the boundaries of minimization as a technique for improving affect: good for the goose but not for...

The boundaries of minimization as a technique for improvingaffect: good for the goose but not for the gander?Kristin W. Grover1, Elizabeth C. Pinel1, Jennifer K. Bosson2, Lavonia Smith LeBeau3

1The University of Vermont2University of South Florida3Human Services Research Institute

Correspondence concerning this article shouldbe addressed to Kristin W. Grover, Departmentof Psychology, The University of Vermont, 2Colchester Avenue, John Dewey Hall,Burlington, VT 05405, USA.E-mail: [email protected]

doi: 10.1111/jasp.12127

Abstract

Research on minimization as a coping strategy suggests that it alleviates negativeaffect following threats. In contrast, research on minimization as a support-givingstrategy suggests that it does more harm than good. Does this mean that minimiza-tion works when it is self-generated, but does not when it is offered by others? Thepresent study examined the effect of self- and externally- generated minimizationson people with high and low self-esteem following a self-threat. Results suggest thatexternally-generated minimizations do not alleviate negative affect when they occurbefore the recipient has had time to cope. Discussion centers around the implica-tions of these findings for past research, as well as distinctions between how peoplewith low versus high self-esteem cope with negative events.

I don’t know anyone who could get through the daywithout two or three juicy rationalizations. They’remore important than sex.

Michael, from The Big Chill

How can people effectively help their friends and family copein times of need? One very reasonable approach mightinvolve using the strategies that work for them personally onthose whom they aim to help.As Michael intimated in The BigChill (Kasdan & Nasatir, 1983), perhaps the most commonself-employed coping strategy—one that gets used multipletimes a day—involves some form of rationalization. Peoplemay reframe their experience (e.g., “Not getting tenuregives me the freedom to entertain a new life-path”), seek outdownward comparison partners (e.g., “Daniel didn’t evenmake it past his two-year review”), or engage in downwardcounterfactuals (e.g., “At least I didn’t get accused of aca-demic misconduct”) in their efforts to repair their ownnegative affect following painful life events (e.g., not gettingtenure).

Rationalization strategies abound, but they all have acommon moral; namely, that one’s situation actually is not sobad after all. From this perspective, rationalizations mightmore appropriately be named minimizations, insofar as theyinvolve an attempt to minimize the negative implications ofone’s experience. Here, we use the term minimization insteadof rationalization because we believe the term more accu-

rately describes the process that is unique to one common setof strategies that people employ in the service of makingthemselves feel better following upsetting experiences(Folkman & Lazarus, 1990).

Research on the effectiveness of minimization tends tofocus on self-initiated strategies. For example, in their studieson the coping strategies employed by women with breastcancer, Taylor and her colleagues (Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman,1983; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985) noted the ubiquity ofdownward comparisons. Each patient seemed to have at theready someone worse-off with whom to compare: A womanwho had a lumpectomy (i.e., removal of the tumor) com-pared herself to those who had mastectomies (i.e., removal ofthe entire breast), and a woman who had a mastectomy com-pared herself to those whose cancer had “spread all over.”Importantly, self-generated downward comparisons seemeffective in helping people boost their mood during threaten-ing occurrences (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Morse & Gergen,1970; for qualifiers, see Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk,Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990).

Here, we ask whether what works for oneself works just aseffectively when done for others. If people effectively useminimization to cope with their own adversity, it stands toreason that the effectiveness of this strategy would transfer toothers in times of need. Perhaps, this explains the frequencywith which well-intentioned people offer messages thatdownplay the importance or severity of their friend’s or

bs_bs_banner

Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1717–1724

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1717–1724

family member’s experiences (e.g., “It was for the best”; “Itcould have been a lot worse”). Unfortunately, research sug-gests that these types of minimizations—which we will dis-tinguish from self-generated ones by referring to them asexternally-generated minimizations—are both ubiquitousand experienced by their recipients as entirely unhelpful(Lehman, Ellard, & Wortman, 1986; Lehman & Hemphill,1990). Could it be that minimizations from an externalsource have an altogether different effect from minimizationsthat people initiate on their own?

Researchers still do not have a clear-cut answer to thisquestion because of the dearth of experimental work on thistopic. The bulk of evidence for the ineffectiveness ofexternally-generated minimization comes from qualitativeand survey studies. From these studies, we know that peoplereceive minimizations from (presumably) well-meaningsupport providers in response to a host of painful events,including rape (Davis, Brickman, & Baker, 1991),depression (Revenson, Schiaffino, Majerovitz, & Gibofsky,1991), diagnosis with a troubling disorder or disease(Dunkel-Schetter, 1984; Hays, Magee, & Chauncey, 1994;Martin, Davis, Baron, Suls, & Blanchard, 1994; Siegel,Raveis, & Karus, 1997), and bereavement (Helmrath &Steinitz, 1978; Lehman et al., 1986), among others. Further-more, recipients of minimizations perceive them as uni-formly unhelpful (Dakof & Taylor, 1990; Ingram, Betz,Mindes, Schmitt, & Smith, 2001; Lehman & Hemphill,1990), and correlational research reveals that externally-generated minimizations predict increased psychologicaldistress among their recipients (Davis et al., 1991; Revensonet al., 1991; Siegel et al., 1997).

Although field research on externally-generated minimi-zation clearly has its strong points (i.e., it reflects theexperiences of real people experiencing real troubles), itcannot establish a causal link between externally-generatedminimization and the subsequent affect of its recipients.The most related line of experimental research, researchon downward social comparisons and downward counter-factuals, indicates that when people engage in theirown brand of minimization (hereafter referred to as self-generated minimization), they can successfully improvetheir affect (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Gilbert, Pinel,Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Markman, Gavanski,Sherman, & McMullen, 1993, 1995; Morse & Gergen, 1970;for qualifiers, see Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk et al.,1990; McMullen, 1997; McMullen & Markman, 2000).Unfortunately, this research has not examined the effects ofexternally-generated minimization.

The relevant literature points to the possibility thatexternally-generated minimizations do not facilitate copingbut that self-generated ones sometimes do. Then again, we donot know this for certain because the two have not been com-pared in the same experiment looking at the same self-threat.

The present study fills this gap in the literature by comparingthe effect of externally-generated minimization to that ofself-generated minimization. We begin by asking whyexternally-generated minimizations would hinder copingwhen self-generated ones seem to help.

We believe that the answer to this question rests upon thatwhich distinguishes the self as a messenger of minimizationsfrom the other as a messenger of minimizations. Whereasexternally-generated minimizations can make recipients feelisolated, as though others do not understand their feelings,self-generated minimizations—because they come from theself—should not have this same effect. Given the importanceof feeling understood for people’s emotional well-being(Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006;Swann, 1996) and in therapeutic settings (Ackerman &Hilsenroth, 2003), it makes sense that support providers whouse the strategy of minimization run the risk of makingrecipients feel worse.

Note that feelings of social isolation are most likely to occurwhen people suffering from a negative experience receivethose minimizations before they have had the opportunity tocope on their own. Once people have coped with a negativeexperience, chances are that they have minimized the severityof their own experience, leaving it less likely that anexternally-generated minimization will conflict with theirown interpretation of their plight. However, when peoplereceive minimizations prior to coping (i.e., before they haveminimized their own experience), they may feel particularlyisolated, and thus find it particularly challenging to cope withtheir circumstance. In fact, adding insult to injury, the isola-tion that they feel may give them another experience thatrequires coping resources. Thus, in the present study, wemanipulated not only the source (self vs. external) of a mini-mization but also the time (pre-coping vs. post-coping) atwhich it arrived.

We also considered the effects that self-esteem mayhave on participants’ reactions to externally-generatedminimizations. Given their tendency to take to heart bothinstances of social exclusion (Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary,Blevins, & Holgate, 1997) as well as experiences with failure(e.g., Brockner, 1979; Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970), peoplewith low self-esteem might feel badly regardless of thesource or timing of the minimization. This seems especiallylikely given work that indicates that people with high self-esteem use self-generated minimizations more readily thando people with low self-esteem (Blaine & Crocker, 1993).From this vantage point, we thought it possible that wewould find a moderating effect of self-esteem, such thatthe negative effect of externally-generated minimiza-tions delivered before coping would primarily affect peoplewith high self-esteem. Given past work, we thought thatpeople with low self-esteem would feel bad regardless ofcondition.

1718 Boundaries of minimization for improving affect


Overview of the present work

The present study examined whether externally-generatedminimizations are harmful, and if so, whether they hurt pri-marily when they get delivered before the recipient has had anopportunity to cope with her/his experience. To test thesequestions, we exposed participants to a negative experience(i.e., negative feedback on a test) and manipulated whetherthey generated their own minimization for the experience orwhether they were exposed to an externally-generated mini-mization, and when these minimizations occurred (pre-coping vs. post-coping). We also measured participants’baseline self-esteem. We predicted that high self-esteem par-ticipants would experience more negative affect after anexternally-generated minimization than after a self-generatedone, primarily if they received that minimization messageprior to coping.We predicted that low self-esteem participantswould experience negative affect regardless of condition.

Method

Participants

Seventy-one students (40 women, 26 men, 5 who did notindicate gender) participated in the study in exchange forcredit in an introductory psychology course. We randomlyassigned participants to condition in a 2 (minimizationsource: internal vs. external) × 2 (minimization timing:before coping vs. after coping) design, and we included natu-rally occurring differences in self-esteem as a continuousmoderator variable.

Procedure and materials

Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and wereintroduced to a study on personality and the effects of beingevaluated. They learned that they would be taking an intelli-gence test as part of the experiment, and that they would alsobe completing several questionnaires.

After reading and signing consent forms, participantscompleted Tafarodi and Swann’s (1995) self-liking and self-competence scale. This measure consists of two 10-itemsubscales. One subscale measures self-liking, or the degree towhich respondents like themselves. This subscale includesitems such as “I feel comfortable with myself” and “I have anegative attitude toward myself.” The other subscale meas-ures self-competence, or the extent to which respondents viewthemselves as competent. Sample items include “I don’tsucceed at much” and “I perform inadequately in manyimportant situations.” Respondents indicate their level ofagreement with each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We combined bothsubscales to create an overall index of self-esteem (α = .96).

After participants completed the self-esteem measure, theorder of subsequent stages of the study differed for partici-pants in the before and after coping conditions. For ease ofexplanation, we will first describe the procedure for partici-pants in the before coping condition and then indicatehow this procedure differed for those in the after copingcondition.

The “before coping” condition

To ensure that participants in the before coping conditionwould not begin the preliminary stages of coping, we hadthem undergo the source manipulation before they under-went the threat experience. Thus, immediately after com-pleting the self-esteem measure, participants in the beforecoping condition underwent the source manipulation. Thismanipulation required that they sort seven cards, each withan academic-related threat listed on it (i.e., failing out ofschool, failing multiple classes, failing a class, getting abelow average score on a test, getting a C in a class, getting aB in a class, getting an A in a class but not a perfect grade),into “serious” and “not serious” piles. On the table in frontof them, the experimenter placed a note card indicatingwhere to pile the “serious” events and where to pile the “notserious” events.

The specific instructions associated with the card-sortingtask differed depending on whether participants were in theexternal or the internal minimization condition. For those inthe external condition, the cards themselves included labelsthat read “serious” (for failing out of school, failing multipleclasses and failing a class) or“not serious”(for getting a belowaverage score on a test, getting a C in a class, getting a B in aclass, and getting an A in a class but not a perfect grade).At thestart of the card-sorting task, the experimenter gave thefollowing instructions:

Listed on each card is a negative academic outcomethat a college student could face. In previous studies wehave asked both college students and professors to ratewhether they believe these outcomes to be serious ornot. You will notice that each card is labeled as eitherserious or not serious based on how they were rated inthese previous studies. I would like you to now separatethese cards into one serious and one not serious pile.However, please be careful to note what each outcomeis and how it was rated because we will be coming backto these later in the study.

Participants received the cards arranged from the mostserious to the least serious threat and everyone sorted thecards according to the labels associated with them.

For participants in the internal condition, the cards did notinclude labels. Instead, participants received the followinginstructions:

Grover et al. 1719


Listed on each card is a negative academic outcomethat a college student could face. For each card I wouldlike you to read the outcome and decide whether youbelieve this to be a serious outcome or not and thenplace it into the serious or not serious pile based onyour decision. Please be careful to note what eachoutcome is and which pile you put it in because we willbe coming back to these later in the study.

As in the external condition, participants received the cardsordered from most to least serious. We reasoned that partici-pants would compare each outcome to the one they hadalready sorted and therefore would likely place “getting abelow average score on a test” in the “not serious” pile afterseeing“failing a class.”Indeed, all participants sorted the cardsas we intended, placing “getting a below average score on atest” in the “not serious” pile.

It is worth acknowledging that the card-sorting task doesnot resemble how such messages are most often conveyedduring real social support attempts (e.g., in the contextof a conversation about the experiencer’s painful event).Our timing manipulation, however, required that weoperationalize the minimization so that it could arrive eitherafter or before the painful event without raising suspicion,and our source manipulation required that self- andexternally-generated messages be delivered in a consistentmanner. We opted for the card-sorting task because it effec-tively communicated the minimization (i.e., “scoring belowaverage on a test is not serious”) but could also easily stemfrom either an external or internal source. Additionally, thereare times in real life when people receive minimizations inmuch the same way as we delivered them, for example, in theform of cultural truisms regarding what situations are“serious” that become ingrained in memory (e.g., LordTennyson’s “Tis better to have loved and lost than never tohave loved at all”; Neil Young’s “Better to burn out than tofade away”; nursery rhymes such as “Sticks and stones maybreak my bones but words can never hurt me”).

After sorting the cards, participants in the before conditioncompleted a 7-item baseline affect measure presented on7-point semantic differential scales (e.g., “very sad” to “veryhappy”; “very depressed” to “very elated”), where 1 indicatednegative affect and 7 indicated positive affect. Participantscircled the number on each scale that best approximated theirfeelings at that moment, and we averaged across items to yieldan index of current affect (with higher scores indicating morepositive affect; α = .65).

We insured that all participants underwent an upsettingexperience by providing them with negative feedback on theremote associates test (RAT; Mednick & Mednick, 1967). Thistest required that participants identify the common theme insets of words (e.g., sweet, for the word set sugar-sixteen-heart).Before completing the RAT, participants learned that people

scoring above 80 on the RAT exhibit exceptional levels ofintelligence, people with scores between 40 and 80 exhibitaverage levels of intelligence, and those scoring below 40exhibit below-average levels of intelligence. Note that thisexperience is comparable to the academic threat of “getting abelow average score on a test,” which they had all just sortedinto the “not serious” pile. After the participants completedthe test, the experimenter brought the test to another room“to be scored by another researcher.”

After delivering the negative RAT feedback, the experi-menter left for approximately 10 minutes (because this is howmuch time those in the after coping condition received inwhich to cope after learning of their RAT score). When theexperimenter returned, she gave the participants a packet ofquestionnaires consisting of a filler measure (that took aslong as the card-sorting task, which those in the after copingcondition completed at this point) and our main dependentvariable: a second administration of the affect measure (thesame as that used at baseline). To summarize, participants inthe before coping condition first classified their own negativeexperience (below average test score) as “not serious,” basedeither on other people’s ostensible beliefs (external minimi-zation) or their own beliefs (internal minimization). Theythen completed the baseline affect measure, completed theRAT, received a below average score, waited 10 minutes, andrated their affect for a second time.

The “after coping” condition

After signing their consent form and completing the self-esteem measure, participants in the after condition com-pleted a filler measure that took as long as the card-sortingtask and then indicated their baseline affect. Next, they tookthe RAT and received a below-average score. Note that par-ticipants in the before and after coping conditions completedthe baseline affect measure at different points in the study.Participants in the before coping condition completed thebaseline affect measure after the card-sorting task (but beforethe RAT), whereas participants in the after coping conditioncompleted it immediately after the self-esteem and fillermeasures. We introduced this variability for two reasons: (1)for all participants, we wanted to measure their baseline affectimmediately before they took the RAT and received feedback;and (2) we did not know what effect simply sorting the cardswould have on participants’ affect. To determine whethersorting the cards influenced participants’ affect, we comparedthe before and after groups on their baseline affect measureand observed no difference (F < 1).

After delivering the negative RAT feedback to participantsin the after coping condition, the experimenter left the roomfor 10 minutes to provide ample time for participants to copewith the negative feedback (see Bosson, Pinel, & Thompson,2008; Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004;



Gilbert et al., 1998). When 10 minutes had passed, theexperimenter returned to deliver the instructions for thecard-sorting task. Immediately following this card-sortingtask, participants in the after coping condition completed thesecond measure of affect. To summarize, participants in theafter coping condition completed the baseline affect measure,completed the RAT, received a below average score, andwaited 10 minutes. They then classified their negativeexperience as “not serious,” based either on other people’sostensible beliefs (external minimization) or their own beliefs(internal minimization), and then rated their affect.

Finally, the experimenter engaged all participants in a post-experimental interview followed by a complete oral andwritten debriefing.

Results

Did the source of the minimization affect participants’ reac-tions to it? If so, did the timing of the minimization matter?To broach these questions, we regressed time 2 affect onto (a)baseline affect; (b) self-esteem scores (after centering them ontheir mean); (c) timing condition (coded as −1 and 1); (d)minimization source condition (coded as −1 and 1); (e–g) alltwo-way interactions between predictors; and (h) the three-way interaction. Statistically significant predictors includedbaseline affect, β = .65, t = 7.06, p < .01; the interactionbetween timing condition and self-esteem, β = .21, t = 2.34,p < .05; and the three-way interaction between source condi-tion, timing condition, and self-esteem, β = .20, t = 2.12,p < .05. No other effects approached significance (allps > .25).

We interpreted the three-way interaction by examining thesimple effects for the two-way interaction between source ofminimization and timing of minimization separately at lowand high levels of self-esteem. At low levels of self-esteem, theonly significant finding was a main effect for baseline affect,F(1,60) = 49.82, p < .0001; no other effects approachedsignificance, ps ≥ .29. At high levels of self-esteem, baselineaffect again predicted time 2 affect, F(1,60) = 49.82, p <.0001. Additionally, the interaction between source andtiming was significant, F(1,60) = 5.10, p = .03. As illustratedin Figure 1, participants assigned to the internal minimiza-tion condition showed no differences in time 2 affect as afunction of minimization timing, t(60) = .38, p = .70 (means:before = 4.63, after = 4.36). Participants assigned to the exter-nal minimization condition experienced significantly lesspositive affect when they encountered the minimizationbefore they had time to cope (M = 4.00) than when theyencountered the minimization after they had time to cope(M = 4.76), t(60) = −2.86, p < .01. Moreover, when theyencountered the minimization before coping, participants inthe external minimization condition (M = 4.00) experiencedsignificantly less positive affect than participants in the

internal minimization condition (M = 4.63), t(60) = −2.06,p < .05. When they encountered the minimization after theyhad time to cope with their negative experience, participantsin the external minimization condition (M = 4.76) did notsuffer from less positive affect than participants in the inter-nal minimization condition (M = 4.36), t(60) = 1.14, p = .26.

Discussion

The precise effects of minimization have been unclear andopen to a number of interpretations. Whereas research onexternally-generated minimization (such as being told to“look on the bright side” or being reminded that one’s situa-tion “could be worse”) seems to suggest that minimizationdoes more harm than good, research on self-generated mini-mization suggests instead that minimization can be helpful.Here, we tested whether source could account for this dis-crepancy, and if so, whether timing of the minimizationmatters. We also asked whether self-esteem influences theeffects of minimization.

In short, we observed different effects of source andtiming as a function of self-esteem. At low levels of self-esteem, the effect of a below average test score did not differas a function of the source or timing of the minimization.People with low self-esteem felt bad after failure; the condi-tions did not matter. Conversely, at high levels of self-esteem, a below average test score only hurt when it wasminimized by an external source before participants had achance to initiate their own coping efforts. High self-esteemindividuals who received an externally-generated minimiza-tion after they had time to cope showed no signs of negativeresponse to the minimization. These results suggest thatexternal minimizations exert their effect by keeping peoplefrom activating effective coping responses. Another possible

Figure 1 Affect of participants at high levels of self-esteem as a func-tion of source and timing of minimization.

Grover et al. 1721


explanation may be that externally-generated minimiza-tions imply that the experiencer’s negative feelings inresponse to a threat are inappropriate, and this alone maymake the perceiver feel bad. Although believing one has“overreacted” could contribute to negative affect, we see noreason why this effect would emerge only in the beforecondition.

We can think of at least two reasons why people with lowself-esteem showed equal levels of affect across all condi-tions. First, given their tendency to overgeneralize failure todimensions that bear little relevance to the dimension inwhich failure occurred (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989),low self-esteem individuals may have experienced the threatdifferently from those with high self-esteem. Rather thanexperience the threat as a relatively focused failure (“I didpoorly on that test”), participants with low self-esteem mayhave experienced it as a relatively diffuse one (“I did poorlyon that test; I am clumsy and unlikable, too”). The self-generated minimization we facilitated in the current study(i.e., poor test performance is not serious) would not beexpected to work under such circumstances. One shouldalso consider the very nature of low self-esteem. Insofar aspeople with low self-esteem chronically doubt their ownself-worth, they may find it particularly difficult to “buy”their own attempts at minimization. Self-generated minimi-zation stems from the self, and people low in self-esteemtend to question their own credibility as a source of positiveor reassuring feedback. Consistent with this interpretation,Josephs, Bosson, and Jacobs (2003) found that people withlow self-esteem refused to accept self-generated positivefeedback about their performance on a novel task, butreadily accepted self-generated negative feedback abouttheir performance on the same task.

It is important to consider the possibility that affect influ-ences the quantity of externally-generated minimizationsthat people receive. If externally-generated minimizationsare associated with worse affect, it may not be that theseminimizations influence affect, but rather that affectinfluences the quantity of externally-generated minimiza-tions that people receive. Specifically, people may be moreinclined to provide minimizations to individuals who aremore distressed in the first place, compared to individualswho are less distressed. However, the present study indicatedthat participants in general were harmed by externally-generated minimizations (before they had coped), suggest-ing that although some people may be more prone toreceive these minimizations than other people, individualswho receive them before they have had time to cope shouldexperience less positive affect than people who receive themafter they have coped or people who do not receive themat all.

If externally-generated minimizations do not help dis-tressed individuals, it behooves us to ask what does. If mini-

mization hurts, would it help to do the opposite andunderscore the seriousness of people’s experiences (i.e.,maximization)? We think not, as research indicates thatrecipients do not find maximization to be a particularlyhelpful form of social support (Lehman & Hemphill, 1990).One might thus broach the question of how to help byasking what techniques recipients of social support do per-ceive as helpful. Qualitative and survey research indicatesthat recipients uniformly report emotional support (e.g.,being physically present, listening, expressing love, concern,and understanding) as the most helpful support-givingstrategy (Dakof & Taylor, 1990; Dunkel-Schetter, 1984; Hayset al., 1994; Helgeson & Cohen, 1996; Lehman & Hemphill,1990; Martin et al., 1994). Another potentially effectivestrategy may involve focusing on the component of the selfthat has been threatened (e.g., confidence) rather than onthe negative experience itself, in much the same way thatSteele and his colleagues restore feelings of integrity follow-ing a dissonance-inducing experience (Steele, 1988). Untilfurther research is done, these possible solutions will retaina speculative quality. Thus, future experimental research onthis topic is needed to determine what indeed works to helpease people’s suffering in response to self-threats big andsmall.

As with all research, there are limitations that should beconsidered when interpreting the results of this study. First,the study was conducted with a largely homogenous sample(i.e., college students), so we cannot be certain whether theresults generalize to the broader population. Second, as dis-cussed in the Method section, the card-sorting task that weused to deliver the minimizations was somewhat artificial.While there are times when people receive minimizationsin this way (e.g., through cultural truisms, when readingmagazine articles that convey that certain situations are notthat serious), most often they are received in the context of aconversations about the experiencer’s painful event. Wechose this task in order to deliver the self- and externally-generated minimizations (across time) in a consistent andcontrolled manner, which we believe is an importantfirst step in establishing the relationship between theseminimizations and subsequent affect. Nonetheless, futureresearch should replicate these findings using a more mun-danely real procedure.

Concluding remarks

The study reported here strives to clarify the confusion thathas lingered surrounding the effectiveness of minimization asa coping and support-giving strategy. Whereas self-generatedminimization works for some people (i.e., people high in self-esteem), it appears that externally-generated minimizationmay be harmful, particularly before people have had the



opportunity to cope. Although it may be true that one cannotget through the day without a few juicy minimizations, thegoose would do well to refrain from chiming in until thegander has generated a few minimizations of her own.

Acknowledgment

The authors wish to thank Janice Yanushka Bunn for her sta-tistical guidance.

References

Ackerman, S. J., & Hilsenroth, M. J. (2003).A review of therapist characteristicsand techniques positively impacting thetherapeutic alliance. Clinical PsychologyReview, 23, 1–33.

Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. (1993).Effects of social comparison direction,threat, and self-esteem on affect, self-evaluation, and expected success. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 64,708–722.

Blaine, B., & Crocker, J. (1993). Self-esteemand self-serving biases in reactions topositive and negative events. In R. F.Baumeister (Ed.), Self-esteem: The puzzleof low self-regard (pp. 55–85). New York:Plenum Press.

Bosson, J. K., Pinel, E. C., & Thompson, J. K.(2008). The affective consequences ofminimizing women’s body image con-cerns. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 32,257–266.

Brockner, J. (1979). The effects of self-esteem, success-failure, and self-consciousness on task performance.Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 37, 1732–1741.

Buunk, B. P., Collins, R. L., Taylor, S. E.,VanYperen, N. W., & Dakof, G. A. (1990).The affective consequences of socialcomparison: Either direction has its upsand downs. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 59, 1238–1249.

Dakof, G. A., & Taylor, S. E. (1990). Victims’perceptions of social support: What ishelpful from whom? Journal of Personal-ity and Social Psychology, 58, 80–89.

Davis, R. C., Brickman, E., & Baker, T.(1991). Supportive and unsupportiveresponses of others to rape victims:Effects on concurrent victim adjustment.American Journal of Community Psychol-ogy, 19, 443–451.

Dunkel-Schetter, C. (1984). Social supportand cancer: Findings based on patient

interviews and their implications. TheJournal of Social Issues, 40, 77–98.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. (1990). Copingand emotion. In N. L. Stein, B. Leventhal,& T. Trabasso (Eds.), Psychological andbiological approaches to emotion (pp.313–332). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates, Inc.

Gibbons, F. X., & Gerrard, M. (1991).Downward comparison and coping withthreat. In J. Suls & T. A. Wills (Eds.),Social comparison: Contemporary theoryand research (pp. 317–345). Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.

Gilbert, D. T., Lieberman, M. D.,Morewedge, C. K., & Wilson, T. D.(2004). The peculiar longevity of thingsnot so bad. Psychological Science, 15,14–19.

Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D.,Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998).Immune neglect: A source of durabilitybias in affective forecasting. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 75,617–638.

Hays, R. B., Magee, R. H., & Chauncey, S.(1994). Identifying helpful and unhelpfulbehaviours of loved ones: The PWA’sperspective. AIDS Care, 6, 379–392.

Helgeson, V. S., & Cohen, S. (1996). Socialsupport and adjustment to cancer: Rec-onciling descriptive, correlational, andintervention research. Health Psychology,15, 135–148.

Helmrath, T. A., & Steinitz, E. M. (1978).Death of an infant: Parental grieving andthe failure of social support. The Journalof Family Practice, 6, 785–790.

Ingram, K. M., Betz, N. E., Mindes, E. J.,Schmitt, M. M., & Smith, N. G. (2001).Unsupportive responses from othersconcerning a stressful live event: Devel-opment of the unsupportive social inter-actions inventory. Journal of Social andClinical Psychology, 20, 173–207.

Josephs, R. A., Bosson, J. K., & Jacobs, C. G.(2003). Self-esteem maintenance pro-

cesses: Why low self-esteem may beresistant to change. Personality and SocialPsychology Bulletin, 29, 920–933.

Kasdan, L., & Nasatir, M. (Producers), &Kasdan, L. (Director). (1983). The BigChill [Motion picture]. USA: ColumbiaPictures.

Kernis, M. H., Brockner, J., & Frankel, B. S.(1989). Self-esteem and reactions tofailure: The mediating role of over-generalization. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 57, 707–714.

Lehman, D. R., Ellard, J. H., & Wortman,C. B. (1986). Social support for thebereaved: Recipients’ and providers’ per-spectives on what is helpful. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, 54,438–446.

Lehman, D. R., & Hemphill, K. J. (1990).Recipients’ perceptions of supportattempts and attributions for supportattempts that fail. Journal of Social andPersonal Relationships, 7, 563–574.

Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman,S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1993). Themental simulation of better and worsepossible worlds. Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, 29, 87–109.

Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman,S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1995). Theimpact of perceived control on the imagi-nation of better or worse possible worlds.Personality and Social Psychology Bul-letin, 21, 588–595.

Martin, R., Davis, G. M., Baron, R. S., Suls,J., & Blanchard, E. B. (1994). Specificityin social support: Perceptions of helpfuland unhelpful provider behaviors amongirritable bowel syndrome, headache, andcancer patients. Health Psychology, 13,432–439.

McMullen, M. N. (1997). Affective con-trasts and assimilation in counterfactualthinking. Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 33, 77–100.

McMullen, M. N., & Markman, K. D.(2000). Downward counterfactuals and

Grover et al. 1723


motivation: The wake-up call and thePangloss effect. Personality and SocialPsychology Bulletin, 26, 575–584.

Mednick, S. A., & Mednick, M. T. (1967).Examiner’s manual: Remote associatestest. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Morse, S., & Gergen, K. J. (1970). Socialcomparison, self-consistency, and theconcept of self. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 16, 148–156.

Nezlek, J. B., Kowalski, R. M., Leary,M. R., Blevins, T., & Holgate, S. (1997).Personality moderators of reactions tointerpersonal rejection: Depressionand trait self-esteem. Personality andSocial Psychology Bulletin, 23, 1235–1244.

Pinel, E. C., Long, E. C., Landau, M. J.,Alexander, K., & Pyszczynski, T. (2006).Seeing I to I: A pathway to inter-personal connectedness. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 90,243–257.

Revenson, T. A., Schiaffino, K. M.,Majerovitz, D. S., & Gibofsky, A. (1991).Social support as a double-edged sword:The relation of positive and problematicsupport to depression among rheuma-toid arthritis patients. Social Science andMedicine, 33, 807–813.

Shrauger, J. S., & Rosenberg, S. (1970). Self-esteem and the effects of success andfailure feedback on performance. Journalof Personality, 38, 404–417.

Siegel, K., Raveis, V. H., & Karus, D. (1997).Illness-related support and negativenetwork interactions: Effects on HIV-infected men’s depressive symptomatol-ogy. American Journal of CommunityPsychology, 25, 395–420.

Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of

the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advancesin experimental social psychology, Vol. 21:Social psychological studies of the self: Per-spectives and programs (pp. 261–302). SanDiego, CA: Academic Press.

Swann, W. B., Jr. (1996). Self-traps: Theelusive quest for higher self-esteem. NewYork: W. H. Freeman.

Tafarodi, R. W., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (1995).Self-liking and self-competence asdimensions of global self-esteem: Initialvalidation of a measure. Journal of Per-sonality Assessment, 65, 322–342.

Taylor, S. E., Wood, J. V., & Lichtman, R. R.(1983). It could be worse: Selective evalu-ation as a response to victimization. TheJournal of Social Issues, 39, 19–40.

Wood, J. V., Taylor, S. E., & Lichtman, R. R.(1985). Social comparison in adjustmentto breast cancer. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 49, 1169–1183.



the boundaries of minimization as a technique for improving affect: good for the goose but not for...

Documents