The Consequences of the Peaceby James Chace

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<ul><li><p>The Consequences of the Peace by James ChaceReview by: William G. HylandForeign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 174-175Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045264 .Accessed: 15/06/2014 15:28</p><p>Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms &amp; Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p> .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.</p><p> .</p><p>Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.</p><p>http://www.jstor.org </p><p>This content downloaded from 188.72.126.108 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 15:28:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfrhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20045264?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p></li><li><p>174 FOREIGN AFFAIRS </p><p>assistance to the former Soviet states and advocates an active role in eastern </p><p>Europe and continuing engagement in western Europe. He also comes out </p><p>for independence of the various states comprising the former Yugoslavia, but urges a broader European entity. On the Middle East he is critical of U.S. policymakers' inability to distinguish between true friends and poten tial enemies. While heavily criticizing woolly-headed isolationism, he wisely adds a last chapter prescribing some domestic remedies and, Nixon being Nixon, he finally comes down to the question: "Do we have the will to play a leading role?" Altogether worth reading during the current debate about </p><p>post-Cold War foreign policy. </p><p>I'VE SEEN THE BEST OF IT. By Joseph W. Alsop with Adam Platt. New York: Norton, 1992, 480 pp. $29.95. </p><p>This is a delightful memoir completed by Adam Platt after Joe Alsop's death. Platt has successfully captured the condescending and acerbic flavor of Alsop's commentaries, and many of the stories and vignettes will be familiar to those who knew him as a powerful force and colorful fixture in </p><p>Washington politics and journalism. For Alsop "the best of it" was the </p><p>Kennedy administration. The period that followed was "bitter and bewil </p><p>dering." Unfortunately there is not enough on Alsop's strident and defiant defense of American intervention in Vietnam, which he championed in his columns. If one wants to evoke the ambience of Washington just before and after World War II, this memoir does it. </p><p>THE IMPERIAL TEMPTATION. By Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991, 228 </p><p>pp. $22.50 (paper, $14.95). </p><p>Analyzing the post-Cold War era and the new world order is rapidly becoming a cottage industry. This volume will surely rank as one of the </p><p>best; it has the virtue of dissecting not only the significance of American </p><p>policy at the end of the Cold War but the meaning of the Gulf War as well. The authors suggest that the end of the Cold War and the opening of a new </p><p>world order were characterized by decline in the utility of the use of force </p><p>alongside the growth of economic power as a determinant of policy. The Gulf War, which the authors believe Bush sought from the beginning of the crisis, contradicted the concept of a new order; the result was to exalt the use of force as an essential element of world order. The authors fear that the swift success of the Gulf War will tempt America to a new </p><p>imperialism: a sort of neo-Wilsonian order, but imposed by the very means </p><p>Wilson wanted to disavow. The policy emerging from the Gulf War, they argue, amounts to the functional equivalent of "global containment" in the name of high principles, but at the expense of the American tradition: to use force with moderation and restraint, only if absolutely necessary. </p><p>THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE. By James Chace. New York: </p><p>Oxford, 1992, 235 pp. $22.95. A Twentieth Century Fund Book. </p><p>Another analysis and prescription re the post-Cold War world and </p><p>America's role in it. Borrowing a title from John Maynard Keynes' seminal work after the end of World War I, Chace argues that in the new </p><p>internationalism economic power and social cohesion will count as much if not more than raw military power. The United States emerges as first </p><p>among equals in this context, but its role is bound to be reduced. Economic </p><p>This content downloaded from 188.72.126.108 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 15:28:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p></li><li><p>RECENT BOOKS 175 </p><p>solvency, the subject of a previous book by this writer, will become a key. While contracting its security commitments and revising its military role, </p><p>Washington, the author believes, will have to seek new institutions to </p><p>manage the critical global economy. </p><p>FRIENDLY TYRANTS. Edited by Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle. New York: St. Martin's, 1991, 542 pp. $39.95. </p><p>An interesting idea that produces mixed results. During the Cold War the United States found itself allied to some highly unsavory leaders and </p><p>regimes. They were tyrants but, to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt's remark about the elder Somoza, they were our tyrants. This collection of </p><p>essays includes most of the obvious candidates but some dubious ones as </p><p>well?such as the South Vietnamese leaders, the king of Jordan and Mexican presidents?who hardly qualify as tyrants. Some "tyrants" began as rather moderate alternatives (Suharto); others were even revolution aries (Ferdinand Marcos). Paul Henze on the Turkish military leaders, </p><p>Adam Garfinkle on the Greek colonels and Barry Rubin on the shah of Iran are among the better chapters. The coeditors set the stage effectively </p><p>with an introductory essay that points out that even when such alliances were mandated by valid American geopolitical requirements, once a crisis </p><p>developed, the media spotlight focused on the regressive character of these regimes, and American policy came under increasing pressure. In </p><p>his concluding essay on policy Richard Haass argues that the overt use of force is rarely justified; but if a regime changes, American policy should be "flexible," inclined to support fledgling democracies, but broadly defined. </p><p>THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF D?TENTE. By Michael B. Froman. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 179 pp. $49.95. </p><p>This is an excellent compilation and analysis of the attitudes of Ameri can administrations since Eisenhower toward d?tente. The centerpiece is the Nixon-Kissinger period, when d?tente flourished. In the Carter years it ended in deep disappointment with the U.S.S.R. Most interesting, </p><p>however, is a brief chapter that shows Reagan's transformation from a </p><p>dedicated opponent of d?tente to a man who left office singing its praises, to the dismay of his conservative supporters. The author's net judgment is that d?tente was only a limited success, but probably necessary. </p><p>THE OLD BOYS: THE AMERICAN ELITE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CIA. By Burton Hersh. New York: Scribner's, 1992, 536 pp. $29.95. </p><p>This book traces the formation of central intelligence, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, from its growth out of the Office of Strategic Services through the resignation of Allen Dulles after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Heavily anecdotal and breathlessly written, the narrative intro </p><p>duces a steady stream of colorful characters who became the founding fathers and staff of the CIA. The author documents the infighting and </p><p>backbiting among a group of strong-willed officials, but fails to pause </p><p>occasionally for much reflection or analysis on the course of American </p><p>intelligence, its assumptions about policy and its own role in what came to </p><p>be called the national security state. Well documented, based mainly on </p><p>secondary sources as well as interviews. </p><p>This content downloaded from 188.72.126.108 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 15:28:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>Article Contentsp. 174p. 175</p><p>Issue Table of ContentsForeign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 1-196Front MatterForeign Policy and the 1992 Election [pp. 1-16]A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy [pp. 17-31]A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy [pp. 32-51]The Intelligence Community: How Crucial? [pp. 52-62]Intelligence: Backing into the Future [pp. 63-72]America and the Post-Soviet Republics [pp. 73-89]The Ukrainian Factor [pp. 90-107]Central Asia's Catapult to Independence [pp. 108-130]Islam, Democracy and the West [pp. 131-145]A Second Italian Republic? [pp. 146-164]Recent Books on International RelationsWestern EuropeReview: untitled [pp. 165-166]Review: untitled [p. 166-166]Review: untitled [p. 166-166]</p><p>General: Political and LegalReview: untitled [pp. 166-167]Review: untitled [p. 167-167]Review: untitled [p. 167-167]Review: untitled [pp. 167-168]Review: untitled [p. 168-168]Review: untitled [p. 168-168]Review: untitled [p. 168-168]</p><p>General: Military, Scientific and TechnologicalReview: untitled [pp. 168-169]Review: untitled [p. 169-169]Review: untitled [p. 169-169]Review: untitled [pp. 169-170]Review: untitled [p. 170-170]Review: untitled [p. 170-170]Review: untitled [p. 170-170]Review: untitled [pp. 170-171]Review: untitled [p. 171-171]Review: untitled [p. 171-171]</p><p>General: Economic and SocialReview: untitled [pp. 171-172]Review: untitled [p. 172-172]Review: untitled [p. 172-172]Review: untitled [pp. 172-173]Review: untitled [p. 173-173]</p><p>The United StatesReview: untitled [pp. 173-174]Review: untitled [p. 174-174]Review: untitled [p. 174-174]Review: untitled [pp. 174-175]Review: untitled [p. 175-175]Review: untitled [p. 175-175]Review: untitled [p. 175-175]</p><p>The Western HemisphereReview: untitled [p. 176-176]Review: untitled [p. 176-176]Review: untitled [p. 176-176]Review: untitled [pp. 176-177]Review: untitled [p. 177-177]Review: untitled [p. 177-177]</p><p>Eastern Europe and Former Soviet RepublicsReview: untitled [pp. 177-178]Review: untitled [p. 178-178]Review: untitled [p. 178-178]Review: untitled [p. 178-178]Review: untitled [pp. 178-179]Review: untitled [p. 179-179]Review: untitled [p. 179-179]Review: untitled [p. 179-179]Review: untitled [pp. 179-180]Review: untitled [p. 180-180]</p><p>The Middle EastReview: untitled [p. 180-180]Review: untitled [pp. 180-181]Review: untitled [p. 181-181]Review: untitled [p. 181-181]Review: untitled [pp. 181-182]Review: untitled [p. 182-182]Review: untitled [p. 182-182]Review: untitled [p. 182-182]</p><p>Asia and the PacificReview: untitled [p. 183-183]Review: untitled [p. 183-183]Review: untitled [pp. 183-184]Review: untitled [p. 184-184]Review: untitled [p. 184-184]</p><p>AfricaReview: untitled [pp. 184-185]Review: untitled [p. 185-185]Review: untitled [p. 185-185]Review: untitled [p. 186-186]Review: untitled [p. 186-186]</p><p>Source Material [pp. 187-195]Back Matter</p></li></ul>