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Greece & Turkey in the 21st century

Editor' s noteGreece’s accession in the European Community in the 1980s had a profound impact on the country’s political, societal and economic

development. Hence, there is no doubt that economic prospects will increased significantly if a way is found to address uneasy rela-

tions with Turkey and enhance regional stability.

Only a few years after the end of the Cold War the new context offered for a redefinition of roles and identities in this relationship

in an attempt to build a culture of cooperation, on the basis of mutual trust and interests. Greece’s decision to lift its veto and grant

candidate status to Turkey at the ΕU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 was the result of a paramount shift in Greece's foreign

policy. Before that, the pain and sorrow from the lethal earthquakes that struck both countries in 1999 became fertile ground for the

emergence of a strong feeling of solidarity among the Greek and Turkish peoples. In fact, it was a clear political message of peace

and cooperation, dispelling the misunderstandings of the past that Greeks and Turks are “eternal enemies” unable to live together.

But what were the reasons for the major change in Greece’s foreign policy vis-ΰ-vis Turkey? Was this fundamental reorientation of

Greece’s strategy the result of a rational recognition of Greece’s new strategic needs and priorities, of a more in-depth ideational

change related to a collapse of the traditional – and reigning – orthodoxy about how to deal with the ‘threat from the east’ or of a

combination of both? What were the particular goals the new strategy was aiming at achieving and, most importantly, to what ex-

tent had the new strategy managed through its implementation to affect Turkey’s behavior and/or its definition of national identity

and interests? To what extent had the assumption of power by a conservative government, in March 2004, resulted in an alteration

for the better – the so-called refinement – or for the worse – the so-called invalidation – of the strategy adopted by the socialists?

And perhaps, most importantly, what are the plans of the newly-elected socialist government in Greece?

All these issues, including the developments relating to the current economic crisis were discussed in the international conference

“Greek-Turkish Relations” organized by the Center for Progressive Policy Research, under the Auspicies of the Hellenic Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Indeed, the Greek economic meltdown can be turned to the advantage of both Turkey and Greece, participants in the

KEPP conference have said, stressing the benefits of a solidarity visit to Greece by Turkish high officials and leading businessmen to

boost bilateral relations both politically and economically. This special issue includes some of the most interesting speeches delivered

in the international conference, offering to the public an insight view of this complex relationship in times of hightened crisis. Last

week visit of Prime Minister’s Erdogan and his team stress the importance of resetting relations to exit the crisis.

Dimitris Xenakis

In cooperation with the Center

for Progressive Policy Research

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ISSN 1791-2237

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A quarterly review on European integrationSE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

Pavlos ApostolidisGetting out of the dead lock

cover story 28 - 30

cover story 18 - 20

Selim EgeliChallenges & prospects

cover story 12 - 13

Dimitris DroutsasBecoming pillars of stability

cover story 8 - 10

Yannos PapantoniouWorking together

www.bridge-mag.com

Evangelos VenizelosWe could do the reverse

cover story 36 - 38

cover story 38 - 39

Volkan Vural Cooperation & friendship

Christos MakridisThe democrating opening

cover story 41 - 42

cover story 31

Constantinos AntonopoulosPolitical stability & economic growth

Dimitris AvramopoulosThe more we delay

cover story 32 - 33

Constantinos ZeposOpportunities come out of crises

cover story 22 - 26

contents

There is no doubt that in the last 50 years

the Greek –Turkish relations have affected

the policies not only of the two aforemen-

tioned countries, but also those that are third

countries which try to capitalize or exploit,

rather, if you like, the tension between the

two countries to promote their own interest.

But we are not going to look only to the

past. That is wrong. We all know, particu-

larly those of us who have dealt with foreign

policy issues, we all know that the foreign

policy of Greece and Turkey is based on past

experience, and I am talking about events

that have taken place in the course of the

centuries.

We must also take into account what

is happening in the rest of the world

but also what the aspirations of the two

countries are.

One main aim is on our mind how to

further improve our relations, how to en-

hance cooperation even further and to be

able to become true friends.

I would like to say that such efforts have

been undertaken in the last few years, have

happened in the past as well. At the end of

the ’70s, for example. Later on we had the

Meeting at Davos between Turgut Ozal and

Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Ministers

of the two countries. And again in the early

‘90s there was another such effort to bring

the two countries closer together.

And I would like to say that for 10 years

now there has been a systematic effort to

further improve Turkish –Greek relations

and Turkish –Greek cooperation.

This improvement in the relation of the

two countries actually is proven in many

ways. We have improved cooperation in

many, many sectors, not just tourism, but also

in the economy and other sectors as well.

And we also have high level visits, and

I am talking about military officials who are

going to the countries. And we also see that

there were military officers who had come

to Greece but also the Greek head of the

armed forces had also visited Turkey. So, I

think this is good because it helped the two

countries come closer together.

But we must be realists and we must be

objective as can be. I would like to say that

the Turkish-Greek relations are not ideal.

And this does not come to us as a surprise.

There is a long standing relationship

between the two countries. It is centuries

old. And it is very, very difficult to take away

all the distrust that exist on either side, be-

cause this is something that cannot easily be

forgotten or done away with.

And there are always forces on either

side that do not think of the improvement

in Greek –Turkish relationship in a posi-

tive way. They don’t want this to happen.

And actually they would like to stop it from

happening.

I think that the greatest obstacle that

we have ever encountered in this rapproche-

ment is ignorance. And I am not talking

about not knowing the sides, the views of

either side. The diplomats of the Minister of

Foreign Affairs know these views. But some

times people don’t understand why a cer-

By Yannos Papantoniou

Working together Working together

8 9

tain opinion is expressed and why a certain

behavior exists.

So, we have to have good understand-

ing. We have to have a thorough under-

standing of why things are the way they are

today. Otherwise it will be difficult to have a

common understanding, and there is actu-

ally room for misunderstanding, for friction

and sometimes some things are blown away

out of proportion and they appear to be

more significant than what they actually are.

The economic situation today actu-

ally can help promote greater understanding

between the two countries.

People have not changed priorities in

the world. The way things are is not what it

used to be. My generation and the previous

generation constantly believed in growth.

And we saw that living standards kept get-

ting better and better. So, there was a good

outlook.

But we see that now that the world

has changed, we see that this progress can

not be a given. We cannot considered it as

something that will happen no matter what.

All countries now face financial prob-

lems. All countries need to find a way out

of the crisis. No country in the world has re-

mained untouched by the global crisis. And

this actually is something that we Greeks

and Turks need to understand.

In the previous decades we were inter-

ested in acquiring more and more weapons.

And we see what happened, for example

one side used to buy some armament sys-

tem and then the other country were tried

to catch up and try to purchase a similar

system.

So, we were actually competing in a

way. But this is something we should no

longer do, we have to stop being competi-

tive, we have to work together in a creative

way, between security and economic de-

velopment, because this is to the interest of

both people.

This is what the times dictate. And this is

a message conveyed to all of us, because we

all are facing this crisis and we are actually

feeling it very strongly.

Turkey has now become a strong pe-

ripheral power. It is a member of the G20. Its

economy is very dynamic, quite surprisingly

so, it is remarkable. Its position is a strate-

gic, if you like, from the geographical point

of view.

We all can see that Turkey is becoming

an energy hub. So we have natural gas, we

have oil and the pipelines. We see that a lot

of these pipelines will pass through Turkey,

and there are a lot of energy giants, a lot of

companies represented by Russia, the US,

the European Union, and all these compa-

nies are fighting one other trying to secure

these energy sources.

So, Turkey has expressed its will to be-

come a member of the European Union. And

I think that we Greeks should see this in a

positive light.

Greeks and Turks have a common in-

terest, and that is to belong to one family,

the family of the European Union. Greece

supports the accession of Turkey to the Eu-

ropean Union. But of course there is a pre-

requisite that Turkey has to fully meet all the

pre-accession criteria.

in a way in a way

cover story

We firmly believe that the accession of

Turkey to the European Union will be posi-

tive, will be good for Turkey itself first and

foremost, because it will modernize itself

very quickly, it will be able to meet all mod-

ern challenges.

We had no land borders with other Eu-

ropean Union member states. But the more

countries around us become members of

the European Union, the better of Greece,

but also for its neighbors.

And I think that a lot of thorny issues

would be also in result, for example the Ae-

gean dispute and the Cyprus issue.

On the other hand Greece, as we know,

is in the midst of a crisis. And I think it is bat-

tered more than many other countries in the

eurozone.

But today Greece has a government it is

being supported by its partners in the euro-

zone, and it fully believes in the recovery of the

economy. And we believe that very soon will

be able to go back to positive growth rates.

The coming one or two years are go-

ing to be very difficult years, but we firmly

believe that the government with the mea-

sures that it is willing to undertake will help

Greece recover from its problems, and it

will also push forward the great changes

that Greece is in need of in order to become

powerful once again.

Let us not forget that Greece actively

participates in what is happening in Europe.

I would like to say that we are actively taking

part in all discussions in Europe, and we are

factor of stability in the Balkans.

Moreover trade relations have greatly

improved between Greece and Turkey, and

this actually promotes political relations.

Lets not forget that everything is part of

a puzzle. We cannot establish economic re-

lations without also promoting political rela-

tions. So, these two things are inter-related.

It is essential to congratulate the Greek

and Turkish businessmen who have under-

taken important initiatives in the last few

years to further enhance this cooperation.

The Greek government attributes great

importance to its relations with Turkey. To-

day we have in the Government Andreas Pa-

pandreou who is in favor of rapprochement

and this actually is proof of the great interest

we attached to improvement of Greek –

Turkish relations.

We have with us today a lot of people

from Greece and Turkey who have helped

bring Greece and Turkey closer together. I

know that there are a lot of things that we

don’t share. But we also have a lot of things

in common. We are different personalities,

but we all believe that all problems will al-

ways remain unsolved.

We cannot always talk about the past,

because that is like resigning ourselves to

our fate. It is not good to be pessimists, we

cannot just accept the situation as it is. We

have to move forward.

We can break this vicious circle of ten-

sion and of crisis arising every time. This will

be good for stability because there will be

peace and prosperity in the region. It will be

good for our peoples.

Yannos Papantoniou is the President of the

Centre for Progressive Policy Research

(KEPP), former Minister of Economy & Fi-

nance and of National Defense of the Hel-

lenic Republic

10 11

The historical course of the two coun-

tries has been punctuated by major en-

counters, alternating rapprochements and

clashes. The significance of these encounters

has been set down and interpreted, and is a

collective frame of reference for our peoples.

It can’t be lost, it can’t be erased, and it

can’t be glossed over. It is what it is. And to

a significant extent – as one would expect

– it impacts the relations between the two

states in the modern era.

But the manner in which the historical

past colours modern developments, impact-

ing them positively or negatively, is – in my

view – a matter of political choice.

And I would like to focus on this point.

Our choice – the choice of George

Papandreou’s government – is clear: we

choose to utilize historical experience to

brighten, rather than darken, the prospects

for Greek-Turkish relations. This, I remind

you, is what we endeavoured to do from

1999-2004, when George Papandreou was

again at the helm of Greek foreign policy.

And at that time – again, I must remind

you – our efforts produced tangible results

in many sectors, particularly in our economic

relations.

In practical terms, this choice we have

made means that we are once again explor-

ing the potential for cooperation and under-

standing on a number of issues of mutual

interest; issues on which cooperation and

understanding are or can become feasible.

It means that we are identifying and

exploiting opportunities and positive turns

of events. We ourselves are creating these

opportunities, taking the necessary initia-

tives and building relations of trust and

good neighbourliness in the interest of the

peoples of the two countries – first and

foremost – and in the interest of the wider

region. In short, through history and its les-

sons, we are pursuing the right to prospects,

development and improvement in Greek-

Turkish relations, to the benefit of our states

and their peoples.

And this brings us to the second point I

want to develop: How the political choice we

made in the past impacted developments in

Greek-Turkish relations.

I hope you will agree with me when

I say that at this time the sector in which

there is the greatest activity is bilateral eco-

nomic and trade cooperation. And we must

admit that the impressive growth in our

bilateral economic transactions is due in no

small part to the political courage and vision

shown by the Greek government at that time

in concluding a broad spectrum of bilateral

agreements with its neighbour. Fourteen

agreements were signed between 1999 and

2004, and most of them concerned – more

or less directly – the economic life of the

two countries.

I would like to be more specific and

point to some examples.

In 2000 and 2003, respectively, Greece

and Turkey signed the Agreements on the

Mutual Promotion and Protection of Invest-

ments and on the Avoidance of Double Taxa-

tion of Income. Today, these agreements are

the basic pillars of the bilateral institutional

framework. As we speak, total Greek invest-

ments in Turkey – in a broad range of sec-

tors – have surpassed $6 billion.

But what is also important is the growth

that has been achieved in trade transactions

between the two countries. Suffice it to say,

the volume of our bilateral trade in 2008

surpassed €2.3 billion, whereas in 1999 it

was at €669 million. Despite the difficult

economic state of affairs on a global level,

our bilateral trade transactions have the

necessary momentum to return soon to a

growth trend.

Renewed efforts to remove obstacles

– tariff-related and otherwise – within the

framework of the development of mutu-

ally beneficial cooperation between the two

countries will contribute in this direction.

Moreover, particular emphasis should

be put on cooperation between Greek and

Turkish entrepreneurs on joint ventures in

our countries and in third countries, in vari-

ous sectors of common interest. We already

have good examples of this in the energy

and construction sectors.

Progress in bilateral tourism coop-

eration has also been noteworthy in recent

years, though there is still much room for

growth. For example, major opportunities

can be created for entrepreneurs in the tour-

ism sector through the creation of common

package tours aimed at attracting tourists

from third countries.

I left the most critical sector for last:

energy, and specifically the Interconnector

Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI), a project of ma-

jor importance for energy supplies. But we

mustn’t overlook the excellent opportunities

for cooperation opening up in renewable en-

ergy sources, bearing in mind the significant

dynamic both countries have in this sector.

We now come to Turkey’s European

perspective.

Greece’s position on this matter is

well known and crystal clear: We support

Turkey’s European perspective. We want to

By Dimitris Droutsas

becoming pillars

12 13

see a Turkey that has implemented all of

the reforms required for its accession to the

European Union. If Turkey meets the prereq-

uisites, it deserves full membership. Talk of

a ‘special’ or ‘privileged’ relationship reduces

Europe’s influence on Turkey and muddies

the EU’s message. I reiterate our goal – a

goal agreed upon unanimously by the 27

member states of the Union: a Turkey that

will be a full member, provided it meets all

of its obligations to the European Union and

the member states.

Achieving the goal of accession has so

far been a long and often arduous process

for Turkey, just as it is for every candidate

country, and just as it was for Greece. A

process that needs to be worked through

even as critical domestic realignment is un-

der way. However gruelling and radical it is,

this process is necessary if Turkey is to really

change and become capable of joining the

EU. I have said this before, and it is worth

saying again. The Turkey that joins the EU

will not be the Turkey of today or the Turkey

of the past. It will be tomorrow’s Turkey; a

European Turkey that will have adapted fully

to the European acquis and carried out the

necessary radical reforms.

Greece’s support for Turkey’s European

perspective is sincere and is founded on prin-

ciples and values. But that does not mean

that the bar can be lowered – not even in

the slightest – with regard to the obligation

to meet all the criteria and prerequisites.

We support Turkey’s candidacy both

politically and in deed. Just recently, we pro-

posed to Turkey – anew – that we provide

technical support on issues concerning the

accession negotiations.

It is not easy to make progress on the

road to accession. It presupposes two things

in particular.

First, the normalization of Turkey’s rela-

tions with the Republic of Cyprus, which will

do much to boost Turkey’s accession course.

We need to find a solution on the Cy-

prus issue. A just and viable solution. A Euro-

pean solution for a united Cyprus. We need

to free Cyprus of all forms of dependency,

from occupation forces. We need to free Cy-

prus of dividing walls that have no place in

the European family. We all need to support

the negotiation process in Cyprus. And the

President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris

Christofias, is aware of Greece’s – and the

Greek government’s – belief in and support

for in his efforts.

Second, the speedy and effective pro-

motion of domestic reforms and respect for

good neighbourly relations. And – of course

– meeting all obligations to the Greek mi-

nority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Only

in this way can Turkey send the right mes-

sage to European public opinion: the mes-

sage that Turkey is able and determined to

join the great European family.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

No effort has any chance of success if it

isn’t backed by strategy, composure, con-

sensus and a sense of responsibility.

On the shifting sands of international

relations, it has been Greece’s longstanding

pursuit for its relations with other countries

to be founded on principles and values such

as the promotion of good neighbourly rela-

tions; the peaceful coexistence and prosper-

ity of peoples; respect for international law,

legality and human rights; the pursuit of

global and regional security and stability.

It is through this prism that we approach

our relations with Turkey.

And for this reason, the effort we are

making should not be undermined by spe-

cies of conduct that are incompatible with

international law and the European acquis.

This conduct needs to cease if we want to

talk about real rapprochement with sub-

stantial content.

As I said, Turkey is going through a dif-

ficult time of domestic change. At the same

time, we continue to see dangerous, pro-

vocative and rash practices, as in the recent

entry of Turkish aircraft into the airspace of

the Andros firing range. This has to stop.

Conduct such as this has no place in the rela-

tions of trust that we want to build.

But is this reason to abandon our ef-

forts? Frankly, no. In fact, it is good reason

to intensify our efforts. We want to invest in

a future of peace. With cautious, measured

steps. At the right pace. And always with the

serious preparation that is necessary. If we

succeed, we will create a huge “peace divi-

dend” for our countries and peoples. A peace

dividend that will be clear from defence

spending in the difficult economic crisis we

are experiencing.

For Greece, rapprochement between

the two countries is a sincere choice. Greece

aims to utilize the whole range of bilateral

cooperation. But this is neither uncondi-

tional nor without rules. I stress the need for

absolute respect for the territorial integrity

and sovereign rights of Greece; the need for

respect of international law and interna-

tional treaties.

of stability

Dimitris Droutsas is the Alternate Minister

of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

cover story

Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.

I am really happy to be here. I really

am pleased, because I am addressing such

an illustrious audience. Let me warmly

thank KEPP, the Center for Progressive Pol-

icy Research and Yannos Papantoniou, its

President, in particular, my dear friend and

colleague.

So thank you for giving us the oppor-

tunity to meet in an attempt to promote

Greek-Turkish relations. I would like to say

that the title of this Conference is very ambi-

tious and it is very broad.

I know that a lot of interesting things

have been mentioned this morning and I

am really sorry that I was not able to attend

the morning panel. Unfortunately, this was

impossible; so I actually come in and I am

doing so in a sort of violence manner.

I just came in all of the sudden, I just

barged in. But I would like to express certain

official views; and I hope that by doing so, I

will contribute to a lively conversation, a lively

dialogue after the end of the list of speakers.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the last few

days we have witnessed – and this is the

case in all international organizations and in

all countries of the world – we are all care-

fully and anxiously monitoring what is hap-

pening in Turkey, in our neighboring country.

We are monitoring a clash between

the political system and the army. I think

that right now, what we see unfolding is

something that will hope will quickly be

diffused. There is a lot of tension; we hope

that this will not escalate; we hope that

this will be diffused.

Because what we want to have in Turkey

is a government that has been democratical-

ly elected, a politically strong government, a

government that can undertake strong radi-

cal reforms.

We want it to be able to help change

things as regards Greece-Turkey relations.

So for us it is very important to avoid this

export of internal tension. We don’t want an

internal crisis to spill over to other countries.

Yesterday and the day before yesterday,

I was able to talk to my counterpart, Mr.

Gonul, in Majorca, in the margins of the in-

formal defense ministers’ council in the EU,

where my Turkish counterpart came to par-

ticipate in the dialogue which was held be-

tween the EU and the candidate countries.

And I was really happy to see him once

again, because I see that the current govern-

ment in Turkey is really determined to act in

a responsible, but also moderate manner.

I also see that people now understand

why we do not want the internal institu-

tional or political crisis to spill over to other

countries. You understand that for us it

is very important to have stability in the

wider region.

It is very important for us to know that

in both countries we have governments that

are capable of dealing with the problems

that arise in a swift and moderate manner.

But we also want to transcend and we

want to do things that are very important.

So at the same time, it is also very impor-

tant to respect one another and to further

strengthen the confidence building mea-

sures that we have established between our

two countries.

I think it is very important to have these

channels of communication and to use them

in order to overcome problems and ten-

sions that take place without the presence

of governments. And I say “governments”

and I use the plural, because I do not want to

focus only on the Turkish government; I am

talking about both governments.

It is very important to respect these

confidence building measures and to imple-

ment them. It is also very important to make

use of these direct communication channels

at all levels and lately we have focused on

this, because both sides have fully realized

how fruitful such contacts can be.

Let us not forget that both countries

experience the crisis. We both are feeling

the crisis. You see that we have a big fis-

cal deficit and a fiscal debt. We know that

military spending is an exorbitant amount

of money; it is a very heavy burden for our

two countries.

We have entered into a vicious circle; we

have to find a way to break this vicious circle

with the least possible damage.

I think that we all understand in Greece

By Evangelos Venizelos

14 15

I think that we all understand in Greece

that the economic crisis means that we lose

our diplomatic strength, but the same ap-

plies for Turkey. And let us not forget that

the Greek and Turkish economies are inter-

related in many ways.

So when we have the real economy, we

should also take this into account. There is a

lot of interrelation between the two coun-

tries. This has been the case from the time

of Andreas Syggros, up to the time of the ac-

quisition of the Finance Bank by the National

Bank of Greece.

So I think that we could learn our lesson

and we should take this great opportunity to

overcome our problems and we can have a

more courageous, a more daring economic

partnership between the two countries, at a

regional but also at a wider level as well, not

just on the regional level.

Of course, as you all understand, I am

being very optimistic when I say all this

and it is easier said than done. It is difficult

to move from theory to practice. It is dif-

ficult to move from written text to actual

implementation.

I think that the problem that we have

with the Turkish growth model is quite clear.

I think that the Greek politicians see eye to

eye on what our problems are with Turkey.

We clearly support Turkey’s accession

to the EU; we want Turkey to become a full

member of the EU, because we very well

understand that in the second decade of the

21st century now, all be it belatedly, we see

that the eastern issue is being dissolved, be-

cause we have had the western orientation

of Turkey and the anti-western orientation.

This is something that has been dis-

cussed for two centuries. So there is no

doubt that our answer to this dilemma is

positive. We are in favor of the western ori-

entation of Turkey.

This is something that has been accepted

by the US, this is an answer that has not yet

been given in a final, irrevocable and definite

way by the member-states of the EU.

There are many misgivings and many

reservations by certain member-states of

the EU, but Greece has put forward many

arguments in favor of EU accession of Turkey;

and we will mention it time and again.

Because we fully understand that regard-

less whether this objective is achieved, the

fact that this objective has been set and that

this objective is pursued is very important.

Because what we are actually support-

ing is the way in which this country is ac-

tually organized. So we are supporting the

political decision expressed by Turkey to

think in a European way and to agree with

the community.

So, as I mentioned, we talk about EU law

and we are talking about culture here as well.

This is not self-evident for any European soci-

ety and for any member-state of the EU; and it

is not easy nor self-evident for a society such

as the Turkish society, for an economy such

as the Turkish economy, for a country where

there are many problems, regional inequali-

ties, minority issues, institutional issues, that

are now unraveling, as I said in Turkey and in

the beginning of my speech.

So we know what we want and we

clearly express our opinions. And we sin-

cerely hope that Turkey, as a nation, as a so-

ciety, as a political system, will want this too

and will confirm its determination to do so.

Because I think that this is a strate-

gic choice made by Turkey. We want this

strategic decision to be clearly, if you like,

formulated.

So I think that we try to show our un-

derstanding, we try to be moderate in what-

ever we do and we know that Turkey is part

of Europe and Asia, but it also is a country

which is full of contradictions.

But sometimes, this is also useful. It

helps further enrich the diversity of the EU.

So Turkey is a country, which is mainly Mus-

lim, but it is a secular state, it is a very strong

regional power and we carefully monitor all

Turkish initiatives in relation to Iran, Iraq, and

the Kurdish issue.

We also see the bilateral relations be-

tween Turkey and Israel and the fluctuations

therein, what is happening with the Russian

Federation, the US and so on and so forth.

We see that there have been a lot of

courageous initiatives between Turkey and

Armenia. We do not ignore any of the fea-

tures that Turkey has and we are certain that

our Turkish friends actually watch us closely

as well and they know what the strategic

cover story

decisions are of Greece, of a country such

as Greece, which is a member-state of the

EU, a member of the eurozone and, together

with Turkey, the oldest member of NATO in

southeastern Europe.

So we coexist in the Alliance and this

has been the case since 1952. But this co-

existence did not help us solve any of our

problems. On the contrary, I would say that

problems linked to the structure and func-

tioning of the Alliance may have been fuel-

ling the tension between the two countries.

And I am talking about the Aegean and

the control over the Aegean, the new man-

agement structure of NATO and other mat-

ters as well. For example, the distribution of

positions. I am talking about who actually

gets to sit in which commission in NATO and

other things that are also very important

should be mentioned.

We are talking about flags being put

forward; we are talking about the correla-

tion of powers as well. But sometimes, we

have the impression that we have cold war

structures still in place in NATO. Things that

are outdated, that have nothing to do with

the current relation of powers.

This has nothing to do with trying to

find a new strategic doctrine for NATO; so

maybe we should think of a different, more

radical approach as regards to the strategic

doctrine of NATO.

But also, the truly new, not the new, but

an even different structure of NATO, which

could rid us of tensions that exist and which

would allow us to resolve problems that

have been troubling us for many years and

which do not help us create a more positive

climate in our relations.

I know that I am insinuating a lot, may-

be more than I should be; but I am certain

that those of you who know the problems in

depth, those who deal with these problems

at a military level, know very well what I am

trying to get across.

They understand why we are deter-

mined to actually resolve these issues. We

have to safeguard integrity; we have to safe-

guard our dignity and our sovereignty. But

we have to find solutions that are acceptable

within the framework of the Alliance, but

which will also help us diffuse the tension

which has been there for 35 years.

Problems such as what is happening in

Cyprus, the existence of occupying forces,

the fragmentation of the island of Cyprus,

the fact that the two communities and the

heads of the two communities have not

been able to find a solution to their prob-

lems, so that Cyprus can enter not just the

EU and the Eurozone as one united island.

But let us not forget that if the problem

were resolved in Cyprus, Turkey would be

given a boost to enter the EU as well.

So I would like to say, and this was

mentioned by the Ambassador, Mr. Zepos,

we can talk about the continental shelf is-

sue first, because this is a very important

issue, but we could approach it in many

different ways.

What is not important though is to start

from the most difficult aspect of this issue.

I think we could do the reverse. Maybe we

could try to resolve certain issues pertaining

to basic principles, meaning we should agree

on certain principles first and foremost, i.e.

that the islands have a continental shelf and

that they have all the other zones provided

for by the international law of the sea.

So we can then accept what was ac-

cepted in the agreement between Albania

and Greece and Italy and Greece; and I am

talking about the delimitation of marine

zones and the continental shelf.

We can talk about the middle line,

we can talk about the baselines; and after

having reached an agreement on all these

things, we can then see how easy it is to talk

about the breadth of the territorial waters

and the breadth of the airspace.

Because then there will be confidence,

there will be a will to go beyond the prob-

lem and to try and find a solution to a series

of problems. These problems are like the

links in a chain and one affects the other.

But what is very important is the way in

which you discuss the problem, the way in

which you describe the problem. Because I

think that this is half the solution.

So what is very important is for us to

change what we do in the Aegean. I am

talking about something that happens on

16 17

a daily basis. We actually monitor what

is happening with Turkey and we actu-

ally show strategically cool mindedness in

what is happening in the Aegean and in the

Mediterranean.

But unfortunately, every single day,

many times a week to be exact, definitely

every working day, we have a violation of

our airspace so we have violation of air traf-

fic rules.

This leads to a problem pertaining to

security of flights. So we have the violation

of our airspace between six to ten miles; but

sometimes even up to six miles, up to six

nautical miles.

We very often – and this is more the

case now than in the past – have over flights

of fully armed Turkish aircrafts over Farma-

konisi and Agathonisi.

We fully are in favor of free shipping.

Ships are supposed to have safe passage;

that is very important. But sometimes there

are some borderline cases.

We do not want to say that certain ar-

eas must be saved for exercises in the Ae-

gean. But our NOTAMs should be respected

by both sides.

And if we start thinking about areas

where there can be no misunderstanding

and no insult pertaining to our dignity and

the dignity of the two countries, I am sure

that we can find solutions to our problems.

If we want to go ahead and see all this

in a positive light, I am sure that then we

will be able to generally improve Greek-

Turkish relations.

But in order for this to happen, what

we need, as I mentioned before, is our

ability to create a climate of confidence. I

think we should avoid unnecessary provo-

cations. This is something we do. We do

not react nervously when things are up to

tactical maneuvers.

We do not attribute to any Turkish be-

havior something that is not what it is. So we

must not exaggerate and we must not blow

things out of proportions.

I understand very well that there are

different opinions in Turkey and that there is

a relation of powers. But on the other hand,

one must understand that we are wasting

time. We must make big, radical, coura-

geous decisions.

If we do not do this now, then we will

limit ourselves to things that are small and

insignificant. So time is not infinite. Time is

not working in our favor and it is not work-

ing in the favor of Turkey, as well. Time is

against us.

I think that we must grasp all the op-

portunities. We have to talk to our Turkish

interlocutors on all levels. It is not a coin-

cidence that our Prime Minister, right after

his inauguration, visited Istanbul and letters

were exchanged between the two prime

ministers.

We also know that the Turkish foreign

minister talked to the Greek alternate for-

eign minister, Mr. Droutsas, and I know the

content of their meetings and discussions.

I have actually exchanged views four

times informally with my Turkish counter-

part. I am optimistic, but I am not naïve from

historical or geopolitical point of view.

Here we are talking about a very fine

distinction between naiveté and optimism.

So I think that we have to see where the

difference lies between the two; meaning,

we have to try not to create over optimism,

because this may lead to tension.

I think we have the determination to

find a way out and we are expecting the

Turkish side to show the same determina-

tion and the same capacity.

I would like to express the wish once

again that Turkey becomes a modern,

democratic state, where there is rule of law

and where the government is in charge of

the armed forces and which plays an im-

portant role as well.

And I would like to say that foreign pol-

icy must only be exercised by the legitimate

government of a country. Thank you.

Evangelos Venizelos is the Minister of Na-

tional Defense of the Hellenic Republic

cover story

During the last 22 years, the efforts I have

made for a Turkish- Greek rapprochement oc-

cupied an important part of my life, and also

taught me an important lesson.

When I first started as a member of the

Council in 1988, I believed that the economy,

economic relations, investments and trade

provided the secret and miraculous formulas

that could bring countries together.

If we as businessmen would try harder

and increase our business relations with our

counterparts in Greece, I thought, then the bi-

lateral volume of trade between our countries

would break records and we will start to solve

even some of our political problems.

I was wrong.

With the political problems or differences

between our countries remaining unresolved,

we could only achieve a limited and temporary

success in economic relations.

Without the resolution of the outstand-

ing political issues remaining between our

two countries, it is almost impossible to es-

tablish strong, solid and advancing economic

relations.

For most of the 20th century, our common

relations were defined by the politics of hard

power with national security priorities, domi-

nating the agenda of our foreign policies.

Since the beginning of the 1970s the pri-

orities in our relations were focused only on the

divisive issues.

The borders of the continental shelf and

the territorial waters in the Aegean, the con-

trol of the airspace and the militarization of

the Greek islands, the minorities in Greece and

Turkey and, at the top of the list, the Cyprus

dispute…

Greece recognizes the dispute over the

continental shelf and claims that the disagree-

ment should be resolved at the international

court.

Turkey does not accept the ten-mile air-

space claimed by Greece, and declares that

Greece is only entitled to a six-mile airspace,

and therefore sends its fighter jets as close as

six miles to the Greek coast.

This practice results in aircraft confronta-

tions between the two states that has become

something of a routine.

In order to compete in this race, to keep

their militaries alert, both countries at one

point had to spend between 3.5 and 5 percent

of their GDPs on military expenditures. More

dramatically, the episode over the Aegean is-

lets Immia/Kardak brought us to the verge of

war. Those years of antagonism, suspicion and

historical enmity induced Greeks and Turks to

share a mutual distrust.

Some corporations who tried to establish

some bilateral business activity were obliged

to practice their trade over a third country such

as Switzerland or Lichtenstein.

The very few Greek companies who have

invested in Turkey, and those that did so, as-

sumed the guise of Swiss establishments.

Businessmen were afraid to be exposed as

traders buying from Turkey, or vice versa.

Until 1987, like most of the business com-

munity, our political leaders and diplomats

also avoided meetings and dialogue. In 1987,

Turkish and Greek leaders decided to meet at

an international Forum to try to find a way to

break this vicious circle.

Some of you in this room today, who have

been witnesses to the Forum of Davos, would

remember that the most important outcome

of that meeting has been the joint decision to

choose Greek and Turkish businessmen as the

new driving force to initiate a rapprochement

by improving economic relations between our

two countries.

At the behest of the two governments, we

organized ourselves into a corporate structure

and named it the Turkish- Greek and Greek-

Turkish Business Councils.

The establishment of the Councils in both

countries has been a significant step towards

to improvement of our relations.

Against the background of old political

and historical disagreements, a positive cli-

mate of cooperation in economic relations

and in the business, trade, sports, cultural and

civil society sectors has started to develop very

positively.

Since 1988 both councils tried to promote

trade, joint investments, technological coop-

eration, joint projects in third countries and

brought together Greek and Turkish compa-

nies in banking, construction, tourism, energy,

communication, insurance, textiles, agriculture

and shipping.

Many years of hard work, lots of sacrifices,

hundreds of flights between Athens and Istan-

bul, countless hours spent with the members

of the media, unfortunately, did not solve any

political problem, but did cause a positive

awareness in both of our societies.

As a result of all these efforts, our bilateral

trade volume increased to 400 Million Dollars

in 1990 and almost froze around this figure for

the next 10 years.

But despite the static nature of economic

activity after 1990, economic considerations

and public diplomacy began to affect the

choices of respected political elites who had al-

ready started to try to avoid polarization, even

when “hot incidents” occurred in the Aegean.

In both countries two opposing tenden-

By Selim Egeli

18 19

cies started to face each other: At one end, a

skeptical political class, a negative press, a

negatively predisposed public opinion which

perceived the bilateral relationship only from

a security perspective, a business communi-

ty which mistrusted the other side…

At the other end, flexible and practical

political and economic decision makers and

civil society groups and constructive media

groups who saw this relationship as a posi-

tive and promising challenge with win-win

perspectives…

I think this was a very healthy develop-

ment. At the very least, after decades of silence,

groups and individuals in both of our societies

started to discuss Turkish and Greek relations in

an open and a constructive context.

The large Turkish market of almost 72 Mil-

lion, started to attract the service sectors in

Greece, and the per capita income of Greece

and its membership in the EU, started to move

the Turkish industry to explore the opportuni-

ties in the Greek market.

At the end of 1999 the two governments

decided to start a new era, which became

the second milestone to affect our bilateral

economic relations after the Davos World Eco-

nomic Forum in 1987.

Our Governments have stipulated a

number of high-level agreements regarding

tourism, transport, environmental protection,

cultural cooperation, trade, double taxation,

shipping, refugees, narcotics, and terrorism, in

total 19 agreements.

We should not forget, that compared to

just 3 agreements in 53 years, 19 agreements

were finalized in just a few years after 2000.

As a result of this policy change, more cor-

rectly starting a low policy cooperation which

resulted in all these agreements, both societ-

ies, but primarily the businessmen started to

enjoy this new environment, which afforded

new opportunities and challenges.

The volume of bilateral trade between the

two neighbors has been on an upward trajec-

tory since 2000.

Greek exports of goods to Turkey have

recorded an impressive annual growth rate of

around 18 percent, reaching 5.4 percent of total

Greek exports.

Turkey’s exports to Greece exceeded 1,5

billion Dollars in 2008, but this figure is only a

small share of total Turkish exports. The volume

of bilateral trade reached 3.6 billion Dollars in

2008 and despite the world wide economic

crisis, 3 Billion Dollars in 2009. Turkey’s exports

are enjoying a notably consistent surplus in

value from 40- 50 percent over Greek exports

during this period. I believe there are structural

reasons for Turkey exporting more to Greece.

The contribution of manufacturing to GDP

is significantly higher in case of Turkey than in

the case of Greece. Greek exports consist of

commodities with low value-added compo-

nent. By contrast, Turkish exports are much

more diversified manufactured goods with

higher value-added component such cars

and automotive products, televisions, white-

goods. On the other hand Greece’s economy

is highly service oriented. The Greek market

reforms during the 1990s, together with the

country’s entry into the European Monetary

Union have modernized the service economy

and helped Greece’s economy to grow.

In banking for example, your macroeco-

nomic stability has enabled your country’s

financial institutions to grow and to develop

an excellent level of know-how in many bank-

ing activities, whereas, perhaps due to high

inflation and long lasting economic crises in

Turkey, we were not able to demonstrate such

a capability.

Greece’s reforms and macroeconomic

stabilization have driven Greek companies

to achieve the best corporate governance in

Southeastern Europe.

Greece became the leading foreign direct

investor in the Balkans.

Greece became the 8th largest investor in

Turkey with 5.2 Billion Dollars between 2002

and 2007, with a further 799 Million Dollars

in 2008. First, the National Bank of Greece, the

country’s biggest financial group, please cor-

rect me if I am wrong, bought the controlling

stake in Finansbank and paid almost 2.9 billion

Dollars. Euro-Bank then became the second

Greek bank to make an acquisition in Turkey

by buying 70 percent of Tekfenbank. Alongside

the Turkish restaurants in Athens, Turkish tex-

tile and ready-wear products started to be sold

in Turkish boutiques located at Greek shopping

malls. Turkey’s largest bank, Ziraat opened

two branches in Greece. Turkish and Greek

contractors are working in partnership on big

construction projects in the Gulf, the Balkans

and Central Asia.

Our governments have still not come to an

agreement yet regarding major, difficult and

sensitive issues such as the continental shelf,

airspace, Cyprus and minority rights. Almost

all of the major problems are still pending.

Then, what was the reason for this rapid de-

velopment in our economic relations?I believe

there have been four major reasons.

First, what has actually changed the eco-

nomic climate has been a simple assurance

given by the two governments to their publics

cover story

that they are determined to be good allies,

good neighbors, good partners and that they

intend to solve their problems through peace-

ful means.

This guarantee has been received as a

blessing by the two publics, and has influ-

enced the business communities on a much

larger scale, compared to 1987, namely not

only corporations with global experience but

also many small and medium size companies

have started to enter each other’s market.

This joint message has started to build up

the trust between our two nations. Second,

upon analyzing the characteristics of both

economies at the time this rapprochement

had begun, I noted that they were more com-

plimentary than competitive, which is still the

case, and the most encouraging factor for the

future of our economic relations. Third, Greece

helped to open the way for Turkey’s EU acces-

sion. That paved a completely new path in our

diplomatic relations; the two nations became

partners in cooperating in the context of sub-

regional groupings in South East Europe, the

Black Sea and the Middle East. Fourth, Turkish

and Greek businessmen since 1987 laid an ex-

cellent foundation on which diplomacies could

advance with their bilateral agendas.

First; Turkey will continue to export to

Greece an ever-rising amount of goods and

Greece will continue to export to Turkey, as an

investor, an ever-rising amount of capital. Sec-

ond; a durable EU accession process, following

today’s successful economic policies, will con-

tinue to entrench low inflation in Turkey. This

will continue to give Turkish industry a much

more stable planning outlook and provide the

cheaper funding that the country needs for its

capital expenditures. As a result Turkey’s solid

manufacturing base will be upgraded and its

exporting capabilities greatly enhanced. This

situation will also mean a more effective priva-

tization process and will result in the greater

attraction of Turkey to foreign direct investors.

Third: Greek investors, in turn, who I still are

well prepared because of their solid capitaliza-

tion, their experience with in the Balkans and

their affinity for the Turkish environment will

take a greater advantage of the opportunities

that will made available for them in Turkey.

More specifically, Greek companies in the ser-

vices sector have the capital that probably is

less available in Turkey and the know-how that

Greece’s higher per capita income and a stable

economy for most of the beginning of 2000s

have brought into being.

I think, the economic crisis which effects

Greek’s economy maybe in a very negative

direction today, will not last forever. I believe,

this situation can be a new opportunity for

both of our countries to increase our bilateral

volume of trade. For more Greek companies,

Turkey, of course in the context of EU accession

will be seen as one of their major strategic op-

portunities. Due to the remaining effects of the

world wide economic crisis, delays may well

occur but nothing will change in the long term.

Fourth; Due to competitive advantages, such

as more convenient prices, shorter distances

and superior quality Greece will increase its

share of Turkish imports at least by five percent

during the coming years.

In other words, our bilateral trade volume

annually will exceed 8 Billion Dollars. Fifth;

the majority of the Turkish and Greek inves-

tors in tourism will cooperate more closely and

they will combine their marketing efforts. The

Aegean Sea will get a much higher portion of

the international tourism traffic and income.

Sixth; more Turkish and Greek join-ventures

will initiate construction projects around our

geography.

I believe the future of Turkish- Greek eco-

nomic corporation has an enormous opportu-

nity from which both publics will benefit.

But these predictions can only come true

if the political stability between our countries

continues.

This rapprochement must be sustainable.

There is only one solution. We must bring all

these pending disputes to a solution.

I am fully aware that the discussion of se-

curity questions, such as the continental shelf

or airspace could be a highly charged process

on both sides. True, those issues were once

very sensitive issues and could have entailed

high political costs. Once, it was even worse,

any compromise would have required a sys-

tematic and repeated preparations of the re-

spective public opinions.

But time has changed, the world has

changed, Europe has changed, Greece has

changed, and Turkey has changed. I believe

that we should all feel relieved, both can af-

ford sacrifices in this respect, we should only

trust them more. Recently, our two Prime

Ministers exchanged letters with each other

and the Turkish Prime Minister will pay a visit

to his Greek counterpart during spring months

in Athens. I hope this meeting will be the third

corner stone and will open the way for a radical

solution.

Selim Egeli is the Chairman of the Turkish-

Greek Business Council, Board-Member of

the Foreign Economic Relations Board of

Turkey, Chairman of SHENCO Consulting Inc

and Board - Member of Balikesir Electrome-

chanical Industries

20 21

Greece and Turkey are going through a

transitional phase, they are undergoing a

crisis. But it is a different crisis; there is one

thing in common though. We can assume

and hope that these crises in the two coun-

tries are the herald of recovery.

In Greece, because we have an economy

that is in crisis and in Turkey we have a crisis

when it comes to the political system. I am

talking about the role of the army and other

reactionary forces.

I want people to understand that the

bilateral relation between Greece and Turkey

to a large extent is influenced by the relation

between Turkey and the EU.

I think we can even read the progress re-

port, which was drawn up by the European

Commission last October on how Turkey has

progressed on the road to EU membership,

so we can there understand that all the

problems mentioned in the progress report

are of direct interest to Greece.

We are talking about human rights, for

example. This is not a theoretical problem

that we look at from a distance. I think it has

ramifications on minority rights and minor-

ity issues. Also, territorial rights, sovereignty,

the law of the sea; all these have an impact

on the economy as well.

In 1999 at the Helsinki European Coun-

cil, the bilateral problems were integrated

into the process and Turkey had to show its

will to progress on that front.

I would also like to mention that in these

progress reports there is a mention, of the

fact that we have an intervention on the part

of the army and what is happening in Turkey.

But we also know that despite the fact

that the government in Turkey has all the

good will in the world, but it has not been

able to change the constitution; because

constitutional reform is necessary for Turkey

to come closer to the EU.

We have to think of different periods in

diplomacy. We have the previous period in

diplomacy, where bilateral and multilateral

relations were two distinct, if you like, seg-

ments. This is no longer the case today.

Let me underscore the fact that Greece

is undergoing a serious economic crisis;

there is no doubt about it. But this is a short-

term crisis, whereas the problem facing the

Turkish government is of a different nature

and the duration of that crisis is different.

I think it is time for us to get rid of ste-

reotypes and inhibitions of our past. I think

that we can give fresh impetus to certain

priorities that need to be taken, in order for

us to overcome longstanding problems.

I am trying to be optimistic. I know that

a lot has happened in the last few years. But

let me say that as regards Turkey sometimes

it is difficult for us Greeks to express our-

selves fully in front of Turks, because some-

times there are some highly sensitive issues,

By Constantinos Zepos

22 23

if you like. Sometimes it has to do with how

people perceive things. I am not trying to

say something negative here, at all. But

let me also talk about the progress reports

drawn up by the European Commission. For

example, in the case of Turkey, the latest

progress report was written in a very strict

way. And sometimes things are provided in

a moderate way, if you like, the way they are

expressed is not very strong. Sometimes the

facts are downright negative. Turkey really is

finding it difficult to get rid of the legacy it

actually inherited after the drawing up of the

latest constitution, after what had happened

back in 1980 in Turkey.

However, we are still going through a

phase where there are many factors inhibit-

ing the resolution of bilateral issues.

Despite all this, there have been some

positive moves; and this is recent.

We see that the Prime Minister of Tur-

key, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the oc-

casion of former Prime Minister Karamanlis’

visit to Ankara in the beginning of 2008,

there was a press conference on the occa-

sion of that visit.

Prime Minister Erdogan said something

that was very important, about the Patri-

archate. He said that in fact the ecumenicity

of the Patriarchate is something that is im-

portant to the Orthodox world, the ortho-

dox Christians. So what the Prime Minister

said was easy to understand, but it was the

first time that this came out of official lips.

I am saying this, because the Patriarchate

encountered many problems, just by using

the adjective “ecumenical”, which is clearly

of a religious nature. The Prime Minister of

Turkey also added one more thing during

this very important, historic, press confer-

ence. He also said that the elections of the

Patriarch were also important.

I do not want to preempt anything, but

the Prime Minister talked about a real prob-

lem. I am talking about the way in which the

Patriarch is elected and the way in which the

members of the Synod are elected, meaning

they have to be Turkish citizens.

This is not the case of the orthodox pa-

triarchates in other countries. For example in

Albania, the Archbishop of Albania is elected

as a Greek citizen; but he has the obligation,

when assuming his duties to assume Alba-

nian citizenship.

So this is a very realistic, a very flexible

procedure. If it were implemented in the

case of the Patriarchate, it would greatly

help things. Prime Minister Erdogan also

talked about the fact that the Seminary of

Halki closed down. He mentioned the exact

date when this happened; and we also have

another historic meeting, which took place

on Halki, or Prigipos, between the Patriarch

and the Turkish Prime Minister, because that

was also a very important event.

So Turkey is going through an important

time. There are certain conditions it has to

meet, but it has shown that it fully under-

stands why Greek are so sensitive about the

issue and I am sure that they will be able to

make some positive steps forward.

cover story

Before moving on to the Aegean, I

would quickly like to talk about the Greeks

living in Turkey. And I am talking about their

property rights to be exact.

You know very well that the Court of

Human Rights has actually tried a lot of

cases where Greeks living in Turkey have ac-

tually gone to court, trying to protect prop-

erty rights, because they feel that they were

wronged in Turkey.

Actually, I would like to say that there is

a bad track record in our bilateral relations

when it comes to this issue. And of course,

we have a decree of 1964, according to

which the Turkish government took away

the right from Greeks to freely manage their

property they had in Turkey.

This is a ban, a prohibition, which actu-

ally caused many problems in Greek-Turkish

relations. We also decided to mention this,

not only to Turkey but to our EU partners, an

ambassador had certain doubts and he kept

saying: “Why do you keep scratching these

wounds? That would be bad.”

This is something of course that hap-

pened back in the 1980s. And I said in that

case that it is very simple. For example, that

in Istanbul there are three people, a Dutch

guy, a Turkish guy and a Greek guy, a per-

son of Greek decent of course, who live in

Constantinople.

Let me repeat that the main perception

behind my analysis is that this crisis, be they

long-term or transient, we should actually

see it as an opportunity for the countries to

shed light on their longstanding problems

and try to find solutions to these problems.

So I dare say that we can sight certain

positive examples. And this, of course, is not

based on what happens in the public sector,

but in civil society.

Let me quickly say a few words, before

concluding my presentation, on the Aegean

issues. These issues were examined by an

informal working group, comprising Greek

and Turkish officials and this working group

managed to draft a text.

A text about the problems between the

two countries and on how to find a solution

to the Aegean issues; and of course we are

talking about the delineation of the conti-

nental shelf as well.

So this was a group of people who had

an in-depth knowledge of the subject;

Yes, we are talking about civil society, but

we are talking about informed civil society.

This document was drafted by this working

group and in this text we had certain basic

principles, but also certain proposals on how

to resolve the issue of the continental shelf.

First of all, let me say that we start from

scratch. That is important. So what is very

important is for both sides – and I repeat,

I am talking about an initiative undertaken

by private individuals, this has nothing to do

with the governments of the two countries,

this was then put to the governments, but

first it was a private initiative.

So our basic stand is that both sides

need to determine the vital interest that

they have in the area. This cooperation for

the protection of the marine environment in

particular is something that should be pro-

moted further.

We should also have free shipping; we

should promote tourism. So there were

certain things that were mentioned in this

24 25

AKTOR has significant know-how and experience to various types

of heavy infrastructure and is the preferred contractor of the pri-

vate sector in Greece with a very selected private sector clientele.

The Company’s know-how includes involvement in the construc-

tion of landmark projects such as the Olympic Stadium for the

2004 Olympic Games, designed by S.Calatrava and the New Acrop-

olis Museum designed by B. Tschumi.

In addition, the Company has carried out major infrastructure

projects such as Egnatia Motorway, Attiki Odos Ring-Road, Rion-

Antirion Bridge, tunnels, METRO projects, railway projects as well

as environmental projects.

AKTOR is active in the Middle East (U.A.E., Kuwait, Qatar, Oman),

Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria with major projects such as the

New Doha Airport in Qatar, the Sewage Treatment Plant in Dubai,

the development of the Blue City in Oman etc and recently has

been awarded a concession project, the Comarnic Brasov Highway

in Romania.

The Company currently employees approx. 12.000 employees

(more than 1.000 engineers and other University degree holders)

and has a backlog that exceeds € 3,5 billion, fact which establish-

es a healthy operational basis for further development, both in

the medium and long term.

ELLAKTOR S.A., the parent company of AKTOR forms the holding

group of companies with operations expanding in the construc-

tion sector, concessions in public infrastructure, real estate, en-

vironment and renewable energy, as well as telecommunications

and leisure, and is listed in the Athens Stock Exchange since 1994.

AKTOR constitutes

the construction arm

of ELLAKTOR Group,

Greece’s largest con-

tractor with a his-

tory of over 60 years.

PUBL

I

text. There are a lot of details in this text; it

is a very detailed text. So we see that in this

endeavor undertaken, the main will of the

working group is to try to be as objective as

can be and to try to inform the public opin-

ion in an unbiased way.

We are not living at a time of secret

diplomacy. Our democracies depend on a

large extent on how well we are informed

and on how the public opinion perceives

things. They should really understand the

nature of the problem.

I think we all sometimes are frustrated,

because we do not receive all the informa-

tion. We sometimes believe that the mass

media are not giving us the facts.

So I think that we have to have good in-

formation, timely information and as objec-

tive as can be information, because then we

will be able to look into a complex problem

in a good way.

We said that we should proceed in the

following fashion. First of all, the two coun-

tries should agree that for a certain period

of time that will be strictly predetermined –

for example, it could be six months, one year

or so, two years maximum – so there will

be a timetable set and we must within this

timetable resolve all problems pertaining to

the continental shelf.

That was the first phase. Let me talk

about the second part of this process, if you

like. I am talking not just about the delinea-

tion, the limitation if you like, of the conti-

nental shelf.

We said that whatever was pending

would then be referred to the International

Court of Justice in The Hague and then, for

legal reasons, the Court would first look into

the issues pertaining to the airspace and ter-

ritorial waters.

Anyway we are not talking about one

issue; it is not just the continental shelf, it

is three things. It is the continental shelf, it

is the territorial waters – because the Court

will ask the two parties, “Tell me, how

are you going to measure the continental

shelf?” – and of course, we also have the

airspace, because according to the law of the

sea, the airspace is directly linked to what

was mentioned before.

I do not want to ramble, but this was

the proposal. The proposal concluded that

sensitive issues, such as the demilitarization

of the Aegean islands, according to what

has been mentioned in the Treaty of Paris

and the Treaty of Lausanne, will be left for

settlement at a later stage.

First we have to deal with the continen-

tal shelf issue and we can make use of the

International Court of Justice in the Hague.

I think that it is very important to under-

stand that all these things are interlinked. So

if we want to go to the Hague, we have to

discuss everything. We cannot just discuss

the continental shelf and nothing else.

I do not think that the fate of Greece

was decided by the breadth of the nautical

miles. I think that this is a politically sen-

sitive issue. It has been charged with a lot of

emotion.

But we have got to have a cool head, we

have to think without emotion; and I think

that this is the right time. We have many

opportunities to do so now, because we see

that both countries are undergoing a crisis

and opportunities come out of crises.

Constantinos Zepos is an Ambassador a.h.

26 27

National Bank of Greece to-

day heads the largest and

strongest financial services

group in Greece, and is a key

representative of the Greek

economy on the interna-

tional level. It has a dynamic

presence in 12 countries on

2 continents, where it runs

no less than 8 banks and 64

financial and other services

providers.

In the region of Southeast

Europe and the East Medi-

terranean where in recent

years the NBG Group has

evolved into a strong bank-

ing force, we serve over 12

million customers, offering

a broad range of financial

products and services that

meet the constantly chang-

ing needs of businesses and

individuals alike.

Our network in Greece num-

bers some 576 branches and

almost 1,500 ATMs, while in

the wider region of SE Eu-

rope and the East Mediter-

ranean we run a distribution

network for products and

services that is the biggest

of any provided by a Greek

bank, besides offering prod-

ucts via alternative channels

such as internet, phone and

mobile banking.

It employs almost 37,000

people as a Group, while it

is the leading Greek bank-

ing brand according to the

Banker’s 2009 “Top 500

banking brands” list.

Over the course of the 169

years in which we have been

doing business, we have de-

veloped close ties with our

customers—ties that are

not restricted just to banking

transactions but reflect also

the trust and confidence we

have generated over time.

Thanks to our concerted ac-

tion and active involvement

in the affairs of the society in

which we operate, our policy

is seen to reflect our corpo-

rate culture and ethos.

Each year, through our “Re-

sponsibility” Corporate So-

cial Action programme we

demonstrate our support for

society as a whole by backing

a host of initiatives that are

aimed at the community at

large, the environment and

culture. At the same time, we

follow practices that ensure

a high standard of corporate

governance, and structures

and policies that generate

sound models of professional

conduct and corporate ethics,

by which we can contribute

to the smooth working of the

Greek economy and enhance

shareholder confidence.

At NBG we are building on

our strategic advantages:

the goodwill we enjoy in the

domestic market, as well as

our strong liquidity and en-

hanced operational efficiency

will enable us to broaden and

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achievements in the future. PUBL

I

Your banking hub in SE Europe

& the Eastern Mediterranean

So, just imagine how many years have

gone by since then. We are talking about 23

years. No other country has ever had to wait

so long in order for it to join the European

Union. And if we are to go even back further

in time, and I am talking about the asso-

ciation agreement between Turkey and the

European Union, this entity was into force in

1964, 2 years after the Greek agreement.

The thing is that we might not be able

to realize this, because now Greece is under-

going this economic crisis, it doesn’t actually

see what is happening elsewhere.

But I think that negotiations are not go-

ing that well. And why I am saying that? I

think we have a combination of things.

On the one hand we have countries,

such as France, Germany, but also Austria,

expressing their reservations. And we also

have the Cyprus issue and the Greek –Turk-

ish issues in general, the NG and dispute and

so and so forth.

So, if we look at all these together, we

see that the development of negotiations

and the opening of chapters for Turkey is

very slow, out to 35 chapters they have only

opened 11 chapters, if I am not mistaken.

And it is not just that. We have capital

being blocked from Cyprus. And I am talking

about the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey.

But also something else which is also

very important. I am talking about the ratifi-

cation on the part of Turkey of the extension

of customs union to Cyprus and direct trade

between Cyprus and Turkey, and Greek and

Cypriot ships entering Turkish ports.

So, the question that comes to mind is

how we will be able to get out of the dead

lock. How we will be we will be able to sur-

pass the problems. Well, that is up to Turkey

and the European Union of course.

The solution of the Cyprus issue would

be great. I don’t know if it is realistic to think

that the issue can be resolved now. I think

that talks are about to end in a month’s time.

And I think that it would be overly optimistic

to believe that we will have positive results

in a month from now.

I don’t know what will happen in North-

ern Cyprus. What we here, actually, materi-

alizes, well that is not a good omen for the

continuation of negotiations of these talks.

So, I don’t think we should consider the solu-

tion of the Cyprus issue in the coming years.

What remains is to try to come up with

solutions to other issues. I am talking about

capital, for example, that has been marked

and that can not leave Cyprus.

Of course it is difficult to find a solution,

because this is linked to firm positions held

by Turkey and Cyprus. This goes way back

in time, it is not something new, so people

have to show great will, great courage in or-

der to move forward.

So, I would like to say that it is not that

Cyprus doesn’t want Turkey to become a

European Union member, far from it. It is

important is to look at the process in place.

So we must try to come up with solutions.

Now, there are many objections. I have

talked about the three countries, the three

European Union member states that are

against Turkey’s accession.

These objections are directly related to

the public opinion in Germany, France and

Austria. The public is negatively predis-

posed, it thinks of the consequences of the

European Union enlargement.

We see that the unemployment rate has

gone up, because we have the Polish plumb-

ers, for example, finding work in Paris.

We also have to think of the matter of

religion, because a lot of people in these

countries believe that Muslims will not fully

integrate and will not fully become a mem-

By Pavlos Apostolidis

28 29

ber of French society, German society, Aus-

trian society.

Now, of course in order for these res-

ervations and objections to be justified, we

hear all sorts of arguments being put on the

table. Some people say that Turkey is not

truly a part of Europe, geographically speak-

ing, and so on and so forth.

Some people also express concerns

about the population of Turkey, because it

has a very big population, and will happen

to the rest of the European Union once Tur-

key joins the European Union.

Let us not forget what is happening in

Turkey as regards the institutions, political

institutions and the Turkish economy as well.

And there is a paradox here, because

some people say that the European Union

rushed to help countries in Eastern Europe

become members of the European Union

and that some have regretted that move and

that it was a rushed decision.

On the one hand this is something that

is not in favor of Turkish membership, be-

cause some people may say: well, look, if

those countries joined, why cannot Turkey

join?

But on the other hand some people

seem to be saying: that is enough, we did

what we did and lets stop now, and lets not

have any more waves of enlargement.

But you see what is happening with Croa-

tia. Negotiations with Croatia are continuing,

they are moving forward quickly and I am sure

that the same will happen in the case of the

other Balkan countries as well.

Of course the Helsinki European Coun-

cil was a great milestone. Greece then ex-

pressed that it is in favor of Turkey joining

the European Union. However, effort was

made to try to maximize the benefits of Tur-

key’s joining the European Union.

And here we are talking about the nego-

tiation process, but also the actual accession

of Turkey into the European Union as well. I

believe that these arguments are still valid,

they still apply. So, we must continue to ac-

tively support Turkey in the negotiations.

In Greece, of course, people are really

concerned as to whether our policy was suc-

cessful. Well, what I have to say in answer to

that, is that the opposite policy wasn’t suc-

cessful either.

We shouldn’t even think about the idea

of supporting the privileged, if you like, re-

lationship between European Union and

Turkey. I believe that we should continue to

strive for full membership of Turkey.

We must help so that negotiations can

move forward. We must do our best to lift all

the existing obstacles.

Pavlos Apostolidis is the Ambassador a.h.

and former Secretary General of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

30 31

Since 1995 our company tried to enter

the Turkish market. We managed to do so

in 2001. In 2001, we won a tender and we

actually carried out a major investment. And

I would like to say that before NBG had in-

vested, we were the biggest investment. We

are talking about 100 million euro.

This investment of ours was together

with a business group, TURKCELL, one of the

biggest mobile operators in Turkey and one

of the greatest players in the region.

I must admit that this experience is one

of the most positive experiences we have

had so far internationally. And I would like

to say that we are present in five continents

and I would like to say that this business co-

operation between TURKCELL and INTRALOT

in Turkey is one of our greatest examples of

cooperation in all five continents.

The reason why this was the case is be-

cause Turkish business groups have been

structured in an excellent way. We are talking

about corporate governance and best prac-

tices. This is what makes them stand out.

We are talking about large business,

well organized business groups, better than

the same Greek companies. This greatly

helped us, because we had the knowhow

and the technology and we wanted to work

with a good partner in the Turkish market.

What we managed to get out of this cooper-

ation is that we actually have football pools

now in Turkey. I think that the word “ida” is

what we call “betting” in Greece.

In five years we have been able to

have 1.5 billion dollars given to the Turkish

public sector. And a lot of money went to

football clubs in Turkey.

So we are talking about a lot of money;

substantial amounts. Even if you were to think

of it with a Greek analogy, Olympiakos and

Panathinaikos never gets that amount of mon-

ey. There is nothing similar to that in Greece.

Now you understand that Turkish foot-

ball is very important worldwide. I think

that despite the fact that the Greek football

teams have done very well lately, the Turkish

teams are even better than ours.

To conclude on our experience in Turkey

and our business cooperation with this busi-

ness group, this was a hub and we were able

to expand our business activities in the region.

We were also able to sign an agreement

for the football bet in Azerbaijan. There is a

joint venture; we have a 45%. Now there is a

ten year agreement in Azerbaijan.

It is obvious to see that now there are

practical ways to promote our cooperation.

Business cooperation between Greece and

Turkey is thriving, not just in Turkey, but in

the area around Turkey as well.

Turkey has developed rapidly. Demo-

graphically, the figures change very quickly

and you have to have high growth rates, be-

cause otherwise you have unemployment.

Because we see that the birth rate is also

very high in Turkey.

The growth rates in Turkey are very

good, very good. We see that they were able

to weather the economic crisis very well,

the currency is stabilizing. There were some

troubles, but they were able to overcome

these problems.

What is most important is that Turkey

combines a big domestic market, but also

access to areas which Greece cannot access

easily. And I am talking about whatever is on

the eastern side of Turkey.

In order to put it simply, one of the best

hubs for you to go to Asia, except Dubai

which everybody likes for shopping too, is

Istanbul. Istanbul is a great hub.

You can go to Beijing. There are daily

flights to Beijing. So we believe that one of

the best transport hubs is Turkey and this ac-

tually shows that Turkey is really interested

in developing in transportation.

This means that there are good relations

with the neighbors and this is one of the

main features of modern Turkey.

I would like to say that geopolitically,

Turkey has developed many initiatives for

the Muslin world. It is not just a matter of

politics. Turkey influences the Muslin world.

We work in Malaysia and I would like

to say that Turkey has a special weight in

Indonesia, in Malaysia and in the rest of the

Muslin world. So we are talking about mil-

lions of people.

And I would like to say that it is not easy

for small companies and for small business

groups from Greece to access these coun-

tries. We cannot be international players.

I represent a leading Greek company

that is present in five continents. But I would

like to say that the Greek businesses cannot

be leaders in the world market.

We can be good regional players. So we

have invested in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe,

in Turkey, around the Mediterranean basin.

But it is difficult for us to move further

away. We can only do so by cooperating

with other countries and I think that Turkey

is such an excellent partner.

By Constantinos Antonopoulos

Constantinos Antonopoulos is the Chief

Executive Officer of INTRALOT

cover story

I would like to say that the two people of

the Turkish and the Greek peoples embraced

this initiative and gave the opportunity to the

governments, to come closer to one another.

I remember that George Papandreou,

who was then Foreign Minister, and now

Prime Minister of the country, called me and

we spoke on the phone on how to further

enhance this initiative.

And I would like to say that this is what

led to a friendly relationship with Tayyip Er-

dogan, when we first elected Mayors. We

have a common vision in a new era for Greek

–Turkish relations. I would like to say that the

peoples, the Greek and Turkish people broke

down the walls. Greece traditionally follows a

policy based on values and principals. We be-

lieve in rule of law in respecting international

law. We believe in territorial sovereignty. We

want to avoid the use of force, all threats of

force, and respect for human rights.

All these are the cornerstones of our

foreign policy. This is how we exercise our

diplomacy in the world.

Greece is an honest supporter of Turkish

European Union membership.

We firmly believe that Turkey can be-

come the best possible neighbor for Greece

provided and carries out all the necessary

changes in order for accession to be carried

out. I am talking about geo-strategic court

decisions, changes in the interior of the

country and so on and so forth.

I would like to say that Tayyip Erdogan’s

government meets with difficulties, it has

difficulties with the military regime, the mil-

itary establishment, which of course actually

puts a lot of resistance.

But we know that as days go by, de-

mocracy becomes stronger in Turkey. The

government of new democracy made an

important number of steps in the last five

years in Greek-Turkish relations. This has also

been the case in the past.

Kostas Karamanlis was the first Greek

Prime Minister who after 49 whole years in

2008 carried out an official visit to Ankara.

But at the same time the Turkish planes en-

tered the airspace. They harassed Greek pi-

lots, and they were flying over Greek islands.

This caused concern to the Greeks living

in the Aegean, and the Greeks actually didn’t

know how to interpret Turkey’s will.

I personally believe that Turkey wants to

find a viable settlement, a fair and viable set-

tlement in the area. Now the question is when

we will be finally know who makes decisions

in Turkey. For Europe and for all of us the an-

swer is clear: the legally elected government

of the country decides on what happens.

First of all the UN Chart on the law of

the see is the document which we should

go by. Greece would be in favor of a decision

taken by Turkey to ratify the convention on

the law of the see. This would be a symbolic

move by Turkish diplomacy.

And then the dialogue on the continen-

tal shelf would be placed on a legal basis.

I sincerely would like to hope that our

countries would sit down soon and talk

honestly to one another. I think they have to

move away from problems of the past, to be

realists, to take into account the facts that I

have resulted.

I am certain that both governments will

safeguard their national interests, and they

will be able to give to Europe and to our

neighborhood a new era for Greek Turkish

relations. This is good for our peoples, for the

people in the area, for Europe and the entire

world for that matter.

But the key to all this, and I have to say it

once again, clearly has to do with the Cyprus

issue, contrary to people who say otherwise.

Cyprus, whether we like it or not, is a

full member of the European Union. And I

think that the two communities have to find

a solution which will lead to the automatic

integration of the Turkish –Cypriot side to

the European Union without any problems,

just like what happened in Germany.

So, the road to the settlement of the

Cyprus issue is still a long one, it has many

obstacles, many difficulties. Greece is in fa-

vor of a fair comprehensive and viable settle-

ment on the basis of UN resolutions and on

the basis of the institutional framework of

the European Union and of course in line

with the community.

This is a solution that will lead to a really

unification of the island. The Turkish-Cypriots

will automatically be integrated and Turkey

will very quickly join the European Union.

I firmly believe that the two communities

must act independently without irresponsible

guarantors, without pressure, without any

outside intervention. They must decide on

their common future, our common future.

All these deadlines, all these time limits,

the risk of the island being divided for ever, well

I don’t think that is good. That is not a solution.

One is certain, that the situation in Cy-

prus cannot continue for ever. It is not pos-

sible for Famagusta, which was a prosperous

city to have become a ghost city. Nicosia, can

not be a divided capital.

All this is unthinkable in our modern

world. We can not have foreign occupying

forces on an island, on a country that is part

of Europe.

By Dimitris Avramopoulos

32 33

Let us not forget that the soil and the

sovereignty of Cyprus is part of the European

Union. So, according to the international

law, Turkish forces are actually on European

Union soil.

Lets resolve the issue as quickly as pos-

sible. The more we delay, the greater the

price we will have to pay diplomatically,

economically and otherwise.

Let Cyprus no longer be a problem.

Let it be an example that many others will

follow, a prosperous and peaceful place. There

will be a domino effect, and then Greece and

Turkey will greatly enhance their relations.

We spend a lot of money on defense,

we spend a lot of money on armaments, and

this is to the detriment of our economy, of

our peoples. And we know that we both are

members of NATO and of course there is a

problem in the cohesion of NATO because of

this tension between the two countries.

So, instead of the military trying to in-

vent all these technical difficulties and prob-

lems, it is time for them to try to come up

with viable solutions to any problems that

are still outstanding.

At the same time at the Greek-Turkish

borders millions of people, women, children,

men have tried to enter the European Union

via Greece. They are in search of a better life.

Some were arrested, others were extradited,

some lost their lives.

The time has come for countries in south-

eastern Europe to leave all the problems be-

hind them. These are long standing problems,

they have been divisive. I am talking about

differences in religion and other issues as well.

So, we have to leave the past behind us.

We have to move forward. You see, I don’t

use the term Balkans. We must look ahead.

We must look towards the future. We have

to strengthen our good neighborly relations.

We have to protect legality, and we have

protect institutions.

The time has come for Turkey to official

recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate of

Constantinople, and I am talking about the

reopening of the Orthodox Seminary in Chalki.

I know that the current government in

Turkey wants to reopen the Seminary, but it

doesn’t dare to do so yet, as was mentioned

by the journalist Ali Birrand in an article. The

time has come for us to change our relations,

and to actually be able to find solutions to

our problems.

There was an exchange of letters be-

tween the Prime Ministers of Greece and

Turkey. This shows that the dialogue has

been re-initiated. Both sides have recapitu-

lated long know positions, firm positions.

The Greek Prime Minister says that there

should be a dead line, a timetable for the

talks to take place. Otherwise we have to the

Hague to settle the issue of the continental

shelf. Many compatriots of mine may say

that the relations of powers between the

two countries, it is no longer favorable for

Greece. Greece has many problems. There is

a lack of creditability in the political system

of Greece. And Greece is in the throws of a

severe economic crisis.

And let us not forget that we know that

destabilization of international relations at such

a difficult juncture may lead to terrible conse-

quences. This is the reality. We have to face it.

It is true that the balances that have

been struck now depend more than ever

before on the economic competitiveness,

social cohesion, and the strategic effective-

ness of both countries.

What I mean is that what is happening

internally in Greece and Turkey may be yet

another geo-strategic parameter. But this

makes it even more important than ever be-

fore for the two governments and the politi-

cians to act responsibly.

I am certain that the current govern-

ment of Turkey will never attempt to take

advantage of the fact that Greece is suffer-

ing an economic crisis now. I also know that

Turkey of course wants to become a member

of the European Union.

Let us not forget that Turkey has its own

financial problems, and its own social issues

to deal with.

Greece and Turkey have missed many

opportunities in the past. But this time we

have to move forward. We cannot start from

scratch though. We cannot start talking

about matters like economic and so on and

so forth.

From Davos up until now, all govern-

ments have tried to talk about low policy

issues like tourism, investment, trade, coop-

eration and so on and so forth.

But we can do a lot more. We can bring

the Greeks and Turks closer to one another.

We can show them the way and then they

can actually help us, provided of course the

national systems want it to happen.

The time has come for us to plunge into

deep water, to swim, because we all know

how to swim.

Thank you.

Dimitris Avramopoulos is a Member of the

Hellenic Parliament, former Minister and

Head of the Foreign Policy

cover story

I would like to make some observations

on the international scene from a Turkish

perspective, and the challenges we face.

9:11 was the day when people made the

observation that the world will no longer be

what it used to be. I think they were right.

Nine years ago we had the Middle East

problem, now we have the Middle East-

Afghanistan-Iraq triangle. I say “triangle”

because the three are linked in many ways

and share a certain background.

My last assignment abroad was UNES-

CO. The Constitution of UNESCO starts by

the following : “ …since wars begin in

the minds of men, it is in the minds of men

that the defenses of peace must be con-

structed… a peace based exclusively upon

the political and economic arrangements of

governments would not be a peace which

could secure the unanimous, lasting and

sincere support of the peoples of the world

and that if it is not to fail, it must be founded

upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of

mankind…”

Do we see much of this when we look at

this Middle East-Afghanistan-Iraq triangle?

I regret to say “no”. On the contrary, we see

a vicious circle where internal and external

problems feed on one another, creating

rocky terrain in the minds of men where the

defenses of peace need to be constructed.

The conflicts in this triangle have cre-

ated a profound sense of disappointment

among the peoples of the region. They have

the feeling that they are not treated with

justice. The West has not been able to ad-

dress regional expectations. So much so that

even the Western discourse on democracy is

viewed with suspicion and is attributed to

ulterior motives.

The sentiment in the West is not any

better. 9:11 followed by other acts of terror

in Europe, involvement of local individu-

als in these acts have not only underlined

the urgency of internal/external security but

has also created suspicions towards Muslim

communities in the West. And now there is

the question of growing resistance to what

some call “a changing way of life”.

Walls on both sides are rising.

The question then is “are we heading for

a clash of civilizations?” Hopefully not, but

nations must collectively do their best to

avoid what I would call “border incidents

of growing numbers and intensity”. How?

First try to resolve these conflicts and sec-

ondly encourage intercultural dialogue. The

latter will help but will not constitute a rem-

edy by itself.

Since we generally agree that the

spread of democracy will help overcome

these political questions and problems of

culture, identity then we also have to take

into account the fact that democracy as it is

defined and practiced in the West has also

faced some challenges in recent years. This is

essentially a by-product of the operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, I am referring to

the discussion regarding how much infor-

mation was provided to or withheld from

the public during the lead in to the Iraq war,

and the alleged violations of human rights

and international conventions in those two

countries which have eventually become the

subject of investigations.

Moreover, we now have the global eco-

nomic crisis which is giving rise to strong

criticism of certain aspects of the existing

economic order on both sides of the Atlan-

tic and beyond. Let us not forget that long

before, but especially since the collapse of

communism, the “free market” economy

had become the twin sister of democracy.

The two had become inseparable. Therefore,

one should not overlook the impact of the

shortcomings of the free market on the per-

ception of democracy.

I am sure that our friends and allies will

deal with these problems, because their

democracy is based on strong institutions

and aberrations here and there will be cor-

rected, perhaps at a price, but in a defini-

tive way. In the meantime, however, these

challenges will likely slow down the overall

effort to promote democracy elsewhere. As

a matter of fact, there are those who advo-

cate different understandings of democracy

based on differences of culture, tradition and

experience of history. There are places where

people, in view of their most fundamental

needs, may give priority to economic stabil-

ity over the broad mechanics of democracy.

The West, therefore, and we are part of it,

must rise up to these challenges.

I know that I have moved away from

our immediate agenda for today but I find it

worthwhile because this is the broad inter-

national setting and it may encourage us

to look at our problems in a different light.

The challenges that the world faces in the

“triangle” dwarf, if I may say so, whatever

differences we may have. This the way I feel

By Ali Tuygan

34 35

as a Turk because we are a neighbor to the

“triangle”. You are also close by but you have

Turkey in between. Having a bilateral agen-

da with fewer thorns is fine but it also puts

on our shoulders the responsibility to resolve

our differences in good time and perhaps set

an example for others to follow. I should say

a very valuable example considering:

firstly, that the Greek identity and the

Turkish identity are similar in certain ways

and different in other ways , and

secondly, the international reputation

these questions have earned: “the endless

Turkish- Greek quarrels”.

I will conclude this deviation from our

agenda with a final note : most of us be-

lieve that democracy is the remedy to many

of those challenges within and around the

Middle East-Afghanistan-Iraq triangle. But

it is extremely difficult to externally impose

it and unrealistic to expect it to flour-

ish rapidly. It can, however, be encouraged.

This is where Turkey can play a role. When

the West, the European Union advocate

democracy in this wide area they are not

heard loud and clear because of the cul-

tural background I referred to. But for them

Turkey is a “local”. The ultimate success of

our democracy will set an example. So, as

my colleagues from Turkey underlined

earlier this morning, Turkey’s remaining on

track with the EU is of paramount impor-

tance. Greece is in a better position, given

your experience in the wider region to see

the relevance of this. I hope that your sup-

port to Turkey’s accession process would

be based on its own merits and on Turkey’s

success with its reforms.

If I am to look back, however, just for

a minute, I would say that Greek-Turkish

relations are like a long, very long road. We

have travelled on this road together for a

thousand years. We have crossed rough ter-

rain, different seasons. When I look at the

signs on this road I read, “war “ and “peace”,

“confrontation” and “reconciliation”, rivalry”

and “friendship”, “competition” and “coop-

eration”, “adversity” and “alliance”. So I am

tempted the call this road “the road of ant-

onyms”. I believe that on this long road we

have finally reached, over the last decade,

wide fertile plains and a good climate. So,

we have to start thinking of a new name,

one that emphasizes only the positive. By

saying this now, rather than at the end of

my presentation, I am already displaying a

high level of confidence on our common

future. At least, I am saying that there is

no going back to the past. If I were to be

criticized someday for lack of judgment or

foresight, or for being an optimist, I would

respond by saying that “it was not my lack

of foresight but the lack of foresight of those

who failed to seize the opportunity.”

Does this mean that we have overcome

all our differences. No, but it means that we

have covered good distance in understand-

ing that our interests are served better

when we cooperate.

I am of the opinion that we have made

remarkable progress since 1999 which was

the second year of my stay here. A process of

dialogue and cooperation has been in place

for a decade now. More than 30 agreements,

protocols and memoranda of understanding

have been signed. Numerous CBMs have

been adopted.

Steady improvement in our economic

and trade relations is promising. Energy,

tourism and transport stand out as strategic

sectors, offering new opportunities. Statisti-

cal data of our economic and trade relations

is an important indication of the spillover

effects of dialogue between our two coun-

tries. For example in the year 2000, the bi-

lateral trade volume was about 870 million

US dollars. It amounted to over 2,7 billion US

dollars in 2009. Similarly, foreign direct in-

vestment inflow from Greece to Turkey was

merely 55 million US dollars between 1980

and 2000. It has reached a spectacular 6 bil-

lion US dollar level in 2009. This is a solid

indication of how positively our business

communities perceive the new climate of

our relationship.

To put it in a nutshell, we now have

certain mechanisms in place which pro-

vide a legal and practical framework for

our relations, better political understanding

between us and substantial economic coop-

eration. All of this has given our perceptions

a certain maturity. And, we also have the

unresolved issues.

So the question is, “where do we go

from here to keep up the momentum and to

cover additional ground?”

I believe that a decade is a good period

to allow us to sit down and take stock of

what has been accomplished. The existing

bilateral framework and mechanisms which

have functioned well so far. But, in spite of

cover story

high level visits from time to time they are

essentially at the level of senior officials.

We have the exploratory talks, we have the

political consultations, a steering commit-

tee and its working groups. Over time these

have been expanded in accordance with our

growing cooperation. The Joint Economic

Commission, the Mixed Commission on

Land Transport, the Joint Standby Disaster

Response Unit, the Joint Agricultural Com-

mittee and the Tourism Forum have been

added. We can see if these arrangements

need to be improved, taken to higher level

and if we can inject renewed political will

into the process.

I think this is doable. Prime Minister

Papandreou was Foreign Minister when we

turned a new page. He and Minister İsmail

Cem contributed a great deal to the pro-

cess of rapproachment. Prime Minister

Erdoğan has also expressed readiness for

more and I know that there is an invitation

extended to him to visit Greece.

Within an energized new framework we

can undertake a fresh effort to resolve our

differences.

Earlier, I made a reference to the Con-

stitution of UNESCO to underline the impor-

tance of popular support in achieving lasting

peace. Understandably, the public, with the

help of the media, can form its own opin-

ion on a wide range of issues. But govern-

ments can exert a certain influence. This is

not say that we should mislead our peoples

or keep them in the dark. This is possible

neither for you nor for us. But, we can put

the emphasis on the positive and refrain,

where we can within the limits of reason,

from highlighting what may lead to negative

perceptions which our current relationship

does not deserve. I can tell you that Turks, in

general have a positive perception of Greece

and are ready to move forward. We do not

put our bilateral issues on top of our list of

challenges. We have other worries. This

does not mean that Turks are indifferent to

our bilateral agenda, but they are very favor-

ably disposed towards further cooperation

and the settlement of the questions which

divide us. We want this to happen on the

merits of our own relationship and our con-

verging interests.

If we can together create an enhanced

framework for our relations and start moving

forward then we can start calling the road

on which we travelled for a thousand years,

the ”Road of Partnership”. We both face eco-

nomic and other challenges some of which

are beyond our control and this may create

some distraction. But I still believe that noth-

ing should prevent us from taking charge of

our problems in a result-oriented way.

Our bilateral issues may not be on top of

world’s agenda but they are complex enough

or have become more complex over time.

Though some may not fall directly under the

scope of our bilateral relations, several, such

as Cyprus, Aegean issues, minority issues,

illegal migration require our close attention.

When I look at these problems, some of them

at least, appear to be some sort of a structure,

not a perfect wall, but some sort of a wall.

Blocks of stone have been placed on top of

one another without a master plan or archi-

tectural design. I tend to call these blocks,

“blocks of action/reaction or retaliation”, re-

flecting a “if you put a block there, I will put a

block here” sort of approach.

The first thing to do could be, there-

fore, to look closely at these blocks and

see if if they are actually the same ma-

terial, shaped or polished differently and

whether all of them or only some of them

are relevant to a new and better designed

structure. In other words, we need to see

with a cool mind, without emotion if our

positions are indeed so far apart? Can we

find common ground?

I am not going to go into further detail

of our problems because I know that our in-

tention is not to solve them here but address

the broad framework, at least for a start.

Resolving our differences in a timely

fashion will expand our opportunities for

further cooperation, both bilaterally and

internationally. It will give us an edge in a

wider area. It will serve our economic and

political interests. It will help raise our image

internationally.

If we want to continue with the present

course and allow the relationship to mature

even more, hopefully not forever, that is also

a choice.

Ali Tuygan is the former Undersecretary of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Ambas-

sador of the Republic of Turkey to Greece

36 37

Public Power Corporation was founded in 1950 with a view

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tional power transmission system of 12.000 km, as well as the power

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The Business Plan of the Group includes investments for the total mod-

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state-of-the-art power corporation with social responsibility and en-

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Personnel and stakeholders.THE

POW

ER O

F EN

ERG

Y

PUBL

I

It is very difficult at times like this, both

in Turkey and Greece that we both suf-

fer from the global financial crisis, to talk

about futures. But perhaps precisely for this

reason, it is imperative that we have to look

forward and seek alternative ways to ensure

the prosperity and wellbeing of our peoples.

Admittedly, I am not a businessman; but

having retired from the government public

sector. We have a Black Sea region in Tur-

key, where we have a Greek heritage as well

and these people on that region have a very

particular sense of humor. And one day, one

gentleman on that region, on a rainy day, he

climbs up his roof of his house, but it is very

slippery and he falls down.

His wife, his neighbors, everyone is

gathered around him and one is calling for

an ambulance, another for a nearby doctor

and the man, in pain, suddenly lifts his head

and says: “I don’t need a doctor. I don’t need

an ambulance. Just find me someone who

has fallen off a roof before.”

For an ordinary Turkish citizen, the eco-

nomic crisis is not a novelty. My adult life

has passed through economic crisis. More

recently, in 1994, when we had the major

economic crisis, I happened to be the chief

advisor to the Prime Minister.

When I accepted that job – I remember

that now more vividly than before – she told

me that I could advise her on any subject, ex-

cept economy. I was very glad that I was not

responsible for the economic crisis of 1994.

But this was hardly a consolation, be-

cause in one night I lost 40% of my wealth,

whatever it is. So economic crisis, we know.

In 2001, I was the Secretary General for

European affairs in Turkey. I was entrusted

by our government to prepare our national

program for the adoption of the (…).

But suddenly, we had a financial and eco-

nomic crisis in Turkey and while I was prepar-

ing our national program for EU reforms, my

colleague and friend Kemal Dervis, who was

recruited from the World Bank, came and

prepared the economic stabilization program.

These two programs, which were ad-

opted in 2001 under a coalition government,

even today serve as the main pillars of Turk-

ish economy and political reform.

Through these reforms what we have

done is that we addressed our structural

weaknesses. We did not have any indepen-

dent central bank; we did not have regula-

tory independent bodies; we had govern-

ment control on everything, on statistics, on

everything.

And we did not have a real knowledge

of what was happening in Turkey, because

of the absence of transparency.

So these reforms were addressed to re-

cover the institutional deficiencies in the Turk-

ish economy. And when in 2002 Mr. Erdogan

and his party came to power, they continued

these two programs, even with greater vigor

and with greater fiscal discipline.

So within 2002 and 2007, Turkey regis-

tered an impressive growth rate around 7%

per annum. During that period, we increased

our exports, we cut our budget deficits, we

had of course changed our industrial basis and

Turkey became one of the modern economies

of the world.

In 2007, our economy started to contract

a little. But in 2008, when the global financial

crisis started in the United States, it hit us also.

Last year, our growth rate – nowadays

it will be announced – should be around we

have contracted about 6%; and for this year,

we expect a growth rate of about 5%.

But any growth rate in Turkey below 7%

does not help us. Because high unemployment,

and especially unemployment of the youth, re-

quires a growth rate in the region of 7%.

We are confident that we will manage to

accelerate our growth in the coming years and

we are confident that the Turkish economy, in

addition to traditional markets, will penetrate

into new markets.

The crisis in Turkey, the economic crisis

in Turkey, demonstrated how vulnerable the

world is and especially the capital system.

So we need new regulations, new fiscal in-

struments; we need a new approach.

However, we all live in Europe, but the

world is not Europe. There is a new world.

It is not fashionable anymore to have flash-

backs. What is fashionable today is flash

forward; we have to look forward. There

is Asia, China and India, there are the Latin

American countries; there is an Asian-Pacific

region where we have to concentrate.

Therefore, we cannot be local; we cannot

remain national while we are competing in a

globalized economy. We have to increase our

competitiveness, we have to increase our cre-

ativity, and that means freeing people, freeing

ideas, freeing human ingenuity.

By Volkan Vural

38 39

That brings us to the strong part of Europe;

that is, the freedom of expression, freedom of

ingenuity. And that is why Turkey wants to be-

come a member of the European Union.

In trying to realize the political reform

process in Turkey, in the year 2000, we ben-

efited greatly from the EU accession process.

When Turkey was recognized as a candidate

country, it gave us a moral boost to initiate

reforms and to directly address certain is-

sues which were taboos in Turkey; like the

Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Patri-

arch issue that was mentioned before, like

many other issues. The minority rights.

So in Turkey that discussion is going on.

We do have weaknesses, we have certain

mentality problems, but the Turks and the

Turkish society is changing and changing for

the better.

Almost all the economic crises of Turkey,

except the current one, were homemade. It

was our fault. We could not manage our fi-

nances, we could not bring our budget into

realistic terms and we had to borrow both

domestic and externally in a heavy way.

That meant high inflation, low productiv-

ity, and huge budget deficits. These were the

trademarks of the Turkish economy.

After the reform process of 2001, we met

this current crisis in a more prepared manner.

There were no bank defaults in Turkey; no sub-

sidies to companies, no major deficiencies have

appeared.

Of course, we still have problems. We

have the problems of credits, of the small

and medium sized enterprises, we have the

problems of unemployment; but due to the

structural reforms, we have initiated in 2001

especially, we are now prepared and we are

dealing with the current crisis in a much-

much better way. In fact, better than many

other European countries.

I understand that Greece is now going

through similar challenges at the moment.

In two sectors, in which Europe is highly

vulnerable. That is, shipping and tourism.

You also invested heavily. That is one of the

structural problems of Greece; and I hope

Greece will overcome these difficulties in the

coming years.

But this will require – please, let us not

fool ourselves – this will require sacrifice. No

country can manage such challenges with-

out sacrifices.

In the last decade, certainly Turkish-

Greek relations have undergone dramatic,

important changes, a positive turn. I will not

deal with the economic relations and invest-

ments which have improved.

Political problems, yes there are some

problems, but please, let us not look at these

problems from the 19th or 20th century

concepts. We have to look at them from a

different angle.

These are not only a matter of national

pride or sovereignty rights, which are becom-

ing de passé in many terms. I think we have to

look from a different perspective and I will tell

you how I would like to see them.

Turkish-Greek challenges, problems

ahead, cannot be solved, cannot be ad-

dressed in isolation and in an environment of

competition. There is no necessity for Turkey

and Greece to compete.

We have to cooperate. We have to pool

our resources, we have to bring our expertise

together and we have to think about how we

can deal with this international environment,

which has become increasingly competitive

and how we can live in that environment.

For instance, the Greek islands and the

Turkish mainland can they be separated

economically in an infrastructural way? In

addressing climate change problems, in ad-

dressing water resource problems, electric-

ity problems or intraregional trade, we have

to pool those areas, we have to treat them

as a zone, which are close to each other and

which could bring out a synergy of our re-

sources and efficiency.

Therefore, we have to look at the Turkish-

Greek relations – economic relations especially

– from a different perspective of cooperation.

I am not referring only to regional coop-

eration in the Balkans or in the Middle East,

but in a more global scale. I think there is an

opportunity there; we have to use that op-

portunity and together we can be better off.

And this should include Cyprus as well.

Volkan Vural is a Board-member of the

Turkish Industrialists & Businessmen Asso-

ciation, ret. Ambassador, former Undersec-

retary regarding EU at the Ministry and

Board-Member at DOGAN Group

cover story

A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

A quarterly review on European intergrationS.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

I started working on Turkey three and

a half years ago. Turkey of 2006 was a very

different country to that at the beginning of

this century. This came about after a wave of

reforms that allowed the opening of acces-

sion negotiations in 2005.

In the same vein, Turkey of today is very

different to the country of four years ago. The

Turkish society has started to address openly

a number of issues considered sometime

ago as highly sensitive and, indeed, taboos.

Be it on the "deep state", civil-military rela-

tions, the Kurdish issue, Turkish-Armenian

relations, freedom of expression, cultural

diversity, views unthinkable not so long ago,

are exchanged in the public sphere and rank

high on the political agenda.

This is demonstrated for instance by the

"democratic opening" initiative, which the

government launched over last summer. We

have also witnessed recently one of the most

significant diplomatic breakthroughs of the

past decades in Southern Caucasus, namely

the signature between Turkey and Armenia of

protocols by which both countries commit to

normalise their relations. This is an important

step, which the EU welcomes as a contribution

to stability and peace in the region.

We are now looking forward to a

swift ratification of these texts. Disagree-

ments will have to be discussed and settled

through dialogue. In any case, this develop-

ment is another sign that Turkey is becoming

more assertive, confirming its strong poten-

tial as a pole of stability in one of the most

unstable regions of the world.

Another spectacular development,

which nobody would have imagined a few

years ago, is the so-called Ergenekon case,

followed by the also so-called Cage and

Sledgehammer cases. For the first time in

modern Turkish history, suspects who have

been, or are working for the state, including

military officers, have to respond to charges

as serious as attempting to overthrow the

government and instigate armed riots.

These cases are a unique opportunity for

Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper

functioning of its democratic institutions and

the rule of law. But precisely because they are

so important for the rule of law and the proper

functioning of the state, it is crucial that the

trial be conducted in an exemplary manner,

with the sole aim of disclosing the truth, and

in full respect of the rights of the defendants.

More recently, the EMASYA protocol was

cancelled. This protocol allowed the Army to

intervene without authorisation in case of se-

curity threats. This is a landmark achievement

in civil-military relations.

Turkish society has become over the

years more confident and more aware of its

rights. In many ways, it has demonstrated a

democratic maturity and has gained own-

ership of a number of EU related reforms,

which it sees largely as assets rather than

constraints to improve the rights and living

standards of the Turkish people.

Yet, a lot remains to be done. I will not list

here all the areas which require improvements.

The latest progress report of the Commission,

adopted in October last year, provides a com-

prehensive overview of what was achieved

but, also, what remains to be done to meet

fully all accession criteria.

The issues at stake are serious, as they

concern, still and again, fundamental rights.

For instance, while there have been far fewer

prosecutions under the revised article 301 of

the Turkish criminal code than a few years

ago, intellectuals still continue to be scruti-

nised and sometimes prosecuted for peace-

fully expressed opinions. A number of other

provisions of the criminal code, or of the

anti-terror law, are used to restrict freedom

of expression in practice. Legal uncertainties

and pressures affect equally freedom of the

By Christos Makridis

cover story

press in practice, as shown by the tax fine

against the Doğan group.

In a similar vein, perpetrators of torture

and ill-treatment still benefit from impu-

nity, despite the ambitious "zero tolerance

policy" launched by the government several

years ago. This gives the unpleasant impres-

sion of 'déjà-vu' from year to year.

At the same time, however, we see the

willingness of the government to reinvigorate

reforms in a difficult political environment.

The broad consultation which started over

last summer, known as "democratic opening",

gives rise to hope. As such, the method used

and the debate it triggered are encouraging

and the EU can only invite the Turkish authori-

ties to continue this discussion and translate

it into concrete acts. Recently, the submission

to parliament of a draft law setting up an in-

dependent human rights institution and the

adoption of the much-awaited anti-corruption

strategy are also promising.

As regards accession negotiations, the

opening of the important Environment chap-

ter last December is an encouraging develop-

ment, bringing the number of open chapters

to twelve. We are hopeful that we will open

more chapters this year. These include the

chapters on public procurement, competition,

food safety and social policy. However, this will

require additional efforts from Turkey in order

to be able to fulfil the demanding benchmarks.

In the medium term, however, if things do not

change, we face the risk of not being able to

continue opening negotiating chapters.

Based on our experience with all candi-

date countries, we continue to believe strongly

that the EU perspective is a powerful stimulus

for change, provided, however, that this per-

spective remains clear and credible.

At the same time, the core principle of

any accession negotiation is that progress in

reforms determines progress in negotiations.

The slowdown of reforms in Turkey since 2005

has been a serious handicap in the negotia-

tions. A serious re-launch of reforms, address-

ing all critical areas, will become a powerful

asset in the process that will convince people

in the EU that Turkey is serious about human

rights, democracy and the rule of law. Consti-

tutional reform remains a priority for further

democratisation of Turkey, including the

reform of the judiciary, the civilian oversight

of the military, the establishment of the Om-

budsman, the functioning of political parties

and the extension of trade union rights.

If the encouraging efforts we have wit-

nessed in the last year continue to develop,

Turkey will re-create a virtuous circle of the

same magnitude as the one which led to the

start of accession negotiations in 2005. This

is an issue of political will. It is about grasp-

ing the opportunities when they present

themselves and focusing on what is really at

stake: Turkey's integration into the European

Union as a full member.

Speaking of opportunities, there is one

which, definitely, no one can afford to miss:

a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus is-

sue. It is time to turn to the future and to look

for a pragmatic solution, within the UN frame-

work, in accordance with the relevant UN Se-

curity Council resolutions and in line with the

principles on which the Union is founded. The

settlement of the Cyprus issue will also give an

enormous boost to accession negotiations. In

the same vein, and as the Council has stated,

Turkey needs to commit unequivocally to

good neighbourly relations and to the peace-

ful settlement of disputes in accordance with

the UN Charter, having recourse, if necessary,

to the International Court of Justice.

Since the beginning of this century we

have had the privilege to witness the deep

changes the Turkish people are prepared to

engage in when a clear European roadmap

is provided. We also saw the same people

taking ownership of those reforms, not nec-

essarily to meet benchmarks and criteria, but

simply because these reforms are needed

anyway to take on the challenges of this cen-

tury, for the good of their country. These two

processes of reforms and EU accession are

destined to proceed together. They may move

on at times in parallel, they may not follow

always the same speed, but they will inevi-

tably intertwine and - inch’ Allah - eventually

anchor Turkey firmly into the European Union

and, thus, consolidate its democracy.

Christos Makridis is the Deputy Head of

Unit of the Turkey Team in DG Enlargement,

European Commission

42 43

The Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA) and the

DEPA Group of Companies, import, transport and dis-

tribute natural gas in Greece.

They provide to the Greek industry, small businesses and

households a clean and easy to use form of energy. They

offer natural gas as a strong lever for sustainable develop-

ment and better quality of life.

Through strategic gas pipeline projects, such as the Greece

- Turkey, Greece - Bulgaria and the Greece-Italy Intercon-

nectors, DEPA aims to establish Greece as an energy hub in

South-East Europe, connecting the energy sources of the

East with the European markets in the West.

In today’s changing world, DEPA meets the challenges of

the future, with the energy that connects countries, econ-

omies and peoples.

www.depa.gr

DEPA: Energy from the world,

power for Greece

PUBL

I

A new strategy – why and how?

2010 will be a decisive year for the Alliance

as it will not only mark a further NATO Sum-

mit but, equally important - if not more so, the

shaping of NATO’s future strategic orientation.

Allied leaders are expected to agree on NATO’s

new Strategic Concept, a new mission state-

ment for the Alliance, on the occasion of the

next NATO Summit in Portugal in November

2010. First indications as to where the journey

could be going are awaited in early May 2010.

This is when the NATO-appointed group of

experts will present their analysis and recom-

mendations to the Secretary General.

The process leading towards a new Stra-

tegic Concept formally kicked off at NATO’s

60th anniversary Summit in Strasbourg / Kehl

2009. On that occasion, NATO leaders decided

that it was time to work on a new strategy.

The current Strategic Concept dates back to

1999. As such it does not take into account

many of the new threats and challenges char-

acterizing the 21st century. Likewise, the 1999

Concept describes the Alliance as „Eurocen-

tric“ - but today’s NATO is dealing with secu-

rity issues well beyond Europe’s borders. Last

but not least, in 1999 NATO had 16 members;

now there are 28 Allies.

To facilitate the process leading to the new

Strategic Concept, NATO’s Secretary General

Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed a group

of external experts led by former US Secretary

of State, Dr Madeleine Albright, composed of

representatives from public and private sectors

and coming from a good mix of small and large

NATO members. Following an initial reflection

phase, centred around four key international

seminars, the group is now in the consultation

phase, visiting Allied capitals to discuss their

findings and proposals with governments and,

where possible, parliamentary committees.

A key feature of the process is its intended

openness and inclusiveness, explicitly aiming

to foster public participation and discussion.

To that end, NATO has also, for the first time it

its history, set up a dedicated Strategic Concept

website and discussion forum serving as a key

tool for sharing views and opinions. Raising

public awareness, understanding and even-

tually support is more important today than

ever: NATO is an Alliance of democratic nations,

and many of them regularly experience the

heavy burden of a “NATO in action” especially

in Afghanistan. Engaging the public in a frank

dialogue and, where necessary, controversial

debate is key and must be part and parcel of

the democratic security culture of an organiza-

tion “founded on the principles of democracy,

individual liberty and the rule of law”.

Defining the new strategic

environment

NATO was initially invented to deal with

20th century challenges, mainly the risk of

conventional war between predictable, or-

ganized, military alliances with states as the

key actors – where the response was also es-

sentially military. However, in the 21st century

conflicts within states have largely replaced

conflicts between them. In addition, many

threats these days come from non-state actors

and are often per se unpredictable. As such,

NATO is confronted with a host of new threats

– terrorism, cyber warfare, energy insecurity,

etc. – as well as old, latent threats that are ur-

gent again, such as the proliferation of nuclear

weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

In an age of globalization, we face glo-

balised insecurity. Addressing these issues re-

quires a mix of policy instruments that go well

beyond military capabilities, and frequently

beyond NATO itself. Deciding which challenges

fit most readily into NATO’s frame of reference

and where the Alliance can add value to inter-

national efforts is fundamental.

Updating the meaning of the

Washington Treaty’s Article 5

In light of the new security environment,

how should Article 5, the bedrock of the Alli-

ance, be interpreted and implemented today?

There is no doubt that NATO’s core task

was, is and will remain the defence of its ter-

ritory and populations. For the Alliance to

endure, all members must feel that they are

safe and secure. That is a fundamental raison

d’être for a security alliance. But in a changed

and changing world, the meaning of Article 5

is changing too. When NATO invoked Article 5

for the first time in its history in the immediate

aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-

tember, this was not an attack in the traditional

sense or in the sense Article 5 was initially

thought of.

By Gerlinde Niehus

46 47

In the 21st century, terrorism has mutated

into a global franchise. Cyber attacks or energy

cut-offs can seriously destabilize a country.

Iran and North Korea highlight the risk of nu-

clear proliferation. Piracy poses, once again, a

major threat to international shipping. Climate

change is likely to intensify conflicts over arable

land, competition for natural resources and

migration. Addressing these threats does not

necessarily require military responses, but it

does require collective responses by all Allies.

However, the approaches of a bygone era

simply no longer work. Static, heavy metal

armies are not going to impress terrorists, pi-

rates or computer hackers. Burying our heads

in the sand and hoping that these threats will

fade away will only increase our insecurity

and exposure. Security today is about active

engagement, possibly far away from the bor-

ders of allied nations. As geographic distance

will not protect us, territorial defence means

to engage, to cooperate with partners and to

deal with the problems when and where they

emerge, before they end up on our doorstep.

This implies that any debate about Article

5 versus non-Article 5 missions seems distort-

ed and artificial: it is distorted as the discussion

mainly focuses on the purely military dimen-

sion of the Alliance, thereby neglecting the

much more fundamental political dimensions

of Alliance solidarity and credibility. And it is ar-

tificial as it seeks to reinstate the already obso-

lete dichotomy between security at home and

from abroad as a yardstick for prioritization.

Boosting NATO’s role as a joint

political forum

We cannot meet today’s and tomor-

row’s security challenges effectively without

engaging much more actively and system-

atically with other important players on the

international scene, nor without broadening

the scope of political dialogue, opinion shap-

ing and decision-making amongst Allies and

partners. This cannot be done ad hoc or on a

case-by-case basis. It has to be an ongoing

systematic process and very much the way

NATO does business.

The foundations for doing this are in

place. In many ways they only need to be re-

invigorated: one is enshrined in Article 4 of the

NATO Treaty, whereby “the Parties will consult

together whenever, in the opinion of any of

them, the territorial integrity, political inde-

pendence or security of any of the Parties is

threatened”. Another one is the rediscovery of

Alliance core values founded on the principles

of the UN Charter. And, last but not least, the

rediscovery of the transatlantic link, based on

solidarity and partnership between America

and Europe.

In vigorously drawing on these assets,

NATO should or could become the hub of a

network of security partnerships and a centre

for consultation on international security is-

sues – even on issues on which the Alliance

might never take action. As NATO’s Secretary

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently

flagged: “NATO can be the place where views,

concerns and best practices on security are

shared by NATO’s global partners. And where,

if it makes sense – if we decide that NATO

should have a role – we might work out how

to tackle global challenges together.” This

development also implies that NATO needs to

strengthen its global networking capabilities,

be this by strengthening the various partner-

ship arrangements, or by reaching out to a

broader range of actors such as India, China or

Japan and organizations like the World Bank,

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and

the G20 – to name but a few. And it will im-

ply that NATO will have to move from a largely

geographical understanding of partnerships to

a much more functional approach.

Incorporating the notion of a

“Comprehensive Approach”

Today’s security challenges cannot be

dealt with by NATO nor by military means

alone - but equally, no other institution can do

everything on its own. Today, the effectiveness

of NATO, and security for us all, depends on

how well and efficiently the Alliance cooper-

ates with other organizations and nations. This

is not a question of hierarchy, but of synergy.

Security in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, de-

mands a comprehensive application of eco-

nomic, political and military measures that go

far beyond NATO’s capabilities. A new Strategic

Concept has to lay out the role NATO can play

within a comprehensive approach and how

the necessary civilian and military means are

to be applied coherently, effectively and in a

coordinated manner.

cover story

NATO has made good progress these last

few years in building closer ties with other

international actors such as the UN and the

African Union. The adoption of the EU’s Lisbon

Treaty should encourage greater EU – NATO

cooperation and a more strategic partnership.

Notwithstanding, there are a number of key is-

sues which need to be addressed collectively:

one is about strategic alignment. By reinforc-

ing joint analysis and political dialogue among

major international organizations, it should be

possible to better identify together key prior-

ity areas, helping to concentrate resources and

thereby maximizing our chances of success.

A second issue is about planning, espe-

cially on the strategic level. And a third issue

concerns the relationship between security

and development. It is certainly true that there

is no development without security, and no

security without development. But beyond the

theory, the practice is challenging: strengthen-

ing cooperation between civilian and military

actors implies inter alia to achieve better mu-

tual understanding, strengthening information

sharing and timely coordination.

Fostering military transformation

NATO has been engaged in a process of

continuous and systematic transformation

for many years to ensure that it has the ca-

pabilities, policies and structures required in

the changing security environment. But this

does not imply that the Alliance can rest on

its laurels – there are many challenges ahead,

which require innovative thinking and candid

discussion among the Allies and also its part-

ners: How do we ensure that we do not spend

tomorrow’s money on yesterday’s conflicts?

How can we narrow the capability gap be-

tween the US and its European Allies?

NATO’s fundamental value resides in

particular in the ability to translate political

decisions into military action. This is a precious

asset. But to preserve its value, NATO needs to

focus on capabilities that are relevant for the

new security environment. This means capa-

bilities and forces that are mobile, flexible and

employable in a variety of contingencies – in

distinction to the largely static armed forces of

previous times. In the current economic crisis

it is more important than ever that we get our

priorities right.

This implies that NATO needs to keep re-

viewing and innovating the way in which we

plan, man and pay for operations. We need to

continue focusing on capabilities that we all

know are relevant in the new security environ-

ment, such as strategic lift, helicopters, and

modern command and control systems. And

we need to promote more multinational so-

lutions for acquiring and operating these vital

assets, such as joint funding and pooling ar-

rangements. Having multiple national projects

running at the same time is simply a waste of

scarce resources. In addition, it implies continu-

ing to foster the modernization and training of

armed forces: having technical capabilities and

devices to do a job is certainly important, but

equally, if not more important, is the “human

factor” – the man or woman using them. And

their profession has not only become extreme-

ly demanding, it also requires an increasingly

broad range of skills and competences that can

only be met by embracing an approach of life-

long learning.

Pursuing the consolidation of

Europe

Amidst all these challenges, there is clearly

still unfinished business in Europe. NATO’s

open door policy and related enlargement

process have contributed significantly over

recent decades to consolidating Europe as a

whole, free and democratic security zone. The

process has minimized the risk of a large-scale

war in Europe. It has enhanced stability and se-

curity in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, not just

for NATO nations but also for NATO neighbors.

The process needs to be continued. The

prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration remains

the most effective way to bring lasting peace

and stability to the strategically important

Western Balkans. The perspective for NATO

membership for both Ukraine and Georgia

has been confirmed at recent NATO Summits

and Ministerials. Keeping NATO’s door open to

other European states is anchored in the NATO

Treaty’s article 10. However, application and

implementation of this policy depends upon

key two factors: the performance of the ap-

plicants themselves, underscoring that they

are willing and capable to contribute to the

48 49

security of the North Atlantic area; and the

consensus among NATO nations to offer mem-

bership or the preparatory membership action

plan (MAP) to a candidate, although the latter

does not include any automaticity towards

membership.

Key events over the past two years have,

if anything, demonstrated that attaching

timetables or fixed scenarios to any of these

questions is unproductive. The crisis in Georgia

in 2008, the subsequent deterioration (and

now progressive resurrection) of NATO–Rus-

sia relations or the recent elections in Ukraine

have intensified discussions on enlargement,

yet so far without any major definitive decision

“for” or “against”. With a view to avoiding a

too short-term perspective, it seems therefore

likely that the new Strategic Concept could un-

derscore the principles of enlargement, similar

to the provisions of the 1999 Strategic Concept,

and go for the “long haul”. In that respect it

could also help to get back to some of the fun-

damentals of this policy, as initially outlined in

NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement, putting

particular emphasis on the readiness of candi-

dates to fulfill membership requirements. That

way, the current mainly political and often

(mis)perception-based process could be re-

anchored on more objective and performance-

based principles.

Forging a productive partnership

with Russia

NATO cannot talk seriously about an un-

divided Europe if the organization is unable or

unwilling to engage Russia. Clearly, among the

28 Allies, there are different views on Russia.

History cannot be erased. But neither should

the Alliance become a prisoner of the past.

The international security environment

will not wait for NATO and Russia to sort their

act out. The partnership has the potential

to contribute strategically to security in the

Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. As such, NATO-

Russia cooperation is not a matter of choice but

of necessity. The goal must be a relationship

that allows NATO and Russia to pursue com-

mon interests even when disagreements and

differences remain in other areas.

There are many de facto zones of common

interest providing opportunities to intensify

practical cooperation with Russia. These range

from the fight against terrorism and measures

to enhance maritime security, to steps coun-

tering the proliferation of weapons of mass de-

struction and building a more effective missile

defence system. Some take this scenario even

further by calling for (or at least not excluding)

future NATO membership for Russia. Amidst

these bold and so far controversial proposals,

two foundations of the Alliance should not be

sacrificed as they constitute the lifeblood of the

Alliance: living up to its common core values

as enshrined in the Washington Treaty, and

constantly striving towards Allied unity and

solidarity. The recently launched joint review of

NATO’s and Russia’s common threats and chal-

lenges could serve as a facilitator to these ends.

To conclude, since its founding in 1949,

the transatlantic Alliance’s strategic flexibility,

embedded in its original Treaty, has allowed

it to suit the different requirements of different

times. In the 1950s, the Alliance was mainly a

defensive organization. Since the 1960s, NATO

also became a political instrument for détente.

In the 1990s, the Alliance became a tool for

the stabilization of Eastern Europe and Central

Asia. Now NATO has a new mission: extend-

ing peace though the strategic projection of

security.

This is not a mission of choice, but of ne-

cessity. And it is what the new Strategic Con-

cept should reflect.

Gerlinde Niehus is Head of the Corporate

Communication Section, NATO Public Diplo-

macy Division

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Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, Istanbul

50 51