Commonwealth War Graves Commission

The Battle of The Atlantic

Great Britain's island state had always been herbest defence in time of war but it had also meanta heavy dependence on overseas trade andimported raw materials to meet her needs and,consequently, on the Merchant and Royal Naviesthat transport and protect the vital supplies. Now,these supply lines, and the capacity to launchoperations overseas, would be extremelyvulnerable to an unseen and deadly weapon - thesubmarine.

The Unterseeboot, or U-boat as it was known,had first come to prominence during the FirstWorld War, when unrestricted U-boat warfare had

almost cost the Allies victory on land. But, by theoutbreak of the Second World War, both sides hadunderestimated the impact such vessels couldhave on the conflict's outcome. Instead, fast andpowerfully armed raiders - like the pocketbattleship Graf Spee - were considered to be themain threat to merchant shipping, a threat which,despite losses, the Royal Navy was able to combat.

At the start of the war the U-boat fleet numberedjust 57 vessels, not all of which were operational atany one time, and their base of operations limitedtheir range and effectiveness. Even so, their deadlypotential became all too apparent when just sixweeks after war was declared a U-boatpenetrated the Royal Navy's main anchorage atScapa Flow and sank the battleship HMS RoyalOak with the loss of more than 830 lives.

HMS Royal Oak

Within hours of the declaration of the Second World War on 3 September 1939, the first engagement hadtaken place in a battle that would rage for the next six years and cost tens of thousands of lives.

A German U-boat commander, mistaking the passenger liner SS Athenia for an armed merchant vessel,attacked and sank the ship with the loss of more than a hundred lives. The Battle of the Atlantic had begunand its outcome would determine the course of the war.

The U-boat Threat

The Royal Navy had to adapt quickly to this deadlyfoe and improved training for escort crews, bettertactics, detection equipment and weapons - andnew escort vessels like the Corvette - all helpedto reduce Allied losses while inflicting heavierpunishment on the U-boat squadrons.

Equally, the emergence of Canada as a powerfulally in the war against the U-boats was a hugeboost. Canada's navy had been very small at thestart of the war but an amazing period of growthmeant that Canadians were soon shoulderingmuch of the burden in the north Atlantic.

May 1941 witnessed one of the most significantevents of the campaign. A British ship, HMSBulldog, attacked and disabled U-110. In astrange twist of fate, this boat was commanded bythe same officer who had fired the first torpedoesof the war, sinking the SS Athenia. The crew ofthe Bulldog managed to seize the boat's Enigmamachine, a remarkable piece of equipment thatdecoded the commands and directions sent to theU-boats which they then used to co-ordinate theirattacks against convoys.

The capture of the Enigma was so valuable that ithad to be kept top secret. The machine waspassed to expert cryptographers at Station X -Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom - whomanaged to use it to break the German navalcodes. In so doing, convoys could be directedaway from the U-boat wolfpacks. This code battlecontinued throughout the war.

However, one major problem remained for theconvoys: the mid-Altantic Gap. This was a vastarea of ocean that could not be reached by Alliedaircraft and within which the U-boats couldoperate at will.

In an effort to provide the convoys with muchneeded air support, Catapult Armed Merchantvessels were developed. These were ordinaryships fitted with a rocket powered catapult, thatcould launch a single aircraft, usually a small fighterlike the Hurricane. The major drawback with thisweapon was that the pilot would have to ditch intothe sea when his fuel ran out because there wasnowhere to land!

By the summer of 1940 France and Norway hadfallen and the growing U-boat menace began topose a far greater threat to Britain's supply routesthan Germany's surface fleet. U-boats could nowoperate from bases in occupied Europe whichgreatly extended their range, and, with thereintroduction of the convoy system for Alliedmerchant vessels, the Royal Navy had to provideescorts for increasingly long stretches of theirjourney, a task that began seriously to test theNavy's resources of ships and manpower.

The U-boat's effectiveness was honed further bythe German air force's use of bases in France andNorway. Long range reconnaissance aircraft couldnow locate convoys and direct the U-boats tothem, leading to the development of the"wolfpack" tactic, whereby a number of U-boatswould gather and co-ordinate their attack againsta convoy. The wolfpacks would usually attack atnight and on the surface, overwhelming the escortships and largely nullifying the one weapon theescorts had to detect submarines underwater -ASDIC, an early form of sonar. By the end of 1940,three million tons of Allied shipping had been sunk.The U-boat crews called this "The Happy Time".

During this period, British industry was strugglingto replace the lost tonnage, while supplies of basicfoods and vital raw materials dwindled significantly.Many goods were severely rationed and wouldcontinue to be so throughout the war. In humanterms, the men of the Merchant Navy weresuffering terrible losses and experienced crewswere hard to replace.

A convoy and her escort. Sailors maintain a constant lookout for U-boats.

HMS Sterling launches a depth charge attack.

Survivors from the SS Athenia are rescued by a passing ship. Many victims of U-boat attacks would not be so fortunate.

Allied Tactics

The Royal Navy had to adapt quickly to this deadlyfoe and improved training for escort crews, bettertactics, detection equipment and weapons - andnew escort vessels like the Corvette - all helpedto reduce Allied losses while inflicting heavierpunishment on the U-boat squadrons.

Equally, the emergence of Canada as a powerfulally in the war against the U-boats was a hugeboost. Canada's navy had been very small at thestart of the war but an amazing period of growthmeant that Canadians were soon shoulderingmuch of the burden in the north Atlantic.

May 1941 witnessed one of the most significantevents of the campaign. A British ship, HMSBulldog, attacked and disabled U-110. In astrange twist of fate, this boat was commanded bythe same officer who had fired the first torpedoesof the war, sinking the SS Athenia. The crew ofthe Bulldog managed to seize the boat's Enigmamachine, a remarkable piece of equipment thatdecoded the commands and directions sent to theU-boats which they then used to co-ordinate theirattacks against convoys.

The capture of the Enigma was so valuable that ithad to be kept top secret. The machine waspassed to expert cryptographers at Station X -Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom - whomanaged to use it to break the German navalcodes. In so doing, convoys could be directedaway from the U-boat wolfpacks. This code battlecontinued throughout the war.

However, one major problem remained for theconvoys: the mid-Altantic Gap. This was a vastarea of ocean that could not be reached by Alliedaircraft and within which the U-boats couldoperate at will.

In an effort to provide the convoys with muchneeded air support, Catapult Armed Merchantvessels were developed. These were ordinaryships fitted with a rocket powered catapult, thatcould launch a single aircraft, usually a small fighterlike the Hurricane. The major drawback with thisweapon was that the pilot would have to ditch intothe sea when his fuel ran out because there wasnowhere to land!

By the summer of 1940 France and Norway hadfallen and the growing U-boat menace began topose a far greater threat to Britain's supply routesthan Germany's surface fleet. U-boats could nowoperate from bases in occupied Europe whichgreatly extended their range, and, with thereintroduction of the convoy system for Alliedmerchant vessels, the Royal Navy had to provideescorts for increasingly long stretches of theirjourney, a task that began seriously to test theNavy's resources of ships and manpower.

The U-boat's effectiveness was honed further bythe German air force's use of bases in France andNorway. Long range reconnaissance aircraft couldnow locate convoys and direct the U-boats tothem, leading to the development of the"wolfpack" tactic, whereby a number of U-boatswould gather and co-ordinate their attack againsta convoy. The wolfpacks would usually attack atnight and on the surface, overwhelming the escortships and largely nullifying the one weapon theescorts had to detect submarines underwater -ASDIC, an early form of sonar. By the end of 1940,three million tons of Allied shipping had been sunk.The U-boat crews called this "The Happy Time".

During this period, British industry was strugglingto replace the lost tonnage, while supplies of basicfoods and vital raw materials dwindled significantly.Many goods were severely rationed and wouldcontinue to be so throughout the war. In humanterms, the men of the Merchant Navy weresuffering terrible losses and experienced crewswere hard to replace.

A convoy and her escort. Sailors maintain a constant lookout for U-boats.

HMS Sterling launches a depth charge attack.

Survivors from the SS Athenia are rescued by a passing ship. Many victims of U-boat attacks would not be so fortunate.

Allied Tactics

Unknown Merchant Navy sailor Halifax Memorial, Canada

Unknown Merchant Navy sailor Halifax Memorial, Canada

weapons and aircraft meant that inboth April and May of 1943 theGermans lost 45 U-boats. Morethan the loss of the vessels, U-boat crews were hard to train andreplace, while the effect onmorale was devastating.

On the 23 May 1943 the U-boatswere called off by the GermanNaval Command. The battle didnot end there, but the threat hadbeen greatly diminished. Victory inthe Battle of the Atlantic pavedthe way for the invasion ofmainland Europe in 1944 and theultimate Allied victory.

At the end of the Second WorldWar Winston Churchill, Britain'sPrime Minister, wrote that "Theonly thing that ever reallyfrightened me during the war wasthe U-boat peril". With so much ofthe war effort resting on supportand supplies from beyond Britain'sshores, his fear was amplyjustified.

In human terms the Battle of theAtlantic was a cruel and costlycampaign that claimed a very highnumber of casualties on bothsides. An estimated 80,000 Alliedseamen were lost, while some28,000 out of 41,000 U-boat crewperished.

Despite the many innovations being employed bythe Allies, U-boats continued to inflict heavy losseson Allied shipping. The U-boats had a secondHappy Time just after the United States ofAmerica joined the war in December 1941.Initially, the Americans were slow to learn fromthe experiences of the Commonwealth seamenand in the first few months of 1942 some 200ships, mostly petrol tankers, were sunk offthe United States' east coast. In June theU-boats sank more than 830,000 tons ofshipping, the worst month of the war forthe Allies, but in July American industrialmight began to have a significant effect onthe battle. July 1942 was the first month ofthe war that replacement shipping beganto exceed losses.

The turning point of the battle of the Atlantic camein May 1943. By this time there were some 200operational U-boats but, with US productionreaching its peak, even this formidable force couldnot sink enough ships to prevent supplies gettingthrough. Victory for the Allies in the industrialbattle coincided with unprecedented successagainst the U-boats. The new tactics, intelligence,

The Turning Point

A Sunderland flying boat of Coastal Command watches over a convoy.

This problem was overcome by building escortcarriers. These vessels were much smaller thanthe Royal Navy's attack carriers and were initiallymanufactured using an older "donor" vessel, theflight deck essentially being constructed on top ofthe vessel’s original hull once any guns orsuperstructure had been removed. Escort carriersserved throughout the war and made a valuablecontribution, not only to the Battle of the Atlantic,but to many of the Allies other offensiveoperations.

The mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed by usingsuch vessels in conjunction with new long-rangeaircraft, which became available to the Allies in thesecond half of 1943. They were immediatelyeffective in countering German reconnaissanceaircraft, sinking or damaging many U-boats andforcing others to remain submerged.

A dramatic picture, taken from HMS Bulldog, showing thecaptured submarine U-110, from which the Allies secureda vital Enigma machine.

The Cost

The brave men of the Merchant Marineare remembered with honour at the

Tower Hill Memorial in London.

weapons and aircraft meant that inboth April and May of 1943 theGermans lost 45 U-boats. Morethan the loss of the vessels, U-boat crews were hard to train andreplace, while the effect onmorale was devastating.

On the 23 May 1943 the U-boatswere called off by the GermanNaval Command. The battle didnot end there, but the threat hadbeen greatly diminished. Victory inthe Battle of the Atlantic pavedthe way for the invasion ofmainland Europe in 1944 and theultimate Allied victory.

At the end of the Second WorldWar Winston Churchill, Britain'sPrime Minister, wrote that "Theonly thing that ever reallyfrightened me during the war wasthe U-boat peril". With so much ofthe war effort resting on supportand supplies from beyond Britain'sshores, his fear was amplyjustified.

In human terms the Battle of theAtlantic was a cruel and costlycampaign that claimed a very highnumber of casualties on bothsides. An estimated 80,000 Alliedseamen were lost, while some28,000 out of 41,000 U-boat crewperished.

Despite the many innovations being employed bythe Allies, U-boats continued to inflict heavy losseson Allied shipping. The U-boats had a secondHappy Time just after the United States ofAmerica joined the war in December 1941.Initially, the Americans were slow to learn fromthe experiences of the Commonwealth seamenand in the first few months of 1942 some 200ships, mostly petrol tankers, were sunk offthe United States' east coast. In June theU-boats sank more than 830,000 tons ofshipping, the worst month of the war forthe Allies, but in July American industrialmight began to have a significant effect onthe battle. July 1942 was the first month ofthe war that replacement shipping beganto exceed losses.

The turning point of the battle of the Atlantic camein May 1943. By this time there were some 200operational U-boats but, with US productionreaching its peak, even this formidable force couldnot sink enough ships to prevent supplies gettingthrough. Victory for the Allies in the industrialbattle coincided with unprecedented successagainst the U-boats. The new tactics, intelligence,

The Turning Point

A Sunderland flying boat of Coastal Command watches over a convoy.

This problem was overcome by building escortcarriers. These vessels were much smaller thanthe Royal Navy's attack carriers and were initiallymanufactured using an older "donor" vessel, theflight deck essentially being constructed on top ofthe vessel’s original hull once any guns orsuperstructure had been removed. Escort carriersserved throughout the war and made a valuablecontribution, not only to the Battle of the Atlantic,but to many of the Allies other offensiveoperations.

The mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed by usingsuch vessels in conjunction with new long-rangeaircraft, which became available to the Allies in thesecond half of 1943. They were immediatelyeffective in countering German reconnaissanceaircraft, sinking or damaging many U-boats andforcing others to remain submerged.

A dramatic picture, taken from HMS Bulldog, showing thecaptured submarine U-110, from which the Allies secureda vital Enigma machine.

The Cost

The brave men of the Merchant Marineare remembered with honour at the

Tower Hill Memorial in London.

While Commonwealth casualties from thiscampaign are buried in cemeteries andchurchyards in many lands, the vast majority haveno grave but the sea and are remembered on oneof the Commission's memorials to the missingaccording to the service and the area of operationsin which they died.

Members of the Royal Navy who have no knowngrave are commemorated on one of the threeprincipal naval memorials built by the Commissionin the United Kingdom at the manning ports ofPortsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham (each thesubject of a separate information sheet).

In addition, there are memorials at Lowestoft andLiverpool for members of the Royal Naval PatrolService and members of the Merchant Navy whodied as a result of enemy action while serving with

the Royal Navy. At Tower Hill in London there isa memorial (the subject of a separate informationsheet) to those members of the Merchant Navyand Fishing Fleets who died as a result of enemyaction.

In Canada, the Halifax Memorial commemoratesthe men and women of the Royal Canadian Navy,the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, the CanadianMerchant Navy, and merchant seamen fromNewfoundland who died during the Second WorldWar and have no grave but the sea.

Members of the Fleet Air Arm arecommemorated on their own memorial at Lee-on-the-Solent and the names of airmen servingwith Royal Air Force Coastal Command will befound on the panels of the Air Forces Memorial atRunnymede.

Published by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 2 Marlow Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire, SL6 7DX, England. Tel: 01628 507200 Fax: 01628 771208Web site: www.cwgc.org E-mail: casualty.enq@cwgc.org 04/03

The Commonwealth War Graves Commission

The Commonwealth War Graves Commission isresponsible for marking and maintaining the graves ofthose members of the Commonwealth forces who diedduring the two world wars, for building and maintainingmemorials to the dead whose graves are unknown andfor providing records and registers of these burials andcommemorations, totalling 1.7 million and found in mostcountries throughout the world.

Enquiries on location of individual burials orcommemorations may be directed to the office belowor through the Commission's Internet site atwww.cwgc.org.

The Commission is grateful to the Imperial WarMuseum for permission to reproduce photographs.

For further information contact:Commonwealth War Graves Commission2 Marlow RoadMaidenheadBerkshireSL6 7DXUnited Kingdom

Tel: (01628) 507200Fax: (01628) 771208E-mail: enquiries@cwgc.org