The DAO Hack and the Living Law of Blockchain

Julia Meier / Ben edikt Schuppli

Table of Contents

V. To Fork or not to Fork

VI. No Escape from the Law

VII. Conclusion - From an Ideological Project to a Productivity Tool

Bibliography

Materials

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I. The Realm of Alegality

11. The Emergence of Lex Cryptographia

111. The Ideological Starting Point - Trust

IV. The DAO Hack

I. The Realm of Alegality

Blockchains exist in arealm of alegality. I This postulate has been brought forth by sev-eral exponents working on or researching the phenomenon, while giving vague and di-verging definitions of the concept.2 In contrast, the idea behind alegality has been thesubject of a long-standing discussion in legal theory as weil as legal methodology,though the concepts usually employed are legal vacuum (German: rechtsfreier Raum?

GAVINWOOD,the co-founder ofthe Ethereum blockchain, claims to have coined the term,see http://gavwood.com/; the term blockchain as used in this article exclusively refers topublic blockchains such as Ethereum or the Bitcoin blockchain.OEFILIPPI/WRIGHT,44-45, defining alegality as not needing "to abide by existing mIes andjurisdictional constraints; can be designed to bypass or simply ignore the laws of a particularjurisdiction"; LAPRISE,who defines alegality as the legal gap created by the difference in thedecision cycles of law making and (technological) innovation; LtNDAHL,who describes ale-gality as the space in between the legal-illegal distinction; BRABAZON,who qualities alegal-ity as "the capacity to be neither legal nor illegal"; WOOD,Alegality, defines alegality as therealm which lies beyond the legal classification of acts ar states as either legal or illegal.Arguments far a legal vacuum are offered for example by ENGISClI,ZgS 1952; against byRADBRUCH,298-299.

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and legallacunae (Gennan: Gesetzeslücken)4, rather than alegality. The argument for alegal vacuum is difficult to maintain. Legal systems are conceptualised as being seit":..contained, due to their binary deontic logic necessarily providing a classification of actsand states as either legal or illegal. 5 This idea underlies the prohibition of the denial ofjustice (tor example in Swiss law art. 29 para. I ofthe Swiss Constitution; art. 6 ECHR;art. 14 ICCPR) orthe first article ofSwitzerland's Civil Code (art. I para. 2 ZGB).6 Theidea of alegality as proposed can best be incorporated in the understanding of a certainkind of legal lacunae that emerge due to the reactive trait of the law. From a policyanalysis perspective, laws are always the product of a problem-processing-process (Ger-man: Problem verarbeitungsprozess) and thus areaction to reality and its demands posedto the political system.7 As the law thus lags behind reality, reality poses questions thepolitical system has not yet processed and therefore have not yet been translated intothe binary classification oflegalli lIegal. 8

In this article, we shaIJ analyse the postulation of alegality and delineate its connectionto the idea of"living law" and the nonns proposed by the blockchain community, suchas "code is law". Subsequently, a crisis situation within the blockchain community andthe chosen solution are analysed against this background, namely the DAO Hack9 andthe corresponding hard-fork ofthe Ethereum blockchain.1o Thus, the ideological forcesbehind blockchain technology are showcased, and how they intluence the emerging lexcryptographia. Finally, it will be shown how the nonnative principles identified will beintluenced by continuous adoption of the technology. Given blockchain technology'spotential of having a long-Iasting, disruptive effect on our society, economy, and gov-em mental structures, 11it seems crucial to develop an understanding not only ofthe tech-nology itselfbut also its defining nonnative underpinnings.

11. The Emergence of Lex Cryptographia

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KRAMER, 191-210.KRAMER, 196-199 with further references; for an overview to the deontic logic, see MAIIL-MANN,330-332.KRAMER, 196-199 with further references; BK-L1VER et al., Art. 1 ZGB N 311-315.SCHNEIDERIJANNING,48; BLUM/SCHUBERT,161-166; MÜLLER/UIILMANN,Rz. 102-115.Cr. LUIIMANN,Law, 93; KRAMER, 210, who uses the tenn sekundäre Lücke; for example seeBGE91 11100E.2106.The OAO Hack will be explained in Chapter IV.A similar approach of researching the blockchain phenomenon was chosen by OE FILlPPIILOVELUCK,Internet Policy Review 2016:3, who analysed the discussion on the block-sizeofthe Bitcoin Blockchain.SWAN,vii-ix; WRIGHT/OE FII.lPPI, 17-44.

By postulating that the blockchain technology occupies arealm of alegality, it is impliedthat the law not only does not but also should not apply to blockchain ecosystems. Thissentiment can be seen when GAVIN WOOD, a co-founder of the Ethereum project, de-scribes combatting "the incompatibility, incompetence, unwillingness, expense, uncer-tainty, inconvenience, or corruption of existing legal systems" as an objective of theproject.12 Ethereum is an open-source blockchain platfonn that, among other things,runs smart contracts and aims to "implement a general, fully trustless smart contractplatfonn".13 By building on "rich and unambiguous language" and on autonomous en-forcement of agreements, the "one key goal", to offer a system that aIJows transactionsbetween parties "who would otherwise have no means to trust one another", is aimed tobe achieved.14

The project Aragon follows a similar direction by proposing an "opt-in digital jurisdic-tion for DAOs and sovereign individuals".15 The need for such ajurisdiction is asserteddue to the "violence" which the established "broken govemance processes" - includingpublic bodies such as states or private bodies like corporations - exercise over individ-uals through "restricting your choice ofleaving".16 This implies state-administered legalsystems are inherently violent due to the lack of an opt-in I opt-out function.17 Thispurported violence shall be banned from "cryptonetworks", excluding them from thepurview of state regulators and law enforcement. In both examples, the postulation ofalegality serves as a necessary premise to abandon nation-state law and to propose aparticular set ofrules goveming blockchain technology.

PRIMAVERA DE FIUPPI and AARON WRIGHT describe these emerging set of rules gov-eming blockchain technology and its applications as lex cryptographia.18 Lex cryp-tographia is characterised as the body oflaw goveming the varying and evolving appli-cations of the blockchain technology which is "administered through self-executingsmart contracts and decentralized (and potentially autonomous) organizations."19 It is

12 WOOD, Yellowpaper, I.See Ethereum Homestead.WOOD, Yellowpaper, 1.Aragon Network, Whitepaper.Aragon Network, Manifesto.See Aragon Network, Manifesto: "Oecentralized organizations change our relationship withgovernance: from something that is imposed upon us by others, into something we chooseto opt into. Where we are equally serving and served, rather than just serving."DE FILlPPI/WRIGHT49-52; WRIGHT/OE FILIPPI,44-58.WRIGHI/DE FILIPPI,48.

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thus an adoption as weil as an alteration of LAWRENCELESSIG's argument that "code islaw".20 From the viewpoint of a constitutionallawyer, LESSIG describes how the archi-tecture of cyberspace - the code - organises virtual reality and thereby constitutes law,not in the sense of its possibility of being broken, but by defining the possibilities ofinteraction and its utilisation as a modus of regulation.21 In the understanding of lexcryptographia, the postulate "code is law" is taken a step further to mean that normscan be translated into code and thus "law is code".22

111. The Ideological Starting Point - Trust

The thesis that in aspace where the nation-state law does not or cannot fulfil its tunc-tions, a different set of rules evolve, is not novel in legal scholarship.23 For example,this development was famously described by EUGENEHRLICHas "living law" (German:lebendes Recht).24 EHRLICH, who lived in Bukowina, an ethnically diverse part of theAustro-Hungarian Empire situated in its border region, observed that state law was in-operative and juristic law (German: Juristenrecht) as weil as social norms (German:gesellschaftliches Recht) were applied instead.25 Therefore, EHRLICH developed abroader definition of law, which does not rely on state authority, but rather resorted tothe opinio necessitatis as the feeling peculiarly connected with a legal norm and itsbreach.26 The idea of "living law" was adopted and further developed by GUNTHERTEUHNER in his description of the transnational phenomenon of lex mercatoria, lexsportiva or similar occurrences in the fields of human rights and ecology where lawexists without originating from nation-states.27 The idea of a lex cryptographia can beseen against this theoretical background.28

The postulation of the blockchain technology existing in arealm of alegality and theapplicability of lex cryptographia results from the pronounced ideological underpin-nings ofthis technology. The blockchain technology was first proposed in the form ofBitcoin by a person or group ofpersons known under the pseudonym SATOSIIINAKA-MOTO in 2008.29 It combines various known technologies in a previously unknown wayforming a specific kind of database that is decentralised, immutable, pseudonymous andtransparent.30 The ideological background ofthe blockchain technology can be best ex-plained by illustrating it as a specific solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem, aknown challenge in the context of computer sciences.31 In this exemplification, militaryexecutives, the "Byzantine Generals", are besieging a city with different camps and haveto decide wh ether to attack or to retreat. An attack will only be triumphant if all ofthemjoin. The generals can only communicate with messengers and it is possible that a num-ber of generals or messengers are untrustworthy. The concrete challenge is for the trust-worthy generals to achieve a majority for a certain strategy.32 Translated to the case ofdistributed networks such as blockchains, the question is how the different nodes withinthe network can guarantee that only true information is stored on the database and thatthe information stored is not removed or modified.33

The answer proposed by the Bitcoin protocol is a specific consensus mechanism, the"Nakamoto consensus" or "Proof of Work".34 By ensuring that actors do not have in-centives to act in bad faith, and by preventing central institutions from amassing excess

29 NAKAMOTO.OE FILlPPI/WRIGHT, 13-57.The name and a first solution were presented by LAMPORT/SHOSTAK/MARSHALL,ACMTransactions on Programming Languages and Systems 1982, 382 ff.For an overview see OKUN.SWAN, 2; WRIGHT/OE FILIPPI, 5-8."Proof ofWork" is the process by which "Bitcoin nodes repeatedly attempt to solve crypto-graphic puzzles based on the transactions in a proposed new block on the blockchain. Thesepuzzles are on a sliding level of difficulty so that, roughly every ten minutes, a random nodefinds a solution. The new block based on that solution is broadcast across the network. Othernodes, after checking for validity, add the new block to the blockchain. The node that suc-cessfully proposed the new block receives a financial reward." (REYES, George WashingtonLaw Review 2018, 11). For a more in-depth description, see NAKAMOTO, 3; OE FILlPPIIWRIGHT, 23-26; Team Rocket, I.

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LESSIG, 5-6.LESSIG,81-119.OE FILlPPI/WRIGHT, 81-83, 151-152; WRIGHTIDE FILIPPI, 50; see in this book, WEBER, 3 ff.Vgl. BAER, 90-109.EHRLICH,409-426; BAER, § 2 Rz. 37-39; RAISER, 71-85; REHßINDER, 64-74.EHRLICH, 312-330; far Ehrlich's biography and how living in Bukowina coined his work,see REI IBINDER,13-28.EHRLICH, 146-147; REHBINDER,43-49.TElJßNER, 3-28.A similar comparison is made by WRIGHT/OE FILIPPI, 44-45, who draw paralleis to the lexmercatoria, though without referring to the concept of"living law".

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power, blockchain technology facilitates trust-minimisation.35 The need to trust in peo-pie and in institutions is substituted with the trust in technology.36 Thus, a certain con-ception of human nature as weil as a profound disliking for centralised institutions ofpower, such as banks, the state, or its judicial system, are formative elements of theideology underlying blockchain technology.

Even though misleading,37 the claim has been made that the blockchain technology en-ables "trustless systems".38 Trust plays an important role for the legal system as it bothenables and relies on trust.39 According to NIKLAS LUHMANN, trust also plays an im-portant role in society by reducing the complexity ofthe world and without it, an indi-vidual would not be able to "get out ofbed in the morning".40 Against this backgroundhighlighting the importance oftrust for human beings, the far-reaching implications theargument for a trustless system carries are worth noting. The role the notion of trust-minimisation assurnes in ideological debates within blockchain ecosystems is high-lighted below using the example ofthe DAO Hack.

Automate Governance".41 Essentially, it is a computer software which is distributedacross a decentralised peer-to-peer network and incorporates governance and decision-making rules.42 The nomer "the DAO" was used to describe a specific instantiation ofsuch an organisation, the first DAO ofits kind. The DAO was created with the objectiveof operating as a far-profit entity, a kind of"automated investement fund",43 that wouldcreate and hold a corpus of digital assets through the sale of"DAO Tokens" to investors,blockchain-based digital assets which would subsequently be used to fund business ven-tures. The holders of DAO Tokens stood to share in the anticipated earnings from theseprojects as a return on their investment in DAO Tokens. In addition, DAO Token hold-ers could monetise their investments in DAO Tokens by re-selling DAO Tokens on anumber ofweb-based exchange platforms that supported secondary trading in the DAOTokens.44

IV. The DAO Hack

From 30 April 2016 through 28 May 2016, the DAO offered and sold approximately1.15 billion DAO Tokens in exchange for a total of approximately 12 million Ether("ETH"). ETH is the virtual currency used on the Ethereum Blockchain, just as Bitcoinis the corresponding currency to the Bitcoin Blockchain. As of the time the offeringclosed, the total ETH raised by The DAO was valued in USD at approximately 150 mil-lion.45

DAO is an acronym for decentralised autonomous organisation. The term originatedamidst the nascent ethereum community in 2015. It was coined by CllRlSTOI'HJENTZSCH in the eponymous whitepaper "Decentralized Autonomous Organization to

On 17 June 2016, an anonymous attacker exploited a loophole in the DAO-source codethat allowed hirn to drain funds from it. It is important to note that the attacker merelycalled intended functions in an unintended way which is why the terminology "hack" ismisleading. During the attack, ETH worth USD 55 million of the funds raised weresiphoned offto an anonymous address. This event has subsequently become known as"the DAO Hack".46

35 SZAßO,Towards.SZAHO,Towards.In SZABO,Money, Szabo argues that "an innovation can only partially take away some kindsofvulnerability, i.e. reduce the need far or risk oftrust in other people. There is no such thingas a fully trustless institution ar technology. The nonexistence of complete trustlessness istrue even of our strongest security technology, encryption. Although some cryptographicprotocols do guarantee certain specific data relationships with astronomically high probabil-ity against opponents with astronomically high computing power, they do not provide com-plete guarantees when accounting for all possible behaviors ofall participants. [... ] The his-tarically recent breakthroughs of computer science can reduce vulnerabilities, oftendramatically so, but they are far from eliminating all kinds of vulnerabilities to the harmfulbehavior of any potential attacker."REISENWITZ;WRIGIIT/OEFILIPPI,56; similar also NAKAMOTO,I: "What is needed is an elec-tronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead oftrust."On the role of trust for the legal system see ROSSEN-STAOTFELD,KritV 1999, 226-232;WElLERT,123-125.LlJIIMANN,Vertrauen, 1 [translation by the authors].

The interpretation ofthe DAO Hack varied greatly among observers, so me using crim-inal law jargon to describe the hack as theft and the eventual refund via a hard-fork ofthe Ethereum blockchain as some form ofconfiscation.47 As we will see, the DAO Hackwas not dealt with in reliance on the external state-made legal system by addressingcourts or law enforcement, but rather internally among the involved stakeholders. The

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41 JENTZSCH,I.For a more in-depth description of OAOs, see OE FILlPPI/WRJGHT,131-155; REYES,GeorgeWashington Law Review 2018, 16 f.Economist, The OAO.The OAO Report, I.The OAO Report, 3 f.REYES,George Washington Law Review 2018, 18.REYES,George Washington Law Review 2018, I.

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reasons why no traditional legal institutions were called upon are manifold. Withoutfostering speculation and succumbing to hindsight bias, besides the insistence on exist-ing in arealm of alegality, the creators, curators of, and participants in the DAO collec-tively stood to lose more from filing lawsuits than they could have gained, creating clearincentives to find an extralegal dispute resolution. This is due to a potential legal quali-fication of the DAO as a general partnership with the implication of joint and severalliability of participants as weIl as the dreaded classification ofthe DAO as an unregis-tered securities offering.48 Below, the principles and norms underlying this extralegalconflict resolution favoured over lawsuits will be analysed.

erupted within the Ethereum community on how to handle the situation revolvingaround formative principles within the blockehain community such as immutability,"code is law", and trust-minimisation.

v. To Fork or not to Fork49

After a suggested soft-fork showed serious security weaknesses, people behind theEthereum Foundation, such as VITALIK BUTERIN, proposed to the community to hard-fork the Ethereum blockehain to roll back the malicious transactions.54 A hard-fork inthis case proposes, in layperson terms, that one scrolls back on the chain of blocks tothe point before the DAO Hack happened and adds a different chain of blocks fromthere.55 Through this bifurcation, two blockehains exist with a common history oftrans-actions up until the bifurcation - on one ofthem the DAO Hack happened and on thenewly created one the DAO, as it existed before the hack, could be dissolved and theDAO Token Holders reimbursed.56 WOOD supported the idea of a hard-fork in ca se itfinds a majority within the community, stating "it' s the people who decide" in a 2016interview. 57To conclude how the handling ofthe DAO Hack was approached, the underlying deci-

sion-making process must be analysed, namely the Ethereum blockehain governance.Simply put, in Ethereum blockehain governance, the "Ethereum Foundation" assumesan executive role, being responsible for the long-term vision of the project which isreflected, among others, in its statutes, the "Ethereum Whitepaper", the "Ethereum Yel-low Paper" as weil as the "Development Roadmap ".50 In its actions, the EthereumFoundation as a Swiss foundation in the sense of art. 80 ff. ce is strictly bound by itsstatutory purpose, the fulfilment of which is subject to government supervision. TheEthereum Foundation hires developers to work on the Ethereum protocol by creatingsoftware elements or proposing changes thereto which subsequently may or may not beaccepted by miners.51 Ofthe different stakeholders, the most power lies with miners, asthey factually decide on the success of every proposed protocol change by acceptingand implementing the amendments to the software. 52

As opposed to other protocol changes within the Ethereum blockehain, such as the tran-sition from one to another consensus algorithm,53 the hard-fork ensuing the DAO Hackwas naturally not part ofthe Ethereum roadmap but rather a contentious emergency planproposed by the "Ethereum Foundation". Immediately after the hack, a fierce debate

Opponents of the hard-fork criticised that the rollback would break with the notion of"code is law", trustlessness, and immutability.58 First, it would compromise theEthereum blockchain's original purpose by letting human interests sway detenninistic,code-based rules. The argument here is that as the underlying code ofthe DAO madethe hack possible and it "is the law", the DAO Hack can hence not be "illegal" but ratherwhat the law intended. This argument was highlighted in a letter purporting to be writtenby the "attacker" him- or herself, where it is stated that the attacker is "disappointed bythose who are characterising the use of this intentional feature as theft" and that he orshe is "making use ofthis explicitly coded feature as per the smart contract terms".59Second, a hard-fork is also problematic in the light of the blockehain being seen as atrustless system, as the hard-fork presupposes that the DAO Token buyers trusted thatthe DAO Hack or something similar would not happen. Third, the principle ofimmuta-bility would be broken with, as the hard-fork would feign a reality where the DAO Hacknever happened.

54 Ethereum Blog, Fork.The difference between a hard-fork and a soft-fork is that only latter results in a blockchainthat is compatible with the preceding one, see: Coindesk, Fork.For the technical specifics ofthe hard-fork, see Slock.it Blog, Fork.WOOD,How.For an overview of the argumens, see Blockgeeks, Ethereum, who describe the discussionas "both an ethical and ideological one". For further arguments, see the discussion on twitter,Twitter, feindura, or the reddit thread, Reddit/Ethereum, If.Letter DAO Hack.

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48 REYES,George Washington Law Review 2018, 19-27.The title is quoted from an Ethereum blog post, see: Ethereum Blog, Fork.WOOD,Yellowpaper; Ethereum Wiki, White Paper; Ethereum Wiki, Roadmap.Other stakeholders, such as clients, nodes and even exchanges are not mentioned herein dueto constraints in space.See: Ethereum Blog, DAO Wars.For a brief explanation on the proposed change see: Blockgeeks, Casper.

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On 20 July 2016, BlJTERIN, founder of Ethereum, announced the success of the hard-fork, with 85 % of the Ethereum miners having accepted the proposal by mining on theforked chain.60 That a majority ofthe Ethereum miners accepted the hard-fork led to anirreconcilable schism within the Ethereum community with the "code is law"-factiongathering behind the non-forked version of Ethereum, which subsequently becameknown as Ethereum Classic.61 Both blockchains and their corresponding cryptocurren-cies now coexist: there is thus a blockchain where the DAO Hack happened and the"hacker" successfully acquired cryptocurrency, and a blockchain where the hack neveroccurred and the DAO was dissolved.

lacunaes (see Chapter I) and are in need ofinterpretation.65 This inevitably leads to am-biguity - an element the importance of which lawyers tend to stress when arguing forthe limitations of smart contracts.66 This ambiguity, endowing parties to a contract withthe flexibility to prepare for and react to changing circumstances, is sought to be elimi-nated by the concept of"code is law", as understood by the blockchain technology ex-ponents.67 Comparative legal studies show that the rules for interpretation of contractsin different jurisdictions have long been categorised according to the two ideal types:subjective approach, focusing on the intent ofthe parties, and objective approach68, fo-cusing on declaration ofthe parties.69 This differentation was broken down by combin-ing both approaches and focusing on the interpretation according to the understandingof a reasonable person, as for example codified in the "United Nations Convention onContracts for the International Sale ofGoods ".70

The reaction to the DAO Hack implies that the DAO, or rather the smart contracts itconsisted of, were interpreted following these rules. Ifthe principle "code is law" wereapplied, the exploitation ofthe loophole, i.e. the DAO Hack, would have to be consid-ered an intended function ofthe smart contracts underlying the DAO. Rather, the com-munity regarded the hack as an irregularity as weil as an iIIegal act (see Chapter IV).This position purports that the loophole and its exploitation were neither the intent ofthe parties nor what a reasonable person expected as a resuIt ofthe contracts. By choos-ing to employ a hard-fork, the Ethereum community decided on the basis ofthese stan-dard rules of contract interpretation, deviating from the principle "code is law".

Further principles of private law mirrored in the decision are unjust enrichment andequitableness. By creating arefund smart contract that would send back the investedETH to the DAO-participants after the DAO has been rescinded, the Ethereum Founda-tion employed a principle prevalent in contract law: parties to a contract should not beunjustly enriched after the rescission of such a contract so that each party receives back

VI. No Escape from the Law

As shown above, the principle "code is law" subsided to a more pragmatic, less ideo-logical approach in the majority decision to hard-fork the Ethereum blockchain. Theemphasis on democratic elements ofthe decision to hard-fork the Ethereum blockchainbye.g. WOOI) stands in stark contrast to the aforementioned concept ofalegality definedby WOOI) as "systems that can't care"62. Systems that can't care - unless the majorityofthe people wants them to care, one might add. In combining alegality with the elementofthe majority decision, a system is created, where human interests shall have no swayover the execution of code as programmed, except for the situation where a majority ofthe community decides otherwise - enabling precisely the tyranny ofthe majority whichdemocratic institutions, pillars of the legal system, historically sought to prevent. 63 Ef-fectively, the introduction of such institutions propelled trust-minimisation as opposedto the status quo ante, when people were at the mercy ofan arbitrarily deciding majority,as NICK SZABO succinctly argues:

"Most institutions which have undergone a lengthy cultural evolution, such as law (whichlowers vulnerability to violence, theft, and fraud), as weil as technologies of securily, re-duce, on balance, and in more ways than the reverse, our vulnerabilities to, and thus ourneeds to trust, our fellow humans, compared with our vulnerabilities before these institu-tions and technologies evolved. "64

65 HUGUENIN, Rz. 273-297 with further references.MEYERISCHlJPPLI,recht 2017, 204 ff.See Chaper 11.

Kentucky Court of Appeals, NO, 2007 -CA-000498-MR, March 21 2008, 3: "Absent ambi-guity, the parties' intentions must be discerned from the four corners ofthe document, andextrinsic evidence may not be considered."HERROTS, 425-431; ZWEIGERT/KÖTZ, 395-404.Art. 8 para. 1-2 CISG: "( 1) For the purpose ofthis Convention statements made by and otherconduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew orcould not have been unaware what that intent was. (2) If the preceding paragraph is notapplicab1e, statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted accordingto the understanding that a reasonable person ofthe same kind as the other party would havehad in the same circumstances."; HERBOTS, 431; ZWEIGERT/KöTZ, 404 f.

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Examining further arguments of those in favour of a hard-fork, many commonalitieswith existing legal systems appear. Just as the law itself, legal agreements can have

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Coincentral, Ethereum.WOOD, Alegality; see also the remarks in Fn. 2.MILL, 7; for an overview see HALLER/KÖLZ/GÄCHTER, Rz. 189-251, especially 232-233.SZARO, Money.

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VII. Conclusion - From an Ideological Projectto a Productivity Tool

pinnings.73 Für example, in the document "A Declaration ofthe Independence ofCy-berspace" lOHN PERRY BARLOW disinvited the governments, "ofthe past" from cyber-space as they are seen to have no "sovereignty where we gather."74 In Cyperspace, "ourown Social Contract" is arising, which will be more "humane and fair", and the "legalconcepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context" would not applyanymore.75 Such claims are mirrored in the foundational writings on the blockchaintechnology (Chapter 1-111).

Both the Internet and blockchain technology are seen as generative technology in thesense that they produce "unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions frombroad and varied audiences"76 - accordingly, their development lies outside the sphereof influence of its creators. With the Internet as a technology becoming omnipresent,the ideological ambitions connected thereto have been diluted and the nation-state hasincreasingly penetrated cyberspace.?7 Blockchain technology has also entered the main-stream and is implemented by powerful institutions in the private sector, ranging fromWall Street banks to Californian tech giants.78 In the public sector, states around theworld are researching how to implement blockchain technology in government pro-cesses. In Switzerland for example, the city ofZug plays a pioneering role in that regardand recently, the first vote based on blockchain technology took place. Similarly, it ispossible to pay government services with cryptocurrencies in the city of Zug. 79

Therefore, it is conceivable that the history of cyberspace will repeat itself in relation toblockchain technology.80 This prediction can draw upon the preceding examination ofthe DAO Hack and the solution implemented by the community (Chapter IV-V). Dur-ing this critical situation, core ideological principles were swiftly abandoned and thesolution rather mirrors established principles of contract law (Chapter V\). This seemsto undermine the postulation of existing in arealm of alegality and the impossibility ofexisting nation-state law to govern blockchain technology (Chapter I-I\).

what they have transferred to the other party, as though they have never ente red into thecontract.71 Furthermore, the Ethereum community could have been guided by the prin-ciple of equitableness in its decision to deviate from the immutability paradigm, onecould argue. Weighing immutability and the notion of"code is law" higher than partici-pants' interests would have presumably not been considered an equitable outcome in theeyes of the majority of the Ethereum community. This notion is mirrored in the legalsystems ofmany nation-states. As an example, art. 4 ofthe Swiss Civil Code requirescourts to rule based on equitableness to create justice in each individual case.72

A noteworthy difference between the legal system, as it is evidently referenced by boththe procedure and the outcome ofthe hard-fork, and the extralegal reality within whichthe conflict was resolved is that in the case ofthe latter, the principles of contract inter-pretation and ruling equitably were applied by members of the community, not by ajudicial body. Hence, the quasi-ruling to hard-fork enjoyed widespread support amongthe constituents, endowing it with more legitimacy from a decentralisation perspectivethan a ruling of a centralised judicial authority would have been awarded with. Hence,the discussions and acts undertaken by various stakeholders ofthe Ethereum communityin the aftermath ofthe DAO Hack are evidence ofthe the living law within the block-chain ecosystem. Even though the contlict was not resolved by calling upon legal sys-tems administered by nation-states, the foundational principles of immutability, trust-lessness, and "code is law" were abandoned in favour of principles that are evidentlyreminiscent of and influenced by nation-state-Iaw.

The phenomenon that new technology is developed against an ideological backgroundis not new. For example, at the beginning ofthe development ofthe Internet, cyberspacewas also thought to be arealm of alegality and had equally profound ideological under-

73 LESSIG, 1-8, 31.BARLOW; for a short biography on Barlow see LAMBERT, 8-14.BARLOW.Z//TRAIN, 70.The Working Group on Intemet Govemance, set up by the the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations, places the responsibility of Internet regulation equallyon govemments, theprivate sector and civil society, see WGIG, 4.Coingape, Guess; Bloomberg, Google.NZZ, Blockehain; Stadt Zug.cr SCIIMID.

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71 See art. 81 CISG: "( I) Avoidance ofthe contract releases both parties from their obligationsunder it, subject to any damages which may be due. [ ... ] (2) A party who has performed thecontract either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party [ ... ]."; For Swisscontract law, see for example: BK-WEBER, Art. 109 OR N 58-62; CHK-FlJRRERlWEY,Art. 109 OR N 14-24.On the principle of equitableness in the Swiss Civil Code, see BK-CARONI et al., Art. 4 ZGBN 182-272.

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1996

Materials

42 43

Alexandra Dal Molin-Kränzlin / Anne Mirjam Schneuwly /Jasna Stojanovic (Hrsg.)

Digitalisierung - Gesellschaft - Recht

Analysen und Perspektiven von Assistierenden desRechtswissenschaftlichen Instituts der Universität Zürich

DIKE ~

Sponsoren VorwortDie Drucklegung des vorliegenden Buches wurde finanziell gefOrdert von:

- Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Zürich- UZH Digital Society Initiative

UZH Kommission für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter- Walder Wyss AG- DIKE Verlag AG, Zürich

Homburger AG, TechGroup- SWISSLEX - Schweizerische Juristische Datenbank AG- SwissLegal - Verbund von schweizweit tätigen Wirtschaftskanzleien- Prof. Dr. iur. Felix Dasser, Homburger

lus Alumni, Alumni-Organisation der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultätder Universität ZürichKellerhals Carrard

- Nobel & Hug Rechtsanwälte- Wenger Plattner Basel Zürich Bem- Marianne Wildi, Hypothekarbank Lenzburg

Die Schriftenreihe APARIUZ bietet den Nachwuchsforschenden der Rechtswissen-schaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Zürich seit 1999 eine Plattform, um selbstbewusstam wissenschaftlichen Diskurs teilnehmen zu können. Mit dem vorliegenden 20. Bandfeiern wir ein grosses Jubiläum!

Spätestens seit der Jahrtausendwende schreitet die digitale Transformation unserer Ge-sellschaft rasant voran. Die Schwerpunkte unseres Alltags und unserer zwischen-menschlichen Interaktionen verschieben sich mehr und mehr von einer analogen in einedigitale Welt. Die Digitalisierung verändert jedoch nicht nur unsere Gesellschaft, son-dern stellt auch unser Rechtssystem vor neue Herausforderungen: Das Parlament disku-tiert die Regulierung der Netzneutralität und trifft grundlegende Entscheidungen zurSteuerung des wachsenden Datenverkehrs. Soziale Medien können die politische Mei-nungsbildung entscheidend beeinflussen, sei es durch Fake News oder durch fundierteBerichterstattung. Unter dem Schlagwort E-Government bieten Behörden einen einfa-chen und raschen Zugriff auf Informationen in öffentlichen Registern. Stimmbürgerin-nen und Stimmbürger werden möglicherweise in Zukunft flächendeckend elektronischstimmen und wählen können. Ähnliche Entwicklungen lassen sich auch im Privatrechtausmachen. So wird beispielsweise im Gesellschaftsrecht die Einführung einer virtuel-len Generalversammlung vorgeschlagen. Virtuelle Währungen und persönliche Datentreten in Konkurrenz zu Geld, wobei zugleich einzelne Social-Media-Plattformenmarktbeherrschend zu sein scheinen. Patientinnen und Patienten wenden sich anDr. Google, bevor sie eine Arztpraxis betreten. Die virtuelle Welt ist jedoch keineswegsein rechtsfreier Raum und die Verbreitung oder das «Liken» von Hasstiraden kann straf-rechtlich verfolgt werden. Zu Überwachungs- und Compliance-Zwecken wird auf Re-gulatory Technologies zurückgegriffen. Die Behördenpraxis muss mit der Digitalisie-rung mithalten und technologische Entwicklungen bei der Anwendung bestehenderGesetze beurteilen. Künstliche Intelligenz wird womöglich so weit voranschreiten, dassanstelle der Menschen autonome Technologien moralische Entscheidungen treffen wer-den. Selbstlernende Systeme könnten den menschlichen Erfindergeist übertreffen oderkünftig Richterinnen und Richter ersetzen. Schliesslich agieren Unternehmen sowiestaatliche Institutionen im digitalen Raum und müssen sich vor drohenden Cyberangrif-fen schützen.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen NationalbibliothekDie Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbiblio-grafie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar.

Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk ist weltweit urheberrechtlieh geschützt. Insbesondere dasRecht, das Werk mittels irgendeines Mediums (grafisch, technisch, elektronisch und/oder digital,einschliesslich Fotokopie und Downloading) teilweise oder ganz zu vervieltaltigen, vorzutragen,zu verbreiten, zu bearbeiten, zu übersetzen, zu übertragen oder zu speichern, liegt ausschliesslichbeim Verlag. Jede Verwertung in den genannten oder in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenenFällen bedarf deshalb der vorherigen schriftlichen Einwilligung des Verlags.

Cl) 2019 Dike Verlag AG, Zürich/St. GallenISBN 978-3-03891-081-7

www.dike.ch

Diese und weitere Herausforderungen adressiert der unter dem Leitthema «Digitalisie-rung - Gesellschaft - Recht» stehende APARIUZ-Jubiläumsband. Es stellen sich fol-gende grundlegende Fragen: Kann unser Rechtssystem mit der Digitalisierung Schritt

V

Vorwort

halten oder drängen sich Anpassungen auf? Welche Verantwortung trägt dabei derStaat? Wie verändert die Digitalisierung unser Recht? Welchen Einfluss hat das Rechtauf den digitalen Fortschritt? Macht Digitalisierung unser Rechtssystem überflüssig?Die thematisch breit gestreuten Analysen in diesem Sammelband beleuchten verschie-dene Aspekte dieser komplexen Fragen. An dieser Stelle danken die Herausgeberinnenallen mitwirkenden Autorinnen und Autoren ganz herzlich für ihre vielfältigen Beiträge.Ein besonderer Dank gebührt Herrn Prof. Dr. iur. ROLF H. WEBER für seinen Gastbei-trag.

Ein grosser Dank geht sodann an Frau Prof. Dr. iur. utr. BRIGITTE TAG, Dekanin derRechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Zürich, für das Geleitwort zu diesemBand sowie an den «APARlUZ-Gründem Herrn Prof. Dr. iur. JÜRG-BEAT ACKERMANNfür seinen Rück- und Ausblick auf die Schriftenreihe. Ausserdem danken wir demganzen Team des Dike Verlags, insbesondere Frau CAROLINE MENDELIN und FrauDOROTIIEASCIIÖLL, herzlich für die stets konstruktive, angenehme und unkomplizierteZusammenarbeit. Ebenfalls danken möchten wir Frau ANNINA MELLIGER für die Kor-rektur der englischen Beiträge.

Ein spezieller Dank gebührt schliesslich allen unseren Sponsorinnen und Sponsoren.Ohne ihre grosszügige finanzielle Unterstützung wäre die Realisierung dieses Projektsundenkbar gewesen.

Die APARIUZ-Tradition hat auch im digitalen Zeitalter ihren Platz gefunden. Daraufund auf weitere 20 APARIUZ-Jahre stossen wir an!

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Geleitwort der Dekanin

Jubiläumsworte des Gründers

Abkürzungsverzeichnis

Autorenverzeichnis

Die Herausgeberinnen

Gastbeitrag

Rolf H. Weber

Digital isierung und der Kampf ums Recht

Grundlagen des Rechts

Julia Meier / Benedikt Schupp/i

The DAO Hack and the Living Law of Blockehain

Hanno Menges

Moralische Entscheidungen autonomer Technologien: eine Aufgabefür den Gesetzgeber?

Basel/Fribourg/Zürich, im April 2019 ALEXANDRADAL MOLlN-KRÄNlLlNANNE MIRJAM SCllNElJWLY

JASNA STOJANOVIC

Nata/ie Miche/e Pompe

The new regulatory power of algorithmic information selectionAre traditionallegal instruments suited to the proteetion ofthe value 01' infonnationalselt~determination in the era of"code is law"?

Antonia Hartmann

Fake News, Wahrheit und Regulierung

Öffentliches Recht

Adrian Box/er / Noemi Bha//a

Netzneutralität in der SchweizQuo vadis?

VI

XIXIIIXV

XXXIIIXLI

3

27

45

65

81

103

VII

Vorwort

halten oder drängen sich Anpassungen auf? Welche Verantwortung trägt dabei derStaat? Wie verändert die Digitalisierung unser Recht? Welchen Einfluss hat das Rechtauf den digitalen Fortschritt? Macht Digitalisierung unser Rechtssystem überflüssig?Die thematisch breit gestreuten Analysen in diesem Sammelband beleuchten verschie-dene Aspekte dieser komplexen Fragen. An dieser Stelle danken die Herausgeberinnenallen mitwirkenden Autorinnen und Autoren ganz herzlich für ihre vielfaltigen Beiträge.Ein besonderer Dank gebührt Herrn Prof. Dr. iur. ROlF H. WEBER für seinen Gastbei-trag.

Ein grosser Dank geht sodann an Frau Prof. Dr. iur. utr. BRIGITTETAG, Dekanin derRechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Zürich, für das Geleitwort zu diesemBand sowie an den «APARIUZ-Gründen> Herrn Prof. Dr. iur. JÜRG-BEAT ACKERMANNfür seinen Rück- und Ausblick auf die Schriftenreihe. Ausserdem danken wir demganzen Team des Dike Verlags, insbesondere Frau CAROLINE MENDELIN und FrauDOROTHEASCHÖll, herzlich für die stets konstruktive, angenehme und unkomplizierteZusammenarbeit. Ebenfalls danken möchten wir Frau ANNINA MELLIGER für die Kor-rektur der englischen Beiträge.

Ein spezieller Dank gebührt schliesslich allen unseren Sponsorinnen und Sponsoren.Ohne ihre grosszügige finanzielle Unterstützung wäre die Realisierung dieses Projektsundenkbar gewesen.

Die APARIUZ-Tradition hat auch im digitalen Zeitalter ihren Platz gefunden. Daraufund auf weitere 20 APARIUZ-Jahre stossen wir an!

BaseIlFribourg/Zürich, im April 2019 AlEXANDRA DAL MOLlN-KRÄNZLINANNE MIRJAM SCHNEUWlY

JASNA SrOJANOVIC

VI