The Creation and Implementation of the San Francisco Juvenile Justice Action Plan

The leadership of Mayor Willie Brown, Dr. Mimi Silbert, Margaret Brodkin, Dan Macallair, and the use of public-private partnerships and collaborations

Steve Adami, Geetan Virdi, & Allan Rayo San Francisco State University

Department of Public Administration PA 762

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND/CONTEXTUAL BASIS FOR ANALYSIS ................................................. 2

Historical Context ......................................................................................... 2

Community Context ...................................................................................... 4

Political Context ............................................................................................ 7

LEADERSHIP SCENARIO ........................................................................................... 9

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS .......................................................... 10

ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP SCENARIO .................................................................... 14

Advocates Leadership ................................................................................. 14

The Leadership of Mayor Willie Brown ....................................................... 15

Collaborative Networks/ Leadership of Dr. Mimi Silbert ............................. 16

Change to the SF Juvenile Probation Department ....................................... 19

Post Implementation Results ...................................................................... 20

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 21

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 24

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................. 28

Figure 1: Circle of Care ....................................................................................... 28

Figure 2: SF Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan ................................................... 29

1.0 INTRODUCTION The juvenile justice system in America has done little to address the systemic issues regarding

the deviant behavior of youth—its focus has been on the pejorative labels attached to adolescents

and the punitive consequences our society deemed necessary. The conditions that haunted juvenile

reform schools have been the precursor to juvenile justice reform since the early 1900’s. One might

surmise that a system designed to address errant youths would embrace care and concern; but

historically, juvenile justice has been demeaning, violent, and extremely ineffective.

A pivotal moment in juvenile justice occurred in Massachusetts in 1972. Jerome Miller,

Director of Massachusetts Department of Youth Services—after numerous attempts to fix the

conditions in its juvenile reform schools—realized that no meaningful and sustainable change could

be made within the congregate institutions. Miller had learned that incarceration could never

provide the treatment youth needed. In a calculated response, Miller contracted with local

nonprofits and a university, and emptied out the reform schools. Many of the kids were sent home,

while others went to community-based programs designed to meet their needs. The results of

Miller’s movement of deinstitutionalization of youth proved successful and survived the test of time.

If Miller’s action—termed the Massachusetts experiment—were so successful, why didn’t

other states act in synchronicity? Media scare tactics and public demands for public safety measures

have made it difficult for politicians to reform juvenile justice policies. In the mid 1990’s—after

numerous years with no meaningful juvenile justice reform in San Francisco—youth advocates in the

City raised the issue with Mayor Willie Brown. The culmination of activists, numerous violent

incidents within juvenile hall, and the rising incarceration rate among San Francisco youth, compelled

Mayor Brown to act. Brown turned to Dr. Mimi Silbert—CEO and founder of the Delancey Street

Foundation—for her expertise and leadership in criminal justice reform.

This analytical case study focuses on the deinstitutionalization of San Francisco’s youth. To

frame the event, the research will first explore the relevant historical, community, and political

contextual elements enveloping the creation and implementation of San Francisco’s Juvenile Justice

Local Action Plan (SFJJLAP). Second, the inquiry will describe how the contextual elements led to the

development and implementation of SFJJLAP as the precise leadership scenario. Third, a conceptual

framework will present, define, and link relevant change and leadership theories and concepts.

Fourth, the leadership scenario will be analyzed through the theories presented in the conceptual

framework and applied to the collaborative, cross-sector effort, and prominent individual actors.

Last, the analysis presents implications for leading change across sectors.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUAL BASIS FOR ANALYSIS The culmination of juvenile justice advocates, mistreatment of youth offenders, and the lack

of juvenile justice reform in San Francisco led to the development and implementation of the SFJJLAP

in 1997. The leadership of youth advocates Margaret Brodkin and Dan Macallair, Mayor Willie

Brown, and Delancey Street CEO Dr. Mimi Silbert, initiated and embraced a collaborative effort,

crossing sectorial boundaries, to deinstitutionalize youth and created a rehabilitative model to deal

with delinquent youth offenders in the City. The leadership and change to be explored in this analysis

took place in the community context. The purpose of change in the community context is “to

advance or protect the rights, health, and well-being of community members” (Hickman 2010, p. xv).

Change in the community context is driven in response to a threat or well-being of the community. In

the following analysis, the threat to the community was the treatment and adjudication of

adolescents impacted by San Francisco’s Juvenile Justice System.

2.1 Historical Context Treatment of juvenile offenders has been a controversial issue since the inception of penalties

for defiant youth. The 1820’s saw the rise of the first government funded congregate institutions for

juvenile offenders. The commencement of the juvenile justice system in America can be traced back

to the Houses of Refuge in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston—all opening in the 1820’s (Sutton,

1988, p.43). Incarceration was seen as a mode to impose a code of moral order and behavioral

modification. These early institutions separated juveniles from adults and “were established to

reform delinquents through prayer, study and hard work” (Livers, n.d). Although early institutions

sought a rehabilitative model, youth were still disciplined with whippings.

Early reformers fought for the creation of a separate court for juveniles. In 1899 the passage

of the Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children,

created the first juvenile court in Illinois (Long, 1999; Macallair, 2011). As such, juveniles were no

longer tried like adults, but treated as troubled youth in need of rehabilitation. By 1915, 46 states

had followed Illinois’ lead and created their own juvenile courts (Fox, 1996, p. 46). The focus of the

juvenile courts was to turn troubled youth into law-abiding citizens through methods that included

warnings, probation, and training school confinement—youth prisons—and “lasted until the child

was cured or turned 21” (Livers, n.d).

During the first half of the twentieth century, the rehabilitative model of incarceration thrived

(Lipsey et al, 2010; Tonry, 2009). The 1960’s displayed a sharp increase in the national crime rate.

Simultaneously, evaluations of rehabilitative modalities for youth were deemed ineffective, casting

doubt on therapeutic juvenile justice policy and practice. This prompted numerous states to employ

punitive sentencing policies for youth which continued through the 1970’s and 1980’s. (Lipsey et al,

2010; Howell, 2003).

As reports of abuse, mistreatment, neglect, and racial disparities escalated, youth advocates

of the 1960’s pressed for reform. After challenging the constitutionality of juvenile court proceedings

in 1967, the Supreme Court ruled that youth in juvenile courts had the right to an attorney (Scott &

Steinberg, 2008). Historically, juvenile justice facilities housed abused and neglected youth, status

offenders (runaways, disobedient youth), and youth charged with criminal acts. The passing of

the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (1974), confirmed the removal of minors from

adult facilities, and ruled against the detention of neglected youth and status offenders. As such,

counties were mandated to create non-secure facilities and programs to meet the needs of abused

kids and status offenders. In response, San Francisco refashioned one unit in juvenile hall—Youth

Guidance Center (YGC)—to house these noncriminal youth. This unit was called the West Portal

Residential Center (WPRC), and existed from 1974 to 1988 (McCrackin, 2013; Macallair, 2013).

Although reformists saw this as a step in the right direction, they still opposed youth who had not

broken the law being housed at YGC.

2.2 Community Context The 1960’s gave way to local activist pushing for juvenile justice reform and the

deinstitutionalization of SF youth. After Jean Jacobs (Citizens for Juvenile Justice) toured YGC in the

1960’s and discovered a three year old and other children in cribs, advocates ramped up their

pressure on the bureaucracy (Coleman Advocates, 2013). Jacobs and Jim Queen (Real Alternative

Programs) led the charge and focused on the plight of San Francisco’s children and the conditions in

YGC. The grass roots effort successfully provoked a number of reports on the conditions in YGC and

the treatment of youth housed there.

A series of reports were produced between 1962 and 1996 which assessed the conditions in

YGC and modalities used by juvenile probation. An analysis by the Bar Association and Quentin Kopp

in 1962 reported San Francisco’s over emphasis on detention and prosecution of runaways. It

deemed the City’s juvenile justice system was systemically failing youth. A second report in 1968 by

the Bay Area Social Planning Council drew the same conclusion with an added element of racial

disparity (Macallair, 2013). Although the reports were explicit in their recommendations, San

Francisco politicians failed to act and the conditions at YGC remained static. In response to the

passing of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (1974), a noncompliant San Francisco

cleaned out a unit within YGC and used it exclusively for status offenders. This did not measure up to

the expectation of youth advocates as the non-secured unit was still within the walls of YGC

(McCracken, 2013; Macallair, 2013).

Margaret Brodkin, hired as the Executive Director of Coleman Advocates in 1978, put juvenile

justice reform on the front burner after the City kept locking up status offenders. In 1983, after

intense advocacy work by Brodkin, the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department (SFJPD)

contracted with Huckleberry House—a community-based organization—to operate a halfway house

for status offenders. Youth who had previously been brought to YGC for status offenses were

diverted from incarceration but their stay at Huckleberry was short lived—48 hours—at which point

they were either sent home or brought to YGC (Huckleberry House, 2013; Macallair, 2013; Brodkin,

2013).

In 1986, a suicide at YGC further polarized the situation between advocates and the system,

and placed the SFJPD and the YGC under enormous scrutiny as the deplorable conditions for confined

youth continued (Thompson, 1999; Macallair, 2013). After more reports of abuse surfaced, Judge

Dan Weinstein—presiding Judge over the City’s juvenile justice system—pushed for an external

investigation into the conditions at YGC. A 1987 city-commissioned report by Jefferson Associates

was the largest and most comprehensive evaluation ever of the City’s juvenile justice system. Its

findings were similar to the reports of 1962 and 1968. The Jefferson report determined that an

“unnecessary and often counterproductive over reliance on secure confinement exists at the Youth

Guidance Center. Institutional and attitudinal barriers prevent the program from achieving a

constructive balance between treatment and custody orientation” (Macallair & Miles, 2001, p.12).

Furthermore, the report recommended the number of detainees at YGC be reduced by 50%, from

132 inmates to 60 (Thompson, 1999). This report was utilized by advocates to push for community-

based services in lieu of incarceration.

After the City failed to implement the recommendations of the Jefferson Report, advocates

ramped up the pressure. Brodkin, now allied with Dan Macallair—Center on Juvenile and Criminal

Justice (CJCJ)—took on the system for further reform. Their vision was to permanently close the

status offender program in YGC, and move juvenile probation out of the authority of the Judicial

Branch, place it under the Executive Branch, and separate juvenile probation from adult probation. In

1988 Brodkin successfully led the effort to close the status offender program at YGC. As such, all

status offenders in SF were permanently housed at Huckleberry (Macallair, 2013; Brodkin, 2013a;

Huckleberry House, 2013).

Macallair and Brodkin found support within the Board of Supervisors from Nancy Walker who

took a leading role to remove responsibility of the juvenile justice system from the courts and place it

in the hands of the Mayor. Their vision bared fruit as Walker led the charge for Proposition L in 1988.

The passing of Prop L created a separate juvenile probation department and placed it under the

responsibility of the Executive Branch—San Francisco is still the only county in the state to have

separate probation departments for youth and adults (Macallair, 2013). San Francisco’s failure to

reform the juvenile justice system based on the recommendations of three prior reports led to

increasing incarceration of SF youth. In 1991, James Bell of the Youth Law Center sued the City over

conditions in YGC, “prompting $5 million in renovations” (Thompson, 1999; Goldberg, 1997). Brodkin

and Macallair stayed focused on their vision but shifted their strategy. Until that point, their strategy

was based on the argument of ‘who should’ and ‘should not’ be incarcerated. They shifted their

debate from the kids to the system. Macallair began writing Op Ed’s highlighting the mistreatment of

youth in YGC. Numerous reports of youth beaten by staff, reckless strip searches of girls, lack of

services, and inhumane conditions within the walls of YGC were the focal points of his writings

(Macallair, 2013). An audit in 1995 by Harvey Rose—a city budget analyst—uncovered that in a two

month period $4000 in cash and 271 possessions of detainees at YGC had disappeared. Later that

year Sebastian Rico—juvenile probation accountant— was alleged to have embezzled $500,000

before fleeing the country (Thompson, 1999).

Long-time Speaker of the California State Assembly, Willie Brown (D-SF), was elected the 41st

Mayor of San Francisco and took office January 8, 1996. By the time Brown took office, the SF

Chronicle began publishing articles about deficiencies and corruption in the City’s juvenile justice

system, the treatment of the youth, and the City’s failure to develop and implement detention

alternatives as recommended by the Jefferson Report. Just months after Brown took office, he

brought back Jefferson Associates to conduct another analysis of juvenile justice system and YGC.

The results mimicked that of the earlier Jefferson Report from 1987. Mayor Brown immediately

called a press conference and announced that employees at YGC didn’t deserve their jobs and he was

going to reform the system (Brown, 2013; Macallair, 2013). In a calculated response, Brown didn’t

turn to the advocates who had been fighting for change or consultants, instead he turned to Dr. Mimi

Silbert—Delancey Street Foundation—for her expertise, social and political clout, and her lifelong

commitment to criminal justice reform. “The City did not turn to professional consultants, but to the

people who are the problem to become the solution. In hiring the Delancey Street Foundation, where

adult ex-offenders have turned their lives around, as the key designers and implementers of the Plan,

the City ensured that all voices would be heard” (Delancey Street Foundation, 2013).

2.3 Political Context From the 1970’s to the mid 1990’s, a multitude of juvenile justice issues led public debate and

policy discussions. Topping the list were the racial disparities in the system, the increasing rate of

youth incarceration, and the effectiveness of treatment and community-based programs (Soler,

2001). The perennial political debate surrounding juvenile justice reform in America has been the

polarizing facets of public safety. Should youth be treated as criminals or should they be treated as

kids in need of care and treatment. The Reagan administration in the 1980’s advocated the ‘get

tough on crime’ approach as several states were seeking to reduce the numbers of youth

incarcerated. The get-tough movement made it difficult for politicians to push for reform while the

political environment and public opinion embraced incarceration (Krisberg, 1990).

Between 1992 and 1997, 47 states ratified laws that made their juvenile justice system more

punitive (Krisberg, 1990; Snyder & Sickmand, 1999). Citizen outrage over lenient prison sentences

for repeat offenders led legislators in California to reevaluate what was viewed as a systemic failure

in public safety. The opening salvo of the three-strike movement was the media coverage of the

grisly murders of Kimber Reynolds (1992) and Polly Klass (1993) in California (Greenberg, 2002;

Vitiello, 1997). Citizen’s discontent compelled law makers to legislate new public safety policies

putting reform on the back burner (Vitiello, 1997).

Media scare tactics publicizing the rise of violent crime in the 1980’s and 1990’s made reform

of any kind—juvenile or criminal—a political hot potato. Reformists in the City knew all too well that

it would take the right politician, perfect timing, and media attention of the abuse at YGC if they were

going to change the political discourse and gain public support to reform San Francisco’s Juvenile

Justice system. Numerous incidents at YGC, formal reports commissioned by the City, lawsuits over

conditions at YGC, the rising costs and rates of incarceration had not been enough for politicians in

San Francisco to act in the past (Macallair, 2013; Brown, 2013; Miller, 2013).

Politics is clouded by the dangerous myths of juvenile crime. This disconnect makes reform

easily snubbed by all politicians, justifying punitive legislation for youth offenders, as well as increases

for justice budgets (Krisberg, 1990). The aforementioned conditions make reform in juvenile justice

an issue that is viewed as politically detrimental.

3.0 LEADERSHIP SCENARIO From the perspective of San Francisco’s youth advocates and professionals, the previously

described historical, community, and political contextual factors defined the relevant precedents

which led to the deinstitutionalization of youth in San Francisco. In this analysis, the creation and

implementation of the San Francisco Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan (SFJJLPA) (1997) represents a

leadership scenario of significant change in the community context. The series of reports that

uncovered abuse and over use of incarceration propelled advocates to fight to protect youth in the

City and develop a model of juvenile justice that would embrace care and rehabilitation, rather than

incarceration. Years of advocacy by Brodkin and Macallair, the election of Willie Brown as San

Francisco’s Mayor, and the hiring of Delancey Street to develop an action plan to rebuild the juvenile

justice system will serve as a basis for this analysis.

Dr. Mimi Silbert took the leading role in the collaborative network of public-private

partnerships that ensued throughout the development and implementation of SFJJLAP. Mayor

Brown turned to Silbert for her years of expertise, as well as her social and political clout, which

would enhance his ability to get the finalized plan approved and implemented by the Board of

Supervisors. Silbert brought a myriad of players to the table: Kimiko Burton (Mayor’s Council on

Criminal Justice), Rudy Smith (Interim Chief of Juvenile Probation), Fred Lau (Chief of Police), Terence

Hallinan (District Attorney), Jeff Brown (Public Defender), Dr. Sandra Hernanez (Department of Public

Health), Will Lightbourne (Department of Human Services), Waldemar Rojas (Superintendent San

Francisco Unified School District), Michael Yaki (Board of Supervisors), and Flynn Bradley (Drug and

Alcohol Forensic Services) made up the coordinating council. The Delancey Street planning team

consisted of Silbert and sixteen Delancey residents who were ex-convicts, had changed their lives,

and had first-hand experience with the juvenile justice system (Silbert, 1997).

The Delancey task force utilized applied research interviewing 400 stakeholders, including 160

youth in-custody at YGC and Log Cabin Ranch. Next, Silbert and representatives from the probation

department (probation officers, counselors, and administrators), law enforcement, schools, DPH,

community-based organizations, former youth offenders, and judges met for hours and conducted a

“simulated placement” exercise on all 164 youth in-custody in San Francisco (Silbert, 1997; Peterson

1998). The exercise was based on the needs of each youth and provided the ideal placement. The

culmination of the applied research and the placement simulation resulted in a comprehensive

continuum of care (Silbert, 1997).

The continuum of care, known locally as the Circle of Care (See Appendix-Figure 1), allows

youth at any phase of self-destructive behavior access to services. The research deemed six

interventions necessary to fill the gaps in the existing juvenile justice system —the Early Risk

Resiliency Program (needs and strengths determination), Community Assessment and Referral Center

(CARC), Life Learning Academy (Charter High School), Safe Corridor (Mission Street), Bayview Safe

Haven After School Program, and the Life Learning Residential Center for Girls. The plan called for

taking all youth who are arrested by police, not to YGC, but to CARC where they would be assessed

and then either sent home or to a community-based provider—not jail. The comprehensive

approach to this action plan would cut the number of detainees at YGC by 60%, provide services to

hundreds of youth in the City, and divert nearly 2000 kids annually from incarceration to CARC to be

assessed and released.

4.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SCENARIO This portion of the analysis offers a succinct explanation of leadership concepts and puts forth

a framework for understanding a myriad of leadership theories as they apply to the concepts of

change leadership. First, the framework discusses three closely related leadership theories

(transformational, strategic, and charismatic). Second, the framework will examine change practices

within the community context. Last, a slight nuanced analytical approach to understanding

organizational change—characterized as the result of clashing ideology or belief systems—will be

discussed (Kezar, 2001). The leadership theories and concepts in this framework represent elements

of a unique leadership approach to bring about community and organizational change.

Concepts of Leadership. Complex settings require a diverse set of leadership skills and traits;

advocates, politicians, and organizational leaders may all exhibit similar leadership styles. Two

leadership theories that apply to advocates and organizational leaders are transformational and

strategic leadership, of which both contain essential elements—a visionary leader and a focus on

change—and engage in behaviors such as scanning the environment, managing change, innovation,

and strategic decision making (Hickman, 2010; Shea, 2013; O’Brien & Shea, 2010). Within complex

settings, those in leadership roles may use a myriad of leadership styles to affect change (Hickman,

2010, p.55).

Transformational leadership—of which change is its primary focus—inspires, engages, and

empowers followers. Transformational theories posit that vision and new processes are essential

(Van Wart, 2011, p.8; O’Brien & Shea, 2010, p.42; Gill, 2011, p.82; Schmid, 2010, p.195; Moynihan &

Van Wart, 2013; Hickman, 2010; Stone et al; 2004). A transformational leader inspires and

encourages followers to demonstrate desired behavior and motivates them to commit to a shared

vision and goals (Hickman 2010; Lewis 1996). Transformational leadership is well-matched for

dialectical change because it arouses “critical thinking of followers and inspires commitment to a

compelling vision” (Hickman, 2010, p.69)

Strategic leadership is characterized by the development and execution of a plan. The leader

initiates change, sets goals, and develops new products or processes. To effectively succeed in a

dynamic environment, strategic leaders adapt and change their practices, behaviors, and tactics

(Hickman, 2010, p. 68). Strategic leadership creates effective partnership and alliances, assesses

strengths and weaknesses, has an understanding of where the alliance needs to be, and formulates a

strategy to get there (Hickman, 2010, p.68; Ruchwar, 2012; Dym & Hutson, 2005, p.23). Additionally,

strategic leadership is well suited for dialectical change as it directly challenges the status quo and

sets a future others can aspire to (Hickman, 2010, p.68).

Another leadership style that compliments transformational and strategic leadership is

charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership involves an engaging personalized style of leadership

that transforms followers to pursue goals over self-interest. Charismatic leaders are skilled

communicators —verbally eloquent with have highly developed rhetorical skills —and can reach out

to followers at a deep, emotional level. They articulate a compelling or captivating vision, and have a

profound and extraordinary effect on followers. There are similarities evident in transformational

and charismatic leadership as they both encompass a compelling vision and encourage followers to

embrace a shared mission. Moreover, charismatic leadership is effective in a turbulent environment

triggering dialectical change (Hickman, 2010).

Change Practices. Change in the community context is driven in response to a threat or well-

being of the community. Its primary purpose is to advance or protect the rights, health or well-being

of community members. Community change is led by community leaders, NGOs and community

members (Hickman, 2010, p xv). Those community leaders may exhibit varying degrees of

transformational, charismatic, or strategic leadership.

Horizontal networks and collaborations are an essential component of community change

leadership. Partnerships focus on sharing power and influence, creating relationships leveraging

participants’ competencies to create value, and are inspired by transformational and strategic

leadership. As strategic leaders create effective partnerships, the efforts of networks manifest in the

empowerment of those in the affected community. Traditionally, leadership in collaborations is

shared, comes from a referent perspective, although it may contain vertical elements of hierarchal

leadership (Hickman, 2010; Ricucci & Morse, 2010; Moynihan & Van Wart, 2013).

Change efforts in communities require the identification of gaps or voids pertaining to the

needs of those in the community. A “needs or deficit-based” approach to community leadership

identifies what is lacking. In a deficit-based approach, others advocate on behalf of a marginalized

group, it relies on “outside experts or authority figures” to mobilize resources, and is linked to applied

research which is conducted “about and for” a marginalized group’s benefit (Hickman, 2010, p.141)

Concepts of Change. Dialectical theory is an organizational change theory in which the level

of analysis rests between two or more organizations or groups. It assumes organizations exist in a

diverse environment “of colliding events, forces, or contradictory values that compete with each

other for domination and control” (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995, in Hickman, 2010, p.51). Advocate

leaders of community change, working outside of government, utilize collaborative networks,

transformational and strategic leadership, to affect change within government organizations. The

process of change results from conflict when the status quo (thesis) encounters opposition

(antithesis), and through this conflict a new set of values (synthesis) is born (Hickman, 2010, p. 45,

51). These two forces are always influencing each other and over time change is created through the

interaction of these opposing forces (Kezar, 2001). Dialectical change is well-suited for

transformational, strategic, and charismatic leaders as their ability to empower followers and

promote a shared vision increase the likelihood of a desired outcome. Furthermore, collaborative

networks are the ideal practice to implement dialectical change (Hickman, 2010).

5.0 ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP SCENARIO To critically assess the leadership scenario, individual leadership theories, change practices,

and concepts of change will be applied to the creation and implementation of the SFJJLAP, which

reflects change in the community context. After decades of political inertia the window of

opportunity opened allowing change to the resistant juvenile probation department. Once on the

City’s agenda, the resilient effort of activists spurred the change to what was viewed as an

impermeable juvenile justice system.

5.1 Advocate Leadership When bureaucracies fail to protect or meet the needs of all citizens in a community, it often

takes advocates with leadership skills to frame a strategy, target decision makers, and develop tactics

to affect change (Alinsky, 1971). Community leaders working for change require a vision, a desired

outcome, and a road map—strategy—to get there. This vision is aligned with both transformational

and strategic leadership. In their role as crusaders for systemic change, youth advocates Margaret

Brodkin and Dan Macallair ignited the community change process.

The City’s lack of responsiveness to all formal reports prompted Brodkin and Macallair to

further advocate a model of juvenile justice that embraced care and community-based services in lieu

of incarceration. Their vision was transformational and the tactics they employed were strategic.

They visualized a system that would provide the treatment youth needed to help them move forward

and become productive, law-abiding citizens.

Brodkin and Maccalair exhibited strategic leadership as they designed a plan to initiate

change. They developed and executed an advocacy-based plan targeting decision makers in the

probation department. After successfully eliminating the incarceration of status offenders and

abused youth, Brodkin and Macallair shifted their focus from “the kids” to the “juvenile justice

system” by utilizing the media to highlight inadequacies and abuse within the walls of YGC (Macallair,

2013). Brodkin used the 1986 suicide as a catalyst to reinvigorate the fight for additional reform.

After an environmental scan—consistent with both transformational and strategic leadership—they

adapted their strategy to push their campaign of deinstitutionalization and community-based

alternatives to include all youth offenders (Macallair, 2013; Brodkin, 2013).

After San Francisco politician failed to respond to the formal reports, Brodkin and Macallair

saw an opportunity to reform the system with Mayor elect Willie Brown. Brown, known for his long-

time commitment to social justice, never resisted a moment in the spotlight. Brodkin and Macallair’s

strategic use of the media successfully increased public awareness of the conditions in YGC,

prompted Mayor Brown to call for an external investigation.

5.2 The Leadership of Mayor Willie Brown Mayor Willie Brown, a career politician with celebrity status, rarely passes up what he views

as a “monumental opportunity to change public policy” that will improve the lives of citizens (Brown,

2013). The Washington Post called him “the last political showman of the 20th century”, President Bill

Clinton called him “the real slick Willie”, and George Schultz—Secretary of State under President

Reagan—said Willie Brown was “a man of his word” (Brown, 2008). Brown’s charisma and grace

highlight his transformational and charismatic style (Brown, 2013).

After being elected Mayor in November 1995, Brown met with youth advocates concerned

with the direction of juvenile justice in the City. As reports of abuse in YGC continued through his

inauguration, Brown immediately called for an external report and assessment of the City’s juvenile

justice system. Brown’s vision of the treatment of youth offenders was one that embraced

rehabilitation, providing a platform for opportunity and education leading to a self-productive life-

style (Brown, 2013). Brown’s vision, transformational in nature, was in sync with that of Brodkin and

Macallair.

Soon after the completion of the 1996 Jefferson Report, Brown held a press conference and

announced juvenile justice reform “was on the way” as recommended by all of the previous formal

reports (Brown, 2013). Unlike the City’s Mayors and politicians before him, Brown’s charisma

allowed him to convey messages to the populous that resonated with their values and led them to

embrace his vision. But charisma and a transformational style are not always enough to accomplish

big government tasks. Brown knew he needed an expert in the field of criminal justice with political

and social clout, that believed people could change, embraced reform, and had a proven track record.

Brown approached Dr. Mimi Silbert—an accomplished woman with over 40 years of experience in the

field, who was well known by local and national politicians—who had empowered over 15,000 ex-

convicts to live “crime-free, drug-free lives in mainstream society” (PBS, n.d.).

Brown’s decision to hire Delancey Street demonstrates strategic leadership. After scanning

the political landscape within the City, Brown knew he needed to bring in someone with as much, if

not more, social and political capital than himself. Brown knew that Silbert, deemed an expert in

criminal justice reform, was the ideal choice to design a plan, get it funded, and implemented.

Silbert’s entire life had been committed to turning around the lives of ex-cons and Brown understood

if she could adapt the Delancey model to juvenile justice, youth could actually change their lives

(Brown, 2013).

5.3 Collaborative Networks and the Leadership of Dr. Mimi Silbert With more than 40 years of leadership in rehabilitating ex-convicts, Mimi Silbert is a unique

social entrepreneur who is both a visionary and a pragmatic leader who has empowered numerous

ex-cons to live productive, law-abiding lives. When Brown contacted Silbert, in 1996, she

immediately recommended a multifaceted approach including research, public-private partnerships,

and a collaborative effort that embraced services not only at the traditional end point—

incarceration—but as preventive measures before youth strayed too far (Brown, 2013; Miller, 2013;

Goldberg & Zamora, 1997). Silbert’s lifetime accomplishments have been described as

transformational and inspirational by many scholars (Merron, 2010; Downs & Gaines, 1999). As part

of the juvenile reform planning process, Silbert was able to bring a variety of actors from different

sectors to the table that would typically not come together. “The planning process emerged as one of

the most effective parts of the entire Action Plan. It provided a forum to bridge the philosophical

divides that separate systems and providers in their approaches to working with our youth. People

stopped talking about politics and started talking about youth” (Burton, n.d.). The strategic

leadership of Silbert effectively developed and executed a plan to revamp the City’s juvenile justice

system.

The aforementioned represents a vision for innovative problem solving, inspired collaborative

networks, and a strategy for success, which are key components of transformational and strategic

leadership. Additionally, the horizontal networks and collaborations created by Silbert are consistent

with change leadership in the community context. After designing a strategic plan, Silbert deployed a

team of Delancey residents to interview 400 stakeholders, including 164 youth incarcerated at the

YGC and Log Cabin Ranch—exemplifying applied research. Applied research within the community

context involves others gathering information for and about the affected group (Hickman, 2010, p.

141). The research was designed to find gaps of services in the existing system. This process is

indicative of what Hickman (2010) describes as a deficit-based approach, since it relied on the

expertise of Silbert, and others in the community advocating on behalf of youth entangled in San

Francisco’s Juvenile Justice system.

Silbert’s leadership identified a solution for youth offenders which linked them with

community-based services. Her emphasis was on overhauling the fragmented and uncoordinated

juvenile-justice system by creating a true collaboration between law-enforcement and social-service

agencies—representing her vision (transformational) and a plan to get there (strategic) (Peterson,

1998; Silbert, 1997). Silbert brought together players from government and the nonprofit sectors to

collectively develop a restorative model for youth offenders, exemplifying transformational and

strategic leadership (See Appendix, Figure 2). Collaborative networks are an essential piece of change

leadership in the community context as social and community problems are too difficult for any one

actor to tackle in isolation (Riccucci & Morse, 2010; Hickman , 2010; Moynihan & Van Wart, 2013).

Silbert’s ability to create effective partnerships/collaborations was a productive way to mitigate the

number of incarcerated youth in San Francisco, and develop community-based alternatives that

would promote empowerment and self-efficacy.

Mimi Silbert went beyond changing the system to transforming the youth themselves.

Working from the Delancey Street Foundation model of personal accountability, Silbert transformed

the process of juvenile justice by designing programs for youth based on the concept of reciprocal

restitution. “Reciprocal restitution enables youth offenders to give back services and care to his/her

community, and for society to restore to its disadvantaged the development of skills and

opportunities needed for legitimate and successful living” (Silbert, 1984; Silbert,1997). Silbert

incorporated community restitution into each program in the Circle of Care to enhance the youth’s

commitment to positive social values. Reciprocally, through the collaborative network of partners,

community-based organizations and the City made restitution to the youths and their neighborhoods

which had been devastated by “generations of poverty” (Silbert, 1997). Additionally, Silbert’s use of

independent evaluators to conduct post-implementation evaluations of each program is aligned with

strategic leadership.

5.4 Change to the SF Juvenile Probation Department The SF Juvenile Probation Department was an organization resistant to change. Union

strongholds within the department, media scare tactics, and politicians unwilling to act left an

organization entrenched in the status quo and unresponsive to the needs of youth. Decades of

abuse, mistreatment, and formal reports of overuse of incarceration led to a turbulent environment.

The department’s paralysis left the organization open to critique from external forces, advocates, the

media, and experts.

Unionized employees’ job security was dependent upon high incarceration rates at YGC. This

intervening factor was the divide between the department and advocates who had long called for

reforms (Macallair, 2013). While the department’s focus was on preserving jobs, advocates for

reform focused on the well-being and integrity of youth. This long simmering divide between the

department and advocates continued to heat up. The advocacy of Brodkin (Coleman Advocates) and

Macallair (CJCJ), media scrutiny, public pressure, and a changing political climate created an

environment ripe for conflict and dialectical change.

Dialectical change in this scenario is highlighted by the status quo (thesis) which was the

juvenile probation department’s position to continue incarcerating all youth arrested for committing

crimes—business as usual. Advocates were pushing for a complete overhaul of the system, one that

utilized a rehabilitative model of education and care provided by community-based organization—

emphasizing complete deinstitutionalization of youth (antithesis). The coordinating council’s (see

Appendix-Figure 2) collaborative process gave all stakeholders a voice in the proceedings and

decision making. These two opposing forces forged a compromise (synthesis) in which only serious

and violent youth offenders would be incarcerated while those arrested for petty crimes such as theft

and drugs would be processed through the Community Assessment and Referral Center (CARC). This

process would enable troubled youth to be assessed, released, and provided community-based

services designed to meet their individual needs. Through bargaining and conscious-raising efforts,

the resulting outcome of dialectical change as applied to the City’s juvenile justice system is viewed as

a “modified organizational ideology” on behalf of the juvenile probation department (Kezar, 2001).

5.5 Post Implementation Results The leaders involved in this analysis all played equally critical roles for its success. Brodkin

and Macallair drove the charge for change, Brown played an intermediary role as a political figure,

and Silbert finalized the deal by leading the planning, creation, implementation, and impact

evaluation of the City’s new juvenile justice system. Three years after the plans implementation, over

2500 youth who encountered family problems, drug abuse, crime, and problems in school were

provided services. Independent evaluators have called the programs “phenomenally successful” and

credited them “one of the nation’s largest declines in juvenile” arrests in the nation” (Delancey

Street, 2013). Of the 1000’s who were diverted from incarceration to CARC, they completed

probation at a higher rate, significantly decreased suspension from school, and graduated from high

school at a much higher rate than the comparison group, and over 70% of those who participated in

CARC successfully graduated from the program (Delancey Street, 2013).

Two of the more high profile programs are CARC and Life Learning Academy (LLA). CARC, a

true public-private partnership created by Silbert is managed by Huckleberry Youth Programs. Staff

from juvenile probation, DPH, the SF Sheriff’s Department, SFPD, and community-based organization

work together in the same location to assess and case manage youth arrested for non-violent crimes.

CARC processes approximately 700 youth annually and has decreased the youth incarcerated at YGC

by over 50% —meeting the recommendations of both Jefferson Reports (Huckleberry House, 2013).

Founded by Delancey Street in 1998, LLA is a SFUSD charter high school which serves

youth who have “been involved in the juvenile justice system, or who face challenges including

serious school failure, gang involvement, poverty, abuse, and substance abuse” (Life Learning

Academy, 2013). Utilizing Delancey Street’s model of reciprocal restitution, LLA has reduced

recidivism and incarceration rate among its students. The school’s principal—Dr. Teri Delane—is a

Delancey Street graduate with two PhD’s. Since its inception, the school has maintained over a 90%

graduation rate of which over 60% of graduates have gone on to college (Life Learning Academy,

2013).

6.0 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION Our analysis of the San Francisco Juvenile Justice system illustrates concepts of change

leadership that can be applied to community change or even to broader social, political and/or global

change efforts. Change that spans boundaries and sectors requires a robust multitude of actors. In

this section, three implications will be highlighted: (1) collaborations are essential when dealing with

complex systemic problems; (2) expert advice is crucial when dealing with a group that cannot

advocate or spur change for themselves; and (3) a deficit-based approach is beneficial when there is a

need to identify gaps in a system.

The analysis concurs with leadership literature, which asserts that complex systemic problems

are difficult to solve by any one actor or organization in isolation (Hickman, 2010; Moynihan and Van

Wart 2013; Riccucci & Morse, 2010). Therefore, collaboration among actors from different sectors is

an effective approach in tackling complex issues. The success of SFJJAP can be attributed, largely, to

the public-private networks and relationships that were built. Partnerships bring diversity of

knowledge, expertise, and enhance the capacity to mobilize resources. Moreover, the network

ensures greater accountability and ownership in the change effort.

When members of a community are unable to defend or advocate for themselves, it takes

efforts from outside experts to create change. In juvenile justice, there is a long history of change

spurred by reform advocates that could not have been brought about by the youth themselves.

Expert advice can empower a community through by identifying strengths and opportunities. A

deficit-based approach compliments expert advice by identifying the gaps in a system, or unmet

needs of a community. Experts can conduct applied research which elicits the deficiencies and

inadequacies within the community.

Leading community change can create positive externalities. In today’s unified society,

leading change in one context frequently spills over to change within another context. In many

instances, change is produced in both situations, and is often the case between governmental

agencies and communities they serve. As leaders sought change within San Francisco, it initiated

change and remodeled the juvenile probation department.

The lack of the City’s responsiveness to the treatment and adjudication of San Francisco’s

youth presented an opportunity to examine a noteworthy leadership scenario by analyzing relevant

contextual factors and cursory events. Comprehensive investigative reports, as well as expert opinion

that emerged between the 1960’s and 1990’s assessed the City was failing its youth. The analysis

puts forth evidence supporting a community-based model of youth justice. The innovative approach

of applied research by Mimi Silbert allowed the plan to be developed based on the needs of juvenile

offenders and gaps in the existing system. The use of public-private partnerships proved to be an

innovative solution to effectively mitigate youth crime, while building capacity for youth to better

themselves.

One of the most promising reform initiatives created by the Action Plan was CARC. In

essence, it is imperative to address the traumas of youth, embracing them with compassion, while

assisting them to become productive adults. In contrast to traditional correctional models which are

based on incarceration, CARC provides a platform for youth to be diverted from jail, and receive

services and educational opportunities for a better future. Research has depicted that incarcerating

young people has a profound negative effect on them. Juvenile justice systems should replicate a

community-based model in order to best utilize their funds and serve their community. In

conclusion, it is both efficient and effective to focus the limited resources of the juvenile justice

system on rebuilding the lives of youth instead of locking them up.

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Appendix :

Figure 1: San Francisco Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan, Circle of Care

Figure 2: SF Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan, Council and Committee