“...The tank proper was a freak. Thecircumstances which called it into ex-istence were exceptional and are notlikely to occur again. If they do, theycan be dealt with by other means.”

-MG Sir Louis Jackson, British Army

As the Armor Force prepares to enterthe 21st century, some claim that thereis no longer a need for a standing forceof main battle tanks. These critics statethat Operation Desert Storm was thelast large-scale requirement for massedformations of armored vehicles, andthat future conflicts will not need theservices of our branch as it exists to-day.

The British Army, successful in de-veloping, fielding, and employing ar-mored vehicles during WWI, turned itsback on mechanized doctrine duringthe inter-war years and paid the pricefor its narrow-minded outlook on thefuture of warfare. The study of mecha-nized doctrine development during theperiod 1919-1939 is valuable for sev-eral reasons: it can provide historicalperspective concerning the develop-ment of our branch, and it can reassureus that the argument against the reten-tion of a heavy tank force is neithernew nor well-founded.

In his book, The Tank, Douglas Orgillstated that operations between July1916 and August 1918 focused theBritish General Staff on the real valueof tanks in the offensive. By usingtanks massed in formations of hun-dreds, the British hoped to overcomethe effects of the battlefield stalemateon wide fronts. Appearing simultane-ously with this attitude was the need toprovide what had been lacking in pre-vious operations, namely “an effectivereserve for the second, third, fourth,and fifth days of the battle, so that abreakthrough could be made throughthe whole depth of the front.”1

Once the breakthrough occurred,then, “and only then,” Orgill stated,“might the cavalry come into its own.”2

But by the end of 1918, the British Ex-peditionary Force viewed the tank notas a substitute for cavalry but as awrecker of infantry morale. The Britishmaintained the philosophy that the tankwas auxiliary to both the infantry andthe cavalry; useful for penetrating de-fensive belts but incapable of assumingthe role of a primary combat arm. Assubsequent events showed, few Britishmilitary professionals during the inter-war period wanted to replace either theinfantry or cavalry with a mechanicalinnovation.

In the years following WWI, the Brit-ish Army remained steadfastly devotedto the infantry and cavalry as its pri-mary battlefield combat branches, duein no small part to the opinion of seniormilitary leaders like General SirDouglas Haig. In December 1918, herecorded his thoughts on the effective-ness of the infantry, artillery, and cav-alry, based on his experiences with op-erations like the Somme, Cambrai, andHamel. With regard to the infantry, hewrote: “Despite the enormous develop-ment of mechanical invention... the in-fantry remains the backbone of defenseand the spearhead of the attack.”3 Hecredited the increase in the number ofartillery pieces and the amount of mu-nitions, along with improved rangingtechniques, with fostering “the intimatecooperation between artillery and in-fantry... which has been a marked fea-ture of our operations.”4 The cavalry,whether used for shock effect, “undersuitable conditions,” or as mobile in-fantry, still had “an indispensable partto play in modern war.” While he gavecredit to the tanks for their role inbreaking through defenses, he was ada-mant in his view that mechanical inno-vations were useful only for supportingthe primary branches. These opinionsare both unmistakably traditional and

yet surprising, given the fact that Haigwas the most supportive senior leaderregarding the tanks and early mecha-nized doctrine during the war itself.The following quote portrays clearlyHaig’s opinion of the relationship be-tween innovative mechanical weaponsand the traditional combination of in-fantry and cavalry:

“It should never be forgotten howeverthat weapons of this character [motortransport, heavy artillery, machineguns, aeroplanes, tanks] are incapableof effective independent action. Theydo not in themselves possess the powerto obtain a decision, their real functionbeing to assist the infantry to get togrips with their opponents.”5

Clearly, Haig viewed the proper roleof the tank as being auxiliary to the in-fantry. Because of opinions like these,post-WWI mechanized development inthe British Army slowed dramaticallyin comparison to the period between1916 and 1918. During the last threemonths of the war, the British em-ployed tanks in large numbers alongthe tactical models established at Cam-brai and Amiens, with great success.On August 21, 1918, they opened theBattle of Bapaume with 190 tanks; onSeptember 27 the BEF launched a di-rect attack on the Hindenburg Linewith 230 tanks, succeeding in advanc-ing twenty miles in two weeks andcapturing 48,000 prisoners and 630guns.6 And yet, in spite of the demon-strated success of these and other tankoperations, by November 1918 roughlyfifty percent of the almost 2,000 tanksused by the BEF since Amiens weresent to the salvage yards to bescrapped, and by Armistice Day only204 tanks were operational and readyfor duty.7

These statistics would indicate thatthe British War Office believed theneed for tanks had arisen out of re-quirements peculiar to the WWI battle-

8 ARMOR — March-April 1997

British Tradition vs. German Innovation:

The Continued Development of Mechanized Doctrine

During the Inter-War Years

by Major David P. Cavaleri

field and saw no need to maintain highlevels of tank production once the warwas over. Because the tank hadevolved in direct response to the prob-lems posed by trench warfare, and be-

cause the likelihood of another warfought along the those same lines wasdeemed slim, the Treasury saw no needto invest the funds. In mid-November1918 the Ministry of Munitions can-celed all orders for the future produc-tion of 6,000 tanks. One senior officer,Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, wentso far as to state, “The tank proper wasa freak. The circumstances whichcalled it into existence were excep-tional and are not likely to occur again.If they do, they can be dealt with byother means.”8

Despite the successes of 1918, by theend of 1919 the British Tank Corpsconsisted of only four battalions, downfrom a wartime level of twenty-fivebattalions in 1918.9 British tanks fellvictim to a combination of variables, acombination which I submit is not ter-ribly unlike that which we face today,

which came together at war’s end toframe the British Army’s inter-war phi-losophy concerning the role of thetanks and the need for standing tankunits.

The inter-war period for theBritish Army was filled withdebate over the changing rolesof the infantry, cavalry, andmechanized arms. HistoriansRobert Larson, Charles Mes-senger, and Bryan Perret all de-vote significant time to discus-sions of this period; Larson be-cause his central topic is pri-

marily the development of Britishmechanized strategy after WWI, andMessenger and Perret because this pe-riod forms the foundation for theiranalyses of blitzkrieg operations. Dur-ing the inter-war period, even thoughBritish tank production slowed dra-matically and the Tank Corps remainednumerically small, doctrinal develop-ment continued under visionaries likeJ.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart.

Fuller’s work on the 1920 version ofthe British Army Field Service Regula-tions emphasized the tank’s firepowerand mobility and specified that thetanks’ missions in the attack were to:assist the advance of the infantry; de-stroy hostile tanks; and exploit any suc-cess.10 He also stressed the necessityfor constant coordination betweentanks and infantry: “Tanks must protectinfantry from machine gun fire and the

delay imposed by uncut wire; infantrymust protect tanks from the close rangefire of enemy field artillery and anti-tank guns.”11

Despite this kind of recognition forthe tanks and their potential, the FieldService Regulations maintained the tra-ditional emphasis on the infantry andcavalry as the primary combat maneu-ver arms of the British Army. Theseregulations set the tone for the inter-war period of tactical development forthe British, and that tone specified thattraditional arms would retain the pri-mary roles in offensive operations,while artillery and tanks performedsupport roles. By cutting through wireand destroying enemy strongpoints,tanks enabled the infantry to attackwithout sacrificing the element of sur-prise during preparatory artillery bom-bardments. As a result, the use of tanksreinforced the validity of the WWIstrategy of attrition because it increasedthe effectiveness of that strategy.“This,” said Larson, “was the conten-tion that the theorists of armored war-fare challenged and which forms thefocus of the tank controversy in theBritish Army during the inter-waryears.”12 Fuller’s work on this andother writings continued theoreticaldoctrine development and helped keepthe idea of mechanized offensive op-erations alive.

Liddell Hart was a British infantry of-ficer and a keen student of military his-tory who believed that future warswould be shaped by the combined em-ployment of tanks, artillery, and air-craft. Forced to resign from the BritishArmy in 1924 for health reasons, heturned to the full-time study of militaryoperations from ancient Rome to 1918,writing for Encyclopedia Britannica.While researching this material, he de-veloped a concept of strategic opera-tions he termed the “strategy of indirectapproach.” This strategy, as he outlinedin his work of the same title originallypublished in 1929, involved more thantroop movement and supply routing onthe battlefield. Hart proposed a depar-ture from the traditional European fron-tal assault mindset to one circuitous inboth spirit and execution.

He determined through his studies ofvarious successful military leaders,such as Philip of Macedon, Alexanderthe Great, Hannibal, Cromwell, andNapoleon, that throughout history “de-cisive results in war have only beenreached when the approach had beenindirect. In strategy, the longest way

ARMOR — March-April 1997 9

Post-WWI British neglect of tank development handicapped their armored force well intoWWII. This Crusader, shown being tested at Fort Knox in 1942, weighed just 18 tons,mounted an ineffective 37mm cannon, and still employed riveted armor, which had beendiscredited because, when hit, the rivets flew around inside the fighting compartment.

British tanks fell victim to a combination ofvariables, a combination which I submit isnot terribly unlike that which we face today...

round is apt to be the shortest wayhome.”13

Liddell Hart became convinced thatin any major military operation, the op-ponent who pursued a “direct ap-proach,” that is, along the expectedlines of attack, often experienced disap-pointing results. He stated that “tomove along the line of natural expecta-tion consolidates the opponent’s equi-librium, and by stiffening it, augmentshis resisting power.”14 He claimed thathis study of decisive military cam-paigns demonstrated that the disloca-tion of the enemy’s psychological andphysical balance was the vital preludeto a successful attempt at his over-throw.15 One need only review thetrench warfare practices of WWI torecognize the validity of the argumentagainst a strictly “direct” approach towarfare. One can also imagine easilythe resistance which Liddell Hart facedin his efforts to develop doctrine forthe future.

By 1933, the British Army was com-prised of 136 infantry battalions, 20regular cavalry regiments, 21 Indiancavalry regiments, 16 training regi-ments, and only four tank battalions.16

These unit allocations represent the realareas of tactical emphasis for the Brit-ish. The only real concession to the fu-ture of mechanization camewhen the War Office decided in1937 that all the cavalry regi-ments would exchange theirhorses for light tanks. Thesetanks which, Orgill said, “if nothorses, at least looked like theywere the nearest thing availableto a mechanized horse,”17 en-abled the cavalry to retain itsspirit as well as its role as a pri-mary combat arm. Yet, it is plain to seethat the traditional combination of in-fantry and cavalry remained the back-bone of the British Army during the in-ter-war period.

Liddell Hart’s study is significant be-cause he maintained that, with correctemployment, the tank was admirablysuited for much more than infantrysupport missions. The tank had notonly demonstrated the potential for ef-fective penetration of established de-fensive lines (the direct approach), butLiddell Hart insisted that tanks werecapable of rear area exploitation opera-tions against enemy command and lo-gistics centers (the indirect approach.)By marrying historical examples withthe demonstrated results of WWI tank

operations, this study did much to fo-cus the potential of mechanized opera-tions at the doctrinal level. The BritishArmy, distracted by the debate betweentraditionalists like Haig and visionarieslike Fuller and Liddell Hart, and re-stricted by the post-war economic de-

pression, took note of Hart’s work, butmade minimal progress towards prepar-ing the Tank Corps for the future.While the British were thus stymied,the Germans devoted great energy andresources to developing a mechanizedforce with the tank as its foundation. In1936, the British Army fielded 209light tanks and 166 medium tanks in itsfour battalions. Out of this total, 140 ofthe light tanks and 164 of the mediumtanks were obsolete. In contrast, theGermans at that time fielded 1,600 newlight tanks and between 300 and 400new medium tanks.18 Perhaps more im-portant than the sheer numerical supe-riority was the fact that Germanmechanized doctrine developers duringthe interwar period understood its po-tential and were dedicated to creating

an offensive force based on the tank.General Heinz Guderian was amongthe foremost of those leaders.

Guderian was the first of the Germangenerals to grasp fully the significanceof the work done by Fuller and LiddellHart. He credited both men with pro-viding him with his initial motivationto pursue a working mechanized doc-trine:

“It was principally the books and ar-ticles of the Englishmen, Fuller, LiddellHart,...that excited my interest andgave me food for thought. They envi-sioned [the tank] in the relationship tothe growing motorization of our age,and thus became the pioneers of a newtype of warfare on the largest scale.”19

Supported by the principles outlinedin Fuller and Liddell Hart. and WWIexperiences at the hands of the Britishtanks, Guderian succeeded in convinc-ing Hitler of the potential success to begained by organizing entire units oftanks and mechanized infantry underone command. In 1935, Hitler author-ized the creation of the first three pan-zer divisions.20 Under Guderian’s lead-ership, each division contained a mix-ture of heavy and light tanks, motor-ized infantry battalions, mechanizedengineers, mechanized reconnaissanceelements, field artillery units, and sig-nal units.21 This type of organization issignificant because Guderian designedeach panzer division to be an inde-

10 ARMOR — March-April 1997

The PzKwIII medium tank, seen here in Russia in 1942, was the backbone of Germany’sPanzer Corps early in WWII. Its versatile design supported several generations of upgradeduring the course of the war, including improved armor and more powerful armament. Coher-ent German armor doctrine maximized its effectiveness.

Under Guderian’s leadership, each divi-sion contained a mixture of heavy and lighttanks, motorized infantry battalions, mecha-nized engineers, mechanized reconnais-sance elements, field artillery units, andsignal units.

pendent combined arms command,with a core of tanks to spearhead offen-sive operations, and capable of diversemissions.

For Guderian, the combined arms op-eration came to life in the “blitzkrieg.”This concept of mechanized warfarecombined the basic elements developedand revised during WWI, incorporatedthe principles espoused by Fuller andLiddell Hart, and added a spirit of ruth-lessness and efficiency. The primarycharacteristics of blitzkrieg operationswere speed, surprise, maneuver, andoverwhelming firepower concentratedon a narrow front.22 In its execution, re-connaissance units located enemy weak-nesses and protected the advancing di-vision’s flank. Tanks with air supportpredominated in seizing vital objectivesand held them until infantry units withantitank capabilities arrived to securethem against counterattack. Artillery sup-ported all phases of the attack and tem-porary defense.

Guderian considered the key to offen-sive success to be movement. He be-lieved that by attacking with tanks, hecould sustain a higher rate of move-ment and that, once a breakthroughwas made, the movement could bemaintained by the combined arms divi-sion.23 Since the tank had developed inresponse to the loss of battlefield mo-bility in 1916, and since it had demon-strated the capability to restore momen-tum to the BEF, Guderian’s reliance ontanks to lead his assaults and maintainforward momentum seems logical. Thedoctrine of the blitzkrieg in many as-pects represented the strategy of the in-direct approach and traditional frontalmaneuver taken to a higher level.When the Germans launched their as-sault into Poland in September, 1939,Guderian had at his disposal forty in-fantry, six panzer, four light and fourmechanized divisions with a totalstrength of 2,977 tanks.24 The Polishcampaign proved the validity of Gu-derian’s concept; he considered thecampaign to have been the baptism offire for both his armored formations aswell as the overall philosophy of theblitzkrieg.25

This series of three articles in ARMOR(Nov-Dec 95, Nov-Dec 96, and Mar-Apr 97) has shown clearly that the tankwas designed in the early stages ofWWI as strictly an infantry supportweapon, developed in direct responseto the loss of mobility in the face ofbarbed wire, artillery barrages, and ma-chine guns. Ernest Swinton surely never

envisioned the tank as the primary of-fensive arm of an operation; for him,the tank was auxiliary to the infantry,who remained the premier maneuverforce on the battlefield. As British tacti-cal doctrine developed in the latterstages of the war, the tank took on anincreasingly offensive role, but alwaysremained secondary to the infantry andcavalry.

The immediate post-war reduction inBritish standing tank forces indicated areluctance on the part of the militaryestablishment to continue practical de-velopment of mechanized equipment ordoctrine. It was the Germans underGuderian who expanded on the basicprinciples of tank operations and pur-sued the concept of large combinedarms divisions and rapid, long-rangeoffensive maneuver. To state that theGerman blitzkrieg is the logical resultof the progression of WWI mechanizeddoctrine is to make an inaccurateanalysis. Guderian built on the earlywork of men like Swinton, Fuller, andLiddell Hart, but also incorporated anoffensive philosophy, a spirit of innova-tion, and the fiscal support to fund newvehicle production, none of which werepresent in the British Army during theinter-war period.

In the final analysis, the mechanizedoperations conducted by the BEF wereinnovative solutions to the problemsposed by the battlefield stalemate.Tanks provided the means by whichmobility was restored to the infantry,enabling them to penetrate defensivelines and fight the battle. The BritishArmy ignored, for the most part, theoffensive potential which existed inmechanized operations. During the in-ter-war years, the tank retained its origi-nal mission and purpose for the British,while under the Germans it assumed anew role as the primary offensive com-ponent of the blitzkrieg spearhead. Itmay very well be that the world willnever again see the need for large ar-mored formations along the lines ofOperation Desert Storm; however, thealternative to striking a suitable balancebetween either standing down the heavyforce or retaining excessive heavy ca-pabilities is, to my mind, unacceptablegiven the historical precedent.

Notes1Douglas Orgill, The Tank: Studies in the De-

velopment and Use of a Weapon (London:Heinemann Publishing Co., 1970), p. 83.

2Ibid.

3J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig’s Des-patches, Dec. 1915 - April 1919 (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927), p. 300.

4Ibid.5Ibid., p. 327.6Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the

Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940 (New-ark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p. 63.

7Ibid.8B.H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks: The History of

the Royal Tank Regiment (London: Cassell Pub-lishing, 1959), vol. 1, p. 306; cited in CharlesMessenger, The Blitzkrieg Story (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p. 36.

9Messenger, p. 37.10Great Britain, War Office, Field Service

Regulations, vol. 2: Operations (London: HMSO,1920,) pp. 31-32; cited in Larson, p. 113.

11Ibid.12Ibid., p. 67.13Hart, p. 4.14Ibid., p. 5.15Ibid.16Orgill, p. 98.17Ibid.18Messenger, p. 108.19Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York:

Dutton Publishing, 1952), p. 20.20Ibid.21Ibid., Appendix XXIV.22Ferdinand O. Miksche, Attack: A Study of

Blitzkrieg Tactics (New York: Random House,1942), p. 10.

23Guderian, p. 42. 24Bryan Perret, A History of Blitzkrieg (New

York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1983), p. 78.25Guderian, p. 82.

ARMOR — March-April 1997 11

Major David P. Cavaleri earneda BA from Eastern NazareneCollege at Quincy, Massachu-setts (1982), was commissionedan armor officer in 1983 throughthe Officer Candidate School,and after commanding aUSAREUR-based tank com-pany earned an MA in Historyfrom the University of Missouriat Columbia in 1993. He is agraduate of several Armyschools and is currently attend-ing the United States ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. Major Cavaleri pre-viously served as an AssistantProfessor of History at theUnited States Military Academy.