the battle of britain: misperceptions that led to victory

The Battle of Britain: Misperceptions that Led to Victory

by

Douglas M. Armour

Thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts with

Honours in History

Acadia University

April, 2011

©Copyright by Douglas M. Armour, 2011

i

This thesis by Douglas M. Armour

Is accepted in its present form by the

Department of History & Classics

As satisfying thesis requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honours

Approved by the Thesis Supervisor

________________________________ ______________________________

Dr. Paul Doerr Date

Approved by the Head of the Department

________________________________ ______________________________

Dr. Paul Doerr Date

Approved by the Honours Committee

________________________________ ______________________________

Dr. Sonia Hewitt Date

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I, Douglas M. Armour, grant permission to the University Librarian at Acadia University to

reproduce, loan or distribute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats on a

non-profit basis. I however, retain the copyright in my thesis.

________________________________

Signature of Author

______________________________

Date

iii

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Paul Doerr, for all the support he

has given me while writing my thesis. He has guided me through this long process and put up

with my terrible spelling. Also, I especially thank him for getting some primary sources from

Britain, (you know your thesis advisor is awesome when he crosses an ocean to get sources for

you). Thanks again Paul for all your efforts!

To my parents, thanks for all the loving support and motivation you have given me while writing

my thesis. You have made this thesis possible by first making the writer of it (me) possible and

for raising me to be the person I am. Mom and Dad I love you. To the rest of my family and loved

ones I love you very much.

To Dr. David Duke, thanks for all the guidance you have given me over the years. When I first

came to Acadia you were assigned to be my mentor. The advice you have given me then and

over the years have been extremely valuable. You are now my second reader and still giving me

valuable advice. Thank you for all your guidance; you are a great professor and person, never

change unless it is for the better.

To all the professors I have had while at Acadia, thank you for your hard work and for the

knowledge you have given me over the years. Also, to all the staff that have helped me at

Acadia, thank you.

To God, thank you for literally everything. You have made this thesis possible by making reality

itself. I love you God, you are awesome. For those of you reading who do not share my religious

views, you at least now know I have a religious back ground.

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Table of Contents

Title Page i

Approval Page ii

Permission for Duplication Page iii

Acknowledgement Page iv

Table of Contents v

Abstract Page vi

Chapter One: Historiography............................................................................................................1

Chapter One: Conclusion................................................................................................................31

Chapter Two: The Wrong Battle.....................................................................................................34

Chapter Two: Conclusion................................................................................................................60

Bibliography....................................................................................................................................62

v

Abstract

This thesis examines British preparations for the future of aerial warfare in the 1930s

and the subsequent Battle of Britain in 1940. It argues that British planners in the 1930s

prepared for the wrong war that was going to be fought in 1939 and early 1940. It shows that

this mistake in planning was mainly due to poor information and an institutional bias toward

offensive bombers. The thesis then looks at the defensive preparations made by Air Chief

Marshal Hugh Dowding. It argues that though Britain had prepared for the wrong offensive

battle that was fought in 1939 and early 1940, the preparations it made for a defensive battle

gave the RAF a distinct advantage over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain which would follow.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Chief_Marshal


1

Chapter 1: Historiography

The Battle of Britain is remembered as one of the great battles of World War II. It is also

notable for being the first battle in history fought almost exclusively in the air. The Battle of

Britain is important for many reasons. It was a battle fought for Britain’s very survival, in which

the RAF met the Luftwaffe over the skies of Britain. More importantly if the battle had been lost

it is very imaginable that in all probability Nazi Germany would have won World War 2, making

the world a very different place than it is now. Churchill captured the importance of the battle

when he famously said, “Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves,

that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This

was their finest hour.’”1

The Battle of Britain, like most histories, is too complicated in its many parts and too

large for any human to comprehend atits fullest. From the lowliest airmen to the highest ranking

officers, none know the battle to its fullest. Historians and others, however, can comprehend

some parts of the battle and from these parts are able to draw larger pictures. Looking at these

accounts it is important that one remembers that historians and those who write the past have

subjective limitations. They come from different backgrounds and different times. Also they have

different perspectives, different biases and use different sources. Historians and others end up

giving different accounts of the battle. The Battle of Britain is no exception to this and there are

many varying accounts of the battle that have been written over the years.

1 “The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, London,”

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speechs-how-churchill-did-it, (February 8, 2011).

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speechs-how-churchill-did-it


2

This historiography will look at a number of authors who have written on the Battle of

Britain over the years. It will proceed chronologically, starting with early accounts of the battle

and progress to more recent authors. Finally, it will point out some of the recurring themes and

changing views of the authors.

Sir Arthur Harris was the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command in

1942. After the war, in 1947, he published the book Bomber Offensive. Arthur Harris was born

April 13, 1892 in Cheltenham, England. His father wanted him to join the army, but he did not

join the army right away, “He dearly wanted me to go into the army. I was dead set against it.

And as it was either the army or the colonies, I plumped for darkest Africa.”2 Harris went to

North Rhodesia (modern day Zambia) and fell in love with the country. During World War One,

Harris was compelled to enlist and later in the war found himself joining the Royal Flying Corps

(R.F.C.) This started his career in military aviation, “I certainly had no idea that air warfare would

be my life's work.”3 Harris was promoted in 1942 to Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command.

During the war Harris supported the bombing of German cities and worked to make bombing

effective. After the war he was heavily criticized for the bombing of German cities and was given

the nick name “Bomber Harris” by the media. Harris died April 5, 1984 at his house in Goring.

The book, Bomber Offensive, is an autobiography of Harris’s experiences during World

War II. In the first two chapters, Harris recalls his experiences before the war and the early years

of the war. Harris explained in Chapter One how, during the interwar years, the three services

had been allowed to degrade, so that when the threat of war returned the RAF found itself

inadequately supplied. He points to the "Ten Year Rule" as being responsible for the

2 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, (New York : Macmillan Co., 1947), p 15.

3 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, p 16.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Officer_Commanding

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-Chief


3

degeneration of the RAF during the inter war period. The "Ten Year Rule” was created, under the

following circumstances:

After the 1914-1918 war the Chiefs of Staff sought political guidance on which to base the establishments and plans of the three services. They were told to base their plans on the assumption that there would be "no major war for ten years." That was a simple and, at the time when it was made, justifiable ruling. But that rule remained in force year after year, and no one had observed the logical conclusion that the progressive plans should thereafter have been based on an amended ruling that there would be no major war within nine years, within eight years, and so on each year, to zero.4

In the first part of the chapter Harris describes how far behind Britain was compared to

Germany, and the urgency that military planners faced preparing for war. While Germany was

preparing for war, “everything we had—and that was little—was in the shopwindow, with

nothing behind it.”5 As for Britain’s French allies, their air force was in even worse condition.

“Their air force was hopelessly deficient in every way, a dire state for which their politicians were

responsible.”6 It was only a few years before the war that preparations started in earnest. “For

some time we could not get across to the people who mattered the urgency of making

preparations for war, but eventually Eden and Simon, in 1935, went to Germany and came back

sufficiently staggered by what they had seen to cause them to ring all the bells.”7 In this chapter

Harris also talks about how he believed that the bomber was going to play a major role in

winning the upcoming war,

But I never had any fear that the enemy would succeed in getting across the Channel, with the equipment then available. I knew we could and would stop him. All past experience of combined operations pointed to the impossibility, at that time, of a cross-Channel invasion on the scale that would be necessary in the face of anything approaching serious opposition. I could therefore see only one possible way of bringing

4 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, pp 12-13.




4

serious pressure to bear on the Boche, and certainly only one way of defeating him; that was by air bombardment.8

Harris then recalls the early years of World War Two. Harris talked about some of the problems

Bomber Command faced during the early years of the war.

Flying Training Command and the Empire Training Scheme provided us with recruits trained up to a certain standard, but very far from being fit for operations; for one thing, none of these men had yet been trained to work together as a bomber crew. This was all right when we had bombers, such as the Battles, Hinds, and Vickers Wellesleys, which usually had only a crew of two, but with the newer types, carrying crews of four, five and six, such training of the men as individuals was wholly inadequate. All the rest had to be done by Bomber Command itself, and there had been no provision for such training in peacetime outside the squadrons themselves which in war could not undertake both training and operations.9

New aircraft and new pilots were both in very high demand. Harris believed that on the eve of

war Britain possessed “a force almost without reserves and without any adequate training

organisation behind it; any sustained campaign in the autumn of 1939 would very quickly have

brought us to the end of our small supply of trained crews.”10 Harris commended the efforts of

Ludlow-Hewitt, the chief of Bomber Command in 1939 who was replaced 1940, for insisting that

pilots be taken from the frontlines to be used as training instructors. Harris thought that, “He

was far and away the most brilliant officer I have ever met in any of the three services... Ludlow-

Hewitt saved the situation—and the war —at his own expense, and did it, as he does all things,

with good grace, and without thinking of himself or what effect it might have on his career.”11

Harris goes on to discuss some of the early targets of Bomber Command. He points out the

importance of Bomber Command attacking the German barges, pointing out that in 1940,

What Hitler wanted was protection from air attack for a seaborne invasion and at that time our fighters could not have been a serious threat to shipping. In those days there were no rockets or bombs on fighters, and the protection he wanted was therefore


9 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, page 34.

10 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, page 34.

11 Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, page 35-36.

5

against bombers. It was definitely Bomber Command's wholesale destruction of the invasion barges in the Channel ports that convinced the Germans of the futility of attempting to cross the Channel, especially as Fighter Command's victory meant that our bombers could have fighter cover over the Channel if necessary and so could attack by day in addition to their normal operations by night.12

By pointing this out he tried to show the important role that bomber command played in the

early years of World War II.

Harris gives an interesting perspective of the war from the perspective of a high ranking

commander. However it must be remembered that he also gives a biased account. As already

mentioned, Harris was criticised heavily by the media after the war for his actions, which was

most likely taken into account when he wrote his book. Bomber Offensive gives valuable insight

into the commonly unheard actions of Bomber Command before and during the Battle of Britain.

Harris wrote his autobiography in 1947, 2 years after the war. Harris wrote the

book as an autobiography, does not use many sources, and leaves the ones he does use uncited.

Being a firsthand account of a prominent person, this book is a valuable source. His book is also a

valuable source for those writing on the battle of Britain because it shows the mindset of the

offensive part of the RAF that competed for resources with the more defensive Fighter

Command of the RAF. It must also be remember that Harris took a lot of criticism after the war

and he tries to fight off some of this criticism in his autobiography.

Chester Wilmot was one of the earliest prominent writers who wrote on the Battle of

Britain. Wilmot was born on June 21, 1911 at Brighton, Melbourne and died in the famous crash

of the BOAC Comet in 1954. During the years of the Second World War he worked as an

Australian news correspondent and covered many events of the war, such as the German

12

Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive, page 43.

6

surrender in 1945.13 After the war he wrote several books on the history of the war. He

published in 1952, The Struggle for Europe, in Great Britain. The early sections of, The Struggle

for Europe, give an account of how Britain was able to survive the Battle of Britain. His writing

has a journalistic style/flow to it, which makes it an interesting and engaging read, but this

journalistic style also had the effect of being breathless in parts. Regardless Wilmot’s book, was

given high reviews and today it is still a highly regarded secondary source. The Daily Telegraph

praised his book as being, “impossible to praise too highly. Becomes at once a classic of

contemporary history.”14 The first two chapters of the book talk about the importance of Britain

standing alone against Germany and how Britain was able to survive alone against the seemingly

unstoppable German Army.

In the first chapter he emphasizes how Britain stood against Germany alone, which is

reflected in the title for chapter one “If Necessary, Alone.” He highlights the importance of

Britain not being knocked out of the war early and called Hitler’s inability to take Britain out of

the war his “first great failure.”15 He continued on to say how

It was Britain's refusal to yield or even to compromise that had driven Hitler into the fateful course of invading Russia. It was Britain's defiance that had roused and nourished the spirit of resistance in Occupied Europe and had compelled Hitler, when he turned to the East, to leave one quarter of. his strength in the West guarding his conquests and keeping the subject peoples in subjection. If he had been able to conquer or neutralise Britain, Hitler would have had no cause to fear a 'Second Front', for there would not have been at the western gates of his empire the base from which the forces of freedom would one day set forth to break down the walls of his Festung Europa.16

13

“Australian War Memorial,” http://www.awm.gov.au/people/343.asp, (January 28, 2011). 14

“Amazon.com,” http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-Europe-Wordsworth-Collection/dp/1853266779, (January 28, 2011). 15

Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, (London : Collins, 1974), p18.

16Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, p 18.

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Struggle_for_Europe&action=edit&redlink=1



http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-Europe-Wordsworth-Collection/dp/1853266779

7

Wilmot also champions Britain’s heroic defiance in this chapter. He commented on how the

British had a “strange capacity for seeing victory in defeat”17 and how historically, “Time and

again in the past four hundred years England had fought to prevent the domination of Europe by

a single power. Hitler was now faced with the same British stubbornness that had baulked Philip

of Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm II.”18 He also, in this chapter talks about

Hitler’s reluctant decision to launch an invasion of the British Isles. Wilmot argued that Hitler

thought that, "invasion should be undertaken only as a last resort to force Britain to sue for

peace."19 Wilmot thinks this was because Hitler thought that invasion of the British Isles would

be a difficult undertaking and because he wanted the German people and British people to be

allies. In this chapter Wilmot showed that the need for air superiority, and subsequently a battle

to remove Britain’s air power was needed because of the difficulties of invading Britain. The

main problem with an invasion of Britain was with Britain’s large navy. The Germans thought

that if they had tried a landing even with their superior numbers, “the enemy will still be able to

penetrate with resolute naval forces so as to place himself between the first wave already

landed, and the succeeding transports.”20 Wilmot argued that Germany’s solution to this

problem was to gain air superiority, “The conclusions which Raeder reported to Hitler on July

11th were that no invasion fleet could put to sea until the Luftwaffe had destroyed the R.A.F.

and had driven all British naval forces from the Channel.”21 So, Goering was tasked with the

destruction of the RAF to gain the air superiority needed to bring Britain to her knees.

Wilmot, in his second Chapter, “David and Goliath,” explains how the lonely and

outnumbered RAF was able to stand against Germany. In this chapter he argues that the key to

17

Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, p 24. 18




Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, page 26.

8

Britain’s success was in its preparation, most notably in the area of scientific research. He gives

much credit to, as he put it, “a small band of enlightened and progressive men who through the

years of public complacency and political neglect had worked to give the country a scientific

system of air defence.”22 He also singled out the commander of Fighter Command, Hugh

Dowding, as being very important in the scientific organisation of the RAF. Wilmot gave radar

technology a great amount of attention. Wilmot said that with radar “It was a battle of chance

and force against science and skill. There was no shortage of courage on the German part,

though their pilots lacked the zest of the British, but their confidence was undermined by the

knowledge that in comparison with their opponents they were blind, deaf and dumb.”23 Wilmot

argued that radar had a great impact on Britain’s ability to hold off the Luftwaffe.

Another area that Wilmot identifies as contributing to British victory was Germany’s

poor preparation for an air battle against Britain. He notes that the Luftwaffe was not designed

to fight this kind of air battle against Britain, as the Luftwaffe was primarily intended to provide

close support for ground units. However, in the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe would be fighting

the kind of battle that the British had prepared for. He points out the Stukas as an example of

this, saying that, “Goering decided to withdraw his 300 remaining Stukas from the battle. Thus,

by the mere threat of their intervention the Spitfires and Hurricanes were able to keep on the

ground nearly a quarter of the German bomber strength.”24 He also, points out that Goering’s

decision to switch from attacking the airfields to attacking London was a huge mistake. He cited

Goering as declaring in August of 1940: "It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing

the attacks on radar stations, since not one of those attacked has so far been put out of

22

Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, page 35. 23

Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, page 44. 24

Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, p 45.

9

action."25 Another fault in German preparation that Wilmot pointed out was their lack of

appreciation for British radar. He argued that “their scientists, fondly believing themselves to be

the best in the world, scoffed at the suggestion that the British might have discovered some

secret which had eluded them.”26 These are the areas in German preparation for the battle

which Wilmot picked out as being Germany`s downfall in the Battle of Britain.

Wilmot published his book in 1952, just 7 years after the end of the war. This makes

Wilmot an early post-war historian. Like many other early post-war historians, Wilmot did not

have direct access to many Allied military documents which would be released later. For German

sources, Wilmot was able to rely on German records which were released after the war as part

of Germany’s unconditional surrender. For material on the Allied side, Wilmot relied heavily on

his own personal “interrogations of the principal commanders and staff officers concerned”27

with the events. Also, being a correspondent for the B.B.C., he was an eye-witness to many

major events of the war. Most of his bibliography is full of sources written during or shortly after

the war. Being such an early post-war historian, Wilmot has the advantage of access to firsthand

accounts, and the people involved in the battles themselves, but he obviously did not have

access to official documents.

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster published the book The Narrow Margin: The Battle of

Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-40 in 1961. The book gives an overview of the Battle of

Britain showing how close the battle was and how narrowly it was won. The authors present the

25

Chester Wilmot, The struggle for Europe, pp 43-44. 26



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battle “in the form of a complete operational day-to-day diary.”28 The book is broken into three

distinct parts.

The first part of the book examines German and British preparations for the battle.

Wood and Dempster show how Germany evaded the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, and

built up their air force. They also cover the organisation of the Luftwaffe and how it was to

operate. After looking at German preparations they examine the deterioration of the British air

force and how Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard came “to rescue the

young service”29 in the 1920’s. Then the book looks at the rebuilding of the RAF and the

production of aircraft. The authors then inspect Germany’s intelligence capability, pointing out

its many weakness and shortcomings. They also looked at British intelligence and found it was

not much better than Germany’s. However they point out the success of some British electronic

countermeasures. They also stress the importance of the scientific development of radar and its

implementation. Next they note the importance of the observer corps and radio. Finally they

explain how the entire defence system worked as whole and the advantage it gave to Britain.

The second part of their book focuses on the start of the war and aerial combat in

France. The authors claim that the French air force was an utter failure. They recall the early

defeats and losses the RAF suffered. Then they examine the preparations to defend Britain and

stress the importance of the RAF in fending off an invasion. Finally they point out the importance

of the time the RAF was given to prepare, while Germany tried to convince Britain to surrender

and decide what to do.

28

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The narrow margin : the Battle of Britain and the rise of air power 1930-40, (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1975, c1961), p 13. 29

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The narrow margin, p 65.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshal_of_the_Royal_Air_Force

11

In the third part of their book, the authors give an almost day-by-day account of the

battle. They highlight a date, like September 30th, and then say what happened that day.

“Crossing the coast at Dungeness the two raids were met in force. Split and harried, neither

reached London.”30 They divided the battle into 5 distinct phases. The first phase lasted from July

10th to August 7th when Luftwaffe attacks were light and unfocused. The second phase lasted

from August 8th to August 23rd when there was a noticeable increase in Luftwaffe attacks. The

third phase lasted from August 24th to September 6th when the Luftwaffe, preparing for

Adlerangriff, tried to destroy the RAF by attacking “aircraft industry and the ground organization

of the air”31 The fourth phase lasted from September 7th to September 30th, when the Luftwaffe

changed targets to attack cities. The fifth phase lasted from October 1st to October 31st, during

which the Luftwaffe focussed more on night bombing and highflying fighters with bombs. The

authors finish the book by concluding that “In the final analysis the outcome was dependent on

political systems and personalities.”32

Wood and Dempster published the book in 1961, 16 years after the war. For primary

sources they used mainly interviews with those who took part in the battle and some pamphlets.

They have very few official government documents as sources. They used sources that were

both written in French and English. For secondary sources they used mainly books and articles.

Wood and Dempster are still part of an earlier group of historians that presents the battle in a

recollective, patriotic way.

Telford Taylor published the book “The Breaking Wave: The Second World War in the

Summer of 1940,” in 1967. Taylor was interested in looking at the Battle of Britain the German

30

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The narrow margin, p 368. 31



12

perspective, saying that the “German side of the story is the more interesting strategically and

significant historically.”33

Taylor starts his book by looking at the choices Germany faced in the summer of 1940,

after the fall of France. He identifies potential strategies Germany could have used, and explains

the difficulties Germany faced in employing them. After the fall of France and the conquest of

much of Europe, all that stood against Germany was Britain. Taylor argues that the German

leadership knew that the conquest of Britain would be a difficult undertaking, and so hoped that

Britain would see “reason” and just surrender. Taylor shows that the German leadership was

overconfident that they could “conclude a victor's peace with Britain.”34 However, after it

became clear that Britain would not surrender, Germany had to choose between several

strategic courses of action. Taylor identifies three main strategies Germany could have pursued.

Germany could have attempted to negotiate peace with Britain, or could have tried for a direct

speedy conquest of Britain. Finally, Germany could have dug in for a longer war and expanded

the conflict to other areas of the world. In arraying these strategic choices Taylor points out that

the German leadership had to be careful of the interest of their allies and the interest of neutral

powers. Taylor then argues that after a poor attempt at making peace, Germany then moved to

planning for invasion, but when it came to creating a plan to invade Britain, the German

leadership was uncertain and disorganized. This can be attributed the difficulties of invasion and

to Hitler’s lack of involvement in guiding the planning process. When it came time to decide on

an invasion plan Hitler was, as Taylor described it, on “vacation” while relaxing in France. Taylor

explains that without Hitler, who was “the ‘motor’ of the high command now, at the critical

33

Telford Taylor, The breaking wave : the Second World War in the summer of 1940, (New York : Simon and Schuster, c1967), page 14. 34

Telford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 34.

13

juncture, the engine was idling.”35 The German “Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe commands each

went about its individual tasks, while the Fuehrer relaxed and basked in the warm glow of the

victory in France.”36 The plan that was constructed involved the prerequisite of the Luftwaffe

acquiring air superiority. With such a rudimentary plan to defeat Britain, Hitler’s gaze slowly

turned east to the USSR.

After examining the situation Germany was faced with in 1940, Taylor then looks at the

events and decisions made during the Battle of Britain. He compares the Luftwaffe with the RAF

and concludes they were fairly even, with the exception of German “shortcomings in weapons

and leadership.”37 He notes that Germany had never intended to fight Britain and so did not

have an air force that was designed to fight against Britain. Throughout this section Taylor points

out numerous mistakes made by the German leadership from underestimating the British, to

Goering’s unprofessional conduct, to overconfidence in their success. He argues that

“Handicapped as the Luftwaffe was by its built-up limitations, its leaders failed again and again

to make the most of what they had.”38 Taylor follows the battle almost week by week explaining

the reasons behind German decisions that led to changes in plans and tactics.

In the final section of his book, Taylor looks at the planning of Operation Sea Lion. He

first looks at the point of Operation Sea Lion, questioning whether it was an invasion plan for the

conquest or Britain or just merely “nothing more than a political bluff.”39 He argues that Hitler

thought of Sea Lion as a true plan for the invasion of Britain, but only if a number of

prerequisites could first be met, the major being victory over the RAF. Taylor then looks at some

of the problems of Sea Lion. One of the major problems was that Hitler was almost completely

35

Telford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 53. 36


Telford Taylor, The breaking wave, page 79. 38


Telford Taylor, The breaking wave, page 200.

14

uninvolved in the plan of Sea Lion. This led to poor communication and lack of cooperation

between the three services. The army was overly excited about the operation, the navy was

timid about the entire operation and the air force was only interested with its “private war in the

air”40 and almost completely uninterested in the actual invasion part of the operation. Taylor

also looks at the individual problems the three services faced in Sea Lion, such as getting enough

transport ships. Taylor concludes that Sea Lion ultimately failed because Hitler was not willing to

take the risk of a failed invasion of Britain, “No matter how skillfully planned and diligently

prepared, invasion was bound to be a risky undertaking, with great and perhaps decisively

favourable consequences in the event of success, and serious but not immediately fatal

consequences in the event of failure.”41 The only way for Germany to remove this risk was to

defeat the RAF. “Sea Lion, no matter how well prepared, would have faced substantial risk of

failure unless England had first been really beaten flat by the Luftwaffe.”42 Taylor shows that

with the Luftwaffe being unable to vanquish the RAF, Operation Sea Lion was continually

postponed and finally abandoned with the invasion of the USSR in 1941.

Taylor wrote his book in 1967, 22 years after the war. He wrote around the same time as

Edward Bishop, to be discussed below. However, having more of a focus on the German side of

the battle Taylor uses a large amount of primary German sources. Taylor is writing in a time

when various records on German Army headquarters were opened and became available to

historians. For sources, unlike Bishop, Taylor uses both a large number of primary and secondary

sources. Writing in 1967, Taylor gives a more scholarly account of the battle than earlier writers.

This is the time when scholars of the battle started transitioning from a patriotic recollection

style to a more professional model.

40



Telford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 286.

15

Edward Bishop wrote a book on the Battle of Britain called Their Finest Hour for

Ballantine Books. It was first published in Britain in 1968. It was for a series of about 154 books

that covered all aspects of World War II. Bishop’s book was meant for the general public and

gives a standard early post-war historical account of the battle. These books were cheap with

most of them selling for only a few dollars and as a result became wide-spread and very

popular.43 In his book he gives an overview of the battle, with an emphasis on the areas of the

battle in which Britain and Germany performed well and poorly.

The short introduction of the book was not written by Bishop, but by Barrie Pitt, the

Editor in Chief of the series. It gives an introduction to Bishop’s account of the Battle of Britain

and highlighted the importance of the battle. Pitt trumpets the heroic resistance of Britain

against Germany. In doing so he points out that both the US and USSR were unwilling to stand

up to Germany at this time. He introduced Bishop’s account by saying that as “Edward Bishop so

graphically describes, the Battle of Britain appeared to us here as an affair of high gallantry of

laughing youth going gaily to battle, and white vapour trails high in a clear blue sky.”44 He also,

commends Bishop’s book for showing that “Wars have always been decided more by the quality

of weapons and equipment than popular feeling has allowed, and the more industrialised the

world has become, the greater the factor played by technical skill in comparison with the ancient

virtues of bravery and strength.”45

Bishop gives a fairly standard account of the battle. He pays special attention to the uses

of technology. He starts his account of the battle with the fall of France and Germany’s swift

conquest of Europe. Bishop looks at Germany’s decision to invade Britain. He argues that Hitler

43

“Stone & Stone: Second World War Books,” http://stonebooks.com/archives/970911.shtml (January 28, 2011). 44

Edward Bishop, Their finest hour : the story of the Battle of Britain, 1940, (New York : Ballantine Books, 1968), p 6-7. 45

Edward Bishop, Their finest hour, p 7.

http://stonebooks.com/archives/970911.shtml

16

knew that Britain would not give up easily and that Hitler “...privately doubt*ed+ the successful

outcome of his public peace overtures in June 1940.”46 Bishop then argues that Hitler “retained

his misgivings about the wisdom of attacking Britain but temporarily permitted the recent

performance record of Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe to overlay it.”47 And with that Bishop says

that Germany started preparation for the battle.

Looking at the British side and their decision to remain in the war after the fall of France,

Bishop recognizes Winston Churchill as playing a large role in this decision. He thought that for

Churchill, “surrender was never a word to be found in his vocabulary - although in his wisdom he

respected the pessimistic opinion of outside observers and the reasons for it.”48 He continued on

quoting other famous speeches of Churchill to support this point.

Next Bishop looked at development of the RAF before the start of the war. He points out

that “In 1936, when the Luftwaffe was preparing its new Do 17, He 111, Ju 87 and Me 109

modern monoplane aircraft, tested a year later in the Spanish Civil War, London was guarded by

biplanes.” He continues on arguing that if not

for the personal ingenuity, private philanthropy, public spiritedness and sheer merchant adventure of a number of individuals and aircraft companies, the Royal Air Force would not have been equipped with any machines as fairly competitive with their Luftwaffe counter-parts as the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters.49

Bishop describes the creation of the modern RAF and its fighters in the following terms, “the

evolution of the Spitfire and the Hurricane derived as much from a string of romantic incidents

and plucky gestures as from defence planning. It was an odd story.”50 He thinks the story of the

modern RAF starts with the “biennial international race for seaplanes” in 1931. Britain won the

46

Edward Bishop, Their finest hour, p 12. 47





17

race for a third time due to the support of Lady Houston, a wealthy English philanthropist, and

then ordered “two separate prototype fighters to specifications relating to the Schneider

experience.51 It was a race against time. The plane that won the 1931 Schneider Trophy had

come from the drawing board of RJ Mitchell.”52 Mitchell, who was a dying man, then quickly

designed two planes; one that met the government’s requirement and another that met his and

the Supermarine Company's vision. Bishop thinks that with the creation of these two fighters,

Britain was now ready and able to match whatever plane the German Luftwaffe could throw at

Britain.

These new fighter planes alone were not enough to win the battle. Bishop also highlights

the crucial importance that radar played. Bishop points out that though radar was very

important for its ability to find approaching enemy planes, it was first developed as “a far-

fetched suggestion that raiding bombers might be disintegrated by a science fiction type of

death ray.”53 Radar never became the feared death ray some were hoping for, but fortunately it

was turned into a very important part of Britain’s defence. In this area he singles out Hugh

Dowding as playing a huge role in the development of the RAF’s defences. Though Dowding was

very important for the RAF’s defence, he had uneasy relations with the Air Ministry and could

have been retired at any time or “as British service people say, a bowler hat was permanently

suspended over his head.”54 Bishop observed that during the pre-war period Dowding had to

work hard to create every bit of the RAF’s defence. “There was scarcely a detail in his new

defence system over which Dowding was not obliged to struggle, including a request for

concrete runways to make grass airfields serviceable in all weathers.”55 The British government

51

Schneider Trophy, was a coveted prize for a biennial international race of seaplanes. 52



Edward Bishop, Their finest hour, P 30. 55


18

in the 1930’s simply did not want to spend much money on defence. Dowding’s most important

contribution to the RAF’s defence was in modernising it. Bishop praised him for being,

“technologically ahead of his time *able+, 'to apply science thoughtfully to operational

requirements.”56 Bishop also briefly recognizes Lord Beaverbrook’s contribution to increasing

aircraft production.

Aside from looking at what the British did right to win the Battle of Britain, Bishop also

looks at what the Germans did wrong to lose the Battle of Britain. He identified poor German

planning as being a key point. He brings up instances of disastrous miscommunication on the

German side. “Shortly after the launch, Eagle Day57 was hastily cancelled, but the change of

orders failed to reach all units briefed to attack.”58 Bishop mentions Goering’s insistence on

limiting the potential of fighters by adopting different tactics, “Alarmed by bomber losses, and

the falling morale among bomber crews, Goering insisted that Me 109 pilots must stick close to

their charges, a particularly awkward and restricting assignment...”59 Bishop also points out that

the Luftwaffe was overconfident, saying “At the end of the day when the RAF was wondering

how long it could hold out if the Luftwaffe were to concentrate its full resources against the

radar stations and fighter airfields, Luftwaffe staff and aircrew were congratulating themselves

on a battle already almost won. They simply erased the attacked targets from their maps and

claimed some sixty fighters destroyed.”60 In actuality the Luftwaffe destroyed far fewer aircraft

than reported by their crews, and Bishop points this out as being a recurring theme in the

Luftwaffe’s operational history. They also constantly underestimated the RAF’s numbers,

believing that the RAF was down to its last plane. Goering boasted “that he would drive the RAF

56

Edward Bishop, Their finest hour, page 34. 57

Eagle Day was Germany’s plan to knock out Britain’s Air force in a few large air battles. 58



Edward Bishop, Their finest hour, page 55.

19

out of the skies of south-east England within a matter of days.”61 He also points out the

Luftwaffe’s constant change of targets, from the radar stations, to the fighter airfields and then

to the cities as being particularly disastrous. “Abandoning each new tactic at the moment when

it was on the point of succeeding, the Luftwaffe had gained little, lost twenty-five per cent of its

operational strength and devalued its reputation.”62

Bishop wrote his book in 1968, 23 years after the war. Being a book short book (160

pages) and meant for general audience, it does not have an extensive bibliography being only

one page in length. For sources Bishop relies mainly on secondary sources, these secondary

sources being books that other earlier historians wrote. Though he is writing at the same time as

Telford Taylor, his account of the battle is still very much like the old patriotic recollection style.

Robert Wright published the book Dowding and the Battle of Britain in 1969. Wright was

Dowding’s personal assistant during the battle and an “old and trusted friend”63 of Dowding.

Dowding chose him as the author who would express his views. Later historians have been a bit

critical of his work; John Ray thought,

The book, however, was often less than accurate, and was critical only of those Wright considered to be Dowding's enemies. Its pages certainly reflected the C-in-C's subdued anger at the treatment he had received over his final four years in the RAF. Unfortunately others still believe the charges, and have used them in their own writings, so that they are widely held to be accurate.64

Wright wrote the book in collaboration with Dowding and it focuses on Dowding’s career in the

RAF.

61



Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain, (London : Military Book Society, 1969), page 10. 64

John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain : new perspectives : behind the scenes of the great air war, (New York, NY : Distributed in the USA by Sterling Pub. Co., c1994), page 8-9.

20

Wright tries to present Dowding’s views, which Dowding kept quiet, and which he chose

to express after some many years. Not surprisingly Wright is very biased toward Dowdings views,

always trying to portray him as a great leader. The book, as Wright puts it,

is not a history of the Battle of Britain. That factual story has been dealt with already, in detail, by many historians. This is the story of what happened to one of the men who took part in that battle, and it is intended that it should be placed alongside the many other personal accounts that have been written by or about other participants in it.65

Wright starts by giving a biography of some of Dowdings early life, education and military career.

Wright then looks at Dowding’s work before the war. He points out that Dowding saw

the potential of radar and pushed its implementation. He shows the part Dowding played in

creating a system of air defence. Also, he points out Dowdings early struggles in trying to bring

about this system. Wright follows Dowding’s role during the war. It looks at the early part of the

war, when the RAF was fighting in France. He points outs Dowding’s dislike of politicians and the

troubles they bring. He recalls some of his early struggles, like how Dowding had to appear

before the Cabinet and tried pleading with them to stop sending more planes to France (some in

the British government wanted to sent more fighters to aid in the losing battle to defend France,

but Dowding argued this would weaken the fighter defence of Britain). Also, he comments on

the struggles and problems he had in keeping his forces up to strength during this time.

Wright comments on his style of command, commending Dowding on his foresight. He

comments on his style of giving his Group Commanders a free hand, quoting Dowding as saying,

“I suppose, it could be said that I gave them too much rope.”66 He comments on Dowding’s

character saying he liked to keep to himself on some matters and defends him against the claim

that he thought he was always right.

65

Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain, p 17. 66

Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain, p 147.

21

Wright defends Dowding against some of the criticisms which was raised against him,

such as Dowding allowing too much flexibility to Group Commanders67 and the Big Wing

Controversy.68 He explains the conflict between No 12 and No 11 Groups,69 and more precisely

between Leigh-Mallory and Park. Wright claims that “Dowding felt that he had to keep the

whole matter to himself until he could reach a firm decision about it.”70 He explains that

Dowding thought that the “whole business of intense discussion about whether we should use

three, four or five squadron wings was so simple and inconsequential that it really hardly

deserved a long statement being made.”71 However, he came to realise later that others did not

share this view. Wright highlights the meeting of 17 October 1940 as being the turning point for

the decision to get rid of Dowding and Park. Dowding suspected fiendish political interventions

played a large part in his dismissal. Wright explains that Dowding was not hurt by the fact that

he was dismissed, but hurt by the manner in which he was dismissed after having just won the

battle. The way he was dismissed was very hurtful to Dowding “because of the firm assurances

of only four months before that he would be given plenty of notice when it came time for him to

go.”72 Wright finally comments on how after the war Dowding was not given the honour he

deserved and how Dowding himself allowed for this to happen unopposed. Wright finished his

book by paying tribute to Dowdings achievements.

Wright published the book in 1969 only 24 years after the battle. Wright’s biggest and

most important sources in writing this book were Dowding and his writings. The book is almost

67

Dowding gave a lot of flexibility to his group Commanders to choose tactics. He was criticized for giving too much independent flexibility to group Commanders in this regard. 68

A disagreement in the RAF over whether to us large formation of fighter or small formations. 69

Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park who was the head of No 11 group was in conflict with Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory who was the head of No 12 group. The conflict was mainly over Park not asking No 12 group for help, but also included other elements such as a disagreement over the employment of Big Wing formations. 70




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Vice-Marshal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Park

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trafford_Leigh-Mallory

22

biographical in style and the book itself is meant to clear up the controversy surrounding

Dowding. In addition to Dowding and his own work, Wright used some secondary sources. As

already mentioned, this book was meant to defend Dowding and give his perspective on the

battle. The book, being a biography of one the most senior leaders in the RAF in the Battle of

Britain, is an important source for those writing on the battle and has been used by many other

writers.

John Terraine published the book A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the

European War, 1939-1945 in 1985. In his book Terraine examines the contribution of the RAF to

the war effort in Europe throughout World War II. Terraine tries to argue “that in the war in

Europe between 1939 and 1945 the RAF was, in effect, "the vanguard", holding for much of the

time the place of honour on the right of the line...”73 Terraine’s book is divided into 4 parts, each

part looking at what the RAF did in different periods of the war.

In part one Terraine looks at the RAF’s preparations for war in the prewar era. He notes

the important role that Trenchard played in shaping the RAF. He comments on how the RAF was

different from the other services in character, being much newer. Also, he follows the trend of

disarmament in prewar Britain. Terraine then traces Britain’s path to rearmament and notes the

number of people who were important in making the RAF what it was. He also notes the

importance that was placed on the bomber and keeping the RAF “independently of land or sea

requirements.”74

In part two of his book, Terraine looks at the role that the RAF played in the early phases

of the war. He starts by pointing out the preparations and early lessons that the RAF underwent

73

John Terraine, A time for courage : the Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, (New York, N.Y : Macmillan, c1985), p xi. 74

John Terraine, A time for courage : the Royal Air Force in the European War, p 92.

23

during the time of the “phoney war”. Terraine follows with and the role that the RAF played in

Norway. He then looked at how strong the Allies were compared to Germany, but shows that

this picture was misleading. Terraine described the disasters of the Battle of France and the role

that the RAF played during this time. He notes Dowding’s protest against planes being sent

across the Channel. He also talks about the role the RAF played in the evacuation of Dunkirk. He

finishes by describing the fall of France and compares the British and French Air Forces to that of

Germany.

In part three, Terraine looks at the role the RAF played after the fall of France. He

focuses largely on the Battle of Britain, explaining the events of the battle and giving information

on it. Also, he gives much attention to Dowding and the role that he played. He also notes other

important people like Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park and Lord Beaverbrook and the roles they

played. Terraine follows the start and development of the Big Wing controversy. He notes the

importance of the change in German strategy to attacking cities and Germany’s eventual

abandonment of the possibility of invasion. He follows the “downfall” of Dowding over night

defence and the meeting of October 17.75 He also notes the poor treatment of Dowding during

his dismissal. In this section Terrain also looks at the role of Coastal Command, following all the

demands placed on Coastal Command and its fight against the U-boats.

In part four of the book Terraine covers at the RAF on the offensive. He looks at the

many areas and campaigns in which the RAF was involved. He follows the RAF in the Middle East,

Italy, Africa, the Atlantic, France, Germany and other European countries. For each area Terraine

briefly gives an overview of the conflict and the role that the RAF played. He also follows major

changes and developments, such as the arrival of America and the USAAF. He concludes that the

75

A meeting that took place on October 17 where Dowding and Park were unsuspectingly ganged up on by their opponents and criticised for not adopting Big Wing tactics.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Vice-Marshal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Park

24

RAF played a much larger role in World War Two than they are given credit for. Terraine finishes

by commending the RAF for having played such an important role throughout the war and

arguing that “none deserving more honour, than the right of the line.”76

John Terraine published his book in 1985, 40 years after the war. He uses a large number

of both secondary and primary sources. Most of his sources are secondary, but he still uses some

primary sources. It is not surprising that he uses so many secondary sources as he is trying to

give a broad overview of the role the RAF played throughout the war and secondary sources are

more suited for such a goal. Almost all his sources are English, which again is not surprising as

Terraine’s focus is mainly the RAF. Being a later historian his book is much more professional

then the earlier patriotic writers who mainly wrote before the 1970’s.

Harvey D. Tress published the book, British Strategic Bombing Policy Through 1940, in

1989. The goal of the book was to trace “British governmental thought, policy, and action

regarding strategic bombing from World War I to the end of 1940...”77 In doing so he looks at the

development of “strategic bombing” between 1918 and 1940. His book gives valuable insight

into pre-war polices that helped shaped the RAF.

Tress starts his study, by first establishing that “strategic bombing” during World War

Two was not very effective. After establishing the ineffectiveness of “strategic bombing,” he

explores why it was that the policy makers chose to pursue such an ineffective policy in the first

place? Tress points out that the air-force commonly argued that strategic bombing would break

German morale. He then goes on to argue that policy makers during the bombing campaigns

76

John Terraine, A time for courage : the Royal Air Force in the European War, p 686. 77

Harvey B. Tress, British strategic bombing policy through 1940 : politics, attitudes, and the formation of a lasting pattern, (Ont. : E. Mellen Press, c1989), p i.

25

“knew that the appearances existed there without the realities.” 78 He concluded that “morale

theories did not motivate the swing toward area bombing, [and that] hidden factors must have

contributed.”79 Tress singles out Trenchard as having played a large role in the early influence

and establishment of the morale theory. Early on he collected people around him in the air-force

who agreed with his views, and these people would later, in the 1930’s, be in places of influence

in the RAF. The morale bombing theory was largely adopted as a way of preserving the

independence of the RAF. In the 1920’s, there was a fear and resentment that the only

independent air force in the world would be “eaten alive”80 by the older services. Tress

concluded that, “The top air marshals of 1940, most of whom Trenchard had selected and

indoctrinated in the 1920s, naturally had an ego stake in the value of their life's work, feelings of

institutional loyalty, and a career stake in their service’s independence.”81 Tress continues and

points out during the war how Air Marshals resisted “all uses of air power other than strategic

bombing—without visible military justification or explanatory near-term hopes.”82 He also points

out how strategic bombing was used politically to show other countries, like the US, the

Dominions, Spain, USSR and Japan, that Britain was not lost and still resisting Germany. In this

way strategic bombing became an important propaganda tool. Tress study shows that strategic

bombing was fairly ineffective and that many policy makers were aware of this, but continued to

pursue it nevertheless for other reasons.

Tress wrote his book in 1989, 44 years after the war. For sources, Tress used a mix of

primary and secondary sources. For primary sources he uses public records, government

publications, newspapers, periodicals and others. Writing 44 years after the war, Tress had

78

Harvey B. Tress, British strategic bombing policy through 1940, p 24. 79




Harvey B. Tress, British strategic bombing policy through 1940, p 100.

26

access to declassified Allied war documents that many of the early post-war historians like

Wilmot, did not. Also, being a later writer he had access to a large amount of secondary sources

such as books, biographies, articles and essays. Having access to these materials gave Tress a

greater perspective on the larger historical debates. Tress is part of the newer “school” of

historians that have a more professional approach and methodology.

John Ray published the book The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives in 1994. Ray wrote

the book as an extension of his doctoral thesis which he started at the University of Kent. As the

subtitle, New Perspectives, suggests Ray tries to give a new perspective on the Battle of Britain.

He does not try to give a new perspective of the entire battle, but focuses on giving a new

perspective on Dowding’s treatment and position in the RAF.

In the introduction, Ray explains that Dowding did not get the honour and recognition

that he deserved for playing such a large role in the Battle of Britain until much later. He

introduces other authors views on the subject and questions whether Dowding’s removal from

the position of Air Chief Marshal and lack of recognition was because of the scheming by Sholto

Douglas (Air Vice-Marshal), Trafford Leigh-Mallory (commander of No 12 group) and politicians.

Ray starts his first chapter by looking at Dowding’s position in the RAF before the war in the

1930’s. He looks at why Dowding was chosen as Commander-in-Chief and concludes that

Dowding was chosen for three reasons. First he was the only person with an adequate

knowledge of fighter defence before 1930. The second reason was “a series of emergencies and

accidents had occurred which made change either undesirable or impracticable.” Finally, he had

political backing from Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill.

Ray continues on and looks at the Luftwaffe. He highlights, like many other historians

before him, the weakness of the Luftwaffe. He points out the unpreparedness of the Luftwaffe

27

to attack Britain, flaws in its command and other problems the Luftwaffe suffered. Ray thought

that, “In many respects they had lost the Battle of Britain even before it began, and any

assessment of the strategy, tactics and leadership of Fighter Command is incomplete unless this

point is taken into account.”83 He also looked at the events of the battle from the RAF’s

perspective, pointing out strengths and weakness of the RAF and Luftwaffe. He also looked at

the political workings of the RAF and who backed Dowding.

Ray then looked at the start and progression of the Big Wing Controversy from August

19th to September 7th and from September 7th to October 16th. He shows how the differing

opinions of the best defensive tactics between Park and Leigh-Mallory started and grew. He

points out how the ambiguity of authority between different group areas, especially No. 12

Group and No. 11 Group’s area was a problem that grew and could have been fixed by Dowding

early on. Ray continues on and traces the discussion between those who supported the Big Wing

Formation and those who did not. He looks at the reasoning and motivations of both sides. He

also looked at the personal character of Park and Leigh-Mallory, pointing out that Leigh-Mallory

was not as pompous and as bad a commander as other authors have portrayed him. Finally he

shows how the Big Wing Controversy (disagreement over whether to us large formation of

fighter or small formations) started to reflect badly on Dowding, showing his lack of leadership.

However, Ray is careful to point out that it was not just the Big Wing Controversy which led to

Dowding’s dismissal. He points out that Dowdings poor handling of night air defence also played

a large role in discrediting his leadership abilities. His unwillingness to be cooperative was

another reason.

Ray showed how all these criticisms of Dowding came together and led to his removal,

which was poorly handled. He showed that the meeting of 17 October 1940, where Dowding and 83

John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain, p 47.

28

Park were ganged up on by their opponents was important. However, he argues that it was not

an evil plot. “Douglas and Leigh-Mallory succeeded Dowding and Park was not the end result of

their scheming, and events of the time lack the elements of evil imputed by some writers.”84 He

also argues that one of the main reasons Dowding was replaced was because politicians wanted

the RAF to become more offensive, a stance to which Dowding was not suited. Ray concludes

that “Dowding's treatment, therefore, was not the 'base intrigue' of a vendetta, or a plot

engineered by conspirators. It was rather the result of a plan designed by politicians and Service

leaders for the RAF, and inevitable as a different role was sought for Fighter Command in the

war.”85 Ray ends his book by putting the Battle of Britain and the role Dowding and others

played into perspective.

Ray published his book in 1994, 49 years after the war. In his book he focuses mainly on

the controversy of Dowding’s dismissal and treatment. Being fairly modern, Ray had the

advantage of having access to many sources and the views of other authors. Having a large base

of secondary sources that take sides in this controversy gave Ray the ability to clearly criticise

both sides of the controversy. He uses a large number of both primary and secondary sources.

Though the book is fairly modern, John Ray had the chance to interview many former RAF

members with firsthand experience, which he thanked in his acknowledgements. His work is also

therefore, part of the more “modern school” of professional historians.

Richard Overy published the book The Battle of Britain in 2001. In his book Overy wanted

to show “where 'The Battle' now stands in history.”86 In doing so he tries to uncover some of the

common myths held about the Battle of Britain.

84

John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain, page 169. 85

John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain, page 169. 86

Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain : the myth and the reality, (New York : W.W. Norton, 2001), Page xiii.

29

In chapter one of his book, Overy examines some of the myths of the battle. The first

myth that he looks at is that Britain stood firmly united and determined against Germany. Overy

points out various groups and people in Britain that were not fully committed to united

resistance. “They included Basil Liddell Hart, the military strategist; 'RAB' Butler at the Foreign

Office; the pacifist socialist Charles Roden Buxton; and an unlikely coupling of British fascists and

communists, temporarily bound together by the German-Soviet Pact of August 1939.”87 He

argues that there were a number of groups not committed to resistance. For example, “'Many

workers say about Hitler,' ran a report in mid-June, ' "He won't hurt us: it's the bosses he's after:

we'll probably be better off when he comes.””88 He concludes that Britain was more divided than

is popularly portrayed. Another myth that he looks at is that the battle prevented the invasion of

Britain. He argues that Hitler was not keen on invading Britain. Instead he argues that “Hitler

hoped for a political settlement first and foremost.”89 Overy argues that one reason that Hitler

did not want to invade Britain was because he had a kind of admiration for the British people. He

also argues that Hitler also did not want to invade Britain because of the lack of feasibility of a

German invasion.

Next in his book, Overy compares the organisation of the RAF and the Luftwaffe. For the

RAF, Overy identifies “key to *their+ success was aircraft production.”90 He addresses the

common myth that Spitfires were the main planes that won the battle. He explains that “The

great bulk of Fighter Command was composed of Hurricanes.”91 Another myth he looks at is that

there was a great deficiency of trained pilots available saying, “Yet this deficiency can be wildly

87

Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, P 11. 88



Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, p 33. 91

Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, p 35.

30

exaggerated.”92 He reviews some of the numbers of available pilots and points out that “If

Fighter Command were the 'few', German fighter pilots were fewer.”93 For the German Air

Force, Overy points out that one of their weaknesses was the short range of the Messerschmitt

Me 109. He also pointed out that “they had no way of tracking where the enemy was, and there

was no way of controlling the whole fighter force from the ground once it was airborne.”94 He

also addresses some of the other deficiencies of the Luftwaffe.

Overy points out the problem of setting a date for when the battle of Britain started as

there is no clear day that signalled the start. He also identifies what factors tipped the close

battle in Britain’s favour. Most of these factors agree with accounts given by earlier authors. One

of those factors was Germany over-estimating their success, and thinking that they had almost

destroyed the RAF. Another thing that tipped the battle which Overy identifies was Hitler’s

decision to change tactics. Overy points out that normally this change in tactics is explained as

follows. “Hitler was said to be so incensed by violation of the German capital that he suspended

the attack on the RAF in order to unleash annihilating retaliatory blows against London.”95 Overy

however, argues that this portrayal is inaccurate, and says that the change in tactics was because

“German Air Force commanders assumed from the intelligence they were fed that Fighter

Command was a spent force. Their instructions were now to bring the rest of the country

progressively under attack, starting with industrial, military and transport targets in and around

major urban centres in preparation for the invasion.”96 He also points out that bombing at this

time could be very inaccurate, which explains the perception of a terror campaign. He argues

92





Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, p 79.

31

that Germany did not formally adopt a terror campaign, but did undertake “gradual

abandonment of any pretence that civilians and civilian morale would not become targets.”97

In the last chapter of his book Overy argues that the Battle of Britain was fought with

two different mind sets. The Germans constantly underestimated the British, and the British

constantly overestimated the Germans. This underestimation and “German misperception

encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgement. The shift of targets from air bases

to industry and communications was taken because it was assumed that Fighter Command was

virtually eliminated.”98 He argues that

The British fought the air battle as if it were a last-ditch struggle against an overwhelming enemy; the German side fought against a force persistently misrepresented as technically and tactically inept, short of aircraft, pilots and bases. This psychological contrast put the German Air Force at a perpetual disadvantage.99

Overy thinks that these 2 differing mind sets played a critical role in influencing how both side

conducted the battle. Overy concludes by saying that the Battle of Britain was an important

battle, arguing that it saved Britain from conquest and kept Britain in the war.

Overy wrote his book in 2001, 56 years after the war. Like Tress, Overy had access to

declassified Allied war documents and is aware of the historical debates surrounding the battle.

Unlike Tress however, for sources Overy uses mostly primary sources and a few articles. Also,

unlike Tress he uses some German sources. Overy is being a more modern writer is part of the

more “modern school” that examined the battle in a more professional way.

97


Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, page 114. 99

Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain, page 116.

32

Conclusion

This historiography has looked at a number of historians who published histories of the

Battle of Britain. These authors have provided some of the many varying accounts of the battle.

In these accounts one notices that there is much overlap of material covered. However, these

authors do end up giving new views and perspectives on the battle.

The authors looked at in this historiography can be divided into two groups, earlier

authors, before the 1970s, and later authors, who came after the 1970s. Looking at the

presentation style of the earlier and later authors one can see some differences. The earlier

authors present their accounts in a more narrative fashion, giving in some cases a day by day

account of the battle. The later authors focus more on what happened during a phase of the

battle and the motivations behind some of the important events.

Looking at the different kind of sources used by the authors one can see there is a

difference between earlier and later authors. For sources, most of the earlier authors who came

before the 70s used firsthand accounts of the battle, unofficial records and some official records.

Later authors who came after the 70s mainly used lots of secondary sources, lots of official

government documents that were released later and some firsthand accounts of those still alive.

They used more reliable primary sources and focus on dispelling myths of the battle.

The sources available to the authors and the times they wrote also shaped how they

presented their accounts. The earlier authors, having few secondary sources and being some of

the first to write on the battle, try to establish what happened during the battle. While later

authors having access to secondary accounts of the earlier authors and official records, try to re-

examine the battle and resolve some of the controversies and myths brought up by the earlier

authors.

33

In the interest of self-reflection, it is important to note that this historiography itself is

not perfect. Reflecting on it, one can see some biases and limitations of it. Looking at the authors

chosen, it is clear to see that most of the authors are from a British background. It is also not a

complete account of everyone who has ever written on the battle. Though not perfect, this

historiography does give a general overview of the authors and the main kinds of authors who

have written on the Battle of Britain.

To locate this thesis in the above historiography, I would place it with the later group of

historians. I wrote this thesis in 2011, 66 years after the war. Like many of the later historians I

had access to declassified Allied war documents and to a large number of secondary sources.

Also, like the more “modern school” I tried to write this thesis in a more professional way and try

to give a new perspective on the battle.

34

Chapter 2: The Wrong Battle

Planning for the future can be a very tricky thing, especially in a military conflict. It is all

too often that one finds the future they had planned for is not the future that must be faced. An

old military proverb, attributed to Publilius Syrus, states that “It is a bad plan that cannot be

changed.” Fortunately, for the British, their plans could be changed, for the air battle they fought

in 1940 bore little resemblance to the battle they had planned for in 1938 and earlier. The

standard story of the Battle of Britain focuses on Britain’s heroic defiance and how well Air Chief

Marshal Hugh Dowding had been prepared. Though Britain was prepared, it was prepared for

the wrong offensive war. RAF planners in 1938 and earlier planned for the wrong type of air war

that was going to be fought in 1940 over France. However, this would turn out to their

advantage later in 1940 when they finally fought the defensive battle for which they had been

preparing. Though Britain did not face the offensive battle they were planning for in 1939 and

early 1940, the fear and preparations that came with the defensive battle they expected gave

them a distinct advantage over the Luftwaffe in the summer and fall of 1940.

Looking at plans made before the war reveals very quickly beliefs that were held by

those making the plans. For, it is a belief which creates the framework for making a plan. From a

plan, particular courses of actions are adopted and advanced. However, beliefs being what they

are, can turn out to be true or false. When the beliefs are true, which they rarely are, the plan is

successful. However, when the beliefs are false, success is no longer guaranteed and a new plan

may be needed. Also, when the beliefs upon which a plan is based turn out to be false, the

courses of actions that were adopted in the original plan need to be modified as well to fit a new

plan. This is why it is important to make sure plans are grounded on firm assumptions and that

they can be changed if needed.



35

British plans, and the beliefs within which they were framed, can clearly be seen in AIR

14/381 written April 1938, and which remained secret under the Fifty-Year Rule until 1989. It

clearly shows the perceived fears, abilities and limitations which British planners held and upon

which their plans were based. One belief which sticks out plainly in the document is the

confidence that bombers had the ability to deliver a swift “knockout blow.” The very first line of

the summary for the document starts by stating this as follows:

In the event of war between Great Britain and Germany it is highly probable that the enemy will attempt: to achieve a quick decision by a ‘knock-out’ blow against this country. We have reason to believe that Germany will be ruthless and indiscriminate in her endeavour to paralyse and destroy our national effort and morale, and unless immediate steps are taken to reduce the intensity of attacks it is conceivable that the enemy may achieve her object.100

This argument aligned nicely with the offensive bomber philosophy that Hugh Trenchard

preached. Trenchard was the first Marshal of the Royal Air Force and he is often called the

Father of the Royal Air Force.101 Trenchard believed strongly in the ability of an independent

bomber force to achieve decisive military results. It was this very belief, in the interwar period,

which helped keep the young RAF from being “eaten alive”102 by the established services.

Trenchard saw that a powerful air force could be moulded into a deterrent against future wars. It was he who provided the entire basis on which the Air Force was to develop and on which it was eventually to be tested in the Battle of Britain. His plan covered every aspect of development—the provision of aircraft, air and ground crew training, staff training and the organization for control.103

100

AIR 14/381, “Appreciation of the Employment of the British Air Striking Force against the German Air Striking Force and it’s Ancillary Industries and Reserves in the Event of a Major War Between Great Britain and Germany in 1939,” April 1938, p A1. 101

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin, p 65. 102

Harvey B. Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy Through 1940, p 56. 103

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin, p 66.

36

Trenchard handpicked and indoctrinated many of the top air marshals with this doctrine of an

offensive independent bomber force, as other authors such as Harvey B. Tress have

suggested.104

This belief in a “knock-out” blow was prevalent outside military circles, as well. In 1932,

British politician Stanley Baldwin, senior member of the National Government and leader of the

Conservative Party, warned about a dreaded future war in which unstoppable bombers would

bring about the end of civilization. In a famous speech to the British House of Commons entitled

“A Fear For the Future”, Baldwin articulated the belief that modern bombers had devastating

power:

... I think it is well also for the man in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed, whatever people may tell him. The bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that if you realize the area of space... The only defence is in offence, which means that you have got to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.105

Though Baldwin gave this speech as a protest against war and rearmament, British planners in

1938 found themselves already past the point of no return, where avoiding war was no longer an

option. How to fight this future war, which Baldwin had dreaded, was now their main concern.

The planners who wrote AIR 14/381 feared a “knock-out” blow probably much like the

kind of “knock-out” blow that Trenchard and Baldwin had imagined in the early 1930s. They had

imagined large formations of bombers dropping bombs on major cities, destroying a nation’s

ability to make war and lowering the morale of a nation’s population the point where they

surrendered. Other authors, such as Harvey Tress have suggested that this theory of morale

104

Harvey B. Tress, British Strategic Bombing Policy Through 1940, p 48. 105 “The bomber will always get through,” Airminded: Airpower and British society, 1908-1941(mostly), 10

November 2007, http://airminded.org/2007/11/10/the-bomber-will-always-get-through/

http://airminded.org/2007/11/10/the-bomber-will-always-get-through/

37

bombing had become less prominent by the late 1930s. In British strategic bombing policy

through 1940, Tress argues that by the late 1930s “the air marshals had cooled on the morale

dimension of the Trenchard doctrine.”106 However, the writers of AIR 14/381 still clearly had this

in mind and clearly state it. “Germany will be ruthless and indiscriminate in her endeavour to

paralyse and destroy our national effort and morale, and unless immediate steps are taken to

reduce the intensity of attacks it is conceivable that the enemy may achieve her object.”107

It now fell upon the writers of AIR 14/381 to develop a strategy to counter this

devastating threat. As noted above, it was thought that the best defence was in offence. In AIR

14/381 it was pointed out that “The Chiefs of Staff in their report on planning for war with

Germany (C.O.S. 549) have come to the conclusion that attacks on the enemy's air striking force

and its maintenance organisation may turn out to be the most effective air counter-offensive at

the outset of such a war...” With this in mind it was up to British planners to devise an effective

plan for a counter-offensive. It was the goal of those who wrote AIR 14/381 to outline the

objectives of such a plan. It was their task to decide objectives for a counter-offensive which

would, “reduce the intensity of German air attacks against this country in the shortest possible

time and to the greatest possible extent by air action against the enemy's air striking force and

its maintenance organisation.”108

The planners who wrote AIR 14/381 believed counter-attack to be the best course of

action and therefore considered three possible targets. In deciding what targets were available,

they knew that “The Intelligence Branch at the Air Ministry have already made a very full and

comprehensive survey (appendix 5 to W. 1.) of the various courses of action open to us...”109

106


AIR 14/381, p A1. 108

AIR 14/381, p A1. 109

AIR 14/381, p A1-2.

38

From this they drew three possible targets to consider namely: operational units (including

personnel), air frame and aero engine factories, and aircraft reserves. It was believed that

crippling one of these three targets would have the effect of reducing the intensity of German air

attacks. In deciding which of the three targets was best, several factors were taken into account.

The factors which the study’s authors chose to take into account all reinforced their belief that a

quick counter offensive to negate a German “knock-out” blow was the best plan.

One primary factor that was taken into consideration was time. Great importance was

placed on this factor by those who wrote AIR 14/381.

Our aim is ‘to reduce the intensity of air attacks against this country in the shortest possible time ........’ Time, therefore, is of the utmost importance, so that in selecting our course of action we must at all times be guided by this over-riding consideration; the course finally adopted must be the one which is most likely to be productive of immediate results.110

This high emphasis that was placed on time by the writers owes much to the fear of a “knock-

out” blow. In order to negate a “knock-out” blow, which the name suggest is a quick debilitating

attack, it would have been necessary to take counter measures which also would have a quick

effect.

Another factor which was taken into consideration was the neutrality of Belgium and the

Netherlands. Both Belgium and the Netherlands had declared neutrality unless attacked in any

future great European conflict. Because it was tactically advantageous from an aerial perspective

for Germany to maintain this neutrality, the assumption by British planners was that both

Belgium and the Netherlands would remain neutral in the war. The effect of a neutral Holland

and Belgium was that of creating an, “’air barrier’ between England and Germany.” This “air

barrier” had mainly negative repercussions for Britain. It had the effect of limiting British attacks

110

AIR 14/381, p 2.

39

to two narrow “bottle-necks.” The first lay between Luxemburg and Switzerland on Germany’s

Eastern front, and another longer route north above the Netherlands, both of which would be

heavily defended by the Germans. The effect this had on Germany was that it too would also

have to use the same routes. Attacking via the northern route was not much of a problem for

Germany because attacking from the direction of the North Sea allowed the Luftwaffe to strike

all over Eastern England, and gave Germany greater opportunities to have the element of

surprise.

Taking this into account, the planners thought that German air attacks were more likely

to have the element of surprise, while British attacks would not. Also, it was thought that a large

majority of the air attacks would come from the North Sea route because attacking from the

route between Luxemburg and Switzerland almost certainly sacrificed the element of surprise,

and would meet with heavy opposition from advance British bases and from Britain’s allies. This

point indirectly suggests that strategically a long war was in Germany’s favour, according to the

document. This in turn would lead one to the conclusion that a quick counter offensive was the

best plan.

The writers of AIR 14/381 also point out that British bombers attacking from bases in

South England, in order to attack Germany, would have to fly a distance of at least 1,000 miles.

This was a great distance for most British bombers to fly and meant that, “...the whole of our

light mediums – or approximately 51 % by bomb load of our potential force -will be practically

useless in any plan unless they can operate from advanced bases on the continent.”111 In

contrast it was believed that Germany, attacking from bases in northern Germany, would not be

affected much by “the detour round the North of Holland [which] will make very little difference

in range” and it was believed that the majority of German bombers had this range. It was 111

AIR 14/381, p 4.

40

assumed for these reasons that Belgium and Holland would remain neutral because from an

aerial perspective it was tactically advantageous for Germany to respect and keep them neutral.

Another factor which the writers of AIR 14/381 took into account was the ability of

Britain’s air striking force. They estimated that by January 1, 1939 that Britain would be able to,

carry out an average of 84 sorties per week or one Squadron sortie per day. During the next seven days this will be reduced to approximately 63 individual or 5 Squadron Sorties during this period. Thereafter we can only expect our bombers of being capable of carrying out an average of four Squadron sorties per week.112

These estimates show plainly that the RAF would be able to launch large attacks very early, but

the longer they attacked the less effective their strikes would become. Again, these findings

reinforce a plan where the first quick bomber offensive is critical and favours working to prevent

a “knock-out” blow, where time was of great importance.

Another factor considered was German defences. Britain, like Germany, had poor

intelligence on the abilities of their enemy. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster noted in their The

Narrow Margin that,

Before 1940 there was little to choose between British and German air intelligence. Extraordinary blunders were made on both sides. Britain relied on agents of the various military intelligence sections, on the Foreign Office, the service intelligence departments and attaches and on ordinary British people from many walks of life who kept their eyes and ears open.113

The writers of AIR 14/381 even admit that most of what is known about German air defences

was based on conjecture. But from what they could gather, they were led to believe that when it

came to aircraft defence Germany was, “very much advanced in this art.”114 It was also thought

that Germany would be able to concentrate 500 fighters in western Germany which would

match the number of attacking British bombers. From this it was concluded that,

112

AIR 14/381, p 8. 113

Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin, p 117. 114

AIR 14/381, p 8.

41

Our raiders, therefore, must be prepared to meet with the heaviest opposition, both from enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire from the ground; and this combined with the long distances over enemy territory which they will be compelled to fly, is certain to result in heavy casualties and in a proportionate reduction in our intensity of effort.115

Taking this into account also supported the plan for a quick counter offensive. For their

conclusions would suggest that a sustained air offensive was doomed to failure. It would also

favour picking a target that was not far behind enemy lines.

The writer of AIR 14/381 estimated that Germany had 1332 bombers and dive bombers

available in 1938.116 They thought that this number would increase to 1750 bombers by January,

1939, which would give Germany “numerical superiority of nearly, 1000 bomber aircraft, with a

corresponding superiority in bomb load.”117 Also, by January of 1939 they estimated that

Germany would have around 700 fighters most of them being, “either Messerschmidt 109 or 110

aircraft - aircraft of exceptionally high performance and high rate of climb.”118 As already

mentioned this would give Germany around 500 fighters to defend Germany’s Western front,

assuming that the other 200 fighters would be placed at other fronts. To overcome this, the

authors of AIR 14/381 suggested that large formations should be used to minimize casualties,

which again supported the quick bomber offensive plan. “...the more numerous the number of

raids at any one particular time the greater will be dispersal of the enemy fighters, and the

smaller the number of casualties inflicted by them on our bomber force.”119

After looking at the factors that needed to be taken into account, the writers of AIR

14/381 considered what would be the likely result of attacking each of the three selected targets

and then gave final conclusion. In considering the likely outcome of an attack on one of the three

115

AIR 14/381, p 8. 116

AIR 14/381, p 9. 117

AIR 14/381, p 10. 118

AIR 14/381, p 10. 119

AIR 14/381, p 11.

42

targets, the writers again show their institutional bias. They favoured the target that would

support a large, quick counter offensive.

The first target that came under consideration was operational units (including

personnel). The writers of AIR 14/381 believed that German bombers, at the outbreak of war,

would be moved from the peace-time bases to advanced landing grounds. But they note that

they had been unable find or determine where these advanced landing grounds would be

located. They conclude that German bombers could still attack from their peace-time bases and

given this information, “attacks against operational units can only be directed against them at

their permanent bases.” But they also stress that continuous reconnaissance would be needed

to find out where the German bomber force was located.

With regards to personnel, they thought that by January 1939, Germany’s, “first line

strength will be fully up to establishment and that this personnel will be highly trained.”120 They

also thought that Germany had a large number of potential reserves. However, they thought

that these reserves had little training. They also thought that this consideration would apply to

the skilled support personnel that were needed on the ground. They concluded from this that,

the infliction of heavy casualties on personnel of, regular first line units is likely to have a serious effect on the potential effort of the German Air Striking Force, and will probably result in a reduction in the scale of their attacks on this country until their reservists are adequately trained.121

However, it is noted that this would be difficult as personnel would be fleeing and would have

bomb proof shelters. “successful results will be in a large measure be due to the element of luck

rather than to good judgement” It is also significant to note that the writers of AIR 14/381 took

the time to mention that attacks on personnel were not likely to break the morale of German

120

AIR 14/381, p 12. 121

AIR 14/381, p 12.

43

personnel. This again shows that British planners had the effects of morale bombing and

Trenchard’s doctrine still in mind. However, they rejected the idea that morale of service

personnel could be broken.

The next target they consider in the document is air frame reserves and aero-engine

reserves. They note that “The whole situation with regard to these reserves is obscure, as very

little information is available as to either their strength or location.”122 They make known that

officially Germany has stated that it will have airframe reserves of 100% with 1/3 being held by

operational units. They conclude with such little information about airframe reserves it will be

hard to make them a successful target.

The final target they consider is air frame and aero-engine factories. They argue that

aero-engine factories are fewer in number and more centralised than airframe factories. From

this it was concluded that, “results are therefore likely to prove more successful and more

immediate than those directed against airframe factories.”123

After considering the likely outcomes of attacking one of the three targets (operational

units including personnel, reserves and factories), the writers of AIR 14/381 gave their final

conclusions on what targets were best. They concluded that attacking airframes and aero-engine

reserves would be poor targets because “We are uncertain as to both the quantities which are

held and also as to where they are stored...”124 Also, they thought that any losses to reserves

would be quickly replaced by factory output. In attacking factories they thought that, “successful

attempts against either the airframe or aero-engine factories as a whole would interfere with

the production of aircraft, but the results would not become effective for at least two or three

122

AIR 14/381, p 14. 123

AIR 14/381, p 18. 124

AIR 14/381, p 19.

44

weeks.”125 So, though they thought they would be successful in the long run, in the short run

Germany would still be able to launch attacks against Britain. With attacking reserves and

factories unlikely to negate a swift German “knock-out” blow, the writers were left with the

option of operational units (including personnel). They concluded that attacks against

operational units “if successful, will result in an immediate reduction in their operational

efficiency.”126 The drawback of this plan being that reserves in the long run would be able to

replace units, but there would be a loss in efficiency as they adjust. Fearing the quick “knock-

out” blow, it was concluded that, “Therefore, if we are to achieve an immediate reduction in the

intensity of enemy air attack our best course is to attack, at the outset, the operational units

themselves.”127

It is very interesting to note the layout of the document. It is only after the writers of AIR

14/381 have presented their conclusion, and before they give their final recommendation, that

they chose to reveal what they think Germany’s war aims will be in the coming war. In this

section they state that the German Luftwaffe has two options for attack. The German air force

could make, “indiscriminate attacks' against this country with even greater intensity with a view

to achieving the desired "knock out" blow before our resources are fully developed”128 or the

Germans could attack the RAF directly, neutralizing it, which they suggest in the short run would

help in the “achievement of our immediate aim, as it would involve an immediate reduction in

the weight of (their) air attack against our vital "national" targets.”129 This odd placement of

Germany’s war aims at the end of the document, which most would assume would have been

one of their first points they covered, is not likely formatting error or a personal quirk. The entire

125

AIR 14/381, p 20. 126

AIR 14/381, p 19. 127

AIR 14/381, p 20. 128

AIR 14/381, p 21. 129

AIR 14/381, p 21.

45

presentation is based on the belief that Germany was able to deliver a “knock-out” blow.

Choosing to present Germany’s plans at the end of the document has the effect of justifying

belief by the presentation. This is a problem because it was this belief which the plans were

based on. So, by placing it at the end like this, it reinforced their entire argument without them

having to show that the belief which their argument was based on was true or even likely.

In their summary the writers of AIR 14/381 gave their final recommendation. There they

listed a number of important points. Time is of the “utmost importance”130 and a plan that takes

this into account should be the one that is adopted. It is strategically advantageous for Germany

to respect the neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Germany’s air striking force will greatly

outnumber that of Britain’s. In morale and equipment Germany is equal to Britain. If the

proposed plan is put into action in the first week of war, “we shall probably not have more than

37 bomber squadrons at our disposal owing to the limited range of our light medium bomber

aircraft.”131 Little is known about German aircraft reserves and they would not make a good

target. Attacking factories would have a disastrous effect on the enemy, but would take time

before the effects could be felt. The final conclusion of the summary was that the best plan was

to target operational units, but plans should be flexible, able as necessary to be switched to

another target, preferably factories.

The writers of AIR 14/381 clearly favoured Trenchard’s offensive bomber doctrine. In

creating a plan, the belief that a large quick counter offensive to stop Germany’s large quick

“knock-out” blow was central. This fear dominated the minds of the writers of AIR 14/381. The

planners took into consideration factors which supported this belief and concluded a plan which

also supported this belief. It is hard to tell to what extent the plans were a product of inductively

130

AIR 14/381, p 21. 131

AIR 14/381, p 22.

46

producing a plan which would fit their belief in the offensive bomber, and how much of their

plan was deductively producing a plan with the conclusion that a large, quick offensive bomber

attack was needed to stop a German “knock-out” blow. It is clear that the idea of the larger

quick bomber offensive was not a new idea and it had been around since the early 1930’s. It is

also clear to see that this idea was uppermost in the minds of the planners.

Creating plans for a future war is an extremely difficult task. As Bernard Brodie, a

military strategist and one of the authors of the strategy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold

War wrote, it is difficult to plan for a war. “First, since great changes occur from one war to the

next, military planners are obliged to make far-reaching decisions on issues concerning which

there is little or no directly applicable experience.”132 It is not surprising that the writers of AIR

14/381 given the nature of their task would get some things wrong. The institutional bias that

the writers of AIR 14/381 had, for the offensive bomber, led them to jump to conclusions that

supported this bias. In their defence, they lacked reliable intelligence on the capabilities of the

enemy they were evaluating. It is understandable, with such little to work with, that they would

rely on pre-established belief to give them guidance in creating a plan. Many of the predictions

and assumptions which they made in their plans turned out to be false.

The first and biggest mistaken assumption the writers of AIR 14/381 made was that

Germany was going to try to take Britain out of the war with a “knock-out” blow. This idea, as

already mentioned, had its origins with Trenchard. During the inter-war period the independent

existence of the RAF was defended on the grounds that an air force could independently win a

war or at least turn the tides of a war through offensive bombing. In 1938, the planners of AIR

132 Bernard Brodie, Strategy as a science, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, Strategic Studies: A

Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p 11.

47

14/381 were now fearing that Germany’s air force had this ability to deliver a “knock-out” blow.

This belief in the ability of an air force being able to affect a war independent of the other

services led the writers of AIR 14/381 to regard the prevention of the German air force from

achieving this to be their primary concern. Their fear led them to overlook and neglect other

possible uses of an air force. This fear of a “knock-out” blow turned out to be mistaken for two

reasons: one, Germany never had the intention of knocking Britain out of the war in this way,

and two, Germany was not able to deliver a “knock-out” blow even if it had wanted to do so.

Germany never intended to knock Britain out of the war with an offensive bomber

attack early in the war. Even if Germany did not have the ability to deliver a “knock-out” blow,

the German air force was not built with this in mind. Even with the poor intelligence available,

the writers of AIR 14/381 should have at least had the suspicion that the German air force was

designed for a tactical support role of ground forces. Though the Luftwaffe became an

independent branch in 1935, it had a strong doctrine of working together with the Army, which

had its roots as far back as the 1920s. Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, German Army

commander from 1920 to 1926, greatly influenced this doctrine. He thought that, “The air force

was an essentially offensive force with two primary missions: the first, to attack the enemy air

force and achieve air superiority; the second, to wage an interdiction campaign against the

enemy army by attacking rail centers, depots and military bases.”133 The Luftwaffe did not even

develop any 4 engine bombers for long ranged attacks and never did for the duration of the war.

Also, Germany did not want or intend to fight Britain in the early 1930s. As John Ray

points out, in his The Battle of Britain, “Before 1938 the Germans had barely considered the

133 James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941, The Journal of Military History,

Vol. 59, No. 1, Jan., 1995. p 57.

48

possibility of war with Britain. They believed that the British Government, although suspicious of

Hitler's actions, would not intervene against his policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The

Fuhrer's powers of diplomacy would avert war.” So, before 1938 a cross channel air battle with

Britain was not even considered.

The other main reason Germany never intended to try a “knock-out” blow was because

Germany lacked the capacity. Germany’s air force in 1939 was about as large as the writers of

AIR 14/381 had predicted. In 1938 they calculated that Germany had about 1332 bombers; the

Germans actually had about 1,482 bombers and dive-bombers.134 They also predicted that

Germany’s bomber force would increase to 1750 bombers by 1939.135 In 1939 Germany actually

had about 1, 620 bombers and dive-bombers.136 However the main problem was, as already

mentioned, that the Luftwaffe was not built for a strategic bombing task. “Ernst Udet, head of

the Luftwaffe's technical department, opposed the development of the Heinkel He 177 heavy

bomber because he foresaw no use for it, and claimed that the Luftwaffe General Staff agreed

with him. There might be war with Czechoslovakia or Poland, he argued, but Hitler ‘will never let

us in for a conflict which might take us beyond the confines of the Continent’.”137 The need for a

heavy bomber in this kind of battle, that Germany was about to fight, was important. “As the

experience of World War II was to demonstrate, effective strategic bombing, in the then state of

the art, required adequate forces of heavy bombers and long-range fighters. The Luftwaffe

embarked on the Battle of Britain with neither.”138 Only Britain and the United States, of the

great powers, actively tried to construct an air force capable of strategic bombing. Also, the

amount of damage that could be done to morale and industry was greatly overestimated.

134


AIR 14/381, page 10. 136


John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain, p 34. 138

Teleford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 82.

49

Throughout the war it was shown that morale was not greatly affected by bombing and industry

was much harder to degrade by bombing than first thought.139

The plans made by the writers of AIR 14/381 were not put into action. For mostly

political reasons, “The French had been much afraid, before the war, that the English would

proceed at once to the strategic bombing of German industries and leave the air support of the

French army to the French; this was naturally an alarming prospect, the French air force being

what it was, but they were reassured, and promised everything we could give them.”140 The

French were correct to fear this, for that is what Britain had indeed planned. However, the

British agreed to aid the French. This agreement made all of the targets which had been

proposed in AIR 14/381 off limit. Arthur Travers Harris, the future Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)

of Bomber Command recalled that, when he was still command of No. 5 Group, “In the earliest

stages of the war we were not allowed to bomb anything on land, and our only possible targets

were therefore warships, which we could attack only by day.”141 The only thing that the Bomber

Command did in the early part of the war was drop propaganda pamphlets.

The writers of AIR 14/381 made a number of other predictions that turned out to be

false. The belief that time was crucial turned out to be false. The war started with the Phony

War, a period of several months of near-inactivity in which the RAF did not do very much beside

drop pamphlets. This idea that Germany would try for a quick bomber offensive was therefore

proven to be false.

139 M. Kirby and R. Capey, “The Area Bombing of Germany in World War II: An Operational Research

Perspective,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48, No. 7, (Jul., 1997) p 663.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-Chief


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._5_Group_RAF

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50

The assumption that Belgium and Holland the Netherlands would remain neutral

because it was advantageous for Germany tactically in the air, turned out to be false. The writers

were too focused on the German air force and the fear of a bomber offensive to take into

account that there might be other reasons for Belgium and Holland to get involved in the war

such as a German invasion. However, in their defence the German invasion of these countries

was a surprise to most.

Yet another mistaken assumption was that the Luftwaffe had only two options for

attack. This again was because the writers of AIR 14/381 were too focused on air combat and the

Luftwaffe in their plans and thought that the German air force had the same doctrine as the RAF

did. They did not take into account that the Luftwaffe would be closely supporting the army.

As for picking targets, it is hard to say which target would have been best early in the

war. The plans of those who wrote AIR 14/381 were never put into action. Their assessment that

time was of the most importance turned out to be wrong, with the long Phony War, so the plan

to attack operational units for this reason may also have been a mistake, but that is only

speculation. However, through much of the rest of the war the RAF preferred strategic bombing

of factories, which was their second choice, over operational units.

As already mentioned, beliefs can turn out to be false. And many of the beliefs which

created the framework for British plans in 1938 as seen in AIR 14/381 turned out to be false. The

British, like their counterparts on the other side of the channel, had poor intelligence and this,

combined with institutional bias toward offensive bombers, led the planners to make many

mistakes. Also, fears of bomber attack, after having captured the imagination like an ominous

shadow, was over-exaggerated and made to be more serious than it really was. The Luftwaffe

51

did not have the ability to deliver the devastating power which was feared that it would have in

1939.

The Luftwaffe did not intend to and was not able to deliver the feared “knock-out” blow

at the start of the war in 1939. However, the Luftwaffe became a very dangerous threat to

Britain with the fall of France in 1940. Though this fear of a devastating “knock-out” blow was

false, the fear of it gave Britain an advantage over the Luftwaffe.

After the fall of France, Britain was in a bad situation. It had lost all of its continental

allies and did not have the ability to defeat Germany on the continent alone. In the evacuation

from Dunkirk, Britain had lost most of the equipment for its ground forces. “Twenty-five tanks

came back from France; 25 out of 704. Of the 400,000 men in the B.E.F. some 360,000 were

saved, but only at the cost of sacrificing all their arms and equipment, except those weapons

they carried home on their shoulders.”142 The Royal Navy had taken some losses too. “More than

half the destroyers in home waters had been put out of action; 16 of them sunk and 42 damaged

in less than two months, chiefly by the Luftwaffe.”143 It was conceded that the Navy would need

air cover if it was going to repel an amphibious invasion. With both the Army and the Navy in

such bad shape, the defence of Britain fell to the RAF, which had also suffered heavy losses in

France.

After defeating France, Germany looked to invade Britain. The plan to invade Britain was

called Operation Sea Lion. The German high command, after evaluating the situation, concluded

that for an invasion to be successful the RAF would need to be put out of action. With this in

mind, they made the destruction of the RAF their top priority as a pre-requisite for their main

objective. Before any invasion of Britain could be undertaken, the German army and navy

142



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realized and freely admitted that the RAF had to be vanquished. Goering boasted that his

Luftwaffe could achieve this and so the other services waited, “relying on the Luftwaffe to

establish the conditions which might make Sea Lion a worth-while venture.”144 With this in mind

the Luftwaffe set out to destroy the RAF in the skies over Britain. However, in pursuing this goal,

“Goering and his entourage consistently overestimated their own and underestimated the

British strength.”145

This, however, was not the only course of action open to Germany in 1940 as Teleford

Taylor noted in his book, The Breaking Wave. Taylor points out that Germany had several

options available to it in 1940 besides trying for an aerial “knock-out” blow against Britain.

Instead of an air campaign, Germany could have negotiated a compromise peace treaty, though

this would have required Germany to give up most of her conquests. Germany could have

adopted a passive military posture and worked on building up its economy. Germany could have

tried for a speedy conquest of Britain. Another, option was to expand the conflict to other areas.

Yet another option was a prolonged blockade. For a while it even looked like Germany might try

one of the approaches mentioned above. As Taylor noted, “The mechanized units would be

strengthened, but the principal purpose would be to augment the Luftwaffe and the U-boat arm

of the Navy. All of this indicated a future strategy based on a prolonged blockade of Britain,

rather than a quick knockout blow.”146 Any one of these plans could have been adopted as a plan

for subduing Britain. However, after considering the outcome and consequence of each of these

plans, it was decided that an air campaign against Britain with the goal of eliminating the RAF as

a prerequisite to invasion was the best plan.

144

Teleford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 72. 145

Teleford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 24. 146

Teleford Taylor, The breaking wave, p 50.

53

Now that Germany had decided to defeat the RAF, Britain could finally fight the battle

that resembled what they had been preparing for in 1938. The RAF was not prepared for the

kind of air battle the Luftwaffe had unleashed in 1940 over France. However, now the battle was

going to be fought over Britain with the intention of taking Britain out of the war. The tides of

planning had changed. This is the kind of defensive battle the RAF Fighter Command had been

preparing for in 1938 and not the kind of battle the Luftwaffe was prepared for. As Chester

Wilmot put it, the “RAF had prepared to fight the Battle of Britain long before the war began, but

the Germans had not.”147 The battle was now going to be fought closer to the kind of battle

some British planners had imagined in 1938.

In looking at the preparations that were employed for the Battle of Britain, the account

of Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding in his, Battle of Britain: Despatch, is very useful.

Dowding finished writing this despatch on August 20, 1941, which he notes as being an odd time

to write a despatch for the battle. Though this was after his removal as commander of RAF

Fighter Command, he tries to give a straight forward and unbiased account of the battle. He is

fully aware that this will be viewed by historians some day and says, “I have endeavoured,

therefore, to write a report which will, I hope, be of Historical interest, and which will, in any

case, contain the results of more than four years’ experience of the Fighter Command in peace

and war.”148 This account gives an extensive over view of preparations for and the events of the

Battle of Britain.

In creating a defence for Britain Dowding’s efforts were extremely important. He, like

other planners, feared a “knock-out” blow, which is what biographer Robert Wright indirectly

states, “Great Britain becoming involved two days later, it was the start, for Dowding, of the

147


Air Chif Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding, Battle of Britain Despatch, p 4.

54

testing time. By then everybody, civilian and service alike, the unknowing and the expert, had

very strongly in mind the expectation of devastating attacks from the air.”149 However, unlike

other planners, Dowding did not believe that an offense was the only defence and oversaw the

creation of a defensive system for Britain.

Dowding helped create a defensive network that was able to fend off a German air

attack. He was not keen on the offensive bomber doctrine that Trenchard preached. Dowding

instead believed strongly in defence of the base. This break with established doctrine may have

been in part due to him falling into disfavour with Trenchard during World War One.

“...Trenchard, it was reported, began to feel uneasy about Dowding's 'being obsessed by the fear

of further casualties'. He referred to Dowding as a 'dismal Jimmy', and stated that he proposed

to replace him.”150 Though Dowding broke with the Trenchard’s doctrine that offense was the

only defence available against air attacks, he still feared that Germany was going to directly

attack Britain with bombers as believed by other planners in 1938. This led him and others who

shared this fear to create and develop a defence system that could protect Britain. Dowding

pushed this forward and “Dowding was the overall operational commander of all the means that

were available for the defence of the country in the air.”151

The key part in Dowding’s system was fighters. At the start of the war, Dowding had 39

squadrons available and estimated that he would need “52 squadrons to hold the line of battle

at home.”152 By June 22, 1940 Dowding had around 814 fighters available.153 However, the RAF

was still built on the idea that bombers were more important and even up “until the last

declining year of peace at least two new bomber squadrons were formed for every new

149






55

squadron of fighters.”154 Also, there was a need to send fighters over to defend France at the

outbreak of a war. It became clear to Dowding that this would put a strain on the number of

fighters need to defend Britain.

His first concern was with home defence, but it became clear to him right at the outset that there would be 'heavy demands from overseas for fighters both to satisfy initial requirements and to replace casualties, and these demands would conflict with the even more vital demands of the air defence of the Home Country.155

Before the war started, Dowding tried to convince the Air Ministry to set down a policy that

would insure that a there would be no conflict between these two competing interests, but was

unsuccessful in his attempts.

Things became even more difficult for Dowding in 1940 with the situation in France.

With the fear of a “knock-out” blow at the start of the war most fighter squadrons were

stationed at home in Britain. However, when it became clear that the Luftwaffe did not intend

this, there was a move to rush some of the fighters that had been intended for the defence of

Britain to aid France. This was a move which Dowding vigorously opposed. In April of 1940 there

were six fighter squadrons in France, and four more were sent when the fighting started.156

“Then on the 13th May, 32 pilots and aircraft were sent—say the equivalent of 2 squadrons.”157

Soon after, much to Dowding’s opposition, 8 half squadrons were sent. Dowding was very

concerned over the drain of aircraft to France and their wastage rates. This was especially

alarming because at this time he still believed that these aircraft were going to be needed to

defend Britain from a future “knock-out” blow. Dowding recalls, “All this time, it must be

remembered, the attack on this Country had not begun; with a few accidental exceptions, no

154



Air Chif Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding, Battle of Britain Despatch, p 7. 157


56

bomb had been dropped on our soil. I was responsible for the Air Defence of Great Britain, and I

saw my resources slipping away like sand in an hour-glass.”158

Dowding continued to fight the decision to send more fighters to France. The need to

rush aircraft across the Channel to aid France at the last minute again reflects that planners in

1939 were still afraid that Britain was going to be the target of air attacks. For, if it was known

that the Luftwaffe did not intend to attack Britain at the outbreak of war, it is reasonable to

think that even more fighters would have been sent over to France at the start of the war.

However, the situation in France eventually became so desperate that it looked like sending any

more fighters over would be a lost cause. That is when Churchill declared on May 19th that “" No

more squadrons of fighters will leave for France.”159 With this concern taken care of, Dowding

could now prepare his fighters squadrons for the air battle, which they had been preparing for in

the late 1930’s.

Another crucial part of Dowding’s defence was radar. This secret weapon gave a

tremendous advantage to British defenders in the skies over Britain. As Baldwin had so

alarmingly stated in 1932, “The bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to

understand that if you realize the area of space.”160 Radar solved the problem. Radar allowed the

defenders to see incoming enemy attacks, track their movements and concentrate their fighters.

The chain of radar stations, which Britain had started construction on in 1936, allowed for vital

early warning. Dowding knew the importance of radar and its limitations better than most, for

he was the one who overlooked the development of radar through the late 1930’s. Dowding

said, “the system operated effectively, and it is not too much to say that the warnings which it

gave could have been obtained by no other means and constituted a vital factor in the Air

158


Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p 39. 160

“The bomber will always get through.”

57

Defence of Great Britain.”161 This is an advantage that Britain did not have in the skies over

France, but now had in the skies over Britain. Many writers have given radar much credit in

helping to achieve victory. Chester Wilmot wrote, “It was a battle of chance and force against

science and skill. There was no shortage of courage on the German part, though their pilots

lacked the zest of the British, but their confidence was undermined by the knowledge that in

comparison with their opponents they were blind, deaf and dumb.”162

As impressive as radar was, it was not perfect. Another important part of the Dowding’s

system of defence was the Royal Observer Corps. It was still needed on the ground to track the

progress of enemies as they passed overland. They provided valuable information about targets

that were overland so that fighters could intercept them. Though they had their limitations, such

as cloudy weather and the fact that they frequently gave inaccurate information, Dowding noted

that, “...their work throughout was quite invaluable. Without it the Air Raid Warning system

could not have been operated, and Inland Interceptions would rarely have been made.”163

Anti-aircraft guns were another important part of this defensive system. Like other parts

of the military, anti-aircraft guns had been neglected during the interwar years. However, with

the looming fear of a German air attack, anti-aircraft guns again became important. “With the

awakening to the threat that was posed, it was finally decided, in June, 1938, to do something

about it. The inquiries after the Munich crisis later in that year revealed that precious little had

been done; and it was not until 1 April 1939, that the Army got around to forming Anti-Aircraft

Command.”164 The original placements of these guns needed to be changed after plans made in

1938 became outdated and Germany gained control over most of Western Europe. “The fall of

161





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Belgium and France had increased the danger to the South and West of England, and had

necessitated a considerable modification of the original arrangements when bombing attacks

could start only from German soil.”165 Though an important part of the defence system, anti-

aircraft guns had their limitation. They had a limited range and there was a shortage of guns at

the start of the war.

Another part of the defence network were barrage balloons. These balloons were

deployed to protect vital British industry and important buildings that might be targeted by low-

flying German bombers. The steel cables attached to the balloons were a danger to low-flying

aircraft. Though they were used extensively by the British, balloons were largely ineffective at

destroying enemy aircraft. However, it was believed by military planners that they did deter low

altitude bombing and it was concluded, “that the heavy cost of their installation and

maintenance, and their drain on man-power, were on the whole justified.”166

All the parts of this defence system were connected to form a united defence system

that was highly organized. Fighter Command was divided into groups which were responsible for

their own sector and had their own Air Vice-Marshals. These groups were directed by

headquarters, which was located in Bentley Priory. The groups were given considerable room for

independent action.167 The information was passed through the system to where it was needed

to go. “All Radio Location plots came to a " Filter Room " table at Command Headquarters (next

door to the room in which the Operations Table was situated), and, after surplus information

had been eliminated, tracks were passed by direct telephone line simultaneously to my

Operations Table and to those of Groups and Sectors concerned.”168 This system allowed for

165



This later led to controversy. 168


59

British Fighters to intercept enemy aircraft in a timely manner and allow Britain to conserve its

valuable resources.

New technology played a big role in connecting this system together and making it work

smoothly. The system was connected by a number of technological innovations: “They invented

one electronic gadget which enabled British radar stations to tell friend from foe; another

device, appropriately called ' Pip-Squeak,' by which fighters automatically reported their position

to a control station on the ground; and finally, a Very High Frequency radio-telephone which

provided clear, direct speech between pilot and ground-controller.”169 These were just some of

the technological advances which aided this system. Technology made a big difference in

constructing such a complicated system of defence as many have noted. Dowding himself

commented on all of these advances saying, “Radio was making advances all the time, and radar

was a tremendous leap forward. All these things were coming on at the right time, and many

people and their good work were made immediately available for putting into effect, in the

system we were devising, some quite revolutionary things.”

Also, the fear of Germany gave Britain a distinct psychological advantage over Germany.

For in facing an opponent perceived to be as dangerous as the Luftwaffe, not an effort could be

spared in countering it. British planners constantly overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe.

In contrast the Luftwaffe constantly underestimated the strength of the RAF. This fear of

Germany, as already noted, was not a new fear in 1940. As John Ray notes, “Although the RAF

had fought magnificently over France, especially at Dunkirk, there was trepidation regarding the

power of the Luftwaffe even before the air battle over Britain began.”170 Britain had feared and

had been preparing for a German aerial attack long before Germany had conquered France and

169


John Philip Ray, The battle of Britain, p 33.

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most of Europe. However, the fall of France and other European countries to the Germans

certainly would have increased this fear, which was already established.

Conclusion

In conclusion the offensive battle that British planners expected to fight with the

outbreak of war in 1939 did not happen. It was expected, as seen in AIR 14/381, that Britain

would be fighting a war in which Germany, at the outbreak, was going to try and knock Britain

out of the war with the feared “knock-out” blow. This belief in a “knock-out” blow, however, was

poorly founded and a by-product of poor intelligence and institutional bias. The RAF was kept

alive during the interwar period on Trenchard’s doctrine of offensive bombing. In creating plans,

the writers of AIR 14/381, having little intelligence on the Luftwaffe, assumed that the Luftwaffe

had the same doctrine of a “knock-out” blow as Britain and so created a plan that reflected this

fear.

British planners had expected that when fighting broke out in 1939, there would be

massive German air attacks on Britain. Instead there was the long phony war which saw very

little fighting over the skies of Britain. When the real air fighting started in 1940 over France, it

was not the battle RAF planners had been preparing for in 1938 and earlier. The Luftwaffe did

not strike at Britain as expected, but instead worked in coordination with the army, for which

purpose it had been built to defeat France. With France defeated, Germany’s sights then turned

on Britain and the Luftwaffe was given the task of defeating the RAF in the skies over Britain. The

Luftwaffe was not built for an air-battle against Britain, while this was exactly what the RAF had

been preparing for in 1938 and earlier. Britain had been preparing for this kind of battle long

before Germany had even started widely thinking about war with Britain. These preparations

61

were made through the late 1930s and largely influenced by the efforts of Hugh Dowding.

Dowding did not believe that defence was the only offence. He pushed forward and oversaw the

development of a defensive system. Britain created an elaborate and complicated air-defence

system which gave them a huge advantage over the Luftwaffe in the skies over Britain. The

defence system which Dowding and others helped create gave Britain the advantage they

needed to win the Battle of Britain.

In summary, British planners in 1938 and earlier prepared for the wrong battle they

thought was going to be fought in 1939 with the outbreak of war because of lack of intelligence

and an institutional bias. The battle that was fought in 1940 over France was nothing like the

battle for which they had prepared. However, once France was defeated, the Luftwaffe turned

to Britain and engaged the RAF in the skies over Britain. This was the battle that Britain was

ready for, and its preparations gave the RAF a huge advantage over the Luftwaffe. It was in this

way that German misperceptions led to victory for Britain over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of

Britain.

62

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources A) Government Documents

AIR 14/381, “Appreciation of the Employment of the British Air Striking Force against the German Air Striking Force and its Ancillary Industries and Reserves in the Event of a Major War Between Great Britain and Germany in 1939,” April 1938.

Air Chif Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding, Battle of Britain Despatch, August 20, 1941.

B) Memoirs

Harris, Arthur Travers. Bomber Offensive. New York : Macmillan, 1947.

2. Secondary Sources A) Books

Bishop, Edward. Their finest hour : the story of the Battle of Britain, 1940. New York : Ballantine Books, 1968.

Brodie, Bernard. “Strategy as a science,” in Thomas G. Mahnken, and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds. Strategic Studies: A Reader. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Overy, Richard. The Battle of Britain : the myth and the reality. New York : W.W. Norton, 2001.

Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain : New Perspectives : Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War. New York, NY : Sterling, 1994.

Taylor, Teleford. The breaking wave : the Second World War in the summer of 1940. New York : Simon and Schuster, 1967.

Tress, Harvey B.. British strategic bombing policy through 1940 : politics, attitudes, and the formation of a lasting pattern. Ont. : E. Mellen Press, 1989.

Terraine, John. A time for courage : the Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945. New York, N.Y : Macmillan, 1985.

Wilmot, Chester. The struggle for Europe. London : Collins, 1974.

Wood, Derek and Derek Dempster. The narrow margin : the Battle of Britain and the rise of air power 1930-40. Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1975.

Wright, Robert. Dowding and the Battle of Britain. London : Military Book Society, 1969.

B) Articles

Corum, James S.. “The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Jan., 1995): 53-76.

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Kirby, M. and Capey, R.. “The Area Bombing of Germany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective.” The Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48, No. 7, (Jul., 1997): 661-677.

C) Web Sources

“Amazon.com,” http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-Europe-Wordsworth-Collection/dp/1853266779, (January 28, 2011). “Australian War Memorial,” http://www.awm.gov.au/people/343.asp, (January 28, 2011).

“Stone & Stone: Second World War Books,” http://stonebooks.com/archives/970911.shtml (January 28, 2011).

“The bomber will always get through,” Airminded: Airpower and British society, 1908-1941(mostly), 10 November 2007, http://airminded.org/2007/11/10/the-bomber-will-always-get-through/. (March 3, 2011).

“The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, London,” http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speechs-how-churchill-did-it, (February 8, 2011).





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