the army's stryker vehicle - a costly mistake rasser
TRANSCRIPT
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The Armys Stryker Vehicle: A Costly Mistake
By
Martijn Rasser
May 3, 2005
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The Stryker light armored vehicle is the centerpiece of the Interim Brigade Combat Team
envisioned in current Army transformation plans. This paper analyzes the procurement
decision behind Stryker, assesses the theoretical suitability of the vehicle for its declared
use, and investigates the actual performance of the vehicle in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
I begin by placing Stryker in the context of the Armys ambitious transformation
plan that culminates in the fielding of the Objective Force. The Stryker-equipped
brigades are designed to serve as an interim force that is readily deployable, survivable
and lethal. The decision by Army leaders to procure Stryker generated significant
controversy with detractors decrying the vehicles deficiencies in armor, durability,
maneuverability, and questionable transportability by C-130 aircraft I conclude, after
weighing these criticisms and assessing Strykers performance and use in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, that these vehicles are not warfighting platforms. Procuring Stryker for the
centerpiece of the Interim Brigades is a costly mistake.
What Stryker Is
Stryker is the third generation version of an 8-wheel light-armored vehicle (LAV-III)
manufactured by a consortium of General Motors Defense of Canada and General
Dynamics Land Systems of the United States (GM/GDLS). The vehicle is named after
two eponymous Medal of Honor winners. The United States Army will deploy two
major variants of the vehicle: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun
System (MGS) armed with a 105 mm cannon. The ICV, equipped with a remote-
controlled 12.7 mm machine gun, features a two-man crew and the space to transport
nine fully equipped troops.1
1LAV-III to Provide Army with Rapid-response Capability,Janes, July 9, 2001. Accessed at
http://server2.janes.com/press/pc010709_1.shtml
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Sub-variants of the ICV are a mortar carrier, reconnaissance vehicle, anti-tank
guided missile vehicle, fire-support vehicle, engineer support vehicle, command-and-
control vehicle, medical-evacuation vehicle and the nuclear/biological/chemical weapons
(NBC) reconnaissance vehicle.2 All variants are powered by a Caterpillar 3126 diesel
engine producing 350hp, propelling the vehicle to over 60 mph. The vehicle has a range
of approximately 300 miles on a full 53-gallon tank. Standard equipment includes a
hydro-pneumatic suspension, a central tire-inflation system, a fire-detection and fire-
suppression system, passive night vision and a winch.3 The vehicles are thus designed to
travel significant distances at higher speeds and greater comfort than tracked vehicles.
Army Transformation and the Interim Force
On October 12, 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the
Army Louis Caldera announced their vision for a transformed Army for the 21st century,
a force more strategically responsive, agile, deployable, versatile, lethal, survivable, and
sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations.4 The transformation plan
calls for force modernization in three areas: upgrading the legacy force of current
equipment, fielding of an interim force to fill the near to mid-term capabilities gap, and
the development of the Objective Force (now termed Future Force), the future Army.5 In
Shinsekis words, the purpose of this transformation is to [prepare] this Army for its
future warfighting responsibilities, technologically, materially and professionally.6
2 Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm3 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle USA,Janes Defence Weekly, February 19, 2003.4 Objective Force, Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/objective-force.htm5 Ibid.6 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.
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Shinseki viewed the medium-force interim combat brigades as filling a critical
gap in the Armys bifurcated structure of easily deployed light units and slow-to-deploy
heavy units. In Congressional testimony Shinseki, referring to the plight of the heavily
outgunned 82nd Airborne Division during Desert Storm, emphasized the urgency and
need for the procurement of these new vehicles: My requirement is an operational
capacity that keeps us from having to leave another airborne brigade sitting in the desert
waiting for a heavy division to come. That is what Im trying to fill here.7 In other
words, the Army needs a robust force designed for use in a range of contingencies that
can be deployed as quickly as light forces yet have the firepower comparable to heavy
forces.
Army leaders subsequently formally codified the primary purpose and use of the
interim brigade. According to the 2003 Army Modernization Plan, Strykers are
designed and optimized primarily for employment in SSCs (smaller scale contingencies)
in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end to midrange threats that may combine
both conventional and asymmetric qualities.8 I will analyze Strykers attributes and
performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom in the context of this mission statement.
Cold War-era platforms and equipment will nevertheless remain Army combat
mainstays for at least 15 years. Shinseki intended the interim force to fill the gap
between light early-entry forces and heavier follow-on forces and serve as a stepping-
stone to the ultimate Objective Force with a planned initial operational deployment
7 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.
8 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: p. 27. Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf
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capability in 2015.9 The interim force should be agile, lethal and mobile enough to
dominate combat during that interval.10
A major goal for the interim force is to place brigade combat teams anywhere in
the world with 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five
divisions within 30 days.11 A main criterion for the interim force armored vehicle is air
portability by C-130 transport planes.
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that fielding of the
IBCT also serves to test and validate the concepts, doctrine and training the Objective
Force may ultimately adopt.
12
Senator Lieberman (D-CT), a member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, raised concerns during a Congressional hearing, however,
whether General Shinseki had formulated new operational concepts for the interim
brigade, and an overlying vision for transformation and its end-goal Objective Force.
Shinseki did not answer his question directly, merely citing desirable features agility,
versatility and lethality the Objective force should have.13 Shinseki described a plan to
better prepare the Army for a variety of contingencies, not a fundamentally new concept
of joint warfare.
9 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19,
2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html10United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, not dated. Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf; also see: Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT), Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm11 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of AmericanScientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm12 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-96, Military Transformation: Army Has a
Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges (November 2001): p.23.13 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000. See also remarks by COL
Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, Should the U.S. Army Lighten Up? Cato Institute Policy Forum,
December 18, 2000.
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Choosing the IAV
The IAV selection process for the interim brigade proved contentious. General Shinseki
desired to equip the Interim Combat Brigades with a single vehicle to reduce the logistics
footprint upon deployment. Senator Lieberman questioned whether Army leadership
gave enough consideration to the various vehicle options available and asked whether it
was wise to forgo a mix of platforms and capabilities. Shinseki proclaimed an immediate
operational requirement for a robust, rapidly deployable force to be composed of a single
platform featuring off-the-shelf technologies.14
The Army had three main options to consider for its interim vehicle: procuring the
Marine LAV, upgrading its existing C-130 air portable armored vehicles like the M113 or
procuring a new platform. Ultimately Army leaders formally compared 4 vehicles in the
final evaluation round: the existing M113, and the new LAV-III, Pandur 6x6 LAV, and
Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle (see Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison of Possible and Actual Candidates for Army Interim Armored Vehicle
M113
A3 Varianta MTVLVariant
b
MarineLAV
c
LAV-III
(InfantryCarrier
Vehicle)d
Pandur II6x6
Bionix InfantryFighting Vehicle
Type 25f
Powerplant DetroitDiesel
6V53T
DetroitDiesel
6V53T
DetroitDiesel
6V53T
Caterpillar3126B
diesel
CumminsISC 350
diesel
Detroit DieselDDC 6V 92TA
Power (horsepower)
275 400 275 350 285 475
Wheels/Tracks Tracks Tracks 8 wheels 8 wheels 6 wheels Tracks
Top Speed 41 mph 41mph 62 mph 60 mph 68 mph 43 mph
CombatWeight (lbs)
27,000 40,000 28,000 36,000 28,600 50,705
PrimaryArmament
.50 cal MG M24225mm
chaingun
M24225mm
chain gun
.50 cal MG 12.7 mmMG
M242 25 mm chaingun
C-130
Transportable
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TurningRadius
Pivot (17 ft.circle)
Pivot(20 ftcircle)
25.5 ft* 58 ft. 29.5 ft. Pivot (19.3 ft.circle)
IAV Candidate No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
14 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.
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a: M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org: Accessed athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113a3.htm
b: MTVL,Janes Defence Weekly, September 20, 2000 andc: Light Armored Vehicle-25 Specifications, Global Security.org: Accessed athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav-25-specs.htm
d: LAV Gen III,Federation of American Scientists. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/lav-gen3.htme: Austrian Pandur APC, accessed at http://www.d-2-128.org/armorid/pandur.html and Pandur WAV, accessed at http://www.army-technology.com/projects/pandur/
f: Bionix IFV Technical Specifications. Accessed at http://www.one35th.com/bionix/bi_spec.htm
Option 1: Acquire the Updated Marine LAV
The United States Marine Corps took delivery of its first LAV in November 1984.15 The
program to develop the LAV commenced in 1980, originally as an Army-Marine Corps
venture, though the Army backed out in 1983 stating the vehicle did not fit their needs at
that time.16
Designed as a versatile, expeditionary warfare vehicle, the USMC LAV
weighs only 14 tons and is readily air transportable by C-130, C-141, and C-5 aircraft and
CH-53E helicopters.17 The vehicle is also capable of amphibious operations, which the
LAV-III/Stryker is not.
A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), largely completed by 2001, ensured
the LAVs would remain in service until at least 2015. The objectives of SLEP were to
improve survivability, sustainability, lethality and mobility, improve the readiness of the
LAV Family of Vehicles and reduce Fleet Operation and Sustainment (O&S) costs.18
COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, program manager for the Marine LAV, outlined
substantial enhancements to the turret and gun as well as mechanical and electrical
improvements to the auto-hull in a presentation at the 1998 Combat Vehicle Conference.
He also indicated the Army showed interest in the upgraded vehicle for its own use.19
15 General Dynamics Land Systems Canada LAV (8x8),Janes Military Vehicles and Logistics,January 17, 2005.16 Harold Kennedy, Marine Corps Sprucing Up I ts Light Armored Vehicles,National Defense,
September 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=25717 Ibid.18 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/lav.htm19 COL Thomas M. Lytle, USMC, LAV Program Update, presented at National Defense Industrial
Association, Tank-Automotive Division Combat Vehicles Section, 1998 Combat Vehicles Conference, Fort
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The Marine vehicle should have been an obvious candidate for the Armys
consideration. Engineers designed the LAV largely for the types of operations Army
leaders envisioned. With the addition of a 25mm chain gun the vehicles carry reasonable
firepower. The decision by Marine Corps leaders to upgrade and maintain the vehicle for
at least an additional decade and a half is a testament to the durability of the vehicle.
The LAV is truly an off-the-shelf option, reducing procurement costs. Since the
vehicle is already a part of the Marine inventory, an additional advantage is parts
commonality with the USMC fleet, thereby reducing the Armys operations and
maintenance costs.
Option 2: Update the Deployed M113 Armored Personnel Carrier
The M113 is a tracked armored vehicle manufactured by United Defense LP of
Arlington, VA and was first deployed in the 1960s. The recent A3 variant contains a
275hp engine capable of speeds up to 41mph. At a combat weight of less than 14 tons
and with small dimensions it is readily transportable by the C-130 Hercules, even when
using unimproved airstrips.20 The newest variant, Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light
(MTVL), sports a 400hp engine capable of 41 mph, allowing heavier payloads and more
armor protection. It features greater internal volume than the LAV and LAV-III despite
significantly smaller external dimensions. MTVL was one of four finalists under
consideration for the interim armored vehicle.21
Upgrading the M113 is the most cost-effective option. The Army already owns at
least 24,000 of these vehicles, many sitting unused in storage. Upgrade costs per unit
Knox, Kentucky, September 22, 1998. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/lytle.pdf20 M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113.htm21 Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle To Undergo Additional Tests,National Defense,
December 2000. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm
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would be approximately $210,000 and up to $500,000 if a hybrid-electric drive is
installed.22 A rapidly deployable M113-based force in fact already exists. The United
States Army Europe (USAREUR) created an Immediate Ready Force (IRF), composed of
light, medium and heavy companies. The light force is deployable within 24 hours and
can be quickly reinforced by the M113-equipped Medium Ready Company via C-130
aircraft belonging to USAF Europe.23 The M113 is a battle-proven vehicle already
employed in a manner mirroring Shinsekis vision. Since the Army owns thousands of
these vehicles there is no need to procure additional ones unless they decided to augment
the fleet with the MVTL.
Option 3: Acquire a New Vehicle Platform
Three of the four finalist candidates for IAV selection were new vehicle platforms. In
addition to the deployed M113, the other primary contenders included the wheeled LAV-
III, the wheeled Pandur 6x6 LAV made by Steyr-Daimler Puch (now owned by General
Dynamics) of Austria and the tracked Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle produced by
Singapore Technologies Kinetics.24 These vehicles are well-regarded in international
defense circles and are able and durable. The downside in procuring a new vehicle is the
long-term vehicle delivery schedule, the greater costs involved and a lack of parts
commonality with other vehicles in the U.S. armed forces.
22 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,
Number 50, December 22, 2003.23 MAJ Paul Swiergosz, USA, USAREURs Ready Force, November 2001: Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/soldiers/nov2001/pdfs/lariat.pdf24 Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle,National Defense,
September 2000. Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm
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Selecting the LAV-III/Stryker
The selection process for the Army IAV remains tainted by controversy. The four
challengers for selection faced stringent testing in June 2000 at Fort Knox. Army
officials tested each vehicle for a range of abilities including being C-130 deployable, on-
and off-road capabilities and overcoming obstacles such as barricades and chain-link
fences. Testing officials released no publicly accessible data on each vehicles
performance but many industry analysts expected the LAV-III to come out on top.25 The
fact that units at Fort Lewis, Washington trained with Canadian Army-supplied LAV-IIIs
in September before an official decision was announced in November hints that Army
leaders had already made up their minds.26
LG Paul J. Kern, military deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology announced the official selection for the IAV on November 17,
2000.27 GM/GDLS won a contract to build 2,131 LAV-IIIs over 6 years at an initial
estimated cost of nearly $4 billion.28 On December 22, 2003 the Pentagon announced
final approval for the Army to fund two additional Stryker Brigade Combat Teams for a
total of six brigades to be procured. The total cost for the vehicles was revised upwards
to $7.2 billion.29
25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program,DefenseLINK
News, November 17, 2000. Accessed at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html28 Army Unveils Interim Armored Vehicles,Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1.29 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,
Number 50 (December 22, 2003)
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General Kern refused to divulge source selection criteria during his presentation
claiming that information is protected by the federal acquisitions regulations.30 There
is no public information as to why Army procurement officials selected the LAV-III over
the other contenders. He did highlight several key attributes of the LAV-III: C-130
transport plane transportability; 14.5mm armor providing all-around protection as the
vehicle rolls of the plane, 60mph-sustained speeds; a reduced logistics footprint; fuel
economy and reliability.31
United Defense LP, manufacturer of the M113, protested the award decision,
asserting that the evaluation and resulting cost-technical tradeoff were inconsistent with
the evaluation scheme set forth in the [request for proposal] and were otherwise
unreasonable.32 The GAO denied the protest but many Stryker detractors still accuse
Army testers of questionable performance evaluations for the vehicles, as we will see
below. More importantly, the GAO decision contains evidence that Army acquisition
officials may have turned a blind eye to shortcomings in GM/GDLS ability to meet the
criteria of the contract. The GAO decision states the awardees schedule for deploying
[the mobile gun system (MGS) variant] were very disadvantageous and evaluation did
not fully reflect certain disadvantages with respect to ammunition storage in awardees
MGS.33 Army officials apparently de-emphasized the immediate and urgent need34
for the vehicles emphasized in the proposal request to be able to award the full contract to
GM/GDLS.
30 LG Paul J. Kern, USA, Special Briefing on the Army Interim Armored Vehicle Program,DefenseLINK
News (November 17, 2000): Accessed at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/t11172000_t117army.html31 Ibid.32 United States Government Accountability Office, Decision in Matter of United Defense LP, File B-
286925 et al., (Washington, DC: GAO, April 9, 2001): p. 2.33 Ibid: p. 1.34 Ibid: p. 2.
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Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) attempted to intervene by sponsoring the 2001
defense authorization bill mandating a comparative test between the LAV-III and the
M113, which is manufactured in Santorums home state. The tests were held in 2002.
Prior to the evaluation, an unnamed Army Major General said it wont prove
anything.35 The Army apparently already made its decision: Wed rather spend the test
money on something else.36 The GAO deemed these tests sufficient, although GAO
representatives only witnessed and analyzed one half of the tests and exercises, and their
results.37
Budget Concerns
The Armys ambitious transformation strategy raised significant concerns about its
funding soon after General Shinsekis October 1999 announcement. Not only would the
Army procure and field a large interim force and spend billions on research and
development for its objective force, the Army planned to sustain, re-capitalize and
modernize most its legacy force until 2032. Even in 2000, the infancy stages of the
transformation plan, the service had only 68 percent of the funds necessary to recapitalize
current weapons systems.38
Lawmakers voiced concerns about budget shortfalls during Shinsekis testimony
to the AirLand subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2000.
35 Sandra I. Erwin, Army Confident About Move to Wheeled Combat Vehicle,National Defense,(September 2001): Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Sep/Army_Confident.htm36 Ibid.37 United States Government Accountability Office, Military Transformation, Armys Evaluation of
Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated
Comparison (May 2003)38 Chuck Vinch, Black Berets Will Become Armys Standard Headgear, Stars and Stripes, October 19,
2000. Accessed at http://www.pstripes.com/ed101900c.html
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Shinseki acknowledged he required substantial additional monies to achieve his goals.39
A May 2001 GAO study identified substantial challenges ahead in realizing Army
transformation plans and concluded Army leadership would face significant investment
trade-offs.40
GAO analysts reached these conclusions before significant cost overruns
dramatically raised the price tag of the Stryker contract. When Army officials first
unveiled its selection for the IAV, the average price per vehicle was $1.87 million.41 The
most recent budget figures indicate the average unit cost of a Stryker vehicle variant to be
over $2.85 million (see Table 1), while the average acquisition cost (includes military
construction, and research, development, test & evaluation) per vehicle exceeds $4
million.42
Table 2: Procurement Funds for Stryker Vehicle
PreviousYears
FY03* FY04* FY05* FY06* FY07* FY08*
Stryker1583.6
(754)
742.4
(281)
962.7
(371)
1524.2
(576)
878.4
(240)
719.5
(130)
549.2
(87)
Source: Department of the Army FY 2006-2007 Budget Estimates, February 200543
*Figures in millions of dollars. Number in parentheses reflects total number of vehicles procured that year.
Prior to General Shinsekis accession as Army Chief of Staff Army budget planners
never allocated a penny to an interim armored force so they needed to review all budget
allocations to find money to fund it. As GAO analysts predicted, Army leaders faced
difficult trade-offs. Budget officials cancelled and downsized several systems to release
39 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.40 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces WeaponSystems Challenges (May 2001): p. 12.41 Based on the announced contract of $4 billion for 2,131 vehicles as stated in Army Unveils Interim
Armored Vehicles,Army Logistician, Mar/Apr 2001, Vol. 33 Issue 2: p. 1.42 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-31, Army Transformation Faces Weapon
Systems Challenges (August 2004): p. 13.43 Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked
Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-
07/pforms/wtcv.pdf
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funds for transformation programs. Recent Army Modernization Plans termed this
process balanced modernization.44
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld worried about the trade-offs and intervened on
several occasions. He forced the Army to kill the Crusader artillery system and
demanded steep cuts in the Comanche helicopter program. Rumsfeld seriously
considered slashing funding for Stryker, though he ultimately spared the program.45
Army leaders eventually cancelled the Comanche program in February 2004.46 Despite
these efforts, recent Army budgets still faced substantial shortfalls.
Modernization programs for the legacy forces were cut 16% for the Armys FY04
budget. It terminated 24 systems, including upgrades to M-1 Abrams tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles to free up R&D funds for the Future Combat System.47 These are
precisely the platforms proving so effective and important in Operation Iraqi Freedom.48
Yet even in wartime Army leaders prioritized transformation programs over improving
vehicles with a demonstrated relevance today.
Criticizing Stryker
The Armys choice of a wheeled armored vehicle for its interim brigades remains a
controversial issue. Detractors point out several weaknesses of the Stryker and wheeled
vehicles in general. The primary deficiencies identified by critics are insufficient armor
protection for the troops riding in the vehicle, the inferior performance of wheeled
44 Department of the Army, 2002 Army Modernization Plan, Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2002/wMP_mainv03b.pdf45 John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle With Rumsfeld,Los Angeles Times, November 29,
2002. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021129-sbct.htm46 Army Cancels Comanche Helicopter Program, Government Services Administration, February 23,2004: Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0204/022304cdpm2.htm47 Extra $3B for Army, But That Wont Be Enough,Army Times, February 10, 2003. Accessed at
http://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1554345.php48 Alex Berenson, Fighting the Old-fashioned Way in Najaf,New York Times, August 29, 2004.
Accessed at www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/weekinreview/29bere.html
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vehicles in off-road situations, and the questionable deployability of Strykers in C-130
aircraft.
Insufficient Armor Protection
A significant concern raised by critics of the Styker is the lack of sufficient armor and its
vulnerability to common weapons like rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a weapon of
choice for Iraqi insurgents. Tom Christie, the Pentagons director of Operational Testing
and Evaluation, in fact recommended not sending the vehicles to Iraq precisely due to
their susceptibility to attacks with RPGs and other explosives.49
This vulnerability is striking since Shinseki himself cited RPG survivability as an
important feature for the new IAV.50 To remedy this shortcoming the Army is installing
a cage of ballistic steel slat armor around the vehicle. While the cage does offer
protection against RPGs it also adds an additional 2.5 tons in weight51, impairing
maneuverability, off-road performance, speed, fuel efficiency and C-130
transportability.52 Furthermore, the top of the vehicle and the shoulder-height wheel
wells remain exposed and vulnerable. Each upgrade adds $300,000 to the cost of the
vehicle.53
The rationale behind lightly armored vehicles playing significant combat roles is
the notion that superior access to information offers the United States military distinct
battlefield advantages. As MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.) observes, Perhaps the only
49 Jon E. Dougherty, Controversy Surrounds Armys Stryker,NewsMax.com (January, 28, 2004):Accessed at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/1/28/151543.shtml50 Heike Hasenauer, Reaching the Army Vision, Soldiers (June 2000): Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2000/features/ausa1.html.51 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare,
(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p . 51.52 Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War(A report written for Congressman Jim
Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 58.53 Ibid: p. 11.
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way to achieve the desired degree of self-protection for lightly armored vehicles will be
to replace reliance on heavy armor with an indirect form of protection, achieved through
superior situational awareness. If the enemy can be identified, tracked, and destroyed
will outside the enemys lethal range, then substantial self-protection from heavy armor
might no longer be necessary.54 This vision proved attainable and successful in combat
situations like Desert Storm and the major combat period of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The problem, however, lies in fighting in rough mountainous terrain like Afghanistan or
urban combat like the Fallujah and Najaf uprisings in Iraq. Strykers, and the fighting
style Stryker brigades are designed for, are ineffective in these situations because that is
where the long-range sensors cannot see, where smart weapons are dumbfounded, where
air strikes are impaired, and where ground troops are essential.55
Even heavily armored vehicles prove vulnerable under persistent attack in
asymmetrical warfare. To-date Iraqi insurgents have knocked a staggering number of 69-
ton M1A1 Abrams tanks out of the fight using low-tech improvised explosives and
rocket-propelled grenades by targeting the thinner armor at the sides and top of the
vehicles. At least 80 Abrams were so heavily damaged they were shipped back to the
United States.56 Nevertheless, the heavy tanks have the lowest casualty rates of all
deployed vehicles in Iraq despite their heavy use and frequent attacks they sustain. They
remain the platform of choice for fighting insurgents.57
54 Robert H. Scales, Jr., Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003): p. 151.55 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5, January 31, 2004: p.34.56 Steven Komarow, Tanks take a Beating in Iraq, USA Today, March 29, 2005. Accessed at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-29-abrams-tank-a_x.htm57 Steven Komarow, Tanks Adapted for Urban Fights they Once Avoided, USA Today, March 29, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-03-29-tank-inside_x.htm
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Wheels vs. Tracks
The debate over the relative benefits of wheeled and tracked armored vehicles is decades
old. COL Donald Schenk of the Armys Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
(TACOM) declared in the performance area to date, there is no remarkable benefit for
either wheels or tracks in straight, technical performance.58 Wheeled vehicles are in fact
quicker and quieter in on-road situations and more comfortable for the troops inside, the
main reasons they are the platforms of choice for peacekeeping and paramilitary
operations.
The issue at hand, however, is whether wheeled armored vehicles are effective
warfighting platforms. Douglas MacGregor, a retired Army colonel and author of
Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation under Fire, put it bluntly: A tank, or any
armored track vehicle for that matter, is vastly superior to a wheeled vehicle as a
warfighting platform.59 Victor OReilly, a defense analyst, cites a January 2000 study
conducted by the United Kingdom Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)/United States
Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) program reaching these
same conclusions. OReilly claims Shinseki ignored the findings and terminated the joint
program.60
There are three primary critiques of wheeled armored vehicles. First, their off-
road performance is poor compared to tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles excel in muddy
conditions where wheeled vehicles tend to get stuck, in part due to their better weight
distribution. Tires tend to wear quickly on hard ground and are not as durable as tracks.
58 Harold Kennedy, Army Approaches Decision on Interim Combat Vehicle,National Defense,September 2000. Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Sep/Army_Approaches.htm59 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA Ret, email correspondence with the author, March 8, 2005.60 Victor OReilly,Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003. Accessed at
http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf: p. 63.
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Tracked vehicles also feature a lower center-of-gravity because ground clearance is not a
significant issue in non-wheeled vehicles. The Stryker in particular is purportedly prone
to rollovers in off-road environments.61 If as a result of poor off-road performance
Strykers employed in combat situations primarily stay on roads their effectiveness may
be significantly reduced.62 Enemy fighters could mine the roads and then seek refuge in
roadless areas.
A second criticism is the inferiority of a wheeled vehicles maneuverability,
which is especially important in urban combat situations. While the Stryker has a turning
radius of 58.5 feet (wider than many city streets), a tracked vehicle can pivot steer by
turning on its axis. The Stryker is vulnerable to being blocked or trapped in an urban
setting by enemy fighters. A wheeled vehicle like the Stryker is unlikely to successfully
negotiate rubble without puncturing at least one tire, impacting its speed and mobility.
Tracked vehicles easily traverse rubble-strewn areas and can surmount substantially
higher vertical obstacles (24 for the Stryker vs. 36 for the MTVL).63
A third criticism of wheeled vehicles is that they cannot carry additional weight
from up-armoring, other improvements and load-carrying without significantly degrading
off-road performance. Tracks distribute the overall weight of the vehicle much better.
Wheels tend to sink in soft surfaces or wet ground.64
61 Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War(A report written for Congressman JimSaxton), August 22, 2003: p. 20.62 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare,
(Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p . 51.63 COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA, unpublished information provided in correspondence with the
author, April 27, 2004. See also Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus the Reality of War(A report
written for Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: pp. 22-23.64 Victor OReilly,Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress), December 16, 2003: pp: 64-64, 68.
Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf
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Tracked vehicles do fall short in certain areas of performance. Wheeled vehicles
are faster and quieter on paved roads and dry unpaved roads.65 They typically also
feature better fuel efficiency. Shinseki displayed a preference for wheeled vehicles for
these reasons. During his speech announcing Army Transformation in October 1999 he
observed heavy tracked vehicles like armored personnel carriers and tanks could be
phased out by lighter, faster, more fuel-efficient wheeled vehicles during the next
century.66 In another speech he asked: Can we, in time, go to an all-wheeled vehicle
fleet, where even the follow-on to todays armored vehicles come in at 50- to 70 percent
less tonnage? I think the answer is yes, and were going to ask the questions and then go
where the answers are.67[Authors emphasis]
C-130 Transportability
A primary justification and selling point for the IAV was the capability to deploy a
brigade in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.68 To meet this
goal, according to the Armys IAV solicitation from April 2000, the vehicle should have
the capability of entering, being transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft under its
own power and be capable of immediate combat operations.69
[Authors emphasis]
Furthermore, vehicle weight should not exceed 38,000 lbs.70
65 Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military,
Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 9.66 Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of American
Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm67 As quoted in: Harold Kennedy, Armys New Combat Vehicle to Undergo Additional Tests,National
Defense, December 2000. Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2000/Dec/Armys_New.htm68 See Gerry J. Gilmore, Army to Develop Future Force Now, Says Shinseki,Federation of American
Scientists website. Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/a19991013shinvis.htm69 As quoted in Victor OReilly, Stryker Brigades versus The Reality of War(A report written for
Congressman Jim Saxton), August 22, 2003: p. 62.70 Ibid.
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Soon after the selection of the LAV-III/Stryker as the IAV, critics charged the
vehicle was too heavy and too large for C-130 deployment.71 While the original LAV-III
was light enough, various add-ons and upgrades to the vehicle caused Strykers weight to
balloon significantly. Army officials themselves admitted in early 2002 that certain
Stryker variants exceeded the weight limit, the MGS variant by as much as 3,000 lbs.72
Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich criticized the Stryker and sent several
emails to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilian leaders in
September and October 2002 urging him to cancel the program.73 In an effort to silence
critics, Army officials organized a demonstration for senior Army leaders, government
officials and journalists at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. After a C-130 taxied to
a stop, an 11-man squad retrieved a Stryker from the plane and prepared the vehicle for
combat operations in eight minutes. The Air Force required a special waiver to fly the
vehicle on the plane, however, as it was heavier than the official cargo capacity limit.74
Army officials also backtracked from their original specifications that the vehicle be
combat ready upon arrival. They never envisioned the Stryker to roll off a C-130 with
guns blazing, but rather be capable of conducting combat operations after a short period
of preparation.75
71 See for example Benjamin C. Works, The U.S. Armys Light Armored Vehicle, Strategic Issues
Research Institute, Report issued May 19, 2001. Accessed at http://www.siri-us.com/backissues/2001/SIT-
Rep%2001-05-19%3B%20armyveh.txt72 Frank Tiboni, Most New Armored Vehicles Exceed U.S. Armys Medium-Weight Needs,Defense
News (March 4-10, 2002): p. 6.73 Sean D. Naylor, Digging in on Stryker,Army Times (November 4, 2002): Accessed athttp://www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-1232529.php74 Joe Burlas, Stryker Demo Debunks Critics,Army News Service, October 25, 2002. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/10/mil-021025-usa01.htm
75 Ibid.
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A 2002 RAND study concluded the 96-hour deployment window for a Stryker
brigade (about 366 vehicles) was unfeasible76, delivering another blow to the
deployability argument. GAO reported in June 2003 that five to 14 days, depending on
destination, with a huge commitment of Air Force resources, was a more realistic
figure.77
A December 2004 memorandum from TRADOC chief Gen. Kevin Burns to
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker again raised concerns over the weight of the
vehicle. A stripped down version of Stryker still tips the scales at 24 tons, far short of
Army leaderships stated goal of 20 tons and straining the carrying capacity of a C-130.
According to the memo, it would take four to six hours per vehicle to reload them with
the fuel, ammunition and other supplies necessary for combat.78 Byrnes further noted
that even at 24 tons it is doubtful that the Army will meet its survivability
requirements on most of the eight vehicle variants.79 Stryker advocates like Dan Gour
of the Lexington Institute, a defense polity think tank, admit that the vehicles cannot be
airlifted into a contested area as a result.80
From Theory to Practice: Stryker in Combat in Iraq 2003-present
The true test for Strykers capabilities is how the vehicle performs in actual combat
situations. According to General Schoomaker the Stryker Brigades have proven their
76 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: RethinkingStrategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, (Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 2002).77 Ray Rivera and Hal Bernton, Stryker Readiness Questioned, Seattle Times, September 6, 2003.
Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030906-stryker01.htm78 Megan Scully, U.S. Armys FCS: Too Heavy for C-130?DefenseNews.com, January 31, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20050131/atpc16154722.sgml79 Ibid.80 Dan Gour and Kenneth Steadman, Medium Armor and the Transformation of the U.S. Military,
Lexington Institute Paper, September 2004: p. 11.
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worth.81 He recently hailed their extraordinary performance in Operation Iraqi
Freedom.82 A careful analysis of unclassified sources will determine the merits of his
claim.
The 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division (3/2 SBCT) from Fort Lewis, Wash. was the
first Stryker Brigade deployed to Iraq. The unit arrived in Kuwait in November 2003 and
entered Samarra, Iraq in December. Subsequent a month of operations in Samarra the
unit was reassigned to Mosul in northern Iraq.
A GAO study conducted prior to deployment identified several weaknesses in the
brigades performance. Among the findings, GAO analysts highlighted operational
weaknesses in the unit, primarily due to insufficient training. Army officials conducted
additional training to address this issue before deploying the unit to Iraq.83
Two issues with long-term, potentially deadly implications were not addressed for
the 3/2 SBCT or the currently deployed brigade. One concern is the survivability and
mobility of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer. Currently this person is
assigned to a HMMWV.84 These vehicles, even the up-armored version, have proven
very susceptible to enemy fire and explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of
critical members of the Stryker brigade.85
81 Ann Roosevelt, Strykers Turning in Extraordinary Performance, Schoomaker Says,Defense Daily,
January 18, 2005: p. 7.82 Ibid.83 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-188 Military Transformation: The Army and
OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain forFuture Brigades (December 2003): p. 33.84 Ibid: p. 34.85 Numerous reports have cited the vulnerability of HMMWVs. See for example Craig Gordon, Troops
seen vulnerable in Humvees,Boston Globe, December 18, 2003. Accessed at
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/18/troops_seen_vulnerable_in_humvees/
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The second issue of significant concern is that only half of the Stryker vehicles
were equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment.86 FBCB2 is the
information system providing soldiers with real-time and near real-time battle command
information.87 Half of the Stryker vehicles deployed in December 2003 thus did not have
the very tools to master situational awareness that Army leaders, including Shinseki,88
touted would offer combat advantage on the battlefield and negate the effects of reduced
armor protection.
A further difficulty Stryker brigades face is that, in trying to come as close as
possible to the desired 96-hour deployment goal, they had to shed critical elements. The
brigade gave up its heavy armored vehicles, helicopters, long-term logistical support, and
even lacked adequate staff to coordinate with Air Force squadrons. It appears the lone
Stryker brigade first deployed in Iraq had to supplement its headquarters with 100
additional personnel.89 Currently a Stryker brigade cannot be self-sufficient and air
deployable, undermining the entire rationale for procuring the vehicles in the first place.
As a result, Strykers have not been airlifted inside Iraq.90 The C-130 transportability
requirement may in fact be dropped altogether.91
The 3/2 SBCTs Strykers and other vehicles arrived in Kuwait City on November
12, 2003. Ironically the vehicles were not transported via strategic airlift but by ship.
Two USN supply ships departed the Port of Tacoma on October 19 for the three-week
86 Ibid.87Federation of American Scientists tutorialaccessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/docs/A2C2S_Tutorial_RevA1a/sld010.htm88 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.89 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., The Long March, The National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 5 January 31, 2004: p.
36.90 Jefferson Morris, C-130 not used by Stryker Brigades for In-theater Movement, PM says,AerospaceDaily & Defense Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed through Lexis Nexis.91 Ibid.
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voyage. Logistics crews needed an additional two days to unload the ships and prepare
the fleet for the long drive to Samarra.92 From there the 3/2 Brigade was reassigned to
the northern city of Mosul as the insurgency in central Iraq grew more violent in early
2004.
Analysis of Stryker Brigade Accidents, Attacks and Casualties (to May 2, 2005)
The following data are compiled from a variety of official Pentagon reports as well as
newspaper articles. The compiled incidents include only those where the Stryker vehicle
itself was attacked or involved in an accident. I did not include attacks on Stryker
Brigade soldiers once they had disembarked from the vehicles while on patrol or in
battle. It is important to note, though, that this method of fighting greatly limits the
utility of Stryker Brigades in close combat situations when lacking heavy firepower for
backup. Dismounted light infantry stand to suffer significant casualties in penetration
attacks on defended urban areas.93
Any damage sustained to the vehicle is reported when available, though this
information is usually lacking in official Pentagon news releases. The list is incomplete
as well. According to Lt. Col. Gordie Flowers, commander of 2nd
Battalion, 3rd
Infantry
Regiment, over 50 percent of his Strykers were hit with RPGs and IEDs during his
twelve month deployment.94 I only listed incidents, however, for which I obtained
reliable and specific details.95
92 Michael Gilbert, Last of 5,000 Stryker Soldiers due in Kuwait as Brigade Gears up for Forward
Deployment, The Tacoma News Tribune, November 16, 2003. Accessed athttp://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/3872881p-3466602c.html93 COL Douglas MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, July
15, 2004.94 As quoted in Lisa Burgess, Army Looks to Give Stryker a Facelift, Stars & Stripes, December 22,
2004. Accessed at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_122204_Stryker,00.html95 Blogs often cite news of incidents but rarely provide reliable sourcing. For example, see Minstrel Boys
account of a 4 April 2005 IED attack on a Stryker in Mosul:
http://minstrelboy.blogspot.com/2005/04/securing-scene-of-damaged-stryker-hit.html
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Table 3: A Compilation of Stryker Vehicle Attacks and Accidents, and Resulting Casualties.
Date LocationIncident
Type*Description Casualties Sources#
12/08/2003 Duluiyah (near
Samarra)
Rollover Two Strykers plunge into
a canal.
3 killed 1, 2, 3, 4
12/13/2003 Samarra IED One Stryker destroyed
after secondaryexplosion.
1 injury. 2, 24
12/16/2003 Not specified Rollover One Stryker rolls into
irrigation pond.
1 suffers minor
injuries
1
12/20/2003 Samarra IED Explosion knocks left
front wheel off oneStryker.
Driver suffers
broken foot
2, 24
01/31/2004 Mosul RPG RPG attack inflicts
vehicle damage.
No serious
injuries.
22, 23
02/01/2004 Mosul RPG RPG attack inflicts minor
vehicle damage.
No serious
injuries.
22
02/20/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves to
avoid collision.
Undisclosed damage tovehicle
Undisclosed 1
03/28/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker rolls over
during off-road
maneuvers.
2 suffer
unspecified
injuries
1
04/04/2004 Mosul IED An unspecified vehicle
(possibly a Stryker) hit byan IED during a patrol.
1 killed, 1
injured
3, 21
04/28/2004 Mosul RPG An unspecified vehicle
(possibly a Stryker) hit byRPG during a patrol.
1 killed 3, 20
07/14/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves to
avoid collision, rolls over
down embankment.
2 killed 1, 3
07/15/2004 Not specified Rollover One Stryker swerves toavoid collision.
3 sufferunspecified
injuries
1
09/04/2004 Tal Afar (near
Mosul)
RPG One Stryker disabled
(broken transmission) due
to heavy RPG fire duringa rescue mission.
No major
injuries.
26
09/21/2004 Mosul IED A military vehicle (not
specified, possibly a
Stryker) was hit by an
IED during a patrol.
1 killed 3, 19
10/11/2004 Mosul VBIED A car bomb detonated
alongside a Strykerconvoy.
1 killed, 9
injured
3, 17, 18
12/04/2004 Mosul Unspecifi
ed enemy
fire.
Stryker vehicle attacked
during convoy
operations.
2 killed 3, 14
12/30/2004 Mosul VBIED A convoy of 4 Strykers
was ambushed by a carbomb during an attack on
a Stryker Brigade outpost
15 wounded 8, 12, 13
01/04/2005 Mosul RPG A Stryker patrol came 1 killed, 2 3, 15, 16
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In Samarra the 3/2 SBCT was divided into two company-sized battalions of
approximately 20 vehicles and 170 men. The Brigade would receive intelligence and
targeting information from the 4th Division stationed there. A battalion would then move
rapidly into town, but the infantry would run a few blocks to the target.97 The infantry
is thus exposed to enemy fire protected only by Kevlar vests and helmets.
The first month of the Stryker Brigades deployment in Samarra was marred by
two rollovers and two IED attacks. According to Gilbert, the Brigade Commander
prohibited his soldiers to take Strykers off-road near water subsequent the second rollover
incident
98
, thus greatly limiting the areas of operation for the vehicles in this well-
irrigated area. This also means that the patrol routes for Strykers becomes more
predictable to observant insurgents.
The IED attacks demonstrated that Strykers are indeed vulnerable to such attacks
and probably contributed to the decision to redeploy the 3/2 SBCT to Mosul in January
2004. The Kurd-dominated area in northern Iraq was relatively peaceful at the time and
required little more than stabilization forces.
Gen. Larry Ellis, head of the U.S. Army Forces Command, requested more
Strykers be put in the field around this time to offset the general lack of armor in Iraq. A
Newsweek magazine article cites sources claiming that Army leadership in Washington
was hesitant to approve this. The rubber-tire Strykers are thin-skinned and dont
maneuver through dangerous streets as well as the fast-pivoting, treaded Bradley.
According to a well-placed Defense Department source, the Army was so worried about
the Strykers vulnerability that most of the 300-vehicle brigade was deployed up in the
97 Ibid.98 Ibid.
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safer Kurdish region around Mosul. Any further south and the Army were afraid the
Arabs would light them up, he said.99
Even in Mosul during early 2004 limits were placed on where Strykers could be
used despite the comparative tranquility. According to Gilbert, Strykers were not
allowed in the old section of the city during his time there. The streets are quite narrow,
and the vehicle could not turn around in the event of an ambush. Fears of grenade attacks
from above and behind were also major concerns.100 Again the operational area for the
Stryker Brigade was curtailed, offering insurgents opportunities to establish a safe haven.
The 3/2 SBCT experienced two RPG attacks in late January and early February
2004. In the first attack the grenade impact just above the slat armor cage, causing minor
damage. The grenade wedged into the slat armor in the second attack and exploded away
from the body of the vehicle, thus working as advertised. It is unclear whether the RPG
and IED attacks of April 2004 involved Strykers.
There were 4 rollover accidents during the February-July 2004 time frame, one
during off-road maneuvers and three when swerving to avoid collisions. Michael Gilbert
noted that, in addition to these rollovers, Strykers were also involved in many accidents
with Iraqi civilian vehicles. The 3/2 SBCT commander offered financial compensation to
the victims families as a gesture of goodwill.101 There are no further reports of rollovers
and the number of accidents decreased after the Brigade Commander ordered his soldiers
99 Melinda Liu, John Barry and Michael Hirsh, The Human Cost,Newsweek(May 3, 2004). Online
version accessed at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4825948/100 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.101 Ibid.
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to reduce their patrol speed.102 The Army also changed its training for Stryker drivers in
response to the frequent accidents.103
Whether the Stryker is more prone to roll-overs than other military vehicles,
particularly with the addition of slat armor, is still an open question. COL Peter Fuller,
program manager for the Stryker vehicle program, claims they are not.104 Michael
Gilbert indicated that Stryker drivers he spoke with determined the main issue with the
slat armor was not so much that the vehicle was more top-heavy, but that the vehicle was
more unwieldy due to its greater width and length. The added weight also greatly
increased the stopping distance.
105
The official report on the roll-over accidents
conducted by the U.S. Army Safety Center is not yet available for public release.106
In April 2004 3/2 SBCT participated in operations in Najaf and Kut. Army Chief
of Staff General Schoomaker touted the operational agility of a Stryker battalion citing an
operation where the Army moved a Stryker battalion 420 miles through Iraq in 48 hours,
all the while maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle planning on the
move.107
Gilbert noted a similar operation where a battalion-size task force moved from
Najaf to Kut as part of Operation Danger Fortitude. The Stryker battalion covered over
102 Ibid.103 Jefferson Morris, Army Taking Steps to Solve Stryker Rollover Problem,Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, Vol. 212, No. 44 (December 3, 2004): p. 4. Accessed at Lexis Nexis.104 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune,February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p-
4288984c.html105 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.106 Michael Gilbert, Army Defends Strykers after at Least Seven Rollovers, The Tacoma News Tribune,
February 21, 2005. Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/story/4617218p-
4288984c.html107 Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation,Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed at
www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php
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300 miles in 14 hours while its commanders conducted operational planning en route.108
While the distance traveled is noteworthy and the fact that operational planning on the
road took place is convenient, Strykers still served only as troop transports. The soldiers
involved in the Najaf and Kut battles dismounted their vehicles well outside of town to
join up their fellow soldiers.
The latter half of 3/2 SBCTs deployment in Mosul witnessed relatively few
additional incidents, though they were very violent. One Stryker was targeted and
heavily damaged by a car bomb in October 2004. Reports on the 3-hour battle in Tal
Afar on September 4, 2004 following the downing of a Kiowa helicopter is one of the
few detailed accounts of the 3/2 SBCT in action.109
That morning insurgents attacked two Kiowa helicopters with RPGs, hitting one
in the engine. A Scout Platoon consisting of 4 Strykers was within 1000 meters of the
crash site and arrived on site in less than 5 minutes. Soldiers dismounted from the
vehicles at 75 meters from the Kiowa and set up a perimeter. One of the two pilots was
carried to the Stryker medical evacuation vehicle.
The perimeter meanwhile came under heavy RPG and small arms fire and the
defenders were outnumbered and in danger of being overrun. Bravo Company, another
Stryker patrol, was 1500 meters west of the crash site, but faced a hostile urban jungle of
blind alleyways and two- and three-story buildings.110
Bravo Company crept along a road heading toward the crash site under heavy fire
erupting from seemingly every doorway and window, including at least 15 RPGs. One
108 Authors interview of Michael Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.109 The described sequence of events is based on Matthew Cox, They Werent Going to get this Bird,
Army Times, November 22, 2004. Accessed at http://www.armytimes.com/print.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-
452676.php; and Bill Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes, The Tacoma News Tribune, February 12, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/military/stryker/story/4552351p-4264302c.html110 Cox, They Werent Going to Get this Bird.
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slammed into one of the leading vehicles, damaging the transmission. The column
grounded to a halt a few hundred meters later when the damaged Stryker could go no
further. The soldiers had to hook up the disabled vehicle to another with a tow bar under
enemy fire to continue on.
An overhead UAV monitored the evolving battle continuously and its controllers
observed a new influx of insurgents armed with RPGs and machine guns heading toward
the area. Another determined group of insurgents also placed themselves between Bravo
Company and the crash site. Basically what I did then was call in the Air Force,
according Lt. Col Reed, commander of the forces in battle.
111
Two F-16s provided close air support and targeted the insurgents with JDAMs.
Bravo Company was able to link up with Scout Patrol at the Kiowa crash site in the
ensuing lull in fighting but again came under heavy mortar fire, puncturing Strykers
tires. The pinned down soldiers repeatedly returned to their vehicles for additional
ammunition and launched two TOW missiles to slow the attack. It was not until an F-16
strafed the area, however, that the Stryker troops could dismantle the helicopter and
depart the area in relative safety.
This battle highlights two shortcomings of Stryker-centered brigades. First is the
vehicles primary use as an infantry transport/paramilitary vehicle, as opposed to a
warfighting platform. The troops must dismount the vehicle to effectively fight, thereby
exposing themselves to enemy fire. While such tactics are effective in situations like riot
control, the predicament of the Scout Platoon clearly shows the inadequacy of this
approach in close urban combat as they were pinned down by heavy enemy small arms
and RPG fire.
111 As quoted in Hutchens, Helicopter Heroes.
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Second is the Brigades heavy reliance on airpower for effectiveness and survival
in the face of determined insurgent attacks.112 The soldiers were only able to extract
themselves after multiple close air strikes on the opposing forces. Blasting their way out
in their Strykers was clearly not an option, even though the insurgents were relatively
lightly armed with small arms, RPGs and 60mm mortars.
The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (1/25 SBCT) relieved the 3/2 SBCT in
November 2004 at a time when the security situation in the area deteriorated
significantly. There appears to be an alarming trend of insurgents deliberately targeting
Stryker convoys with IEDs and RPGs. From December 2004 through March 2005 the
1/25 SBCT suffered at least 199 such attacks113, some with deadly consequences, at a
time when overall attacks on coalition forces dropped across the rest of Iraq. The brigade
suffered at least 3 deadly attacks in April 2005, killing 5 and wounding 4 soldiers. This
is a worrying development since it is clear Strykers are not well-equipped to withstand
such large explosions.
A recent incident in Mosul demonstrates another use for Stryker: that of a pursuit
vehicle. Insurgents there recently began launching attacks on Iraqi government building
and Iraqi and American troops from cars. The car enables them to attempt a quick
getaway, often seeking shelter in the narrow alleys of the old city. On several occasions
soldiers of the Stryker Brigade pursued insurgents in their Stryker vehicles, though there
is no indication that any chase yielded results. The pursuit on March 12 ended when a
112 See COL Douglas A. MacGregor, USA (Ret.), Army Transformation, Washington Times, February
11, 2005: p. 20.113 Albert Eisele, Improvised Explosives Becoming more Common in Iraq, The Hill, March 28, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/032305/explosives.html
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Stryker ground to a halt due to a broken axle, though the soldiers were able to destroy one
insurgents vehicle when he doubled back through the area a few minutes later.114
In the midst of this influx in attacks on Strykers, the Washington Post leaked
details of an internal Army Report completed in December 2004.115 The report, entitled
Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul Iraq (3/2 SBCT), chronicles numerous
complaints about Stryker drawn from confidential interviews with 3/2 SBCT soldiers.
Among the more important findings are shortcomings in the slat armor, situational
awareness system and the remote weapon system.
Army investigators found the slat armor cages to be effective only against 50% of
total rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and not effective at all against anti-personnel and
anti-tank grenades.116 The additional weight of the armor seriously impacted vehicle
handling and performance in wet conditions and muddy terrain, caused significant tire
wear, and made the central tire inflation system, used to adjust tire pressure according to
terrain, inoperable.117
The FBCB2 battlefield information system proved ineffective in battle. The
commanders heads-up display, a helmet-mounted display used to access the tactical
battlefield intelligence computer, was rarely used because it was too large and difficult to
use inside the vehicle and caused blind spots to its wearer in urban environments. It was
used effectively, however, during long convoy movements.118
114 Monte Morin, In Mosul, Insurgents Have Become Road Warriors,Los Angeles Times, March 13,2005. Accessed at ht tp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-fg-
mosul13mar13,1,2134295.story?coll=la-iraq-complete&ctrack=1&cset=true115 R. Jeffrey Smith, Study Faults Army Vehicle, The Washington Post, March 31, 2005: p. A01.116 Center for Army Lessons Learned,Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq: p. 48.
Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/iir-mosul-ops_stryker-
bde_21dec2004.pdf117 Ibid: pp: 50-1, 53.118 Ibid: p. 55.
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The computer providing situational awareness requires numerous improvements
itself. Its processor is too slow, the computer locks up when multiple vehicles attempt to
access the system while moving at high speed and many of the overhead photos were
outdated.119 Additionally, soldiers complained that the digital systems overheated easily.
The reports authors conclude air conditioning units will have to be installed in all
Strykers120. This will impact the vehicles fuel efficiency, acceleration and add additional
weight.
Strykers remote weapon system, its main armament, also suffers significant
deficiencies. A lack of stabilization for the gun and sight makes it extremely difficult to
hit targets while moving, the lack of a color display makes it difficult to identify specific
targets (e.g. a car of a particular color), and the slow slewing of the guns turret impairs
the gunners ability to quickly engage a target. The gun is only marginally effective at
night even when standing still because the thermal sensors used for firing accuracy dont
work well then.121 While the remote weapon system serves as an effective area
suppression weapon when standing still122, its shortcomings underline Strykers lack of
effective firepower in combat.
In an apparent response to these problems, the Army Engineering School will
soon outfit the 1/25 SBCT with a new radio-frequency kit to allow soldiers to detonate
mines from as far as several kilometers away. The units, called Matrix, are designed to
work with Claymore antipersonnel mines that feature a lethal radius of 50 meters. Matrix
119 Ibid: p. 56.120 Ibid.121 Ibid: p. 58.122 Ibid.
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can also be paired with a non-lethal version of the mine for crowd control purposes.123
This emphasis on static, stand-off defenses nevertheless underscores Strykers liabilities
in close-quarter combat.
Despite the spate of incidents and the negative internal Army report, soldiers of
the deployed Stryker Brigade remain enthusiastic supporters of the vehicle124, often citing
the vehicles speed, safety and quietness: Being quiet is an advantage because [the
insurgents] dont know where were at. If they attack us, we can circle around behind
without hearing us, because the firefights are loud. You cant even notice us driving
up.
125
According to Lt. Col Michael Kurilla of the 1
st
Battalion, 24
th
Infantry Regiment
in urban combat, no better vehicle exists for delivering a squad of infantrymen to close
in and destroy the enemy.126 Indeed, Stryker is useful as an infantry transport vehicle.
It is, however, not suitable for combat in urban and complex settings it was intended for
as described in the 2003 Army Modernization Plan.
Conclusions
Stryker is not a warfighting platform. They are inherently unsuitable for the small-scale
contingencies, particularly urban operations, they were designed and optimized for.127
Stryker has not proven particularly agile or versatile in its missions in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. My analysis of operations in Iraq indicates that, in reality, the vehicles are used
only for paramilitary missions like patrols and light infantry transport.
123 Michael Peck, Stryker Brigade will Protect Bases with Remote-controlled Mines,National Defense,
March 2005. Accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Mar/UF-Stryker_Brigade.htm124 Robert Burns, Stryker has Proven its Worth,Associated Press , April 21, 2005. Accessed at
http://www.usarpac.army.mil/news/xform/ap_042105.asp125 Edward Harris, Soldiers Hail New Army Troop Transport, The Associated Press, April 5, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0405/218502.html126 Michael Kurilla, Stryker Gets the Job Done, The Washington Post, April 5, 2005: p. 22.127 Department of the Army, 2003 Army Modernization Plan: pp. 26-27. Accessed at
http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2003/MP03Mainweb100.pdf
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The vehicles lack adequate firepower for fast-paced and close-quarter urban
combat. In the one well-documented case where Stryker Brigades were drawn into
serious urban combat the troops were not able to dominate the battlefield until after the
bulk of the opposing force had been wiped out by strong displays of air power. An
internal Army report also raised serious concerns about the deficiencies of its main
armament.
Strykers inadequate armor and large exposed wheel wells make them
unnecessarily vulnerable to weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and improvised
explosive devices commonly employed in guerilla tactics and urban combat situations
American troops face daily in Iraq. The vehicles large turning radius hinders its
maneuverability on narrow city streets. Off-road mobility has proven problematic as well,
especially with the additional weight of appliqu armor.
Due to restrictions on use off-road around Samarra and in the narrow streets of
Mosuls old quarter, large areas became relatively safe havens for insurgents and Stryker
areas of operation became predictable. Worryingly, Stryker patrols in Mosul now appear
to be specifically targeted by insurgents using improvised explosive devices.
The ability of Stryker Brigades to perform independently at the higher end of the
combat spectrum is limited as well. A root cause of this miscalculation is the underlying
assumption of the battlefield advantage of situational awareness. We simply do not
possess the technological capabilities to achieve a clear picture of enemy movement and
intentions. The edge in information superiority our forces currently do enjoy is generally
negated in close-quarter urban combat.
Transport by C-130 within the theater, a primary reason for procuring the vehicle,
has proven entirely unrealistic. Even Strykers stripped down to the bare essentials are
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only just light enough for air transport but require an unacceptable amount of time to
prepare for operations upon landing. It is telling the 2/3 SBCT drove to Najaf rather than
be flown there.128 TRADOC analysts concluded a Stryker unit is capable of winning
decisively in major combat operations (MCO) only with significant augmentation.129 In
other words, Stryker brigades would need accompaniment of a heavy division to be truly
effective, undermining the utility of being C-130 transportable.130
General Shinseki was right to emphasize the need for rapidly deployable, lethal,
and survivable brigades. He got it wrong by insisting on equipping them with wheeled
LAVs. Transformation does not necessarily necessitate a new platform or new
technologies. It often means employing the tools you have in a different manner.
Pursuing Stryker as the platform for the all-purpose Interim Brigade was a costly mistake.
Policy Implications
In light of the preceding analysis I propose the following five policy changes:
Cancel the Stryker Program
The Department of Defense should terminate the Stryker program after FY2005.
Restricting procurement of additional vehicles frees up $2.1 billion131
for upgrades to and
new purchases of existing platforms, as well as additional funds for body armor,
ammunition and vehicle maintenance. An average per unit cost of nearly $3 million for a
new platform used only for paramilitary missions is a poor use of resources. The United
128 Megan Scully, The Squeeze on Transformation,Army Times, February 21, 2005. Accessed atwww.armytimes.com/story.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-649239.php; and Authors interview of Michael
Gilbert, reporter with the Tacoma News-Tribune, March 2, 2005.129 As quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Transforming the Legion: The Army and the Future of Land
Warfare, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 14, 2004): p. 52.130 Ibid.131 Based on estimated budget figures outlined in Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2007
Budget Estimates: Weapons and Tracked Vehicles, Army, February 2005. Accessed at
http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/wtcv.pdf
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States military already owns a fleet of highly-capable, and less expensive, vehicles for
this purpose in the Marine LAV.
There is, however, a considerable political hurdle to be dealt with when canceling
the Stryker as they provide significant economic benefits to the areas where they are
based.132 It is not a coincidence that the Stryker Brigades are located in or near the
districts of powerful members of Congress. Three brigades are to be based in Fort Lewis,
Wash., in the district of Representative Norm Dicks (D-WA), a senior member of the
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. One unit is based at Fort Wainwright,
Alaska, represented in Congress by Representative Don Young, 3
rd
ranking Republican
Member of the House, and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), a commanding force in the
upper chamber. The fifth U.S.-based brigade will be at Oahus Schofield Barracks just
outside the district of Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), ranking member of the House
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee. Taking on their vested interests in
maintaining all five U.S.-based Stryker Brigades will undoubtedly be difficult, but a
compelling argument must be made.
Upgrade Existing Fleet of M113s133
The Army can achieve its goal of forming rapidly deployable, robust brigades by
upgrading its current fleet of C-130 transportable M113 armored vehicles and
augmenting them by procuring the MTVL variant. These vehicles are much better suited
132 Stryker-related projects such as construction of roads and training facilities on Oahu and the Big Island
alone will cost nearly $700 million through 2010, with much of these funds benefiting the local economy.Gregg K. Kakesako, Stryker Projects On,Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 1, 2005. Accessed at
http://starbulletin.com/2005/05/01/news/133 See Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Approves Fifth and Sixth Stryker Brigades,Defense Week, Volume 24,
Number 50, December 22, 2003 and Victor OReilly Preventable Deaths (A report written for Congress):
December 16, 2003. Accessed at http://www.combatreform.com/ppd43.pdf
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for the asymmetric challenges posed during urban warfare and stability operations. 134
The M113 A3 is significantly lighter and smaller than a Stryker for greater
maneuverability in tight urban quarters. As a tracked vehicle it provides superior off-
road capabilities. The Army currently has over 11,000 M113s in storage and could be
up-armored and updated to the specifications of the A3 for under $500,000.135 This
policy recommendation has two precedents. First is the aforementioned existence of a
rapid reaction force centered on the M113. Second, LG Thomas Metz, US Army ground
force commander in Iraq, requested hundreds of M113s be sent to Iraq earlier this year
because it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transportthan Stryker.
136
General
Casey, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, approved the request. The newly-
deployed M113s received armor upgrades to better withstand RPG attacks.137
Augment the Interim Brigades with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
No light armored vehicle can withstand large-caliber tank fire. Outfitting the Interim
Brigade solely with lightly armored vehicles, therefore, greatly limits the operational
scope of the unit. The Army should enhance the firepower and survivability of its
Interim Brigades with a mechanized task force.138
I propose the Interim Brigades be reconfigured by adding M2 Bradley Fighting
Vehicles. The M2 has armor protection similar to that of an M1 Abrams tank and can
134 BG David Grange, USA (Ret), interview with Lou Dobbs, CNN. Broadcast April 26, 2004. Transcript
accessed at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0404/26/ldt.00.html.135 Jack Kelly, Newly Armored Humvees Still Fail to Protect,Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 29, 2005.
Accessed at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05029/449831.stm136 Joseph L. Galloway, Army to send Older Armored Personnel Carriers to Iraq After Upgrading Armor,
Stars and Stripes, January 4, 2005. Accessed at
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SS_010405_Armor,00.html137 Ibid.138 The authors of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report for Operation Iraqi
Freedom allude to such a solution. See: Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003: p. 88. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf
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withstand 30mm projectiles on all sides (compared to 14.5mm only on top, the rear and
the sides above the wheel wells for an up-armored Stryker).139
Continue Research & Development of Combat Survivability Technology
The quest for better combat survivability is more imperative than ever. Army scientists
should continue to research advanced technologies but be realistic about the timeframe
for development and the shortcomings of such new technology.140 One promising arena
is finding light-weight substitutes for steel armor. Ceramic armor, such as silicon
carbide, features many desirable attributes but its current cost is prohibitive. Another
important shortcoming is that ceramic armor tiles are thicker the lighter they are, thus
impacting the size and interior space of the vehicle sporting it.141
Other interesting avenues of research include active defenses and electronic
countermeasures. Scientists at the Tank-Automotive Research Development and
Engineering Center (TARDEC) believe applying a set of such defenses could contribute
to the goal of manufacturing lighter but durable armored vehicles.142
Reevaluate the Objective Force
Senator Lieberman (D-CT) presciently questioned the wisdom of centering the vehicular
components of the Objective Force on a single platform in early 2000.143 Army leaders
are beginning to articulate this point of view now as well. According to BG David
Fastabend, a senior officer responsible for long-range planning at the Armys Future
139 M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems, Global Security.org. Accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2.htm140 Sandra Erwin, Future Combat Systems Technologies Not Keeping Pace with Expectations,NationalDefense, October 2004. Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/oct/Future_Combat.htm141 Ibid.142 Sandra Erwin, Survival in Combat Zones Requires Layers of Protection,National Defense,
December 2004. Accessed at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Dec/SurvivalInCombat.htm143 Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee,Army Transformation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on AirLand Forces. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 2000.
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Center, the answer to complexity, volatility and uncertainty is always diversity.144
Both the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ensuing
insurgency point to the value of maintain