Volume 5, Issue 1 January 2019

THE CASE FOR RESTORING RELATIONS WITH IRAN

Ryan J. Anderson Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

On 7 September 2012, Canada’s then-foreign affairsministerJohnBairdannouncedthatCanadahadformallyendedalldiplomaticrelationswithakeyregionalpowerintheMiddleEast—Iran.Labellingthecountryas“themostsignificantthreattoglobalpeaceandsecurity,”theHarpergovernment closed the Canadian embassy in Tehran,declared all Iranian diplomats in Ottawa personae nongratae, and listed Iran as an official state sponsor ofterrorismundertheStateImmunityActandtheJusticeforVictimsofTerrorismAct.1

Indeed, Canada had shut itsmission in Tehran before—once in1980 foreightyearsafterthe1979 Iranhostagecrisis—andIranhasnotdelegatedaCanadianambassadorsince2007.ThescopeofthishostileapproachtakenbytheHarper government, however, marked a sudden shift inCanada’s foreign policy towards Iran—and to a lesserextentitsMiddleEastpolicy—whichhasforcedCanadatoforgoitsbasicnationalinterestsinsideofIranfornearlysix years. Yet despite such costly implications of thisforeignpolicydecision,theTrudeaugovernmentrecentlyvoted in favour of an opposition motion that called onOttawa to “immediately cease all negotiations ordiscussions”onnormalizingdiplomatictieswithTehran—anowabandonedLiberalcampaignpromisefrom2015.2

The purpose of this policy brief is tomake the case forreassessing Canada’s relationship with Iran through astrategic and realist lens; one thatdoesnot conflate therole of morals and shared values with interests ininternationaldiplomacy.ThepolicyprescriptionputforthinthisbriefanditssignificancetoCanadianinterestsarestraightforward: Canada should begin to take concretestepstowardsre-establishingformaldiplomaticrelationswiththeIslamicRepublic.Byadoptingapragmaticforeign

policyapproachbasedondirect,non-restricteddiplomacy,Canada has the opportunity to regain its strategic anddiplomaticinterestsinTehranwhilealsobenefittingfromthe short- and long-term opportunities that bilateralrelationsnaturallyyield.Assuch,restoringtieswithIranmustbecomeanon-partisanpriority inCanada’s foreignpolicyagendamovingforward.

Criticsofthisprescriptionarerightinmanyrespects.TheIranian regime iswidely accused of having an atrociousrecordofhumanrightsabuses,providingdismaltreatmentforreligiousandethnicminoritygroups,andsupportingterrorist and militant groups across the Middle East toundermine and exhaust regional threats. However,policymakersshouldnotallowthesedifferencesinsharedvaluesandinterestsfrompreventingCanadafromholdingrelationswithforeigncountry,letaloneasignificantplayerin theLevant andPersianGulf.Diplomacy is ameans toadvanceandachievenationalinterests;itisnotdesignedtospreadmorals,nordoesitrepresentanendorsementofitshostgovernment’sbehaviourorpolicies.Canadamustnotsimplypickandchoosewhotheyengageinrelationswithbasedondegreesofethicalandideologicalapproval

Revisiting Harper’s DecisionBefore explaining why restoring formal diplomaticrelationswithIranissoundforeignpolicyforCanada,itisimportanttorevisitthesixfactorsBairdcitedin2012tojustify the original decision. They included: (1) Iran’ssupport and military assistance to the Bashar al-Assadregime inSyria; (2) thecountry’srefusaltocomplywithUnited Nations’ (UN) resolutions regarding its nuclearprogram; (3) Iran’s anti-Semitic rhetoric and repeatedthreats towards the existence of Israel; (4) the human

The Case for Restoring Relations with Iran

2

Volume 5, Issue 1 January 2019

rightsatrocitiesthattakeplaceundertheIranianregime;(5)itsshelteringandmaterialsupportofterroristgroups;and,(6)thecountry’sneglecttoguaranteetheprotectionofforeigndiplomaticpersonnel.3

Indeed,manyofthesearelegitimatefactorsandthereforewarrantCanada’scontinuedcondemnationoftheIranianregime.IranhasforlongbeenSyria’skeystrategicallyinpreserving the Assad regime; Ali Khamenei, Iran’sSupremeLeader, is oneof theharshest critics of Israel’spresenceintheMiddleEast;andIranisamongtheworld’sworst violators of civil liberties and political rights.Moreover,IrancontinuestosponsorandprovidematerialsupporttoHezbollah,thePalestinianIslamicJihad,Hamas,andothermilitantorganizationsincountriessuchasIraq,Syria,andYemen.4

The remaining two factors, however, are based onfundamentallyflawedandhollowlogic.First,in2015,Iransigned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).NotonlydidthisdealensureareductioninIran’suraniumstockpile by ninety-eight percent over the next fifteenyears, it also put in place measures to confirm Iran’scompliance with the terms over time, such as theinstallation of UN monitoring devices (e.g., theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency).Overthecourseofthethreeyearsthatthisdealhasbeenineffect,theIAEAhaspublishedeightseparatereportswitheachconfirmingIran’scompliance.5AndalthoughtheJCPOAwasput—andstill remains—in troublesome jeopardy by the UnitedStatesafteritannouncedinMayitwouldbewithdrawingfrom the deal, Canada, its European partners, and Iranhave all since indicated a commitment to protect theagreementandcontinueitsterms.

TheJCPOAiscertainlynotperfectandmayindeedbenefitfromacollectivereviewinduetime,howeveritwouldbestrategicallyfoolishandfactuallyirresponsibletoignore—or even worse, deny—the agreement’s ongoing successtowards stabilizing Iran’s nuclear capability. As such,arguments that Canada should remain disengaged fromIran due to its unmonitored nuclear development andassumed hostile ambitions has become a strawmansupportedbyproveninaccuracies.6

As Baird’s sixth factor indicates, much of the reasoningbehindclosingCanada’sembassyinTehranwastoensurethe protection and safety of its foreign service officers.

Referencingthe1979hostagecrisisasanexampleofthesecurity threat facing Canadian personnel, Baird arguedthe embassy “faces abusy roadand it couldbeoverrunpretty quickly.” 7 However, neither Baird nor HarperprovidedanyrecentexamplesofwhentheIranianregimeoritscitizenshavetargetedCanada’smissioninviolationoftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations.Infact,Baird later acknowledged there had been no knownthreats facing the Canadian embassy or its staff. 8Moreover, the Iranian embassy in Ottawa has beenattackedmore times—specifically in1992by agroupofIranian–Canadian supporters of the Mujahedin-e-Khalqcarryingironbarsandsledgehammers.Afterforcingtheirway in the building, they assaulted the Iranianambassador, injured six embassy staff, and causedextensivedamagetotheinterioroftheembassy.9

Although Baird was correct that Iranian protestersstormedtheBritishembassyone-yearpriorinNovember2011, the Cameron government did not respond bysevering diplomatic relations with Iran, but insteadincreased its economic sanctions and only temporarilysuspendeditsmission.Alas, itisunclearwhytheHarpergovernment chose to pursue this hostile foreign policytowardstheIslamicRepublicinthefirstplace.

Re-Engaging with Iran Canadaprovedtolosemuchmorethanitgainedafterthe2012decision.NotonlydiditgoagainstCanada’snationalinterests in the country, but the decision was merelysymbolic and had no real chance of leveraging Iran toimproveitshumanrightsrecordortoenditssupportofterrorist organizations. Canada is simplynot a powerfulenoughplayertounilaterallychangeanyofIran’spoliciesthatitdisagreeswith.Instead,byseveringdiplomatictieswithIran,Canadaforfeitedtwokeyelementsofitsnationalinterests.

HereinliesthereasonwhyCanadashouldrenewtieswithTehran: The cost of forgoing these interests aresignifcantly greater than the symbolic ormoral value ofremaining disengaged. To argue otherwise would be amisguidedunderstandingofwhatinternationaldiplomacyissupposedtoachieve.ThisiswhyCanadacontinuestobediplomatically engaged and even strategically partneredwith other countries whose human rights and policyrecordhasalsobeenseriouslyquestioned,suchasSaudiArabia, Egypt, Russia, and China. The list is long, and

The Case for Restoring Relations with Iran

3

Volume 5, Issue 1 January 2019

Canadacannotsimplyselectsomeandignoreothersfromit.

First, Canada forfeited its diplomatic channel ofcommunication with an important regional power. Theimplications of this are sizeable and should not beoverlooked,asitmeantCanadalostitswayoftalkingto,negotiating,andworkingwithIranianofficialstoadvanceCanadian interests insideof the country. Canadaalsonolonger has a direct and reliable way of conveying itsmessages or concernswith the Iranian regime about itsdomesticandinternationalbehaviour.Inaddition,havingno embassy or physical diplomatic presence in Tehranmakes it nearly impossible for Canadian authorities toactivelydefenditscitizenswholiveinIranandareinneedof immediate consular service—not to mention thosealreadysittinginEvinprison.Instead,Canadahasreliedonforeign consulates, namely Italy’s, to serve as Canada’sdiplomaticproxy.WhileitisunreasonabletobelievethathavinganembassyinTehranwouldsuddenlysolveeveryCanadian consular case, it is likely that it would aid inmanagingdifficultlegaloradministrativeprocesses.

Forinstance,theTrudeaugovernmentfacedconsiderablechallenges trying to free Homa Hoodfar, a Concordiaprofessor who was detained in Evin prison until herrelease in late 2016. 10 More recently, Prime MinisterTrudeautooktoTwittertoexpressCanada’sconcernthatMaryam Mombeini—a Canadian–Iranian citizen—hadbeen banned from leaving Iran to return to Canada.TrudeaualsocalledonTehranto“provideanswers”forthedeathofMaryam’shusband,KavousSeyed-Emami,inEvinprison earlier this year. 11 These sorts of ‘diplomatic’efforts,however,areproblematicandmuchlesseffectivethanengagingindirectdiplomacy.Canadamustthereforeregainaposition inTehran tobecomemore involved indiplomaticcrisesthatcannotpossiblybesolvedbyTweetsorpressreleasesalone.

Second,CanadagaveupitsstrategicinterestsbyrecallingitsforeignserviceofficersfromIran.Canadanolongerhasits own ears and eyes on the ground—a necessity forhumanintelligencegathering—andthushastorelyontheintelligenceandinformationofforeignembassies.Notonlyis the IslamicRepublic an important country toobserveconsideringitsforeignactivityintheregion,butasrecentdomestic events suggest, Iranian politics and societalunrest can move at a quick and complex pace. It is

therefore in Canada’s interest to re-establish a physicalpresenceinTehransothatCanadiandiplomatscanrelaytrusted, on-the-ground information back to the PrimeMinister’s Office, Canadian policymakers, and itsintelligenceagencieswhocanthensharetheinformationwithitsFiveEyespartners.

ItisalsoworthnotingthatCanadaconcededitstradeandcommercial interests in Iran—one of the largest andgrowingmarketsintheMiddleEast.Whiletheeconomicgains Canada would receive from trading with Iran aresmall in comparison to its larger trading partners, thisshould not discount Canada’s economic interests in thepolicy prescription. This is yet another opportunity thatCanadaforgoesduetotheabsenceofsharingdiplomatictieswithIran.

Nonetheless, restoring relations with Iran remains adifficult task that has been marred by many legal andpoliticalobstacles.ThisismainlyduetothejointpiecesoflegislationthatHarperusedtolistIranasastatesponsorofterrorism(i.e.,theStateImmunityActandtheJusticeforVictimsofTerrorismAct)whichinpracticehashandcuffedany future Canadian government from removing thesesanctionsandrestoringtieswithIran.12Indeed,itwouldbeprocedurallysimple for anygovernment todelist thecountry and lift its sanction—this can be done during acabinet’sbiennialministerialreview.However,itwouldbepoliticalsuicideasitindicatesthatthesittinggovernmentdoesnotbelieveIranisasponsorofterrorism.Moreover,itwouldbealegallycomplexandburdensometaskasitisunclearwhatwouldhappento thecasescurrentlybeingtried against Iran under the Justice for Victims ofTerrorismAct.

The only alternative option thenwould be to re-engagewith Iranwhile it is still on the list, asneitherpiecesoflegislation prohibit Canada from having contact withIranianofficials.Butthistooispoliticallydangerous,anditis unlikely any government would be willing to engagewitharegimethatisofficiallylistedasastatesponsorofterrorism.Assuch,policymakersmustfirstfindawaytoovercomethesebarriersbeforeanymeaningfulactioncantake place. If not, future governments will remainapprehensive about the political repercussions fromconductingdirectdiplomacywithIran.

The Case for Restoring Relations with Iran

4

Volume 5, Issue 1 January 2019

ConclusionTo conclude, this policy brief hasmade the case for re-engagingwithIranonformaldiplomaticlevels.ThoughtheIslamicRepublicisakleptocratictheocracywhoseforeignanddomesticpolicyrunoppositetoCanadianvalues,theneedforCanadatorestoreitsdiplomatictieswithTehranis—and should be—based on national interests, notshared morals. For six years now, the hostile approachadopted by Harper and continued by the Trudeaugovernmenthasbeenat the cost ofCanada’sdiplomaticandstrategicinterests.

Moreover, the morally symbolic meaning behindrestrictingalldialoguewithIranandinsteadcondemning

Endnotes 1.SeeJohnBaird’spressreleaseinVladivostok,RussiaattheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperationforum,7September2012.2.LevonSevunts,“HouseofCommonsvotesagainstrestoringtieswithIran.”RadioCanadaInternational,13June2018.3.Seenote1.4.MarcR.DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: ACase Study of How State Sponsorship Affects Terrorist GroupDecision-Making,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 4–5 (October2012):87–107.5.Thelatestreportcanbeviewedhere,www.niacouncil.org/niac-statement-iaea-report-confirming-irans-compliance-jcpoa/.6. “Statement on Iran by the IAEA Spokesperson.” InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,1May2018.

itsbehaviourfromwithinCanada(includingsocialmedia)has yet to—nor will ever—leverage the Iranian regimeintochangingitsways.Infact,asthisbriefhasargued,thisapproachdirectlyimpactsthesafetyofCanadianslivinginIran as it leaves no Canadian embassy there to protectthem during times of regime abuses. Although certainlegislative and political hurdles must first be overcomebeforebilateralrelationswithIrancanberesumed,boththe Canadian government and its opposition must bewillingtosetasideelectoralpoliticsandworktogethertorecoverCanada’snationalintereststhatwillcontinuetobesacrificedifnoconcretestepsaresoontaken.

7.DanielSchwartz,“WhyCanadaseveredrelationswithIran.”CBCNews,8September2012.8.Ibid.9.EdwardF.MickolusandSusanL.Simmons,Terrorism,1992-1995:A Chronology of Events and A Selectively Annotated Bibliography(Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1997),150.10.MelissaFundiraandKamilaHinkson,“HomaHoodfar,Concordiaprofessor, released from Tehran jail.” CBC News, 26 September2016.11.Michelle Zilio and SunnyDhillon, “Federal government urgesIrantoallowprofessor’swidowtoleavethecountry.”TheGlobeandMail,6June2018.12.Thomas Juneau, “WhyresumingtieswithTehranwillbeslowgoingforCanada.”TheGlobalandMail,25March2017.