the authority for u.s. participation in the paris climate agreement

8/20/2019 The Authority for U.S. Participation in the Paris Climate Agreement

1/44 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.O

The Authority for U.S. Participation

in the Paris Climate AgreementBy Gwynne Taraska and Ben Bovarnick July 2015


2/44

The Authority for U.S.Participation in the ParisClimate Agreement

By Gwynne Taraska and Ben Bovarnick July 2015


3/44

1 Introduction and summary

3 Background on the UNFCCC and the Paris agreement

5 Categories of international agreements in the United St

7 Prevalence of executive agreements

8 Considerations in choosing a path

11 The case of Paris

13 Conclusion

15 Endnotes

18 Appendix: Multilateral agreements—other than

treaties—the United States entered from 1985 to 2014

Contents


4/44

1 Center for American Progress | The Authority for U.S. Part icipation in the Paris Clim ate Agreement

Introduction and summary

In December 2015, he paries o he U.N. Framework Convenion on Climae

Change, or UNFCCC, will mee in Paris o srike a new inernaional agreemen

ha aims o limi climae change. A cenral aspec o he agreemen will be a se

o naional goalsrom boh developed and developing counrieso reduce

greenhouse gas emissions. Many major emiters, including he Unied Saes,

China, he European Union, and Mexico, have already announced heir inended

goals.1 Te Unied Saes, or example, aims o reduce emissions 26 percen o 28

percen below 2005 levels by 2025.2

Tere has been considerable discussion, however, abou wheher he Unied

Saes will be able o become a pary o he agreemen, given he conspicuous

opposiion o some members o he U.S. Senae o addressing climae change. Tis

repor aims o shed ligh on his discussion by explaining he ypes o inerna-

ional agreemens in he Unied Saes and he possible naure o he orhcoming

climae agreemen.

In he Unied Saes, here are wo caegories o agreemens ha are binding under

inernaional law: reaies, which require he ormal consen o a wo-hirds major-

iy o he Senae, and execuive agreemens, which he presiden can be auhorized

o conclude on a variey o grounds. Tese grounds may include he consen o

he Senae o a prior reay o which he agreemen is pursuan, he enacmen by

Congress o a saue o which he agreemen is pursuan, or he presiden’s inde-

penden consiuional auhoriies.

Despie popular undersanding, execuive agreemens are a well-esablished

means o enering inernaional agreemens and accoun or he overwhelming

majoriy94 perceno inernaional agreemens in he Unied Saes in hemodern era.3 Tey are also on par wih reaies in orce and weigh under iner-

naional law, as boh can creae inernaional legal obligaions or he Unied

Saes.4 Te Appendix o his reporwhich presens a memorandum rom he

Congressional esearch Service on he 182 mulilaeral execuive agreemens


5/44


enered by he Unied Saes rom 1985 hrough 2014illusraes ha execu-

ive agreemens have been used in almos all areas o inernaional law, in ma-

ers o boh grea and minor significance, and hroughou boh epublican and

Democraic adminisraions and congresses.

Te general opic o he Paris agreemen and is level o imporance, hereore, dono predeermine ha i will qualiy as a reay raher han an execuive agree-

men. Insead, he conen and conex o he agreemen mus be considered. o

his poin, U.S. Special Envoy or Climae Change odd Sern has said:

We will submi o Congress any kind o agreemen ha requires ha kind o sub-

mission. Some agreemens do and some agreemens don’. So i’s going o depend

enirely on how his agreemen is writen, how i’s famed, wha is or isn’ legally

binding, and so orh.5

Te Paris agreemen is sill under negoiaion. I is becoming increasingly clear,however, ha he final agreemen could lack he eauressuch as legally binding

naional emissions reducion arges or legally binding naional arges or provid-

ing financial assisanceha would sugges he need or ormal congressional

consen.6 I is hereore possible ha he Paris agreemen will qualiy as an execu-

ive agreemen. I so, U.S. paricipaion would be based on he auhoriy graned

by he Senae when i approved he original UNFCCC reay in 1992, as well as

he presiden’s consiuional oreign affairs power. Te ac ha he agreemen

would be consisen wih exising U.S. laws, such as he Clean Air Ac, and could

be implemened wihou new legislaion would supplemen hese auhoriies.7

In general conversation and outside the United States, “treaty” is often used to refer

to any written international agreement that is governed by international law.8 In a

narrower, U.S.-specific sense, it refers to an international agreement—governed by

international law—that is approved pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, requir-

ing the consent of at least two-thirds of the Senate.9 This report uses “treaty” in the

U.S.-specific sense. Binding international agreements in the United States that are

not treaties are called “executive agreements.” President George Washington con-

cluded the first executive agreements during his tenure, and U.S. courts have upheld

their constitutionality.10

Meanings of ‘treaty’


6/44


Background on the UNFCCC

and the Paris agreement

In 1992, he George H.W. Bush adminisraion submited he U.N. Framework

Convenion on Climae Change o he Senae or is consen o U.S. raificaion.

I was approved and enered ino orce in 1994.11 Since hen, he paries o he

reay have aimed o sabilize greenhouse gas levels in order o avoid dangerous

climae change and have aimed o build global resilience o he climae change

ha is now unavoidable.

In 2011, he paries began he process o developing a new inernaional climaeagreemen o be adoped in December o his year in Paris and o ake effec no

laer han 2020.12 Te agreemen is inended o be more effecive han previ-

ous effors o he paries, including boh he Kyoo Proocol o 1997 and he

Copenhagen Accord o 2009. Te Kyoo Proocol, a legally binding agreemen

wih naional arges ha were inernaionally negoiaed, required emissions

reducions rom only developed counries and lackedor loshe paricipa-

ion o several major economies, including he Unied Saes, which never sough

o raiy i. As a consequence, he Kyoo Proocol now covers only a racion o

global emissions. Te Copenhagen Accord, a poliical agreemen wih naionally

deermined goals, had insufficien collecive ambiion o rein in global warming.13

In conras o he Kyoo Proocol, he Paris agreemen will require acion rom

boh developed and developing counries, will have naionally deermined goals

o miigae greenhouse gas emissions, and is expeced o elici broad paricipaion.

In conras o he Copenhagen Accord, he agreemen is o have orce under iner-

naional law and is expeced o elici more adequae miigaion effors, especially

over successive 5- or 10-year cycles ha give counries he opporuniy o improve

heir naional goals.14 I is possible ha he Paris agreemen will become he firs

climae agreemen ha successully limis carbon polluion.


7/44


Te ac ha he Paris agreemen will be governed by inernaional law does no

imply ha he associaed naional goalscalled “naionally deermined conri-

buions”also will be legally binding. I is possible or he core agreemen o be

binding while he associaed naional goals remain poliical commimens. Te

paries o he UNFCCC coninue o negoiae he legal saus o he naionally

deermined conribuions. Alhough he European Union has proposed legally binding naional miigaion arges, oher paries may be coalescing around an

agreemen in which here are binding procedural obligaionssuch as obligaions

o submi naional goals and o repor on progressbu in which he naional

goals have poliical, no legal orce.15


8/44


Categories of international

agreements in the United States

Treaties, executive agreements, and the authorities that underlie them

In he Unied Saes, here are wo caegories o bilaeral or mulilaeral agree-

mens ha are inernaionally binding: reaies and execuive agreemens. Te

presiden submis reaies o he Senae, where hey require approval by a wo-

hirds majoriy, as oulined in Aricle II o he U.S. Consiuion.16

Execuive agreemens, which carry he legal orce and weigh o reaies underinernaional law, have a variey o auhoriies ha can underlie hem:

• Te presiden can conclude an execuive agreemen ha is pursuan o a prior

reay. Such agreemens are someimes reerred o as “reay-execuive agree-

mens.” Execuive agreemens made pursuan o reay obligaions are well

enrenched in U.S. pracice and law. In Wilson v. Girard , or example, he U.S.

Supreme Cour deermined ha he Senae’s approval o a reay provided

auhorizaion or a subsequen agreemen.17

• Te presiden can conclude an execuive agreemen using auhoriy delegaed

by Congress hrough he previous enacmen o a saue ha approved such

an agreemen.18 Execuive agreemens ha are sancioned by prior saues are

reerred o as “ex ane congressional-execuive agreemens.”

• Te presiden can negoiae an agreemen and subsequenly submi i o boh

he Senae and House or approval hrough he adopion o a saue.19 Tis is

in conras o reaies, which are submited only o he Senae or approval by a

supermajoriy. Such agreemens are reerred o as “ex pos congressional-execu-

ive agreemens.”

• Te presiden can conclude an execuive agreemen based on he presiden’s

inheren oreign affairs power or oher independen consiuional auhoriies.

Tese include, or example, he presiden’s auhoriy as commander in chie and


9/44

he auhoriy o “ake care ha he laws be aihully execued.”20 Agreemens

auhorized only in his way are someimes called “sole execuive agreemens.”

Sole execuive agreemens may be srenghened i hey are consisen wih U.S.

law and can be implemened wihou new legislaion.21

Tis caegorizaion is no mean o imply ha he possible auhoriies o ener anagreemen are always muually exclusive. I is possible, or example, or a prior

reay, a saue, and he presiden’s oreign affairs power o simulaneously pro-

vide auhorizaion.

Alhough mos orms o inernaional agreemen involve a measure o congressio-

nal approval, only reaies and ex pos congressional-execuive agreemens involve

ormal congressional approval afer he agreemen has been negoiaed.

Self-executing and non-self-executing agreements

Te auhoriy o ener an agreemen and creae an inernaional legal obligaion or

he Unied Saes does no necessarily imply he auhoriy o implemen he agree-

menha is, he means o mee and enorce he agreemen under domesic law.

Some inernaional agreemensboh reaies and execuive agreemensare

“sel-execuing,” which means ha U.S. cours can direcly enorce hem.22 Mos

reaies and execuive agreemens, however, are no sel-execuing; insead, hey

rely on wha is known as “implemening legislaion” or domesic legal effec.23

Under inernaional law, an agreemen carries he responsibiliy o creae he

domesic means o implemenaion i hey do no already exis.24



10/44


Prevalence of executive agreements

Execuive agreemens are no only common bu also accoun or an overwhelm-

ing majoriy o inernaional agreemens. From 1939 o 2013, he Unied Saes

enered approximaely 94 percen o is inernaional agreemens as execuive

agreemens and only 6 percen as reaies: Tere were 17,300 execuive agree-

mens, compared wih 1,100 reaies.25 From 1980 o 2000, here were more han

3,000 execuive agreemens and only 375 reaies.26 An empirical sudy o execu-

ive agreemens finds ha approximaely 80 percen o execuive agreemens

beween 1990 and 2000 were congressional-execuive agreemens. Te majoriyo hese were ex ane, ha is, hey were concluded according o he auhoriy pre-

viously delegaed by Congress in a saue.

Execuive agreemens also accoun or he majoriy o mulilaeral agreemens,

alhough mulilaeral agreemens are more likely han bilaeral agreemens o be

reaies.27 Te Appendix o his reporwhich presens a memorandum rom

he Congressional esearch Service o ep. Earl Blumenauer (D-O)shows

182 recorded mulilaeral execuive agreemens enered rom 1985 hrough 2014

on subjecs including aomic energy, aviaion, environmen, polluion, deense,

oresry, migraion, and arms limiaion, among ohers.


The United

States entered

approximately

94 percent of its

legally binding

international

agreements

as executive

agreements and

only 6 percent as

treaties from

1939 to 2013.


11/44

Considerations in choosing a path

In some cases, i may be relaively clear how he execuive branch should pursue

a poenial inernaional agreemen. Te agreemen may, or example, all under

legislaion ha auhorizes i, such as he 1954 Aomic Energy Ac, which has sanc-

ioned execuive agreemens on nuclear research, saey, and wase managemen.28

Alernaively, he agreemen may all wihin he purview o a prior reay, such

as he Convenion on Inernaional Civil Aviaion, which has sancioned several

execuive agreemens on air saey and ranspor.29

In oher cases, i may be less clear wheher an emerging inernaional agreemen

will be an execuive agreemen or a reay. Despie popular undersanding, impor-

ance does no necessiae ha an agreemen be a reay raher han an execuive

agreemen. Many ruly significan inernaional agreemens are execuive agree-

mens: examples include he General Agreemen on ariffs and rade; he Norh

American Free rade Agreemen; he World rade Organizaion; he Breton

Woods Agreemen; he Algiers Accords; he Paris Peace Accords; he Yala

Agreemen; and he Convenion on Long-range ransboundary Air Polluion, or

LAP, among many ohers.30 Several noable execuive agreemens are high-

lighed hroughou his secion.


LRTAP, signed in 1979 during the Carter administration, “was the first international

legally binding instrument to deal with problems of air pollution on a broad re-

gional basis.”31 The United States entered LRTAP—and several subsequent protocols

signed during the Reagan and Clinton administrations—as executive agreements.32

The agreements committed the United States to help finance monitoring and

evaluation of pollutants; control emissions of nitrogen oxides; control heavy metals

pollution; and support abatement of acidification, eutrophication, and ground-

level ozone. U.S. acceptance of these protocols did not require new legislation or

modification of U.S. laws.33

Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution

and subsequent agreements


12/44


Neiher does subjec mater necessiae ha an agreemen be a reay raher han

an execuive agreemen. Te Unied Saes has enered execuive agreemens

in almos all areas o inernaional law.34 Tere are, however, some paterns in

pracice, alhough hese paterns may be rooed more in radiion han reason.35

From 1980 o 2000, or example, agreemens on human righs and exradiion

were pursued only as reaies, whereas agreemens on deense, aomic energy, andeconomic cooperaion ended o be pursued as execuive agreemens.36

Environmenal agreemens during his ime ypically were pursued as eiher

reaies or agreemens pursuan o reaies: Tere were 8 reaies and more han

30 execuive agreemens, many o which were reay-execuive agreemens, over

he 1980–2000 span.37 Tere are, however, several imporan examples o execu-

ive agreemens on environmenal opics ha were no pursuan o prior rea-

ies, including LAP and is proocols and he Norh American Agreemen on

Environmenal Cooperaion.38 Te Minamaa Convenion on Mercury is anoher

recen case.

In 2013, the United States became the first country to join the Minamata Convention

on Mercury, a multilateral agreement to combat mercury pollution.39 Regulation of

mercury under the convention requires control of mercury emissions through “best

available techniques (BAT) and best environmental practices (BEP),” while preserving

flexibility of individual countries to comply with the agreement through “nationally

appropriate mechanisms.”40 The convention has 128 signatories and has been ratified

by 12 countries to date.41 The United States concluded the convention as an execu-

tive agreement. The State Department noted that it could be implemented “under

existing legislative and regulatory authority.”42

Minamata Convention on Mercury

I is noeworhy ha an empirical sudy o inernaional agreemens finds ha he

daa do no suppor he heory ha presidens are likely o use execuive agree-

mens o circumven an anagonisic Senae.43

Te Appendix o his repor, whichsors mulilaeral agreemens by presiden and he majoriy pary in he House

and Senae, confirms ha execuive agreemens are common regardless o he

configuraions o he paries in he execuive and legislaive branches.


13/44

10 Center for American Progress | The Authorit y for U.S. Part icipatio n in the Paris Clim ate Agreement

The Convention on International Civil Aviation established international rules for air

travel and the International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, which is the agency

tasked with regulating international air travel.44 The United States entered the con-

vention as a treaty in 1946. Since then, the United States has participated in several

executive agreements pursuant to its treaty obligations, such as an agreement to

ban smoking on international flights, signed under President Bill Clinton, and an

agreement on the liberalization of international air transportation, signed under

President George W. Bush.45

The 1998 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Sta-

tion, or ISS, set forth commitments by the United States and partner countries to de-

sign, develop, and operate the ISS. The 1988 International Cospas-Sarsat Programme

Agreement established cooperation on a satellite-based distress alert system to aid

search and rescue operations.46 The United States entered both agreements as ex-

ecutive agreements pursuant to four prior treaties concerning international activity

in outer space.47 The agreements did not require new implementing legislation.

Convention on International Civil Aviation and subsequent agreements

Space treaties and subsequent agreements


14/44


The case of Paris

Some have argued ha acs such as he Clean Air Ac, he Naional Environmenal

Policy Ac, and he Clean Waer Ac give he presiden sufficien auhoriy o con-

clude an agreemen wih legally binding naional emissions reducion arges as

an ex ane congressional-execuive agreemen.48 Tis posiion, however, is conro-

versial. An agreemen wih naional emissions reducion arges ha are binding

under inernaional law would sugges he need or ormal congressional consen

afer he agreemen has been negoiaed, as would an agreemen wih naional

arges or providing climae finance ha are binding under inernaional law.49

As he conours o he Paris agreemen come ino ocus, however, i is becoming

clear ha he agreemen may no include naional emissions reducion arges or

finance arges ha have legal orce. Insead, he agreemen may include legally

binding procedural obligaionssuch as obligaions or he paries o submi

naional emissions reducion goals and o repor on progressbu he naional

goals hemselves may be only poliically binding.

Such an agreemen would qualiy as an execuive agreemen, and he Unied

Saes could become a pary o i on several grounds. Firs, he U.N. Framework

Convenion on Climae Change, approved by he Senae in 1992, would lend

auhorizaion as a paren reay. Framework convenions as a class are undersood

o produce more specific agreemens ha advance heir missions over ime.50 Te

Paris agreemen would advance he purpose o he UNFCCC, he primary goal

o which is o sabilize greenhouse gas levels in order o avoid dangerous climae

change.51 Furher, he Unied Saes already pledged o make emissions miigaion

effors and o repor on progress when i raified he UNFCCC.52

Again, he presiden’s auhoriy o ener agreemens ha are wihin he purviewo a preceding reay is esablished. According o poliical scholars Glen Kruz and

Jeffrey Peake, “Execuive agreemens pursuan o U.S. reay obligaions are rarely

conroversial and are generally considered well wihin he domain o he execuive


15/44


as chie diploma.”53 I is worh noing ha he Senae, during he hearing on he

original reay, expressed is preerence only ha urher agreemens wih legally

binding naional arges should come back beore i or ormal consen.54

Te presiden’s consiuional oreign affairs power would also lend auhoriza-

ion or U.S. paricipaion in he Paris agreemen and would be srenghened bysauory suppor: Te agreemen would be consisen wih curren U.S. laws, and

implemening legislaion would no need o be creaed.55 Insead, he agreemen

would be domesically grounded hrough he same saues ha implemened

and coninue o implemenhe original UNFCCC reay. Tese include he

Clean Air Ac, which requires he regulaion o air polluionincluding green-

house gas emissionsand he Energy Policy Ac, which direcs he Energy

Inormaion Adminisraion o invenory emissions and provides implemenaion

power or monioring and reporing requiremens.56 Te Paris agreemen would

hereore be akin o LAP and he Minamaa Convenion, insoar as becoming a

pary o he agreemen would no require any change o exising U.S. law.57


16/44


Conclusion

As he Paris climae meeing approaches, a narraive has emerged ha he execuive

branch will seek o circumven he Senae by pursuing he agreemen as an execu-

ive agreemen raher han as a ully legiimae reay. Tis narraive is misguided

in muliple ways and may be dispelled by an examinaion o he role o execuive

agreemens in U.S. diplomacy and he conen and conex o he Paris agreemen.

Execuive agreemens are well esablished in U.S. law and pracice. Tey are

ubiquious in boh epublican and Democraic adminisraions; hey have beenused in maters o grea significance, as evidenced by agreemens such as he Paris

Peace Accords, which ended U.S. comba in Vienam; and hey can be ound on

nearly all opics o inernaional cooperaion, including he environmen and air

polluion. Te Convenion on Long-range ransboundary Air Polluion and is

proocols, approved during boh epublican and Democraic adminisraions, is a

vivid example.

Alhough he Paris climae agreemen is sill under negoiaion, i is becoming

clear ha i could ulimaely lack any eaures ha would sugges he need or or-

mal congressional approval. An agreemen wih legally binding naional emissions

reducion goals or legally binding naional finance commimens would likely be

appropriae as a reay. Bu an agreemen in which he naional goals hemselves

lack legal orcealhough here may be binding procedural obligaions o submi

and updae hose goalswould qualiy as an execuive agreemen. Such an

agreemen would advance he original U.N. Framework Convenion on Climae

Change reay, which isel obliged he Unied Saes o miigae emissions and

repor on progress, and would no require any change o U.S. law or implemena-

ion. Formal congressional approval o such an agreemen would be unnecessary

and uncharacerisic given U.S. pracice.


17/44


About the authors

Gwynne Taraska is a Senior Policy Advisor a he Cener or American Progress,

where she specializes in inernaional climae and energy policy. Her recen

work has concenraed on he U.N. climae negoiaions and mulilaeral climae

finance. araska has a Ph.D. rom he Universiy o Washingon, where she special-ized in symbolic logics.

Ben Bovarnick is a esearch Assisan wih he Energy Policy eam a he Cener,

where he works on domesic clean energy deploymen and inernaional climae

policy. He holds a bachelor’s degree rom he Universiy o ocheser in chemisry

and poliical science, where he ocused on he inersecion o he wo fields.

Acknowledgments

Te auhors hank Nigel Purvis rom Climae Advisers and Daniel Bodansky rom

Arizona Sae Universiy or helpul commens on an earlier draf o his repor.

Tey also hank Greg Doson and Pee Ogden rom he Cener or American

Progress. Te views expressed in his repor do no necessarily reflec hose o he

reviewers. Any errors are he responsibiliy o he auhors.


18/44


Endnotes

1 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, “INDCsas communicated by Parties,” available at http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx (last accessed July 2015).

2 The White House, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement onClimate Change,” Press release, November 11, 2014,available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.

3 Michael John Garcia, “International Law and Agree-ments: Their Effect upon U.S. Law” (Washington: Con-gressional Research Service, 2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf . See the section ofour report titled “Prevalence of executive agreements”for more information.

4 United Nations, “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” (1969), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf .

5 United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange: “United States of America: Lima ClimateChange Conference - December 2014: Press briefing,”December 8, 2014, available at http://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-america.

6 For the elements that would suggest formal congres-sional consent, see Daniel Bodansky, “Legal Options forU.S. Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement”(Arlington, VA: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions,2015), available at http://w ww.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdf.

7 Bodansky presents the idea of presidential executiveagreements augmented with statutory support in ibid.

8 See, for example, United Nations, “Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties.”

9 “[The president] shall have power, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”See U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2.

10 Nigel Purvis, “The Case for Climate Protection Author-ity,” Virginia Journal of International Law 49 (4) (2009):1007–1062.

11 See, for example, Emily C. Barbour, “International Agree-ments on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions”(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2010),available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organiza-tion/142749.pdf .

12 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,“Decision 1/CP.17: Establishment of an Ad Hoc WorkingGroup on the Durban Platform for Enh anced Action”(2012), available at http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.

13 See Daniel Bodansky and Elliot Diringer, “AlternativeModels for the 2015 Climate Change Agreement”(Lysaker, Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2014), avail-able at http://www.fni.no/climatepolicyperspectives/FNICPP-13.html.

14 Gwynne Taraska, “The Paradox of Paris: How a Suc-cessful Climate Agreement Could Have Inadequateand Nonobligatory Emissions Reduction Targets,”Center for American Progress, June 6, 2015, availableat https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/.

15 Gwynne Taraska, “From Bonn to Paris: Navigating theCourse to an Effective International Climate Agree-ment” (Washington: Center for American Progress,2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-interna-tional-climate-agreement/.

16 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2.

17 See Congressional Research Service, “Treaties andOther International Agreements: The Role of the UnitedStates Senate; A Study Prepared for the Committee onForeign Relations” (2001).

18 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).

19 Oona A. Hathaway, “Presidential Power over Interna-tional Law: Restoring the Balance,” The Yale Law Journal 119 (2) (2009): 140–268, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balance; Purvis, “TheCase for Climate Protection Authority.”

20 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sections 2 and 3. See alsoHannah Chang, “International Executive Agreementson Climate Change,” Columbia Journal of EnvironmentalLaw 35 (2) (2010): 337–372; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairsand the United States Constitution, Second edition (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1996). American Insurance Association v. Garamendi recognizes the power of thepresident to conclude internationally binding agree-ments as executive agreements, without formal con-gressional approval. See American Insurance Associationv. Garamendi , 539 U.S. 396 (2003).

21 For the idea of sole executive agreements with statu-tory support, see Bodansky, “Legal Options for U.S.Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement.”

22 See, for example, Chang, “International ExecutiveAgreements on Climate Change.”

23 See, for example, Garcia, “International Law and Agree-ments.”

24 See, for example, Oona A. Hathaway, “Treaties’ End: ThePast, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking inthe United States,” The Yale Law Journal 117 (7) (2008):1236–1372, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-states.

25 Garcia, “International Law and Agreements.”

26 Hathaway, “Presidential Power over International Law.”

27 Six percent of executive agreements were multilateralbetween 1980 and 2000; 35 percent of treaties weremultilateral over the same timespan. See Hathaway,“Treaties ’ End.”

http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspxhttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspxhttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspxhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdfhttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142749.pdfhttp://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142749.pdfhttp://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdfhttp://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdfhttp://www.fni.no/climatepolicyperspectives/FNICPP-13.htmlhttp://www.fni.no/climatepolicyperspectives/FNICPP-13.htmlhttps://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/treaties-end-the-past-present-and-future-of-international-lawmaking-in-the-united-stateshttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttp://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/presidential-power-over-international-law-restoring-the-balancehttps://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2015/06/19/115641/from-bonn-to-paris-navigating-the-course-to-an-effective-international-climate-agreement/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2015/06/03/114333/the-paradox-of-paris-how-a-successful-climate-agreement-could-have-inadequate-and-nonobligatory-emissions-reduction-targets/http://www.fni.no/climatepolicyperspectives/FNICPP-13.htmlhttp://www.fni.no/climatepolicyperspectives/FNICPP-13.htmlhttp://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdfhttp://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdfhttp://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142749.pdfhttp://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142749.pdfhttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://www.c2es.org/docUploads/legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdfhttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttp://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop20/events/2014-12-08-15-30-united-states-of-americahttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttps://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdfhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-changehttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspxhttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspxhttp://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx


19/44


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 See, for example, Purvis, “The Case for Climate Protec-tion Authority.”

31 U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, “The Conven-tion – The 1979 Geneva Convention on Longe -range

Transboundary Air Pollution,” available at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.html (last accessed June2015).

32 U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, “1979 Conven-tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution”(1983), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf.

33 U.S. Department of State, Protocol to the 1979 Conven-tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone (1999), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125299.pdf .

34 Hathaway, “Treaties’ End.” A typical view, in fact, is thattreaties and congressional-executive agreements areinterchangeable. In Foreign Affairs and the United StatesConstitution, Louis Henkin makes the often-quotedclaim that “it is now widely accepted that the Con-gressional-Executive agreement is available for wideuse, even general use, and is a complete alternative to

a treaty.” Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United StatesConstitution. This may be an overstatement, as the U.S.Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland , said that treaty-making power could address issues beyond the powersof Congress as outlined in Article I of the Constitution.Missouri v. Holland , 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

35 Hathaway, “Treatie s’ End.”

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 The North American Agreement on EnvironmentalCooperation was negotiated alongside the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement. See Hathaway, “Trea-ties’ End.”

39 United Nations, “Minamata Convention on Mercury”

(2013), available at http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdf.

40 Tseming Yang, “The Minamata Convention on Mercuryand the Future of Multilateral Environmental Agree-ments,” Environmental Law Reporter 45 (1) (2015):10064–10073.

41 The convention will enter into force when it clears thethreshold of ratification by 50 countries. See Un itedNations, “Minamata Convention on Mercury.”

42 U.S. Department of State, “United States Joins Minama-ta Convention on Mercury,” November 6, 2013, availableat http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htm.

43 Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, Treaty Politics and the

Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitmentsin a System of Shared Powers (Ann Arbor, MI: Universityof Michigan Press, 2011).

44 International Civil Aviation Organization, “Conventionon International Civil Aviation” (1944), available athttp://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf.

45 Chang, “International Executive Agreements on ClimateChange”; Foreign Affairs, Trade and DevelopmentCanada, “Agreement to Ban Smoking on InternationalPassenger Flights,” available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=102789(last accessedJuly 2015); International Civil Aviation Organization,“Aeronautical Agreement - ICAO Registration Number4778,” available at http://cfapp.icao.int/dagmar/agr_details.cfm?UserLang=&icaoregno=4778%2E0 (lastaccessed July 2015).

46 Parties to the International Cospas-Sarsat Programme

Agreement, “The International Cospas-SarsatProgramme Agreement” (1988), available at https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdf.

47 These space treaties established guidelines that dictatearms control, freedom of exploration, damages liability,and safety and rescue for astronauts. They include the

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of Statesin the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, includingthe Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Agreementon the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronautsand the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;the Convention on International Liability for DamageCaused by Space Objects; and the Convention onRegistration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.See, for example, U.S. Department of State, SpaceStation: Agreement between the United States of Americaand Other Governments (1998), available at http://www.

state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdf .

48 See, for example, David R. Baake, “International ClimateAction without Congress: Does §115 of the Clean AirAct Provide Sufficient Authority?”, Environmental LawReporter 44 (7) (2014): 10562–10573. See also KevinBundy and others, “Yes, He Can: President Obama’sPower to Make an International Climate Commit-ment Without Waiting for Congress.” Working Paper 2(Center for Biological Diversity Climate Law I nstitute,2009), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdf.

49 Bodansky, “Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a NewClimate Change Agreement.”

50 See, for example, Barbour, “International Agreementson Climate Change”; United Nations, “U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change” (1992), available athttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/conven-tion/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdf .

51 The Congressional Research Service’s report for theSenate Committee on Foreign Relations says that “ex-ecutive agreements pursuant to treaties are supposedto be within the pur view of the treaty, that is, carry outthe purposes of the treaty.” See Congressional ResearchService, “Treaties and O ther International Agreements.”

52 At the hearing on the UNFCCC before the Senate Com-mittee on Foreign Relations in 1992, the Bush admin-istration was asked about U.S. obligations under thetreaty. Its response was, “There will be commitmentswith respect to greenhouse gas emissions, reporting,cooperation in science and education, provision offinancial resources, technology cooperation, and

participation in the convention’s various institutions.”See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.N.Framework Convention on Climate Change: Hearingon Treaty doc. 102-38, S. Hrg. 970, 102 Cong. 2 sess.(Government Printing Office, 1992), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000021075452.

53 Krutz and Peake, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements.

http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htmlhttp://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htmlhttp://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdfhttp://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125299.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125299.pdfhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htmhttp://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdfhttp://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdfhttp://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=102789http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=102789http://cfapp.icao.int/dagmar/agr_details.cfm?UserLang=&icaoregno=4778%2E0http://cfapp.icao.int/dagmar/agr_details.cfm?UserLang=&icaoregno=4778%2E0https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttps://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttps://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000021075452http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000021075452http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000021075452http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000021075452http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/pdfs/Yes_He_Can_120809.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdfhttps://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttps://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttps://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/EmergencyBeacons/Internationa_C-S_Agreement1988.pdfhttp://cfapp.icao.int/dagmar/agr_details.cfm?UserLang=&icaoregno=4778%2E0http://cfapp.icao.int/dagmar/agr_details.cfm?UserLang=&icaoregno=4778%2E0http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=102789http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=102789http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdfhttp://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htmhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htmhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata%20Convention%20on%20Mercury_booklet_English.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125299.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125299.pdfhttp://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdfhttp://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdfhttp://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.htmlhttp://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.html


20/44


54 “… A decision by the executive branch to reinterpretthe Convention to apply legally binding targets andtimetables for reducing emissions of greenhousegases to the United States would alter the ‘‘sharedunderstanding’’ of the Convention between the Senateand the executive branch and would therefore requirethe Senate’s advice and consent.” See Senate Commit-tee on Foreign Relations, “United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change: report to accompany

Treaty doc. 102-38” (Government Printing Office, 1992).Quoted in Congressional Research Service, “Treatiesand O ther I nternational Agreements.”

55 Again, for the idea of sole executive agreements withstatutory support, see Bodansky, “Legal Options for U.S.Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement.”

56 For the means of implementation for the UNFCCC trea-ty, see Barbour, “International Agreements on ClimateChange”; Chang, “International Executive Agreementson Climate Change.” See also Senate Committee on For-eign Relations, U.N. Framework Convention on ClimateChange: Hearing on Treaty doc. 102-38. The UNFCCCtreaty provides authorization to enter a new agreementthat is pursuant to it, but—as it is not self-executing—itwould not itself provide domestic implementationpower for an agreement in its purview.

57 It is worth noting that existing U.S. statutes—such asthe International Development and Food AssistanceActs of 1975 and 1977 and the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961, which are statutes that authorize ex antecongressional-executive agreements—would supplyadditional support for any obligations to assist vulner-able countries in their development efforts or efforts tomanage and protect natural resources. For a selectedlist of acts that authorize ex ante congressional-exec-utive agreements, see Hathaway, “Presidential Powerover International Law.”


21/44


Appendix: Multilateral

agreements—other than

treaties—the United Statesentered from 1985 to 2014

Te ollowing inormaion was originally compiled by he Congressional esearch

Service, or CS, in a memorandum o ep. Earl Blumenauer (D-O). I has no

been edied or subsance bu has been reorganized chronologically by presiden-

ial adminisraion and he concurren congressional sessions.1

Te CS memorandum draws rom he annual reaies in Force repors rom heU.S. Deparmen o Saewhich lis all inernaional agreemens o which he

Unied Saes is a paryand excludes agreemens ha were sen o he Senae or

ormal consen. I hereore capures inernaional agreemens ha are considered

execuive agreemens.

President Ronald Reagan: 14 multilateral executive agreements

from 1985 to 1989

1985 to 1987: Democratic House majority, Republican Senate majority

• Convenion esablishing he Mulilaeral Invesmen Guaranee Agency

(MIGA) wih annexes and schedules.

Done a Seoul Ocober 11, 1985. Enered ino orce April 12, 1988.

• Memoranda o undersanding concerning salmonid research and enorcemen o

he inernaional convenion or he high seas fisheries o he Norh Pacific Ocean.

Signed a Vancouver April 9, 1986. Enered ino orce April 9, 1986.

• Agreemen concerning he inernaional und or Ireland, wih annexes.

Done a Washingon Sepember 26, 1986. Enered ino orce Sepember 26, 1986.


22/44


1987 to 1989: Democratic House majority, Democratic Senate majority

• Amendmen o Consiuion o he Inernaional Organizaion or Migraion.

Done May 20, 1987.

•Memorandum o undersanding concerning general arrangemens or he col-laboraive developmen and producion o a modular sandoff weapon sysem.

Signed June 12-July 24, 1987. Enered ino orce July 24, 1987.

• Iner-American convenion on amaeur radio service.

Done a Lima Augus 14, 1987. Enered ino orce February 21, 1990; or he Unied

Saes March 20, 1991.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning a NAO ani-air warare sysem

(NAAWS), wih annex.

Signed Sepember 11 o Ocober 19, 1987. Enered ino orce Ocober 19, 1987.

• Memorandum o undersanding or he projec definiion phase o a NAO rig-

ae replacemen or he 1990s (NF 90).

Signed Ocober 20, 1987, January 23, 1988, and January 25, 1988. Enered ino

orce January 25, 1988.

• Agreemen regarding inspecions relaing o he reay o December 8, 1987

beween he Unied Saes and he Union o Sovie Socialis epublics on he

eliminaion o heir inermediae-range and shorer-range missiles, wih annex.

Signed a Brussels December 11, 1987. Enered ino orce June 1, 1988.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he our power air senior naional

represenaive cooperaive long erm echnology projecs.

Signed a Washingon and Paris April 11, April 27, and June 28, 1988. Enered ino

orce June 28, 1988.

• Agreemen concerning he accession o Belgium, he Neherlands and he

Unied Kingdom o he Unied Saes-German memorandum o undersand-

ing o March 10 and June 13, 1986 or cooperaive sofware developmen andimplemenaion or he EIFEL sysem.

Signed a Bonn, Brussels, Washingon, Te Hague, and London January 27, March

8, April 5, June 27, and July 19, 1988. Enered ino orce July 19, 1988.


23/44


• Inernaional COSPAS–SASA program agreemen.

Done a Paris July 1, 1988. Enered ino orce Augus 30, 1988.

• Agreemen or he esablishmen o he Inernaional Developmen

Law Organizaion.

Signed a Rome February 5, 1988. Enered ino orce April 28, 1989.

• Proocol o he 1979 Convenion on long-range ransboundary air polluion

concerning he conrol o emissions o nirogen oxides or heir ransboundary

fluxes, wih annex.

Done a Sofia Ocober 31, 1988. Enered ino orce February 14, 1991.

President George H.W. Bush: 28 multilateral executive agreements

from 1989 to 1993


• erms o reerence o he Inernaional Copper Sudy Group.

Done a Geneva February 24, 1989. Enered ino orce January 23, 1992.

• Declaraion o Caragena concerning he producion o, rafficking in and

demand or illici drugs.

Signed a Caragena February 15, 1990. Enered ino orce February 15, 1990.

• Agreemen regarding proecion o inormaion ranserred ino he Unied

Saes in connecion wih he iniial phase o a projec or he esablishmen o a

uranium enrichmen insallaion in he Unied Saes based upon he gas cenri-

uge process developed wihin he hree European counries.

Signed a Washingon April 11, 1990. Enered ino orce April 11, 1990.

• Agreemen esablishing he European Bank or econsrucion and

Developmen, wih annexes.

Done a Paris May 29, 1990. Enered ino orce March 28, 1991.

• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding or he cooperaive suppor o

he 76/62 OO Melara Compac Gun (OMCG), wih annexes.

Signed May 30, June 22, Augus 24 and November 8, 1990.


24/44


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaion in he figh agains

illici rafficking o narcoic drugs hrough he use o equipmen and personnel

based a Grea Inagua and such oher bases as may be esablished in he urks

and Caicos Islands, wih annexes.

Signed a Washingon July 12, 1990. Enered ino orce July 12, 1990.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive program or ull ine-

graion o a radar in he AV-8B weapon sysem and he producion and lie cycle

suppor o a radar equipped AV-8B (AV-8B Harrier II Plus), wih annexes.

Signed a Rome, Washingon, and Madrid Augus 8, Augus 31, and Sepember 28,

1990. Enered ino orce Sepember 28, 1990.

• Agreemen concerning he convenion o Ocober 23, 1954, on he presence o

oreign orces in he Federal epublic o Germany.

Exchange o noes a Bonn Sepember 25, 1990. Enered ino orce Sepember 25, 1990.

• Agreemen regarding he saus o oreign orces in he ormer erriory o he

German Democraic epublic.

Exchange o noes a Bonn Sepember 25, 1990. Enered ino orce Ocober 3, 1990.

• Agreemen concerning he convenion o May 26, 1952, as amended, on rela-

ions beween he Tree Powers and he Federal epublic o Germany and he

convenion o May 26, 1952, as amended, on setlemen o maters arising ou o

he war and he occupaion.

Exchange o noes a Bonn Sepember 27 and 28, 1990. Enered ino orce Sepember

28, 1990.

• Declaraion suspending he operaion o quadriparie righs and responsibiliies.

Signed a New York Ocober 1, 1990. Enered ino orce Ocober 3, 1990.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive projec or he

esablishmen, operaion, managemen and suppor o he NAO Insensiive

Muniions Inormaion Cener (NIMIC), wih annexes.

Signed a Brussels Ocober 24, 1990. Enered ino orce Ocober 24, 1990.


25/44



• Memorandum o undersanding or exchanges o inormaion regarding hird-

generaion ani-ank guided missiles.

Signed a Washingon, London, Paris, and Bonn January 30, February 13, and

March 7, 1991. Enered ino orce March 7, 1991.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive program or ull

inegraion o a radar in he AV-8B weapon sysem and he producion, remanu-

acure and in-service suppor o a radar equipped AV-8B (AV-8B HAIE II

PLUS), wih annexes and supplemenal agreemen.

Signed a Rome and Washingon February 7 and March 4, 1992. Enered ino orce

November 12, 1992.

• Memorandum o undersanding on he avoidance o overlaps and conflics rela-

ing o deep seabed areas, wih annexes.Signed a New York February 22, 1991. Enered ino orce February 22, 1991.

• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding or he cooperaive suppor o

he 76/62 OO Melara Compac Gun (OMCG), wih annexes.

Signed June 14, 1991, July 5, 1991, Ocober 9 1991, December 3, 1991, and

February 5, 1992.

• Memorandum o undersanding on he avoidance o overlaps and conflics rela-

ing o deep sea-bed areas, wih annexes.

Done a New York Augus 20, 1991. Enered ino orce Augus 28, 1991; effecive

Augus 20, 1991.

• Program memorandum o undersanding concerning general arrangemens or

he collaboraive program on a muliuncional inormaion disribuion sysem,

wih supplemen no. 1.

Signed a Paris, Madrid, Washingon, Rome, and Bonn June 17, 1991, July 4, 1991,

Augus 27, 1991, Ocober 4, 1991, and January 7, 1992. Enered ino orce Ocober

4, 1991.

• Agreemen on cooperaion in he engineering design aciviies or he

Inernaional Termonuclear Experimenal eacor.

Signed a Washingon July 21, 1992. Enered ino orce July 21, 1992.


26/44


• Agreemen regarding he esablishmen, consrucion and operaion o a ura-

nium enrichmen insallaion in he Unied Saes, wih annex and agreed minue.

Signed a Washingon July 24, 1992. Enered ino orce February 1, 1995.

• Memorandum o undersanding on cooperaive research, developmen and

demonsraion o inerneworking echnologies o improve communicaionssysems nework ineroperabiliy, wih annex.

Signed a Bonn, Washingon, London, and Paris Ocober 22, November 7, November

14, and December 16, 1991. Enered ino orce December 16, 1991.

• Agreemen on a comprehensive poliical setlemen o he Cambodia conflic,

wih annexes.

Done a Paris Ocober 23, 1991. Enered ino orce Ocober 23, 1991.

• Agreemen concerning he sovereigny, independence, erriorial inegriy and

inviolabiliy, neuraliy and naional uniy o Cambodia. Done a Paris Ocober 31, 1991. Enered ino orce Ocober 31, 1991.

• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding concerning he EUO-NAO

Join Je Pilo raining (ENJJP) Program.

Signed December 6, 1991, January 31, 1992, March 20, 1992, April 9, 1992, May

5, 1992, July 17, 1992, Augus 14, 1992, Sepember 9, 1992, Ocober 19 1992,

November 3, 1992.

• OECD Council decision on he conrol o ransronier movemens o wases

desined or recovery operaions.

Adoped a Paris March 30, 1992. Enered ino orce March 30, 1992.

• Agreemen esablishing he Iner-American Insiue or Global Change esearch.

Done a Monevideo May 13, 1992. Enered ino orce March 12, 1994.

• Agreemen on sae and local axaion o oreign employees o public inerna-

ional organizaions.

Done a Washingon April 21, 1992. Enered ino orce May 24, 1994.

• Norh American ree rade agreemen, wih noes and annexes.

Signed a Washingon, Otawa, and Mexico December 8, 11, 14 and 17, 1992.

Enered ino orce January 1, 1994.


27/44


President Bill Clinton: 62 multilateral executive agreements from

1993 to 2001


• Amendmens o Memorandum o undersanding concerning he EUO-NAO


Signed January 15, 1993, March 16, 1993, and April 15, 1993. November 3, 1993,

January 11, 1994, February 4, 1994, February 16, 1994, April 1, 1994, April 28,

1994, May 11, 1994, May 25, 1994, June 6, 1994, June 28, 1994, July 20, 1994,

and Ocober 4, 1994.

• Esablishmen agreemen or he Cener or Inernaional Foresry esearch

(CIFO), wih consiuion.

Done a Canberra March 5, 1993. Enered ino orce March 5, 1993; or he UniedSaes May 3, 1993.

• Amendmens o Agreemen o supplemen he agreemen o June 19, 1951

beween he paries o he Norh Alanic reay regarding he saus o heir

orces wih respec o oreign orces saioned in he Federal epublic o

Germany, wih proocol o signaure.

Signed March 18, 1993; May 16, 1994.

• Adminisraive agreemen o implemen aricle 60 o he agreemen o Augus

3, 1959, as amended, o supplemen he agreemen beween he paries o he

Norh Alanic reay regarding he saus o heir orces wih respec o oreign

orces saioned in he Federal epublic o Germany.

Done a Bonn March 18, 1993. Enered ino orce March 29, 1998.

• Norh American agreemen on labor cooperaion, wih annexes.

Signed a Mexico, Washingon and Otawa Sepember 8, 9, 12 and 14, 1993.


• Norh American agreemen on environmenal cooperaion, wih annexes.Signed a Mexico, Washingon and Otawa Sepember 8, 9, 12 and 14, 1993.



28/44


• Agreemen o esablish a science and echnology cener in Ukraine.

Done a Kiev Ocober 25, 1993. Enered ino orce July 16, 1994.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaion on an inernaional

miliary saellie or communicaions (INMILSA) (Feasibiliy Sudy).

Done a Washingon, London, and Paris December 30, 1993, January 6, 1994, and January 28, 1994. Enered ino orce January 28, 1994.

• Inernaional ropical imber agreemen, 1994, wih annexes.

Done a Geneva January 26, 1994. Enered ino orce provisionally, January 1, 1997.

• Agreemen on echnological saeguards associaed wih he launch o he

INMASA–3 saellie.

Signed a Washingon February 14, 1994. Enered ino orce Augus 19, 1994.

• Marrakesh agreemen esablishing he World rade Organizaion (WO). Done a Marrakesh April 15, 1994. Enered ino orce January 1, 1995.

• Agreemen on governmen procuremen.

Done a Marrakesh April 15, 1994. Enered ino orce January 1, 1996.

• Norh American ramework agreemen beween he Unied Saes reasury, he

Banco de Mexico/Governmen o Mexico and he Bank o Canada.

Signed a Mexico April 22 and 26, 1994. Enered ino orce April 26, 1994.

• Memorandum o undersanding or he developmen o synheic aperure

radar applicaion o suppor coasal warare and surace shipwake deecion and

characerizaion, wih annexes.

Signed a Washingon, London, and Kjeller Augus 12, Augus 25, and Sepember 5,

1994. Enered ino orce Sepember 5, 1994.

• Agreemen erminaing he agreemen o Sepember 25, 1990, concerning he

presence and saus o Allied Forces in Berlin.

Exchange o noes a Bonn Sepember 12, 1994. Enered ino orce Sepember 12, 1994.

• Agreemen on he saus o missions and represenaives o hird saes o he

Norh Alanic reay Organizaion.

Done a Brussels Sepember 14, 1994. Enered ino orce March 28, 1997.


29/44


• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive proj-

ec or he esablishmen, operaion, managemen and suppor o he NAO

Insensiive Muniions Inormaion Cener (NIMIC), wih annexes.

Signed Ocober 6, Ocober 12, Ocober 17, Ocober 25, and November 2, 1994.

• Agreemen o ban smoking on inernaional passenger flighs. Done a Chicago November 1, 1994. Enered ino orce March 1, 1995.

1995 to 1997: Republican House majority, Republican Senate majority

• Agreemen on he esablishmen o he Korean Peninsula Energy

Developmen Organizaion.

Done a New York March 9, 1995. Enered ino orce March 9, 1995.

• Amendmens o Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive proj-ec or he esablishmen, operaion, managemen and suppor o he NAO

Insensiive Muniions Inormaion Cener (NIMIC), wih annexes.

Signed March 15, 28 and 29, 1995.

March 15, March 28, March 29, April 4, and April 10, 1995.

March 15, March 28, March 29, April 4, and April 12, 1995.

March 29, April 2, April 9, April 16, April 18, April 22, April 30, and June 13, 1996.

• Amendmens o Memorandum o undersanding concerning he EUO-NAO


Signed March 17, March 29, March 30, April 27, June 16, June 30, July 27, and

Sepember 19, 1995.

• Arrangemen on he join financing o a Norh Alanic Heigh Monioring Sysem.

Signed a Monreal July 31, Augus 11, 18 and 23, Sepember 28, Ocober 25 and

December 12, 1995. Enered ino orce December 12, 1995.

• Memorandum o undersanding or senior naional represenaives (AMY) coop-

eraion and exchanges o inormaion, wih atachmens and an undersanding.

Signed a Washingon, London, Paris, and Bonn Ocober 19, 1995, November 13,1995, November 27, 1995, and January 9, 1996. Enered ino orce January 9, 1996.


30/44


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning mulilaeral exchange o research

and developmen inormaion, wih appendix.

Signed a Washingon, Otawa, London, and Canberra Ocober 20, 1995, November

15, 1995, December 1, 1995, January 30, 1996, and February 12, 1996.

Enered ino orce February 12, 1996.

• Memorandum o undersanding or he echnical cooperaion program,

wih appendices.

Signed a Melbourne Ocober 24, 1995. Enered ino orce Ocober 24, 1995.

• Addendum o he memorandum o undersanding o May 20, 1977 or coop-

eraive suppor o he NAO seasparrow surace missile sysem concerning

he cooperaive engineering and manuacuring developmen o he evolved

seasparrow missile, wih annexes and relaed leter.

Signed a Washingon April 26 and June 16, 1995. Enered ino orce June 16, 1995.

• Agreemen among he Saes Paries o he Norh Alanic reay and oher Saes

paricipaing in he Parnership or Peace regarding he saus o heir orces.

Done a Brussels June 19, 1995. Enered ino orce January 13, 1996.

• Memorandum o undersanding on he esablishmen and operaion o he

Inernaional Planning and Coordinaion Saff or he Mulinaional eacion

Forces (Air) o NAO – eacion Force Air Saff, wih annexes.

Signed a Caseau July 20, 24, 25, and 28, and Augus 1, 10, and 15, 1995. Enered

ino orce Augus 15, 1995.

• Memorandum o agreemen concerning he SASA Space Segmen.

Done a Washingon Sepember 11, 1995. Enered ino orce November 10, 1995.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he esablishmen, mission, financ-

ing, adminisraion and saus o Headquarers 5 Allied acical Air Force (HQ

5 AAF), wih annexes.

Signed a Caseau Sepember 25, 26, and 29, and Ocober 2, 1995. Enered ino

orce Ocober 2, 1995; effecive January 1, 1994.


31/44


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he manning, unding and suppor

o NAO Souhern egion Mariime Sub-Principal Subordinae Command

Headquarers o Commander Gibralar Medierranean (HQ GIBMED),

Commander Mariime Air Forces Medierranean (HQ MARIMED),

Commander Cenral Medierranean (HQ MEDCEN), Commander Easern

Medierranean (HQ MEDEAS), Commander Norheas Medierranean(HQ MEDNOEAS) and Commander Submarines Medierranean (HQ

SUBMED), wih annexes.

Signed a Caseau Sepember 27 and Ocober 2, 1995. Enered ino orce Ocober 2,

1995; effecive January 1, 1994.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning a easibiliy sudy or a NAO

influence minesweeping sysem (NIMS), wih annexes.

Signed a Haakonsvern, Otawa, Paris, and Washingon December 4, 1995, December

5, 1995, March 11, 1996, and June 3, 1996. Enered ino orce June 3, 1996.

• Memorandum o undersanding covering a easibiliy sudy or a NAO subma-

rine rescue sysem (NSS).

Signed a Brisol, Oslo, Washingon, Rome, and Paris February 21, February 29,

March 15, March 22, and June 12, 1996. Enered ino orce June 12, 1996.

• Memorandum o undersanding covering subphase wo o he design and devel-

opmen phase o he NAO improved link eleven (NILE) projec, wih annex

and relaed leter.

Signed a Quebec, Brisol, Rome, Bonn, Te Hague, Washingon, and Paris May 24,

June 5, June 6, June 11, July 2, and July 8, 1996. Enered ino orce July 2, 1996.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning mulilaeral exchange o miliary

inormaion, wih appendix.

Signed a Washingon, London, Otawa, Canberra, and Wellingon November 19,

1996, January 8, 1997, March 10, 1997, March 26, 1997, and April 18, 1997.

Enered ino orce April 18, 1997.

• Agreemen esablishing he Middle Eas Desalinaion esearch Cener.

Signed a Musca December 22, 1996. Enered ino orce December 22, 1996.


32/44



• Agreemen beween he paries o he Norh Alanic reay or he securiy o

inormaion, wih annexes.

Done a Brussels March 6, 1997. Enered ino orce Augus 16, 1998.

• Agreemen on cooperaion among he original members o he Korean

Peninsula Energy Developmen Organizaion. Signed Sepember 19, 1997.

Signed a Washingon Sepember 19, 1997. Enered ino orce Sepember 19, 1997.

• Amendmen o agreemen on he esablishmen o he Korean Peninsula Energy

Developmen Organizaion.

Signed Sepember 19, 1997.

• Agreemen or he High speed Ani-adiaion Missile (HAM) AGM-88

upgrade, wih annexes.Signed a Washingon, Bonn, and Rome Ocober 14, 1997, February 5, 1998, and


• Arrangemen concerning applicaion o he space saion inergovernmenal

agreemen pending is enry ino orce.

Signed a Washingon January 29, 1998. Enered ino orce January 29, 1998.

• Agreemen concerning cooperaion on he civil inernaional space saion,

wih annex.

Signed a Washingon January 29, 1998. Enered ino orce March 27, 2001.

• Agreemen on he inernaional dolphin conservaion program, wih annexes.

Done a Washingon May 21, 1998. Enered ino orce February 15, 1999.

• Proocol o he 1979 Convenion on long-range ransboundary air polluion on

heavy meals, wih annexes.

Done a Aarhus June 24, 1998. Enered ino orce December 29, 2003.

• Agreemen concerning he esablishing o global echnical regulaions or wheeled vehicles, equipmen and pars which can be fited and/or be used on

wheeled vehicles, wih annexes.

Done a Geneva June 25, 1998. Enered ino orce Augus 25, 2000.


33/44


• Memorandum o undersanding or he cooperaion in he engineering and man-

uacuring developmen phase o he U.S. lighweigh 155mm howizer program.

Signed a Washingon and Brisol Augus 9 and 28, 1998. Enered ino orce Augus

28, 1998.

Amendmens and exension

March 19, 24 and 26, 1999.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning rilaeral echnology research and

developmen projecs, wih annex.

Signed November 3, 1998. Enered ino orce November 3, 1998.


• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive proj-

ec or he esablishmen, operaion, managemen and suppor o he NAOInsensiive Muniions Inormaion Cener (NIMIC), wih annexes.

Signed April 7, April 20, April 21, April 26, April 27, May 6, May 18 and May

21, 1999.

• Agreemen esablishing he Group o Saes agains Corrupion (GECO),

wih appendix.

Done a Srasbourg May 1, 1999. Enered ino orce May 1, 1999; or he Unied

Saes Sepember 20, 2000.

• Agreemen concerning cooperaion on he applicaion o non-prolieraion

assurances o low enriched uranium ranserred o he Unied Saes or abrica-

ion ino uel and reranser o aiwan, wih annex and relaed side leter.

Exchanges o noes a Washingon July 21, 1999. Enered ino orce May 1, 2000.

• Proocol o he 1979 Convenion on long-range ransboundary air polluion o

abae acidificaion, europhicaion and ground-level ozone.

Done a Gohenburg November 30, 1999. Enered ino orce May 17, 2005.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he research, developmen and acqui-siion o chemical, biological and radiological deense maeriel, wih appendices.

Signed a Washingon April 6, April 10, and June 1, 2000. Enered ino orce

June 1, 2000.


34/44


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he esablishmen, financing,

adminisraion, manning and saus o headquarers naval sriking and suppor

orces, souhern region, wih annexes.

Signed June 1, June 7, June 8, June 13, June 14, June 19, June 26, and July 27, 2000.

Enered ino orce July 27, 2000; effecive Sepember 1, 1999.

• Inernaional coffee agreemen 2001, wih annex.

Done a London Sepember 28, 2000. Enered ino orce provisionally Ocober 1, 2001.

• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding or he echnical cooperaion

program, wih appendices.

Signed Ocober 16, 2000.

• Memorandum o undersanding or ineroperable neworks or secure

communicaions.

Signed a Washingon, Koblenz, Rome, London, Otawa, Baerum, Paris, and TeHague Ocober 31, 2000, November 27, 2000, December 21, 2000, December 22,

2000, January 3, 2001, January 16, 2001, and February 16, 2001. Enered ino orce

February 16, 2001.

President George W. Bush: 68 multilateral executive agreements

from 2001 to 2009

January 2001 to May 24, 2001: Republican House majority, Republican

Senate majority

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaive ramework or sysem

developmen and demonsraion o he Join Srike Figher.

Signed a Washingon January 17, 2001. Enered ino orce January 17, 2001.

Amendmens and elaed Agreemens

January 17, 2001.

• Mulilaeral agreemen on he liberalizaion o inernaional air ransporaion, wih annex and appendix.

Done a Washingon May 1, 2001. Enered ino orce December 21, 2001.


35/44


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaion in navigaion warare

echnology demonsraor and sysem prooype projecs, wih annexes.

Signed a Washingon, Canberra, and Brisol May 13, May 31, and July 6, 2001.

Enered ino orce July 6, 2001.

May 24, 2001, to 2003: Republican House majority, Democratic Senate majority

• Agreemen on he appoinmen o he Inernaional Mines escue Body

(IMB), wih atachmen.

Signed a Byom, Poland May 29, 2001. Enered ino orce May 29, 2001.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaive ramework or sysem

developmen and demonsraion o he Join Srike Figher.

Done February 1 and 5, 2002.

February 1 and 7, 2002. May 16 and 28, 2002.

May 28 and June 20, 2002.

June 5, June 10, June 17, July 8, and Sepember 17, 2002.

June 17, June 20, July 8, Sepember 17, and Ocober 14, 2002.

June 17, June 24, July 8, Sepember17, Ocober 14, and November 14, 2002.

July 11, Sepember 17, Ocober 14, and November 14, 2002.

Ocober 31 and November 14, 2002.

• Memorandum o undersanding or uure air capabiliies projecs, wih annexes.

Signed a Grama, London, and Paris March 26, April 5, and May 3, 2002. Enered

ino orce May 3, 2002.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he in-service suppor phase o he

NAO improved link eleven projec, wih annexes.

Signed a Washingon, Otawa, Paris, Koblenz, Rome, and London June 13, June 18,

June 20, June 27, and July 2, 2002. Enered ino orce July 2, 2002.

• Amendmens o Agreemen or he esablishmen o he Inernaional

Developmen Law Organizaion.Signed June 30, 2002; November 30, 2002.


36/44


• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding or senior naional represena-

ives (AMY) cooperaion and exchanges o inormaion, wih atachmens and

an undersanding.

Signed Sepember 19, 2002.

•Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaive projecs or heC-130J, wih annexes.

Signed a Washingon, London, Rome, and Canberra December 16, 2002, and

January 7, 2003, January 17, 2003, and January 31, 2003. Enered ino orce

January 31, 2003.

• Agreemen on muual accepance o oenological pracices, wih annex.

Done a orono December 18, 2001. Enered ino orce December 1, 2002.


• Framework agreemen on a mulilaeral nuclear environmenal programme in

he ussian Federaion.

Signed a Sockholm May 21, 2003. Enered ino orce April 14, 2004. Enered ino

orce or he Unied Saes June 14, 2013.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he mission raining via disribued

simulaion (MDS) projec.

Signed February 19, February 20, February 23, February 26, February 27, and


• Memorandum o undersanding concerning exchange o elecric

warship inormaion.

Signed a Washingon, Paris, and Brisol April 7, April 30, and May 6, 2004.

Enered ino orce May 6, 2004.

• Amendmens o Memorandum o undersanding or he cooperaion in he

engineering and manuacuring developmen phase o he U.S. lighweigh

155mm howizer program.Signed April 28, June 7 and July 13, 2004.


37/44


• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding concerning a cooperaive pro-

gram or ull inegraion o a radar in he AV-8B weapon sysem and he produc-

ion, remanuacure and in-service suppor o a radar equipped AV-8B (AV-8B

HAIE II PLUS), wih annexes and supplemenal agreemen.

Signed June 28, 2004.

• Te Dominican epublic-Cenral America-Unied Saes ree rade agreemen.

Signed a Washingon Augus 5, 2004. Enered ino orce March 1, 2006.

• Amendmen o Memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaive proj-

ecs or he C-130J, wih annexes.

Signed Augus 27, Sepember 8, Sepember 15, and Sepember 29, 2004.

• Memorandum o undersanding concerning he Mulilaeral Ineroperabiliy

Program (MIP).

Signed Sepember 24, 2004, Ocober 13, 2004, Ocober 26, 2004, January 6, 2005, January 19, 2005, and February 3, 2005. Enered ino orce February 3, 2005.

• Framework memorandum o undersanding concerning cooperaion in pos

producion suppor o harrier