the attritionist letters anthology

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THE

ATTRITIONIST

LETTERS

BY ANONYMOUS

Compiled from the Marine Corps Gazette

by Major Paul Stokes USMC, Retired

12 August 2011


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A Time of Transition

With those four simple words my recruiter, Sergeant Fred Pierson USMC, advised me on 30

December 1974 to not worry about the fact(s) that the Vietnam War was winding down and that

becoming part of the greatest fighting organization in the world was considered to be a poordecision by the most of the American Public. Because he knew the day would come when our

beloved Corps would be called upon again to face & defeat our nations foes.

And as the years went by, I experienced firsthand how the Corps pulled itself out of the doldrums

of the Post-Vietnam Era; embraced the time-honored tenets of Maneuver Warfare; organized,

trained, deployed and defeated enemies across the globe only to find itself fighting for its very

existence because far too many people [at home] believe that once again the Corps had become

A Second Land Army.

A significant contributor to this flawed perception is the fact that technology has given us the

ability to literally reach down to the individual Marine Rifleman increasing exponentially a

Commanders innate desire to influence the battle while creating the perfect environment for

micromanagement of not only combat operations but almost every aspect of a Marines activities

in both garrison and deployed environments.

From May 2010 to August 2011 the Marine Corps Gazette published The Attritionist Letters

which discuss how we, as a Corps of Marines, must guard against embracing the lock-step,

check the box mentality that is insidiously creeping like a virus into our very souls. As

one can expect, these ideas have caused some fireworks in a variety of circles [throughout our

Corps] but after having been labeled a heretic more times that I can remember in my 36 years

of service both in & out of uniform, Im proud of the fact that the Gazette had the courage &

forethought to gave the authors of these treatises the opportunity to raise their concerns.

After all Lads, they have made us think.

Tien len! Muon doc lap phai do mau! & Semper Fi Mac,

Paul L. Stokes

Major USMC, Retired

Director of Operations

Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School

Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center

Twentynine Palms California 92278

12 August 2011

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Table of Contents

The Screwtape Letters- Marine Corps Gazette, May 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Attritionist Letters (#1) - The debate continues- Marine Corps Gazette. May 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Editorial: Too Much Command in Command and Control- Marine Corps Gazette, June 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Attritionist Letters (#2) - The debate continues- Marine Corps Gazette, June 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Attritionist Letters (#3) - Do as youre told

- Marine Corps Gazette, July 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Attritionist Letters (#4) - Do as youre told- Marine Corps Gazette, August 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Attritionist Letters (#5) - Words mean things- Marine Corps Gazette, September 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Attritionist Letters (#6) - Eliminate maneuver warfare concepts- Marine Corps Gazette, October 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Attritionist Letters (#7) - Trusting one another- Marine Corps Gazette, November 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Attritionist Letters (#8) - Centralize control of intelligence- Marine Corps Gazette, December 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

The Attritionist Letters (#9) - A crucial warfighting element- Marine Corps Gazette, January 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

The Attritionist Letters (#10) - Subcontracting leadership development?- Marine Corps Gazette, February 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

The Attritionist Letters (#10) - A response- Marine Corps Gazette, June 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Regarding the Attritionist Letters- Marine Corps Gazette, February 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

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Table of Contents

The Attritionist Letters (#11) - Artillery leads the way!- Marine Corps Gazette, March 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Attritionist Letters (#12) - Succumbing to enticements- Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

A View from the Deckplate- Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Attritionist Criticism- Marine Corps Gazette, April 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Attritionist Letters (#13) - Thinkers need not apply

- Marine Corps Gazette, May 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

A Blunt Rebuttal- Marine Corps Gazette, June 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Editorial: The Opposing Ideas- Marine Corps Gazette, August 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A Dissenting Opinion- Marine Corps Gazette, August 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63


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Marine Corps Association Honorary President, Gen James T. Conway; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Je

ins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Ron Christmas, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew B. Davis, USMC(Ret); BGen James Kessler, USMC; BGen Thomas V. Dra

USMC(Ret); MajGen Eugene G. Payne, Jr., USMCR; Col Catherine D. Chase; Col William R. Costantini; LtCol Greg Reeder; Maj Gilbert D. Juarez; Maj Matthew A. McGarvey, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Carlton Kent; SgtMaj K

Eugene Davis; MGySgt Steve Williams; SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Frank J. Knox, USMC(Ret); Mr. Carlton Crenshaw; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. James A. Mosel; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Douglas D. Tennis, Jr.

MCA President and CEO, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. Tom Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneckmagazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC(Ret);Marketing & Communications DireSgtMaj Douglas Castle, USMC(Ret);Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Chief Financial Officer, Charlene French; President, MCAF, MajGen Leslie M. Palm, USMC(Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.

MAY 201

President & CEOMAJGEN EDWARD G. USHER III, USMC(RET)

www.mca-marines.org/gazette 1-800-336-0291

PublisherCOL WALT G. FORD, USMC(RET)

EditorCOL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET)

[email protected] Ext. 163Senior EditorLTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC(RET)[email protected] Ext. 109Layout/Editorial Production CoordinatorCHARLENE K. [email protected] Ext. 139Assistant EditorNIKI [email protected] AssistantLAWRALYNN [email protected] Ext. 144Web Content EditorMARGOT CORNELIUS

[email protected] Ext. 106Advertising DirectorG. SCOTT [email protected] 718-715-1361 Advertising RepresentativeRICHARD [email protected] 718-576-1286

Editorial BoardCOL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET)ChairmanCOL JAMES A. LASSWELL, USMC(RET)COL THOMAS KEATINGHead, Logistics Vision and Strategy Center, HQMCCOL ROBERT K. DOBSON, JR., USMC(RET)LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET)LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMCRCommanding Officer, 1stBn, 25th MarinesLTCOL WAYNE A. SINCLAIRChief, J5 Plans Division, USEuComLTCOL MATTHEW P. MCLAUGHLINDivision of Public AffairsLTCOL WILLIAM M. REDMANHead, Sr. Leader Management Branch, MMSLLTCOL CARL E. COOPERG3 (Future Operations), II MEFLTCOL LYNN A. STOVERDeputy Director/Dean of Students, MCC&SCMAJ KEITH KOPETS

Director, CMC Staff GroupMAJ BRIAN E. RUSSELLExecutive Officer, 5th Bn, 10th MarinesMAJ GARY W. THOMASONMAG24, 1st Marine Aircraft WingCAPT SCOTT CUOMOCO, Co F, 2d Bn, 2d Marines1STSGT DENNIS J. COLLINS1st MLGMSGT BRIAN CRILEYOperations Chief, OCS

Editorial: Dont Ask, Dont TellTo say that law and the policy of Dont Ask, Dont Tell is controversial is an uderstatement. The personal views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are dvergent. This was clear in recent congressional testimony where ADM MichaMullens, USN, the Chairman, testified that he thought the policy should be rescindeThe other Service Chiefs were less certain and cautioned against a change until tcommission appointed by the Secretary of Defense has reported out on all of the forseen consequences of changing the policy and recommending that Congress chanthe law. The Commandant was very succinct and explicit in his testimony. Testifyibefore the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen Conway responded to a questioon his position this way: At this point, I think that the current policy works. My bemilitary advice to this committee, to the Secretary, to the President would be to kethe law such as it is. In this months issue we have published two letters that are pol

opposites in opinion on the subject. The two letters responded to Leading ThrouChange, an article by LtCol Michael D. Grice published in the January GazetLtCol Grice took no stand on the law and policy but provided food for thought fleaders of Marines if the policy and law were changed. The bylaws of the Marine Cor

Association are very explicit, No part of the resources or programs of the Associatiowill be devoted to the promulgation or support of legislation. Given that stricture wwill not publish articles that are advocacy articles on either side of the issue. I agree withe Commandant. Any decision made about changes in law or policy should be viewthrough the filter of readiness and cohesion. I for one am not convinced that chaning the law and the policy will improve either, but like the majority of the membeof the Joint Chiefs I will wait until the group appointed by the Secretary of Defentasked to examine the issue, reports out.

The Screwtape LettersIn 1942 the English author, C.S. Lewis, published a novel in epistolary style tled, The Screwtape Letters. The novel took the form of a series of letters of advifrom an experienced devil named Screwtape to his young nephew Wormwood. Hprotg was having a difficult time in tempting and ruining souls. The novel isthinly veiled postulation of faith and morals. We have had a group of Marine

whom I have allowed to remain anonymous, compile epistolary articles they hatitled, The Attritionist Letters. They write provocatively about what they see as tongoing clash between maneuver warfare advocates and attritionists. It is our hothat they will engender a spirited debate over the next several months as we publitheir letters. I do not agree with everything that they assert, but they also makpoints that are valid and well worth considering. One of the most important itemI discovered soon after becoming the editor of the Gazetteis that we will have t

opportunity to publish points that we may or may not agree with and hope ththe readers will take up the debate.

Flying LeathernecksFinally in this issue we highlight Marine aviation. We are fast approaching t

100th anniversary of Marine air. We are an infantry-centric Corps, but the realiis that it is the A in the MAGTF that makes the Corps, and our contribution the national defense, unique and arguably indispensable. John Keen


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IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE)

apt Wormwood,From your lessons at TheBasic School (TBS), youno doubt recall the great1989 victory won in

Quantico by those who called them-selves maneuverists. Then-Comman-dant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, arrayed his

forces against uswe the noble attri-tioniststo do battle over the philos-ophy upon which the Marine Corps

would operate. Gen Grays forces at-tempted to redefine the Marine Corps

with a new interpretation of militarytheory, that of maneuver warfare.

For the past two decades, these ma-neuverists have touted their victory. Butas you know, young Wormwood, weare far from dead. In fact, attritionistforces have long waged a surreptitious

insurgency on all fronts of the Corps.Now, even as those maneuverists cele-

brate the 20th anniversary of their vitory, it is increasingly evident that thhave all but lost the war. As the Corhas quietly transitioned from a manever-centric philosophy back to a mo

attritionist one, you will note that Mrine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP 1), Warfighting, has remainanchored in the past, dated and inadquate. It should be quite obvious ththe Marine Corps in no way conducitself in accordance with this documen

What is more, very few Marines realithis . . . and fewer still even care! It now almost useless as a reference upo

which to base action. As a young Mrine officer, you can appreciate the im

portance of ensuring doctrine is kecurrent. This is the sign for which whave been waiting! In order to accrately reflect those attritionist methoologies we have striven so hard implement and currently emploMCDP 1, Warfighting, must be revise

We must not strive for certainty bfore we act, for in so doing we will surender the initiative and pass uopportunities.

The very nature of war makes cetainty impossible; all actions in w

will be based upon incomplete, inacurate, or even contradictory informtion.

You will recognize the previous ecerpts from the current version MCDP 1, Warfighting. While thcould have been uttered by Sun TzMoltke (the elder, of course), Claus

witz, or even Patton, they represent thmost dangerous line of thinking to o

Corps. Military philosophers have lonsuggested that uncertainty and diso

The AttritionistLetters (#1)

The debate continues

by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspon-dence, which I now offer to the public, fell into myhands. The general who authored them is almost cer-

tainly retired, for he writes with such careless disre-gardand one might suggest some contemptfor ourbeloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writesis a more puzzling case; there are far too many CaptWormwoods in the global access list to determinewhich is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is theessence of these papers that I find disconcertingand thus the urgency with which I submit them to you,

the reader. Read on.

MCDP 1 was written to change the wayMarines think about warfare. (File copy.)

C


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der are inherent attributes of war.Clausewitz said that:

. . . the commander must work in amedium which his eyes cannot see;

which his best deductive powers can-

not always fathom; and with which,because of constant changes, he canrarely become familiar.

You, my dear Wormwood, being atthe dawn of your career, are perhapsmost familiar with the traditional Ma-rine Corps position on this line. Since1989 Marine schoolhouses have at-tempted to familiarize the student withan environment of intentionally di-minished situational awareness whilesimultaneously demanding decisive ac-

tion. This was intended to create toler-ance for uncertainty and simultan-eously discourage the expenditure ofenergies in seemingly fruitless attemptsto ascertain certainty. Surely you canrecall that most horrific utterance froman overzealous TBS instructor, Whatnow, Lieutenant?

But to what end? I have long asked.Wormwood, you will note with zeal thatover the past several years, we have suc-ceeded in finally convincing Marine com-manders that they can no longer tolerate

the uncertainty and disorder traditionallycharacteristic of battlefields from time im-memorial. No longer must we attempt toappease our discomfort at an unruly bat-tlefield in which we lack complete andclear situational awareness. Quite the op-posite, we can no longer tolerate uncer-tainty. We must ensure that primacy ofeffort lies with pursuing certainty.

As a mere captain of Marines, thereis no need for you to clutter your mind

with military theory. However, if you

feel so inclined, there is an author whoclaims:

When confronted with a task, andhaving less information available thanis needed to perform that task, an or-ganization may react in either of two

ways. One is to increase its informa-tion processing capacity, the other to

design the organization, and indethe task itself, in such a way as to eable it to operate on the basis of leinformation.

It is obvious that maneuverists wou

rather accomplish the latter while wattritionists have long sought to pursthe former.

You will note with pride that felloattritionists have worked ever so digently to ensure that billions of dollaare invested to procure the latest tecnologies with the primary objectibeing the elimination of disorder anuncertainty on the battlefield. C2P(command and control personal computer), CPOF (command post of th

future), AFATDS (advanced field atillery tactical data system), and othlike systems (as well as their interfacpromise an unparalleled clarity on thcurrent battlefield. Similarly, intelligenpreparation of the battlespace is becoming extraordinarily focused on produdevelopment in order to provide t


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commander with the answers for any

possible data requests. From your read-ing of Napoleon, you will recall that hewould implore intelligence staffs to findany information I might find of inter-est and subsequently leave it to theirinitiative. How pathetic! Todays com-manders canand therefore doright-fully demand ever-increasing amountsof quantitative information with whichto eliminate uncertainties and disorderon the battlefield. For only when thehighest echelon commanders are pro-

vided all of the information can they de-termine the appropriate course of actionand issue forth appropriate tasks forsubordinates. You can see that currenttechnology has eliminated Clausewitzsfog of war.

I cannot recall when you last de-ployed to CentCom (U.S. CentralCommand). Was it earlier this year?Last year? Either way, you must haveobserved that our movement is gainingsignificant assistance from military con-

tracting firms. Even in a recent issue ofthe Marine Corps Gazettethat forum

for discourse among our Corps bestone firm actually published an adver-tisement clearly identifying un-certainty as the primary enemy and of-fering the military extensive command

and control system capabilities in orderto resolve the problem. I have seen sim-ilar advertisements from other compa-nies, both offering elaborate (althoughexpensive) information and commandand control systems that seek to in-crease information-processing capabil-

ity rather than to pursue the uselessobjective of allowing the commander tobecome comfortable with uncertainty.These advertisements are, of course, nottargeted at junior officers like you,

Wormwood, but rather they are in-

tended to connect with our Corps de-cisionmakers. I must admit that uponseeing the advertisements, I was flooded

with an immense sense of relief . . . rlief that our position, so long bannfrom respectable circles, is now firmentrenched and even valued at the higest levels.

I have no doubt that we are achieing our objectives in Afghanistan anIraq primarily through increased use technologies that seek to eliminate ucertainty on the battlefield. Deludemaneuverists will argue that these netechnologies can actually introdumore confusion into the operating evironment. They will also try to arguthat rather than attempt to banish ucertainty from the battlefield, Marinshould train more extensively in su

unpredictable environments in order develop confidence in their abilities. Bclinging to such dated ideas, the mneuverists are proving their ineptituby their refusal to accept the obvioutechnology has eliminated the need be comfortable in chaos. After all, onof our most esteemed fellow attritioists, retired MG J.F.C. Fuller, wrotWeapons, if only the right ones can found, form 99% of the victory.

Capt Wormwood, I am cognizant

your contributionalbeit a small analmost meaningless oneto this causAt times, however, you strike me as amost rambunctious and unpredictabHow many times must I tell you? Takno unnecessary risk! Make no unneessary decision! You would do well simply pay attention and emulate thoseniors (such as myself) who are kinenough to have assumed the responbility for your leadership developmeas we proceed in our most worth

cause. Stay vigilant, for just as victorynear, it can also be seized away at thlast. Until then, I remain,

Gen Screwta


Agree or disagree? Join the discussion at www.m

marines.org/gazette/anonymous.

Join th

Debat

Coming in theJuly 2010 issue:

Victory in Afghanistan

Attritionist Letter #3

Ground equipment

Energy strategy

A not so quiet Marine

Principles overcome by technology. (File copy.)

You can see that currenttechnology has elimi-

nated Clausewitzs fogof war.


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Marine Corps Association Honorary President, Gen James T. Conway; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. J

ins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Ron Christmas, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew B. Davis, USMC(Ret); BGen James Kessler, USMC; BGen Thomas V. Dra

USMC(Ret); MajGen Eugene G. Payne, Jr., USMCR; Col Catherine D. Chase; Col William R. Costantini; LtCol Greg Reeder; Maj Gilbert D. Juarez; Maj Matthew A. McGarvey, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Carlton Kent; SgtMaj K

Eugene Davis; MGySgt Steve Williams; SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Frank J. Knox, USMC(Ret); Mr. Carlton Crenshaw; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. James A. Mosel; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Douglas D. Tennis, Jr.

MCA President and CEO , MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. Tom Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneckmagazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC(Ret);Marketing & Communications DireSgtMaj Douglas Castle, USMC(Ret);Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Chief Financial Officer, Charlene French; President, MCAF, MajGen Leslie M. Palm, USMC(Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.

JUNE 201

President & CEOMAJGEN EDWARD G. USHER III, USMC(RET)

www.mca-marines.org/gazette 1-800-336-0291

PublisherCOL WALT G. FORD, USMC(RET)

EditorCOL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET)

[email protected] Ext. 163Senior EditorLTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC(RET)[email protected] Ext. 109Layout/Editorial Production CoordinatorCHARLENE K. [email protected] Ext. 139Assistant EditorNIKI [email protected] Administrative AssistantLAWRALYNN [email protected] Ext. 144Web Content EditorMARGOT [email protected] Ext. 106Advertising DirectorG. SCOTT [email protected] 718-715-1361 Advertising RepresentativeRICHARD [email protected] 718-576-1286

Editorial BoardCOL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC(RET)ChairmanCOL JAMES A. LASSWELL, USMC(RET)COL THOMAS KEATINGHead, Logistics Vision and Strategy Center, HQMCCOL ROBERT K. DOBSON, JR., USMC(RET)LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET)LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMCRCommanding Officer, 1stBn, 25th MarinesLTCOL WAYNE A. SINCLAIRChief, J5 Plans Division, USEuComLTCOL MATTHEW P. MCLAUGHLINDivision of Public AffairsLTCOL WILLIAM M. REDMANHead, Sr. Leader Management Branch, MMSLLTCOL CARL E. COOPERG3 (Future Operations), II MEFLTCOL LYNN A. STOVERDeputy Director/Dean of Students, MCC&SCMAJ KEITH KOPETS

Director, CMC Staff GroupMAJ BRIAN E. RUSSELLExecutive Officer, 5th Bn, 10th MarinesMAJ GARY W. THOMASONMAG24, 1st Marine Aircraft WingCAPT SCOTT CUOMOCO, Co F, 2d Bn, 2d Marines1STSGT DENNIS J. COLLINS1st MLGMSGT BRIAN CRILEYOperations Chief, OCS

Editorial: Too Much Command in Command and ControlIn this months Gazetteon page 10, we publish the second in the series of Atritionist Letters written by several officers concerned that the tenets of maneuv

warfare are being supplanted by an attritionist mindset, and it is evident in the ations and command climate created by some commanders. I dont think that the impact of technology on commanders is a new phenomenon.

After World War I the noted British military historian and tactical theoriMajGen J.F.C. Fuller, lamented, In the World War nothing was more dreadful

witness than a chain of men starting with a battalion commander and ending wian army commander sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, taling, talking, in place of leading, leading, leading. He was alluding to the impact ththe invention of the field phone had on commanders. In actuality he was lamening the impact that technology had on some commanders. Not all commanders

mained in the rear. There were those who knew when it was more important move forward to the point of impact so that they could make an impact. In facFullers Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cures: A Study of the Personal FactorCommandis still a relevant primer today on command, almost 80 years after it wpublished. I commend it, and it is available on the web at http://www.cgsc.edcarl/resources/csi/Fuller/Fuller.asp.

The problem is not advancing technology, such as command and control psonal computer (C2PC) or the advanced field artillery tactical data system or any oof the myriad of other command and control (C2) systems that permeate the moern combat operations center (COC). The problem is how commanders use or muse the capabilities of these systems. C2 systems are like a weapons system in thatmaximize its effectiveness it is critical to know the systems capabilities and limitions. I believe the issue to which our young Turks refer in their letter when th

speak about C2

is not the system but the commander.On page 45 in The Combat Operations Center, LtCol Debra Beutel gives update on the latest capabilities that the currently fielded COC provides to the commander. It does not, however, come issued with a commander who understands ththe COC is a capability and a tool, not a method of C2. The latter is personal to tcommander. If the commander chooses to use this capability to micromanage suordinates or give such explicit direction that he is in effect telling them how to a mission and not the why and end state, then there is no systemic way to correthat. The correction lies with the commanders commander.

Years ago I was Coyote 6 and was accompanied on a combined arms exercfinal exercise by an Army general. As we watched tanks, fixed-wing aircraft, and atillery attack a target, he asked if the Marine tank was digitized. He was quite proof the fact that as a division commander he could drill down on a C2 system a

find out the fuel, ammo, and maintenance status of any Army tank in the divisioI probably looked like a stunned mullet when I asked why he would want to knothat unless he had been reassigned as the company CO or battalion logistics offic

Yes, you can have too much commander in command and control. However, icould command again I would want to fight with the tools available now and n

just a field phone. John Keen


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apt Wormwood,I recieved your reply justlast week. You raised an in-teresting question regard-

ing centralized command and controland why we attritionists are so adamantin our pursuit thereof. I must expressmy disappointment in you. I had

thought that you were intelligentenough to see the wisdom of thismethod. You have once again re-minded me of how incapable our jun-ior officers can be and why centralizedcommand and control is absolutely es-sential. Being a young captain ofMarines, you will no doubt recognizethe following excerpts:

In order to generate the tempo of op-erations that we desire . . . commandand control must be decentralized.1

We must not try to maintain excessivecontrol over subordinates since this

will necessarily slow our tempo andinhibit initiative.2

These contentionscited directlyfrom that archaic and outdated MCDP1 [Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication1], Warfightingrepresent the strong-est arguments maneuverists have de-rived to support their antiquated and

inadequate theories of decentralizedcommand and control. These maneu-veristsblinded by their own hubrishave sought to cling to a principle evenas it has succumbed to the realities ofthe modern age.

I am convincedand the MarineCorps is increasingly demonstratingthat centralized control is the most effi-cient method of controlling tempo,operations, and supervising mission ac-complishment. Militaries have long

been forced to execute decentralizedcommand and control procedures only

out of necessity, not out of preferencBattles and wars have been lost becauof insufficiently centralized control ancoordination; Frances defense in 194is a clear example. You will recall that

spoke of extensive technological innovtion in a previous letter. Those technlogical capabilities have increased clarion todays battlefield and enhanced tcapability of higher commands to rceive and analyze information, and theto disseminate detailed orders to subodinate commandersall with unprecdented speed.

I am sure that you have witnessed this firsthand. In recent years, the siof command and control cells h

grown exponentially due to thamount of information acquireprocessed, analyzed, demanded fromand disseminated to subordinates. Thall serves to ensure effective centralizecontrol. One needs only to compathe size (defined by number of assignpersonnel and amount of commanand control systems/equipment) of thMEF command staff in OperatioDESERT SHIELD/STORMwith that dployed in a combat environment tod

to realize the transformation that weas a modern fighting forcehave udergone, and this is just within the pa20 years! Not since the Prussians, aftbeing trounced by Napoleon in 180has a military force so ideologicaltransformed itself in such a brief perioof time. However, Scharnhorsts miguided and detestable efforts attemptto empower junior ranks, whereas wseek to empower the highest commander with greater situational awar

ness and increased decisionmakincapability. Look where it got the Ge


The debate continues

by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspon-

dence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my

hands. The general who authored them is almost cer-

tainly retired, for he writes with such careless disre-

gardand one might suggest some contemptfor our

beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes

is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt

Wormwoods in the global access list to determine

which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the

essence of these papers that I find disconcerting

and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you,


C


16/64

mans! Catastrophic losses in two worldwars were the reward for delegating re-sponsibility to subordinates.3

As you have served at various regi-mental and battalion staffs, you have

no doubt seen the growth of central-ized staffs as well. Some maneuveristsmight claim that the increased size ofbattalion and regimental staffs reflects acorresponding increase in decentraliza-tion. However, as youand any oth-ers who have served on battalion andregimental staffsare well aware,much of the battalion and regimentalstaff effort is expended not to lead theirown men but rather to meet the ever-increasing demands of higher echelon

commands. Those obsequious battal-ion and regimental staffs are inundatedwith demands for required reports, var-ious overlays, and PPT [MicrosoftPowerPoint] information slidesallforwarded on to a single centralizedhub of operations.

Wormwood, if you find time youmight want to review recent trends inOIF/OEF [Operations IRAQI FREE-DOM/ENDURING FREEDOM] combatoperations. I believe that you will be

pleasantly surprised to see that subordi-nate commanders are already deferringroutine decision points and reportingseemingly minor information require-ments to higher echeloned command-ers. Many commanding generals

while perhaps required to pretendmaneuverist sympathiesactually con-cur that greater centralization is key toachieving desired effects in combat.One of my dear friends boasts that as adivision commander in Afghanistan he

demanded daily situation reports fromhis company commanders in the field.These reports were sent directly to himrather than to the respective battalionand regimental/brigade commanders!

As he says, there just wasnt time towait on battalion and regiment com-manders to act on the information attheir level. Similarly, I have heard thatapproval of fires is now often central-ized at the highest level in order to bestcoordinate with all participant agencies

as well as assess potential collateral ef-fects.

These recent trends toward central-ized command and control are nothingnew; they simply represent the militaryreturning to its roots. Young captain ofMarines, I will again refer you to Mar-

tin van Creveld who wrote that decen-tralized command and control was:

. . . bitterly opposed by headquarters,especially higher headquarters, whoresented the loss of control and dideverything in their power to counterthe growth of chaos on the battlefield.Control-by-wire was pushed progres-sively forward and downward untilcorps, divisions, regiments, and evenbattalions were hooked into the net-

work. From then on, if an officer wasto be on call by his superiors he had

to be within reach.4

While Van Crevelds example datesfrom World War I, it is easy to see thesame trends emergent in todays mili-tary forces. Wormwood, have you seenthe latest discussion on the CLICs[company-level intelligence cells] andCLOCs [company-level operationscells]? Although such plans might bepackaged as maneuverist in natureunder the guise of enhancing smaller

units with more capabilities, they willno doubt be used to keep those subor-dinate units under ever tighter and cen-tralized control.

The trend toward centralization ofcommand and control is due in largepart to effective command and controlsystems now available at all levels.Never before could high-level com-manders gain an accurate sight pictureof the fluid battlefield. Gen [A.A.] Van-degrift could not accurately track unit

positions on a C2

PC [command andcontrol personal computer] or verifygreen gumballs on the AFATDS [ad-vanced field artillery tactical data sys-tem] as subordinate units encountered

jungle terrain, tropical storms, and Japanese troops on Guadalcanal. Buttodays environment no longer requiresthat command and control be decen-tralized to subordinate commanders. Infact, it is far more effective to assumeand maintain centralized control at the

highest echelon. Even distributed oper-ationsthe latest catchphrase tossed

around by Marines of all ranksanot immune to this trend; althougmiles distant from central control, iformation transfer capabilities ensuthat subordinates have limited ability

conduct any autonomous operationCentralization is the wave of the futurThis trend toward centralization pr

cludes the need to indulge in the ambiguous commanders intent anmission tactics, but I shall write moon that in my next letter. Capt Worm

wood, I am looking forward to yopending selection to career-level scho

where you shall have the most enjoyabopportunity to master the Marine CorPlanning Process and learn to make th

most effective matrices and PPT slidwith which to brief your higher. Onthen can you become an effective staofficer. Until then, I remain,

Gen Screwta

Notes1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Washington, D1997, p. 78.

2. Ibid., p. 80.

3. Here it appears that the general is referrito the work of Prussian GEN von Scharnhoin establishing the Militarische Gesellscha(an educational collaborative) that led to a formedand victoriousPrussian militamuch changed in the 6 short years between Je(1806) and Leipzig (1813). It is my opinithat the general mislabels the German losses

World War I and World War II. There is no gument that the Germans lost both conflictsthe strategic level, but sound arguments suggthat German tactics were actually superiCharles Edward White, The Enlightened SoldPraeger Publishers, Santa Barbara, CA, Nove

ber 1988.

4. Van Creveld, Martin, Technology and WThe Free Press, New York, 1989, p. 176.



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17/64

apt Wormwood,I received your last lettersome time ago, but youmust understand that

someone of my stature has far moreimportant things to do. Furthermore,it took me some time to compose anadequate response to your misguided

andquite honestlyalmost insolentcomments suggesting that missiontactics and commanders intent haveredeeming value. Put such thoughtsout of your feeble mind this instant! I

will tell you exactly what I want you todo. You will not have to wonder, nor

will you have to burden yourself withthinking about it. And as for my in-tent, my intent is for you to do exactly

what I tell you to do! It is time for youto grow up and leave such foolish no-

tions behind. Wormwood, I mustadmit that at times I suspect that you

may actually be in league with thesemaneuverists, and then I realize that its

just the navet of a young captain. It iscritical that you understand that thetrend toward centralization precludesthe need for Marine leaders to indulgein such archaic and ambiguous con-cepts as commanders intent and mis-

sion tactics. As a relatively recent graduate of

The Basic School, you no doubt willrecall the terms introduced above.Long heralded as part of the triad ofmaneuver warfare, these two elementsof Marine warfighting philosophy areproving to be increasingly obsolete intodays operating environment. Ac-cording to Marine Corps DoctrinalPublication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting:

The purpose of providing intent is to

allow subordinates to exercise judg-ment and initiativeto depart from

the original plan when the unforeseoccursin a way that is consiste

with higher commanders aims.1

We must remind ourselves that commanders have been forced to use com

manders intent and mission tactibecause of limits imposed upon theby chaotic battlefield situations anlimited technological capabilities. Nether of these limits exists any longeFurther, we must admit that so fe

junior leaders on the battlefield possethat coup doeilthe intuitive grasp

what is happening on the battlefielThus, it is absolutelynotin the intereof higher echelon commanders to allosubordinate leaders to demonstrate in

tiative and independence.As we further our agenda, we cclearly imagine a combat operatiocenter (COC) 5 years from now:

A battalion commander walks into hCOC and sees a troops in contact ufold on the plasma touch screen operatiomonitor. The zoomed in live satellite fe

provides him eagle-eyed observation of tsituation unfolding in realtime. He sethe blue icons displaying his friendliesthanks to global positioning system trac

ing devices embedded in the riflesmoving north along a road. He also sethe enemy platoon attempting to flank hlead units. Realizing the gravity of the suation, the battalion commander doubtaps on the trace squad leaders icon anslides it approximately 200 meters norThe commander selects an ambu

graphic icon from a dropdown menu andouble taps the screen at the desired loction. Almost immediately, he sees tsquad leader halt his movement, glan

downwardno doubt at the liquid crytal display screen strapped to the squ


Do as youre told

by Anonymous




tainly retired, for he writes with such careless disre-

gardand one might suggest some contemptfor our








C

IDEAS & ISSUES (MANEUVER WARFARE


18/64


leaders forearmand make a fewblurred hand gestures directing his mentoward the identified ambush position.The battalion commander looks on withsatisfaction as he sees the squad set out.

Wormwood, you know that thetechnologies to allow us these capabil-

ities are currently available. If we ad-hered to the tenets of commandersintent and mission tactics, we wouldhave to rely upon subordinate com-manders to receive, evaluate, analyze,and execute our guidance. Each ofthese steps introduces potential errorinto the process, error thatalthoughonce necessary to assumecan now beavoided.

A second reason for shifting ourphilosophy is that both commanders

intent and mission tactics demand thata commander trust his subordinatecommanders. In todays more intercon-nected and globalized world, the penal-ties for wrongly trusting subordinatesare no longer confined to a court-mar-tial or conference room deliberationsamong military professionals. We attri-tionists must continually leveragetodays commanders who are held ac-countable in a court of national and in-ternational opinion, and due to the

24-hour news cycle, immediately.Thus, a results-oriented (and dare I say

career-minded) individual assumestremendous risk if he leaves subordi-nate commanders to interpret his guid-ance. MCDP 1 falsely claims that trustby seniors in the abilities of their sub-ordinates2 is essential. In fact, I hopeyou will agree that it is far better for a

senior to eliminate all doubt and en-sure that subordinate commanders ex-ecute guidance as passed rather thanrisk mistakes. Ideally, subordinate com-

manders should be relegated to beingnothing more than simply managersof the personnel assigned them. Worm-

wood, how easy would your job be ifsomeone told you not just what toaccomplish but how to do it as well?

You may be wondering what yourrole would be in such a system. Not to

worry, my dear Wormwood, therewould still be a need for a few excep-tional officers to be trained for highercommand. Junior officers would spend

their formative years learning and de-veloping not by trial and error, not by

attempting to achieve dazzling resuand succeeding or failing, but as thought, by simply following the ordeof their wiser seniors. They would a

ways succeed, and success would their teacher. The maneuverists woucertainly complain, You will tea

them obedience and they will nevlearn initiative! This is absurd. Whofficers and NCOs are young, they alike children and should be treated

such. We will teach them initiative the proper time, if it is necessary, b

we will be very careful about givithem this tool. It is unpredictable andifficult to control, much like givinfire to primitives.

Even at the simplest levels, we mucontinue to centralize decisions and rmove the possibility that subordinat

will misinterpret orders. Wormwoodcannot remember when you last dployed to a combat zone. No dou

you saw firsthand the emergence of atritionist policy with regard to the u

. . . both commanders intent and mission tactics demandthat a commander trust his subordinate commanders.

The fog of war has become an excuse to grant subordinates too much latitude. (Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian D. Jones.)


19/64

of personal protective equipment(PPE) in theater. Commanders intentand trust in subordinates have beenusurped by the centralized dictates ofan attritionist culture, and rightfully so.

While some higher echelon command-ers have suggested that perhaps PPE re-quirements are situationally dependentand based upon subordinate com-manders battlespace assessments, sev-eral battalion commanders haveindicated that such decisions were notdelegated but rather made by a seniorcommander at a forward operatingbase far removed from their daily op-erations. It is clear that senior com-manders cannot trust subordinates to

make independent decisions. And thislack of trust is justified! After all, whowill be held responsible if a Marine iskilled and his death might have beenprevented?

Capt Wormwood, you must realizethat in order to be more effective as a21st century fighting force, we must

halt our dependence upon archaiccharacteristics, such as commandersintent and mission tactics. Althoughsuch practices may have seemed to

work in years past, they now work

against us. (It is more likely that ma-neuverists have simply exploited suchsuccesses by claiming credit for maneu-ver warfare when in fact some other ra-tionale was responsible.) Quite simply,senior officers make better decisionsthan junior officers, as we have seenboth in Iraq and Afghanistan. Com-manders intent and mission tacticsonly serve to reduce the speed and pre-cision with which a senior commandercan make necessary decisions. Subordi-

nate commanders should be relegatedto the more appropriate role of per-sonnel manager focusing primarily onthe human resource concerns of theforce rather than on the leadership anddecisionmaking so espoused in eraspast. The subordinates must under-stand that their role is twofold: to exe-

cute the orders they have received anto report back to higher headquarter

While this may not sound terribexciting, Wormwood, please remembthat it is for the good of the Corps

am looking forward to your next lettand until then, I remain,Gen Screwta

Notes1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters MarCorps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 89.

2. Ibid., p. 58.



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Jenifer M. GuimondClass of 2010

Pre-MBA: U.S. Navy Pilot

Post-MBA: Bain & Company Consultant

Dardens emphasis on leadership, ethics and the team-oriented, case

method style of learning make Darden a great fit for students with a

military background. Learn more about the MBA Program, as well as

several military-specific scholarships, by visiting us in person or online.

Darden did more than value my militaryexperience Darden encouraged me to leverage

those experiences in the learning process.


20/64

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21/64


apt Wormwood,So much time has

passed since my last letterto you. I am sure that you

have been waiting, no doubt withbated breath, for my next commu-niqu. You will understand that as aman of significance, I cannot leavematters unattended even to respond to

your veiled pleas for correspondence.Although the trend is inarguably in our

favor, there is much left undone in ourattritionist crusade to centralize theMarine Corps.

Fortune smiles upon us! The latestnews out of Training and EducationCommand (TECom) is of great signif-icance to our cause. For years, unitshave been forced to conduct training

without observation and monitoring

from higher headquarters. This wasonly due to a lack of capability on the

part of TECom. Great news! The dvelopment of the individual traininmanagement (ITM) module will sooresolve this shortfall. Finally, MariCorps Combat Development Command and TECom will be able to acess the information they need properly oversee training across tMarine Corps.

Upon implementation of the ITmodule, the training accomplishmen


Do as youre told

by Anonymous

C

Each Marines training will be tracked and recorded. (Photo from MCB Camp Butler.)


22/64


of each Marine will be tracked andrecorded from initial enlistmentthrough retirement. Capt Wormwood,I am not only referring to professionalschools or even just Marine Corps In-

stitute courses. The ITM will recordevery collective training task, annualtraining event, and ancillary trainingrequirement required of a Marine. Letme use an example to break it down foryou. Take a motor transport operator

who drives 7-tons, for instance. He hasa number of required tasks in which hemust demonstrate proficiency. In addi-tion, he must accomplish all of his re-quired annual training (such as riflerange and Marine Corps Martial Arts

Program) and ancillary requirements(such as suicide prevention and Ser-vicemans Group Life Insurance briefs).This new ITM module will display allof the training tasks required for our 7-ton driver on a centralized database.Even better, it will identify which ofthose requirements have been accom-plished and which remain incomplete.This information will be accessible toallbattalion staff, regiment/groupcommands, division/wing/group, and

even (most importantly) TECom.Until now, unit commanders wouldsubjectively assess their own trainingreadiness percentages. Unit command-ers have proved time and again theycannot be trusted to objectively assesstheir own unit capabilities. We have allheard of those lazy battalion com-manders who cant seem to qualifyenough drivers or those incompetentcompany commanders who are derelictin suicide prevention briefs. Why

should we leave it to them to assess thereadiness of their units? The ITM al-lows higher (TECom) to assign nu-merical value to each trainingrequirement and thus assess a readinesspercentage for each Marine. With theITM, higher headquarters can instan-taneously ascertain a units readiness byaggregating the individual Marinesreadiness percentages. After all, unitreadiness is the sum of individual readi-ness. The honorable Mr. McNamara

and even Colonel-General Druzhininwould be so proud of our effective

use of quantification to measure re-sults.1

Even more impressive is the ITMmodules ability to take skill perishabil-ity into account. For instance, a suicide

awareness brief is required once everycalendar year. Three hundred sixty-fivedays after it was entered into the ITMmodule, the designator will automati-cally change from qualified to un-

qualified. The same is true for thocollective training skills requiring rfreshment every 30 or 90 days. Worm

wood, think about how much time yowill save by using this ITM module

monitor those tens of thousands training requirements for all of yoMarines. All you must do is ensure thyour staff keeps the ITM module up date. Think of the freedom you w

If his driver training record isnt up to date, woe be to the unit commander. (Photo by Sgt Wayne miston.)


23/64


enjoy from higher headquarters; nolonger will you have to submit rostersto them or answer the generals queries.Now he only has to click a mouse a fewtimes and he can evaluate your units

overall effectiveness and readiness forcombat. Not to mention, it is increas-ingly convenient now that the generalcan check up on how well your unit isdoing maintaining those motorcycle

clubs, conducting the vehicle inspec-tions, and ensuring that everyone hasprinted off the appropriate informationassurance certificates. Those companyor battalion commanders who have

routinely skimped on these criticalmatters under the guise of prioritiza-tion in training for combat will nolonger have a crutch to lean upon; thenumbers will speak for themselves!

More importantly, perhaps, tITM will allow higher (regiment, divsion, MEF, or even TECom) to gback and investigate what traininMarines were deprived of by unit com

manders, especially after a mishap casualty. For instance, if a Marine commits suicide, TECom can go back anopen up the ITM to track all of the sucide briefs that the Marine missed order to find the leader who failed hMarine. Similarly, if a Marine is seously injured while on patrol in thater, TECom can speedily identi

whether or not the Marine was proerly trained; was the Marine qualifito cross a linear danger area, and w

he proficient in maintaining dispesion? Were the other Marines of tunit properly trained in first aid? Uncommanders must be held accountabfor their lack of attention to detaTime and again, company and battaion commanders have failed to ensuthat the required boxes are checkein an appropriate manner; this attudebordering on insubordintionmust cease!

Skeptics will argue that this ove

sight will have unforeseen negatiramifications. Some claim that tITM module will undermine a uncommanders ability to prioritize traiing requirements. Others claim thunit commanders will succumb to tmoral hazard of designating Marines proficient when they are not. Evmore claim that increased centraliztion will only contribute to an atomaton mentality among juniofficers and make them more hesita

to take initiative and assume risk. Somof these assumptions are indeed accrate. However, we must remember th

we really no longer need junior officeto take initiative as they did in yeapast. Headquarters Marine Cor(HQMC) has now determined thotraining skills required of each MarinThey have also designed and directadherence to those methods throug

which the Marines become proficie(such as the predeployment trainin

program). Now HQMCmospecifically, TEComwill be able

Imagine, at the highest levels we will know who trained them and what training they missed.(Photo by LCpl Jeremy T. Ross.)


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hold the individual Marines account-able for being proficient in each re-quirement. We are graduallyeliminating the need for decentraliza-

tion and dependence upon unit lead-ers. And my dear Wormwood, youknow my thoughts on initiative inyoung officers. It is best if they do not

try too hard too fast.Capt Wormwood, I know you arebut a junior officer, but I hope you canappreciate what this ITM program willdo for us. Never again will higher com-mands have to depend onnay, totrustthose subordinate unit com-

manders who prove themselves incom-petent to train Marines. Marines areonly properly trained when they havethe appropriate skills checked off of

those rosters designed by the retiredMarine contractors in Quantico. I dohope you have the opportunity tolunch with me again before you exe-

cute orders. However, you will forgiveme if I am too busy; we are gainingtraction on so many fronts. Until then,I remain,

Gen Screwtape

Note1. Here I believe that the author is referringthe former Secretary of Defense Robert McNmara and Colonel-General V.V. Mikh

Ivanovich Druzhinin of the General StaUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, both

whom were instrumental in the quantificatiideology being applied to military practice the 1960s and 1970s.



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25/64


y Dear Capt Worm-wood,

I must admit that thetone of your last letter sur-

prised me. The maneuverists may haverecently celebrated the 20th anniversarysince Fleet Marine Force Manual 1,Warfighting, was published, but you

should ask yourself, what have they trulygained? You are, perhaps, not sophisti-cated enough to understand, but simplypublishing a book and proclaiming itdoctrine doesnota revolution make. I willattempt to enlighten you on this topic inthe future; I doubt that you are capable ofcomprehending my meaning in a singleletter. It will suffice for now to examinethis thankfully incomplete revolution(as I long ago took to calling it) from theperspective of terminology.

In the effort against the maneu-verists, we have one inestimable advan-

tage. Let us be blunt: attrition is simplyeasier to understand than their ma-neuver warfare. This is one of our in-herent advantages. For those who arelost and confused in the morass of ma-neuver warfare, attrition will seem alight in the darkness, a beacon for the

wayward. We will seduce converts with

our simplicity. Simplicity is essential inwar. After all, everything in war is verysimple, but the simplest thing is diffi-cult.1 The maneuverists are fond oftrotting out this quote, but they ignoreits implicationsin war, everythingshould be as simple and straightfor-

ward as it is possible to make it.Hard experience has shown us that

our subordinates cannot deal with muchcomplexity. Take the example of thestrategic corporal. I have often heard

senior officers extol the virtues of thestrategic corporal, yet the only examples

they give of the impact of the strategcorporal are negative. I do not want anstrategic corporals! I want corporals whdo exactly what I tell them to do. Theis a reason that enlisted Marines ataught instant, willing obedience to oders in boot camp; it is because this

their appropriate role. Please save from Marines who think! They shouleave the thinking to their superiors ando what they are trained to dofolloorders. We must seek to make everthing as simple as possible for our suordinates, otherwise they will leave

with a mess that wemust clean up anfor which wewill be responsible.

We have been extremely successfin dominating the way that terms usby the maneuverists are defined. I a

certain that you have heard many your instructors and superiors repe


Words mean things

by Anonymous




M

Be careful of wordsthey have meaning. (photo.)


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the phrase, words mean things. Itmay be trite, but it is also true. Wemust strive to dictate the meaning ofkey terms to the maneuverists. Bydoing so we can quite literally force

them to discuss and understand war onour terms. This is particularly true inthe case of those new lieutenants seek-ing to understand maneuver warfare. If

we control the lexicon that they mustlearn and use, they will be predisposedto accept our views. We will have pre-pared their minds properly, and they

will be much more receptive to attri-tion warfare, all while speaking in ma-neuverist terms.

Let me give you an example. Take

the term shaping. For the maneu-verists, it has many meanings. It mayconnote gathering intelligence; it maymean an attempt to deceive the enemyor create uncertainty in the enemycommanders mind. Only rarely does itmean that you are attempting to attritethe enemys forces. For us, however,shaping is virtually synonymous withdestroying the enemys forces on thefield of battle. And why not? After all,this is the purpose of military force!

What the maneuverists fail to under-stand is that anything else is simplywindow dressing! The fools!

Where we cannot subvert the mean-ings of their words, we must attemptto sow confusion. Confused officers

will look for answers they can under-standclear answers that attritionists

will be able to provide. Thus far wehave been extremely successful in thisarena. The terms center of gravityand critical vulnerability are a clear

indication of this success. As manytimes as I have seen it, it never fails toamuse me to watch operational plan-ning teams devolve into chaos as theyattempt to determine the enemys cen-ter of gravity. Perhaps the greatest jokeis that upon the conclusion of this in-tense debate, they invariably determinethat the center of gravity is the enemysartillery or indirect fire assets! What-ever was the debate about?

We have also been aided by a num-

ber of well-intended efforts to clarifythe concept of the center of gravity. In

some cases such clarification has beento our decided advantage as it hasforced the maneuverists to employ con-cepts that virtually force them into anattritionist approach. I find it a delight-

ful irony that the maneuverists own ef-forts to clarify their terms may actuallylead to their undoing!

In my last years on active duty, I be-came heartily sick of hearing maneu-verists quote chapter and verse from

John Boyds briefings about how war isfought not just at the tactical, opera-tional, and strategic levels, but also atthe physical, mental, and moral levels.

What nonsense! War is a physical act;all of Boyds mental- and moral-level

mumbo jumbo is useless and unneces-sary complication. Today, young offi-cers are taught that the center of gravitymust be a tangible thing, most likely anenemy unit. This forces them to focuson the physical level of war, which isonly proper. They cannot escape it.

Perhaps this is all more than you ctake in at one time. I sometimes forgthat I am writing to a mere captaiPlease forgive me if I have overbudened you with ideas that you cann

yet understand. When next we meewill give you detailed instructions fthe continuation of the struggle. Unthen, do nothing unless I have aproved it first.

Gen Screwta

Note1. Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, edited atranslated by Michael Howard and Peter ParPrinceton University Press, Princeton, N1976, p. 119.



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27/64


apt Wormwood,In my last letter I dis-

cussed some of the reason-ing behind why we have

made such a concerted effort to elimi-nate such archaic concepts as com-manders intent and mission tactics.

You noted that I only mentioned ex-

amples from in theater or from combatsituations. How daft of me! You obvi-ously are aware that we are aggressivelypursuing this agenda on all frontsin-cluding in garrison environmentsacross the Corps.

For the past 20 years we attritionistshave sought to banish commanders in-tent and mission tactics from themodus operandi of the Corps, and wehave all but succeeded. For instance, inall previous predeployment training

programs (PTPs), higher echelon lead-ership was limited to providing com-

manders intent and allowing missiotactics to occur as subordinate regment, battalion, company, and platoocommanders determined specific traiing requirements and the methods

best accomplishing them. Howevemostif not allcurrent PTP is coodinated, directed, and supervised bhigher echelon directives. I think th

we can all agree that such templattraining programs as Enhanced M

JAVE VIPERexist because subordinaunit commanders have proven themselves consistently unable to execuhigher headquarters intent.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publicati1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, dates its

by claiming that as a rule, [senicommanders] should refrain from ditating how the training will be accomplished.1 In no other PTP enviroment has the Marine Corps been abto institutionally create, maintain, andisseminate such extensive guidanvia such effective media as e-mail anMicrosoft PowerPoint and SharePoisystems. With these assets availabtoday, there is simply no need to reupon subordinate commanders to cr

ate or execute training plans. Rather,is best to implement templated traiing packages that cover all potential suations for all units preparing fdeployment. Wormwood, I must asdoes it not make your job considerabless challenging now that you have nneed to schedule or execute trainin

Just count the Marines when thshow up and ensure that your opertional risk management has been sumitted.

Our dear friendsthose attritioists who implemented the PTPha

The AttritionistLetters (#6)Eliminate maneuver warfare concepts

by Anonymous




C

MCDP 1, Warfighting. (File photo.)


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minimized any platoon, company, bat-talion, and even regiment leadershipinput into the PTP process. This cen-tralized attritionist policywhileclearly executed on a daily basis across

our Corpsis still not reflected inthose antiquated philosophies found inMCDP 1. I find it so frustrating thatMCDP 1 still claims that commandersat each echelon must allot subordinatessufficient time and freedom to conductthe training necessary to achieve profi-ciency at their levels. MCDP 1 goeson to claim that commanders mustensure that higher-level demands donot deny subordinates adequate train-ing opportunities for autonomous unit

training.2 It is almost laughable!Thankfully, these archaic pronounce-ments are clearly out of step with thecurrent attritionist trends across ourCorps! MCDP 1 falsely assumes thatsubordinate commanders are best situ-ated to divine training shortfalls and re-quirements for their respective units,

when in fact the PTPs offer a far supe-rior and comprehensive solution.

Higher echelon commands have ef-fectively relegated subordinate com-manders to managers of their

assigned personnel with limited abilityto interfere with the training of theirunits. While skeptics decry this trendand claim that it will serve to diminishinitiative and the abilities of subordi-nate commanders, it is a small price topay for the creation of a MAGTF withstandardized capabilities and the pro-tection of our training programs fromthe tampering of subordinate leaders.

Wormwood, more examples of oursuccess abound! Think of those junior

Marines who are so often subject to re-strictions placed upon them while de-ployed. Liberty cards in Okinawa,curfew restrictions imposed in Korea,and exclusion from major cities inKuwait are specific policies directed bythe highest echelons of command, notby local subordinate commanders.

After all, it is far simpler to imposeregulation than it is to establish an epectation and challenge subordinatto accomplish it. Moreover, it is fmore difficult to trust a subordina

than it is to impose a regulation.Thus the practice of the MariCorps must be to eliminate the oudated need of trusting subordinacommanders. While MCDP 1 migclaim that trust by seniors in the abities of their subordinates is essentiyou will witness the hypocrisy of thstatement.3As I mentioned in my laletter, it is far better for a senior eliminate all doubt and ensure thsubordinate commanders execute gui

ance as passed rather than make falassumptions.And Wormwood, you will conc

that when units return from traininexercises or a deployment and tMarines seek to set out on leave, eachrequired to complete a paperwork-itensive leave request. In years past, t

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highest echelon commands would es-

tablish their intent and allow subordi-nate commanders to determine unitleave policies (and thus execute missiontactics). That obviously did not work.The Marine Corps has therefore estab-lished directed leave policies (includingthose extensive paperwork require-ments) by higher echelon commands.Skeptics will query why a MEF com-mander must dictate the requirementsof a lance corporal desiring to takeleave. The answer lies no doubt in the

inability of regimental, battalion, andcompany commanders to competentlyimplement the commanders intentfrom higher headquarters. Thus, themost senior commanders have nochoice but to dictate and institutional-ize standardized procedures that restrictsubordinate commanders use of dis-cretion and judgment.

You can see that we are achievingsuccess on all fronts. Soonvery soonsubordinate leaders will be relegated

completely to automaton-like roles,simply executing that guidance explic-

itly directed by the highest comman

That transformation of the MariCorps to a completely attritionist forwill provide unprecedented battlefieeffectiveness for the battles we have yto fight. Until then, I remain,

Gen Screwta

Notes1. MCDP 1, Warfighting, Headquarters MarCorps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 60.

2. Ibid., pp. 5960.

3. Ibid., p. 58.


Coming in theDecember 2010

issue:

Attritionist Letter #8

Naval warfare

Fighting at night

Contractor justice

The connection

Subordinate commanders are now managers.(Photo by Cpl Aaron J. Rock.)

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Go to www.mca-marines.org/forum.

Join th

Debat


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apt Wormwood,After reading some of themissives that you send, Icannot help but sit down

and laugh heartily at your naivet. Itdoes not surprise me that you hear allmanner of absurd ideas; there is no endof foolishness in this world. What I

find laughable is that you give enoughcredence to the things you hear thatyou would actually ask me about them!I suppose I should not be terribly sur-prised. What else should I expect froma mere captain? In fact, perhaps Ishould be pleased that you are referringmatters great and small to me. That iscertainly the role of every subordinate.

This brings me to the subject ofyour last letter. It is a mark of the de-generacy of these maneuverists that

one of their number would actuallystate that trust is the secret ingredient

of maneuver warfare. The arroganceof these people is stunning. If you needa secret ingredient to conduct theirform of warfare, what happens when itdisappears? If trust between subordi-nates and seniors is an absolute re-

quirement for maneuver warfare, thenthe maneuverists occupy an even

weaker position than they know. Whenwas the last time that you observed a

relationship between senior and subor-dinate in which they truly trusted one

another? I would wager that you hanever seen it. I certainly havent.

How can we trust our subordinateThey have been trying to avoid anshirk their duties since time immem

rial. Frederick the Great wanted his sodiers to be more afraid of their officethan their enemy, and with good reson. He knew they would desert given a minutes opportunity. Do yonot think that your lieutenants will rquire minute supervision? Of courthey will, and not simply because thare young. They will attempt to mlead you if you do not watch theclosely. This is no more than an aknowledgement of human nature.

The need for control, not trust, istruth that the Marine Corps has lonrecognized. If you look beyond trhetoric, you can see how little trucommanders have in their subordnates. It is manifest in things bosmall and large. Why do Marines fout reams of paperwork before goinon leave or prior to an extended liberperiod? Why has the Marine Corps cr

ated a detailed predeployment traininprogram that minutely prescribes traiing requirements for deploying unitThe answer is obvious, although it

also obvious that no one will openadmit it.


Trusting one another

by Anonymous




tainly retired, for he writes with such careless disre-gardand one might suggest some contemptfor our








C

How can we trust our subordinates? They have been

trying to avoid and shirk their duties since time imme-

morial.


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Trust be damned! You cannot com-mand and control a unit effectivelybased on trust! You cannot trust thatyour subordinates did maintenance;you must know. You cannot trust that

your subordinates know what you wantthem to do; you must tell them andthen ensure that it is done to your fullsatisfaction. I know what one of thosefool maneuverists would say. I had oneof them as a subordinate before I re-tired, and he was thick enough to at-tempt to discuss this issue with me. Hesaid that trust did not replace supervi-sion, but that the form of supervision isdifferent. He said that in many cases,the senior would conduct unan-

nounced visits to see what is reallygoing on and had the right to expecttotal openness and honesty from hissubordinates. Can you imagine this? I

was far too busy to leave my headquar-ters. My form of supervision was better;I had my subordinates come to myheadquarters and brief me. We wouldsit in the conference room and they

would conduct a Microsoft PowerPointbrief detailing what they had beendoing. I could have them make changesor give guidance to my staff based uponthis brief. I did exactly what everyone

else did, but I had this young officer tellme that it was wrong. What did heknow about exercising command?Nothing! I find that I am getting angry

just relating the story to you now, and ithappened some years ago.

Let me tell you this, Wormwood.You had better learn your place in thisorganization. Listen carefully and keepyour mouth shut. Your superiors havebeen put in their positions because theyare smarter than you. You would do

well to remember this. I have heardmaneuverists say that decisions flow upthe chain of command and supportflows down, but this is not the way theMarine Corps works, thank Nick.There is a reason that informationflows up the chain of command anddecisionsflow down. It is because those

who have the experience and will know

best what to do in any situation are the top.

It is quite likely that it is difficult fa mere captain to grasp all of this. you are able to understand, you shou

begin to see how all of the things whave discussed in this and in past leters are interrelated. Each individuissue may not seem critical, but thare part of a coherent and logic

whole. When viewed in this manner,is clear that the maneuverists have bedefeated and that we are in charge.

If, as I expect, you are still confusejust shut your mouth, put your brain neutral, and do what youre told. NMarine who follows that order can

far wrong. Gen Screwta

Gen Screwtapes axiom for these Marines, Shut up, put your brain in neutral, and do what your told.(Photo by Sgt Pete Thibodeau.)

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y Dear Capt Worm-wood,

It never fails to as-tound me how quickly

the Young Turks are ready to dismissthe prerogatives of command and thebenefit of long years of experience. Asin all things, we see the maneuverists

touting the benefits of decentralizingmilitary intelligence resources to thelowest possible level, chattering onabout collaboration, every soldier asensor/every Marine a collector,achieving the hive mind, and othersuch drivel. The latter bumper stickerphrase is particularly hilarious, for theswarm of bees serves the natural matri-arch, the queen, who in turn providesfor and reproduces for the hive. Like-

wise, it serves little purpose to decen-

tralize intelligence assets and resources without ensuring that this directly

serves the master decisionmaker who isheld responsible for results. Is not intel-ligence a primary responsibility of com-mand? Yet those Young Turk man-euverists seem altogether too ready todivest the senior commander of his eyesand ears. As the Ringwraiths servedSauron in the Tolkien classic, so must

the assets and resources of intelligenceserve the senior commander. They mustbe at his immediate beck and call. Todo otherwise is to waste time and effortin pursuit of diversionary distractionsat best; at worst it will dilute its powerand fall prey to enemy tactical decep-tion in pursuit of purely local, tempo-raryand illusoryadvantage.

Two heads are better than one,goes the common wisdom, whichafter allcannot be wisdom once you

consider what this means in military af-fairs. Unity of command is essential;

given two commanders of equal ranand experience, only one can be charge. So he is the decisionmaker, tother the advisor. And who is the iformation gathering and analysis app

ratus intended to support? The both them? No, of course not. But this is artificial and theoretical problem any case. Naturally, we never see susituations in reality. What is really hapening is that the maneuverists propoto share intelligence asset allocatioamongst themselves in a bizarre trickdown arrangement. The two heads anot of the same seniority and expeence as the one. Actually, these peop

want 6, 8, 10 headsbut they are

far junior than the one. And they wathe intelligence system to support all them equally on demand and, worsjust in time. This is the way condtions must be to succeed in irregul

warfare, they proclaim. Is one to sumise that 6, 8, or 10 kindergarteneknow as much (lets dismiss the fancifidea that they can know more) as theteacher? Poppycock!

It is amazing to me, my deswollen-headed Wormwood, that yo

can fall prey to such illogical and emtional argument. But then, how couyou know the difference? You are bdazzled by the power that increased acess to information could potentialbestow upon you. Do not be so easand stupidly seduced by those wh

would tell you that informationpower. Information is power only the mind cultivated to receive, analyzand make use of it. Delivering the cpability to collect and process to t

unpracticed mind is like giving tgrammar school student a law librar


Centralize control of intelligence

by Anonymous




tainly retired, for he writes with such careless disre-gardand one might suggest some contemptfor our








M


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having all the legal information at onesfingertips does not a lawyer make. In-deed, successful lawyers have not onlythe information, but they also have a

whole network of assistants to help

them make their case. From the juniorpartner to the lowliest paralegal, theentire system is set up for the success ofthe lead lawyer in the courtroom or atthe negotiating table. This was true200 years ago, and despite the adventof computers and instant communica-tions, it is still true today. So it is withcommand and control when it comesto intelligence support. To give merecaptainsto say nothing of lieutenantsand sergeantsunsupervised and un-

restricted access to such information-gathering resources is akin to puttingtoddlers in a workshop filled withpower tools.

Nowhere do I see evidence of amore dangerous mindset than the ma-neuverist pleas for access to wider and

wider sets of information data, sayingthey will analyze and tailor actual in-telligence products that provide knowl-edge and understanding to thosemaking decisions at their local area,

based on local requirements and thelocal situation. One can interpret thisto mean that those who stand in themiddle of the woods are best suited tounderstand the forest if they merely

can get access to all of the data aboutmore of the trees! And they expect usto truly believe such paradoxical state-ments? Only the benefit of distancefrom the problem, a cool head, a calmdisposition, the obvious advantages ofyears of experience, and the authorityto make decisions at the highest levelcan successfully leverage such reams ofinformation. Economy of scale consid-erations alone make it necessary to cen-tralize such capacities into fewer and

fewer far more capable hands, to saynothing of minds, to be more efficientin dealing with all of the informationat hand.

It is only the nave who forget thelessons of history. After World War II,our forebears understood the dangersof decentralization. That is why theNational Security Act of 1947 set upthe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).The name has meaning. Not the Na-tional Intelligence Agency or even the

American Intelligence Agency. TCIA was intended to centralizeintelgence. Why? Not only to ensure ththose who were national leaders hthe knowledge they needed, but it al

went to great lengths to ensure secrecIt is not fashionable today to speak secrecy, but as Master Sun relates to uall warfare is based on deception. Yocannot deceive when you cannot kesecrets. And to keep a secret, tell it nto a friend.

To those who suggest that 11 Setember 2001 has put paid to what thterm are such quaint notions, I wonly point to what has been donrather than what has been said. Ce

tralization is obviously the only soltion. The Director of NationIntelligence has been created becauthe CIA could not centralize intelgence enough. The Department Homeland Security was implementbecause its discrete and disparate oganizations and agencies had decetralized information and intelligencapabilities. Inventing additional spervisory layers on top of existing onis notdespite what some might

He has no business or need to have access to more information. There is a reason it is called the Central Intelligence Agency. (Photo by Cpl Pete Tbodeau.)


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tempted to label otherwisedecen-tralization.

Of course, it is natural that thepawns of the commander should br

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