Fac. Ltrs. Rev. （34）, Otemon Gakuin Univ, Dec. 30, 1998

The Battleof Midway from the Standpoint

　　　ofHistoricalPsychology　Part Ｈ

Jiro Anzai

Conclusion

　　Thus, the precious battle lessons that should have been obtained from the Battle

of Midway's, halfａ century before. the turning point of the Imperial Japanese Navy's

war conduct as in the annals of the PacificWar, not only have not faded, but increased

in their importance to the Japanese now engaging in the reciprocal trade enterprises

and　international interactions as well. The facts that tribes, nations　and　many

culturally　integrated　groups　tend　to　show　or　betray　unmistakably　indegenous

behaviors, unique Archetypus (archaic type)actions expounded by Swiss psychologist

Carl Jung, ０r as Wiederholungen (Recapitulations)compulsion by Sigmund Freud had

been vindicated even at the Midway, some halfａ century before. Yes, indeed, when in

crisis,where there the UN had taken cognizance of their being in crisis, almost

unexceptionally the ancient "Archety)us" or archaic type of images had appeared for

their psychic and psychological support.

　　This tendency kept popping up even in the pre-PHA situation,in that the Nagumo

force's Commander Masuda's diary entry indicates. While standing aboard the

flaghoisted carrier Aだagi, amidst snow flakes from overcast skies over the Kurile

islands chain's Hittoka)pu bay, aboard the assembled PHA striking forces, Flight

Commander Masuda wrote as follows:“……remind me of that 47 Ronins assembled

on the second floor ofａ noodle shop for the coup …"

　　Moreover, the first stick of bombs that would go, the 250 -kilo sharpnel bomb

thrung　under the　belly　of ａ Type 99 divebomber got chalked　with　the　words

“Remember……the accumulated grudges of ours!" They were the same words

uttered by Lord Asano as he resorted to arms for his revenge on Lord Kira，in the Edo

period, had been chalked sprawlingly.

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The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part H

　　　Toadd further, the PHA originator Yamamoto himself had written : seeing not ａ

chance　for　winning, he　had　come　to　choose　the　possible　execution　of　daring

simultaneous attacks that would remind him of the Okehazama, Hiyodorigoe, and

Kawanakajima (allof these had been daring surprise attacks executed by our historic

heroes)｡

　　　Furthermore, when pressed for mere survivals in the post-Midway Guadalcanal

struggles, where chances for survivals had dwindled, out of the hard-pressed destroyer

men, the word “Nagurikomi" (Ｇｏfor broke) became their common clichS,and when in

later phase, even the Yamato had been forced to go in one-way sortie for Okinawa, the

designated name for the special operation was The Kiku-Shui (Chrysanthemum/water)

op in the traditionallegacy of Kusunoki Masashige's one-way sortie the very name

Chrysanthemum-water telling the pre- and wartime Japanese mind set on their sui-

cidal mission for His majesty's service.

　　　Against all these, almost one ｅχception was the Battle of Midway, June 4th, 1942,

in which all the cautions were forgotten by us.

　　　Now that l have ｅχamined all these tragic behaviors of ours in the past in the

twenty chapters, I feel all the more, the battle lessons should be most heeded to,now,

by us of the peaceful time, that because of our chances for survival are dependent so

much more on the goodwill of other nations, including the American people's； yes

inded, facts reveal more than any other period before in our history, the fate of Japan

and Japanese nation's are locked with the welfares of not just the American people but

with all the rest of other nations of the world｡

　　　Infact, only with others we can survive, as the prosperous exporting country,

with such limited amount of natural resources. The predicamental situations under

which we are in now are much more complicated, but in our reciprocality,entirely

peace-loving.　But problems increase in their difficultyand delicateness,inasmuch as

our post-war products are far more welcomed by Americans. Thus, our enterpreneurs

who are willing to utilizethe American market but refuse to meet the job supplying

oversaeas, can incur the recurrent memories of the Kidobutai.

　　　Thus,our enterprises who would refuse the job opportunities overseas, resemble

so much as the UN's HQ aboard Yamato and Admiral Yamamoto himself who had kept

off the Kidobutai (Nagumo's First Air Fleet) on the time-map distanced so far off that

even at twenty knots one day and ａ half be needed to catch up and assist the

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44 ―

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　JiroAnZA!

Kidobutai, so very afraid of their getting damages that even when they tried to rescue,

the Kidobutai had been reduced to shambling ruins. Indeed, so engrossedly concerned

about their own security,they had kept their own in the shroud of complete silence.

　　　No doubt that the Battle of Midway was indeed the multi-phased, multi-angled air-

sea battle of the grand order. These advancing 100.000 or more men in the overall man

power, and more than ａ hundred in men-of-wars, became useless in half a day！

　　　Amidst this gigantic procession. aboard the Yamato, Operations Officer Com-

mander Miwa had entered into his diary as follows :

This is indeed our Navy's hithertounfathomed campaign grandiose overseas.

And the pushed and pushers alikeeχpectnothing but victoriesforus.

This should have been indeed the true confession of his, but the reversal of the

hitherto much envied object and objective so one-sidedly expressed by the USN in the

pre-war days, or the dead copy of the much-publicized “Ring Formation" tactic the

very tactics had been so much propagandized in the pre-war publications in almost

every martitime nations｡

　　　The gist of the ring formation is comparable in its schematic design to that of

compounded decoration cake whose top is composed of sophisticated concerntric

designs, the center piece of which is the huge battleship row, of especially the flagship,

and those creams of crops are heavily defended by cordons of destroyers in huge

concentric, ring formations, thus acquiring the name, “Ring Formation." Had ｌ been

permitted to add, this procession is an extension of "Westwards, ho !”tradition where

there the origin is directlytraceable to that Caravan fashion.

　　　Had there not been the presence of the loudly advocating USA and USN on the

other side of the Pacific ocean rim. the Japanese would not have awakened from their

self-induldgent isolation that had lasted 250 years under the Tokugawa goverment;

and in the end, the worst fate might have been lying for their future, and in that case

Japan with its limited natural resources and obsolete industry and economy in what

Wittfogel（1896－1988）calledAsiatic stagnation or Asiatische Stockung.

　　　Thiswould naturally bring up another illuminating angle : even though historians

used to refrain themselves from “had it been " inferences, psycho historians'job is

not in the execution of the straight jacketting of such the non-if inference that has

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The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part Ｈ

been hindering possible breakthroughs into historic enigmas. On the other hand, had

there not been the Yamamoto/Kuroshima team that beated all other alternatives off

the planning board at the UN's HQ. prior to the Midway op, and the offensive strategy

had not been adapted for the neχt phase of operations, the natural end result would

have been the adaption of attritionsstrategy. But even here, what's been plaguing us

and our post-war Japanese thinking. that stereotyped way of thinking would have

recurred.

　　　We recall the Ermattungsstrategie or that strategy based on the Attritions Warfare

concept had brought nothing but stopgapping means forａ series of disarmaments con-

ferences and their strict demands (in the 1921 －1922)Washington and (1930)Ｌｏｎｄｏｎ

arms reduction conferences, placed in front of us, we seized that“Have and Have-not

Nations" doctrine｡

　　　One after another, the fully developed countries' navies threw a hurdle after

another before the newly developing Japanese navy ； so many they had thrown that

they had in essence hobbled the UN to the ratio of 60 percent to the Anglo-American

fullstrengths. In essence, the UN with the unfair ratio had been forced to the level 0f

nil admiral.

　　　The only plausible answer should have been the perseverance extreme to the

existing impass6 or overwhelming realitiesto which persevering warrior spirits would

have stood most effectively,by means of Wiederholungen recapitulations of the pattern

practice,of tea ceremonial legacies｡

　　　Inthe wise-only-after-the-event way. these miss-chanced tactics and very strate-

gics had even as the fittestone for the viscous type of persons whose kinds had been

abundant in our most warriors. at least,at the Showa ages.　But the course of history

took the other direction,leaving the UN in the dazed stupor and their once proud first-

line carrierair arms wiped offin a day. off the Midway, such a littleisle that they had

thought they could have taken inａ whiff.

　　　The real tragedy brewed out in the victory disease is that,instead of treating the

opponent in ａ tea-ceremonial master Rikyu's modest Wabi-cha style,they had tried to

dwarf the then small forced us navy with guilded utensils that would have awed even

the friendly force's men and officersin ａ blinding Potlatch (Tribal Indians' big feast

throwing so as to awe all the opponent.)!　Inversely speaking the very tragedy had

been cooked up at the start,by our own lack of empathy into the pressed enemy's

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Jiro Anzai

mind as to what they would do when we ourselves were in their shoes.

　　　Thus,trying to catch the USN in surprise, the UN had been completely surprised

at Midway･

　　　Inmy view, arrogancy of ours and devaluating the Anglo-American capabilities

by us, are essentially history-old recapitulating phenomena, about which Captain

Fuchida and Commander Okumiya had been deploring as the Victory Disease.

　　　Asour re-considerations deepen. we are bound to infer that not only America,

England and Europe but even our Asiatic neighbors have been countering, using the

Midway as the best manuel to crash the post-war Japanese attacks or what they had

come to term economic agressions.

　　　Who indeed can deny the pre-scientificfeels of the US's cartwheeling offensives,

just on the brink of theirlaunching ？

　　　Even about the British,there are more than the past records of antisubmarine

measures including Sonar, OR's, and Rolls-Royce engines of the ww II innovations

that would have taught us.

　　　Itshould be recalled, with references to the above statement, that while we were

self-praisingly lulled in the so-called 1970 Eχposition held at Osaka, Japan, Queen

Elizabeth IFs figure had been absent from the said expo's dignitarieslist； where had

she been ？　She was absent；not because she had been ill,but because she had been

present at the starting ceremonies of the under-sea oil recovery attempt called the

North Sea Oil,off Scotland ！

　　　Asto the sharpness of eyes. no one could have ｅχcelledpilot-goggled Genda's that

had ben the gem among fighter pilotofficers.

　　　Asto Kusaka, we know that he had been known for his striking out in the pre-

war days twenty-four corpsed plan by which he had proposed the setup of the early

warning system with big flying boats and twin-engined scout planes of ｅχceedingly

long distanced range･

　　　And yet the fact remains that the same Kusaka off Midway had been so slow and

almost dragging his feet in the cold. As we recall,the laurel had come to crown

Admiral Spruance's head, the steady strolling walker.

　　　Though paradoxical to mention of this. the real starter that came to crown

Spruance at Midway is Admiral Halsey and his skin rashes that forced him to be

hospitalized. The truth of the matter is during that criticaltime, both Nimitz and his

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The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part Ｈ

Fleet's Cheif Surgeon Captain Gendreau feared for the possible rise of miss judgements

by that otherwise dauntless Halsey due to his skin-rashed irritations,but none had

ever doubted Halsey's recommendation of Spruance for his right successor！　Indeed,

the same Halsey's word had underlined assuredly the oncoming victory, even if this

statement of mine would have smelled of that wise-after-the-event kind of comment.

Nevertheless, the very Halsey's piece of advice or what is the most thought-out quality

for the good task force'scommander was the serene non-self losing selfthat would not

disintegrate even in the midst of ordeals and my colleague Ray Spruance would be the

man for it｡

　　　There are, to be sure, too many shallow thinkers who, seeing Admiral Halsey's

sporadic temper-losings, have pronounced him and his whole person as a fiery bull-run

fighter with no brains, no hind sight, not to speak of prescientificcautions；but the

facts　prove otherwise, indicating Admiral　Halsey as the most cautious, foremost

thought-through sailor,in the us Navy in the Pacific. In my view, Admiral Halsey

who had overthrown the order by CincPac fixing for his Task Force's sortie on the

Friday 13th,is one such the proof that this Admiral had been ａ true psychologist of

the firstorder. Furthermore, Halsey had not left Spruance alone in his Carrier Task

Force's commanding post；he had provided for his comrade, ａ real super weapon : the

man about his capabilities can be classed navy's “Capability Brown," Captain Miles

Browning, of whom Prof Morison spoke as“Human Slide Ruler!" Although the Prof

had not hesitated to add ａ comment that Browning had been the most emotionally

unsteady one, among all the USN's captains. Be that as it had been, this Browning

was true-to-goodness real brown-shoed fleetairman, and air staff chief at that.

　　　Thus, not only the Porter Gesit like super dreadnought Yamato and but also

Admirals Yamamoto and Koga followed in their wakes, and the“small vesseled

surprize attacker doctrine or destroyer flotilladoctrine uplifter" Admiral Makaroff's

legacy (materialized) by Tokugata (Special Type) destroyers such as Hatsuyuki and

Yugiri had gone down to the sea bottom. though not at the Midway, but in the Pacific

ocean as the direct result of the obsolete Wiederholungen or Recapitulations in the

stereotyped minds in the entire UN's. As pronounced in Part　l ，and Part n, the

unbelievable fiasco and debacle of the Imperial Japanese Navy, was neither ａ chance

failurenor the incredible victory of a dwarf force set against the giant Japanese Navy.

Thus, the famed w equation-wise. the Nagumo's victorious aircraft carrier striking

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　JiroAnzai

force alone would have won the battle；alas. they not only blundered in their basic

operation, but brought about the beginning of the ends for the UN and the Empire of

Japan｡

　　　Aspropounded in Part l ，and Part 皿,the unbelievable fiasco and debacle of the

Imperial Japanese Navy, was neither ａchance failure nor ａresult ofａforce set against

the inferior American Navy.　The famous N^ equation wise，the Nagumo's Carrier

striking Force alone would have ensured the victory. Had they acted or reacted

according to the prewarning by Vice-admiral Yamaguchi's double warnings ？　Alas！

the victory disease or psychological case of overcompensation had come to ruin not

only Nagumo's vain glories but the entire UN's.

　　　Psychic as well as psychological lessons the author has endeavored in the fore-

mentioned 19 chapters are indeed many, but the very fact that more than ａ passage of

half ａ century the self glorifying post-WW II Japanese industry and business and

financial quarters and even Japanese Government functions that seem to be over-

confident, are the things to be most refrained｡

　　　For essentially the same psyche- and psychologically deep-rooted arrogant and

unhealthy attitude had been prevailing in the nation's been amply pointed out in my

original text (The Battle of Midway-A Psychological Account, PHP Publications, 1986)!

　　　Essentially　the　same　psychic and　psychologicaly　deeprooted　arrogancies　and

unhealthy attitudes had been prevailing in this nation's in the post-war booms in

industrial and economic fieldshad been pointed ｏｕt｡

　　　Utilizeingnot only Dr. Ernst Kretschmer (1888 －1964)'sKorperbau und Charakter

theory but also Adlerian Doctrine of Minderwertigkeitsg好此l (InferiorityＣｏｍｐｌｅｘ)

theory, and　above all　Carl Jung's Umbewuβtes kollektive (Collective　Unconscious)

theory, I have tried to interpreat all the enigmas pertaining to the Midway Battle,but

that success at the PHA and the subsequent. simultaneous operations all over the

Pacific theaters had been the accelerated reactions out of his inner psyche, that resort

to the Wiederholungsz切ang (Recapitulations Compulsion or Repetition Ｃｏｍｐｕlｓｉｏｎ)｡

　　　What indeed should have been lying at the depths ？　As l explored at, l have

discovered the unexpected “Fall" of which seems to have ａlead.

　　　Overmy retrospection, it would link with my personal experience in that l have

been told by Admiral Kusaka and Captain Fuchida in person.

　　　The gist of revealing hints especially by Fuchida is as follows : Had the UN been

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The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part Ｈ

succeeded in the Midway Ops and come out as the victors, even the flag-hoisting

carrierAkagi should have been de-classed to the decisive Night Fighting Second Fleet's

auxiliary arms ！

　　　Admiral　Shigeyoshi Inoue (1889-1975)'s now revealing anticipatory　pronounce-

ment that the Japano-American warfare would not be fought in the Fleet versus Fleet

encounter, but be fought in ａ succession of airbased islands taking or losing between

the two ……"

　　　The fact remains not just Yamamoto in the Midway Ops, but his C-in-C successor

Koga could not disengage himself from the spells of the now obsolete Battleship

Fleets'decisve encountering in the midst of the Pacific Ocean. Behind this existed the

presence in his or even in Koga's mind of categorizing the aircraft carriers as the

auxiliary ships, the most surprisingly backwarded tunnel vision even, despite Admiral

Yamamoto's premature death.

　　　Inmy view, this underlined clich6 seems to now have clinched the following

pronouncement　by　Admiral　Koga, Yamamoto's　very　successor　and　his　one-time

colleague, ex-Naval General Staffs member.

　　　The above-mentioned “Decisive Night Action's Force" would come to complement

the enigmatic strategic principle over-em phasized by Koga･

　　　Asthe component of the Second Fleet…(Night Engagement Forces)made up of

with heavy cruisers,light cruisers and screen destroyers and fast battleships.　And in

her wakes, come the armor-decked Taiho and other Yamato-class sized super carriers

which would take up the screening positions around the Main Body (11 0r more of

battle-ships),Yamato and Musashi included.

　　　Significantmessages can be read in the above，in that this Second Fleet had been

entitled“Decisive Night Engagement Battle Forces'！ Even at thislate stage！

　　　Now back to the ｅχamination of Commander Spruance's career, after the Midway

victory Spruance was put ashore. and became Chief of staff for Admiral Nimitz, also a

known stroller. Thus, enjoying the land-based life.in unison. For all that his daugh-

ter had observed ； all her life this victorious father and now Vice Admiral kept the

same habit or saving use of paper tissues.splitting them into halves and using only

one half atａtime！

　　　Thishabit, however, can be ａ symbol of his saving parsimonious economics in his

psyche, partly witnessing of his glutinous or VISCOUS temperament, but also of his

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Tiro Anzai

psychic trauma (he had seen his once rich grand father lose all his possessions

overnight). Spruance's wife came to him. with ａ modest amount of Mitgift, but when

widowed she was astounded to find the original had been multiplied by Admiral's

careful manipulations, into what could be called fortunes, that reminded her of his

exceeding love.

　　　Justhow much of this psychic hysteresis. had played in his decisive victory over

Nagumo, can hardly be measured, not to speak of judging. But Spruance's careful

withholding the so-called let-loose by attackers until the last moment, thus made his

Air Chief of staff Captain Miles Browning in ａ furious uproar, should have betrayed

the essentially same parsimonous psyche and temper, as confided in his daughter's

anecdotal episode.

　　　Having observed the wakes or courses of the Midway operations in history one

might be led to believe that long-drawned out hours of attacks, which resembled the

ancient Japanese tactics of“Wheeled-out Pattern of Attacks called Kuruma-gakari

tactic.

　　　Itlooked at firstsight the USN's been thrown everything they could get hands on,

so sophisticatedly timed as in“wheeled-out pattern of tactic",but the truth had been

they had been forced to attack the Nagumo forces, so sporadically from the lack of

coordinations, and due to disparitiesin their equipments and pilot trainings as to the

performances, he could not have possibly effected the hundred-percent coordinationed

attacks, but this basic strategy that intended to catch Admiral Nagumo's four carriers

in the midst of re-fuellingand re-arming for the decisve second attacks had been fully

paid off,because of Spruance's calculated risk taking principle that would betray even

now the presence of the Anglo-Saxon objectivity even in their gambles ；compared to

this, the Japanese attitude of ours. or Nagumo's been subjectivity period. In re-

considering we have to admit as follows; the very defeat colossal had been brought

about by the subjective psychology of none but Yamamoto's the person that had been

so proud of his knowing the American industrial as well as fighting capabilitiesand

very tenacities,not to speak of his bragging internationally minded ！　So grossly

stumbled on his own blinding success. So overwhelmed by his own “Sneak" attak that

was not all,l have fullyｅχplicatedａ number of points which l have discovered in each

and every chapter of my nineteen chaptered assay. and came up with novel inter-

pretations of mine, such as capturing the Nagumo as the chronical thumb sucker, and

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The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part Ｈ

interpreting Yamamoto and Kuroshima team's operational planning as the very roots

of the unconscious defeatism, despite the existence of their daring pusher images.

　　　And finally, as early as the day of my PHP bublication, that happened to have

been the June 10th, 1986, I have predicated the downfall of Japan's booming financial

market and exporting industries as well. so long as they had been recapitulating

essentially the same Nagumo-Kusaka or Yamamoto-Kuroshima-branded inferority-

turned-superiority ｃｏｍｐｌｅχway, we are bound to lose.

　　　Yes, indeed it had been the Anglo-American and Dutch ingenuities that had

uncovered the trapped oil and gas layers situated deep under the icy North Sea

bottoms.

　　　Though having no immediate relations to the Midway of half ａ century's past UN

operations, it had been the end product of the relentless joint ventures, especially those

of the us Marine Corps air-minded officers and of British innovations that came to

result in the creation of the wholy novel VTOL concepted aircraft, which was to

assure another case of the turning point victory at the Battle of the Fauklands. Re-

considering of this Harrier creation makes us aware that when about the world outside

Anglo-Saxon nations is beginning to take the Anglo-American cheap and diseased, the

tables are about to turn. Reconsiderations keep us aware of these most eloquently

telling that the British ingenuities and for that matter even Americans are to show

themselves most eloquently just about the time people outside the Anglo-Saxon

countries began to chorus of either the British or American weakling, that British had

been afflicted with British disease, and Americans likewise enthralled in twin deficits｡

　　　But our people have once again erred in evaluating the Anglo-American tenacity,

not because they did not have daily contacts with either England or America, but

because they are lacking in the studies of the past histories of other nations and

cultural groups and their techno-cultural implications｡

　　　The facts re-eχamined by the author of this thesis, prove to the effect that the

Imperial Navy had not lost that Battle of Midway due to the simple level of Inferiority

Ｃｏｍｐｌｅχor Self-centered Inferiority-turned Overflowing Suprriority Ｃｏｍｐｌｅχes,but

they have lost the war, because they had taken the American guts and their kind of

patriotism cheap ； as facts have been shown the follies of Admiral Yamamoto and

Kuroshima had　thus so　devastatingly　undermined 、the　basic psychology　of the

Japanese nation's, especially the moralistic legacies cultivated and handed down by

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Jiro Anzai

Admiral Togo/Nimitz's line of Chivalry/Bushido principles｡

　　　Ifanyone challenged for the proofs of these psychic, psychological and psychiatric

interpretations of history, especially those of Midway ops as l have just finished,just

how both the nations've been observing this date June 4th are the most eloquent

testimonies. The Japanese have suppressed almost all these painful and humiliating

defeat experiences ；as the result The Battle of Midway had been observed only by the

American forces on the June 5th on Japan, the day remembered very feebly by us as

the day in which the Americans have been much fussed over the triflething of the

past.

　　　Aswe recall,０ｎJune second, the Nagumo's striking force had run into the thick

soupy fog and they had been forced to make medium-wave radio contacts with other

forces to effect the necessary turns. Ironically the fogs lifted soon after the radio

propagation had been effected.

　　　Much to teeth-gnawed chagrin of the Commander Genda, but for some reasons,

the American listening posts of not only on land but aboard the surface forces failed

to pick them up.

　　　Forall that, had we taken ａ second look into the Midway debacle, the course of

what seemed　to have been　the inevitable destiny had　been　the end results of

individuals and groups, who had played not just cardinal roles but also hitherto

seemingly insignificant parts, all of which had been playing categorically psycho-

logical effectsupon both opponents.

　　　０ｎ　the　other　hand,to　the　victory-crowned　us　Navy　and　its　successive

generations, June 4th, 1942, the historic date's been repeatedly observed on the day, as

betraying on frequent visitationsin the past of the now friendly us Navy's carrier

force'sperfect-timed Yokosuka arrivals,but to most Japanese whose memory had been

deliberately shanned the past records until the avergae post-war generations think

nothing of the Midway｡

　　　Forall these, l would like to point out the fact that on June 10th, 1942 l had seen

on the Mainihci News in the original Japanese version that the UN's sweeping victory

over the USN had been flashed on the front pages, with block letters that the Japanese

Navy's won the gigantic victory on the Midway, and eastern Pacific theater. It was

complete to the oiled picture of at least one American carrierin flames, and its caption

declared the control of the Pacific ocean had been forced to flee from the Pacific……

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　　　　　　TheBattleof Midway from the Standpoint of HistoricalPsychology　Part Ⅱ

This had been more than plain lies｡

　　The author remembers somewhat resembling case had been flashed over 1938

Nomonhan incident in which the proud Imperial Japanese Army had been thrown into

humiliating fiascos of defeat in which thousands of men and equipments including

tanks and artillerybeen crashed under the Russian mechanized troops.　Rumors that

our tanks had been crashed by the Russian armored forces like a tofu (bean ｃｕrd)，ｏｒ

burned to theirinfernal deaths and destructions by means of flame thrower came to

us, even the patrioticschool kid's ears.

　　In both cases these inglorious defeats and their facts had been washed off as if

they had been minor errors or mistakes that can be corrected by and with the rise of

our patrioticspiritsand morale uplifting.

　　For all that, the feats meeted out to the junior officers and most men had been

more than harsh and cruel｡

　　As Captain Fuchida's and Commander Okumiya's Midway accounts tell,ａ number

of the survivors had been locked up inside various domestic barracks as if prisoners,

and later ordered to various outlying posts or surface fleet to die. But the facts that

how the Midway debacle had been handled by the late Admiral Nagumo until the last

day of his inglorious life after the Midway at the Island of Saipan, betray beyond any

room for doubting how the admiral had been thinking himself of the Midway.

　　He kept saying to the effect what had shocked him most was not from the Battle

of Midway, but the fact his PHA striking Forces had been seen in clear and sure

within the distance of some 8,000 meters by ａ hammer-and-sickle-insignia funneled

Russian ship on the open sea. on the 6th (5th in American day)December, 1941, some

800 miles due north of the Oahu, Hawaii.

　　To this reseracher, this case, had it been true,seems ａ startling one and makes ａ

case of what Dr. Sigmund Freud termed Covering Memory or the working of covering

the unwelcome memory with ａ pleasurable one. In ｅχplicatingthings in dreams,

Freud had told us of the almost un-consious working of one's memories, that of

substituting　some　bright-faced　memory　to　inhibit　the　unpleasant　memory ；　in

Nagumo's case, covering memory is the victorious PHA with the spine-chillingthrill0f

being discovered by ａ Russian ship. Important is ａ thing that needs a further

exploration； that was Admiral Nagumo's washing off the stigma of Sneak Attack

charge of his PHA as though these accusations were water drops on the Vinylite rain

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Jiro Anzai

coat.

　　　Covering memory had been a lid-placing behavior in one's mind that works almost

unconsciously in human psyche. In reconsidering. three generationed (Meiji, Taisho,

and Shoｗａ)ｒｅｃｏrdｓof the UN's past acts and deeds. are but epics and lyrics as well of

our emotion- and sentiments-laden national history, but as the years went by, the

memories of the ww II had taken sprirally diminishing course, unitl they had become

of no moralistic self-searching material｡

　　　The facts remain in that the historical and historic courses of the UN as the

modern day version of the ancient Tale of the Heike clan or acts of Lord Yoshitsune's

as in the ancient ｓtｏry｡

　　　In retrospecting， we must reconsider the existence of Admiral Togo, along with

hosts of true heroes as in the Meiji-period Russo-Japanese war. Of the said Admiral

Togo, even　Admiral Nimitz had　never tired of ｅχpressing deep-seated love and

professional respect to this senior Admiral. Admiral Nimitz's love and admiration to

Togo seem not to have diminished even after the Midway and the total Defunction of

the UN under his command.

　　　The very facts that the UN represented by the British legacied Admiral Togo's

time and American Mahan-influenced Senior staff Officer Akiyama's time had acted

blamelessly ； not one case of torturing prisoners-of-war had occurred ！　Their Bushido

code and morale as well as moral had matched their deeds｡

　　　The facts so saddening as to make us deeply ashamed happened to the prisoners

of war caught at the Midway, not one of the survived American airmen had come out

alive from the hands of the First Air Fleet's but some fifty Japanese captured off the

Midway, came out alive, well-treated just like prisoners of war in the 1905 Russian

POW's at Tsushima ！　The point had been uncovered by the famous woman writer

Hisae Sawachi for the first time. In my last chapter, l took up this problem and

reasoned that we have no right to equate this unfair treatment by us with the atomic

bombing.

　　　Itwas facts of history that we had terrorized the world with Zero fighters' and

First striking forces' strength. but due to the hollow-outing of the Bushido in our

Showa officers and men, there can be no mistaking that we have been defeated, our

Bushido had been disintegrated. no matter how eloquently Dr. Inazo Nitobe had

preached in his Busido book, nor Okakur in his Book of Tea, they had come to no avail

－55－

The Battle of Midway from the standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part ｎ

under　the　feeble　influence　of　the　shallow-seated　Buddhistic　philosoophy ；　when

compared to Admiral Togo and his righ-hand man Akiyama, even though materially

much advancedly equipped with Zero fighters or super battlewagon Yamato, they

could not possibly command other peoples' respect. Why this has occurred ；because

these supposed-to-be Bushido equipped officersand men had been long since hollowed

in their warrior mind ；in their ever growing dependency on their material strengths

and equip-ment-wise selfglorificationsthey have forgotten the importance of Bus

in a word, they have come to ignore the quality of men's spiritsbehind guns ！

　　　Tothe author, so much similarity can be observed between the slack attitudes and

arrogancy in the Heike clan's warriors and those of the UN's Showa period ones.

　　　Indeed,to this thesis author, acts and actions taken by the UN's very personnel

drunken in the Victory-diseased spiritsin the First-phase ops, so much resemble to the

unhealthy acts and actions of the Heike clan's men. as toldin the Tale of Heike, in that

the young and robust Kiyomori, on his pilgrimed seaward journey to Kumano shrine,

ate ａ huge fish that had jumped into his boat, as good omen (though the Buddhistic

doctrine forbade killingeven a fish during the religious pilgrimage)｡

　　　The Nagumo's officers and men, most of all,had been wrapped　up in such

optimistic moods, never doubting the on-coming success at Midway, such ａ speck-of-a-

foam-like ａ couple of isletsin the vast Pacific ocean.

　　　But　far　more　had　been　waiting　for　the　doomed　Nagumo　and　Yamamoto.

Yamamoto that had distanced himself from all his subordinates and even his staff

officers,in his estimations of the Anglo-American might, had so blundered in his

handling the Nagumo and his men. as though the latter'sforce had been the hapless

half-brothered Yoshitsune, younger brother. to Yoritomo, the elder,and sent him and

his force on the constant runs as depicted in the Gikei or even in the Tale of the Heike

Clan. That subordinates-loving Yamamoto would have mistreated Admiral Nagumo

and his staff；quite discriminatingly. Yamamoto's right-hand man Kuroshima acting as

though the dead copy of the sinisterKajiwara, that agent-like supervisory man to the

young　but　heroic　warrior　Yoshitsune.　Moreover, how　comes, that　all-knowing

Yamamoto should have slighted Nagumo, the earnest-to-goodness Commander, of the

crack 1st Air Fleet,and kicked him up to the silent galley or attic even. In a word, it

had been discovered that the C-in-C Admiral Yamamoto and his senior staff officer

Kuroshima's set had been dictating all the war plans and battle phases to the complete

- 56－

Jiro Anzai

neglect of other officers' initiative. especially of his Chief-of-the staff Admiral Ugaki's.

Inasmuch as all the operations had been issued out from the Yamamoto/Kuroshima

combination, the Midway debacle had also been the end-product of these two men's or

the paired folie. As ａ master piece that had reached into the depths of Dostoevski's

character, I would be permitted to make ａ mention of Fijlop-Miller's Dostoiewski und

die Vatertotung (PP. 339－418, Gesammelt Werke、Vol.χIV, Fischer Verlag). Our man

Yamamoto had been relentlessly pushing himself into chess, chequer, shogi and go

games, so engulfedly enthralled had he been that he had often at ａ loss : one anecdote

has it that he had been kicked out of the casion in Monaco, for his straight winning

runs.

　　　To the fatty physiqued Admiral Kusaka that did not hesitate to tell him of its

vulnerability, Admiral Yamamoto had been recorded to tell: you should not say too

risky ａ gamble just because l have been being fond of playing bridges or pokers｡

　　　Yamamoto's later year muscular physique nearing the fatty, was hiding beneath

the mask, his glucous temperament, miχed with rather asthenic, schizophrenic tern-

perament, all of which fix him as miχed type.　His steadfast observances in saluting

back at the subordinates so contrary to his Cheif of staff Vice-admiral Ugaki's｡

　　　For all that Yamamoto was of very selective in his selection of friends. Despite his

constant wholesale service to the populace so ｅχpressive in such acts as spending

hours in replying for even grade-school kids' fan-letters； he had been eχtremely

choosy in his friends and foes. There were many indications that would taletelling of

his inner psyche or nucleus as the typical viscous type.

　　　As to this viscous temperament, the resounding success of Quality Control method

that had been introduced by Dr. Deming in the post World War Ｈ Japan (tｈｅpre-

Korean　war　Japan), had　its　basic　stratum, in　the　Japanese　love　of　viscous

recapitulations ！

　　　Despite this episode had been so well known now, all the published books and

articles have glossed over as though this habit of Ｙａｍａｍｏtｏ'ｓbeen ａ sort of psychic

appendiχ ； but under the magnifying glass of depths psychology, these never-ceasing

movable and moving finger tips are but the very indeχ into his inner psyche. and

Overall Commander Admiral Yamamoto's itchy finger tips are no less tale-telling than

his subordinate Nagumo's the Sonde (exploring implement)into his inner psyche, are

all too plain now.

- 57 －

　　　　　　TheBattleof Midway from the standpoint of HistoricalPsychology　Part n

　　　Hisnot-a-moment's resting finger tips were but the betrayal of his lifelong Lebens-

formen (lifestyles),with his yen willpower to fight. But then, why he had succumbed

so fast to his death, as early as April 18th, 1943｡

　　　AsI've been dwelt on in the main text.using Dr. Kretschmer's character/body type

(Kor)erbau und Charakter) theory for reference. we could say many warriors and

fighters could have been categorized into the muscularly strong physiqued, viscous,

persevering temperament.After getting middle aged, one's physique tends to stay.

Ｙａｍａｍｏtｏ'ｓmuscular and strong physique in his later years seems to be tale-telling

his basic temperament as that of viscous type. but also of asthenic thin bodied. His

stead-fast observances in saluting back at subordinate's, (so unlike his nominal Cheif

of staff Vice-dmiral Ugaki's),is becoming the correspondoing love of the well-dressed

orderliness in parlances and manners. As the very indication of glucous type of

temperament.His love of the carefully selected men and friends,oddly offensive and

sporadic bursts of anger that often materialized in his practical jokings all seem to be

tale-tellingof his inner psyche as the typical viscous type｡

　　　Repeating again, the resounding success of Quality Control method in the post-

war Japan (introduced by the American authority Dr. Deming just before the Korean

War)had succeeded so amazingly because not only the seeds were sown rightly on the

minds of the Japanese workers, (many of them. working girls) who had been of the

glucous, repetitions-loving type, the spiritsof which go wel卜ｎ harmony with the tea

ceremonies lover. Repetitive actions that fitin harmony with Wiederholungenzwang

that betray the existence of complex and often sophisticated love of complicated

process coupled with the yen for the purified and orderly atmosphere. These tactics

are in ａ word also those ofａ typical tea people's｡

　　　The next issue is how to add ａ grain of salt creativity (laden most heavily with

schizoid or schizopherenic temperamented) so symbolically vindicated in ａ thin or

asthenic　physiqued.　That fatty　manic-depressive　tempered　Churchill/Yamaguchi

types, who despite their bulky forms. often gifted with fast-revolving brains and ready

for actions on the instant attitude, gifted in multi-channeled receptiveness, as in

Yamaguchi at Midway, come as panacea ！

　　　Finally,we had to make mention of the workings of propaganda and publicity

departements of both navies. It is said that to the retreating ears of the survived UN

men, the American broadcast in perfect Japanese told them that the ghosts of the dead

－58－

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　JiroAnzai

incurred at the Midway would haunt the UN, as told in the ancient Noh-play's Funa

Benkei. Amazing seizure of the situation by the victors had made the defeated to take

their hats off｡

　　　The author of this thesis has not ben committing himself and his endeavors in the

self-criticalironies alone. He has only wished to emphasize the point to the effect that

now is the time for us to re-consider German Historian Ranke's saying that every age

is in ａ close relation to the almighty God. The present generation may laugh him off,

pushing off this kind of the Romantic wist-fulness, but l have to admit, the present

generation has to seriously reconsider this Rankian epigram.

　　　We know the Meiji-bred Akiyama had been ａ devout believer in religion,but we

also know our Showa warriors had behaved as if a bunch of born atheists；moreover,

they allowed atrocitiesprevail. We, the Showa men, had succeeded in terrorizing the

world over. Had our Showa-aged soldiers and sailors and General Staffs,and for that

matter had High Command officersstood up like Meiji-warriors Nogi and Togo, even

if the Japan had been defeated, the world over should have come in our defense in the

same International Tribunal Court.

　　　Had our Showa-era sailors and soldiers been upright as the Meiji bred Togo and

Nogi, and their everyday philosophy been guided in the Heike story depicted human

and humane spirits,lined with the Buddhistic concept of mercy and uncertainty of

human lifeand prosperity, or the short periodness of victories,the world all around us

had been behaving differently｡

　　　Inthe end, l stressed upon the importances of break-through to today's Japanese

problems, and suggested the future Japan, learning from the past lessons at the

Midway should be bent upon educational reforms, techno cultural innovations, and

above all enlarging domestic demands. All these l had spoken in the book published

twelve years before, June 10th, 1986.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Bibliography

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5. Bruell,T. B. Admiral Spn（nce, trans.Nango (Yomiuri, 1979).

6 . Chihaya, M. Nippon-Kaigun-no-Senryaku-Hasso (President, 1982).

-

59－

The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology　Part Ｈ

7 . Farago,L. War of Wits (Greenwood, 1976).

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19. Lord, W. Incredible Victory(Harper & Row, 1967).

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　　Submarine Actions.

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24. Prange, G. W. At Dawn We Slept (McGrat-Hill, 1981).

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27. Smith, C. B. Evidence in Camera (Chatto & Wind, 1958).

28. Stevenson, W. A Man Called Intrepid (Ballentine,1976).

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30. Toyoda, J.Namimakura Ikutabizo (Kodansha, 1973).

31. Ugaki, M. Sensoroku Vols l & II (Shuppan-kyodo，1952).

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Magazines and Periodicals

Koser, R. Die ）reussische Kriegesfuhrung im siebenjahrigen Kriege (Hist. Zeitshcrift, Bd. 92, 1904).

Anzai, J. The UN. or the Ill-omened Navy (Bungeishunjyu's Sept. 1966 issue, Vol. 44, No. 9).

＿.＿、Midway (A Case of Psycho-historicalApproach or theInfluences of Psychological

－60－

Factors upon the Battle of Midway, June 4th, 1942) (Otemon-gakuin University's10th

Anniversary Bulletin,Oct.,1976,pp.573-604）.

　　In addition,Gesammelte W&rka (CollectedWorks) or the works of Freud, Jung and

Kretschmer have been liberallymade use.