the challenge of collaborative governance
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This article was downloaded by: [Ondokuz Mayis Universitesine]On: 09 November 2014, At: 09:32Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T3JH, UK
Public Management: AnInternational Journal ofResearch and TheoryPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpxm19
The Challenge of CollaborativeGovernanceChris Huxham a , S. Vangen a , C. Huxham a & C.Eden aa University of Strathclyde Graduate School ofBusiness , 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow, G4 OQU,UK Phone: +44 141 553 6113 Fax: +44 141 553 6113Published online: 28 Jul 2006.
To cite this article: Chris Huxham , S. Vangen , C. Huxham & C. Eden (2000) TheChallenge of Collaborative Governance, Public Management: An InternationalJournal of Research and Theory, 2:3, 337-358
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719030000000021
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I / Abstract 1 THE CHALLENGE OF
therefore essential to understanding modern governance principles. This art icle describes action research a iming t o develop a conceptual ization of fac- to rs inherent in col laborative fo rms and, hence, about their practical i ty as governance tools . Different in terpreta- t ions of what col laborative governance is intended t o achieve are f i r s t reviewed. Two areas that seriously affect the abi l - i ty of col laborations t o del iver thei r potential, s t ructura l complexity and diversity are then reviewed. The art icle concludes by considering what i s needed t o make col laborative govern- ance work.
Partnerships increasingly play a major role i n determining and implementing major pol icy drives i n local i t ies. Under- standing how they may provide value i s
i j Key words
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
/ Col laboration, governance, partnership I
Chris Huxham
j Chris Huxham University of Strathclyde Graduate School of Business 199 Cathedral Street,
Glasgow G 4 OQU, UK Tel: 4-44 141 553 61 13 Fax: +44 141 552 8851 E-mail:
I I 1 1 Vol 2 Issue 3 2000 337-357
I Publlc Management ISSN 1461-667X prlnVlSSN 1470-1065 online 1 _ - - -- -- O 2000 Taylor 8 Francis Ltd
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338 Public Management: an international journal of research and theory
INTRODUCTION
It goes without saying that thc important issucs fhclng moclcrn public scctor lcadcrs
and managers arc highly complex and cross-cutting. As Trist ( 1 983) argued, significant
social issues neccssarily sit within the '~ntcr-orpni /at lonal domain' and cannot bc - tackled by any organization acting alonc. In practice, the nced to work across
organizations has long been rccc)gnizcd as a charactcristic of the rolc of public scctor
managers (I-ricnd et al. 1974; Mctcalfc 1993). licccnt yc:ars, howcvcr, havc sccn a
world-widc step changc in the cmpliasis on intcr-organizational arrangements as a
mainstay of governance regimcs (scc, for cxamplc, Hamblcton ec a1. 1995; Hcalcy 1997; Lowntles 1997; Jcnnings and E\valt 1998; Brinkcrhoff 1999; Mandcll 1999a). Covcrnmcnt inccntivcs and dircctivcs for collaborative initiatives hccomc cvcr morc
abundant (Jacobs 1997; Ball 1999). Many of the initiativcs cmphasize the participation
of 'the community' (Sarkissian et al. 1997; King er a1. 1998; Stcclc and Scargcant
1999), busincss organizations (EIU 1999; Glaistcr 1999) and NGOs (Paintcr et al. 1997). Localities (whcthcr url:~an, regional o r national) increasingly abountl with
multiple, overlapping partnerships in which various combinations of local, national and
intcrnational organizations arc reprcscntccl (Stcwart 1998; I-iuxham and Vangcn
2000a). Thcsc partnerships play a major rolc in the govcrnancc of thc arca,
determining and implcmcnting major policy drives. Thcrc is thus a shift of governing powcr away from dircctly clcctcd bodies (Jacol~s 1997; Painter et al. 1997). Thc
arguments for the inevitability of a futurc in which powcr rcniains shared in this way
havc bcen ably put by Bryson and Crosby (1992). 'Thc public arcna is rife with both
rhetoric about thc potential of collaborativc govcrnancc and coniplaints ahout thc
difficulty of achicving in practice, I)ut it appears that littlc considci-ation has bccn given
t o thc practical question of thc skills nccdctl to manage in this contcxt (O' lbolc
1997). Understanding the way that collaborativc approaches may providc value is therefore
an csscntial clcment of undcrstanding modcrn governance principlcs. This issue can bc
addressed at many Icvcls. Kooiman (1999), for cxamplc, sct a framework of thrcc
'governing orders', whcrc thc first is conccrnccl with prohlcm solving and opportunity
creation, the second with institutional conditions and thc third with the principlcs that
'govern governancc'. This articlc rclatcs primarily to thc first two of thcsc orders. It
is conccrncd with the factors, both managerial and institutional, that cffcct thc day-to-
day opcration of intcr-organizational initiativcs and that, hcncc, influence thcir capacity
to achicvc collaborative advantage (Huxham with Macdonalcl 1992). This mcans achieving
something that could not bc rcalizcd t)y a single organization acting alonc. Thcsc issucs
will be discussed against the I~ackgrountl and in terms of thc thrcc concepts
complexity, dynamics and diversity which arc also a central clcrncnt of Kooiman's
governancc framework.
Thc articlc dcrivcs from rcscarch carricd out over the last decade by the author ant1
collcagucs. Thc aim has bccn to develop a conceptual understanding of factors that arc
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Huxharn: The challenge of collaborative governance 339
inherent in collaborativc forms and hcncc to provide insight about how thcy may best be managed. Thc rcscarch has bcen predominantly action rcscarch (Eden and I-luxham 1996; Huxham and Vangcn 1998a) and has engaged thc author in work with individuals from a wide variety of public and community agencies involved in collaborativc initiatives. In this article the aim is to explore the nature of collaborativc forms and thcir practicality as governance tools through summarizing somc aspects of this rcscarch. For a fuller account of thc arguments madc herc, thc data that support thcsc and their methodological justification the following articles can be consulted: for cxamplc, Edcn and tluxham 2000; Huxham and Vangcn 1996, l998a, 1998b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Vangcn and Huxham 1998. The article begins by reviewing diffcrcnt intcrprctations of what collaborativc governancc is intended to achieve. It thcn focuses on two areas which seriously affcct the ability of collaborations to delivcr thcir potential, structural complexrty (including dynarnlcs) anci d ~ v e r s ~ t y . It concludes by considering what is needed to make collaborativc govcrnancc work.
INTERPRETATIONS OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
In thc UK, thc particular buzzword of the momcnt is 'joined-up'. The Government's 'Modernizing Govcrnmcnt' initiative promotes the co-ordination of the public, prlvate and voluntary sectors so that citidens' needs arc addrcsscd in a way that will appear seamless. A particular thrust, which is new in the UK setting, is a dellberate policy of collaboration bctwccn central and local government (Cabinet Officc 1999). Many other words are, however, also used to dcscribc govcrnancc shucturcs that involvc cross-organizational working. 'Partncrship' and 'alliance' figure licqucntly in thc namcs of these structures, but phrases such as 'collaboration', 'co-ord~nation', 'co-operation', 'network', 'joint working' and 'multi-party working' are often also uscd to describe them. Practitioners often claim diffcrcnt meanings for these labels. Typically thcy arguc that a particular situation is a collaboration but not a partnership, or vicc vcrsa. Somc authors, too, have madc clcar definitional distinctions bctwccn thc tcrms (sce, for cxamplc, Himmelman 1996). I-lowever, thcrc appears to be no consistcncy bctwccn practitioners or authors in this respect, so thc terminology remains confusing. In this article, the terms 'collaboration' and 'collaborative govcrnancc' are taken to include all forms of, and labcls for, governance that involvcs pcoplc in working rclationships with those in other organizations.
Of much greater significance than the variety of labels surrounding these inter- organizational forms is thc varicty of understandings about what thcy can or should achieve. At one level, the varicty is cxprcsscd in tcrms of expectations about thc bcncfits to be rcapcd. Many benefits arc claimctl for collaboration. Perhaps the most important of these is moral lrnperatlve that Trist's observation highlights; namcly, that it is the only way to address complcx socictal problems. Howcvcr, government rhetoric about the bcncfits varies over time and with political inclination. One common driver
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is a pcrccivccl nced for co-ord~nat~on of activitics and services. This can dcrivc from a
focus on e#ciency or, by contrast, from a concern to provide citizens with a seamless,
'one stop shop' face to both policy and scrvicc provision. Anothcr drivcr may IIC thought of as thc sharing of learning, but is oftcn cxprcssccl in terms of thc transfer of
good pmclice from one partner organization to anothcr. A common political argument,
for example, is that what is seen as thc good practice of the private sector should rub
off on what are seen as thc morc inefficient public agencies. A third drivcr of
collaboration can be a finoncitll imperative. Organizations oftcn carry out cxpcnsivc
projccts jointly as a way of sharing the costs o r the risks. At a dccpcr Icvcl, thcrc appcars to bc a range of implicit conccptions ahout what
collal>orating actually Incans (Huxham 1996). CollaI>ol-ations arc generally initiated with an instrumental purpose in mind. Somc have very broad aims. For cxamplc, in
somc locations, thc major agcncics produce a joint social and economic dcvclopmcnt
strategy for thc arca with the aim of providing direction for individual and othcr, lcss
broad, collaborative initiatives. Others will he morc spccifically focused on a particular
policy arca such as education, licalth o r crimc. Yet othcrs will be narrowly focuscd on
a particular project, for cxamplc thc upgrading of physical facilities such as roads or
civic buildings. Othcrs may bc rather lcss ambitious collaborations for exchanging
information only (Gray 1989).
For some pcoplc, howcvcr, collaborations also carry ideological connotations
associatcd with participation and cmpowcrmcnt (Macfarlanc and Lavillc 1992; Taylor
1995; Barr and I-luxham 1996; dc Jong 1996; Erlclcnbos 1999; Grccnwood and
Lambic 1999; Mandell 1999b; Nalbandian 1999). Participasion gcnci-ally lncans
inclusion of stakcholdcrs in thc dccision making proccsscs that affect them. For somc,
this is a pragmatic expedient which incrcascs the chance that outcomcs from the
collaboration will be substantively bcttcr and morc politic:ally fcasiblc than othcrwisc.
Thus community groups are invited to participate in local collaborations and industry
rcprcsentativcs and prcssurc groups arc invitcd to participatc in policy making. For
othcrs, the main concern is an ideological bclicf that stakeholders shoultl bc involved.
In the cxtrcmc this means empowering such stakcholdcrs to take a ccntral, rather than
pcriphcral, role in thc collaboration, including having direct authority for spending its
budgets (Himmclman 1994). Anothcr common conccption of collaboration sccs it as
countcrpoiscd with conflict o r competition (Gray 1989; U u s c n l ~ e r ~ 1999). -fhus, for
cxamplc, trade unions work collaborativcly with eml~lo jc rs o r prcssurc groups work
c~ l labora t ivc l~ with govcrnmcnt agcncics towartls win-win outcomcs.
Morc details on thcsc and othcr conccptions of collaboration can bc found in
Huxham (1996). All of the al-love interpretations arc reasonable. That thcrc is such
variety would suggest that participants might he wisc to chcck out their own al-rd
othcrs' assumptions in this respect in order to avoid cntcring collaborative situations
with diffcrcnt expectations about the intcr-organizational form with which they are
involved. I f this happens it is not likely that thcy can all be satisfied with the outcomcs
from thc collaboration, however thcy may turnout. The concern of this articlc,
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Huxham: The challenge of collaborative governance 341
howcver, is with the potential for collaborations to achieve satisfactory outcomes from
any of these perspectives. The next two scctions cxplorc somc of the inhcrent features
of collaboration that have a bearing on this.
DIMENSIONS OF STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
Conceptually, collaborations are often thought of as consisting of a numbcr of
idcntificd organizations that arc involvcd in working rclationships with each other in
the pursuance of a common purpose. At face value, thc conceptualization sounds
simplc but it bclics thc rcality of real collaborativc forms. Typically, systems of
collaborativc govcrnancc havc structurcs that display vcry complex featurcs in a
numbcr of rcspccts. This has implications for their practicality as governance
mechanisms. In this section, six inter-related dimensions of structural complexity arc
discussed. The intention is to highlight some of the features that contributc to thc
complexity and provide somc indications of thc way in which thcy affect thc practical
output from collaborations.
Working relationships
One dimension of complexity is concerned with the nature of thc so-called working
relationship. In conceptually simple collaborative forms, direct interactions bctwccn the organizations arc restricted to thosc bctwccn the individuals from cach of the organizations who attend meetings of the collaboration (or pcrhaps communicate
through othcr mcdia). In morc complcx forms, cross-organizational intcractions
involve a numbcr of (or cvcn all) individuals from cach organization in a varicty of different ways. Many may have day-to-day worlung relationships.
In practice, the working relationships within a collaboration can be, and are,
anywherc along this spectrum. Indccd, in many collaborations the cxtcnt of involvc-
mcnt varies from one organization to anothcr. For cxamplc, it is quitc common for a
small number of mainstream public agencies to providc thc major human resource for
dclivcring the output of a collaboration, while other organi7,ations arc involvcd only to rcprcscnt a scctoral viewpoint or to havc occasional active input into tasks that arc of
particular rclcvance to them. Thus, while personnel from the mainstream agencies arc
in daily contact, rcprcscntativcs from othcr organizations arc normally involvcd only at
formal mectings of the collaboration.
Sometimes distinctly diffcrcnt forms of interaction occur bctwcen diffcrcnt catc-
gories of individuals in the organizations. For cxamplc, 'coal facc' profcssionals often
work togcthcr in project or case groups. At policy level, thcre is often an executive of
senior managcrs or board members who may mcct as infrcqucntly as oncc or twice
per year. The responsibility for creating the infrastructurc to makc the collaboration
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Huxham: The challenge of collaborative governance 343
community collaborations among their mcmbcrship. Thus thcrc can be complcx
hicrarchics of collaboration with individuals and organizations somctimcs appearing at
more than onc Icvcl. This mcans that a reprcsentativc from an umbrclla group or a
confederation may come t o a mccting ablc t o provide a pcrsonal view about issues
undcr discussion but unable t o mobilizc any rcsourcc and having no clear reprcscnta-
tive power o r accountability. All of thc abovc possibilities may, and oftcn do, occur in
a single collaboration.
Governance and task structures
A third dimension of structural complexity is concerned with the governance
structurcs of the collaboration itself (Huxham and Vangcn 2000a). It is relatively rarc t o find collaborations manifcstcd only through regular rncctings of a stccring group o r
managcmcnt cornmittec. In practice, therc arc oftcn several laycrs of comrnittccs.
Usually thcrc are also staff employed by thc partnership. Somc collaborations crcatc a
ncw organization - pcrhaps a limitcd company with its own board of clirectors - in
which t o locatc staff. Boards, which arc responsible for ratifying (if not crcating) policy decisions, are usually cornpriscd of individuals from mcmbcr organizations. In
collaborations with largc mcmbcrship, however, only a small numbcr of organizations
can bc dircctly reprcscntcd this way. Thus individual board membcrs arc notionally
accountable t o organizations othcr than thosc for whom thcy work. More commonly,
staff arc formally employed by onc of the mcmbcr organizations. Staff associatcd with thc different projects of a collaboration may even be crnploycd by cliffcrcnt organiza- tions from each othcr.
Working groups often also form part of the structure. Working groups somctimcs
contain individuals who clo not belong to membcr organizations and rarely contain
represcntativcs from all of the mcmbcr organ~zations. Reporting structures bctwccn
the various clcments of a collaborativc structure are not always clear and working
groups opcratc with varying dcgrccs of autonomy relativc t o thc collaboration.
Thc governance structurcs of collaborations are oftcn hcavily influenced by
governments o r othcr funding bodics who spccify at lcast minimal requircmcnts about
thc parties that must be involved, which of thcse should take thc lcad responsibility and thc rcporting structures that must be in placc. Thc dcgrec to which structurcs arc
imposcd varics and in some cases, the initiators o r membcrs of a collaboration may
have the frecdom t o construct thc partncrship in whatever way thcy fccl appropriate. Somc arc dcsigncd vcry deliberately. Even though careful attcntion may havc bccn paid
to their design, however, dcvclopmcnts of structurcs normally cmcrge out of thc
practical reality of thc tasks that thcy tackle. For cxamplc, working groups cmerge as
and when ncw or altercd agendas have to be attendcd to. Pre-cx~sting working groups
arc somctimes co-optcd into the collaboration. This can happen, for cxamplc, lf an
agcncy that had provided funding t o the group conceives this as part of its budgct for
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thc collahoration. This change in status is not always made clear to mcm1)crs of the
group who may have no notion that they arc officially linked to the collaboration.
Pluralism
A fourth dimension of structural complexity is what Stewart (1998) calls 'pluralism',
referring to the largc expansion, in rcccnt years, in the number of cross-relating
partncrships in many localities. This arises partly out of a currcnt 'managcmcnt fad',
but also out of thc recognition that complex social prot~lcms can only be addressed through multi-party initiativcs. It has Ixcn strongly il~flucncccl by government policies. In the UK, for cxamplc, the Govcrnmcnt's fi)cus on '~oinccl-up government' has Icd to
a mass of policy incentives for local-level collaborations t o add to the alrcatly prolific
EC-funded schcmcs. Thc effect has txcn dcscrihed Ily some as 'partncrshipitis' o r 'mad
zone discasc' (Huxham and Vangcn 2 0 0 0 ~ ) . Swccting el al . (1999) obscrvc that kcy
local figures arc present at ever more local mcctings of separate but interlocking
partncrships. In Bristol, for example, twenty-two pcoplc occupy fifty-six on
nine of the major Hristol partnership or joint-working structures. Under thcsc
circumstanccs, individuals can be rcgular attendees at meetings of, say, half a dozen
collaborations. Whether thcy rcprc:scnt thcir own organization, one of the othcr
collaborations o r somc combination of tlicsc at thcsc mcctings is open t o question.
What is being created is a complcx system of governance in tvhich actions takcn in
one collaboration arc linkecl to thosc takcn in othcrs in ways that neither participants,
nor an impartial observer (nrcrc one to cxist) coultl Ilc cxpcctcd to fathom. In somc
localities, the major agcncics make valiant cfforts to control this Ily devising a 'grand
collaborativc plan' for the area into which all othcr initiatives (whcthcr collaborativc
or not) arc supposed to fit. At best, ho\vevcr, the 'grand plan' can demand buy-in only
from the agencies involved in its creation, ancl somc of thcsc may be half-hcartcd in
thcir commitment. There remains of scopc for collaborativc initiativcs t o be set
up by others taking no account of the grand plan. Ironically, go\ I ( : rnmcnt inccntivcs can
act against local efforts to gain synergy through co-ordination because thcy encourage
pcople to respond t o funding availability rather than to cc)nsidcr the relationship of thc
new initiative to the existing ones.
A fifth dimcnsion of structural complcxity relates to the lack of clarity about who the
members of collaborations actually arc (I-luxham and Vangen 2000a). It has hccn
argued that having explicit mcnibcrship where the partics 'know and agrcc on who is
involved and in what capacity' is a key tlcfinitional clement of collaboration (Kobcrts
ancl Bradley 1991). In practice, this docs not always appcar to I)c applicable. Some
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Huxharn: The challenge of collaborative governance 345
reasons for this havc alrc:ady bccn discussed in thc prcvious scctions. For example,
thcrc is often significant ambiguity about what individual participants rcprcscnt. Thcrc
is also often ambiguity about thc link bctwccn work~ng groups, and thc individuals in
thcsc, and the 'parent' collaboration.
Bcyond this, variety in the status ancl rolc of both ind~viduals and organizations (or
collaborations) involvcd can also lcad to confusion about who thc mcmbcrs actually
are. For example, usually somc organizations haw a much morc central function than
others. Thus thosc which appcar on thc formal membership list may not map onto
those that play an activc rolc in thc collaboration's activities. Many collaborations d o
not cvcn havc a formal membersh~p list so thosc involvcd make their own intcr-
prctations of who the mcmbcrs arc. Thc many varying motivations that individuals ancl
organizations havc for getting involvcd with a collaboration (Vangcn et 01. 1994; Edcn
and Huxham 2001) also affcct whcthcr thcy arc vicwcd, o r vicw thcmsclvcs, as
mcmbcrs. Individuals often view themsclvcs as bcing in somc way diffcrcnt from
everyone clse. For cxamplc, thcy may rcgard thcmsclvcs as an advisor o r a
rcprcscntative from an organization providing funding to the collaborat~on rathcr than
a full membcr of it.
In many collaborations cvcn centrally activc indiv~cluals arc unable to namc mcmbcr
organizations with any dcgrcc of ccrtainty and it is common for individuals to provide
dcscriptions of thc membership structurc that arc inconsistcnt with cach other
(Huxham and Vangcn 2000a). I t is rcasonablc to assume that cach participant is likcly
t o form a distinct, if blurred, picture of the mcmbcrship structurc and thcrc will bc
(at least) as many variants on the dcscriptions as there arc participants involvcd. Collaborative structures arc therefore rarely unlqucly dcfinablc so it can I,c argucd that
a full description should include all of the variants.
Dynamics
A final dimension secs structural complcxity as in continual changc. Govcrnmcnt
policies promote ncw initiatives and also change thc purposcs of existing oncs. Evcn
without cxtcrnal pressures, thc natural evolution of collaborations leads to changcs in
thcir purposc, if only bccausc the initial joint purposc has bccn succcssfully addrcsscd.
Government policics also, frcqucntly, lcad t o changcs in the nature of thc partncr
organizations. In the UK, for cxamplc, policies in the last decade alonc, havc lcd t o a
new set of local authorities with ncw boundaries t o both thcir physical locations and
remits. They have also Icd t o scvcral incarnations of Health Scrvicc organizations and
development organizations. Thus organizations involvcd in a collaboration comc and go
cithcr in rcsponsc t o changing purposc o r bccausc thcy, thcmsclvcs, haw changed. Not
infrequently, kcy organizations ceasc to cxist, and new relationships havc to bc
dcvclopcd to address the particular social issue. Individual rcprcsentativcs also comc
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and go as thcy takc on new roles within thcir organizations o r move in o r out of them
altogether.
Thc complex structurcs dcscribcd in thc previous sections arc therefore relatively
transitory. Any description of how a collal>oratic)n is structured can thus hold only at
thc point of time it is created. A real understanding of a collabor;ltive structurc needs
both to takc account of its history ancl to look forward to changcs in thc futurc.
Practical implications: Structural complexity, agenda building and accountability
What then docs this all add up to? A picture of collahorativc governance has been
paintcd in which s o n ~ c of thc indivicluals invol\.ctl arc largcly acting in a
capacity, while others arc acting on hehalf of agcncics. Somo of thcsc individuals
notionally rcprcscnt multiple organizations o r othcr collahoratic)ns antl niay he unclear
about their rolc. Some arc in daily cross-organizational intcraction \vhilc othcrs meet
rarcly. Most of the individuals arc not clear who else is a mcmbcr or what thcy
rcprcscnt antl reporting structurcs arc often unclcar. O n top of' this, cvcrything is
continually changing.
l'hc picture paintccl is one of confusion, anel thosc involved often cxprcss this.
Howcvcr, this structural coml,lcxity has practical implications that rxtcncl far clccl,cr
that the superficial confusion. It is l~ossi l~lc only to givc an intlicntion of sonic 0 1 ' thcsc
and our focus herc is specifically on implications conccrnccl with agcnda \>uilcling and
accountability.
Structural issues arc important hccausc thcy all'cct the way collal~orativc agendas arc
formed ancl implemented (Huxharn ant1 Vangcn 2000b). I'or example, an open
structurc that allows any organization that wishes to send a rcprcscntativc to meetings
allows wide access to the agcnda. However, it also tends to militatc against the sctting
ant1 implementation of clear agendas hccausc it is likely to bc cliflicult both to resolve
differences I)et\veen participating indi\iduals o r organizations ancl t o co-ordinate action
if rcprcscntativcs arc allowed to dip in and out. By contrast, a tightly controllccl
membership structurc - with, for cxamplc, a designated lcatl organization, a small,
well-defined number of core mcmbcr organizations, an cxccutivc committee ant1 a set
of working groups that report to the conimittcc - may IIC more ahlc to gain agrccmcnt
and to implcmcnt its agcnda, but may cxclutlc key stakeholders from accessing the
agcnda. It may also rcstrict thc fi-cetlom of thc \\,orking groups to shape thcir agendas o r cven to source funding. As (;iclclcr~s has argued, the structurc afl'ccts thc way people
act, I ~ u t docs not preclude clclibcratc action (Whittington 1992). Structures thus play an important rolc I~ccausc thcy dctcrminc such key factors as
who may havc an influcncc on shaping a agcntla, who may havc powrcr t o
act and what resources may I,c tappetl. When a collaboration is part of a system of
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Huxharn: The challenge of collaborative governance 347
multiplc ovcrlapping collaborations, thc influcncc on the agcnda may bc cvcn morc
significant. O n c effcct is that the agendas of onc collaboration may bc movcd forward
at mcctings of another of which somc - but not all - participants in the first are
mcmbcrs. Whcthcr this is a deliberate power ploy or simply thc conscqucncc of ad hoc
conversation, it can lcavc lcss connected participants in thc cold. Anothcr conscqucncc
is a wcarincss dcscribcd by somc as 'partnership fatigue' (Huxham and Vangcn 2000c)
that dcrivcs from individuals' involvement in too many initiatives. This can rcndcr
participants unablc to nurturc agenda itcms that they care about through to
completion. Purdue et a l . (2000) havc dcmonstratcd that problcms of 'burnout' arc
particularly prcvalcnt among community rcprcscntativcs on urban partncrships. A third outcomc is that since individuals participate in many partncrships it is difficult t o
interpret what thcy are rcprcsenting, and what thcy arc accountable to, in any
particular one. Individuals thcmsclvcs arc oftcn unclcar about thcir own reprcscnta-
tivcncss and often comment on thc difficulty of juggling their 'multiple hats'. A conscquence is a lack of clarity about the aims ancl valucs that thcy d o - or could bc
expected to - bring t o thc collaboration. Mcncc they d o not always drivc thc agenda
forward in ways that thosc rcprcscntcd, o r othcr participants in thc collaboration,
might expect.
Many othcr issucs of accountability also arise out of structural complexity. Each of
thc types of working relationship brings with it a particular sct of practical issucs. For
cxamplc, if only rcprcscntativcs meet, issucs of cnsuring accountability bctwccn thc
parent organizations and the collaboration arisc. If many pcoplc arc involved, issucs of
consistcncy may necd t o bc acldrcsscd. Anothcr cxamplc conccrns the employment of staff appointed by the collaboration.
If thcy arc formally employed by onc of thc rncmbcr orgamzations, they may bc
subject t o conflicting accountabilitics t o thc cmployer and t o thc collaboration. In
many cascs, mcmbers try t o cnsurc that staff arc ablc to opcratc indcpcndcntly from
thc cmploycr organization and somctimcs thcir physical location is dclibcratcly rcmotc
from it. Howcvcr, their conditions of cmploymcnt arc oftcn set by thc cmploycr
organization. More significantly, from a day-to-day point of vicw, they oftcn rcport t o
a linc manager in that organization.
If staff arc instcad cmploycd into a ncw organization crcatcd for this purposc a
different sct of accountability issucs may arisc. In this casc thcrc can bc conflict
betwccn thcir rolc as a rcsource to thc collaboration and that of dcvcloping an
indcpcndent rolc for the ncw organization. Ensuring its survival and the continuity of
funding t o kccp staff employed may takc prccedcncc ovcr mccting thc collaborative
nccds of the parcnt organizations. Trist (1983) argucs that collaborations can bccomc
seriously problematic if such 'rcfcrcnt organizations' b c g ~ n to usurp thc rolc of thc
'parcnt' organizations.
Issucs of accountability can also arisc in working groups. Thcrc is a question, for
cxamplc, about whcthcr individuals who arc on a working group whilc not belonging
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to a mcmbcr organization should fccl accountable to the collaboration. A similar
qucstion is whether, since working groups rarely contain rcprcscntativcs from all of the
mcmber organizations, the individuals bvho arc involved should fccl thcmsclvcs
accountablc to members of the collaboration bcyoncl thcir own organizations.
Uncertainties of this sort arc exacerbated if thcrc is ambiguity allout the relationship between the working group ant1 the collaboration or about who the mcmlxr
organizations arc.
All of the above issucs arc cxaccrl>atccl 11y the dynamics of collaboration I~ccausc the
situation docs not remain stable long enough fbr pcoplc to clarifj thcir thinking ahout
what is going on. Thus much of the time pcoplc arc unahlc to act with the rcquisitc dcgrcc of sophistication for atlclrcssing the issucs. .17his point is highly 1-clcvant to thc consiclcration of diversity in collahorativc governance, which is the focus of the next
section.
DIMENSIONS OF DIVERSITY
The principle of collaborative advantage rclics on the diversity of' the mcnibcrs. It is
thc potential to harness the tlifft:~-cnccs that crcatc:~ thc possil~ility of synergy. I-lo\vcvcr
clivcrsity brings \\rith it a con1:cxt in \vhich thc most obvious rccipcs for- succcss fall
apart. Thrcc of'thc most obvious tlirncnsions crf d i ~ c r s i t ~ arc introiluccd in this section
and, as bcforc, somc indications of the \vay in which they allcct the practical output
from collaborations arc tliscusscd.
Resources and aims
It is usually the bringing together ol' the diffcrcnt resourccs of cach partner that
provides the potential for collaborative atlvantagc. I7hc diffcrcnt rcsourccs arc,
however, the rcsult of diffcrcnccs in organizational purllose (Vangcn el (11. 1994; Eclcn
and I-luxham 2001). Thus, although partners may ostcnsil~ly agr-cc on a broad label for
a collahoration's purpose - at least to the cstcnt that thcy arc willing to IIC involved
- thcy cach have diffcrcnt reasons fi)r k i n g thcrc. C o m n ~ o n l ~ , somc have much lcss
intcrcst in it than others so arc: lcss Lvilling to commit to aims that have significant
resource implications. Some arc only involvctl at all due to external (usually
govcrnmcntal) pressure. Some partncrs arc often looking to thc collaboration to help
satisfy vested interests that arc rclcv;int only to their organi~ation and somc inclivicluals
arc usually looking to satisfy ~)crsonal agendas this way Many ol' thcsc organizational
and individual agcndas will be 'hiddcn'. With all this in the background, it is
commonly difficult for indiriclual rcprcscntati\~cs siin1,ly to grasp what may bc
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Huxham: The challenge of collaborative governance 349
motivating (or not) others to takc part let alonc to find a way to address the different
conccrns of all involvcd.
Language and culture
There will also be differcnccs bctwccn the organizations o r profess~onal groups in
terms of their cmbcdded profcssional Ianguagcs and in tcrms of thcir organizational
cultures. l'hcrc are somc obvious, stereotypical differcnccs bctwccn, for cxamplc, thc
languagc and culturc of the police force as comparcd t o the languagc and culturc of
social work as comparcd to that of economic dcvclopmcnt. Not-for-profit organi~a-
tions may bc stcrcotypcd as diffcrcnt again, with values associated with empowcrmcnt
and equality embeddcd in their language and culturc.
Whether o r not the prccisc stcreotypcs arc rcal, significant misundcrstanclings can
happcn because of the diffcrcnt profcssional languagcs and associatcd values with
which diffcrcnt work. Often pcoplc from different professions takc
entircly diffcrcnt meanings from the same phrascs. Practitioners oftcn quotc examples
of misunderstandings of this sort, concerning vcry basic terminology such as 'child
carc' and 'carc managcmcnt', that wcrc not revealed until many meetings had passed.
Kcprcscntativcs on collaborations from community organizations - who may not be
cmploycd in profcssional rolcs in their normal jobs - sometimes express extreme
frustration and rcal anger at what thcy view as professional jargon being uscd in
mectings. Though this may be sccn by thc speaker as normal, non-specialist, artlculatc languagc, it can have thc practical cffcct of excluding community rcprcscntativcs from discussion (Muxham and Vangcn 1996).
Embcdded in organi~ational culturc is a mass of organizational proccdurcs - thc way
an organization docs things (Schcin 1985; Martin 1992). Formal proccdurcs can make thc proccss of reaching formal agrccmcnt tcdious. For cxamplc, if dccisions rclcvant to the partnership have t o be approvcd through established committee structures of a
largc bureaucratic organization o r by the head officc of a multinational company
or charity, thcrc can be considcrablc delay, by which timc thc momcnt of rclcvancc
may havc p s s c d . This can bc particularly prol~lcmatic if dccision cycles arc out of
synchrony in thc partner organi~ations, cspccially i f any organization refuses to
approvc thc dccision in its initial form so that it has to pass through the system several
times. Clearly, thesc kincls of organizations arc unnatural bedfellows, in this respect,
for the small community organizations o r relativcly autonomous agcncics with
which they oftcn collaborate. Different organizational procedures oftcn also lead t o differences in the substance of
dccisions from one organization to another evcn at levels that arc only instrumcntal to, .., rather than directly rclatcd to, thc purpose of the collaboration. For example,
employing staff t o a partnership sometimes leads t o major issucs over trade union
recognition, salary scales and job advertising protocols.
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Power
There arc usually also rcal o r perceived power tliflkrcnccs between the organizations
(McCann 1984; Gray 1989). Small voluntary organizations, for example, oftcn feel
vulnerable when collaborating with the statutory agencies o r largc, national charities
that bring major resources to thc collal~oration. On the other hand, the larger
organization may fccl vulnerable if involvement of a small but cntircly independent,
organization is essential to achievement of its aims. This is true, for example, if they
arc committed to spending rnoncy in \vays that invol\~c particular organizations and
need to be sccn t o do so. Prohlcrns with powrcr diff'crcnccs (:an cxtcnd hcyoncl thc ~ r ~ n n i z a ~ i o n a l Ic\zcl to ~ h c
indivitiual participants in a collal~oration. It has bcc:n argued that collaborations \vork
best if the individuals involvecl in any management committee o r similar structure
perceive thcmsclvcs as being of approximately thc same status (I-lardy et 01. 1992). This
can he difficult to achieve i f the organizations invol\~ccl arc of varied sizes o r i f thcy
havc aims which makc thc collal~oration much morc important to onc party than
another. In practice, collaborations oftcn involve niitlcilc managers fi-om largc organiza-
tions and scnior managers from smaller ones (Huxham 1991). Even if scniot- managers
from largc organizations are involved at the start, the pressure to dclcgatc management
of the collaboration to an operational manager is largc. This means that thcrc may Ilc
imbalances in the dcgl-cc of autonomy to act that diffcrcnt core group mcmhcrs havc,
especially i f the larger organization is highly I,urcaucratic.
Despite the genuine prol~lcms causctl hy po\vcr inil~alanccs thcrc is also a scnsc in
which thc parties involved arc too equal. Though sonic mcnibcrs may bc seen as more
scnior than others in the context of thcir- own collat)oration, thcrc arc no furmal
authority hierarchies within a collaboration (Huxham 1991). This mcans that no-one
can require anyone else to act in particular ways. C:ommitmcnt to act thus has to be
achicvcd entirely through persuasion and ncgot.iation; a tirnc-consuming business, cvcn
if cvcntually successful.
Practical implications: Diversity, purpose and trust
In this section a picture of collaborntion has IIccn paintctl in which thc participating
organizations and individuals arc pursuing cliffcrcnt and sonictimcs conflicting and
hitldcn intcrcsts. The potential for niisuntlcrstandi~ig is high because t~r ing \\,it11 them different sets of profcssional and organizational languages, values and cultures
and individually and diffcrcntlp ti-amc thcir cxpcricnccs through these. In aclclition,
there are procedural diffcrcnccs in cach organization that can make it hard to get
things done i f morc than one organization is involvcd. Ancl though thcrc are rcal and
pcrccivcd power diffcrcnccs, no-one is in charge.
This is a picturc that suggests that harnessing thc synergy needed to achieve
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Huxharn: The challenge of collaborative governance 351
collaborativc advantagc is not simple. Diversity issucs have major and varicd
implications Ibr thc task of managing collaboration successfully. As mcntioncd
carlicr, many of the cxpcctcd rccipcs for success arc not casily cnactcd In this
environment. By way of illustration, this scction will cxaminc two such inter-rclatcd
recipcs conccrncd with crcating a clcar scnsc of purpose for the collaboration and
with dcvcloping trust.
Many researchcrs of collaboration and, in thc author's cxpcricncc, most practi-
tioncrs arc united in promoting wisdom that strcsscs the irnportancc of having a
common, agrced purpose o r vision and a trusting relationship bctwccn partncrs; and,
(scc, for exarnplc, Gray 1985; Hudson et al. 1999). At facc valuc, thcsc are clearly
scnsiblc conditions to irnposc upon collaborations. An agreed sense of what thc
collaboration is aiming to achieve is sccn as an csscntial precursor t o taking joint action
and mutual trust is ncccssary to prornotc a positivc attitudc bctwccn partners and to
allow autonomy of action by individual partncrs within thc spirit of thc collaboration.
Both can be sccn as thc cmbodirncnt of thc principles of collaborativc govcrnance and
they are mutually rcinforcing. In practice, as thc abovc authors comment, ncithcr of
thcsc arc casy t o achieve and practitioners often exprcss frustration at thc lack of a
sense of dircction and mutual support for heading therc. Thc rcasons stcm to a largc
extent from the diversity issues discussed abovc, as follows.
Agrccing a dcfinition of joint purposc tends to be difficult for collaborations bccausc
of thc divcrsity of individual and organi~ational goals, somc of which may bc
conflicting (Gray 1989), which nccd to be cithcr satisfied or cornpromiscd. Obviously
any proccss of rcaching agrecrncnt rcquires participants to bc scnsitivc to thc aspirations, nccds and constraints of others, yet oftcn thcsc arc not clearly statcd. Evcn with thc bcst will in the world, misunderstandings arc likcly t o occur duc t o divcrsity
in language, valucs and culture. Pcrccptions of power diffcrcnccs can lcad to aggrcssivc
rathcr than syrnpathctic stanccs towards each othcr. In addition, thc proccss of rcaching agreement takcs place within the contcxt of thc issucs raiscd by structural
cornplcxity, so that participants may not know clcarly who thc partncrs arc that thcy
are trying to rcach agrccmcnt with, o r to whom thcy arc accountable. Nonc of this is
likely to cnhancc the building of trusting relationships betwecn thc partners.
Furthcrmorc, it also rcduccs the chance that thc partners will fccl ablc t o takc action
in furthcrancc of the collaborativc purposc. Sincc trust is oftcn built on thc succcss of past actions, there is also an indirect hindrance to achicving trusting relationships
(Vangcn and I-luxharn 1998).
There is a dilcrnma hcrc in tcrms of the extent t o which it is scnsiblc for partncrs
t o try to clarify their collaborativc purposc or t o agrce critcria for succcss in advancc.
Although there arc obvious potential benefits t o be had from open discussions about
aims, thcrc is also a potcntial danger that irrcconcilablc diffcrcnces will bc uncarthed.
A pragmatic way forward is for partncrs to find a way to rnovc on without cxplicit
agrcemcnt about exactly whcrc thc collaborat~on is going. In this casc, what is nccdcd
is enough ?f a scnsc of dircction for initial actlons t o bc takcn. A clcarcr scnsc of
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purposc may then evolvc from the rcsults of' the actions. This too can hc a way of
dcaling with trust building. This would mcan moving for\vard without full mutual
trust, aiming for modcst, but achicvablc, 'small wins' in thc: first instance and
bccoming morc ambitious only as succcss brccds a grcatcr lcvcl of trust (Rryson 1988;
Vangcn and Huxham 1998).
Comparcd to thc suggested recipes Ihr succcss given ahovc, 110th of' thcsc
sugpstions arc proccssual comprorniscs. Yet even thesc comprornisc approaches arc
fragilc (Ring 1997). To addrcss joint purposc and trust huilding seriously takcs a lot of
substantivc compromise and thc willingncss ant1 skill to scc thc worltl from the
perspectivc of othcrs. It gcncrally takcs a long time - at least two ycars in many cascs - and many cycles of direction setting, action ant1 trust building for a collahorati\~c
rclationship to scttlc in. As has beer1 seen in thc discussion of structural complexity, the conditions required to sustain the trust building loop long enough to reach - and
thcn work with - a comfortable lcvcl of trust d o not oftcn pcrtain. Two years is a lung
time in govcrnmcntal policy cycles and nc\v initiati\-cs arc olicn being introduced bcforc prcvious oncs have bccc~me emlbcddcd. 1-lard-carncd trusting rclationships can
disappear as rncmbcrs lcavc the collaboration. Equally, the arrival of new mcmhcrs
oftcn disturbs thc equilibrium and new clforts arc rcquirctl to 'list track' thcrn into
the loop.
CONCLUSIONS: MAKING COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE WORK
In summary, the prcvious sections havc dcscrihed a highly complcx worlcl of intcr-
organizational rclationships in which the inhcrcnt - and ncccssary - divcrsity is, if left
to its own dcvices, morc Iikcly to havc a ncgativc c:ffcct than to Icad to collaborative advantage. In this world, thcrc is not cvcn any agrccmcnt on \vhat is includcd in the
broad conccption of collaboration (or partnership, o r alliance, or any of thc othcr
intcr-organizational tcrms). 1-urtherrnorc, only a small part o f thc story has hccn told
hcrc. Lcft to thcir own dcviccs, collaborations as a form of' govcrnancc must Ile
expected to floundcr and are unlikely to tlclivcr fully any of thc expected bcncfits o r
livc up to any of the conccptions. For cxamplc, thc amount of effort and compromisc
rcquircd just to dcvclop a sensc of purposc that all partics can own calls into qucstion
thcir potential as $cient systems for policy dcli\~ery. Similarly, searnlessne.~.~ is hard to
achievc across thcsc complex and divcrsc: systems. *l'hc~~nancrcll imperative - sharing
major costs - might be achicvablc for \vcll-tlcfincrl projects, but the 'cost' of co-
ordinating (the 'transaction cost' (Williamson 1986)) is unlikcly to hc trivial. Similarly,
thcy arc unlikely t o bc ablc to casily deliver against thcir instrumenla1 purposc. Ncithcr
arc thcy likely t o be able t o bc casily participatoy or- emporitering or to resolve con~ict o r
address cornperition. Ncvcrthclcss, if the moral impcrativc that thcrc is no othcr way to
tacklc major social issucs is acccptcd, thcir clumsiness for purposc is not sufficient
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Huxham: The challenge of collaborative governance 353
rcason for abandoning them. Kathcr, it providcs thc imperative for finding competent
ways t o manage thcm.
O n c ovcrwhclming conclusion is that collaboration as a govcrnance tool should bc
used sparingly but whcrc uscd, should takc high priority for resource, carc and
attcntion (Wcbb 1991). This is incompatible with a world in which cvcryonc is
involved in scvcral collaborativc initiativcs. Even if the initiativcs wcrc cntircly non-
overlapping (which thcy rarcly arc in practice), thc lcvcl of rcsource needed would
prccludc thc giving of carc and attention t o all. This suggcsts, on the onc hand, thc
nccd for dcvclopmcnt of morc sophisticated govcrnment incentive schemes that 'work
with the local cncrgy' rather than promoting a chaotic scrics of initiativcs. l'hc
rccognition that the collectlv~ty of initiativcs providcs a problcm even if cach ind~vidual
onc can bc justified is ccntral to this. O n the other hand, it also suggcsts a nccd for
organizations t o bc sclcctive in thc way thcy rcact to policy incentives and to initiatc
collaborations only aftcr appropriate consideration of the challenges that thcy prcscnt.
This, in turn, suggcsts the nccd for individuals to bc broad-mindcd in considering thc
cffcct on othcrs of setting up a collaborativc initiativc.
Although thc fcatures describcd In this article arc cndcmic to collaborative
situations, no two scttings arc cvcr cxactly alikc. O n the ground, thcreforc, thcrc
arc n o casy answcrs t o making collaboration work cffcctivcly, but thc rcscarch does
demonstrate that it is possible for participants t o bchavc in ways that make a
differcncc t o the outcome. Recognition and understanding of the issucs of
complcxity and diversity is important to h s . undcrstanding does not in itself
provide solutions, but it docs providc the platform for participants to think about how to dcvisc crcativc and sophisticated responses t o thc idiosyncrasics of thcir particular situation. It also clarifies thc need for bchaviours that support collabora- tivc cndcavours, which are not cntirely exactly as might bc cxpcctcd. Thus, for
cxamplc, paticnt, empathctic and compromising bchaviours, which support dcvclop- mcnt of mutual aims, undcrstanding and trust, arc important. I-lowever, arguments
can also bc made for thc importance of singlc-mindedncss, dominancc, pcrsevcrance
and cvcn, as one practitioner put it, 'thuggery', bccausc thcsc are all ways of
cnsuring progrcss in a collaborativc environment. Slngle-rn~ndedness and perseverance in
seeing collaborative actions through t o complct~on arc essential leadership charactcr-
istics (Huxham and Vangcn 2000b). Dornlnance of a govcrnancc arena by onc o r a
numbcr of organizations over othcrs can provide thc stage for thc creation of a
framework within which indcpcndent and collal~orativc activity in thc arcna can takc
placc. Thuggery was a descriptor uscd t o rclatc positivcly t o an individual's
convcnorship behaviour, which aimed to allow only those organizations with a real
commitment t o takc part in a collaboration. It carried thc mcssagc 'bc activc or gct
out ' . Collaboration is full of paradoxes. An implication of thc above argument for thc rclcvance of understanding thc issucs
underlying thc practice of collaborative govcrnancc is that those who takc lcadcrship
rolcs nccd t o bc serious reflcctivc practitioncrs (Argyris and Schon 1974). A corollary
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is that cvcryonc ncccls t o take a lcadcrship role to somc cxtcnt, and t o play a part in
making it happcn. I-lowcvcr, pragmatically, it is also essential to recognize that some - perhaps many - of those involved will not bc competent reflective practitioners o r will
not havc the requisite cxpcricncc and undcrstantling and typically somc will have a
prcfcrcncc for individualistic action. This can havc a detrimental cffect on thc
outcomcs, but it is not always possible to avoid their involvement, cspccially if they arc
in key positions in thc community. So part of thc challenge t o individuals in making
collaborative go\.crnance work, is working around those who are lcss ablc as
collaborators.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Many of the concepts introduced in this articlc wcrc dc\,elopcd jointly with my
collcaguc, Siv Vangen, \vhosc enthusiasm for the topic is un\var~ing.
REFERENCES Argyris, C . and Schon, D. (1974) Thhzorrer In Proctrcc, San Francis(:(), C/ \ : Josscy-Bass.
Ball, I<. (1999) 'Ilelivcring New Potential for Community Economic I lcvc lo l )n~cnt? : Europca~i
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