the configuration of symbolic boundaries against immigrants in europe

The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in EuropeAuthor(s): Christopher A. BailReviewed work(s):Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 37-59Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25472513 .Accessed: 20/10/2012 06:09

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The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries

against Immigrants in Europe

Christopher A. Bail

Harvard University

Recent studies report significant cross-national variation in the conceptual distinctions

or "symbolic boundaries "

used by majority groups to construct notions of "us "

and

"them." Because this literature compares only a handful of countries, the macro-level

forces by which certain symbolic boundaries become more salient than others remain

poorly understood. This article provides the first panorama of these processes by

comparing the relative salience or "configuration " of multiple symbolic boundaries in

21 European countries. I use fuzzy-set analyses of data from the 2003 European Social

Survey to create a typology of symbolic boundary configurations. The results indicate

that the symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public do not correspond to the

official "philosophies of integration " emphasized in the literature. Moreover, the data

suggest previous comparisons have focused too heavily on Western Europe, overlooking

important variation in other regions of Europe where immigration began more recently. I

generate hypotheses to explain this newfound variation using demographic,

socioeconomic, institutional, and historical data from quantitative and qualitative

sources. The article concludes with examples of how these hypotheses can be combined

by future studies toward a theory of "boundary-work."

INTRODUCTION

Although

the boundaries of countries neat

ly divide people into social groups, the

conceptual distinctions used to construct notions of "us" and "them" are an equally important

component of social identities (Barth 1969;

Direct correspondence to Christopher A. Bail, 541

William James Hall, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]). This research was made possible by fellowships from the German Marshall Fund and the National Science Foundation (IGERT #98070661). I thank Jason Beckfield, Eric Bleich, Rogers Brubaker, Cybelle Fox, Riva

Kastoryano, Neil Gross, Michele Lamont, Charles

Ragin, Graziella Silva, William Julius Wilson, Christopher Winship, and the ASR editors and review ers for their insightful comments and suggestions. All errors are uniquely my own. Previous drafts of this

article were presented at the ASA Annual meeting in

Montreal, the Council of European Studies Annual

Meeting in Chicago, and the International Conference on Comparative Social Science in Tokyo, Japan.

Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996). Explaining cross national variation in the relative salience of these "symbolic boundaries" is the central goal of the boundary-work literature (e.g., Kastoryano 2002; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Wimmer 2005). This literature shows that social identities are not only multidimensional but also highly mutable. While religion is an

extremely salient symbolic boundary in certain

countries, it is largely irrelevant in others and

displaced by race, language, or culture?in dif ferent configurations?still elsewhere (e.g., Lentin 2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka

1994). Although a number of idiosyncratic explanations have been provided for such vari

ation, they have yet to be synthesized into a

theory of boundary-work. Building on previous small-scale comparative studies, this article advances the study of boundary-work by pro viding the first panorama of symbolic bound aries toward immigrants in 21 European countries.

Immigration is of natural interest to scholars of boundary-work because it reveals the sym bolic boundaries deployed when social bound

American Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 73 (February:37-59)

38 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

aries are crossed. While Europeans once looked askance at the U.S. "color line," a recent influx of non-Western immigrants has brought ten sions to the fore. The murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the fatal beating of a Chinese student in Ireland in 2002, and the

perennial debate over laicite (secularism) in France exemplify the severity and variety of such tensions. Today, Europe is perhaps best described as a set of "diverse diversities," not

only because of variation in the ethnic and cul tural background of minority populations across

countries, but also due to variation in their

understanding of diversity itself. Britain, for

example, practices multicultural race relations

(Favell 2001), whereas the use of racial cate

gories is prohibited under the tenets of repub licanisme in France (Weil 2002). Until recently, nationhood in Germany was cast in terms of

ancestry (Kastoryano 2002), while thousands of

expatriates are denied cultural and legal mem

bership in Greece each year (Kiprianos, Balias, and Passas 2003). So-called "Dutch tolerance" rests on religious accommodation (Rath et al.

2001), but Swedish multiculturalism has a dis

tinctly secular heritage (Runbolm 1994). These "philosophies of integration" (Favell

2001) are central to the "xenophobophelia" (Stolcke 1995) of European policymakers wary of being compared with the "race-obsessed" United States. It is yet to be determined, how ever, whether these distinctions also shape the

configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public. This question is central to numerous comparisons of "old" immigra tion countries in Western Europe (e.g., France, Germany, and Britain) where immigration began in the immediate postwar period (e.g., Brubaker

1992; Favell 2001; Kastoryano 2002). In con

trast, the emerging literature on the "new"

immigration countries of Southern and Eastern

Europe emphasizes the absence of philosophies of integration among these regimes (e.g., Lentin

2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994). Because these small-scale comparisons are com

partmentalized by region, only idiosyncratic explanations for the configuration of symbolic boundaries have been produced. Macro-level

comparisons within and between regions of

Europe are needed not only to contextualize

previous research, but also to explore significant variation in the historical, demographic, socio

economic, and institutional characteristics of

immigrants and immigration regimes across the Continent.

I begin by developing a framework for the

study of boundary-work at the macro level and

providing a brief overview of immigration to

Europe from 1945 to 2003.1 then review the lit erature on symbolic boundaries in three regions of Europe, highlighting macro-level factors within and between regions. Next, I develop a

typology of symbolic boundary configurations by applying a combination of "fuzzy-set" tech

niques to data derived from questions about a

hypothetical immigrant in the 2003 European Social Survey. The results indicate that the sym bolic boundaries deployed by the general pub lic do not correspond to the official philosophies of integration emphasized in the literature.

Moreover, the data suggest previous compar isons have focused too heavily on Western

Europe, overlooking variation across other

regions where immigration began more recent

ly. I develop hypotheses to explain this new found variation using demographic, socioeconomic, institutional, and historical data from a variety of quantitative and qualitative sources. The discussion and conclusion offer

examples of how these hypotheses can be com bined by future studies toward a theory of

boundary-work.

SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES

The recent "boom in boundary studies"

(Wimmer 2005) highlights the significance of social classification across a wide variety of contexts. These studies show considerable vari

ation in the "boundaries" developed by groups to separate themselves from others (Abbott 1995; Barth 1969; Baubock and Rundell 1998;

Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996). Boundaries have both social and symbolic dimensions; this arti cle examines the latter. Symbolic boundaries are

"conceptual distinctions made by social actors ... [that] separate people into groups and gen erate feelings of similarity and group member

ship." Conversely, "social boundaries are

objectified forms of social differences mani fested in unequal access to an unequal distri bution of resources... and social opportunities" (Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). To be sure,

symbolic and social boundaries are closely relat ed. While social boundaries are institutionalized, however, symbolic boundaries shift through

SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 39

classification struggles where majority groups

attempt to maintain the privileges attached to

their status (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003).

"Only when symbolic boundaries are widely

agreed upon can they take on a constraining character ... [and] become social boundaries"

(Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). Citizenship laws, for example, are rigid social boundaries, but they are predicated on the flexible distinc

tions of symbolic boundaries, which are need

ed to define such exclusion (Bryson 2006;

Sackmann, Peters, and Faist 2003). In this way,

symbolic boundaries are a "necessary but insuf

ficient" condition for the creation or modifica

tion of social boundaries and should therefore be viewed as "equally real" (Lamont 1992).

To unravel the complex relationship between

symbolic and social boundaries, studies of

boundary-work emphasize the multidimen

sionality and mutability of the former. Whereas

social psychological theories of social identity

require that groups be categorized as "in

groups" or "out-groups" (e.g., Tajfel 1981), the

boundary-work approach I propose requires attention to the relative salience or configura tion of multiple symbolic boundaries (e.g., race,

religion, language, culture, or human capital).

This not only adds much-needed precision to the

concept of social identity but also enables one

to ask whether the configuration of symbolic boundaries reveals the interests of groups in

competition for social resources. For example,

previous research suggests that symbolic bound aries based on race?increasingly stigmatized through the growth of international antiracist discourse?have been displaced by religion, language, culture, or even human capital

(Goldberg 2006; Lamont 2000). By examining the entire configuration of symbolic bound

aries, one can identify how the social boundaries

previously protected by race are renegotiated. In

this way, the boundary-work literature attempts to explain why majority groups choose certain

symbolic boundaries, incorporating some

groups while excluding others. The manner in which symbolic boundaries are policed or made

permeable reveals the strategic?although often subconscious?interests of majority groups.

BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE, 1945 TO 2003

The comparative study of immigration in

Europe is ideally suited to the study of bound

ary work, given major differences in the caus

es, sources, and scope of interaction between

immigrants and natives across countries.

Although a comprehensive overview of such variation is not feasible here, four major axes of differentiation can be identified: (1) sources and timing of migration, (2) the size and origin of immigrant groups and their position in the labor market, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion

policies, and (4) philosophies of integration.

Timing and Sources of Migration

As Table 1 shows, postwar immigration gener ally occurred much earlier in Western Europe than in Southern and Eastern Europe. Castles and Miller (2003) identify three general trends of immigration to Western countries between 1945 and 1970: (1) refugee movements after

World War II, (2) guest-worker migration from the European periphery, and (3) postcolonial

migration. Germany accepted the bulk of

refugees in the immediate postwar period, most of whom were fleeing Eastern Europe. Postwar labor recruitment of Southern Europeans, Turks, and Moroccans was most prominent in France,

Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria. Substantial postcolonial migration from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East occurred in France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

After 1970, European integration and eco nomic restructuring altered the sources and tim

ing of immigration flows (Brochmann 1996). Although postwar labor migration bolstered the economies of many Western European coun

tries, global economic decline in the 1970s led

many to tighten their borders. Large-scale immi

gration continued, however, through family reunification policies. By the mid-1980s, countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands had significant second-generation immigrant populations. Meanwhile, Southern

European countries began to experience sub stantial immigration from Latin America, North

Africa, and Eastern Europe for the first time. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and civil unrest in Africa and the Middle East ushered in a new


Table 1. Timing of Migration, 1960 to 2000_

Average Net Migration (Weighted by Total Population)

1960 to 1970 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1990 to 2000

Austria .08 .11 .18 .30

Belgium .12 .11 .03 .14

Britain .01 -.04 .00 .11

Czech Republic -.19 -.02 -.04 .08

Denmark .06 .04 .09 .25

Finland -.37 .01 .09 .12

France .42 .12 .09 .04

Germany .20 .19 .26 .41

Greece -.46 .28 .22 .68

Hungary .01 -.02 -.16 .17

Ireland -.58 .33 -.58 .30

Italy -.18 -.02 -.02 .07

Luxembourg .48 .76 .42 .95

Netherlands .07 .24 .14 .24

Norway .00 .10 .14 .23

Poland -.12 -.09 -.08 -.14

Portugal -1.39 .42 -.21 .20

Slovenia .05 .34 .13 -.05

Spain -.22 .04 -.06 .33

Sweden .03 .10 .20 .23

Switzerland_.58_-^14_.39_.36

Source: Eurostat.

Note: Significant migration occurred between 1945 and 1960 in several of the above countries but data are not

available for this period.

wave of refugee migration in the mid-1990s. At the same time, illegal migration of non

European Union (non-EU) immigrants increased while legal obstacles preventing intra

European Union migration began to dissolve.

Characteristics of the Foreign-Rorn Today

Variation in the timing and sources of postwar migration to Europe caused vast discrepancies in the size and regional origin of foreign-born populations. Table 2 describes foreign-born populations as a percentage of the total popu lation by region of origin. While the foreign born constitute 40.10 percent of the total pop ulation in Luxembourg and 20.45 percent in

Switzerland, they make up only 2.88 and 1.98

percent of the population in Hungary and

Poland, respectively. Although those born in the Middle East and North Africa are roughly 4.40 percent of the population in France, they constitute less than .03 percent of the total Czech

population. Among many other possible exam

pies of such variation, European immigrants from non-EU countries make up 6.83 percent of the Austrian population but only .47 percent of the French population. As Table 3 shows, the varied timing and sources of immigration have also led to variation in the role of immigrants within European labor markets.

Citizenship and Civic Inclusion

Each of the above factors made the development of citizenship and civic inclusion policies more

pressing in certain countries than in others. While citizenship policy is well established in "old" immigration countries such as France and

Germany, many "new" immigration countries such as Spain and Italy did not develop citizenship laws until the mid-1980s. Among the old countries, there is variation in the criteria used for citizenship decisions and even the very definition of an immigrant. A now classic com

parison is drawn between France, where all

second-generation immigrants are entitled to

citizenship (jus soli), and Germany, where until

recently those without blood-based ancestry

Table 2. Regional Origin of the Foreign Born as a Percentage of the Total Population, 2002

Europe Middle East and Sub-Saharan Latin North

Totala EU-15 (Non-EU-15) North Africa South Africa South Asia East Asia America America Caribbean Oceania

Austria 12.12 2.60 6.83 1.94 .06 .14 .33 .07 .11 .00 .02 Belgium 10.68 5.80 .70 2.21 1.00 .16 .39 .19 .18 .04 .01

Britain 8.11 2.41 .33 .45 1.27 1.75 .67 .11 .39 .44 .29

Czech Republic 4.38 .27 3.85 .03 .01 .01 .17 .01 .03 .01 .00

Denmark 6.72 2.00 1.07 1.58 .42 .56 .65 .17 .21 .02 .04 Finland 2.54 .81 1.02 .22 .14 .05 .17 .03 .08 .01 .01 France 10.01 3.30 .47 4.40 .90 .12 .52 .14 .10 .04 .01 ^ Germanyb 8.82 2.32 2.42 2.77 .20 .43 .39 .10 .15 .02 .01 rf Greece 10.24 1.58 6.44 1.19 .16 .22 .08 .05 .32 .01 .19 8

Hungary 2.88 .22 2.48 .04 .01 .01 .07 .01 .03 .00 .00 ?

Ireland 10.19 7.23 .62 .16 .60 .20 .42 .07 .65 .02 .21 O

Italy 3.91 1.23 .94 .57 .24 .14 .18 .39 .13 .04 .03 g

Luxembourg 40.10 34.28 2.75 .51 .99 .13 .69 .35 .31 .07 .03 g Netherlands 10.07 1.98 .69 2.67 .63 .36 1.51 .20 .19 1.76 .08 ?

Norway 7.30 2.43 1.05 .96 .53 .71 .86 .33 .37 .03 .03 % Poland 1.98 .41 1.51 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .03 .00 .00 w Portugal 6.32 1.66 .21 .02 3.38 .08 .08 .73 .14 .01 .01 2

Spain 5.33 1.55 .40 .89 .18 .05 .13 1.83 .06 .24 .01 j*

Sweden 12.03 4.29 2.84 2.36 .55 .37 .68 .67 .20 .03 .04 *

Switzerland 20.45 11.34 4.66 1.43 .57 .50 .67 .67 .41 .12 .07 C

- 5*

Source: OECD (data

not available for Slovenia). O

Note: Foreign-born populations were aggregated by region according to the World Bank coding scheme. Cross-national data on the regional origin of second-generation immigrant P

populations are not currently available. 2

a The sum of regional percentages does not equal the total because immigrants who are stateless or whose origin is unknown are not shown. ?

b Data for Germany are

from Statistiches Bundesamt. S

w


Table 3. Characteristics of Immigrants in the Labor Force

Percent of Total Labor Percent of Immigrants with Change in Percent of Total

Country_Force (2003)_Tertiary Education (2002) Labor Force (1998 to 2003)a Austria 9.2 13.7 -.8

Belgium 7.7 22.0 -.4

Britain 5.1 43.6 +1.0

Czech Republic 1.6 21.5 +1.1

Denmark 3.5 27.5 +.1

Finland 1.6 24.9 +.6

France 5.2 15.5 -1.0

Germany 9.0 14.7 +.3

Greece 9.5 17.0 ?

Hungary 1.0 27.2 +.4

Ireland 6.5 50.1 +3.1

Italy 3.8 ? +1.1

Luxembourg 45.0 18.2 +4.3

Netherlands 3.8 24.8 +.3

Norway 3.6 39.2 +.9

Portugal 2.7 16.6 +1.3

Spain 3.7 28.2 +2.7

Sweden 4.6 30.9 +.2

Switzerland_2L9_2^0_+3_

Source: OECD (data not available for Slovenia and Poland). a Weighted by the total population.

(jus sanguinis) were treated as foreigners

regardless of their birthplace (Alba 2005; Brubaker 1992). The distinction between these

"civic" and "ethnic" citizenship regimes has

been applied throughout Europe (Weldon 2006),

although it is heavily criticized for failing to cap ture the nuances within each category (Kuzio 2Q02; Kymlicka 1999). A growing number of

studies suggest that most states now fall firm

ly within the civic side of this dichotomy (e.g., Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2005). Table 4 shows

each country's score on the Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes et al. 2005), a

five-part measure gauging the generosity of

immigration and integration policy. Again, there

is considerable variation along each dimension.

For example, naturalization is generously award

ed to immigrants in France regardless of their

origin but more tightly restricted in Austria,

Luxembourg, and Denmark. Similarly, Finland

and Sweden have flexible family reunification

policies, whereas Greece and Austria do not.

Finally, the index suggests immigrants have more easily integrated into the labor markets of

Belgium and Spain than those in Germany,

Austria, and Greece.

Philosophies of Integration

Citizenship policies are closely related to the

philosophies of integration (Favell 2001), or

public ideologies about exclusion and inclu sion of immigrants, that are created by many

European governments (see Table 4). Most

philosophies of integration draw upon the lega cy of nation building or colonial strategy. For

example, French republicanisme stresses total

assimilation of immigrants, while British mul

ticultural race relations follows a pluralist model

loosely based upon a similar colonial policy. Until 2000, Germany's Ausldnderpolitik (for

eigner's policy) treated immigrants and their

children as "permanent guests" entitled to very few benefits from the state. Many Southern and

Eastern European countries either do not have

philosophies of integration or are in the process of developing them (Carrera 2006). Those coun

tries currently developing philosophies of inte

gration are responding to increasing calls within

the EU to design a "Common Agenda for

Integration" among all member states whereby

immigrants obtain "basic knowledge of the host

society's language, history, and institutions"

(European Parliament 2005).

Table 4. Civic Citizenship Index and Philosophies of Integration

Civic Citizenship Index3

Country Antidiscrimination Naturalization Family Reunion

Long-Term

Residence Labor Market Inclusion Philosophy of Integration15

Austria 85.83 93.2 84.54 93.5 86.73 (Varies by region) Belgium 133.51 107.77 111.11 111.41 122.45 (Varies by region)

Britain 99.46 107.77 99.03 99.47 102.04 Multicultural Race Relations

Czech Republic ? ? ? ? ? (In development) Denmark 69.48 78.64 77.29 103.45 81.63 (In development) Finland 100.82 99.03 115.94 107.43 102.04 (In development)

France 100.82 113.59 106.28 111.41 96.94 Republicanisme (Republicanism)

Germany 79.02 90.29 106.28 99.47 91.84 Auslanderpolitik

(Foreigner's Policy) eg

Greece 79.02 84.47 86.96

81.56

81.63 (In development) g

Hungary ? ? ? ? ? (In development) g

Ireland 114.44 107.77 94.2 75.6 86.73 Inter-Culturalism E

Italy 95.37 101.94 99.03

95.49

102.04 (In development) g

Luxembourg 64.03 107.77

91.79

91.51 81.63 (In development) O

Netherlands 122.62 96.12 103.86

113.4

117.35 Gedogen (Dutch Tolerance) 5

Norway ? ? ? ? ? Diversity through Inclusion P

and Participation

g

Poland ? ? ? ? ? None gj

Portugal 128.07 104.85 106.28 99.47 112.24 Lusotropicalism (Tolerance) g

Slovenia ? ? ? ? ? None *o

Spain 107.63 101.94 103.86

109.42

127.55 (In development) ?

Sweden 119.89 104.85 113.53

107.43

107.14 Mangkulturellt Samhalle g

(Multicultural Society) O

Switzerland ? ? ? ? ? (Varies by region) w

Source: Geddes and colleagues (2005), OECD, and qualitative sources listed in Table 5. ^

a Higher scores indicate more inclusiveness in each policy domain. Data are not available for Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and Switzerland. For details on the meas- O

ures used to create indices see Geddes and colleagues (2005). ?

b Philosophies of integration have been created or modified in several countries since 2003. Germany's immigration policy was revised extensively in 2000; second generation Q

immigrants can now obtain citizenship regardless of

ancestry.

For an overview of recent changes see Carrera (2006). w


SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AGAINST IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

Western and Northern Europe

While race is central to discussions of symbol ic boundaries in the United States, its relevance is highly contested in Western Europe, where race is not defined through hypodescent but rather through nation building, colonialism, and the Holocaust. Analyses of racism in Western

Europe often focus on the relationship between

philosophies of integration and public attitudes. For example, Favell (2001:226) emphasizes the "colorblind" ethic of fepublicanisme in France vis-a-vis multicultural race relations in Britain: "In France, racism is public and spectacular;... in Britain ... it has become privatized and

unspoken." Still others suggest that "private" racism is equally prominent in France, albeit dis

guised as republicanisme (Lapeyronnie 1993; Todd 1994; Wieviorka et al. 1992). Comparative historical studies of France and Germany sug gest race became part of national identity through conflict between the two nations, long before the arrival of non-Western immigrants (Brubaker 1992; Weil 2002). Another strand of the literature compares the emergence of antiracist attitudes (Lentin 2004; Taguieff 1991) and shows a more general denunciation of race

throughout Western Europe. Given the widespread stigmatization of

racism in Western Europe, religion has become a primary focus of the boundary-work literature in this region (Zolberg and Long 1999). For

example, Goldberg (2006:349) argues that World War II created a "shift in Europe's dom inant fixation of concern and resentment from the figure of 'the black' ... to that of 'the

Muslim.'" Again, however, the literature shows

important cross-national variation in the relative salience of religion in the configuration of sym bolic boundaries. Kastoryano (2004) argues that anti-Muslim attitudes are more public in France than in Germany because secularism is an integral aspect of Civic Republicanism, whereas German secularism allows religious pluralism. While the French openly demand the "nationalization" of Islam, she argues, Germans

are more likely to view Muslims as Gastarbeiter

(guest workers) whose cultural differences are to be tolerated but not incorporated. Comparing anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands,

Belgium, and Britain, Rath and colleagues

(2001) suggest the legacy of "pillarisation," or

religious accommodation, has encouraged reli

gious tolerance in the former countries, where as the highly political Muslim community in Britain has provoked public backlash. Not unlike

racism, however, there is evidence that overt

"Islamophobia" has become stigmatized in

many Western countries as well (Cesari and

McLoughlin 2005; Kastoryano 2002). Previous studies also suggest that language

and culture are two of the most important sym bolic boundaries in Western European coun tries. Again, the literature focuses on the

centrality of language and culture in philoso phies of integration. In France, for example, government demands that immigrants learn the

language and culture through le creusetfrancais (the French Melting Pot) provoked a public backlash that stressed la droit a la difference (the right to be different) (Todd 1994). More recent

ly, Brubaker (2001) identified a strong resur

gence of assimilationist rhetoric spurred by the success of the far right in France. Similar, although perhaps less virulent, debates about assimilation have emerged in Britain (Bleich 2003; Favell 2001) and Germany (Kastoryano 2002).

The question of assimilation is fiercely con tested in France, Britain, and Germany, but the debate is less prominent among noncolonial

powers where assimilation has no historical

precedent (Garner 2003; Wimmer 2002; Zolner

2000). Zolner (2000) argues that Danes use the

principle of Grundtvigianism or "bounded

equality" to distinguish themselves from the colonial atrocities perpetrated by their neigh bors. Similar observations have been made of "transethnic" patriotism in Switzerland, which stresses linguistic and cultural pluralism, albeit

within strict European limits (Wimmer 2002). A final question in the literature on symbol

ic boundaries in Western Europe concerns the

possible convergence of attitudes toward immi

grants at the regional level. A number of stud ies point to growing similarities in the

immigration policies of Western European coun

tries now that most face similar challenges of

immigrant integration (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2005). Joppke (2005), for example, argues that most Western countries have shifted the crite ria of citizenship decisions from the character istics of groups to the credentials and voluntarism of individuals. Such arguments are


provoked in part by the growing harmoniza tion of immigration policy at the EU level and an international human rights discourse that stresses civic criteria in citizenship decisions.

Although supranational pressures have been shown to produce convergence of government policies, it is not yet clear whether these forces have produced similar effects on public opinion. A number of studies describe an emergent tide of xenophobia based on the notion of "fortress

Europe" (e.g., Geddes and Favell 1999; Goldberg 2006; Kastoryano 2002), but it is not

yet clear which symbolic boundaries are most salient in these developing attitudes. These find

ings have scarcely been tested empirically, par ticularly outside Western Europe.

Southern Europe

The literature on boundary-work in Southern

Europe highlights the region's abrupt transition from emigration to immigration in recent years. Comparing Greece, Italy, and Spain with the old

immigration countries of Western Europe, Triandafyllidou (2001) concludes that symbol ic boundaries in Southern European countries are much more unstable. Indeed, previous research suggests ethnicity and culture in Southern Europe have historical antecedents based on the unique "mixed" character of the

Mediterranean, marked by North African and Middle Eastern influences long before Western states came into existence.1 For these reasons,

previous studies have concluded that race is less salient in Southern Europe than in Western

Europe (Medrano 2005; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994). For example, Sniderman and

colleagues (2000) report no difference in Italians' attitudes toward immigrants from

Africa and Eastern Europe. Similarly, previous survey analysis suggests that Greeks are the least likely of all Europeans to describe them

1 For instance, race in Greece is derived from the

Megali Idea (Great Idea) through which irredenta were incorporated as "ethnic" Greeks based on shared

religion and language but not ancestry

(Triandafyllidou 2001). Similarly, la razza italiana (the Italian race) and italianitd (Italianess) do not have explicit racial connotations, although there is evidence

of racist attitudes among Northern Italians toward

their southern counterparts, who often have darker

skin(Vasta 1993).

selves as racist (Kiprianos et al. 2003). There is tentative evidence, however, that Western-style racism is being "imported" to Southern Europe via popular culture (Lentin 2004).

The role of religion in the configuration of

symbolic boundaries is also unclear, even

though Christianity has historically enjoyed a

pivotal place in nationalism in the Mediterranean (Muro and Quiroga 2005). Only recently has the arrival of non-Christian immi

grants provoked scholars to analyze the role of

symbolic boundaries based on religion (Zapata Barrero 2003). There is limited evidence that

religion is a more important symbolic bound

ary in Greece than in Italy (Triandafyllidou 2001). The relative salience of symbolic bound aries based on language and culture has yet to be studied in detail, although both were strong components of colonial strategies in Spain and

Portugal (Medrano 2005; Mendoza 2001). Instead, the literature on Southern Europe focus es primarily on perceptions of economic threat induced by the abrupt increase of immigrants in the labor market and high levels of unemploy

ment and illegal migration (Apap 1997; Baganha 1997). Sniderman and colleagues (2000) report that Italians have negative attitudes toward immigrants with low human capital. Likewise, Kiprianos and colleagues' (2003) analysis of multiple public opinion surveys sug gests that Greeks are among the most likely of all Europeans to blame immigrants for high unemployment. Previous research also suggests that human capital is an important symbolic boundary against the large Albanian popula tion in Italy (Vasta 1993) and Greece (Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000).

Eastern Europe

Because immigration to Eastern countries began very recently, the literature on symbolic bound aries in Eastern Europe primarily focuses on the ethnic "unmixing" (Brubaker 1996) of people brought together under communism.

Complicating these studies is the migration of "national" minorities such as the Roma

(Brubaker et al. 2006). A small but growing literature has begun to compare how these fac tors shape attitudes toward the rapidly growing population of "new" immigrants from Asia and the Middle East in Eastern Europe (e.g., Nyiri 2003; Phalet and Orkeny 2001; Wallace 2002).


Several studies conclude that of all Europeans, those in the East are the most hostile toward for

eigners (Nyiri 2003; Wallace 2002). The com mon assumption is that cultural membership is based on race or ancestry in these countries, although this has been challenged in recent

years (Janmaat 2006; Nyiri 2003; Szoke 1992). Nevertheless, Wallace (2002) reports racism is

higher in Eastern Europe than in other regions, even though non-European immigrants make up an extremely small proportion of their total

population. There is some evidence of growing racism toward Asian immigrants in the Czech

Republic and Hungary (Nyiri 2005), although negative attitudes are most frequently directed toward African and Middle Eastern immigrants (Nyiri 2003). Other studies suggest that religion is a more important symbolic boundary in the Czech Republic than in Hungary and Poland

(Wallace 2002). There is also evidence that lan

guage is a strong symbolic boundary in Poland

(Nowicka 2006), as is culture in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Nyiri 2003). Finally, recent studies show that symbolic boundaries based on human capital are particularly strong through out Eastern Europe (Nyiri 2003; Phalet and

Orkeny 2001; Wallace 2002).

A PANORAMA OF SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AGAINST IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

Table 5 lists comparative studies of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in Europe in

chronological order. This panorama reveals sev eral patterns that have inhibited the progress of the boundary-work literature thus far. First,

most studies compare only a handful of coun

tries. This is because many use qualitative meth ods that are not conducive to broad cross-national comparison. Second, compar

isons of Western European countries outnum

ber comparisons of Southern and Eastern

Europe. While comparisons of France, Britain, and Germany are commonplace, the amount of variation between these countries has yet to be assessed in a wider European context. This is

important not only because of variation in the

development of social boundaries between natives and immigrants within and between

regions, but also because it limits assessment of the possible convergence of symbolic bound aries in Western countries themselves. Finally,

symbolic boundaries based on race, religion,

language, culture, and human capital are ana

lyzed in the literature at large, but most studies

focus only on two or three of these dimensions.

Insofar as the theory of boundary-work empha sizes the mutability of symbolic boundaries, inattention to the entire configuration risks over

looking symbolic boundaries that displace oth ers. Therefore, the primary goal of this article

is to produce a typology of symbolic boundary

configurations using data on multiple symbol ic boundaries from countries in different regions of Europe.

The secondary goal of this article is to iden

tify new macro-level variables that can be used

to explain the configuration of symbolic bound

aries. Although explanations of variation in the

configuration of symbolic boundaries routine

ly cite country-level phenomena, the compart mentalization of the boundary-work literature

has prohibited systematic analysis of historical,

demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional

variation among countries within and between

regions. For example, most comparisons of

Western European countries focus on citizenship laws and philosophies of integration, but they

neglect the demographic and socioeconomic factors emphasized in the literature on Southern

and Eastern Europe. Conversely, studies of

Southern and Eastern countries often overlook

the institutional factors central to the literature on Western Europe. Below I explore the rela

tionship between my typology and the four axes

of variation across countries identified above:

(1) the sources and timing of immigration, (2) the size and origin of immigrant groups and

their position in the labor market, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies, and (4) philosophies of integration.2 In this way, I provide the first

systematic analysis of these variables in broad

cross-national perspective that can be used by future studies to develop a more comprehensive

theory of boundary-work.

2 Part II of the Online Supplement (on the ASR Web site: http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/

toc061.html) contains analyses of 21 additional

country-level variables.


Table 5. Comparative Studies of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe

Symbolic Boundaries

Author(s) Countries Compared3 Analyzedb

Bovenkerk, Miles, and Verbunt Britain, France, Netherlands Race

(1990) Brubaker (1992) France, Germany Race, Religion, Language, Culture

Lapeyronnie (1993) Britain, France Race, Culture

Wrench and Solomos (1993) France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Race

Netherlands

Ireland (1994) France, Switzerland Human Capital, Race

Todd (1994) France, Britain, Germany, (United Race, Religion, Language, Culture

States) Wieviorka et al. (1994) France, Britain, Belgium, Italy Race, Religion, Culture

Apap (1997) Italy, Spain Human Capital, Religion, Race

Favell (1998) Britain, France Race, Culture, Language Fetzer (2000) France, Germany, (United States) Culture, Human Capital, Religion

Zolner (2000) Denmark, France Culture, Race, Language Brubaker (2001) France, Germany Language, Culture, Race, Religion Mendoza (2001) Spain, Portugal Human Capital, Language, Culture

Phalet and Orkeny (2001) Hungary, Netherlands Religion, Race, Human Capital Rath et al. (2001) Belgium, Britain, Netherlands Religion

Triandafyllidou (2001) Greece, Italy, Spain, Britain, France, Religion, Race, Culture,

Germany

Kastoryano (2002) France, Germany, (United States) Religion, Culture

Wallace (2002) Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Human Capital, Race, Religion

Germany, Austria, (Slovakia) Bleich (2003) Britain, France Race, Language, Culture

Garner (2003) Ireland, Britain, (United States) Race

Nyiri (2003) Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Race, Human Capital, Culture,

Slovenia, (Romania), (Slovakia), Language

(Belarus), (Russia)

Rydgren (2003) France, Sweden Race, Culture

Sackman et al. (2003) Germany, Netherlands, Britain Religion, Language, Culture

Fetzer and Soper (2004) Britain, France, Germany Religion

Koenig (2004) Britain, France, Germany Religion Lentin (2004) Britain, France, Italy, Ireland Race Cesari and McLoughlin (2005) Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Religion

Netherlands, Spain a Countries in parentheses are not included in my study.

b The vast comparative literature on social boundaries is not described in this table (e.g., Alba 2005; Joppke 2005; Soysal 1994).

MEASURES OF SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES

Data for this study are from the 2002/2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS), a

cross-sectional, multistage probability sample of social attitudes among people age 15 and older in 21 European countries. Because this

study is designed to probe the configuration of

symbolic boundaries deployed by native popu lations, I drop all first- and second-generation immigrants from the sample. In addition, I exclude all respondents who indicated they are

members of an ethnic minority in their country.3 My total sample comprises 33,258 individuals in 21 countries, averaging 1,584 people per country.

I derive measures of symbolic boundaries from a unique set of questions in the ESS that

3 The following two questions were used to deter

mine minority status: (1) "Are you a member of a

minority group in your country?" and (2) "Have you ever been discriminated against on the basis of your

race/religion/ethnicity?"


ask respondents to evaluate a hypothetical immigrant. Respondents were first asked: "Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside

[country] should be able to come and live here."

They were then shown a card with the follow

ing statements: (1) be white, (2) come from a Christian background, (3) speak [one of] the official languages of [country], (4) be commit ted to the way of life in [country], (5) have good educational qualifications, and (6) have work skills that [country] needs. Responses were coded on a 10-point Likert scale where '0' is

"extremely unimportant" and' 10' is "extreme

ly important." I refer to the six symbolic bound aries measured in these questions as race,

religion, language, culture, education, and occu

pation. The "hypothetical immigrant" module of the

ESS marks a considerable improvement over

previous cross-national surveys of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. Whereas most

previous surveys ask respondents to describe their feelings toward "immigrants," "immigrants from outside Europe," or "racial and ethnic

minorities," the ESS questions are designed to

capture important variations within each of these broad categories. By disaggregating atti tudes toward immigrants into multiple sym bolic boundaries that are compared in the

boundary-work literature (see Table 5), the ESS measures both the intensity and the form of attitudes toward immigrants. It is thus particu larly well suited to the conf igurational approach to symbolic boundaries adopted here. As with all survey-based studies, however, it is possible that ESS respondents produced socially desir able responses to the questions, rather than the intimate convictions that might be revealed

through ethnography. This is particularly rele vant for the question on race because the liter ature demonstrates the widespread influence of antiracist discourse in Western Europe. It remains to be determined, however, precisely how much antiracism has permeated each coun

try (Lentin 2004) and, more importantly, how such developments have shaped the entire con

figuration of symbolic boundaries in response. Table 6 presents descriptive characteristics for

the six symbolic boundaries in each country. Language and culture are consistently among the most important symbolic boundaries.

Conversely, race is least important in all coun

tries, although in varying degrees. In

Luxembourg, for example, the mean score for racial symbolic boundaries is .93, but it is 4.12 in Hungary. Religion is relatively more salient, averaging 3.52 across all countries and ranging as high as 5.87 in Greece. Symbolic bound aries based on human capital (education and

occupation) generally fall between the most

important (language and culture) and the least

important (race and religion) symbolic bound aries.

FUZZY-SET METHODOLOGY

Typologies are analytical tools used to com

pare cases?in this case, countries?with ideal

types not observed empirically. In practice, however, many of the quantitative methods used to construct typologies create mutually exclu sive groups, ignoring the likelihood that many countries are in fact combinations of multiple types (Ragin 2000). Traditional or "crisp" clus ter analysis, for example, ignores countries "in

between" types by forcing them into the clus ters they most closely resemble. Although this is inconsequential for studies with large sample sizes, failure to identify such cases among the 21 countries in this study risks misidentification and misinterpretation of typical symbolic boundary configurations. I address these issues below through a combination of "fuzzy-set" techniques. I use "fuzzy cluster analysis" (FCA) (Dimitriadou et al. 2006) to produce a typolo gy of symbolic boundary configurations and

explore its relationship to the country-level fac tors above using measures of "fuzzy consisten

cy" (Ragin 2006).4 Crisp cluster analysis requires that countries

belong to one?and only one?group. In con

trast, FCA assigns countries "membership scores" that describe how much they resemble

multiple fuzzy clusters or "sets." This is accom

plished by applying a "fuzzy modifier" to the traditional c-means clustering algorithm (Dimitriadou et al. 2006). Consider the matrix

Xy comprised of 21 countries (i) and their mean scores for the six symbolic boundaries above

4 For a detailed comparison of these techniques and

traditional or "crisp" analyses see the Online

Supplement.


Table 6. Mean Scores of Six Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in 21 European Countries

Country Race Religion Language Culture Education Occupation Austria 2.04 3.27 7.57 7.14 6.67 6.92

Belgium 2.26 2.71 6.99 8.25 6.09 6.25

Britain 2.39 3.26 7.40 7.51 6.29 6.87

Czech Republic 3.64 3.69 6.29 8.24 6.33 7.42

Denmark 1.84 3.57 6.41 6.88 6.28 6.39

Finland 2.81 3.89 6.23 8.18 6.34 6.91

France 2.34 3.20 7.33 7.47 6.30 6.38

Germany 1.52 2.49 7.77 8.00 6.77 7.07

Greece 3.64 5.87 7.78 8.18 7.79 8.22

Hungary 4.12 4.69 7.68 8.95 6.83 8.13

Ireland 2.40 3.47 6.38 6.68 6.12 6.82

Italy 2.55 4.44 5.77 7.17 5.73 6.52

Luxembourg .93 2.01 8.45 7.95 6.19 6.67

Netherlands 1.90 2.67 7.42 7.90 5.58 6.05

Norway 2.27 3.39 6.25 6.57 5.10 5.89

Poland 2.95 4.79 6.82 6.45 6.38 6.92

Portugal 2.94 3.83 6.00 7.08 6.08 7.47

Slovenia 2.95 3.45 7.50 7.98 6.32 7.21

Spain 2.94 3.91 5.92 7.35 6.09 6.67

Sweden 1.31 2.32 4.35 7.73 4.48 4.84

Switzerland 1.55 2.92 6.15 7.25 6.13 5.98

Mean (all countries) 2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57 6.19 6.74 Min .93 2.01 4.35 6.45 4.48 4.84

Max 4.12 5.87 8.45 8.95 7.79 8.22

SD_180_191_.94_.65_.65_.76 Note: 0 = extremely unimportant; 10 = extremely important.

(j).5 When applied to matrix Xtj, the fuzzy c means algorithm produces a matrix of mem

bership scores M for 21 countries and k sets, and akx 6 matrix of "set cenrroids" C that describes the configuration of symbolic boundaries in

each fuzzy set. This is accomplished by mini

mizing the objective function: n k

(M,C) = X^fjdtj i J where uij is the membership coefficient of coun

try / in set j, and dtj is the Euclidean distance between observation / and center j. The researcher must specify a value greater than 1 for k and m, the fuzziness index.6 The function

51 performed fuzzy clustering of the entire distri

bution to assess bias from kurtosis, but it did not yield substantially different results (available from the author).

6 Here a value of m = 2 is chosen, following Bezdek

and Pal (1995) who show that values lower than 1.5 and higher than 2.5 produce unstable results in most

is constrained such that each country's mem

bership cannot be negative, and the total mem

bership across all sets is normalized. The

strength of membership scores increases from 0 to 1, and the sum of each country's member

ship scores equals 1. Unlike factor scores, FCA membership scores

describe relationships between cases, not vari ables. Therefore, countries with strong mem

bership in a given set axe prototypical, whereas those with weak membership in all sets are sim

ply atypical. The characteristics of each set are identified through inspection of the cluster cen troids. A country's membership scores describe how closely its configuration of symbolic boundaries resembles the configuration of clus ter centroids in each set. By plotting member

applications. I used the Xie-Beni index to determine

the appropriate number of sets (k). Different values of m and k produced very similar results (available from the author). I used the R software to conduct all

analyses.


ship scores in multidimensional space, one can assess how exclusive each set is. Moreover, one can easily identify countries in between sets as

well. The "crisp" clustering solution can be deduced for reference simply by grouping coun tries according to their strongest membership. The range of membership scores within each

crisp set, as well as the amount of overlap between them, reveals the integrity of the crisp clustering solution. In most applications, there is considerable variation within and between

crisp clusters. In most cases, FCA therefore

provides more precise measures of structure in data than crisp cluster analysis.

Fuzzy sets cannot be analyzed in tandem with non-fuzzy variables unless the latter are

transformed into fuzzy sets as well. I calibrate the country-level variables presented in the

background sections into fuzzy sets using the method proposed by Ragin (forthcoming) and detailed in the Online Supplement. Even after all variables are transformed into fuzzy sets, standard correlational techniques cannot be used to explore the relationship between fuzzy sets (Ragin 2006). This is because correlations describe the covariation of variables, whereas the fuzzy-set approach asks whether cases are

subsets of one another. Consider Figure 1, which describes the relationship between two fuzzy sets: X and Y. The figure shows that member

ship in X is almost always greater than mem

bership in Y. Traditional correlational

techniques, however, would not reveal a signif icant correlation between the two because the

points in the lower right-hand corner are con

sidered error. In the fuzzy approach, however, a consistent subset relationship exists between X and Y; meaning that membership in X is

almost always a necessary condition for Y7 The

points in the lower right-hand corner are sim

ply considered cases in which membership in Y must be explained through additional pathways other than X.

7 For a discussion of the distinction between nec

essary and sufficient conditions see Ragin (2000). I calculated only necessary conditions due to space

constraints, as well as the exploratory goals of this

study. More rigorous analysis would explore combi

nations of necessary and sufficient conditions as

well as their set-theoretic "coverage" (Ragin 2006).

As Ragin (2006) shows, the consistency with which one set is a necessary condition for anoth er can be calculated as follows:

Consistency (Y< X) =

^(miniY.Xd)/^) This formula measures not only the frequency of X being greater than Y, but also the magni tude of this difference. Large inconsistencies are

penalized, but "near misses" are also acknowl

edged as such. Scores .80 and higher indicate

increasingly consistent relationships. Below, I calculate the consistency of the country-level variables (from the background sections) with the sets produced by FCA to develop hypothe ses to explain the configuration of symbolic boundaries at the macro level.

THREE SYMBOLIC BOUNDARY CONFIGURATIONS

I identified three typical symbolic boundary configurations via FCA.8 Table 7 describes the value of each boundary for Sets A, B, and C cen tered around the mean for all countries.

Set A is characterized by: (1) stronger than

average racial and religious symbolic bound

aries, (2) weaker than average cultural and lin

guistic symbolic boundaries, (3) slightly weaker than average educational symbolic boundaries,

and (4) slightly stronger than average occupa tional symbolic boundaries.

Set B is characterized by: (1) stronger than

average linguistic and cultural symbolic bound

aries, (2) weaker than average religious and racial symbolic boundaries, (3) slightly stronger than average educational symbolic boundaries, and (4) slightly weaker than average occupa tional symbolic boundaries.

Set C is characterized by: (1) weaker than

average scores on every symbolic boundary, (2) extremely weak racial symbolic boundaries,

(3) extremely weak education and occupation symbolic boundaries, and (4) weaker than aver

age religious symbolic boundaries (but slight ly stronger than those in Set B).

Figure 2 is a three-dimensional scatter-plot of each country's membership scores in Sets A, B,

8 For further details on cluster validity, see Part I

of the Online Supplement.


1.0-1

0.9

0.8

0.7

I 0.6

.g

? 0.5 -

g 0.4

0.3 -

#

0.2- %

0.1- ? % %

0.0 -\-\-1-1-1-1-1-1-\-1-1

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Membership in Set X

Figure 1. Example of a Subset Relationship

Table 7. Characteristics of Three Sets of Symbolic Boundary Configurations

Race Religion Language Culture Education Occupation Mean (All Countries) 2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57 6.19 6.74

Fuzzy Sets Cluster Centroids

SetA +.43 +.42 -.68 -.37 -.16 +.16 SetB -.41 -.57 +.67 +.15 +.16 -.10

SetC_-.75 -.46_-M_Il57_-M_-.91

Note: Cluster centroids are centered around the mean for all countries.

and C.9 The three ellipses depict the crisp clus

tering solution for reference. Spain, Portugal,

Italy, Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Ireland most closely resemble Set A (in order of the strength of their membership). Britain,

9 See Table S2 in the Online Supplement for a

complete list of membership scores.

France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia most

closely resemble Set B. Finally, Switzerland,

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden most closely resemble Set C. While Spain, Britain, and Switzerland are nearly prototypical of Sets A, B, and C, respectively, countries closer to the ori

gin of the axes (e.g., Greece and Hungary) are

scarcely related to the three sets. Most countries


iBB_-__9____-___r:"' ^ " ""

M__^_^__i_itt___. -jjJJJ^^IfBPP^

__B_H______^__^_HP^ ^^^^^i^__^^^^Hn__^_^_H__H_S-L.

jJl____________P^^* '

* - ^ "VH____^_BP^^' *

f^BBP^^ * --. .iiiiiiiii.

Figure 2. Fuzzy Membership Scores in Three Sets

Notes: A country's membership scores describe how closely its configuration of symbolic boundaries resembles the

sets described in Table 7. Countries with high membership in a given set are prototypical; those with low member

ship are simply atypical. Ellipses depict the "crisp" clustering solution: the major diameter or "length" describes

the range of membership scores within each crisp cluster whereas the minor diameter or "width" describes overlap between them.

fall somewhere in between, and several are best described as in-between sets. The Netherlands, for example, has significant membership in both Set B (.56) and Set C (.28). Likewise, Ireland has significant membership in Sets A

(.51) and C (.29) and Slovenia has significant membership in Sets B (.50) and A (.25). In sum, FCA shows significant variation within and between sets that would not be recognized by crisp cluster analysis.

EXPLORING THE CONFIGURATIONS

Perhaps the most striking feature of Figure 2 is the geographic pattern of countries across the three sets. Countries that most closely resemble Set A (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) are each located on the periphery of Europe. Set

B countries (Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and

Slovenia) are geographically continuous in the "core" of Western Europe?if one ignores the

English Channel?and all but one of the Set C countries (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and

Sweden) are part of Scandinavia. The in between countries roughly follow this pattern as

well. Slovenia sits between the "core" coun

tries of Set B and the "peripheral" countries of Set A. Ireland sits between Sets A and C, and the Netherlands sits between Sets B and C.

Because a theory of boundary-work does not

yet exist, a variety of different hypotheses could be developed to further explain the FCA results. Below I develop hypotheses by exploring the

consistency of Sets A, B, and C with the four

country-level factors discussed in the back

ground sections: (1) the sources and timing of


immigration, (2) the size and origin of immi

grant groups and their position in the labor mar

ket, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies, and (4) philosophies of integration.

Consistency Calculations

Table 8 describes the consistency between Sets

A, B, and C and the four fuzzy sets that describe increases in migration by decade proportional to the total population. Set C is highly consis tent with countries that experienced high net

migration between 1960 and 1970, 1980 and

1990, and 1990 to 2000. Set B is highly con sistent with high net migration between 1960 and 1970 and consistent with high net migration between 1980 and 1990. Although consistency increases between Set A and net migration by decade, it never reaches the .80 benchmark.

Returning to Table 1, one finds that the Set A countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) were all once countries of emigration and only recently experienced large-scale immigration. In

contrast, the countries in Sets B and C all expe rienced sizeable postcolonial or guest worker

migration in the decades after World War II. Given the timing of migration, it is not sur

prising that Sets B and C are consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations (proportional to the total population), while Set A is not (see Table 8). Set B is consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations from the Middle East and North Africa, sub Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, and Oceania. Set C is consistent with countries that have large immigrant populations from all

regions except the Caribbean and Oceania. Set

Table 8. Consistency of Country-Level Sets with Sets A, B, and C

Symbolic Boundary Configurations

_Set A_SetB_Set C

Timing of Immigration (N = 21) 1960 to 1970 .590 .932** .938**

1970 to 1980 .630 .719 .684 1980tol990 .587 .851* .942**

1990 to 2000 .743 .766 .966** Characteristics of Immigrant Population (N

= 20)

Total Immigrant Population .541 .891 .904** EU-15 .536 .754 .896*

Europe (non-EU-15) .646 .684 .946** Middle East & North Africa .566 .880* .900** Sub-Saharan Africa .680 .812* .906**

South Asia .563 .818* .926** East Asia .526 .825* .927**

Latin America .704 .622 .883* North America .500 .678 .929**

Caribbean .500 .637 .673 Oceania .466 .558 .756

Immigrant Percent of Labor Force3 .592 .833* .863*

Tertiary Education15 .906** .557 .872*

Change in Immigrant Percent of Labor Force (1998 to 2003)b .895* .641 .714 Civic Citizenship Policies (N

= 15) Antidiscrimination .851* .642 .770 Naturalization .807* .756 .827*

Family Reunion .689 .840* .742

Long-Term Residence .759 .764 .908** Labor Market

Inclusion_.873*_^44_.754 aN=19

bN=18 * Consistent (.80 Benchmark) **

Highly Consistent (.90 Benchmark)


A is not consistent with countries that have

large immigrant populations regardless of

region. Sets B and C are consistent with coun tries in which immigrants make up a consider able part of the labor market, while Set A is not. Sets A and C are consistent with countries in which a substantial part of the immigrant pop ulation holds tertiary education. Only Set A is consistent with countries that experienced an

abrupt increase in the percentage of immigrants in the labor force between 1998 and 2003.

Table 8 presents the consistency of sets A, B, and C and five fuzzy sets generated from Geddes and colleagues' (2005) Civic

Citizenship Index. Because the index is not available for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, or Switzerland (see Table 4), these results should be considered

highly tentative. Set A is consistent with coun tries that have generous antidiscrimination, nat

uralization, and labor market inclusion policies. Set B is only consistent with countries that have

generous family reunion policies. Set C is con sistent with countries that have generous natu ralization policies and highly consistent with countries that have generous long-term resi

dence policies.

Philosophies of Integration in

Context

Surprisingly, the results suggest that official

philosophies of integration do not correspond to the configuration of symbolic boundaries

deployed by the general public. France, Britain, and Germany's philosophies of integration are

compared in the literature more often than those of any other combination of countries (see Table

5). Figure 2, however, suggests the configura tion of symbolic boundaries used by the gener al public in these three countries is nearly identical. All three countries are closely affili ated with Set B, which is characterized by strong

linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries and weak racial and religious boundaries. While this configuration mirrors the emphasis on

assimilation in French republicanism^ it runs counter to the pluralist tenets of British multi cultural race relations. The results are even less

compatible with Germany's historical emphasis on ancestry, despite a modest growth of assim ilationist rhetoric in government discourse described in recent studies (Brubaker 2001;

Carrera 2006). Moreover, there is no discernable

pattern across Sets A and C apart from the lack of philosophies of integration among most coun tries that resemble Set A.

DISCUSSION

Set A: New Immigration Countries on

the European Periphery

Countries most closely affiliated with Set A

(Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland, Czech

Republic, Ireland, Greece, and Hungary) share the following characteristics: (1) They are locat ed on the periphery of the European Union. (2) They were all once sources of emigration and

only recently began receiving considerable

immigration. Nevertheless, (3) immigrants remain a small proportion of the overall popu lation. Therefore, (4) discourses about immi

grant integration are relatively unsophisticated compared with those in the old immigration countries of Western and Northern Europe.

It remains to be determined why racial and

religious symbolic boundaries are stronger than

average in Set A (see Table 7). One hypothesis is that phenotype and religious dress provide visual cues about group membership that are

particularly conspicuous in new immigration countries, precisely because of their homo

geneity. These cues may limit positive contact

between groups, allowing racial and religious stereotypes to go unchallenged (Allport 1958). An abrupt increase in the visibility of a minor

ity population may also provoke perceptions of

"group threat" (Blumer 1958), as majority group members come to realize that certain privileges and status are attached to their race or religion. These perceptions may be reinforced by eco

nomic insecurity as well, and Set A is consis tent with countries that experienced an influx of

immigrants into their labor markets in recent

years.10 The results might also suggest that antiracist discourse has not yet permeated the

periphery of Europe as thoroughly as it has

Europe's core. Note that these hypotheses are not

10 This may also explain why occupational sym bolic boundaries are stronger than average in Set A.

See the Online Supplement for a more comprehen sive application of "group threat" and "contact" the

ory following Quillian (1995).


mutually exclusive. For example, positive con tact may limit perceptions of group threat or facilitate the diffusion of antiracist discourse.

Nevertheless, additional research is needed to

explore these hypotheses in different combina tions and to provide alternative explanations for the strength of racial and religious symbol ic boundaries in Set A countries.

Set R: Old Immigration Countries in the Core of Western Europe

Countries most closely affiliated with Set B

(Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) share the following characteristics: (1) They are locat ed in the core of Western Europe (except Slovenia). (2) They received substantial immi

gration in the decades after World War I, either from guest worker agreements with countries on the European periphery (including Turkey and

North Africa) or from former colonies. Because of this, (3) immigrants now constitute a sizeable

portion of the overall population, and (4) pub lic discourse about immigration has evolved over decades and is therefore more sophisticat ed than that of the new immigration countries.

The emphasis on language and culture in Set B countries may result from natives' acceptance of the permanency of immigration. As second

generations of nonwhite and non-Christian

immigrants come of age, racial and religious distinctions may not only become less con

spicuous but also less politically tenable. While public discourse necessarily shifts from the accommodation to the integration of immigrant populations, natives may become more con

cerned about the longevity of their linguistic and cultural identity. Or, natives may realize that

language and culture guarantee the privileges of group status that were previously "protected" by race or religion. These attitudes may be rein forced by recent reports of "segmented" or "downward" assimilation of second-generation immigrants (e.g., Alba 2005; Crul and

Vermeulen 2003; Silberman, Alba, and Fournier

2007), whose difficulty crossing social bound aries may inhibit their "symbolic" integration as well. There is growing controversy, for exam

ple, about "reactive ethnicity" among second

generation Turks in Germany (Diehl and Schnell

2006) and their North African counterparts in France (Beaud and Pialoux 2003).

Regardless of the extent of second-generation disenchantment, the "integration question" is

perceived as a common "social problem" across most Set B countries (e.g., Tissot 2007). With the exception of Slovenia, Set B countries are

long-standing participants in discussions about the harmonization of immigration policy at the EU level, and they are highly aware of each other's integration strategies (Carrera 2006).n This may have produced convergence in the

configuration of symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public, because these discus sions are constrained within a universal human

rights discourse that stigmatizes group-based exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclu sion based on language, culture, and human

capital (Joppke 2005). Nevertheless, addition al research is needed to explain why such supra national discourse appears to have permeated Set B countries more deeply than countries in Set A.

Set C: Accommodating Isolationists

Countries most closely affiliated with Set C

(Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) share the following characteristics: (1) They are located in Scandinavia (except Switzerland). (2) They each received considerable migration after World War II, although they had no colonies from which to recruit. Because these countries initially had relatively small popula tions, (3) immigrants from a variety of differ ent regions constitute a relatively large proportion of the overall population. Finally,

(4) they are politically isolated from the core of Western Europe, and discourse about immi

grant integration has evolved independently (Runbolm 1994; Wimmer 2002).

As above, the weak racial and religious sym bolic boundaries characteristic of Set C coun tries could be explained as resulting from strong antiracist discourse, positive contact among natives and non-European immigrants, or the absence of competition between them. None of these hypotheses, however, explain why racial

linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries are far weaker in Set C countries than in all others. Here, deeper historical analysis may be war

1 x I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pro

posing this hypothesis.


ranted. Tagil (1995), for instance, shows that

intergroup differences were accommodated in the early history of Scandinavian countries to

provide stability against the threat of cultural

ly homogenous rivals. This was also true of

Switzerland, where geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual defense of the country) united dis

parate linguistic and religious groups into a sin

gle republic in the face of threats from its more

powerful neighbors.12 In contrast, linguistic and cultural differenti

ation was central to the nation-building strate

gies of many Set B countries. Consider, for

example, the Herderian tradition in Germany (Calhoun 1993) or France's virulent

"Anglophobia," which Britain repaid in kind

(Greenfeld 1992). Likewise, race and religion were particularly important distinctions in the

nation-building strategies of several countries on the European periphery that defined themselves

against the threat of non-European and non Christian empires.

This line of reasoning builds on Gellner's

(1983) theory of nationalism, which suggests that different components of group identity become salient based on threats from external

groups. When "human chasms" such as race or

religion do not separate insiders from outsiders, Gellner's theory predicts that linguistic and cul tural boundaries become the primary mecha nism of intergroup exclusion. While it is not

clear whether European publics today are aware that such processes might affect their attitudes toward immigrants, the national self-under

standings produced during nation building may be path dependent. As many Western European countries forced their language and culture on

colonies, Scandinavian countries, for example, condemned them for doing so (Z0lner 2000) and welcomed a disproportionate number of

refugees from those colonies.13 In this way, Gellner's theory is not incompatible with the other hypotheses developed above. For instance, historical emphasis on accommodating dis

parate groups may have encouraged positive

12 Note that the Netherlands and Belgium adopt ed similar nation-building strategies. While they are

most closely affiliated with Set B, their second clos

est affiliation is with Set C. 13 Part II of the Online Supplement shows that

Set C is highly consistent with large refugee popu lations.

contact between natives and immigrants or reduced perceptions of threat between them. Or the coincidence of these national self-under

standings with international antiracist discourse

may have rendered ethnocentric attitudes less

politically tenable than elsewhere. Again, much additional research is needed to explore these

hypotheses more rigorously.

Directions for Future Research

To be sure, the configuration of symbolic boundaries is but one of many factors that shape the integration of immigrants into host soci eties. While the socioeconomic and legal seg regation of immigrants cannot be ignored, neither can the role of symbolic boundaries in

creating and maintaining social boundaries. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to establish whether the config urations of symbolic boundaries revealed above are the product or the source of social inequal ity. While it is likely that causality works in both directions, longitudinal data and historical case studies are needed to explore my hypothe ses in greater detail and in different combina tions. In addition, ethnography and in-depth qualitative research are needed to further ana

lyze the content of these symbolic boundaries across different situations. For example, it is

possible that linguistic and cultural symbolic boundaries are used publicly to mask private racism or Islamophobia.

This study provides new theoretical and

methodological tools for the study of boundary work. I argue that treating immigrants as a sin

gle out-group neglects important cross-national variation in the conceptual distinctions used by natives to create notions of "us" and "them." The

typology of symbolic boundaries presented above provides much needed context for previ ous comparisons of two or three Western

European countries and identifies new variations in other regions of Europe. This discussion also identifies new historical, demographic, and socioeconomic variables that appear to be more

promising in explaining the logic of boundary work than the philosophies of integration emphasized in the literature. Together, these contributions constitute a preliminary step toward a theory of boundary-work that must be

explored more rigorously by future studies in

Europe and beyond.


Christopher A. Bail is a PhD Candidate in the

Department of Sociology at Harvard University and a Doctoral Fellow in the Multidisciplinary Program on Inequality and Social Policy at the Kennedy School

of Government. His other research explores the con

nection between symbolic boundaries and collective

violence, the global diffusion of culture, and the pol itics ofantiracism in cross-national perspective. He

is an affiliate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies.

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