the challenge of isis and the rise of new middle east · the challenge of isis and the rise of new...

The Challenge of ISIS and the Rise of New Middle East

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The capture of Mosul by the radical Islamist group ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has once again brought to the fore the important question of how the dynamics of security relations and regional poli-tics have been changing in the Middle East in the post 9/11 era. Indeed, studies on the impact of 9/11 on the Middle East abound. Simi-larly, analysts have been trying to make sense of the possible repercussions of the so-called Arab Spring process on regional politics in different platforms and in terms of different dimensions. This short essay will make a modest attempt to under-stand the evolving dynamics of regional politics in the Middle East against the background of such formative events as mentioned above, and the spectacular rise of radical Islamic groups across the region.

The first observation to make in this regard is that the interstate boundaries in the region no longer exist as their de-signers had planned nearly one hundred years ago. Today’s Iraq and Syria are no longer the Iraq and Syria of our fa-thers. Following the failure of pan-Ara-bist and secular authoritarian regimes to help create strong nation-states in

their territories in the post-colonial era, groundbreaking developments in the last decade have further shaken the foundations of these states profoundly. The regional society in the Middle East that included Iraq and Syria as indepen-dent and sovereign units seems to have evaporated. Though these states are still UN members, the rise of new actors has put into question their de-jure and de-facto existence and integrity. Unless the socio-political dynamics are dealt with effectively, other states in the region might follow suit. The most likely can-didates are Lebanon, Jordan and many small emirates in the Gulf region.

Second, the rise of ISIS and other radi-cal Islamist movements have made it

abundantly clear that the boundaries be-tween Syria and Iraq do no longer sepa-rate two independent countries from each other. Transnational movements and actors make the existing territo-rial frontiers porous. The goal of ISIS to bring into existence an independent Sunni Islamic state stretching from the shores of Mediterranean to the borders of Iran is the most existential challenge posed to the inviolability of existing borders. ISIS provides the clearest example of the growing salience of transnational movements that operate on the logic of particularistic identi-ties. The politics in the Middle East do now reflect the rise of cross-boundary linkages and networks. The cohabita-tion of multiple actors of different sorts

by Tarık Oğuzlu


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Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi, No:10, 34387 Şişli -İSTANBUL www.bilgesam.org www.bilgestrateji.com [email protected] Phone: 0212 217 65 91 - Fax: 0 212 217 65 93



within a system of loose borders and transnational loyalties makes the emerging Middle East resemble Medieval Europe. Hence, neo-medievalism is back in the Middle East.

Third, in today’s Middle East there are no clear-cut borders separating foreign policy from domestic policy. Each and every development across the region appears to have the potential of affecting internal and external policies of all states in the region. Similarly, states in the region tend to formulate their foreign policies with strong internal motiva-tions remaining in the background, and vice versa. For ex-ample, the rise of Shiite influence in Iraq and the Gulf region would tremendously strengthen the internal legitimacy of the theocratic regime in Iran. Another example would be the way in which Turkey deals with the Sunni-Shiite struggle and Arab-Kurdish confrontations in Iraq will strongly affect Turkey’s internal fabric and stability. The dire humanitar-ian conditions in Iraq and Syria have already spilled over to Turkey with the latter transforming into one of the main addresses of the Syrian and Iraqi refugees. At stake is not only the continuing flow of Syrians into Turkey but also the allegation that the Turkish government’s sectarian support to all anti-Assad opposition would likely cause similar sectar-ian struggles at home.

Fourth, in today’s Middle East, traditional interstate rival-ries do not always match with current power alignments. The assumption that my enemy’s enemy is my friend is be-coming difficult to hold as emerging dynamics in the region appear to lead countries to sometimes face each other as rivals and enemies and at other times as partners or friends. It is no longer possible to talk about the existence of long-term durable alliance relations. The boundaries of alliances have become more malleable than ever in recent years. It is apparent that two different countries, which are assumed to be in different camps by the criteria of the old Middle East, can easily cooperate if they find some common ground.

In the old Middle East, mostly before the Arab Spring began, three sets of countries used to face each other. One the one hand there was the so-called Shiite crescent, consisting of Iran, Shiite Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. On the other hand, there used to exist the so-called Sunni axis composed of Saudi Arabia, Gulf emirates, Jor-don, Lebanon and Egypt. Turkey was trying to act somehow independently of these rival groupings constituting a cat-egory of its own. Without delving into too much detail, one could confidently argue that the onset of the Arab Spring and the following developments across the region seem to have affected the sustainably of these opposing power blocks. For example, Hamas is no longer included in the pro-Iranian

block despite the fact that the Sunni character of Hamas did not prevent this organization in the past from establishing strong strategic relations with Shiite Iran and Alawite Syria. Saudi Arabia and Egypt remained at opposing blocks by the time General Sisi took over the control of the country from the political Islamist Morsi government. Iran tried to im-prove its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood dominated Egypt in such a way to weaken the Sunni block and increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean region. On the oth-er hand, whereas the Sunni Saudi Arabia and Gulf emirates shared a common security threat emanating from the rise of Iranian influence in the post-Arab Spring Middle East, they continue to remain at opposing ends as to which particular faction to support in Egypt and Syria. While the specter of the Muslim Brotherhood taking root in Egypt and Syria has already caused the alarm bells to ring in Riyadh, many Gulf emirates led by Qatar have lend their support to this group. The members of the Sunni block are now quarreling among each other as to which Islamist group to support against the Assad regime.

Turkey offers another example of changing alliance dynam-ics in the Middle East. Compared to the pre-Arab Spring era, Turkey appears to have now come closer to the Sunni block in Syria and Iraq. Turkey has been supporting the Sunni opposition block in Syria against the Assad regime and in this regard has been criticized by the international community on the ground that its direct support to the Free Syrian Army has already transmogrified into indirect support to radical Islamist movements. While sectarian/ideational colors of Turkey’s post-Arab Spring Middle East policies are quite evident in Syria and Egypt, realpolitik concerns have continued to shape Turkey’s evolving relations with Iran and various Iraqi authorities. While energy politics and the continuing struggle against PKK constitute the main rationales for Turkey’s improving relations with the Kurdish Regional Government based in northern Iraq, Maliki govern-ment’s exclusive and authoritarian policies on the one hand and intimate relations with Iran on the other hand appear to have pushed Turkish rulers to pursue containment policies towards Baghdad. What seems to be the ideal example of shifting and loose alliance relations in the Middle East per-tains to the Turkish and Iranian efforts to salvage their co-operative bilateral relations from the negative consequences of their rivalry in Iraq and Syria. That Turkey and Iran lend their support in Iraq and Syria to different groups does not seem to have prevented them from improving their bilateral relations, particularly in the field of energy and trade.

The fifth point, which is also very much related with the previous one, is that the rise of radical Islamist circles across



the region, particularly ISIS and Al-Nusra, might unexpect-edly bring the members of the so-called Sunni axis and Shi-ite crescent around a common platform through which they could cooperate more in the near future. As the unfolding of the latest developments appear to suggest, almost every actor in the region appears to perceive ISIS an existential threat directed to its interests. ISIS’s territorial gains in Mo-sul and other parts of northern Iraq where a sizeable Kurdish population live is a threat to the Iraqi Kurds. ISIS’s radical interpretation of Islam whereby not only moderate Sunnis but also Shiites of different sorts are to be killed in the name of Jihad, pose a vital threat to the Shiites’ gains in the post-Saddam Iraq. The possibility of ISIS’s transformation into a credible player in Syrian and Iraqi politics would not only endanger the incumbent regimes in Baghdad and Damascus but also put the gains that Iran has achieved in the post-Saddam era into great risk. Turkey is also not happy with the rise of ISIS, despite the initial assumption that the strength-ening of all opposition forces in Syria, either directly or in-directly, would shorten the days of Assad in power. What is at stake is not only the possibility of ISIS exporting its brutal and archaic version of Islam to Turkey but also the fact that if Turkey’s southern borders were to be controlled by ISIS and its sympathizers, Turkey could soon resemble Pakistan, facing another Afghanistan on its doorsteps. All such fears that the rise of ISIS seems to have already caused in many different actors of different clothes might indirectly push them to cooperate further and share closer regional outlooks than ever. The declaration of Islamic Caliphate by ISIS and the inability of the Iraqi politicians to bring into existence a new inclusive political arrangement in the aftermath of the latest parliamentary elections seem to have already encour-aged the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to consider ‘independence’

as a serious alternative. The funny thing is that whereas the old Turkey would likely strongly object to the idea of an in-dependent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the new Turkey ap-pears to have tacitly recognized the idea of potential Kurdish independence as a security insurance against the growing chaos and anarchy on Turkey’s southern borders.

Finally, the post-ISIS era will likely see that solutions to problems in the Middle East will increasingly be sought after through regional platforms and mechanisms. For the United States, let alone other global powers, have grown extremely reluctant to get involved in regional politics. The gradual departure of global powers from the Middle East, in the sense of acting as direct players, will likely have both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the trend of regional ownership might strengthen, which might in turn lead regional actors to act more responsibly in their dealings with each other. The declining US presence in the Middle East will certainly help make more room for Iran. It is also quite likely that the US will soon reach a modus vi-vendi with Iran, if not a historic peace, that will in turn lead the regime in Tehran to act more responsibly and in close cooperation with the Sunni regimes. On the other hand, in the emerging post-American Middle East the most likely scenario is that the region will descent into more chaos and anarchy in the short and medium terms. This is actually what has occurred since the American withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq. In the absence of a regional hegemon providing security and stability, the countries in the region might increase their competition for influence and primacy. The emerging power vacuum in the Middle East following the departure of US troops seems have already deepened regional rivalries and power competitions.



About BILGESAM

Established in 2008, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) is one of the leading think tanks in Turkey. As a non-profit, non-partisan organization BILGESAM operates under the guidance of a group of well-respected academics from different disciplines, retired military generals and diplomats; and aims to contribute regional and global peace and prosperity. Closely following the domestic and international developments, BILGESAM conducts research on Turkey’s domestic problems, foreign policy and security strategies, and the developments in the neighbouring regions to provide the Turkish decision-makers with practical policy recommendations and policy options.

About Author

Tarık Oğuzlu is professor of international relations at Antalya International University. He holds a PhD from Bilkent University, and two MA’s one from London School of Economics (LSE) and the other from Bilkent University. In 1999 he was granted the Jean Monnet Scholarship of the European Commis-sion. He has published numerous articles on interna-tional relations and politics at home and abroad.

the challenge of isis and the rise of new middle east · the challenge of isis and the rise of new...

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