage operations;however, the report on radiologicaldecontamination concluded that these efforts,“although successful to a certain extent in thelimited application they received, revealedconclusively that removal of radioactivecontamination of the type encountered in thetarget vessels in Test Baker cannot beaccomplished satisfactorily ....”8° On August 25,1946, the Navy’s Director of Ship Material, in

charge of the inspections, “felt that allsignificant information had been recorded andreported that the technical inspection phase atBikini was complete.” That day he and hisstaff departed for Kwajalein “to establishfacilities there for continued examination andradiological re-checks of the target ships.”81Some of the vessels had departed as early asAugust 19, and now the other ships followed;by August 29, only 19 target vessels--thedestroyer Mustin, YOG-83, and 16 landingcraft, were left at Bikini, along with 18 salvagevessels.

THE LEGACY OF CROSSROADS

Thirteen target ships were sent to Pearl Harboror to the West Coast “for further study ofdamage and for development of radiologicaldecontamination and safety techniques by theNavy ....it is the policy of the Navy to carry outan aggressive active program of radiologicaland atomic defense research to apply thelessons of Crossroads.”82 The study of theships led to certain modifications in theconstruction of new naval vessels, though afterWorld War II the United States built few large

vessels. Rounding of ship surfaces andwash-down systems to spray a vessel subjectedto fallout and facilitate the rinsing off of theship were the only Crossroads-induced changesfor passive defense against nuclear weapons.The primary naval modifications afterCrossroads were measures to take the bomb tosea as a weapon, leading to nuclear-capablecarriers, guided missile cruisers, andsubmarines. Additionally, there was a demandfor new designs of nuclear weapons suitable forcarrying in these vessels. In an atmosphere ofno adequate defense against nucleardeployment, the Navy, like the rest of themilitary, embraced nuclear deterrence throughthe adoption of and subsequent escalation ofuse of nuclear weapons at sea as a defense.

Decontamination efforts at Kwajalein ceased inSeptember 1946; work after that focused onremoving ammunition aboard the ships. Onone such detail, the light carrier independencewas visited and described:

The Independence is a ghost ship--itstight deck blown up, leaving the thickoak planks broken like so muchboxwood; its hangar deck blasted downand only the skeleton of its sidesremaining. Gun turrets and gangway$,twisted, crushed, dangle oversides,grating and creaking with the roll of theship. Doors are smashed in and jammedtight against the bulkheads, or blown outaltogether, and the rusty water sloshesaimlessly back and forth across the rustydecks. For the most part the radiationis not particularly high, althoughsometimes these rusty pools will set yourearphones singing and shoot yourindicator needles off scale.8a

A confidential memorandum from theCommander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,(CINCPAC), dated September 4, 1946,authorized the sinking of contaminated vesselsat Kwajalein. 84 The same day, Admiral Blandy,back in Washington, reported that “only 9 of92 ships escaped at Bikini,” noting that “all butnine . . . were either sunk, damaged orcontaminated by radioactivity,” naming thesubmarines Tuna, Searaven, Dentuda, and

31

Parche, and the transports Cortland, Niagara,Bladen, Fillmore, and Geneva as the nineundamaged ships. The report named 45 vessels

that had been decommissioned after the tests.Blandy also reported he had sought andreceived permission to sink “a number of thesmall landing craft damaged in the experiments,pointing out the dangers of possible lingeringradioactivity and also,,. the cost of repairs andmovement from the Marshall Islands ....”85

The target ships at Kwajalein remained therefor two years in a caretaker status. Soon afterthe tests, on December 22, 1946, one vessel,the German cruiser Prinz Eugen, capsized andsank and was left in place. Another target

vessel, LCI-327, stranded on Bascombe (Mek)Island in Kwajalein Atoll; it could not be freedand was “destroyed” in place on October 30,1947. Some of the ships--the submarines, forthe most part, and some of the landingcraft--were sufficiently “cool” to return to dutyas training vessels. The other vessels,

contaminated by the tests, were subjected toadditional analysis but for the most part weresimply left as a ghost fleet that was literallytoo hot to handle. In June 1947, Chief of

Naval Operations (CNO) established a policyfor handling and control of “radiologicallycontaminated material from Crossroads. ”Noting the “real and ever present hazard,” theCNO dictated that materials were to beremoved only for carefully considered testing,that they be carefully controlled and handled,and they not be “retained indefinitely ...but shallbe disposed of, when the tests are completed,by sinking at sea or by replacement aboard thetarget vessel.”86

Eventually, this policy was adhered to for theships themselves. On August 30, 1947, the

Chief of Naval Operations reiteratedCINCPAC’S September 1946 dictate that allships “found radiologically unsafe” were to besunk at sea in deep water.a’ By this time

decisions had been made to separate the targetships, as well as some contaminated supportvessels, into groups. The majority of ships, too

hot to be decontaminated, were left atKwajalein, while 13 others were taken to PearlHarbor, Seattle, and San Francisco fordecontamination studies; the three ships towedto San Francisco were Independence,Crittenden, and Gasconade. The six surviving

32

submarines--Dentuda, Tuna, Parche, Searaven,Skate, and Skipjack were sent to Mare Island

Naval Shipyard and the San Francisco NavalShipyard at Hunter’s Point. Dentuda andParche were considered only “radiologicallysuspect” and were cleared for preservation andreuse. Four of the submarines could not bedecontaminated; Skipjack, Searaven, Skate, and

Tuna were sunk as targets off San Clemente,

California, in 1948.

Pearl Harbor received the battleships Nevadaand New York. Puget Sound Naval Shipyardreceived the destroyer Hughes and the cruisersPensacola and Salt Lake City. In 1948 allthree were towed to sea and sunk as targets indeep water.88 Fifty of the target vessels weresunk as targets for conventional weapons(surface bombardment and aerial attack); 36were sunk in the vicinity of Kwajalein. New

York and Nevada were sunk off Hawaii in deepwater; Hughes and Pensacola were sunk off thePacific coast of Washington, and Independence,Crittenden, Gasconade, Salt Lake City, and thefour submarines previously mentioned weresunk off California. Nine ships are known tohave escaped scuttling or sinking: twosubmarines, Dentuda and Parche; two LCISwere sold for scrap along with one LCM; andfour attack transports--Cortland, Fillmore,Geneva, and Niagara were transferred to theMaritime Commission and ultimately scrappedby them. The fate of 13 landing craft (fiveLCIS, three LCMS, and five LCVPS) isunknown.89 If they were scrapped later, thiswould raise the number of “survivors” of thetarget fleet to 22 vessels. Although a fourth ofthe total fleet numerically, these ships includedonly two combatant ships and a small fractionof the total tonnage assembled at Bikini for thetwo blasts. The contaminated or “suspect”support vessels present better statistics; by thebeginning of 1947, 80 of the 159 support shipswere granted “final radiological clearance.” Bythe end of the year, every one of the 159 wascleared, though some, like the destroyer Laffey,required drydocking in floating drydocks (toavoid contaminating permanent onshorefacilities), sandblasting and repainting of all

underwater surfaces, and acid washing andpartial replacement of salt-water piping andevaporators in the ship.go

The message of Bikini, while not understood by

the public at the time, and only grasped laterin hindsight, was clear to the military, whichhad seen a fleet survive physically butnonetheless lost forever to radioactivecontamination. Blast effect, while impressive,paled next to radiation effect: “From a militaryviewpoint, the atomic bomb’s ability to killhuman beings or to impair, through injury,their ability to make war is of paramountimportance. Thus the overall result of abomb’s explosion upon the crew,..is of greaterinterest ..,.” Therefore, it followed that,

If used in numbers, atomic bombs notonly can nullify any nation’s militaryeffort, but can demolish its social andeconomic structure and prevent theirre-establishment for long periods of time.With such weapons, especially ifemployed in conjunction with otherweapons of mass destruction, as, forexample, pathogenic bacteria, it is quitepossible to depopulate vast areas of theearth’s surface, leaving only vestigialremnants of man’s material works.g’

Ironically, the vestigial remnants of man’smaterial works in the form of the target shipswere the first tangible demonstrations of thepower of the atomic bomb and the futility ofdefense against it; as Paul Boyer notes, anawakening slowly resulted from “the navy’sdetermined, frustrating, and ultimately futileefforts to decontaminate the surviving ships byscrubbing, scraping, and sandblasting... thepariah fleet of ghostly radioactive ShipS....”92

Public awareness and wariness began to surfacein 1948. That year, David Bradley, M.D., amember of the radiological safety team atBikini, published his diary, written during thetests as the book, No Place to Hide, which wassyndicated in a pre-publication release by theAtlantic Monthly, condensed by The Reader’sDigest, made into a Book-of-the-Month Clubrelease, and stayed on The New York Timesbest sellers list for ten weeks. No Place toHide was a forceful book that subtly told thereal message of Bikini; Bradley felt that theCrossroads tests, “hastily planned and hastilycarried out ...may have only sketched in gross

33

outlines... the real problem; nevertheless, theseoutlines show pretty clearly the shadow of thecolossus which looms behind tomorrow. ”g3Bradley also was drawn to the analogy of thetarget ships at Kwajalein, including “thebeautiful Prinz Eugen, once the pride of theGerman fleet and as sleek and cavalier a shipas ever sailed the seas,” intact and unbroken bythe blasts but “nevertheless dying of amalignant disease for which there is no help.”g4The cure was sinking the ships. In February1949, The Washington Post published a columnby Drew Pearson that termed the test results a“major naval disaster.” Pearson reported thatas of 1949, “of the 73 ships involved in theBikini tests, more than 61 were sunk ordestroyed. This is an enormous loss from onlytwo bombs . . . . The aircraft carrierIndependence . . . is now anchored off SanFrancisco, permanently destroyed--usable onlyas a testing ground to determine the possibilityof removing radioactivity. This is stilldangerous two years after the ship wasatt acked.”g5

It is strangely prophetic that almost all of thetarget ships were ultimately taken to sea andscuttled in deep water, joining their sisterssunk in the more shallow waters of Bikini.Once too radioactive to visit, these vessels, withthe beta or gamma activity reduced due toradionuclide decay are now the focus of a newlook at them and at Crossroads.

Ironically, the “nuclear nomads” of the Pacific,presently the absentee owners and managers ofmany of the vessels from the sunken fleet ofOperation Crossroads, were, like the shipsthemselves, harbingers of a nuclear future. In1948, David Bradley wrote of his 1946 visit tothe displaced Bikinians on Rongerik Island.They “are not the first, nor will they be thelast, to be left homeless and impoverished bythe inexorable bomb. They have no choice inthe matter, and very little understanding of it.But in this perhaps they are not so differentfrom us all.”ge In 1978, Tomaki Juda, leader ofthe Bikinians, testified before Congress that hispeople had been relocated on the premise thatthe tests were for the good of mankind andthat they were to be like “the Children ofIsrael, whom the Lord led into the Promised

Land.” Juda noted, sadly, that the Bikinians“were naive then .... We are, sadly, more akin tothe Children of Israel when they left Egypt andwandered through the desert for 40 years.”g’Now, 44 years later, the Bikinians and the restof the world more fully understand the meaningand legacy of Operation Crossroads, a legacythat is reflected in twenty-three vessels that lieaccessible to divers at two Pacific atolls.

THE 1947 SCIENTIFIC RESURVEY

In early 1947, plans for a scientific resurvey ofBikini during that summer were drafted by theJoint Crossroads Committee. Adm. W. S.Parsons, the Navy’s Director of AtomicDefense, forwarded a proposal to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on April 9, 1947. A programof biological study was necessary “in order todetermine the long-term effects of Test Bakeron fish and other marine organisms includingcorals and calcareous algae... and to obtain dataon which to base a decision relative to possibleresettlement of the native population.”g8 At thesame time, diving on some of the sunken targetships was proposed to “make additional divingobservations” and retrieve test data fromCrossroads instruments abandoned in 1946.Specifically mentioned as high priorities forreassessment were Saratoga, Nagato, Pilotfish,Arkansas, and Apogon .99

The plan was approved, and a group ofscientists and technicians from the Navy, Army,the Smithsonian Institution, the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service, and other unnamed institutionswas placed under the command of Capt.Christian L. Engleman, USN, the ProjectDirector at Bikini. Overall command of theresurvey ships was given to Capt. H. HenryHederman, USN. Both men were Crossroadsveterans. While a classified operation, theresurvey was publicly announced because of astrong desire by the Joint Chiefs to stress “the.story of cooperation that exists between civilianand military agencies in the Bikini resurveywork. Proper handling of the Bikini Resurveystory can do much to acquaint the Americanpublic with the long-range value of OperationCrossroads.’’ioo

34

.-

fie Bikini Scientific Resurvey team lands at Bikini1947. (US. Naval Institute)

The Bikini Resurvey task group steamed fromPearl Harbor to Bikini on the transport USSChilton (APA-38), the submarine rescue vesselUSS Coucal (ASR-8), LSM-382, and LCI(L)-615 on July 1, 1947, arriving on July 15 andremaining until the first of September. Theoperations plan that they sailed under includedan effort, directed by Lieut. Cmdr. F. B.Ewing, USN, to make detailed observations ofSaratoga, Nagato, Gilliam, and Apogon. “Othervessels, including Arkansas and Pilotjish will beinspected if time permits.” The inspectionplans called for extensive underwaterphotography and structural inspections “in an

effort to determine the exact cause ofsinking.’’io’ The only specific instrumentrecovery noted was from Nagato. Fourinstruments, an ionization gage, two linear timepressure recorders, and a diaphragm gage, “theexact locations of which are known,” were tobe recovered at the discretion of Lieut. Cmdr.Ewing. Additionally, “it is believed that aportion of LSM-60 has been located. If timepermits, an attempt will be made by divers tolocate this portion and inspect it thoroughly fortype of rupture, heat effects, and radioactivity.If practicable, an attempt will be made to raisethis section for an inspection on the surface.’’ 102

More than 600 dives were made to study blasteffects and damage on the wrecks of Saratoga,Apogon, and Pilo@h. “In addition, a cursoryinspection was made of the ex-Japanesebattleship Nagato.’’103 The first dives madewere on Saratoga on July 17, two days after theresurvey team arrived. The Navy diversreported visibility to be from 15 to 30 feet onthe wrecks. However, “divers on thebottom...did have difficulty in seeing clearlybecause of fogs of sand and mud which wereeasily stirred up ....’’104 Radiation levels werecarefully monitored, Divers wore pencildosimeters and three film badges--on the chest,abdomen, and leg--and when hoisted from thewater, each diver was “washed down by hosebefore being hoisted aboard ship.’’105 Radiationlevels recorded ranged from “two timesbackground (gamma) to .1 R/24 hr. (gamma),and up to .6 R/24 hr. (beta and gamma),’”oeDive equipment was found to be lightlycontaminated; however, “some of the divingequipment was contaminated prior to theresurvey, which can be attributed to the factthat this equipment was used during OperationCrossroads.” The source of contamination wasfound to be “due to contamination by coralpowder from the sunken ships and sand fromthe lagoon bottom.’”o’

Only observations were made of the ships atBikini. Instrument recovery was not attemptedsince “after Baker day, recovery operationswere carried on with unabated vigor and veryconsiderable success, so that perhaps 80percent of the instruments were recovered.’’108Instruments left behind were presumed buriedon the bottom or were “by now [1947] socorroded that their readings would beuseless ....” A spring chronogram in the crew

space, “port side, main deck, frame 16 [ofNagato] “might contain a valid record onmagnetic tape. It is believed, however, thatrecovery of this instrument would not addmaterially to the information at handconcerning the air blast in shot Baker.” ‘og

Other work accomplished by the resurvey teamincluded detailed geological assessments of reefstructures by drilling. Cores and samples weretaken of the bottom of the lagoon. Scientists

35

..,.

I-’..—. –—-–- --- -–— —.

sunken snip aunng me 1947 resurvey. (UJ, NavalInstitute)

collected samples on the reefs to determine the“existing degree of radioactivity, or [conducted]studies concerned with habitats, food chains,and taxonomic relationships. ” Algae, seaurchins and other marine invertebrates, insects,birds, and mammals were collected and studiedfor “possible radiological or blast effects uponstructure, physiological processes, fertility ornormal processes of develop merit.” Aradiological survey group made “acomprehensive survey of radioactivity on thereefs and islands ....”i 10

At the end of August, packing of equipmentbegan for departure. Laboratories ashore “wereclosed and packed by August 27, and thebuildings ashore were cleared and locked onAugust 29, A final inspection was made beforethe resurvey ships sailed on the 29th. Theflagship of the group, USS Chilton, arrived atPearl Harbor on September 3. The task group

was dissolved on the 4th,11 i The production orthe final reports was completed at the end ofthe year, and the three-volume TechnicalReport, Bikini Scientific Survey was published inDecember 1947 by the Armed Forces SpecialWeapons Project.

NOTES

1W. A. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report ofOperation Crossroads (New York Wm. M Wise & CO.,Inc., 1947) p. 36.

2Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The SecretHistory (Arlington, Texafi AeroFax, Inc., 1988) p. 5.

3Eugene Klnkaid, “Bikini: The Forthcoming Atomic BombTest in the Marshalls Will Determine the Future of Man,Animals, Birds, Fish, Plants, and Microorganl~ms,” Life,XX (l), July 1, 1946, p. 41. Paul 130yer, m By theBomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture atthe Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: PantheonBooks, 1985) analyses the response to the bomb.

4Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. ix.

sIbid., p 2.

6Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One,“Historical Report: Atomic Bomb Tests Able and BakerOperation Crossroads,” (1947) Operational Archives,Naval Historical Center, Vol. 1, p. xiii. Hereafter citedas Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report.”

7Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, “Operation CrossroadsBackground Material,” distributed to U,S. Naval Forcesin Europe by the Public Information Section, JTF 1.Cited in Thomas N. Daly, “Crossroads at Bikini,” U.S.Naval Institute Proceedings, VO1. 42, No. 7 (July 1986),p+ 68.

8Blandy appeared on CBS radio youth forum broadcastsponsored by the New York Herald-Tribune on April 13,1946. Cited in Daly, Ibid., p. 70.

9Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 10. Brian McMahon,junior senator from Connecticut, was chairman of theSenate’s Special Committee on Atomic Energy.McMahon’s committee held public hearings inWashington, and on December 20, 1945, McMahonintroduced his Atomic Energy Act bill, Public hearingsfollowed, and on April 19, 1946, the bill was reported tothe Senate, Passed on June 1, 1946, the bill was sent tothe House Milita~ Affairs Committee, which referred itto the House on June 13, The House passed the billwith amendments on June 20; subsequently most changeswere removed in a joint conference. The bill was signedinto law by President Harry S. Truman on August 1,

36

1946, as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law585, 79th Congress, 1st Session). The bill passed controlof atomic energy from the Manhattan Engineer District,and hence the military, to the newly created AtomicEnergy Commission, created a military liaison committee,and instituted security provisions to protect against therelease of “classified” nuclear secrets. See Vincent C,Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic BombThe United States Army in World War II, SpecialStudies (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,1985), pp. 576-578,

10Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 9. A dispatch by HansonW. Baldwin to The New York Times, published in thepaper’s July 25, 1946 edition, reported that the targetarray for Baker, a “tactical situation of the fleet inharbor..,was frankly patterned after an opportunity in thepast war that was never realized,” namely an atomicbombing of Truk. Baldwin noted the bomb was notused because of the Japanese fleet’s near destructionand “no concentration of enemy ships sufficiently largeenough to warrant the use of the atomic bomb was everdetected.” p. 2. Trinity, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki cameas soon as active material and other components wereready--no earlier detonation was ever possible.

11According to Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of theImperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Annapoli* NavalInstitute Press, 1978), Appendix A, “Name, Date ofCompletion, and Fate of Major Ships of the ImperialJapanese Navy,”pp. 343-350. The remaining ships, someof them half-sunk at Kure or practically inoperable (suchas Nagato at Yokosuka) were one battleship, twocarriers, two light carriers (CVLS), two heavy cruisers,two light cruisers (CLS), and thirty-eight destroyers.

12Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, pp. 10-11.

13Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report,” Volume1, p. viii.

14Ibid., pp. ix-x.

1.5The New York Times, August 25, 1945, p. 2.

16Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 11.

17The New York Times, October 24, 1945, p. 4.

18The New York Times, December 11, 1946, pp. 1, 3.

19Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 9.

20Kinkaid, “Bikini,”p. 41.

21Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini, p. 7.

22Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, p. 50.

23W. A. Shurcliff, “Technical History of OperationCrossroads,” Vol. 1, (1946) copy on file at the NationalTechnical Information Service, p. 5.3. Hereafter cited asShurcliff, “Technical History.”

24Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report,” Vol. 1,pp. 68-69.

25Ibid., p. 67.

26Ibid., p. 684

27Ibid., p, 69. Also see Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane,USN, “Crossroads and Ship Design, ” Shipmate,(September 1946) pp. 9-10.

28Ibid., pp. 74-75.

29Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.3.

30Ibid., p. 6.4.

31Ibid.

32Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.5.

33Ibid.

34Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.6.

35Ibid.

36Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report,” pp. 72-73.

37Ibid., p. 71,

38Ibid., p. 21.

39The New York Times, January 25, 1946, pp. 1, 4.

40The New York Times, March 20, 1946, p. 10. TheBureau of Shim. when totalling the costs of the targetships, was ord~red not to inclu~e the cost of armame~t.Also untallied were modernization, modifications, andrepair costs.

41The New York Times, March 24, 1946, p. 4.

42Letter, John P. Howe to the President, April 16, 1946,filed in Protest Answers, Joint Task Force One, Recordsof the Defense Atomic Support Agency, NationalArchives Record Group 374.

37

43The New York Times, April 17, 1946, p. 5

44Letter, Brig. Gen. T, J. Betts, USA, to Alexander Wilde,April 2, 1946, filed in Protest Answers, NationalArchives Record Group 374.

45Letter, Max Ladewasser and Gang to the President,April 14, 1946, filed in Protest Letters, NationalArchives Record Group 374.

46The New York Times, January 26, 1946, p, 1.

47Letter, Brig. Gen. T. J. Betts, USA, to Peter Brambir,March 21, 1946, filed in Protest Answers, NationalArchives Record Group 374.

48Letter, Brig. Gen. T. J. Betts, USA, to Lt. Herbert B.Leopold, February 11, 1946, filed in Protest Answers,National Archives Record Group 374.

49“The Effect of the Atomic Bomb on Naval Power,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, Vol. 1, No.5 (February 15, 1946), p. 1.

50Letter, R. Lee Page to George Lyons, Commissioner ofAtomic Research, Naw Department, March 15, 1946,filed in Protest Letters, ”Nati&al Arch’ivesRecord ‘Group374.

51Letter, Jeanne Robinson to Adm. W. H. P. Blandy, May1, 1946, filed in Protest Letters, National ArchivesRecord Group 374.

.52Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.7.

53Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.4 lists 94 vessels, butneglects to include LSM-60, the bomb-carrying ship forBaker, as well as one landing craft.

54Ibid,,p. 6.7,

55The New York Times, July 1, 1946, p. 3.

56Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.7.

57Ibid., p. 6.8,

58Ibid.

59Shurcliff, “Technical History,” p. 6.10,

60Ibid., p. 6.11.

61Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, p. 31, 38n.7. GeneralPaul Tlbbets, then commander of the Composite 509thGroup, which dropped the bomb, blamed the Able misson crew error. See Paul Tlbbets, The Tibbets Sto~(New York: Stein and Day, 1978). In a telephoneinterview on December 20, 1990, the pilot, Woody P.Swancutt stressed the high level of training he and hiscrew had received, the considerable experience of thebombardier, Harold Wood, and post-AbIe tests with thesame crew and bomb sight that consistently dropped “FatMan” casings close to the target.

62The New York Times, July 1, 1946, p. 1.

63Ibid,, p. 3,

64Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report,” Vol, 1, p.44.

65Ibid., pp. 44-45,

66The New York Times, July 2, 1946, p. 3.

67The New York Times, July 15, 1946, p. 3.

68See “Helen of Bikini,” Time Magazine, August 5, 1946,m 27. The naminu of the two Bikini bombs is a furtherindication of th~ ~eed to “humanize” the bomb througha mechanopomorphic process that began with the “FatMan” and “Little Boy” weapons dropped on Japan. Thefemale names for the Bikini bombs, particularly “Gilds”and its reference to Rlta Hayworth, are part of whatPaul Boyer terms the “complex psychological link betweenatomic destruction and Eros” that was evidenced byburlesque houses advertising “Atomic Bomb dancers” inAugust 1945, the “unveiling” by Hollywood ofscantily-clad starlet Linda Christian at poolside as the“anatomic bomb” in Life Magazine in September 1945,the French bathing suit “Atome” (quickly dubbed the“Bikini” when introduced in 1946) and the 1947 pop song“Atom Bomb Baby,” which Boyer notes made the Bomba metaphor for sexual arousal. See Boyer, By theBomb’s Early Light, pp. 11-12.

69Shurcliff, “Technical Histo~,” p. 28.7. Also see theWashington Star, August 22, 1946.

70The New York Times, August 4, 1946, p. 3.

71David J. Bradley, No Place to Hide, 1946/1984 (Hanoverand London: University Press of New England, 1983),pp. 109-110.

72Director of Ship Material, “Technical Inspection ReportiRadiological Decontamination of Target and Non-TargetVessels,” Vol. I, p. 4. Hereafter cited as “RadiologicalDecontamination of Target and Non-Tar~et Vessels.”For a summary of the ~adiological dec&taminationeffort, also see C. Sharp Cook, “The Legacy of

38

Crossroads,” Naval Histoy, Vol. II, No. 4, Fall 1988, p.28.

73“Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-TargetVessels,” Vol. I, p. 4.

74Ibid., p. 5.

7.5Ibid., p. 6.

76Ibid., p. 8.

77Ibid., p. 13.

78Director of Ship Material, “Historicrd Report,” p. 55.

79Memorandum, Col. A. W. Betts, USACOE, to Brig.Gen. K. D. Nichols, MED, USACOE, August 10, 1946.F-3-5, Test Baker Results, Box 26, National ArchivesRecord Group 377, Records of the Manhattan EngineerDistrict.

80“Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-TargetVessels,” Vol. I, p. 17.

81Director of Ship Material, “Historical Report,” p. 57.

82Memorandum, CNO to CINCPAC, “Removal ofEquipment and Supplies from ContaminatedCROSSROADS Target Ships}”February 18, 1947, Serial034P36, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.

83Bradley, No Place to Hide, pp. 143-144.

84Cited in “Radiological Decontamination of Target andNon-Target Vessels,” Vol. III, p. 14.

85The New York Times, September 5, 1946, p. 7.

86Memorandum, CNO to Chiefs of the Bureau of Ships,Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Aeronautics, Bureau ofMedicine and Surgery, Bureau of Yards and Docks,Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, “Handling and Controlof Radiologically Contaminated Material fromCROSSROADS, ” June 10, 1947, Serial 0138P36,Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.

87Cook, “The Legacy of Crossroads,” p. 29.

88A. G. Nelson, Capt. USN, “Crossroads Target Ships,”Memorandum, NNTPR #24-78, May 25, 1978,Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of NavalOperations; NAVSEA Shipbuilding Support Office, “USVessels Involved in Operation Cross roads,”NAVSEASHPSO, Philadelphia, n.d.; and James L.Mooney, ed. Dictiona~ of American Naval Fighting

Ships, eight volumes (Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1959-1981).

89See, for example, “Atom Bombed Ship Undergoes Study,”in The New York Times, May 11, 1947, p. 19, whichdiscusses the sinking of New York as a conventionalweapons target as the battleship’s probable fate.Parche’s conning tower is now on display at the PacificFleet Submarine Memorial Museum at Pearl Harbor.

90Cook, “The Legacy of Crossroads,rnpp. 31-32.

91“The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a MilitaryWeapon: The Final Reuort of the Joint Chiefs of StaffEval~ation Board for bperation Crossroads; (June 30,1947), CCS 471,6, 10-15-46, Section 9, Part 1, p. 60, 73(top quote). National Archives Record Group 218.

92Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, p. 92.

93Bradley, No Place to Hide, pp. 165-166,

94Ibid., p. 147.

95Drew Pearson, “Bikini Naval Losses Disaster,” TheWashington Post, February 18, 1949.

96Bradley, No Place to Hide, p. 163.

97Cited in Jonathan M. Weisgall, “The Nuclear Nomads ofBikini,” Foreign Policy, Vol. XXVIV (Summer 1980), p.98. Also see William S. Ellis, “A Way of Life Lost:Bikini,” National Geographic (June 1986), pp. 813-834.

98Memorandum to Op-36 from Op-33 and Op-38 (Parsons),A~ril 9, 1947. Serial 106P36, Operational Archives,N&al Historical Center. -

99Ibid., attached draft memorandum from the JointCrossroads Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theSecretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War.

100“Bikini Resurvey Operation Plan 1-47, Annex L, PublicInformation Plan,” National Archives Record Group 374,Entry 4B, Box 156, Folder A4.

101Ibid., Annex D, “Sunken Ship Inspection Plan.”

102Ibid.

103“Bikini Backtalk,” 10 September 1947, Vol. I, No. 16.Copy on file in RG 374, Box 28, Folder 212.

104“Report of the Director Ship Material,” in “TechnicalReport, Bikini Scientific Resurvey” (Washington, D.C.:Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 1947) Vol. III,

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[

p. 1. Hereafter cited as “Report of Director of Ship 109Material,” Ibid.

105 110Ibid., p, 2, “Operations,” in “Technical Report, Bikini Scientific

Resurvey,” Vol. I, p. 67,106

Ibid. 111Ibid., pp. 71-73.

107Ibid.

108Memorandum, Bureau of Ordnance to Chief of NavalOperations, 1S June 1947, Serial F141-6(49), Copypublished in “Report of Director of Ship Material.”

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TABLE ONE: SHIPS LOST DURING OPERATION CROSSROADSTESTING AT BIKINI ATOLL LAGOON

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

BAKER TEST: USS Sumfoga (CV-3), Lexington Class

BATTLESHIPS

BAKER TEST: USS Akansus (BB-33), New York ClassHIJMS lVuguto, Nagato Class

CRUISERS

ABLE TEST: HIJMS Sakanw, Agano Class*

DESTROYERS

ABLE TEST: UssUss

SUBMARINES

BAKER TEST: USSUss

TRANSPORTS

Anderson (DD-411), Sims Class*Lamson (DD-367), Mahan Class*

Apogon (SS-308), Balao ClassPilo@sh (SS-386), Balao Class

ABLE TEST: GWiam (APA-57), Gilliam ClassCarlisle (APA-69), Gilliam Class

AUXILIARIES AND LANDING CRAFT

BAKER TEST: ARDC-13LCM-4LCT-414 (scuttled after)LCT-812 (scuttled after)LCT-1114LCT-1175LCT-1187 (scuttled after)LCT-1237 (scuttled after)LCVP-10LSM-60 (completely destroyed)YO-160

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TABLE TWO: VESSELS LOST INSIDE KWAJALEIN ATOLL LAGOONIMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CROSSROADS TESTSCURRENTLY AT DEPTHS ACCESSIBLE TO SCUBA

CRUISERS

USS Ftinz Eugen (IX-300), ex-KMS Prinz Eugen

LANDING CRAFI’

LCI-327

Boldface indicates this vessel wasSurvey (includes analysis of USN

documented byROV Survey).

NPS SCRU (luring August 1989 and/or May 1990

*At the time this report went to press, the remains of three additional vessels were discovered atBikini. They have not been evaluated but it is probable based on descriptions that they are thetwo destroyers and Sakawa.

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