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THE CHINA FACTOR IN EU-US RELATIONS: FAULT LINES AND FUTURESMercy A. Kuo, Vice President of Strategic Services at Pamir, columnist at The Diplomat, and member of the National Committee on US-China Relations.
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Mercy A. Kuo is Vice President of Strategic Services at Pamir, a global risk intelligence consultancy in Washington D.C., and contribut-ing author on US-Asia policy at The Diplomat. She is a member of the National Committee on US-China Relations and Advisory Council Member of the Asia Pacific Institute at the American Jewish Committee. Dr. Kuo was most
recently President and Executive Director of the Washington State China Relations Council in Seattle. She was previously managing director of the Committee of 100, a US-China leadership organiza-tion. Dr. Kuo formerly served with the Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign policy analyst on Northeast and Southeast Asian political, security and military issues. Her recent select China-related publica-tions include: “Waters of Discord: Geopolitics of Energy in Southeast Asia,” World Energy magazine, Issue 43 (June 2019), “The China Factor in US Foreign Policy,” The Strategy Bridge (April 2016), and “China’s Strategic Orientation: Assessing Alternative Futures,” China in the 21st Century: History, Security and International Relations (Praeger 2014). She holds a Ph.D. in Modern History from Oxford University.
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The China Factor in EU-US Relations:Fault Lines and FuturesDr. Mercy A. Kuo is Vice President of Strategic Services at Pamir, columnist at The Diplomat, and member of the National Committee on US-China Relations.
The China Factor in EU-US Relations: Fault Lines and FuturesChina poses a geostrategic challenge to the future of US-EU rela-tions. China’s growing presence across Europe is exacer bating fault lines in intra-EU state relations and the transatlantic relation ship. For European and American policy makers and industry leaders, the key concern is how the China challenge is accelera ting frag-mentation and eroding cohesion of the European Union and more broadly, the EU’s relationship with the United States. Transatlantic cooperation has been a cornerstone and catalyst of international stability and economic growth in the post-World War II period. However, critical fault lines – divergence of strategic objectives and approaches – in managing Iran, Israel, NATO, climate change, and technology – further aggravated by friction vectors of nationalism, populism and protectionism – are undermining the rules-based, free-market, liberal world order of the 20th century.
In the first quarter of the 21st century, China’s rapid rise has become a multi-faceted wedge in transatlantic fault lines. From Beijing’s pursuit of dominance in 5G and artificial intelligence to China’s strategic partnership with Russia as a counterweight to US-EU preservation of liberal democracy, the “China Dream” may evolve into a “China Nightmare,” if fissures between Europe and the United States persist. Fractures within Europe – Brexit, eastern versus western/northern versus southern socio-economic and ideo-logical cleavages, national versus continental identity – avail China myriad opportunities to capitalize on European vulnerabilities.
Transactional US leadership has become a disruptor rather than guarantor of international security and stability. The geostra-tegic equation is clear: a fragmented Europe plus an unpredictable United States equals an increasingly aggressive China buoyed by a belligerent Russia. As Carl Bildt, former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden and co-chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations recently opined, “Although the EU punches above its weight in global trade policy, the overall direction of
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travel is unclear. This raises the following questions: is the EU willing or able to be a world power alongside the other three [US, China and Russia]? Or will it simply allow itself to become a playground for their ambitions?”1
The aim of this analysis is to examine how China is using hard and soft power to exacerbate fault lines in intra-EU state relations and its impact on transatlantic relations. The analytic framework consists of four lines of inquiry: 1) Scope out the strategic context in which Beijing’s “whole-of-nation” approach is fueling China’s global reach, 2) identify key fault lines in transatlantic relations, 3) delineate four plausible futures of how the US-EU-China dynamic might evolve, and 4) assess forward-looking policy implications.
Strategic Landscape The rapidly shifting strategic landscape of US-EU-China dyna-mics reflects the divergent strategic orientations of China and the United States. Strategic orientation connotes “the position, perspective, and preferences that animate a state’s strategic calculus in how it chooses to advance and defend vital national interests...China’s evolving strategic orientation is rooted in a complex of history, culture, memory, and symbols that compose the calculus of strategic decision making and exercise of power.”2 Moreover, as referenced in The Diplomat,
Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung has noted key historical events are critical in defining a group’s identity and determining how that group behaves in conflict situations. Galtung argues that the three forces of chosenness (the idea of being a people chosen by tran-scendental forces), trauma, and myths combine to form a country’s Chosenness–Myths–Trauma (CMT) complex. This CMT complex is an extremely useful tool for understanding the rationale behind many of China’s actions.3
China’s strategic orientation focuses on fortifying national power to restore its central role and relevance in international affairs. Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership the strategic shift is under-way from covert to overt challenge of US primacy and European unity. The scope of the shift is now global as implemented through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and whole-of-nation under the aegis of Made in China 2025 (MIC2025). In the current US-China trade and technology war, Europe’s strategic orientation is con-sequential in determining the degree to which China will usher
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in a viable alternative system of governance. Moreover, Europe’s recognition that unity among EU states is a critical factor in pur-suing effective engagement with China.
President Xi Jinping addressing the general debate of the 70th UN General Assembly (Photo: United Nations Photo, Flickr CC BY).
China: Going GlobalChina’s “Going Global” stance is an amplification of President Xi Jinping’s mantra of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” on the world stage. This “rejuvenation” – ubiquitous, yet ambiguous in Beijing’s policy pronouncements – is essentially the leitmotif of the CCP narrative in centralizing control and power under President Xi’s leadership. This concept, which has historical roots, lends legitimacy to and rationalizes China’s current military, economic, political, and ideological posture.
From the Chinese military’s perspective, increasing strategic compe tition characterizes the global strategic landscape, accor-ding to China’s 2019 Defense White Paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era”:
International strategic competition is on the rise. The US has adjusted its national security and defense strategies and adopted unilateral policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. NATO has continued
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its enlargement, stepped up military deployment in Central and Eastern Europe, and conducted frequent military exercises. Russia is strengthening its nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for strategic containment and striving to safeguard its strategic security space and interests. The European Union (EU) is accelerating its security and defense integration to be more independent in its own security.4
BRI: All Roads Lead to BeijingChina aims to counter US and European power projection through hard, soft and smart power channels. China’s Belt and Road Initiative – modern silk road encompassing Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, Middle East, Europe, and parts of Africa, and Russia – is a mega-infrastructure, logistics, transportation, and connectivity tour de force to exert China’s global influence. As an all-roads-lead-to-Beijing blueprint, BRI is focused on empowering Chinese companies and exporting China’s economic development model.
According to the Carnegie Endowment, Europe is the final des-tination of this ambitious project, and still represents the largest and most attractive consumer market for Chinese products.5 To date, 24 European countries have signed BRI memoranda of under-standing with China: Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Ukraine. As the first G7 country to endorse the BRI, Italy’s decision amplified China’s adroit approach in enervating an already fragile EU unity.
China Model and MIC2025: Silicon Self-RelianceBeijing’s propagation of the “China Model” and MIC2025 magnifies the role of military-civil symbiosis in fueling China’s competitive agenda to become a manufacturing superpower and technology leader in AI, Big Data and Internet of Things (IoT). At the Multilateral Actions on Sensitive Technologies (MAST) conference convened by the US State Department this September, the “China Model” was described as follows:
Significantly, the modern “China Model” is built upon a foundation of technology-facilitated surveillance and social control. These tech-niques for ruling China have been – and continue to be – in critical ways developed, built, and maintained on behalf of the Party-State by technology firms such as Huawei, Tencent, ZTE, Alibaba, and Baidu.
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As these companies export their products and services to the rest of the world, the security and human rights problems associated with this “China Model” are progressively exported with them. Already, it has been reported that Ecuador, Venezuela, and Pakistan, among others, have become customers for such firms’ repression-facilitating technologies … So this is the geopolitical context for understanding our specific concerns about companies such as Huawei. Countries that choose Huawei technology are opening the door to Chinese access to their domestic networks and local companies, as well as potential surveillance by Chinese officials, posing a potential threat to their national security and economic well-being.6
With Airbus and Boeing as leaders in the global aviation indus-try, Chinese industrial competition is emerging. The 2019 U.S. Senate Committee report on “Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry” confirms that MIC2025 has consequential implications for the future of US and European aerospace, avia-tion and avionics.7
• COMAC – Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China – is develop-ing the C-919, an indigenous large passenger aircraft. MIC 2025 sets a goal for domestic commercial aircraft to supply 20 percent of the global market and regional delivery planes to capture 40 percent of the global market by 2025. The implication of this goal is clear: Boeing and Airbus currently occupy the vast majority of the market, so meeting MIC2025’s targets requires reducing their market share, according to the report.
• In 2017, the top export from the U.S. to China was civilian air-craft, with a value of $16.3 billion. That China has singled out the most successful American industrial product in its markets for competition, then, is notable. Air and spacecraft, and the related technologies required to mass-produce them, represent perhaps the highest end of the value chain in exportable goods in the global economy in terms of value and scale required for production, as the report highlights.
Information Warfare: Ideas and IdeologiesChina’s sophisticated state-media system of influencing Chinese public perceptions and fashioning China’s domestic and global image is an integral component of China’s strategic calculus in dominating the information war. “Information is how China plans to dominate in the future. That is their strategy. China’s
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government plans to leverage the growing data industry and cutting-edge technologies as part of its strategy to get an edge on its competitors,” according to Army Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.8
China’s United Front Work Department, the primary organ man-dated to propagate CCP propaganda and engage in influencing perceptions of China in host countries, has extensive networks in democratic countries, including Europe. According to recent media analysis,
In a 2018 report, Germany’s domestic-intelligence agency wrote that China’s security agencies “intensively elicit the work area and knowledge potential of Chinese scientists in Germany.” The report suggested it was difficult for Berlin to prosecute such espionage when the border between state and individual activity was blurred, as was often the case with China.9
Moreover, the same study found that
In Helsinki, the United Front’s footprint is apparent: Among the organizers is the Stockholm-based Nordic Zhigong Association, which says on its website it has “long contact with the Zhigong Party of China, and holds all kinds of exchange activities with all Zhigong Party branches and associations overseas.”
China is also intent on sincizing all forms of belief systems that pose a potential ideological threat to the CCP as well as Chinese govern-ment and society.10 At the March 2019 Chinese National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang re-affirmed the Chinese government’s intention to implement a policy of sinicizing five major religions in China: Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and Daoism. The current campaign to sinicize religion originated in a speech by Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the National Religious Work Conference in April 2016. Following Xi’s speech, the China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement released the “Outline of the Five-Year Working Plan for Promoting the Sinicization of Christianity in our Country (2018–2022).” The objective is essentially to use religion as a CCP tool to advance the Chinese socialist agenda.
The sinicization of religion in China is already having alarming impact – from the ongoing systematic detention of nearly two mil-lion Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the closure of 10,000 Christian churches in Henan province alone in 2018 to fear among Hong
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Kong’s approximately one million Protestants and Catholics over future Chinese incursions on their religious freedom.
RMB InternationalizationThe internationalization of Chinese currency – yuan or renminbi – is another integral facet of China’s “Going Global” trajectory. RMB-denominated products, transactions and markets broaden China’s capital market reach with offshore trading platforms in key international financial centers and through the Belt and Road Initiative. According to RMB Global Advisors,
The U.S. is the first market to feature two officially appointed RMB clearing banks – Bank of China’s New York branch and JP Morgan – each offering distinct capabilities to meet the demands of the domestic market…While the BRI is about connecting the Asian, European, and African continents, opportunities for Chinese invest-ment extend to other parts of the world, including the Americas, offering additional avenues for RMB use. Together, the BRI and RMB internationalization initiatives are bound to have a significant impact on the world.11
Two key European financial centers – London and Frankfurt – serve as European hubs on RMB-related transactions. Despite Brexit’s outcome, the City of London Corporation and People’s Bank of China Europe Representative Office confirm a 110% rise in cross-border RMB-denominated transactions, including issu-ances of dim sum bonds – RMB-denominated bonds – in 2018.12
In 2015, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Germany’s Deutsche Börse and China Financial Futures Exchange founded a joint ven-ture, the Frankfurt-based China Europe International Exchange (Ceinex), a platform for authorized RMB-denominated trading outside China.13 In 2018, Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, confirmed plans to invest in RMB assets, following the lead of the European Central Bank’s decision to invest €500 million (US$609.8 million) into yuan in 2017.
Beijing’s recalibration toward greater self-rejuvenation under-pins acceleration of self-reliance through the BRI’s infrastructure and logistics expansion, MIC2025’s technology innovation acquisition, information and ideological warfare, and RMB inter-nationalization. This process entails clamping down domestic dissent, centralizing political power and projecting geopolitical influence regionally and globally.
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President Trump and President Xi during the U.S. president’s visit to China in 2017 (Photo: Official White House by Shealah Craighead, CC BY).
United States: America First The US Administration’s “America First” policy has necessitated portraying China as the primary rival of US military, economic and technological predominance. Within this rhetorical and realpoli-tik framework, the United States and China are both seeking to preserve national sovereignty despite globalization-driven inter-linkages that have integrated the world economy and supply chains and empowered borderless communities of interest to mobilize on issues from democracy in Hong Kong to climate change.
From the US military’s viewpoint, China will continue to harness all elements of national power to project China’s influence glob-ally, as articulated in the OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019:
China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the initial two decades of the 21st century for China to develop domestically and expand its “com-prehensive national power.” Over the coming three decades, they are focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China on the international stage that is equipped with a “world-class” military. Their pursuit of this vision will fulfill what outside observers assess to be the overriding strategic objectives of the CCP: 1) perpetuate CCP rule; maintain domestic stability; sustain economic growth and
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development; defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity; secure China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, emerge as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region.14
The US policy perspective of China’s “comprehensive national power” is based on the understanding of the symbiotic relation-ship between military and civilian capabilities. Recent remarks from Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, US Department of State provide further elucidation:
“Comprehensive national power” is felt to have many elements, but for the CCP, a critical point of emphasis is for China to become a high technology economy. For Beijing, this is critical not only in order to improve economic competitiveness, but also in order to facilitate development of the high-technology military capabilities Chinese leaders believe they need in order to challenge the United States…The economic component of this strategy is outlined in mul-tiple industrial plans, including a strategy known as “Made in China 2025,” in which China seeks to climb the industrial production value chain through development of advanced manufacturing capabili-ties. The military component of this strategy is outlined in Chinese statements and policies on what Chinese officials’ term “Military-Civilian Fusion” – but which I’ll just call “MCF” – in which China seeks to develop a world class, high-technology military through acquisition and development of the most advanced military and technological capabilities in the world.15
The US-China tech war is also yielding repercussions in EU-US relations. With US-Europe trade tariffs hanging in the balance, and European anti-trust actions against US tech giants, including Google, Amazon and Facebook, EU-US fault lines are facing further exac-erbation, while China bilateral trade and investment overtures to individual European states undermines EU cohesion. US sanctions and restricted export controls on Chinese technology transfer has brought Chinese acquisition of European technology under greater scrutiny. Parallel to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) – an interagency entity mandated to review national security aspects of foreign direct investment in the US – Europe has adopted a stricter framework for the screening of foreign investment in March 2019, namely the EU-level foreign direct invest-ment screening system (mainly directed at Chinese companies).16
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Europe: Quo Vadis? What is the European Union’s strategic orientation? The European Commission under the leadership of new EC President Ursula von der Leyen will steer the EU’s course as US-China rivalry escalates, but in what direction? It seems President von der Leyen’s selection of Margrethe Vestager as Executive Vice President of Competition and Digital Policy and Phil Hogan as the EU Trade Commissioner signals EU intentions to uphold rules-based trading system and exercise a more assertive approach to trade negotiations with the United States and China. Brussels recognizes that a more forward-leaning approach to managing EU-China relations is a policy priority that requires greater cohesion within the Union.
The 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook17 based on the 2016 JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: Elements for a new EU strategy on China18 describes the EU’s relationship with China in three aspects – negotiating partner, economic competitor and system rival:
China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiat-ing partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This requires a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of interests and values.
The outlook further articulates three core objectives of EU engage-ment with China and underscores the importance of unity among EU members:
• Based on clearly defined interests and principles, the EU should deepen its engagement with China to promote common inter-ests at global level.
• The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship.
• Finally, in order to maintain its prosperity, values and social model over the long term, there are areas where the EU itself needs to adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base.
Neither the EU nor any of its Member States can effectively achieve their aims with China without full unity. In cooperating with China,
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all Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 16+1 format, have a responsibility to ensure consistency with EU law, rules and policies.
In the contest between “America First” and “China Goes Global”, Europe’s voice and visibility should articulate and represent a counter-vailing vision. But Europe faces high stakes and hard choices regarding an optimal approach – should Brussels hedge on bolstering transat-lantic relations, remain neutral in US-China competition, or rebalance toward China and Asia? Bruegel analysis explores all these approaches in depth and asserts that “China’s economy is already as large as that of the US (at least in purchasing power terms and soon in dollar terms) but, most importantly, will contribute more than three times the US to the global economy in the next 10 years. In other words, although the US is a more important market for Europe today, this will soon no longer be the case, based on the growth differential between the US and China, which continues to be very large.”
Strategically, as the new leadership of the European Commission articulates the EU’s role in the broader US-China trade and tech-nology war, Brussels faces the challenge of fortifying the European project while leveraging opportunities to engage Asia.
EU-US Fault LinesThe United States and European Union are entering a critical stage of transatlantic tension. Seven primary fault lines undergird growing divergence between Washington and Brussels, Berlin, and Paris: US leadership, NATO, Iran, Israel, Brexit, climate change, and technology. From Beijing’s perspective, US-EU collaboration and contestation on these issues avails key footholds where China will insert its influence and leverage to shape conditions conducive to its competitive advantage.
US LeadershipA fundamental question for policy makers and business leaders is whether the Trump presidency is an anomaly or aberration from con-ventional US leadership. Will the 2020 US presidential election issue in a democratic White House, and if so, would a democratic US presi-dent restore a pre-Trump United States? Or will the United States and the world face another four years of a Trump presidency? If so, what does that portend for international security and the global economy? This uncertainty for the US and Europe serves as a “period of strategic opportunity” for China as President Xi articulated at the 2017 National Congress of the Communist Party of China.19 Though uncertainty is now
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the norm, navigating uncertainty requires testing assumptions about the future, as will be addressed in a subsequent section of this analysis.
Regardless of which US political party prevails in 2020 to occupy the White House and Congress, US-China cooperation is qualita-tively evolving into bilateral competition that could issue in some form of decoupling between US and Chinese supply chains. EU positioning vis-à-vis US-China rivalry will be a decisive factor in curtailing or propelling this trajectory.
NATOThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the most consequential security guarantor since World War II. But will it risk becoming a WWII relic if it does not address the challenge China poses to Europe? NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent call for the formation of a NATO-China Council underscores that China must be factored into Europe’s security calculus to mitigate emerging geopolitical and security threats.20 In addition to China’s rise, Russia’s revanchism will further test the transatlantic alliance. With US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and NATO’s refusal to accept Moscow’s offer to freeze deploy-ment of short and medium-range nuclear missiles, Moscow and Beijing seem intent on weakening Europe’s security architecture.
IranAmid the Washington’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran, how will the EU manage Iran’s nuclear ambitions within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) while contending with China and Russia? The September bombings of oil facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais, and tit-for-tat in the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and foreign shipping vessels spotlight the interlinkage between geopolitics and energy security. China is maintaining a delicate balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest oil importer. Yet, China-Iran rela-tions hold deeper civilizational bonds and Tehran is an endpoint in one of China’s BRI corridors. Flaunting US maximum pressure sanctions on Iranian crude oil, China agreed to $400 billion invest-ment in Iranian oil exploration and infrastructure development.21 The Atlantic Council recently shared this observation from the World Energy Congress in September:
One can also see decoupling in the oil deliveries not made to China from the United States this year, even though the US has become
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the world’s largest oil and gas producer and a net exporter. Whereas US shipments of crude oil to China reached half a million barrels a day in summer 2018, they averaged only a third of that in the spring of 2019. Though delegates had come here [World Energy Congress] to focus on energy markets, the implications of decoupling have begun to touch almost all economic sectors, from aviation and automobiles, from finance and farmers, and from cell phones to semiconductors.22
Israel Deep-seated divisions between Europe and the United States over Israel are evident in the EU’s resistance toward US desig-nation of Hezbollah’s political branch as a terrorist organization and EU efforts to salvage the JCPOA and negotiations with Iran. China is Iran’s key ally. The transatlantic relationship is facing an added dimension of growing Chinese investment in Israeli tech-nology and Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. Israel-China relations must be understood in a strategic context vis-à-vis the United States. As a global leader in dual-technology innovation, Israel could play a critical role in how the US-China tech war unfolds. As US-China trade and technology relations become increasingly restricted and contentious, China’s interest in Israeli’s innovation ecosystem potentially poses a litmus test to US-Israel relations. China is projected to surpass the United States as Israel’s top source of foreign direct investment in the near future.23 Israel as the Start Up Nation and key US ally in the Middle East will face high stakes and hard choices in engaging EU support in fragile transatlantic relations and US-China trade war.
Brexit The future will soon reveal the reverberations of Brexit across Europe and indeed, the world. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson is keen to partner with China and welcomes closer cooperation with Beijing. London will soon determine whether Huawei will gain market presence in the United Kingdom. Despite Washington’s reservations that London’s embrace of Huawei could jeopardize Five Eyes – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States – intelligence-sharing, Downing Street’s prioritiza-tion of trade over security reflects an understanding that the UK must shore up its economy. London’s post-Brexit challenge in the US-China rivalry will be to remain relevant as the world’s second leading clearinghouse of Chinese yuan (RMB)-denominated
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transactions and salvage any semblance of the UK-US special rela-tionship. On the long run, regardless of an acrimonious or amiable split, Brexit might set in motion a contagion effect on European countries that seek to restore national sovereignty and independ-ence. With China allergic to any form or support of self-autonomy, e.g. Brexit and Britain’s support of Hong Kong protests for rule of law, Beijing’s utilitarian approach and Washington’s fickle ten-dencies are key factors that London must weigh in balancing the UK’s relations with both China and the US.
Climate changeOutcomes from this year’s UN Climate Action Summit under-scored that commitment on reducing greenhouse emissions and reaching net-zero emissions will come from smaller nations in the absence of leadership from the United States, China, and India. Notable European representation on climate change included Germany’s pledge to end reliance on coal and increase funding to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and commitments from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, France, and several other European countries to the GCF and to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.
For the United States, President Trump’s attempt, whether mere bluster or real business, to purchase Greenland highlights the geostrategic competition between China and Russia in the Arctic that have implications for climate change. The Arctic Council, composed of the Nordic states, Canada, Russia and the United States, will likely face growing challenges over Greenland’s critical minerals, rare earths, oil and gas exploration, and Northern Sea Route security. Despite climate change as an ancillary dimen-sion of the US’s Arctic strategy, it is an issue that will likely remain a point of contention in Council considerations.
TechnologyThe US-China trade and tech war points to a strategic contest to determine which country will predominate the future of digital governance. From 5G, AI, IoT, Big Data, and robotics to aviation, agriculture, clean tech, and biotech, Europe’s leadership in defin-ing competition and technology rules of road will directly impact the US-China tech race. The appointment of Margrethe Vestager as the European Commission’s executive vice president of com-petition and digital policy confirms the EU firepower in driving the debate on global digital governance. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence recently warned,
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Chinese technology companies have become significant players in the global market because of their embrace of innovation and the notably improved quality and affordable cost of their products. However, the legal and political influence of the Chinese state over its technol-ogy industry and ties between the government and the companies leave the Western countries uneasy. China has made no secret of its adversarial perception of the West and has been actively seeking a stronger global influence. It has for long also sustained a remarkable track record of cyber espionage…Western democracies need a better understanding of the way China integrates its technological and geo-political ambitions in accessing Western markets. The implications of this endeavour for liberal democracies go far beyond the issue of 5G.24
Four Plausible Futures MethodologyThis scenario-based analysis serves to delineate four plausible futures of China’s impact on EU-US relations. More prognosis than prognostication, this exercise seeks to test conventional or “official” assumptions and imagine how policy decisions might frame the future trajectory of EU-US-China dynamics. Scenarios are useful tools; they can dramatize trends and alternatives, explore the impacts and implications of decisions, choices, policies, and provide insights into cause-and-effect sequences. Scenarios can be exploratory or normative. Exploratory is to determine the cor-relation between past and present trends and how they could lead to a realizable future. Normative is to identify different visions of the future, ranging from aspirational to unimaginable. Scenarios compel decision-makers to anticipate risks that could evolve into threats and to ascertain risk management options in order to lev-erage opportunities.
This study identifies two key variables — the spectrum of US-Chinese relations from bilateral cooperation to rivalry and the condition of EU-US relations from collaboration to friction —that underpin the evolution of these scenarios. As a useful exercise in bounding the uncertainty of what the future portends, each hypothetical future could reflect some degree of reality over the next two decades. While multiple permutations of scenarios could theoretically be generated, this analysis offers four distinct alter-native futures that could plausibly evolve in a real-world context. The basic features, traits, drivers, variables, and indicators of each future are briefly presented below:
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Quadrant 1: Strategic Engagement (win-win)The “Strategic Engagement” future envisions a win-win outcome which assumes US-China cooperation and EU-US collaboration in upholding international rules and norms. In this scenario Washington and Brussels re-affirm and re-fortify transatlantic security alliances and defense cooperation. The US, EU and China work together to address and resolve global challenges such as climate change, technology competition, energy security, etc. Key drivers of change include US-EU cooperation to reform the World Trade Organization to improve its role as an effective arbiter. In addition to US commitment to strengthening transatlantic ties, Washington and Brussels strive to bolster security alliances in Northeast and Southeast Asia to preserve regional stability for economic development. The US, EU and China collaborate with global tech giants to establish a regulatory framework for digital governance and e-commerce. The key variables in this Strategic Engagement is effective US leadership from the White House and Congress in developing a G3 or Strategic and Economic Dialogue-type platform with China and the EU. Key indicators of a trajectory toward this alternative future would include a shift in US presiden-tial leadership from transactional to strategic foreign policy, US re-entry to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and US-EU agreement to pursue the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and establish a NATO-China Council.
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Quadrant 2: EU Irrelevance (EU loses; US and China win)In the “EU Irrelevance” scenario, a fragmented EU is sidelined amid transatlantic friction and US-China cooperation. Regional divisions between northern and southern as well as western and eastern European countries paralyze Brussel’s decision-making process and political potency on the world stage. In this alterna-tive future, the Brexit fallout yields a contagion effect on countries such as Italy, Hungary and Greece, which resist Brussel’s leader-ship as overreach into domestic affairs. Populism and nationalism in key countries, including Germany and France, limit effective leadership from and partnership between Berlin and Paris. Infighting in Italy’s fragile governing coalition lead Italy’s economy into a Greek-style debt crisis that raises the specter of an Italexit, Italy’s exit from the EU. In this scenario US and Chinese companies ignore or contravene EU anti-trust oversight. The hollowing out of the transatlantic alliance and resurgent Russian’s revanchism result in splintering of the Visegrad 4 and 16+1 (CEE + China).
Quadrant 3: US Isolation (US loses; EU and China win)The “US Isolation” future is fraught with uncertainty over the direc-tion of US global leadership and the erosion of US international influence. Despite retaining military predominance, Washington’s unpredictability and unreliability diminish US credibility. Allies no longer trust the United States. The key driver underpinning this scenario is insular US leadership mired in domestic politi-cal division and social polarization. Ineffectual decision-making reflects gridlock between the White House and US Congress. Key variables include the strategic direction of US leadership post-2020 US presidential election and the US precipitously losing the war of ideas and influence in the US-China trade and technology war. Key indicators of this scenario becoming discernible include the US decision to drastically reduce NATO and UN funding; EU’s decision to establish a NATO-China Council with US as observer; US withdrawal from the G7, UK demoted to observer status in the G7, and China and Russia are added to form G5+2.
Quadrant 4: Democracy vs. Autocracy (One World, Two Systems)The primary outcome of the “Democracy vs. Autocracy” future is a bifurcated world with two predominant systems and competing ideologies – democratic capitalism led by the US and EU versus autocratic capitalism led by China and Russia. In this scenario the decoupling of global supply chains transpires along democratic
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and autocratic fault lines. China’s economic development model is adopted in parts of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Southeast Asia and Australasia uphold free trade and open markets. Key drivers animating this scenario include aggressive Chinese eco-nomic nationalism, bilateral trade agreements, and foreign direct investment into like-minded countries; US and Chinese tech giants emerge as dominant e-commerce players and disseminators of artificial intelligence and Internet of Things in all areas of life from smart retail to smart cities. Moreover, US and Chinese defense hawks ensure national security drives trade and investment. Key variables revolve around how US-China rivalry increases risks and vulnerabil-ities of US and EU companies doing business in China, and whether European companies will be compelled to choose between free-mar-ket trade and protection of intellectual property rights to China’s economic development model based on military-civil fusion. Key indicators of this future unfolding would include the ability of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to yield new supply chains, transcon-tinental logistics and connectivity; China gains predominance in 5G and AI-driven technology and pre-emptively sets global standards; China ratchets up retaliation against foreign companies that refuse to acquiesce to Chinese requirements.
FlashpointsGeopolitical flashpoints pose high-risk threats to regional and global stability. Each flashpoint could trigger a series of events that escalate tensions and conflict that see real-life and scenarios col-lide in the lower quadrants of the above scenario matrix. Thinking about future scenarios may not necessarily prevent worst-case outcomes, but it can help mitigate strategic and tactical miscal-culations when weighing risk trade-offs when flashpoints flare up into full-blown conflict.
Hong Kong and TaiwanOngoing anti-China protests in Hong Kong against the withdrawn extradition bill have long-term implications for US-China rela-tions and China-Taiwan-US relations. Three factors are currently heightening Hong Kong-Beijing tensions and sensitivity on the Taiwan issue in cross-strait relations and US-China relations:
• Taiwan is moving more towards independence as result of generational changes and identity politics. Taiwan President
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Tsai Ing-wen’s support of the Hong Kong protestors is fueling Beijing’s angst over how best to facilitate an optimal outcome for China without unleashing domestic instability and interna-tional opprobrium.
• At the same time, China is becoming more nationalistic and assertive under President XI Jinping. The Taiwan card is one Beijing leadership can easily use to divert national attention in the event of declining public support for the Communist Party or in case of economic setbacks, etc.
• The Trump administration is shifting toward more open support for Taiwan, to which China’s leadership will leverage for territo-rial sovereignty purposes. Major tension between Beijing, Taipei or Washington could have direct or indirect impact on US and European business operations and assets in China.
Europe’s role in the Hong Kong crisis amplifies the international community’s concern over the future of democracy in Hong Kong. The fact that Joshua Wong – one of the Hong Kong protest lead-ers – appealed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel to address democracy in her meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping and met with German Foreign Minister Heiko Masse in Berlin, attests to Germany’s international stature as a guardian of human rights and rule of law – a cache of Germany’s political capital and credibility in the eyes of Hong Kong protestors.
South China SeaThe South China Sea remains a perennial flashpoint in the geo-politics of Southeast Asia. For energy companies, suppliers and stakeholders, managing escalation of tensions and potential impact on corporate operations necessitates identifying and track-ing risk indicators. More than one third of Europe’s and one fourth of US external trade goes through the Indo-Pacific region, and any escalation of tensions in the area will undoubtedly have a direct impact on the West, according to Istituto Affari Internazionali, a Rome-based think tank.
Despite the Obama Administration’s “rebalance to Asia” policy to fortify the US as a Pacific Power, the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP) and initiate a trade war with China has increased uncertainty over the degree of US commitment to the region. US leadership is a key variable in the balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia.
As geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea continue to
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grow, Europe has shifted from low-profile contact of the past to current proactive engagement from the United Kingdom, France and Germany. According to recent Asian media reporting, the US and UK conducted naval drills in the South China Sea in February this year, France sent an assault naval ship Dixmude and frigate to the Spratly Islands in 2018, and the UK will deploy its new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Asia Pacific in 2021.25
During this period of strategic opportunity, China aims to build a world-class military, including blue water navy, by 2049. The South China Sea is the fulcrum of China’s naval ambitions. US Navy Admiral Philip Davidson in 2018 stated, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”26 US-China friction is a catalyzing factor that underpins Southeast Asian countries’ hedging strategies vis-à-vis China and the United States.
North KoreaNorth Korea’s recalcitrance and unpredictability remains a high-alert geopolitical risk in Northeast Asia and in the nuclear proliferation into the Middle East. Brussels role in facilitating talks between Pyongyang and Washington might be an asset if US-China rivalry intensifies. Deepening EU security cooperation with key Asian part-ners – China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea – remains a priority, according to the Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia conclusions in 2018.27
Policy Implications and Outlook If the United States and China remain on a trajectory toward full-scale rivalry, the European Union will face multi-faceted challenges to mitigate geopolitical risks on global trade, innovation technology and supply chains. The further fraying of US-EU relations is opening a vacuum for China in tandem with Russia to fill. China’s “divide-and-conquer” approach serves to enervate EU cohesion and accelerate intra-EU fragmentation.
The United States is a critical variable in directing the future course of transatlantic relations. In the absence of strong US commitment to the transatlantic alliance, US leverage in countering China’s rise is limited in potency and scope. Beijing is bracing China for protracted US-China rivalry on multiple fronts — trade, technology, currency, innovation, defense, among others. As this strategic rivalry intensifies, China poses a systemic challenge to the current international order. As a countervail-ing force to a US-led postwar global order, China is intent on pursuing and propagating an alternative system of global governance.
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The European Union can play a decisive role in how the US-China rivalry will evolve. As the world’s largest single market and global trading leader, EU leverage resides in a market of 500 million con-sumers, global position as top trading partner to 80 countries, and commitment to rule of law and free trade. As the counterweight to US leadership in NATO, the EU’s leadership in the formation of a NATO-China Council could avail Brussels greater leverage in hold-ing Beijing accountable for China’s security and defense measures linked to the Belt and Road Initiative and MIC2025.
In Asia, the EU could take on the mantle of multilateralism once held by the United States. “Last year, the EU was the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ second-largest trading part-ner, after China, with bilateral trade worth roughly $263 billion. The EU also is the largest investor in ASEAN, having pumped a cumula-tive $374 billion of foreign direct investment into the region by the end of 2017,” according to Asian media reporting.28 The EU-Japan Economic Agreement implemented in 2019 as well as similar type bilateral trading agreements with South Korea (2016), Canada (2017), Singapore (2018), Vietnam (2019) with several more in pro-cess is a clear confirmation of Asia markets as a prime arena for the EU’s future economic growth and expanding influence. The ability of Brussels to conclude the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment at the 2020 EU-China Summit would be a key indicator of the EU’s strategic relevance to China and could lay the groundwork for a EU-China free trade agreement.29 More importantly, Brussels’ formulation of an industrial policy would strengthen EU cohesion and market position vis-à-vis China and the United States.
China’s strategic calculus is premised on transatlantic discord, EU fragmentation and US unreliability. China’s position as the world’s second largest economy and world’s largest retail market with a burgeoning middle class of 400 million consumers is “fore-cast to become home to 32 of the world’s 40 high net worth cities over the next five years.”30
Harnessing a whole-of-nation approach, Beijing is intent on shaping global and regional conditions conducive to sustaining domestic prosperity and expanding the CCP’s power at home and abroad. US and European policymakers, military planners and corporate strategists are well-served to understand that China’s “Going Global” policy is essentially a “China Central” policy in which the country’s policies, preferences and positions center foremost on preserving and advancing China’s vital interests to restore China’s centrality in the global order.
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1 Bildt, Carl. (2019, 07.19). Europe risks irrelevance in the age of great power competition. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c4f8d89c-a898-11e9-90e9-fc4b9d9528b4?segmentId=63bac0e6-3d28-36b1-7417-423982f60790
2 Chau, Donovan C., & Kane, Thomas M. (2014). China and International Security. History, Strategy and 21st-Century Policy. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger.
3 Wang, Zheng. (2013, 05.02). Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: The «Chinese Dream». The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/
4 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, «China’s National Defense in the New Era», (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., July 2019). Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/specials/whitepaperonnationaldefenseinnewera.pdf
5 Le Corre, Philippe. (2019). On China’s Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/09/on-china-s-expanding- influence-in-europe-and-eurasia-pub-79094
6 Ashley Ford, Christopher. (2019). Huawei and its Siblings, the Chinese Tech Giants: National Security and Foreign Policy Implications. Available at: https://www.state.gov/huawei-and-its-siblings-the-chinese-tech-giants-national-security-and-foreign-policy-implications/
7 Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry, Project for Strong Labor Markets and National Development, U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship. Available at: https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0acec42a-d4a8-43bd-8608-a3482371f494/262B39A37119D9DCFE023907F54BF03.02.12.19-final-sbc-project-mic-2025-report.pdf
8 Read, Russ. (2019). China plans to use information to ‘dominate in the future’, says defense intelligence chief. Available at: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/china-plans-to-use-information-to-dominate-in-the-future-says-defense-intelligence-chief
9 Tatlow, Didi K. (2019, 12.07). The Chinese Influence Effort Hiding in Plain Sight. The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/chinas-influence-efforts-germany-students/593689/
10 Schottelkorb, Kerry., & Pittmann, Joann. (2019, 20.03). China Tells Christianity To Be More Chinese. Christianity Today. Available at https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2019/march/sinicization-china-wants-christianity-churches-more-chinese.html
11 Kuo, Mercy A. (2018, 04.04). RMB Internationalization Outlook: Milestones and the BRI. The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/rmb-internationalization-outlook-milestones-and-the-bri/
12 London retains its RMB crown in face of Brexit uncertainty: https://news.cityoflondon.gov.uk/london-retains-its-rmb-crown-in-face-of-brexit-uncertainty/
13 Leng, Sidney. (2018, 15.01). German central bank to include yuan in its reserve pile. South China Morning Post. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2128309/german-central-bank-include-yuan-its-reserve-pile
14 (2019). Annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. [Washington, D.C.] :[Office of the Secretary of Defense]. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
15 Ford, Christopher A. (2018). Coalitions of Caution: Building a Global Coalition Against Chinese Technology-Transfer Threats. Remarks at FBI – Department of Commerce Conference on Counter-Intelligence and Export Control. Available at: https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/coalitions-of-caution-building-a-global-coalition-against-chinese-technology-transfer-threats/
ENDNOTES
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16 Herrero, Alicia G. (2019). Europe in The Midst of China-US Strategic Economic Competition: What are the European Union’s Options?. Bruegel, Working Paper 03. Available at: https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/US_China_strategic_competition_EU_080419.pdf
17 European Union: European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council -EU-China – A strategic outlook, 23.03.2019, JOIN(2019) 5 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf
18 European Union: European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council -Elements for a new EU strategy on China, 22.06.2016, JOIN(2016) 30 final, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf
19 Jinping, Xi. (2017). Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Speech given at the 19th CPC National Congress. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm
20 Pavel, Barry., & Brzezinski, Ian. (2019, 21.08). It’s Time for a NATO-China Council. Defense One. Available at: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/its-time-nato-china-council/159326/
21 Cohen, Ariel. (2019, 19.09). China’s Giant $400 Billion Iran Investment Complicates U.S. Options. Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/09/19/chinas-giant-400-billion-iran-investment-snubs-trump/#557fdd6f84d1
22 Kempe, Frederick. (2019). Abu Dhabi dispatch: The great Sino-US decoupling. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/abu-dhabi-dispatch-the-great-sino-us-decoupling/
23 Schindler, Max. (2017, 20.12). Chinese Investors Flock to Israel for Unlikely Reasons. The Jerusalem Post. Available at: https://www.jpost.com/Jpost-Tech/Chinese-investors-flock-to-Israel-for-unlikely-reasons-518600
24 Kaska, Kadri., Beckvard, Henrik., @ Minárik, Tomáš. (2019). Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Available at: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOE-Huawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf
25 Elmer, Lee Jeong-ho K. (2019, 15.09). European nations ‘determinded to stay relevant’ in Asia-Pacific, South China Sea. South China Morning Post. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3027256/european-nations-determined-stay-relevant-asia-pacific-south
26 US Congressional Research Service. U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress. R42784, 24.09.2019. O’Rourke, Ronald. Text from: Congressional Research Digital Collection. Available at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784
27 Council of the European Union. (2018). Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia. Brussels. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35456/st09265-re01-en18.pdf
28 Hutt, David. (2019, 04.08). Eu struggles to strike trade pacts with major ASEAN countries. Nikkei Asian Review. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/EU-struggles-to-strike-trade-pacts-with-major-ASEAN-countries
29 The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. (2019). European Business in China Position Paper 2019/2020. Available at: https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-position-paper#download-table-335
30 Gilchrist, Karen. (2019, 16.01). These countries are set to see their millionaire populations skyrocket in the next 5 years. CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/countries-with-the-fastest-growing-millionaire-billionaire-populations.html
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1-2019 The China Factor in EU-US Relations: Fault Lines and Futures Mercy A. Kuo
2-2018 Macron’s France in the world: strategic challenges, and a narrow path Frédéric Charillon
1-2018 Russia Challenges the West Geir Flikke
2-2017 Cybered Influence Operations: towards a scientific research agenda Lior Tabansky
1-2017 Samhandling for sikkerhet – En ny sikkerhetslov for en ny tid Kim Traavik
3-2016 Erdoğan’s Turkey: An Unpredictable Partner for a Desperate EU? Joakim Parslow
2-2016 Ten Proposition about the US and the Middle East Steven Simon
1-2016 The Migration Challenge from MENA: considering the EU`s struggles James H. Wyllie
4-2015 A Timeline for the Conflict and War in Ukraine Geir Flikke and Tor Bukkevold
3-2015 Opening speech at the 2015 Leangkollconference Erna Solberg
Prospects for NATO–Russia relations Alexander Vershbow
2-2015 Fremveksten av autonome droner Gjert Lage Dyndal
1-2015 Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict Anton Alex Bebler
3-2014 Baltikum, Russland og fremtiden Tor Husby
2-2014 Russlands stormaktsstrategi og Vestens respons Janne Haaland Matlary
1-2014 What now, little England? Prospects for the forthcoming Scotland and EU referendums Øivind Bratberg
4-2013 Konflikten i Syria Rolf Willy Hansen
3-2013 Polen – et lyspunkt i Europa Jahn Otto Johansen
2-2013 Hva skjer i Nord-Korea – Asiatisk stabilitet i fare? Sverre Lodgaard
1-2013 Engaging with Islamists: A new agenda for the policy community Mona Kanwal Sheikh
3-2012 US Shale Oil Revolution and the geopolitics of Oil Trygve Refvem
2-2012 NATO’s influence in the near abroad Oktay Bingöl
1-2012 Ungarn – alene og miskjent Jahn Otto Johansen
4-2011 Conflict or Coincidence of Interest of Main Oil and Gas I mporting, Exporting and Transit Countries Liana Jervalidze
3-2011 Breaking down the remaining walls Alister Miskimmon
2-2011 Russia in NATO Charles A. Kupchan
1-2011 Bringing War Home–The use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Norway and Denmark
to construct strategic narratives for their domestic audiences Ida Dommersnes
5-2010 Sjøforsvarets historie 1960-2010–En kortversjon Roald Gjelsten
4-2010 The Tragedy of small power politics Asle Toje
3-2010 Integrasjon med grenser eller grenseløs integrasjon? Bjørn Innset
2-2010 Reconciling the nuclear renaissance with disarmament Alex Bolfrass and Kelsey Hartigan
1-2010 Approaching the comprehensive approach Dag Kristiansen
3-2009 Turkish Neo-Ottomanism: A turn to the Middle East? Einar Wigen
2-2009 20 år etter muren Jahn Otto Johansen
1-2009 Between Reluctance and Necessiy: The Utility of Military force in Humanitarian and Development Operations Robert Egnell
5-2008 Civil-military relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in comprehensive approaches Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad
4-2008 Tsjekkoslovakia–40 år etter Jahn Otto Johansen
3-2008 NATO–Moldova/Israel/Ukraine Dr. Gabanyi, Dr.Kogan, Dr. Begma & Igor Taburets
2-2008 Hearts, minds and guns: the Role of the Armed Forces in the 26st Century UK Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup
1-2008 Krav til fremtidens forsvar sett fra unge offiserers ståsted Tomas Bakke, Kadett Krigsskolen
7-2007 Threats to Progress of Democracy and Long Term Stability in Georgia Liana Jervalidze
6-2007 Militærmaktens særtrekk i moderne konflikter Div. forfattere
Previous publications in this series:
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5-2007 Norge i et Sikkerhetspolitisk Dilemma Asle Toje
5-2007 EU-staters varierende bidragsvilje til militær intervensjon Rolf Magnus Holden
4-2007 Defence as the Best Offence? Missile Defences and Nuclear Non-proliferation Lars Van Dassen and Morten Bremer Mærli
3-2007 Putins Russland–Partner eller utfordrer? Jahn Otto Johansen
2-2007 Energy and Identity–Readings of Shtokman and NEPG Jakub M. Godzimirski
6-2006 Ungarn 1956–Et 50-årsminne Jahn Otto Johansen
5-2006 NATO foran toppmøtet i Riga Ambassadør Kai Eide
4-2006 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers Keith Smith
4-2006 Oil and gas in The High North–A percpective from Norway Ole Gunnar Austvik
2-2006 EUs sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i internasjonal politikk Jan Erik Grindheim
1-2006 Fra “Kursk” til “Priz”: Ubåtredning som internasjonalt samarbeidsområde Kristian Åtland
9-2005 Nordisk sikkerhet Tønne Huitfeldt
8-2005 NATO going global or almost
The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee Alv Jakob Fostervoll, Jamie Shea, Chris Donnelly
7-2005 Galileo–et europeisk globalt navigasjonssystem Hans Morten Synstnes
6-2005 Coming home to Europe? Central and Eastern Europe in EU and NATO
Eastern Europe’s silent revolution Jahn Otto Johansen og Nils Morten Udgaard
5-2005 Det tyske eksperiment Jahn Otto Johansen
4-2005 The naval Dilemma of the early 26st Century Hans Olav Stensli
3-2005 What are the strategic challenges faced by Norway in the years to come?
In the new types of conflict we face, how to define and defend humanitarian space?
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee’s 40th annual Leangkollen Conferance. the Nobel Institute. Jørgen Kosmo and Jonas Gahr Støre
2-2005 The New Geopolitics of the North? Jakub M. Godzimirski
1-2005 “Global Partnership”, russiske ubåter og brukt kjernebrensel – internasjonal koordinering av oppgaver og bidrag
Christina Chuen og Ole Reistad
6-2004 Oljens geopolitikk og krigene ved Persiagulfen Ole Gunnar Austvik
5-2004 Coping with Vulnerabilities and the Modern society Jan Hovden
4-2004 Forsvarsperspektiver i nord Jørgen Berggrav
3-2004 NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger
-Kortsiktige og langsiktige perspektiver Jahn Otto Johansen
2-2004 The Role of a Humanitarian Organization in an International Security Operation -
a Basis for Cooperation or a Basis for Separation? Jonas Gahr Støre
1-2004 If Effective Transatlantic Security Cooperation is the Question, Is NATO the Answer? Stanley R. Sloan
6-2003 Frankrike og Irak-krigen: Bare i prinsippenes navn? Frank Orban
5-2003 Norwegian Priorities for the Extended G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Asle Toje and Morten Bremer Mærli, NUPI
4-2003 Saddam’s Power Base Major John Andreas Olsen
3-2003 Terroristbekjempelse og folkeretten Terje Lund
2-2003 Men and Machines in Modern Warfare General Charles A. Horner (ret.)
1-2003 The Real Weapon of Mass Destruction: Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare in the era of terrorism and “rogue” states
Morten Bremer Mærli
