Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Chihuahua

The China’s neocolonialism case in AfricaThe economic advance of China Jorge Alberto López Lechuga

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Index

I. Introduction...............................................................................................2

II. Political Relations Between China and Africa and their Impact on International Area.....................................................................................3

i. Diplomatic Relations................................................................3

ii. China’s Support for Authoritarian Governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan..............................................................................8

III. Economic Relations Between China and Africa……………...……….….12

i. The New Strategic Partnership for EconomicDevelopment..........................................................................12

ii. Bilateral Trade…….................................................................14

iii. Chinese Direct Investment to Africa.......................................16

1. Agriculture....................................................................18

iv. The Chinese Expectations......................................................20

v. Oil Resources.........................................................................22

1. Angola Case................................................................22

2. Sudan Case.................................................................23

IV. Conclusions............................................................................................26

V. Bibliography………………………………………..…………………………29

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I. Introduction

People’s Republic of China undoubtedly has become one of the new economic

and political powers in the world. However, their international success was

achieved not only for its huge and cheap production levels, but for investment

projects and business expansion in low priority geographical regions for Western

economies. The African continent is one of those areas where China not only

maintains high levels of investment and trade, but an important political influence

directly with certain member states of the African Union. The procurement of new

oil reserves, a new market for domestic production are the center on relations of

the People’s Republic of China in Africa, however, beyond this, the new Asian

Dragon seeks greater political influence in the continent in order to obtain more

support in the process of voting in the United Nations system, principally the World

Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations General Assembly. For this, the

large financial flow from China to Africa has degenerated into a neo-colonialism

that while it has brought major infrastructure and employment in Africa, has also

caused serious problems in environmental conservation and human rights.

Precisely this is the central thesis of this research paper.

To start will need to define neo-colonialism for this analysis. Neo-colonialism

(Ginebra, 1998) can be defined as the continuation of the economic model of

colonialism after a colonized territory has achieved formal political independence.

Western countries had colonized most of the continent in the late nineteenth

century, instituting a system of economic exploitation in which African raw

materials, particularly cash crops and minerals, were expropriated and exported to

the sole benefit of the colonizing power. The idea of neocolonialism, however,

suggests that when foreign powers granted nominal political independence to

colonies in the decades after World War II, they, as others like China, control the

economies of Africa but the most important thing is that domination is made by an

economic and financial mean.

To demonstrate it, will be necessary to begin analyzing the political relations

between the People’s Republic of China and Africa including their diplomatic ties,

programs and systems of cooperation in the historical and current context, later to

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analyze how the Asian Dragon has come to legitimize some totalitarian regimes in

Africa, where the supply of weapons is one of the basic issues in relations, a

situation that has become controversial in the context of United Nations Security

Council.

Subsequently it will be analyzed the topic of bilateral trade (including

agricultural issues) and the Chinese investment in the exploitation of natural

resources, mainly oil, for which we choose two cases in particular for its relevance:

Angola and Sudan.

Finally, based on the above analysis will integrate the positive and negative

impacts that the Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa has generated particularly in the

areas of economic development, environment and human rights, all this taking into

account the current international scenario and the new counterweight that China

represents for the traditional western economies.

II. Political Relations Between China and Africa and their Impact on International Area

i. Diplomatic Relations

As China is the biggest and most important developing country in the world,

Africa is the biggest developing continent which has the largest number of

countries. A long term, stable, friendly and co-operative Sino-African relations

would not be only beneficial for the solidarity and cooperation among the

developing countries, but would have significant influence on the trend of

multipolarization of world politics.

Diplomatic relations between China and Africa are based on political and

economic cooperation and bilateral trade. The pillars of the Sino-African

relationship were established under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

(FOCAC) in 2000: Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common

development.

China, currently has diplomatic missions on 48 countries in Africa (Embassy

of the People’s Republic of China in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2010),

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certainly a significant number if we remember that the U.S. has 45 (U.S.

Department of State, 2010).

The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 started the current

diplomatic relations with Africa. The Arab Republic of Egypt was the first country in

the continent where was established a diplomatic mission of China. Since then, as

African countries were gained their independence they established diplomatic

relations with China. Within this process should not forget the context of the

second half of the twentieth century around this, particularly, the role of China as

an important member of the movement of non-aligned countries in the North-South

dialogue.

The foreign policy of People’s Republic of China focused, since its

establishment as a republic, in supporting the independence process, legal equality

of states and self-determination of countries against imperialism and colonialism.

As George T. Yu mentioned (1977): “the Chinese model also relates to China’s

developmental experience. China has stressed struggle against the superpowers,

the U.S. and Soviet Union, identifying with the Third World against them. There

can be no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy... In

this sense, the success of the relationship lies on the answer that China has been

held in the changing situation in Africa”.

In other words what China and African countries had in common was their

shared history and their perception dominance by the West. Statements such as

‘we all belong to the Third World; we are developing countries’ were commonly

heard at this time (Van de Looy, 2006). As Yu (1977) also asserts, the importance

of Africa to China is that the continent “became a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet

conflict, just as Africa had earlier become an arena in the Sino-American

competition. An example of the Sino-Soviet battle was manifested in China’s

campaign to win African support to exclude Russian participation at the abortive

Afro-Asian conference of 1965”.

In summary, the Sino-American competition particullary was centered on the

conflict between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan). With

more than 50 states in Africa, there have been opportunities for both Taiwan and

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China to establish alliances. With aid programmes and loans, the two governments

sought partnerships and thus recognition. The foreign policies of African countries

have for a long time been driven by the search for aid and substantial financial

contributions have often determined the choice made by African governments in

this respect. However, relations could easily change. For example Liberia, Senegal

and the Central African Republic have switched allegiances al least five times in

the past (Ríos, 2006). Currently, there are only six African countries that have

diplomatic ties with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tomé and

Principe, and Swaziland (FOCAC, 2009).

Currently, most of African countries adhere to the “principle of one China”

and support its reunification. On several occasions they have led to the failure of

the attempt of Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO),

World Trade Organization (WTO) and other agencies of the UN system. It was

thanks to the support of African countries that China succeeded in restoring its

position as a permanent member of UN Security Council and contributed to the

failure of western anti-china proposals on the issue of human rights at the UN. The

success of Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games was also supported by a

large number of African countries (Embassy of The People’s Republic of China in

the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2010). In this sense, African countries have

played an important supporting role for China in the international framework.

The Paper on China’s African Policy is the main strategic instrument issued

by the Chinese Government on its foreign policy toward a continent in all history,

which shows the great importance of the relationship. The content of this document

focuses on the proposal to create and develop a strategic partnership based on

equality and trust in the political, cooperation and joint satisfaction in economic

exchange and mutual learning in the cultural (FOCAC, 2009). In politics, the

Chinese government maintains a constant number of visits by presidents and

business leaders to Africa. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the Chinese leaders

have visited the continent on numerous occasions, particularly Hu Jintao, who has

been in over 20 States of the continent. Only in February 2009 the president made

a trip in which visited four countries: Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius.

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Meanwhile, in 2006 there were more than 40 African heads of state one gathered

in Beijing for the FOCAC, the largest gathering of African heads of state outside of

the United Nations (Bodom, 2009). Such activities are more common within the

Chinese Government than any other western state.

Another example of the relevance of the relationship is the exchange of

legislative bodies and political parties between China’s National People’s Congress

(NPC) on the one hand and Parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African

Parliament of the African Union (AU) on the other, for the purpose of deepening

understanding and cooperation.

The consultation mechanisms are also recurrent, which work as bilateral

committees between China and African countries in which they develop policy and

technical consultations between ministers of trade, science and technology,

everything from the typical pragmatic approach of Chinese foreign policy.

Other areas where there are cooperation forums between local governments

creating brotherhood of cities aimed at strengthening the systems of local social

development and administrative professionalization. In the areas of human

development and education there are important financial founds for human

resource development in Africa, through which vocational training is provided to

workers from priority areas according to the needs of countries in the region.

Another area of interest in Sino-African cooperation is education,

strengthened through exchanges of students and teachers to provide academic

assistance. The Chinese Government encourages the participation of students in

volunteer programs in which the purpose is to train African students in specific

areas. Related to this is to mention that China has provided African countries with

government scholarships for more than 20,000 persons (FOCAC, 2010). In an

official visit that Chinese president Hu Jintao attended in February 2009 in

Tanzania he said: “many young Chinese have also come to Africa”, describing

them as "young ambassadors for China-Africa friendship”. He concluded: “Working

in local communities day in and day out, they have gone through thick and thin

together with the people there and contributed their share to economic and social

progress in Africa" (FOCAC, 2009).

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Other important areas in the bi-regional cooperation are science and

technology transfer, cultural exchanges (artists, sportsmen and the establishment

of Confucius Institutes for Chinese language learning in Africa) medical and health

cooperation (China send medical teams with programs for prevention and

treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria), media

cooperation (in order to facilitate the communication and contact between

government departments and social groups); consular cooperation, people-to-

people exchange (between social organizations, especially the youth and women);

environmental cooperation (water resources conservation, anti-desertification and

bio-diversity protection by facilitating technological exchange), disaster reduction,

relief and humanitarian assistance, military cooperation (military high-level

exchanges between two sides in order to support defense and army building of

African countries for their own security), conflict settlement and peacekeeping

operations and judicial and police cooperation (China put special emphasis on

combating transnational organized crime, corruption and human trafficking,

terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.)..

The People’s Republic of China argues that like the African nations, is

devoted to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, however, does not

denies he is trying to establish a new international, political and economic order

based on justice, rationality (pragmatism), equality and mutual benefit, promoting

more international diplomatic relations and the rule of law in global affairs,

safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

Thus, Beijing displays its progress in Africa as a model for developing countries

(many of them see his success as a stimulus to escape poverty), not imposing or

demanding political or economic reforms to access to its technical and financial

assistance. In doing so, China is seen in the eyes of African states as a world

power that is more attractive than the United States or the European Union (Ríos,

2006).

Going beyond the official positions on the surge of Chinese interest in Africa,

it is clear that the Asian Dragon as a rapidly developing economy requires a large

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amount of raw materials like oil, gold, diamonds and iron, resources that Africa has

in abundance.

Africa, meanwhile, realizes the need to seek new alliances for development

beyond the western economies with which it has previously associated. African

countries therefore accept the investment from China in order to revive their

economies. Given this reality, raises the question of whether we are seeing an

equal partnership or one of the two is the one who dictates the terms of the

relationship (Bodom, 2009).

China's international relations are based on the pragmatism, and their

bargaining power lies in two sources: the international trade and investment and

soft power (based on diplomacy involving the Chinese Government's efforts to

convey their culture with the goal of understanding between nations). This, beyond

the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the parties or not,

represents a viable way to African economic development and a means to balance

the equation in the international arena.

China justifies its model applied on Africa insisting that they do not want to

repeat the mistakes of western colonialists. Relations with African countries are

increasingly multidimensional and narrower; however, economic investment should

not be the only topic of attention in the case, which would be a mistake.

At a meeting between presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Hu

Jintao, the African leader loudly proclaimed his desire to: “let China lead the world”

(Radio France International, 2006).

ii. China’s Support for Authoritarian Governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan

The system of Sino-African cooperation maintains a broad exchange and

coordination of actions; however, the “Paper on China's African Policy"” specifically

excludes the interference in internal affairs, being consistent with its foreign policy

based on respect to self-determination of nations.

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Despite this fact, the People's Republic of China has been accused by some

western governments to assist oppressive African States, legitimizing their political

systems. Thus, Beijing is accused of exporting its model of development based on

the existence of a totalitarian single party with full authority over all aspects of

economic activity, a system that Africans could emulate.

Moreover, China is accused of reward them with diplomatic attention and

financial and military assistance to dictatorships exacerbating the existing social

dislocations, creating a complicity in human rights violation, increasing the

likelihood of propagation of weak and failed states, mainly referring to Sudan and

Zimbabwe (Brookes & Ji Hye, 2006).

For example, China is attributed to the protection of the government of

Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the Hamam Al-Bashir of Sudan from economic

sanctions to which their countries have been imposed by the international

community. On July 11, 2008 China vetoed the economic sanctions imposed on

Zimbabwe for the UN Security Council. In a statement about the vote on China’s

ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, said the threat of sanctions was not

conducive to solving Zimbabwe’s problems and he concluded: “the situation in

Zimbabwe had not exceeded the context of domestic affairs and did not

constitutive threat to international peace and security” (CNN, 2008).

For his part, Sudanese president Haman Al-Bashir, requested to trial in

2008 by the International Criminal Court has been supported by the Chinese

Government justified by its policy of non-intervention. Western nations are angered

by the reluctance of China on the issue of human rights in Sudan, particularly

(Woolford, 2008). The Asian country is an investor in the vast oil industry in Sudan

and has therefore adopted a policy of support Africans in the case.

In addition, several continent dictatorships are common buyers of chinese

weapons and military equipment, which they use to oppress minority populations

and suppress political opposition. In 2004, despite the arms embargo imposed by

the U.S. and the E.U. against Zimbabwe, China sold war aircraft and military

vehicles by USD $200 million (Business Day, 2004).

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When Robert Mugabe became president of Zimbabwe in 1980, the country

was one of the wealthiest in the continent. However, during the decade of the 90’s,

Mugabe cracked down on opposition political groups and ethnic minorities.

Currently, the country faces a chronic food shortage and 70% unemployment

(Woolford, 2008). The increasing isolation and pressure from the West have

prompted Mugabe to engage in close diplomatic relations with China as a means

to resist sanctions and criticism from the United States and United Kingdom

mainly.

China has a history of arms sales and production systems through its state

enterprises whose main clients are some repressive governments in Africa,

including Liberia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. We can only mention that almost 80% of

the USD $500 million of Sudan's annual oil income is used to buy weapons to

subdue the rebels in the south. With the assistance of China, the Khartoum

government has built three weapons factories near the capital (Dickie & Reed,

2005).

Added to this, we know that in 2003, several Hong Kong firms were accused

of smuggling illegal weapons, including AK-47s, machine guns and rocket-launcher

grenades from China and destined to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Sudan

(Agence France-Presse, 2003).

The weapons have always been one of the products exported to China over

Africa, from the processes of independence to the conflict during the Cold War.

This trade continues, and not just represents an income, but a means by which

bilateral relations have improved: a growing demand for arms in Africa to cope

armed conflicts and China’s access to oil and other natural resources of the region.

Despite the demands of western powers, China shows little concern for

human rights, which they consider a western concept and not a reference of the

current international scene.

The arms market also allows China to participate in African politics,

especially through military exchanges. For example, most of the defense ministers

of China, since the formation of the republic, have visited Africa and its

counterparts as well (Servant, 2005).

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According to the National Congress of Investigation Service of United States

(2003), Chinese arms sales to Africa, between 1996 and 2003, constitute 10% of

all arms transfers to the continent. During the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in

1998, was sold to both sides a total of USD $1,000 million (Pan, 2006).

In 2000, Zimbabwe delivered eight tons of national ivory in exchange for a

shipment of small arms. And in 2004, China sold to the army of the country 12

fighter jets and 100 war trucks in a transaction valued at more than USD $200

million (Ríos, 2006). The policies of president Mugabe’s know as "Look East

Policy" is understandable, after all China is a big investor in mining, infrastructure

and agriculture of his country with 70% unemployment (Chinese Government,

2000).

As China’s power and influence grows, Beijing is increasingly prone to

challenge the United States and the European Union to protect its interests in

Africa. Undoubtedly, in the future, differences between China and western countries

on human, political and civil rights will be intensified. The question lies in the so

exceedingly pragmatic and realistic approach of the Asian government to Africa.

Their positions seek to maintain economic growth, improved quality of life of

Africans and their political independence; however, there are certain gaps in the

means by which they try to achieve it.

As an example remember that time in which to protect their influence in

Sudan, in September 2004, China vetoed the resolution 1564 of the UN Security

Council that condemned the mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region, showing a

stand against any type of sanctions against the African country (CNN, 2004).

Undoubtedly, present days requires countries to develop a pragmatic foreign

policy that moves away from any ideological dogma. China is one of the countries

that its economic and political success has been achieved thanks to this, however,

must take responsibility for what is becoming the next great economic power

rivaling the United States. The People’s Republic of China must understand that

their power involves a great responsibility of becoming an actor contributing to

maintaining peace and security; China must understand and accept that it is wrong

to feed the demand for illegal weapons in Africa. While Africa has benefited greatly

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in economic terms for the contributions of China, should play a role in requiring the

Asian stop the illegal sale of weapons, mostly. Otherwise, the proliferation of weak

and failed states and other problems like terrorism, human trafficking and crimes

against humanity will continue to recur throughout the African continent.

III. Economic Relations Between China and Africa

i. The New Strategic Partnership for Economic Development

After several years in which the cooperation between China and Africa has

increased, the FOCAC (2010) approved a plan of action for three years where

there is a new type of partnership strategy. This partnership, as the document

mentions, will be based on pragmatic cooperation, equality and mutual benefit. The

plan pledges that China:

• Double aid to Africa by 2009 (to about USD $1 billion)

• Set up a USD $5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage

Chinese companies to invest in Africa

• Provide USD $3 billion in preferential loans and USD $2 bn in preferential

buyer’s credits to African countries

• Cancel all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free government loans that

matured by the end of 2005, for the 31 highly indebted and least developed

countries (LDCs) in Africa that have relations with China (an amount

estimated at around USD $1.4 bn)

• Further open China’s markets to exports from African LDCs by increasing

from 190 to 440 the number of products receiving zero-tariff treatment

• Train 15,000 African professionals, double the number of Chinese

government scholarships given annually to Africans (to 4,000) and send 100

senior agricultural experts and 300 youth volunteers

• Build 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers and 100 rural schools.

It can be said that great progress has been made by the implementation of

the 7 measures developed in pragmatic cooperation between Africa and China,

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and most of these measures are already being implemented. For example, the

dramatic increase in humanitarian aid to African countries, zero-tariff measures

that are already launched, and debt relief to several countries on the continent.

China promised to give aid to the construction of Conference Center for

African Union, and the construction has formally begun. The work of setting up an

economic and trade zone in some African countries also gained momentum. To

date, China has trained various kinds of personnel for African countries for 13,307

person-times. In addition, Chinese young volunteers and senior agricultural

technical experts work in Africa in succession. The projects of offering aid to

construct hospitals, agricultural technical demonstration center and rural schools

were carried out smoothly. At the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, we will

continue to assess the implementation of the mentioned projects without doubt.

The third of the 7 policies and measures was: to set up China-Africa Fund

that will reach the total of USD $5 billion progressively in order to encourage and

support Chinese enterprises to make investment in Africa (Zhang Ming, 2009).

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate

access for African commodities to the Chinese market and fulfill its promise to

grant duty-free treatment (zero-tariffs) to certain products of least developed

African countries, as mentioned above, in order to expand and balance the bilateral

trade and optimizing trade structure. Efforts will be made to encourage the

business communities of both sides to establish China-Africa Joint Fund of the

Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are solidified, China is even

willing to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with African countries and African

regional organizations (FOCAC, 2010).

The statistic data do not end, the last November 3rd 2009, in Beijing opened

the third China-Africa summit, the largest diplomatic gathering organized by China

and ended two days later with a balance outstanding and certainly many

commitments to double in 2010 the amount of assistance offered this year to

Africa, provide USD $3,000 million in preferential loans and other 2,000 million in

preferential loans to African buyers in the next three years, establishing a special

fund of 5,000 million to encourage Chinese investment in Africa; provide further

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debt cancellation for some countries, more scholarships for students, more

resources for technical training and cooperation especially in energy (FOCAC,

2010).

ii. Bilateral Trade

Since the founding of the FOCAC in 2000, the trade and economic

cooperation between China and Africa has entered in a new era with a

comprehensive, rapid and stable development. The bilateral trade volume grew

from USD $10 billion in 2000 to 39.7 in 2005 and 45.3 in 2009, according to the

same international organization.

Of the total trade volume between them, 21 billion are imports of products

from Africa. The main products China exports to Africa are machinery and

electronics (25%), textile and apparel (17%), hi-tech products (10%) and finished

goods (9%), while imports from Africa concentrate on crude oil (40 %), iron ore

(28), cotton (13%), diamond and other natural resources and primary goods (Africa

Business, 2010).

The main African countries exporting to China are: Angola (30%), South

Africa (19%), Sudan (11%) and Congo (10%). For its part, the major African states

that import goods from China are: South Africa (21%), Nigeria (12%), Egypt (10%),

Morocco (7%), Algeria (7%), Sudan (6 %) and Benin (4%), according to National

Bureau of Statistics of China (2005).

However, the African continent currently accounts for only 2.3% of China’s

exports, and 2% of its imports. And Sino-African commerce consists predominantly

of trade with South Africa, which represents 19% of the trade with the continent as

a whole. This situation is perfectly normal, since the South African economy is still

the most dynamic in the region, with a GNP equivalent to that of all the other sub-

Saharan African states combined. China’s second major customers are Nigeria,

Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, followed by Sudan and Benin (Lafargue, 2005).

Added to this, China has forgiven debts of 10.9 billion Yuan (USD $1.38

billion) to 31 least developed countries in Africa and has exempted commodities

import tariffs for certain of these countries. China has announced the names of 25

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African countries that enjoy zero-tariff preferential treatment and special rate for

exports of some 190 products to China, ranging from food, mineral and textile

product, to machinery and electronics (FOCAC, 2010).

Chinese companies, known for their marketing and business skills, have

been reaping rich dividends by promoting their products and services in the new

and emerging markets of Africa. The Asian Dragon has established in Africa more

than 800 non-financial companies. Investment projects are distributed in 49

countries on the continent and in sectors such as trade, manufacturing, resource

exploitation, communications and agriculture, mainly. Have been conducted with

financial assistance from China, more than 720 completed projects in 49 countries.

In 26 of these states, China has provided concessional loans for a total of 58

projects and has trained 14,600 African employees in different professions

(Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela, 2010).

Moreover, the importance of these figures not only focuses on the financial

aspect, but also in the socio-economic development. More and more Chinese

people work in Africa in different productive activities. Among those Chinese, some

go to Africa to carry out construction projects that are aided by their government;

some work as volunteers in the continent, some are medical staff of the national

medical team sent to the Africa (FOCAC, 2010).

Despite this, there is a problem in the system of prices of Chinese products

into the African market that clearly exposes the unequal relationship between the

two actors, a clear example of this are the textiles, a major Chinese imported

goods in Europe. Textiles are Morocco’s leading export, representing 45% of its

industrial employment, but Chinese industrialists can offer prices 50% or 60%

lower than the Moroccans or Tunisians. While the geographical and cultural

proximity of the Maghreb countries to the European Union operates in their favour

(allowing quicker delivery times), this advantage will probably last for only a limited

period. In sum, then, relations between China and some of the countries of Africa

do not appear equitable. In exchange for its construction projects, China

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sometimes makes demands that are felt to be excessive, like the granting of large-

scale fishing rights (Angelier, 2005).

The problem does not end here; the manufacturing sectors also have a

similar problem. To this question we must make the question that if in fact China's

role in Africa is that of a partner committed to the welfare of its counterpart.

iii. Chinese Direct Investment to Africa

According to a recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) in 2009, Chinese direct investment flow to Africa in

2008 reached USD $107 billion, more than 100 times the level recorded in 1991.

Currently, some 700 Chinese firms are estimated to hold shares for a total

investment of USD $6.3 trillion, which represents 10% of total Chinese investment

in the world.

In the first six months of 2009, China made a non-monetary direct

investment of USD $875 million, an increase of 78.6% year-on-year. So, Africa is

one of the regions with a relatively fast growth for Chinese ODI.

China’s financial activity in Africa is another notable feature. Everyone

knows nowadays that China is the primary recipient of direct overseas

investments, amounting to USD $53 billion in 2003, but is actually also now one of

the major sources of such investments. In 2003 China was fifth in the world, after

the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Its overseas

investments totaled to USD $2.087 billion, which represented an increase of 112%

over the amount for 2002, and made it an active presence in 160 countries. China

is investing massively in raw material deposits overseas, and is multiplying its

trading partnerships in order to secure regular supplies. China’s presence has

undergone rapid expansion in both Latin America and Africa. In 2002 its total

overseas investments (leaving aside Hong Kong and Macao) amounted to USD

$5.083 billion, of which 25% were in North America, 9.5% in Latin America, 8.7% in

Africa, and 8% in Australia. The main recipients of Chinese investment in Africa are

Zambia, South Africa, Mali, and Egypt (Lafargue, 2005).

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Meanwhile, Africa has become China's second largest engineering

contracting market. By late 2008, China had made deals for contract projects worth

USD $126.3 billion in Africa and completed a turnover of 68.1 billion. And in the

first three quarters of 2009 China completed the contract engineering business

turnover of 17.84 billion dollars, up 41.2% year-on-year (FOCAC, 2010).

Most of all these data are aimed at oil exploration projects, road and rail

infrastructure, development of information and communication technologies, as

well as the exploitation of natural resources like forests and minerals.

Not surprisingly, China is investing in countries where natural resources can

be obtained. In 2004, oil-exporting countries such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and

Sudan received 54% of total Chinese investment in Africa. Other countries that

receive a large amount of investment are: Zambia, Ethiopia and Botswana (Van de

Looy, 2006).

Given this, not all Chinese investment in Africa is perceived as positive by

the international community. First, the Chinese construction companies have

lowered their costs so overwhelming, that has caused the displacement of their

western competitors on the continent. Likewise, international observers fear that

the Chinese way of doing business (paying bribes and fixing no conditions)

undermines local efforts to improve transparency and good governance. For its

part, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are unable to

put pressure on the countries concerned by the support of China. Finally, Chinese

companies in Africa have their own national employees. In areas where

unemployment is high, the effects of Chinese migrant labor will be felt over time.

For example, in Angola, some domestic suppliers and retailers have had to close

because they can not compete against the Chinese, which in some parts of Africa

has created resentment against Asians projects (Woolford, 2008).

However, in this situation we can not deny the role that China has in the

economic development of Africa, seen in statistics; as an example, from 2004 to

2008 the average GDP growth rate was over 5% in five successive years (UN,

2009). So far, the nature of these flows has been quite similar to those between

Africa and its traditional trading partners, noted the OECD study, The Rise of

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China and India: What’s in it for Africa? For the most part, it found, Africa exported

oil and other raw materials to China, while importing Chinese manufactured goods.

Inexpensive Chinese textile and clothing products have become prevalent in many

African markets, seriously jeopardizing the survival of Africa’s own manufacturers.

A columnist in the Nigerian Daily Trust newspaper, Mr. Charles Onunaiju

(2007), observed that unless steps are taken to alter this pattern of trade, “the

relationship in future will come to resemble the Europe/America and Africa

relations, that is, lopsided, dependent and even detrimental to Africa.” China’s

leaders are responding to such criticisms. The action plan calls for the growth of

China-Africa trade “in a more balanced manner.” The decision to double the

number of African products allowed into China duty-free was one concrete step in

that direction. Another was a Chinese pledge earlier in the year to voluntarily cap

clothing exports to South Africa (Harsch, 2007).

Whatever questions Africans may still have about China’s economic

relations with the continent, noted Legwaila (2006), the high African turnout in

Beijing “was a clear demonstration that China has succeeded in winning the

confidence of its African partners.”

China has also provided humanitarian aid to its African partners, contributing

to the building of physical infrastructure to treat infectious diseases such as malaria

and HIV/AIDS. Since 1960, about 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47

African states serving about 180 million patients (Shin Hye, 2006).

There are also important works of roads and railways financed by Chinese

companies in Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria as well as a mobile telephone network

currently being built in Tunisia. These projects also are sometimes granted to

Asian firms rather than local ones provide little impact to the economy in terms of

employment.

1. Agriculture

The agricultural issue has special importance in the context of Sino-African

relations. The large flow of Asian investment to Africa is represented not only in

building infrastructure, but also in technology development and agricultural

20

production. The past five years China's role has somehow combat some cases of

famine in Africa. However, African euphoria may fade soon, due to the significant

increase in the price of agricultural products. African countries are still mostly

importers of grain, like corn and wheat, mainly. In this sense, the development of

China is palpable, but in a negative direction. Although the purpose of feeding a

billion people has been reached, the objective defined in the mechanisms of

cooperation for the development of the FOCAC, the position of agriculture in China

is still as precarious. While China is currently the leader in rice production (176

million tons in 2004), on going to India and Indonesia, and wheat (91 million tons),

up from India, Russia, U.S. and France, still being the fourth agricultural importer in

the world, and the problem with Africa is that most production for the African

continent is accused of submitting low quality. The demand for African producers

lies in the finding that Chinese imports without an adequate transport system,

resulting in the arrival of agricultural products in many cases outdated (Angelier,

2007). Although China has pledged to combat cases of famine in Africa, has to

feed 20% of the world population with its production.

In 2002-2003, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt imported 15 million tons of

wheat, mostly from Canada and China. Sub-Saharan African countries have little

impact on the international grain markets because of the low levels of their imports,

but any price increases will still have serious financial consequences for them.

Nigeria has become the first major African importer of rice, and Africa in general

buys a quarter of global rice imports. Although there is currently no fixed global

price for this cereal (since only 6% of global production is exported), the prices

fixed by Thailand, the major global exporter (25%), are a useful benchmark. In

Africa, everyone admits that the price of rice is rising continually. In addition to the

increase in world market prices (averaging 10% since 2001) rising shipping costs

are also having their effect (Woolford, 2008).

China’s dynamic presence in Africa is therefore developing along several

different lines. And as Shintaro Ishihara emphasizes in his analysis: “Africa can

say no”. African countries must demand more equitable economic relations with

China (Brooks, 2006). They should not be satisfied with just exporting their raw

21

materials but should receive technological transfers in exchange. Taking

advantage of the potential fears aroused by the emergence of China, India is

attempting to offer African countries a more equitable partnership. India, who faces

the same problem of energy dependence, is unable to rival China in financial terms

but offers its suppliers technical co-operation (such as technological transfers, the

sofcomp information technology project, medicine sales, etc.). This competition

between the two Asian giants could be favorable to the development of the African

continent

iv. The Chinese Expectations

Given the magnitude of the investment and cooperation of the Chinese

government in Africa, it is clear that China wants to work with so many African

countries are ready. China has much to gain:

I. Securing natural resources to fuel its own fast-growing economy

II. Great new markets for national manufactured goods and services

III. Large-scale projects for Chinese companies

IV. New jobs for citizens, currently there are 750,000 working in Africa

V. The cheap local labor to supplement the Chinese labor in infrastructure

projects and exploitation

VI. Favorable support of 53 African nations at the UN

VII. Increased solidarity with solidarity with the principle of One China

And certainly, the key to Chinese success in achieving these aims is to

develop a pragmatic policy, giving priority not to seek political constraints, as if to

reach both the European Union and United States. And apparently, while China

continues to invest at this level in Africa, the continent's countries continue to allow

the role of Asians in their region.

On the other hand, it is necessary to examine the perhaps more important

reason for China-Africa relations: the quest for natural resources.

22

China is currently the fastest growing economy in the world with an annual

growth rate of 8%, reaching 9% in some cases. But this rapid economic

development in post-Mao era has been a steady and growing demand for oil and

minerals.

The biggest change came in 1993 when China became a net importer of

energy. Oil demand in China has been so fast that in 2004 the country became the

second largest oil importer after the United States. The demand growth is due not

only to the expansion of the economy, but also to increase the quality of life of the

population causing increased consumption of highly specialized goods like cars

and appliances. In this situation, it is estimated that Chinese demand for oil will

grow 156% between 2001 and 2025 (IEA, 2005).

Just as the United States does, China is looking for new countries and

different suppliers to meet their requirements of hydrocarbons in order to diversify

their sources and facilitate energy security. In Africa, where new reserves have

recently been found, China has a large chance of success when the exploitation of

deposits, all thanks to the goodwill and cooperation that has meant to African

countries. To gain and maintain control of these sources allocated a considerable

sum of military, diplomatic and economic.

Africa has about 8% of world oil reserves and 11% of global production. It is

estimated that production in the continent is growing 6% annually. For 2007,

amounted to seven million barrels per day and by 2010 an estimated eight million,

we must remember that generally African oil is of good quality. New offshore fields

have been discovered in the Gulf of Guinea, more specifically in Nigeria, Angola

and Equatorial Guinea. Despite the notorious political and social problems in

Africa, oil companies continue to invest in the continent (Brooks, 2006).

A quarter of China's oil imports come from Africa: Algeria, Angola, Chad,

Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The thirst for oil has become so

important that even the principle of One China was not taken into account when

Chad established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. A new pipeline from Chad to

Cameroon opened in 2003; thereby Chad's oil can be transported directly to a

major port (Woolford, 2006). While this trade in natural resources has a positive

23

effect on the trade balance in Africa, has some major disadvantages caused

largely by China. Usually in countries where there are abundant deposits of oil,

governments and their economic policies tend to focus on the hydrocarbons sector

and neglecting others. Corruption is a common problem.

Unfortunately, instead of facilitating the development, resource wealth has

been an important factor of political instability, armed conflicts, social dislocation

and economic decay that has characterized much of the post-colonial Africa.

v. Oil Resources

For this section it was decided to analyze two specific cases, the Sudan and

Angola, first because the issue of oil exploration goes hand in hand with the

controversial case of repression and violation of human rights by the government in

Khartoum regime that has been supported by China in the international arena and

represents one of the demands of the world community toward the eastern country.

The second on the importance of Angola as a new source of oil resources, a

situation that has allowed China to solve its energy security for the next 10 years.

1. Angola Case

Angola is currently recovering from a civil war that lasted 30 years, and

solves its economy thanks to donations and humanitarian aid from Western

countries for the reconstruction of needed public and economic institutions.

China is also present in Angola, assisting in the reconstruction of infrastructure.

China offered Angola a loan of USD $2 billion with unrestricted policies that was

completed in March 2004. The terms of the loan was established within 17 years at

an interest rate of 1.5% (Malaquias, 2005). Considerably low and attractive. The

money has been earmarked for reconstruction and development projects such as

railways and administrative buildings and power generation. Despite this, the terms

of the agreement are beneficial to China because 70% of construction projects

were assigned to Chinese companies. Local contractors may cover only 30% of

the projects covered by the loan, a fact that is causing consternation among the

Angolan entrepreneurs (Servant, 2005). In short, the loan is not creating

24

opportunities for nationals, which is vital to the livelihoods of local people. A second

important term in the agreement is that China may import 10,000 barrels a day of

oil from Angola without cost. The African country currently exports 25% of its oil to

China, which is a form of payment of credit and no income for the balance of

payments (Global Witness, 2005).

The loan, which was originally intended to rebuild the country, was used for

government propaganda in the 2006 elections. Some international observers have

stated that part of the problem is the unwillingness of government to be more

transparent on the issue of oil reserves. Angola preferred to sign commercial debt

held by major oil and without political or administrative requirements than small

loans from international institutions like the World Bank or International Monetary

Fund demanded reforms and transparency.

2. Sudan Case

Sudan, which currently supplies 7% of total oil imports of China has

benefited from the investment of large sums of China. The China National

Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the single largest shareholder (40%) in the

Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, which controls Sudan's oil fields, and

has Invested USD $3 billion in refinery and pipeline instruction since 1999

(Malaquias, 2005).

Total Sudan oil reserves are currently estimated at USD $5 billion. The

African country was producing about 500,000 barrels per day in 2004 and

increased by 750,000 in 2006. According to the World Trade Organization (2006),

oil exports to China accounted for 64% of Sudan's total exports in 2004 (Walta

Information Centre, 2006).

China's National Petroleum Corporation began the exploitation of Sudanese

oil and has expanded steadily since 1995. In 1997 the U.S. imposed trade and

economic sanctions on Sudan and China became the intermediary between

Western countries and the African country, coming to occupy a more legitimate

role for the Khartoum regime.

25

China covered the cost of the USD $15 billion pipeline of 932 miles to get to

Port Sudan where is building an oil terminal. In 2005, approximately 10,000

Chinese workers were employed in Sudan (Malaquias, 2005).

Both China and Sudan enjoy this relationship. China has been able to

diversify its oil reserves and become less dependent on other producing countries,

while Sudan has found a reliable economic partner that does not undermine its

domestic political situation. Just worth noting that China has offered financial

support to the government of Sudan, a symbol of recognition of his government, as

some Western countries.

As mentioned above, China has assisted financially and militarily to Sudan,

even after the actions of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Human Rights Watch (2006)

for this reason accuses China of having cooperated in the genocide in Darfur since

2003.

In days coming up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, an American

athlete had his visa revoked by the Chinese government because of his activism

against China's connection to Sudan's civil war. Joey Cheek, a former Olympic

speed skater and the founder of the group Team Darfur, received a call from the

Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C. some weeks before the beginning of the

Olympic Games saying that his visa had been revoked.

In short, good Sino-African relations are in the role of China as the main

operator of the oil business in Sudan. To ensure oil resources to its expanding

economy, China has supported the Khartoum government both financially and

politically and has ignored any ethical issue. In a 2004 interview with the New York

Times, China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong said: "Business is

business.... We try to separate politics from business" (New York Times, 2004). In

other words, energy security is more important than anything else, such as Human

Rights.

Moreover, not only Angola and Sudan are African countries where China

exploited the oil resources, there are other specific cases of interest, such as

Nigeria, where Petro China concluded a deal for USD $800 million in July 2005

with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in exchange of 30,000 barrels of oil a

26

day during a year. At the end of that contract, in January 2006, China National

Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), after failing to acquire American-owned

Unocal, purchased a 45% stake in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field for USD

$2.27 billion and promised to invest an additional USD $2.25 billion in field

development (Harsch, 2003).

In the middle of this decade, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Algeria,

Gabon and Nigeria -the three African oil giants- to consolidate further the security

of energy supplies. Since then, there have been dozens of high-level visits from

both sides; most of the visits have focused on economic and energy cooperation.

Mineral resources are also a recurring event in trade negotiations, especially

with South Africa (which has the largest reserves of platinum and iron of the world)

as well as Togo, Benin, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia, all important centers of

mineral reserves.

Moreover, and rightly so, for African countries, China is a tempting partner

after witnessing U.S. interventions in Iraq and Europe in Afghanistan, taking control

in most of the oilfields of the Middle East (except Iran). This undoubtedly has led to

greater distrust of African countries to the west. Therefore, Africa is a continent of

great opportunity for China, which has come to occupy the parental role previously

belonged by Europeans in the economic and political.

Added to this, the deposits in the Caspian Sea have been disappointing,

only representing somewhere between 2% and 4% of global reserves, according to

conflicting estimates. China is especially fearful of American initiatives in this area

of the Caucasus, of which GUUAM is an example (Malaquias, 2005). Founded in

1996 with the joint support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, this organization is intended to

advance economic and military co-operation between its member states in close

collaboration with the United States, and to deal with such matters as the fight

against terrorism, the settlement of local conflicts, etc. (Woolford, 2006). The five

founding members share a common platform in refusing the presence of Russian

forces on their territory. But one of the main aims of GUUAM is the building of a

supply network, independent of Russia, with the support of the Atlantic alliance.

27

Peking shares Moscow’s view that GUUAM is a mechanism for allowing

Washington not only to pursue a policy of encirclement aimed at Russia, but also

to expand it later to include China. Admittedly, China is attempting to bypass

GUUAM through rapprochement with Kazakhstan, but still the threat of

encirclement weighs heavily on it (Brooks, 2005). So Africa allows Peking to

reduce its dependency on these energy supplies, since the African continent

possesses almost 10th part of global oil reserves and represents 11% of global

production. China is currently the second major importer of African oil, after the

United States. Africa supplies 25% of its requirements as opposed to 15% in the

1980s (Statesman, 2003).

IV. Conclusions

On October 23th, 2006 the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang

Jiaxuan said that the deepening of friendly relations and cooperation between

China and Africa is the only road leading to the African continent to the

development and prosperity in the new century (Embassy of the People's Republic

of China in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2006). Clearly, speaking on

behalf of the People's Republic of China, the declaration is an expression

messianic attempts to put the Asian Dragon as an economic and political

alternative for Africa, that in the absence of Western countries.

China’s arrival in the continent provides African countries with a new

horizon. Unlike France and the United States, China makes no specific political

demands, and allows African countries to retain complete sovereignty. China’s only

demand for entering into commercial relations is a complete break of links with

Taiwan. But Peking allows African countries to vote as they please at the United

Nations Organizations, does not propose to deploy any troops on their territory,

and above all refrains from lecturing African governments on democracy. Its

intention to re-establish relations was marked in 2000 by the foundation of the

Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. Nearly all African states belong to this

organisation, and it commits China to adopt measures to support their economies

28

(such as giving an important investment, giving zero-tariffs preferences, lowering

customs duties, and granting tourist exit visas to Chinese citizens, etc.).

Cooperation with Peking offers some real advantages for Africa. China

provides know-how to its raw materials providers, plus a labour force, low-interest

loans, and favourable financial conditions for infrastructural building projects. It

does not restrict its presence in Africa to the petroleum-producing countries, and is

expanding its commercial activities in all regions from the continent.

Maybe the most important advantage for Africa in this relation is the

increased room for maneuver for African states now that they are no longer totally

dependent on the West. In addition, increasing oil production has boosted the

revenue of African states. On the other hand, the Chinese way of doing business

does not take into account human rights, the environment or good governance,

though this is also not uncommon among western countries when dealing with

Africa. The Chinese government states very clearly that the import of oil is its top

priority. Exports of textiles and household utensils from China dominate the African

market and, as a consequence, national factories have had to close and people

have lost their main source of income.

While Chinese investment for the African continent are a huge source of

income and welfare, the truth is that Chinese entrepreneurs are the most profitable

of this activity, such as having a market on the continent virtually neglected by the

West for its products, workers and construction companies and

telecommunications, while contributing to national income, has served as a

justification for African countries to China provide many of the rights to exploit

natural resources and support in the international arena on particularly in the case

of Taiwan's sovereignty. In return, China also prevented the other four permanent

members of United Nations Security Council impose sanctions on countries

recognized as a threat to stability in the region, Sudan, mainly.

Sino-African trade has many implications for Africa. The continent as a

whole is currently China’s third biggest trading partner, after the United States and

France. Statistics show, on the other hand, that Africa is less important for China.

29

In spite of increased oil exports from Africa, the continent’s total trade with China

amounts to only 2% of its international trade (CIA, 2009).

China is fast becoming a dominant player in Africa, the problem is that

China has being accused of doing so from a purely pragmatic view, focusing on

profits and not on other important issues as human rights, employment of Africans,

the high prices of agricultural products, as well as the disadvantage of regional

companies to the power of Asians.

In summary, we can say that treatment that Africa needs to revive its

economy and social development, from investment and cooperation in China is

both a means by which the Asian giant is introducing a neo-colonial system, if

while not based on the subjugation tax, appears as a model of economic

imperialism, which, far from helping African development, regional development is

being compromised, not forgetting China is holding regimes accused of committing

crimes against humanity in their territories, which puts on show among other

States, the international justice system does not work as expected.

The possibility of changing this situation for the good of the African

continent is that members reconsider the relationship with China, to try to develop

a more equitable, that actually allows the continent to develop economic, social

and public solid enough to transform Africa into a competitive region, capable of

development on their own without having to rely on the charity that China is

offering, that undoubtedly contributes most to Asians.

30

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