the dao of politics: li (rituals/rites) and laws as...

The Dao of Politics: Li (Rituals/Rites) and Laws as PragmaticTools of Government

Sor-hoon Tan

Philosophy East and West, Volume 61, Number 3, July 2011, pp. 468-491(Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i PressDOI: 10.1353/pew.2011.0043

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468 PhilosophyEast&WestVolume61,Number3July2011468–491 ©2011byUniversityofHawai‘iPress

THE DAO OF POLITICS: LI (RITUALS/RITES) ANDLAWS AS PRAGMATICTOOLS OF GOVERNMENT

Sor-hoon TanPhilosophyDepartment,NationalUniversityofSingapore

AmericanphilosopherJohnDeweyspentmorethantwoyearsinChina(1919–1921).Duringandafterhisvisit,hewrotesomefairlyperceptiveandinsightfulcommentariesonChina.ThesewerepublishedinperiodicalssuchastheNew Republic, Asia,andtheChina Review,andsometimesinnewspaperssuchastheBaltimore Sun.How-ever, there is hardly any discussion of Chinese philosophy in Dewey’s publishedworksorevenhispapersandcorrespondence.AmonghisrarementionsofChinesephilosophywasanarticlepublished in1922, “As theChineseThink,”whichdis-cussedtheteachingsofLaoZiandConfucius(M13:217–27).1ThiswasanattempttoimproveWestern(oratleastAmerican)understandingofChineseattitudesandac-tionsininternationalnegotiationsandbusiness.ItdescribestheinfluenceofConfu-cianismandDaoismasmerging“tocreateadefinitecontemptforpoliticsandanaversiontogovernmentastheWestunderstandstheterm”(M13:225).ItgoesontodescribetheChinesepolityinthesewords:

Theemperordidnotgovern.Heruledbynotgoverning,bynotinterferingwiththerealgovernment,thecustomsofthepeople,whichweresoimmemorialandsointerwovenwithagriculture,withtheoperationsofnaturethattheythemselveswerelikethework-ingsofnature.(M13:225)

Alaterwork,The Public and its Problems,contrasts“theOrient”withWesternsoci-ety,inwhichthepubliciscapableofbeingorganizedintoastatebetweenthe“toocloseandintimate”and“thetooremoteanddisconnected”(L2:260).In“theOri-ent,”

Politicsisnotabranchofmorals;itissubmergedinmorals.Allvirtuesaresummedupinfilialpiety.Wrongdoingisculpablebecauseitreflectsuponone’sancestryandkin.Offi-cials are known but only to be shunned.To submit a dispute to them is a disgrace.(L2:262)

Deweyconsidereditacommonfeatureofearlysocieties,andnotjustoftheOri-ent,thatcustomsratherthanlawshadbeenthemainmeansofachievingandmain-taining social order and dealing with crises (L2:262; M7:399).As a principle oforganization(M6:413),customsconsistofthevariouswaysinwhichkeyrelation-shipsinasocietyareregulated(L7:50).Theyare“approvedwaysofacting,commontoagroup,andhandeddown fromgeneration togeneration” (M5:54), includinglanguage,politemanners,socialconventions,andalargepartofthecontentofmo-rality.DeweycitedChinaasanexampleofacivilizedsocietyinwhichthematerialsandidealsofeducationderivealmostentirelyfromcustoms(M6:413).

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WhatDeweyreferred toasChina’s“customs”overlapsignificantlywithwhatConfucianscallli禮,translatedas“rites”or“rituals,”amongseveralpossibilities.2AccordingtoDewey,ritualisthe“greatpositiveagent”ofcustomsand“worksbyforminghabits,andoperatesthroughassociationsformedbyactuallydoingcertainacts,usuallyunderconditionswhichappealtotheemotions”(M5:58).Deweyused“ritual” mostly in connection with religion and occasionally in connection withprimitivesociety.AlthoughtheChineseli禮alsohasareligiousorigin,Confucianliismuchbroaderandmoreakinto“custom”inDewey’susage:

Donotlookunlessitisinaccordancewiththerites[li];donotlistenunlessitisinac-cordancewiththerites;donotspeakunlessitisinaccordancewiththerites;donotmoveunlessitisinaccordancewiththerites.(Analects12.1)3

ExamplesofliintheAnalectsincludenormsregulatinganddistinguishingvariousimportant relationships, facilitating social interaction, and “Of the things broughtaboutbytherites[li],harmonyisthemostvaluable”(Analects12.1).Confucianli,likeDewey’scustoms,arealsomeansofdealingwiththecrisesoflifesuchaswaranddeath, andof celebrating important events suchasbirth andcomingof age.Dewey’scontrastofcustomsastherealgovernmentinChinaandthetypicalChinesedisparagementofpunishmentsandlitigationimplicitlyreferstothetraditionalop-positioninChinesethoughtbetweenli禮andfa法(laws)astoolsofgovernment.

I shall examine theoppositionbetween li and fa throughanengagementbe-tweenConfucianismandDewey’spragmatism.4DoesthisoppositionenlightenorobscureourunderstandingofChinesepoliticalphilosophy?Whatareitsinadequa-cies?CouldDeweyanpragmatistslearnsomethingfromitsstrengths?

China’s “Society without Litigation”

WhilelawandlegallanguagedominatethewayAmericansthinkofthemselvesandtheirsociety,theChinesehavealwayspridedthemselvesontheir“kingdomofritualsandceremonies”(liyi zhi bang禮儀之邦).5Chinesesocietyhasoftenbeenseenaspreferringlitofainitsapproachtoregulatingsocialinteractions.Theradicaldiffer-encebetweenChinaandtheWestwherelawisconcernedhasbecomeanorthodoxysince Montesquieu’s description of China as “a despotic state whose principle isfear”highlighteda“propertypeculiartothegovernmentofChina,”which“confusedreligion,laws,mores,andmanners”;Chinawaswellgovernedonlywhenawaywasfoundtomakelibeobservedexactly.6ThisorthodoxyhasalsobeenborneoutintheworksofChinesescholars,suchasthesociologistFeiXiaotong,whosefieldworkinChinesevillagesduringthe1930sand1940srevealsa“societywithoutlitigation.”Chinese villagers thought of a “songshi訟師, a litigationmonger,” as “a trouble-maker,”as“someonewhocreatessocialdiscord.”7AccordingtoFei,ruralsocietyinChinawasruledbyliandnotbylawsinthesenseof“regulationsmaintainedbystatepower.”8LiprovidebothguidanceforbehaviorandrulesbywhichChinesecom-munities resolved conflicts through mediation by their elders. Recent writings onChineselawbyWesternscholarsstillrefertoa“sometimesambivalentattitudethat

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Chinese popular culture maintained towards the likelihood that justice could beachievedthroughresorttoformalstatesanctionedlegalinstitutionsandpractices.”9

Onecould trace thephilosophical inspiration forFei’s“societywithout litiga-tion”andthe“ruleofritual”totheAnalects:

TheMastersaid,“Guidethembyedicts,keeptheminlinewithpunishments,andthecommonpeoplewillstayoutoftroublebutwillhavenosenseofshame.Guidethembyvirtue,keeptheminlinewiththerites[li],andtheywill,besideshavingasenseofshame,reformthemselves.”(Analects2.3)

Othertexts,suchastheZuozhuan左傳andLiji禮記(Bookofrites),alsomentionliasatoolofvirtuousgovernment.10Incontrast,penalcodesinChinesesocietywereseenasresponsestodisorderresultingfromthedeclineofvirtuousrule.ThechapteronLüXing呂刑(“ThePrinceofLeuonpunishments”)intheShangshu尚書(Bookofdocuments)contraststheChineseuseofmoralinfluence(de德)withtheuseofpunishmentstorestraina“barbarian”people,theMiao.11TheZuozhuantellsofhow,inthesixthyearofDukeZhao’srule,thestateofZheng,undertheableministerZiChan,hadsimilarlycast tripodswithacodeofpunishmentson them.Thisactofpromulgation in the sixth century b.c.e.was criticizedas incompatiblewith goodgovernmentintermsthatConfucianswouldagreewith:

Whenthepeopleknowwhattheexactlawsare,theydonotstandinaweoftheirsupe-riors.Theyalsocometohaveacontentiousspirit,andmaketheirappealtotheexpresswords,hopingtobesuccessfulintheirargument.Theycannolongerbemanaged....Whenoncethepeopleknowthegroundsforcontention,theywillcastpropriety[li禮]away,andmaketheirappealtoyourdescriptions.Theywillallbecontendingaboutamatterassmallasthepointofanawloraknife.Disorderlylitigationswillmultiply,andbribeswillwalkabroad.12

Inthenarrativeabove,thetermfawasnotactuallymentioned;“Whenpeopleknowwhat theexact lawsare” translatesmin zhi you pi民知有辟.However, thetermfaisexplicitlyemployedinthenarrativeofthetwenty-ninthyearofDukeZhao,whichattributestoConfuciusthefollowingremarksaboutthecastingoftripodsin-scribedwithpenalstatutesbythestateofJin:“[itispresumed]tomakethesearticleswiththepenalstatutes, toformthelawsoftheState.Thisisgivinganexampleoflawlessness” (shanzuo xing qi yiwei guofa shi fa jian ye擅作刑器以為國法是法姦也).13

InConfucianpoliticalphilosophy,itismoreimportanttohavevirtuouspeopleingovernmentthantohaveagoodsystemoflaws.Whileeveryaspectoflifeistobeguidedbyli,whichexemplifiestheappropriateformsofallcivilizedbehavior,in-cludingbutnotlimitedtoethicalbehavior,lawsareatbestnecessaryevils.Attheirworst,lawsundermineeffortsatachievingapolityofvirtuouspeople.CriticsofCon-fucianism,whousuallyunderstanditintermsofthestateideologyofimperialChina,oftenblameConfucians’negativeattitudetowardlawsforthelongevityofdespotism,thedifficultyofestablishingtheruleoflaw,andthelackofrespectforhumanrightsinChina.Whilesomeobserversfinddirectandindirectevidenceofamovetoward

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ruleof law inChina,criticsworry that thisproductofWesternsocietycannotbetransplanted toChina, and attempts todo sowill onlydisrupt the existing socialorder.14Evenifthereisagenerallymorenegativeattitudetowardlaw,itsdevelop-mentinChinaiscomplexandcannotsimplybeblamedonConfucianphilosophy.Weshouldquestioniftheobjectionstopublicizingpenalcodesandthecriticismofagovernment’suseofpunishmentinearlyConfuciantextsamountedtoarejectionoflawperse.

William Alford contends that those who accept at face value the Confucianworldview of government as effecting social order through moral transformationratherthanlegalrestrainttendtounderestimatetheroleoflawthroughoutChinesehistory.15 Other scholars, including RobinYates, KarenTurner, Melissa Macauley,KathrynBernhardt,andPhilipHuang,havebeguntofillthisgapinourunderstand-ingofChina.16Passagesfromearlytexts,suchastheShangshuandtheZuozhuan,mentionvariouspenalcodes,includingoneoftheXiadynasty.SomecontemporaryChinesescholarstracetheoriginofChineselawstothetimesofthelegendarysage-kingsYaoandShun.Since the1980s,newarchaeological findshavegeneratedaspateofdiscussionsinChinesescholarlyjournalsregardingtheexistenceandnatureof a legal system during the Shang and Zhou dynasties.17Although Derk Boddemaintainedthat“thewrittenlawofpre-modernChinawasoverwhelminglypenalinemphasis,”otherscontendthatearlyChineselawswerenotrestrictedtopenalcodes,evenifthereisinsufficientevidencetobelievethatChinahadacomprehensivecivillawsystemfromveryearlytimes.18AccordingtoGeoffreyMcCormack,administra-tivelawswerewelldevelopedbytheQindynasty(221–206b.c.e.).19

There is no conclusive evidence of a clear distinction between criminal andcivillaw,theformerinvolvingpunishmentsandpenalties—lossoffreedom,property,andlife—andthelatterinvolvingdirectivesforthelosingpartytocompensatethewinningpartyforinjuriessuffered.20TheexistenceofcriminallawsispresupposedbytheConfucianviewthat,evenifnecessary,punishmentsareinferiorinstrumentsof government, andagoodgovernment that cares about socialharmonyand thepeople’svirtuesandwelfareshouldaimtominimizeitsownuseofsuchnegativeinstruments.The reference to not differing from others in hearing litigations eventhoughtheidealistomakelitigationsunnecessary(Analects12.13)mightpresup-posetheexistenceofcivillawaswell,but“litigation”(song)duringthisearlyperiodcouldalsomeanaformalpracticeofbringingcivildisputesforjudgmentbyrespectedpersonsinthecommunity,withoutnecessarilyapplyinganycodifiedcivillaw,whichmightbealatterdevelopment.21

SomeattributetheConfuciandislikeforlawstothefactthatthelawhadbeenusedprimarilyasanarbitraryinstrumentinthehandsofdespoticrulers.22ThelongabsenceofdemocracyinChinameansthatweshouldnotexpectthesamekindofrespectforlawasrecommendedindemocraticsocieties,wherethelawhasdifferentoriginsandfunctionsvis-à-vis thepeople. InthehistoricalrivalrybetweenConfu-cianismandLegalism(fajia法家),Legalistsaretraditionallyseenasadvocatingtheuseoflawasatoolof“governmentoftheruler,bytheruler,fortheruler.”23IntextssuchastheShangjunshu商君書andtheHanfeizi韓非子, fa法comprisesclearly


formulated,widelypromulgated,anduniformlyappliedrulesofbehavior that thepeoplemustconformto;obediencebringsrewards,andtransgressionsharshpunish-ments.24ImperialChinaowedmostofitsstatemachinerytotheLegalists,whogainedpowerunderQinrule.Authoritarianpoliticsdidnotallowthepeopletousethelawsfortheirownprotection,especiallyagainsttherulingclass.Confucianconcernforthepeople’swelfare,notsurprisingly,thenledthemtocondemnwhathadturnedouttobeatoolofoppression.MostofthosewhoacceptanoppositionbetweenfaandlioperatewithJohnAustin’sfamousdefinitionoflaw(equatedwithfa)asasover-eign’scommandmadeobligatorybythethreatofpunishmentforviolation.Thisisonlyoneamongmanydifferenttheoriesaboutwhatthelawis,andonewhichhasbeenstronglycriticizedand,ifDeweyhimselfistobebelieved,wasalreadywellonitswaytoobsolescencebythe1940s(L7:120).25

Althoughitisnotclearwhetherfa,ifunderstoodaslaws,wouldincludecivillawinpre-QinChina,wecouldstillconsiderwhethertheConfuciandisapprovalofpun-ishmentsandpenalcodesmightnotextend tomoderncivil law,whichdoesnotinvolvepunishment(ifwesetasidethecomplicationofpunitivedamages).Thedirec-tivestocompensatethewinningpartyforinjuriessufferedmightbevoluntarilycom-pliedwithonceaverdictisreachedwithoutanyneedforcoercion,andoppressionbygovernmentisnotanissue.However,thisvoluntarycompliancedoesnotmeanthatthethreatofcoercionisabsent;thedirectivescouldbecoercivelyenforcediftheyareignored.TheConfucianconcernthatcoercionwouldresultonlyinexternalcompliancewithoutmoraltransformationwouldstillbevalidinsuchcases.More-over,theneedtobringacivilsuittocourtindicatesafailureinsocialharmony,alackofvirtue inoneormoreof theparties involved,ofwhichConfucianswouldalsodisapprove.Thereisalsothedangerthatthecivilsuitwouldresultinevenmoreac-rimonyandhostility,whichwouldfurtherdamagesocialrelations.

ThereisevidencethattheChinesedidnottreatfaasmerelyatoolofoppressivegovernmenteveninthepre-Qinperiod.Confuciansoftencitethefaofancientkingstocriticizetheexistingpracticesofrulers.26ChadHansenarguesthatLegalistfaisanti-bureaucracyratherthananti-people.27TheLegalistShangYang’sinsistenceonmetingoutpunishmentwhenthecrownprinceofQinbrokealawisinthedirectionof turning laws into tools thatcouldbewieldedagainst,aswellas for, the rulingclass.28Thoughnotcommonlypracticed,theChinese,includingmanyConfuciansoverthecenturies,havehadtheidealthatwhenthe“sonofheaven”breaksalaw,heshouldbepunishedinthesamewayasthecommonpeople.Intheseventeenthcen-tury,theConfucianHuangZongxi,contrarytotheearlierConfucianview,assertedthatonlyifthereis“rulebylaw”(fazhi)cantherebe“rulebymen”(renzhi).Heusedthe“higherlaw”oftheearlykingscitedbyConfuciusandMenciustocriticizeposi-tivedynasticlawsandconceivedoftheformerfaashigherthanthestateorruler.29RandallPeerenboomarguesthattheHuang-laothoughtofthepre-QinandHanpe-riodssubscribestoanatural-lawtheorythatseesanecessaryrelationshipbetweenlawandmorality.30Iflawswerenotalwaysperceivedasimmoraloratbestamoralinstrumentsofarbitrarydespoticrule,thenfaandliinearlyChinesepoliticsmaynothavebeenasfarapartassomeConfuciansbelieve.

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Thosewishingtoreducethedistancebetweenli禮andfa 法oftenpointoutthatearlyChinesetextsopposeliwithxing刑orxingfa刑罰,punishmentsandpenalties,orpenalcodes,andnotfa.ModernMandarintranslateslawasfaorfalü法律,butinthepre-Qinperiod,itmaybemisleadingtoviewChinesefa法throughtheWesternmodernconceptoflaw.31AccordingtoHerrleeCreel,duringtheZhouandWarringStatesperiods,fahadawholerangeofrelatedmeanings:“model,”“method,”“tech-nique,”“rule,”“regulation,”and“law.”32InearlyChinesetextssuchastheAnalects,faisbettertranslatedas“model”or“standard”(Analects9.24,20.1).D.C.Lauuses“standard”(andsimilarterms)morethan“law”(onlyin4A1and6B15)intranslatingfaintheMencius.JohnKnoblocktranslatesfasometimesas“standard”andsome-timesas“law”intheXunzi.33ThismixtureofmeaningsiscommontomanytextsoftheWarringStatesperiodorearlier.Whichmeaning isdominant ina textvaries.Scholarsgenerallyconsider“law”anappropriatetranslationoffaintheShangjunshuandtheHanfeizi.CreelinsistedthatShenBuhaiwasnotaLegalistbecausefadidnotmean“law”forShen.

ScholarssuchasBenjaminSchwartz,AngusGraham,andRogerAmesbelievethatthemeaningoffachangedduringtheWarringStatesperiod,andbythetimeofXunZiandHanFei,justbeforetheQinunification,facametoduplicatexing.34Ac-cordingtothisview,thelatermeaningoffaaslawsisrestrictedtopenalcodescoer-civelyimposedattheruler’swhim.BytheHandynasty,thisreductionoffatoxingseems fairlyestablished; theHan lexicon,Shuowen jiezi說文解字,explains fa intermsofxing.TheDuancommentary,insteadoftreatingthisasareductionfromabroadermeaning, treatsxing as theprimarymeaningof fa,whichhadbeen“ex-tendedtomeanallmodels.”35However,ChadHansenarguesagainstthemeaning-changethesisandmaintainsthatfameansnot“laws”but“objectivestandards”evenfor theLegalists.Notuntil itwasusedto translate“dharma”whenBuddhismwasintroducedtoChina,acenturyaftertheriseofLegalism,didfacometomean“law,”inthesenseof“universalpropositions(sentences)witheitherdescriptiveorprescrip-tivenecessity(causationorobligation).”Hansenmaintainsthat,beforethen,Chinadidnothaveaconceptoflaw.36

Theearliestandwidestmeaningoffaprobablyincludesstandardsofmeasures,standardsoflanguageuseandinterpretation,andnormsormodelsthatneednotbearticulatedaspropositions.Amongtheseareli,whichwerenormsofbehavior,tradi-tionallybelievedtobeestablishedbysage-kingsbutwhichmoreprobablyemergedfrompracticessociallysanctionedovertime,aswellascodifiedprescriptiverulesimposedbyrulersonsubjectsandcoercivelyenforced,whichcouldbeidentifiedaslaws.Bothprovide“standards”ofwhattodoandtheconsequencesofvariousac-tionsinspecificcircumstances.Ibelievethatthisaccountsfortheoverlapsbetweenfaandliaswellasbetweenfaandxing.

Li as Laws

DifferentrelationshipsbetweenliandfacouldbeinferredfromdifferentchaptersintheXunzi. Insteadofoneencompassing theother, the twomaybeonparas two


majorkindsofhuman“artifice”(wei偽).Todealwithbadnatureinhumanbeings,thesage,“havingcreatedritualprinciplesandmoralduty(li-yi禮義),institutestheregulationsoflawsandstandards(fa-du法度).”37Insofarasfacanbetranslatedaslaws,someChinesescholarshavearguedthatintheXunzi,liformsthemoralbasisoffa,indicatingamoralisticviewoflaws.38However,thecloseassociationbetweenliandfaintheXunzileadsotherstoviewXunZiasmoreLegalistthanConfucian;tothem,whatXunZicallsli,whichcanrectifythepersonandthestate,isthesameaswhattheLegalistscallfa.39ChineselegalscholarMeiZhongXieconsidersitauniquecharacteristicofancientChinathatithad“directiveandpreventive”laws,whichareknownasli,incontrasttocorrectiveandsuppressivelawsknownasxing.40RobertoUngerseeslias“customaryorinteractionallaw,”eventhoughliwere“tacitmodelsofexemplaryconduct” thatareeitherunformulatedor formulatedasmoralanec-dotes,andthereforedifferentfromfa,whichpossessesthedefiningqualitiesofbu-reaucratic or regulatory law in being positive and public.41 Criticizing Unger’sdescriptionof li as “not rulesatall,”Alfordmaintains that li comprises “specific,publicrules.”Manualsof li,suchas theZhouli周禮andtheYili儀禮,existedasearlyasthefourthandthirdcenturiesb.c.e.42Confuciuslamentedthelackofrecordsofritesofearlierdynasties,whichimplies that licouldbewrittendown(Analects3.9).However,therecordsConfuciuswaslamentingneednotbeformulatedasrulesandcouldhavebeenarecordofmoralanecdotes.Later, li formulatedasrulesofbehavior were written into the dynastic statutes. Ch’üT’ung-tsu’s study of “tradi-tionalChineselaw”(fromtheHandynastytotheQingdynasty)isasmuchaboutliasitisaboutfa.43

Ainsworth sees li and fa as “two competing normative legal concepts.”This“communicates something significant about the imperialChinese legal sensibilitythatsoughttoincorporate”bothConfucianandLegalistviewsabouthumannatureandnormativeorder.ToAinsworth,liare“prescriptivesocialrules”eventhoughtheyare“unwrittenandlackingindetails.”44Besideslegalscholars,sinologistsandphi-losophersalsooftenconceiveofli,whetherwrittenorunwritten,asrulesofbehavioraimingatsocialharmony.Wm.TheodoredeBarymaintainsthat“therewasacon-siderableoverlapin theconceptionsof ‘rites’and‘laws’ inConfucianusage”andconsidersli“abasicconstitutionalorder.”45Bothareabout“corporateorsystemicmodels”thatarerequiredtorealizepersonalvirtueingovernment;thedifferenceliesonlyinliworkingthroughvoluntaryself-restraint,whilelawsemployexternalincen-tivesordisincentives.Eventhisdifferencedisappearedwhenitbecameacommonpracticetopunishtransgressorsofli.However,viewingliasalegalconceptdoesnotmeanminimizingthedifferencesbetweentraditionalChinesesocietyandWesternsocieties,asthefailuretodevelopcivilsocietyinChinadiscussedindeBary’sworkwasdueatleastinparttotheinadequacyoftheritualformof“basicconstitutionalorder”inrestrainingthedespoticpoweroftheemperor.46

TheConfucian tendency to treat lias imposingmoralconstraintsonstatutorylawsledtoviews,suchasJosephNeedham’s, that li —whichwerebelievedtobecreatedbysagesbasedonhumannatureandcosmicorder—weretheequivalentofnaturallawsinWesternthought.47AccordingtoDewey,thenatural-lawtraditionin

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theWest,whichreferredtoanultimatesourcethatissupposedlyhigherandmorefixed thanexperienceand thereforea suitable “ground for genuinelyphilosophicevaluationoflaw”(L14:116),isanattemptatjustificationand/orcriticismofexistingrulesandpractice.Asapragmatist,Deweyrejectedsuchattemptsandtreatedlawas“throughandthroughasocialphenomenon”(L14:117).48However,Deweydidnothavetoworryaboutthearbitrarywillofthemonarch;hewasconcernedwithhowwellthelaw,asarelativelypermanentinstitutionenactedbydemocraticcommuni-ties,couldtrackthedynamicdesiresandinterestsofthepeopleasitshould.WhatisobsoleteforDewey—anappealtoahigher,nonhumanauthoritytocriticizedefactohumanauthorities—mighthavenecessitatedsomekindoffunctionalequivalenttonaturallawsintheundemocraticChinesecontext.

Dewey’s general conceptof law is “a statementor relationoforderwhich isemployedasaneffectivemethodofprocedureinfurtherdealingswithphenomena”(M7.269).Lawsdealingwithactivitiesofhumanbeingsinrelationtooneanother,thatis,lawsinthejuralsense,werethefirsttoemergeintoconsciousrecognition;“natural law” was conceived “after the analogy of jural law” (ibid.). Dewey alsocriticizedtheAustiniantheoryoflaw,eventhoughitlocatesthesourceoflawwithinsocialactivitiesandrelations,forfailingtogiveapersuasiveorcoherentaccountoftheroleplayedbycustom(E4:81–89).Deweymaintainedthatthedevelopmentoflawasaninstitutionbeganwithrulesthatwerefirstimposedintheformofcustoms,whichmakescustoms the sourceof law (E4:40; L14:118).Ononeoccasion,heactuallyassertedthat“alllawsexceptthosewhichregulatetechnicalproceduresareregistrationsofexistingsocialcustomsandtheirattendantmoralhabitsandpurposes”(L5:73). However, on other occasions, Dewey maintained a distinction betweencustomandlaw,insistingthatwhenacustombecomesalaw,itgainsanewstatus.Customsbecomelawsonlywhenauthoritativelyformulatedandstatedbyacompe-tentauthority(L3:327).ItwasnotedearlierthatDewey’s“customs,”ifnotexactlyequivalenttoli,areakintooratleastoverlapwiththem.Thetrendofwritingmanyritualrulesintothedynasticstatutes,beginningatleastwiththeHandynasty,mightthenparallelDewey’sunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweencustomsandlaws.49However,Iproposethatwewouldarriveatamorenuancedunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweencustoms, li,andlawbyfocusingonhowtheyworkonindi-vidualswhocomplywiththem,andtherebyachievesocialorder.

ToDewey,customsarosefromtheneedtoshapeandcontrol thebehaviorofmembersinasocialgroup;theyaresocialnormsembodyingthegroup’sjudgmentthatcertainrulesaretobefollowedforthesakeofthegroup’swelfare.Transgressionismetwith thegroup’sdisapprovalandsometimesbypunishment; theyoungaretrainedtoobservetherulessothattheybecomesocialhabits(M5:54–55).“Acus-tomisthusanormofvoluntaryaction.Itisintermediatebetweenmorality,properlyspeaking,andlaw—akintomoralsinhavingatdisposalasubjectivedispositionintheindividualtoconform,andakintolawinusingobjectivemeansofcompulsion”(L3:16).Usingthisspectrumbetweentheuseofobjectivemeansofcompulsionandthesubjectivedispositiontoconform,lawoverlapswithcustomsinusingobjectivemeans of compulsion, while Confucian li overlaps with customs in requiring the


subjective disposition to conform.When li descends to usingobjectivemeansofcompulsion,itdegeneratesfromethicalidealorvirtuetocustomorevenlaw.Lawcouldbeobeyedwithout theuseofobjectivemeansofcompulsionbecause it isrootedinorhasengenderedacorrespondingcustom,andifthepracticebecomesmorethanaboutexternalcompliance,bringingaboutmoraltransformationofchar-acterandsocialharmony,itascendstotheethicalidealofli.

Confucian and Pragmatic Tools of Government

InDewey’sview,“Politicsandlawarecloselytiedtogether;theycannotultimatelybesevered”(M15:105).Deweymaintainsthat,asstatementsorrelationsoforderbetweeneventsoractions,“lawsarethegeneralmethodsbywhichweintroducecontinuityandorderinexperiencesotherwisediscrepantandmixedup....[T]heyareinstrumentalitiesofreducingseemingconflictstoharmony”(M4:199).Bystatingclearlytherelationbetweencertainactionsandspecificconsequences,andpromis-ingthatthecourtsofthelandwillensurethatthestatedrelationbetweenthetwowillobtain,lawsintroducepredictabilityintosociallife.Laws“areinfacttheinstitutionofconditionsunderwhichpersonsmaketheirarrangementswithoneanother.Theyarestructureswhichcanalizeaction”(L2:269).Bysettingoutandmakingpredict-abletherelationsbetweenspecificconditions/actionsandtheirconsequences,lawhelpstoregulatesocialinteraction,wherethereispotentialforconflict.Deweysug-gestedthattheoccasionforacustomtobecomelawbybeingauthoritativelyformu-latedbyacompetentauthorityisalwaysadispute(L3:327).Forexample,thecustomofonlytheeldestsoninheritingmighthaveexistedinasocietybutbecamelawinthecommon-lawtradition,whensomeconflictthataroseoveraparticularcase(per-hapstheothersiblingsinsistedthattheirfatherhadwantedalltohaveashare)wasbroughtbeforeamagistratewhoruledinfavorofthecustomaryinheritancerightsoftheeldestson.Inotherlegaltraditions,somedifferentprocessoflegislationbytheappropriateinstitutionmightberequiredbeforealawcameintobeing,butthetrig-gerforlegislationinsuchcaseswouldbesomedisputeoverpreexistingcustoms.ItshouldbenotedthatDewey’sobservationdoesnotprecludethatlawscouldalsohavetheirsourceintheresolutionofcertainconflictsevenwhennocustomexists.

Thelawisatoolofgovernmentbecauseofitsfunctioninpreventingandresolv-ingconflicts.Byclearlydelineatingboundariesofpermissiblebehaviorinspecificcircumstances, lawsenablepeopletoavoidconflicts,andwhentheydoarise,re-solvethemaccordingtoprinciplesknowntoandacceptedbythecommunity.Bydeterminingwhatisrightineachcase,thelawmakesitpossibleforpeoplenottosettleconflictsthrougharbitrarymight.InDewey’sview,“lawisthesolealternativetoresorttoforce,individualandcollective,asamethodforarrangingdisputesduetoconflictofinterests”(M15:107).Weshouldprobablyread“force”inthequotedpas-sagefromDeweyas“violence,”thewastefulanddestructiveuseofforce,torenderitconsistentwithotherstatementsrecognizingtheuseofforcetoenforcelaws.ThereissomeevidenceforthisreadingofDewey’sconceptionoflaw:“lawisessentiallyaformulationof theuseof force”(M10:251); itdescribes“amethodforemploying

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forceeconomically,efficiently,soastogetresultswiththeleastwaste”(M10:212).DeweyseemstomovefromaconceptionoflawinvolvingwhatH.L.A.Hartcalls“rules of recognition,” secondary rules setting out the criteria of legal validity—“customs do not become law in any juridical sense until they are authoritativelystatedor formulated” (L3:327)—toonecloser to theconceptionof law found inGerman thought,which views coercion as a necessarypart of law.50Whether ornotcoercionisincludedinitsdefinition,theabilityoflawtosettledisputes,whenothermeanssuchasnegotiationfail,isneverthelessduetothepresenceofacoerciveelement.

From a Confucianperspective, li are also “structureswhich canalize action,”whichintroducecontinuityandorderintoexperience,andpredictabilityandstabil-ityintosociallife,andpreventandresolveconflicts.However,bothtreatingChinaas“asocietywithoutlitigation”atoneextremeandreducinglitoaformoflawsattheotherextremeoversimplifytheissuesanddistorttheunderstandingofactualexperi-ence.Liandlawsarenotrelatedasmoralidealtothepracticeofrealpolitik.Theyhavecoexistedinactualpractice,andbothlegalandritualpracticeshavefallenshortoftheirrespectiveideals.Asideas,lawandlioverlapandsharecertainsimilarities,buttheyalsodiffersignificantlyintheirfunctioningvis-à-visthegoalofgoodgovern-ment.Allgovernments,EastorWest,needtocontendwiththeproblemofconflictsarisingfromdifferencesinbeliefs,desires,needs,andinterests,andattempttoservethecommongoodwithlimitedresources.Howcouldsomethingcommonbecreatedfromdifferences?Howdowecoordinatedifferentpursuitstoavoidorresolveharm-fulconflicts?Byofferingdifferentanswerstothesequestions,lawandliserveasdif-ferentkindsoftoolsofgovernment.

LiandlawarecomplementaryratherthanmutuallyexclusivealternativesevenintheConfucianworldview.Bothbuildsocialconsensusandfacilitatesocialcoordi-nationandcooperationbyestablishingandmaintainingsocialnorms.Whetherwerubnosesorbowtoeachother,sharingacommonritualnormofgreetingensuresthatanencounterbeginsonapositivenote,increasingthechancesofharmoniousandmutuallysatisfyinginteraction.Whetherwedriveontherightorontheleft,fol-lowingthenormsofasinglesetoftrafficlawstogetherensuresthatwedonotkilleachothersimplyforlackofcoordination.Confuciansrecognizebothlawsandliastoolsofgovernmentbecausebothcouldbeemployedtoelicitcertainkindsofbehav-iorandpreventothers,butassesstheirdesirabilitydifferently.Onemayeithercom-plywithanormofbehaviorvoluntarilyasperritualpracticeorbeorderedtodosobytheauthoritiesastheresultofanaggrievedpartybringingthedisputetotherele-vantofficials.Thelatterindicatesafailureofvirtuousself-regulationandcooperationonthepartofthoseconcerned.Confucianspreferthatpeopleregulatethemselvesthroughvirtuesothatgovernmentauthoritiesneednotresorttoforce.

Confuciansbelievethatwhiletheeffectonbehaviorintheshorttermmaybethesame,differenttoolsofgovernmenthavedivergingresultsinthelongerrun.Thosewhoobeylaws“willstayoutoftrouble,butwillhavenosenseofshame,”whereasthosewhofollowrituals“will,besideshavingasenseofshame,reformthemselves”(Analects2.3).Whethercriminalorcivil,laws,byjudgingactionsanddealingwith


disputesaccordingtopublicrules,willdirectpeople’sattentiontowinningthead-versarialcontestsbeforetheadjudicatingauthorities,evenattheexpenseofmoralconsiderationsofthesituation.Apartfromencouragingthekindofmorallysuspectverbalglibness(ning佞)thatConfuciusdisapprovedof,thetendencytoseparatelawfrommoralitymeansthatusingthelawastheprimarytoolofgovernment(letalonetheonlytool)mayleadtothekindofsocietywhereevensocialandpoliticalleaderspubliclyexcuseorjustifytheiractsintermsof“WhatIdidwasimmoral,butitwasnotillegal.”51Moreover,giventhatthereisusuallyawinnerandaloserinlitigations,anincreaseinlitigiousnessislikelytoreducetheoverallharmonyofacommunity.Indeed,resortingtolitigationisinitselfafailureinharmonysinceitmeansthatthepartiescouldnotvoluntarilycometoamutualagreement.

Confuciansseethesocialnormsofli,unlikestatutorylaws,asinherentlyethical,whichsetsthemapartfrommereconvention.Liembodyvirtuesandrealizeharmonyinthecommunity.Asanidea,Confucianlieschewcoercion.Dewey’sEthicscon-ceivesofritualintermsofnoncoercivecustomembodyingsocialifnotmoralcon-sensus.Deweyrecognizesthat it isnot forcethatbringsaboutconsensus,but theexistenceofconsensusthatenableslawsorcustomstobeenforced.ThecontextforDewey’semphasisonconsensusisDewey’ssocialconceptionofselfasacritiqueofAmerica’sruggedindividualism.ThisbringsDewey’sunderstandingofthevalueofcustomsandritualsclosertothatofConfucianli,whichimplyarelationalconceptofself,andasavirtuebringthevalueofharmonytosocialinteraction.However,lihaveahigherethicalstatusinConfucianismcomparedwithcustomsandritualsinDewey’sEthics.FromtheConfucianperspective,whenbothelicitvoluntarycompli-anceandembodyconsensus,listilldifferfromcustomsinintroducingthepossibilityofexcellenceorvirtueintoapractice.

TheissueofcoercioniscentraltotheConfucianpreferenceforlioverlaws.Byresortingtopunishmentorthreatofforce,thereasonsofferedbylawsforactionareexternal;theymakeaparticularactmoreorlessattractivebymanipulatingtheexter-nal preconditions or consequences. Once the laws are removed or if a personbelieves she could avoid these external deterrents, shewill return to her originalpreference.Inthisway,lawsworkonlyaslongasthereiseffectiveenforcement.Incontrast,liworkthroughhabituationthatresultsinspontaneouscompliancebasedonemotive-cognitivetransformation.Itisthistransformationinternalizingtheethical-socialnormthatdevelopsasenseofshameinaperson.Onereformsoneselfthroughlisothat,evenifnooneiswatchingornoonewouldknowifonetransgresses,onewouldstillfollowtheritualnorms.52

HowvalidisthisConfuciancontrastbetweenlawsandli ?Theclaimthatlawsalwayscoerceorthreatenandnevereducateorreformthosewhoobeyseemstoosweeping.HanFeimentioned“usinglawstorectifythemind,”intendingthatlawsbringaboutchangesinthosewhoobeythem,goingbeyondexternalcompliance.53Onemightstartobeyingalawtoavoidpenalties,butifthenormgivessatisfaction,itcouldverywellbringabout thekindof transformationConfuciansassociateonlywith li. Forexample,by repeatedlyobeyinga lawagainst littering,apersonmaydevelopahabitofnotlitteringaswellascometoappreciatetheconsequentlyclean

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environmentsomuchthatshevoluntarilywillnotlittereveninacountrywithoutsuchalaw.54Conversely,compliancewithritualnormsmayalsobeduetoexternalfactors,suchasafearofdisapprovaloradesireforpraisefromthosearoundus;itisbecauseexternalfactorscouldalsoplayapartinelicitingritualbehaviorthathis-toricallylicametobeenforcedthroughcoercivemeansinChina.Evenifnosuchexternalfactorsareinvolved,thereisnoguaranteethathabituationwilldevelopasenseof shame rather than result inblindandmechanical followingof the ritualnormsthatwillmaintainorderonlyinfairlystaticconditions.

OnecouldarguethatConfuciuswasquiteawareofhowlicoulddegenerateintono more than mechanical habit or compliance for external reasons, and that hewouldratherhavepeopleignorelithanfollowthemonlyforform’ssakeorforthewrong reasons.His rhetoricalquestion, “Are ritesnomore thangifts of jadeandsilk?”isanimpliedcriticismofthemechanicalfollowingofritualformsthatalreadymusthavebeenaproblemduringhistime(Analects17.11).HetoldZaiWotoignorethethree-yearritualmourningperiodif“[youwould]beabletoenjoyeatingyourriceandwearingyourfinery”againsttheritualnorms(Analects17.21),althoughtootherstudentshecriticizedZaiWo’slackoffeeling,makingitclearthatliisethi-callyimportanteventhoughitdefeatsthepurposetoforcepeopletoconform.Per-formancesthatareforced,mechanical,ordoneforsomeexternalreasonsarenotexemplary liandaremeaningless.Unless theperformancecomes fromtheheart-mind,withtherecognitionthatsomethingistheappropriatethingtodo,andmore-over is anembodimentof excellence towhichonecommitsone’s entireperson,thereisnoConfucianli.

AlthoughitmightoverlapwithDewey’sconceptofcustom,theConfuciancon-ceptofliisnotmerelyaboutcustomarymorality,whichDeweycontrastswithreflec-tivemorality.Inreflectivemorality,customsarestillpresent,but“theindividualhastograspthemeaningofthesecustomsoverandabovethebarefactoftheirexistence,andhastoguidehimselfbytheirmeaningandnotbythemerefactnoted”(M5:167).AdequateperformanceofConfucian limustrisetothelevelofreflectivemorality,eventhoughover-intellectualizingwillgetinthewayofeffectivepractice.TheCon-fucianliiscloselyrelatedtoyi義,understoodaswhatismeaningfulorappropriate.AccordingtotheBook of Rites,“liistheactualizationofyi.Ifanobservancestandsthetestofbeingjudgedbywhatisyi,eventhoughtheancientkingsmaynothavedoneit,itshouldbeadoptedforitsyi.”55Graspingandembodyingthemeaningandnotmerecompliancewithobservedformsiscriticaltoeffectiveritualperformance.PerformancesofConfucianliaresubjecttoevaluation,bythecriterionofyi,orwhatisappropriatetoasituation;thisintroducesacriticalreflectiveelementtolithatisimportanttoanyeffort toreform li tomeetchangingsocialandhistoricalcircum-stances.

TheideaofliinConfucianismdoesnotmerelydescribecustomarymores;itisassociatedwith“leadingthepeoplewithde德(excellenceorvirtue)”(Analects2.3).ForConfucians,goodgovernmentisagovernmentofvirtue;suchagovernmentmustachievemorethansocialorderbasedonlyonprudentialactionselicitedbythreatsorincentives.Itmustbringaboutsocialharmonybasedonethicaltransformationof


thepeopleintovirtuousritualparticipants.Whereactualpracticesareconcerned,whetherweapplythetermlawor li,whatisimportantistoidentifywhatkindofsocialnormsareatworkandhowtheywork,sothatwemaydeterminewhethertheywillbringaboutthekindofsocialharmonyConfuciangoodgovernmentaimsfor.

Whatshouldgovernmentsdobeforethatidealofharmoniousritualcommunityisachieved?Voluntarycomplianceisundoubtedlysuperiortocoercedobedience,butuntiltheethicaltransformationoftheentirepopulaceiscomplete,threatsandincentivesremainnecessary.Governmentsmustdealwiththeproblemsofanimper-fectsocietyhereandnow,ratherthanactasiftheyarealreadylivinginautopiaofvirtue.ThisrecognitionisalsopresentintheAnalects,whereinoneofthepurposesofConfucius’“rectificationofnames” (zhengming) is toensure that“punishmentswillfitthecrimes”sothat“thepeoplewillknowwheretoputhandandfoot”(Ana-lects13.3).ItbecomesmuchmorepronouncedintheXunzi,whichadvocatesthat“those who come forward with good intentions should be treated with full ritualcourtesy;thosewhocomeforwardwithoutgoodintentionsshouldbehandledwithpunishments”(Xunzi9.2).Aflourishing,well-governedstatemustgetbothpunish-mentsandpenalties(xingfa刑罰)andritualsandmusic(liyue禮樂)right,implyingthattheyarecomplementary.Inpracticalterms,ritualsdonotofferacompletealter-nativetolawsasthetoolofgovernment;theyarebothneeded,togetherwithothermeans,suchaseducationandnon-officialagenciesthatresolvedisputesandcon-tributetosocialorder.Neitherislawalonesufficientforgoodgovernment.The“rulebylaw”thatConfuciansmustrejectisavisionofgovernmentthatfocusesonlyontheminimalrequirementofelicitingexternalcomplianceandignorescompletelythequestforsocialorderthatisnotmaintainedbycoercivethreatsandincentives.

Deweyan Democracy and the Art of Community

DeweybelievedthatChineseempireswereso“interwovenwithlocalcustomsastobepartoftheestablishedorderofnatureandabletodispensewithmilitarysupport”(M11:219).Thisresulted,inChina,in“aschemeofremarkablestaticequilibrium—themoststableknowntohistory”(M11:219).Inthenineteenthcentury,thisequilib-riumwasdisruptedbyexternalforces,andwhathadoncebeenastrengthbecameaweakness.56 Entrenched customs prevented intelligent solutions to new problems(M11:213).Forcustoms lackadaptability,and thosewhose livesaregovernedbycustomstendtodislikechange.Evenincivilizedsocieties,custom“hasthegreatestinertia”andtendstopersisteventhroughsocialrevolutionsthatdismantlethevisiblestructuresofinstitutions(M14:76–77).Incontrast,lawspragmaticallyunderstoodasservingasocialfunction“assuretheintroductiononalargescaleoftherationalfac-torintoconcreteevaluationsoflegalarrangements”(L14:122).Pragmaticlawsareamenableto, indeeddemand,social inquiryandintelligentchangetoensurethattheyliveuptotheirfunction.

Deweyseemstoimplythatcustomonitsownisaninferiortoolcomparedwithlaw(whichimpliescustom)becausetheformerisnotamenabletointelligentchange.Notingthatsomeappealtoreasonasthe“fountandorigin”oflaws,Deweyhimself

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considerslawtobe“embodiedreason”inthesenseof“aformulatedgeneralizationofmeansandproceduresinbehaviorwhichareadaptedtosecurewhatiswanted”(L2:271).57 Formulation, application, and critiqueof laws as prescriptive rules oruniversalpropositionsallrequirewhatiscommonlyrecognizedasreason.Tobeir-rationalorunreasonablewouldrenderalawseriouslyflawedifnottotallydisqualifyapropositionfrombeinga law. Insofarasdeliberate,controlledsocialchangere-quirestheuseofreason(broadlyconstrued),theConfucianlialsoneedstheuseofreasonifitistobeamenabletoreformandconsciousimprovement.Forexample,whenlaterConfucianssuchasZhuXiformulated“familyrituals,”probablyonthebasisofpreviouspractices,reasonisinvolvedinreflectiveselectionandmodification.Thisdoesnotcontradictthefactthatritualperformancesarenotprimarilyexercisesinreasoning,butembodiedexperiencesbetterunderstoodasaesthetic,concernedwithperception,appreciation,andenjoyment.58Analects8.8associatesliwithartssuchaspoetryandmusic:“BestimulatedbytheOdes,takeyourstandontheritesandbeperfectedbymusic.”TheBook of Riteshaschaptersonmusic,andonliandmusic,whichareoftenmentionedtogetherasliyueinearlyChinesetexts.Theasso-ciationofliwithmusicalsoimpliestheimportanceofenjoymentinritualpractice,asthesamecharacter樂isusedforbothmusicandjoy,afactthatXunZi’sdiscus-sionofmusicmademuchof.59RobertEnocapturesthecentralityof theaestheticdimensioninConfucian(ru儒)ritualmasterymostaptlybydescribingtheRuistsas“mastersofdance.”60

The aesthetic emphasis of li may be obscured or deliberately suppressed byviewingitasarigidsetofprescriptiverulesofbehaviorimposedfromaboveinordertoentrenchhierarchicalclassdistinctions.OnlyasmallminorityagreeswithHansenthattheancientChinesethinkers“nevercharacterizedtheli禮asrules,asoughts,orasprescriptivesentences.”61ThelatterlegalizationofConfucianismovershadowstheoriginofliascustomarypracticeswherein,“farfromuniversallyapplicableprinci-ples, they are particular mores, values and guidelines for human interaction of aparticular societyataparticular time.”62TheChinese traditiondoesnotofferanydetailedaccountoftheoriginofritualsthatmatchesthePragmatists’accountoftheconnectionbetweenpersonalhabitsandsocialcustoms,andhowtheseemergeintheprocessofindividualsinteractingtobringordertotheirlives,simplifyingprac-tices, and preparing the way for evaluating habits and customs.63 In general, theChinese traditionaldiscourseon li paidmoreattention to intentional “top-down”propagation and training to observe the rituals properly than to the spontaneousemergenceofritualsaspersonalaestheticpractices.TheAnalectsconsiderstheinsti-tutionoflitheprovinceofthe“sonofheaven”(Analects16.2).ThetreatiseonliintheXunzi(chapter19)andotherearlyChinesetextsattributedthemtothelegendarysage-kings.

Traditionalaccountsnotwithstanding,theconceptofConfucianlicouldbere-constructedtobetterappreciateitsaestheticelement,whichiscrucialtoitscapacitytobringaboutharmony.Aritualperformanceshouldbeadynamicprocessof“nour-ishingtheemotions”(Xunzi19.1d),conveyingthefittingemotionsandmeaningsinsocial interactions.Therulesof liareelicited fromexemplaryperformances.They


emergeoutofanaestheticprocessandshouldbetreatedassecondaryratherthandefinitive.Theymayguidethebeginner,buttheritualvirtuosohasnoneedforthem.Therulesmayattempttoarticulatetheritualforms,buttoreducelitorulesistomis-takethesacrificialvesselfortheactualsacrifice.Howinadequatetherule-conceptionofritesismaybeseenbyhowlittleimportancetheAnalectsattachestothetangibleforms,thatpartofriteswhichcouldbeformulatedasenforceable“rulesofbehavior”:

TheMastersaid,“Surelywhenonesays‘Therites,therites,’itisnotenoughmerelytomeanpresentsofjadeandsilk.Surelywhenonesays‘Music,music,’itisnotenoughtomeanbellsanddrums.”(Analects17.11)

Confucianliareperformanceswhereintheparticularismorethefocusthantheuni-versal;qualityandcontentinauniqueperformanceoutweighformandtechniqueinimportance.Observingallthecorrectritualformsisworthlessifreverenceismissingfromtheperformance(Analects3.26):“Inmourning,itisbettertoerronthesideofgriefthanonthesideofformality”(Analects3.4).InConfucianism,liembodythewaysoflivingharmoniouslytogether.Governingthroughliistoconductpoliticsastheartofmakingcommunity.

StudyingthewayConfucianliworkcouldilluminatetheaestheticsideofpoliticallifeandenhanceourunderstandingofhowtoachieveDeweyandemocracyasawayof life.Studyinghowlawscouldpromotedemocratic lifeandhowtheycouldbecontinuouslyreformedtomeetthepeople’schangingneedsyieldscluesfordemoc-ratizing Confucian rituals through social inquiry and reflection.The contrast andcomplementarityofliasprimarilyaestheticandlawsasprimarilyrationalgiveusacluetohowtointroduceflexibilityandresponsivenessintothetaskofgovernment.Aswithallpragmaticcontrasts,thisshouldnotbereifiedintoadualism.ItmustbestressedthatDeweybelievedthatreasonrequirestheguidanceoffeeling(theaes-thetic apprehensionof quality), and feeling requires continual reflective (rational)scrutiny.64Partofappreciatingthecontrastandcomplementarityofliandlawsistorealizethattheaestheticemphasisofonedoesnotprecludetheuseofreason,andtherationalemphasisoftheothershouldnotneglecttheaesthetic.Thesuccessofreforming laws tomeet theneedsanddesiresof individualsandcommunities re-quires thekeen“aestheticapprehensionofquality”mentionedaboveasmuchasrigorous reasoning.While the aesthetic is emphasized in particular performancesthemselves,thatlicouldbeformulatedandevaluatedindicatestheapplicabilityofreasontoaneededprocessofimprovementashumancommunitiesandindividualschange.

Deweyhimselfunderstoodthetaskofachievingdemocracyasbothartandsci-ence;he refused toseparate the rationaland theaesthetic,although theaestheticelement inDewey’spoliticalphilosophyhasbeen relativelyneglected.65The ten-dencytoemphasizeoneattheexpenseoftheother—and,worse,toopposetheminadualism—isthecauseofmanysocialproblems.Tobemorethanapoliticalsystem,morethanthe“politicaldemocracy”thatDeweyfound“theleastinspiring,”democ-racyas“theideaofcommunitylifeitself”(L2:328)mustavoidareifiedseparationoftherationalandtheaesthetic,andachieveabalancebetweenthem.Therationaland

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theaesthetic,scienceandart,areinseparableinbringing“anorganized,articulatepublic”intobeing:

Thehighestandmostdifficultkindofinquiryandasubtle,delicate,vividandresponsiveartofcommunicationmusttakepossessionofthephysicalmachineryoftransmissionandcirculationandbreathelifeintoit ... fordemocracyis thenameforalifeof freeandenrichingcommunion. Ithad its seer inWaltWhitman. Itwillhave itsconsummationwhenfreesocialinquiryisindissolublyweddedtotheartoffreeandmovingcommunica-tion.(L2:350)

Democracyasawayoflifeisguidedbydemocracyasaregulativeidea(L2:328);itsmeaninghastobeenvisionedimaginativelyandemotionally,aswellasunderstoodconceptuallyandanalyzedrationally; its functioningmustbe investigatedempiri-cally.Achievingthedemocraticwayoflifeisatthesametimeanartandascience.InNature and Experience,Deweypointsout

[that] science is anart, that art ispractice[,] ... that art—themodeofactivity that ischarged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession—is the completeculminationofnature,andthat“science”isproperlyahandmaidenthatconductseventstothishappyissue.(L1:268–269)

InThomasAlexander’sview,“TheartoflifeisthegoalbehindDewey’sethics,hisphilosophyofdemocracy,andhistheoryofeducation.”Furthermore,thekeytothisartoflifeistodevelopa“creative-criticalculture,”acultureunderstoodas“thatorganized body of activities by which human beings are meaningfully present toeachother”and“aculturethatisconsciouslyawareofitselfasashapingandshape-ablepower.”66AccordingtoDewey,

Theproblemoffreedomanddemocraticinstitutionsistiedupwithwhatkindofcultureexists....Thestrugglefordemocracyhastobemaintainedonasmanyfrontsasculturehasaspects:political,economic,international,educational,scientificandartistic,[and]religious.(L13:186)

ThisculturalapproachtothepursuitofdemocracyindicatestheareaofmostfertileengagementbetweenDewey’sphilosophyandConfucianism.Liconstituteanim-portantpartofculture:theyarenormsofexcellenceselectedthroughtheexperienceofacommunityfromwhatDeweycalls“thehabitudeswhichliebelowthelevelofreflection...whichhavebeenformedintheconstantgiveandtakeofourrelation-shipwithothers”(M9:22).Whilereasoningisrequiredtosolveproblemsinsocialinquiry,lishapethetacitenvironment,whichhasanimpactonhowweparticipateintheinquiryandtheoutcome.67

Inanaestheticexperience,wemovefromaprecognitive,inchoatefeelingofasituationtoacognitive,communicative,processofunderstandingitsmeaningandvalueinthewider,continuouscontextofsharedexperience,andreturntoanappre-ciationofthewhole,asense—whichisafusionoffeelingandthinking—ofitsmean-ingandvalueasimmediatelyembodiedinthesituation.AccordingtoDewey,“allcommunicationislikeart,”andcommunicationiscentraltothebuildingofcom-


munityasdemocraticprocesses(M9:9).Reasoninginsocialinquiryisinstrumentalin solving theproblemsof thegeneralpublic inademocracy.However, thinkingalonedoesnotdeterminetheoutcome;theattitudesandfeelingsthatparticipantsbringtotheinquiryalsoaffecttheresults.Ifoneentersaninquiryfeelinghostileto-wardfellowparticipants,obstinatelybelievingthatonealoneisrightandentitledtowhatonewants,differencesofopinionareunlikely tobe resolved to themutualbenefitofall.Theeffectofritualsonemotions,especiallytheemphasisofConfucianlionrespectanddeferenceor“yieldingtoothers,”meansthattheycouldbeusefulinguidingsocialinquiryinthedirectionofsocialharmony.

Toappreciatehowlicouldbeanimportantcomplementtolawsingovernment,weshouldrecognizethemas“tacitmodelsofexemplaryconduct”withoutreducingthemto“customaryorinteractionallaw.”Confuciansbelievethatactingandgovern-ingappropriatelycannotbeachievedbymerelyapplyinguniversalrulesinanexer-ciseofreason;theyalsorequireaestheticsensitivitytotheuniquecircumstancesofeachparticularsituation.Ratherthanrulesthatanyonecouldcomprehend,authori-tativeperformancesoflibyexemplaryindividualsprovidethestandardsofbehavior.ThisiswhyaConfuciangovernmentoflialsoassertsrulebyvirtuouspersonsoverrulebylawalone.However,itisimportanttorememberthatdefactogovernmentsarenotnecessarilythepeoplewhoshouldrule.Aslongaswedonothavethemostvirtuousingovernment,thenlawscanbeveryusefulinconstrainingsuchimperfectgovernment.Justaslawshavetobeappliedtosubjectswhoarenotvirtuousenoughto follow good examples, governments who are not virtuous enough to governthroughlishouldbecurbedbylawsaswell.Besidesrecognizingthatliandlawsaremorecomplementarythanmutuallyexclusivealternativesincurrentlypossiblegov-ernment,wemustalsorealizethattherecannotbeanabsoluteruleastowhichisthemoreappropriateinaparticularsituation;ultimatelyitisamatterofjudgmentrequir-inghumanityandwisdom.

Notes

ThisarticlebeganasapaperforapanelorganizedbyRussellArbenFoxforthe2004annual meeting of theAmerican Political ScienceAssociation. Since then, it hasundergoneseveralmajorrevisions.IthankLeighJenkoandtheanonymousreviewersforPhilosophy East and Westfortheirhelpfulcommentsinimprovingthiswork.Anyremainingerrorsandinadequaciesaremysoleresponsibility.

1–CitationsofDewey’sworksgivevolumeandpagenumberfromDewey’sEarly Works(E),Middle Works(M),andLater Works(L),inJoAnnBoydston,ed.,Col-lected Works of John Dewey (Carbondale:Southern IllinoisUniversityPress,1972–1985).

2–Othertranslationsinclude“rites,propriety,orrulesofproperconduct,”inAn-tonioA.S.Cua,“Li:RitesorPropriety,”inEncyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy,ed.AntonioA.S.Cua(London:Routledge,2003),pp.370–384,atp.370.Dubs

Sor-hoonTan 485

listedthesepossibletranslationsof li :“religiousrites,ceremony,deportment,decorum,propriety,formality,politeness,courtesy,etiquette,goodform,goodbehavior,goodmanners”(HomerH.Dubs,Hsüntze: The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism[London:ArthurProbstain,1927]p.113n).

3–AlltranslationsoftheAnalectsarederivedfromD.C.Lau,trans.,Confucius: the Analects(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1979),unlessotherwisestated.

4–Likemost“isms,”pragmatismisheterogeneousandtoobroadtobecoveredcomprehensively;thisessayisonlyconcernedwiththeversionfoundinJohnDewey’sworks.

5–OnAmericanidentificationwithlaw,seeAlexisdeTocqueville,Democracy in America(1835;VintageBooks,1990),p.280.RuskolaarguesthattheportrayalofChinaaslackinginlawisanexerciseinconstructingWesternculturaliden-tityagainstChinaintermsoflawandcriticizesitas“legalorientalism”(TeemusRuskola,“LegalOrientalism,”Michigan Law Review101[2002]:179–235,atpp.209–212).

6–CharlesdeSecondat,barondeMontesquieu,The Spirit of the Laws,trans.AnneM.Cohler,BasiaCarolynMiller,andHaroldSamuelStone(Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1989),pp.128,318.

7–FeiXiaotong,From the Soil,trans.GaryHamiltonandWangZheng(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1992),p.101.

8–Ibid.,p.96.

9–JanetE.Ainsworth,“CategoriesandCulture:Onthe‘RectificationofNames’inComparativeLaw,”Cornell Law Review82(1996):19–42,atpp.37–38.

10–Forsomeexamples,see11thyearofDukeYin,intheZuozhuan,trans.JamesLeggeinThe Chinese Classics,5vols.(HongKong:HongKongUniversityPress,1960),vol.5,pp.31,33;Liji jijie,ed.SunXidan (Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1989),pp.8–9,583,605–607,1260.SeealsoLiji,chap.5,“RegulationoftheKing,”onliregulatinggovernmentfunctionsandactions.

11–Legge,Chinese Classics,3:590–591.

12–Ibid.,5:607,609.

13–Ibid.,5:729–730,732.

14–Forabalancedscrutinyofsucharguments,seeRandallPeerenboom,China’s Long March toward the Rule of Law (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),p.126.ForadiscussionofvariousWesterndefinitionsof“ruleoflaw,”seeMichaelNeumann,The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics(Aldershot:Ashgate,2002),pp.23–50.

15–WilliamP.Alford,“TheInscrutableOccidental?ImplicationsofRobertoUnger’sUses and Abuses of the Chinese Past,” Texas Law Review 64 (1986):915–972.


16–RobinYates,“SecondStatus in theCh’in:Evidence fromtheYun-mengLegalDocuments,”Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies47(1987):197;KarenTurner,“War, Punishment, and the Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concept of theState,”Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies53(1993):285–324;KathrynBern-hardtandPhilipC.C.Huang,eds.,Civil Law in Qing and Republican China(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Melissa Macauley, Social Power and Legal Culture(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1998).InhisstudyoftheWesternZhouperiod,CreelalsomaintainedthattheWesternZhouhadlegalcodes thatwereprobablywrittendown(HerrleeG.Creel,“Legal InstitutionsandProceduresduringtheZhouDynasty,”inJeromeAlanCohen,R.RandleEdwards, and Fu-mei Chang Chen, eds., Essays on China’s Legal Traditions[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980],pp.26–55,atp.29).

17–AdiscussionofsuchliteraturecanbefoundinZhangPeitian,Zhongguo fawen-hua sanlun(EssaysonChineselegalculture)(Beijing:ZhongguoZhengfaDaxueChubanshe,1993),pp.16–23.

18–DerkBoddeandClarenceMorris,Law in Imperial China(Cambridge,MA:Har-vardUniversityPress,1967),p.3.SeealsoAlford,“TheInscrutableOcciden-tal,”pp.927–929;HerrleeG.Creel,The Origins of Statecraft in China(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1970),vol.1,pp.161–193;BernhardtandHuang,Civil Law in Qing and Republican China,chap.2.

19–GeoffreyMacCormack,The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law(Athens:Univer-sityofGeorgiaPress,1996),p.20.

20–Ithanktheanonymousreviewerforpointingouttheneedtoaddressdirectlythedifferencebetweencriminallawandcivillaw.Therevieweralsopointedoutthatthisdistinctioniscomplicatedbythepracticeinsomesystemsoflawofawardingpunitivedamagesincivilcasestotheplaintiffratherthanthestate,butitcouldbearguedthatsuchpunitivedamagesarecompensationforharmtothecommunityrepresentedbytheharmtotheplaintiff.

21–Thetermsongisalsousedinzisong自訟tomean“self-accusation,”inAnalects5.27.BernhardtandHuangnotethat“Thoughtheearlyempiresawwidespreadjudicialenforcementofprivatecontracts,survivingdocumentsdonotindicatethatthestatepromulgatedabodyofrulestodetermineresultsinsuchcases”(Civil Law in Qing and Republican China,p.35).

22–JuliaChing,“HumanRights:AValidChineseConcept?”inConfucianism and Human Rights,ed.Wm.TheodoredeBaryandTuWei-ming(NewYork:Colum-biaUniversityPress,1997),pp.67–82,atp.74.

23–Roger Ames, The Arts of Rulership (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,1983),p.50.ForasummaryofConfucianandLegalistargumentsagainstandfortheuseoflaws,seeBoddeandMorris,Law in Imperial China,pp.20–27.

24–Onthecodificationandnecessarypublicityoflaws,andtheneedforlawstobecomprehensible to people, see Hanfeizi jijie, ed. Wang Xianshen (Beijing:

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ZhonghuaShuju,1998),pp.380,448;The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu,trans.W.K.Liao(London:ArthurProbstain,1939),vol.2,pp.188,284.

25–JohnAustin,Province of Jurisprudence Determined(1832;London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1954,p.350).DeweyfirstcriticizedAustin’stheoryoflawinanarticle published in Political Science Quarterly in 1894, “Austin’sTheory ofSovereignty”(E4:70–90).AccordingtoDewey,Austin’sviewhadlostitsappealbecauseadvancesinthesocialscienceshave“tendedtomakesovereigntyatbestanexpressionoftheworkingofavastmultitudeofsocialforces,andatworstapureabstraction”(L14:120).HerbertHart,oneofthemostinfluentialphilosophersoflawofthetwentiethcentury,alsocriticizedAustin’sreductionoflawtogeneralizedcommandssanctionedbytheState’suse(orthreateneduse)inThe Concept of Law(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1961),chaps.2–4.Hart,however,notedthattheAustinianviewpossessed“perennialattractions.”

26–Mencius4A1,inD.C.Lau,trans.,Mencius(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1970);Xunzi6.6,inJohnKnoblock,trans.,Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Com-plete Works,3vols.(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1988–1994).

27–ChadHansen,A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),p.359.

28–J.J.L.Duyvendak, trans.,The Book of Lord Shang (London:ArthurProbstain,1928),p.16.Itwasnotthecrownprincebuthistutorwhowasactuallypun-ished.TheeventwasrecordedinShangYang’sbiographyintheShiji(RecordoftheGrandHistorian)(Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1997),juan68,p.2227.HanFeiwenttotheextentofrecommending“extirpationofthepolicyoflove”toensure that the lawwillnotbeunderminedbypartiality resulting fromlove,evenwhenitislovefortheruler(Hanfeizijijie,pp.335–336;Liao,The Com-plete Works of Han Fei Tzu,2:124–126).

29–Wm.TheodoredeBary,Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (Huang Zongxi’s (1610–1695) Min Yi Dai Fang Lu, 1662)(NewYork:ColumbiaUniver-sityPress,1993),pp.97–99.

30–RandallPeerenboom,Law and Morality in Ancient China: The Silk Manuscripts of Huang-Lao(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1993).

31–MarkEdwardLewis,Writing and Authority in Early China(Albany:StateUni-versityofNewYorkPress,1999),p.18.

32–Creel, The Origins of Statecraft, 1:147–148. For samples of these differentmeaningsoffa,astheyareusedindifferentearlyChinesetexts,seeZhongwen da cidian, 8th ed. (1973;Taipei: ZhongguoWenhua Daxue [China CulturalUniversity],1990),vol.5,p.1043.

33–Lau,Mencius;Knoblock,Xunzi11.1a,includesbothtranslations.

34–HerrleeG.Creel,Shen Bu Hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of Fourth Cen-tury b.c.(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1974),pp.136–151;Benjamin


Schwartz,The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1985),p.321;AngusC.Graham,Disputers of the Tao: Philo-sophical Arguments in Ancient China (La Salle:OpenCourt, 1989), p. 275;Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought(Honolulu:UniversityofHawai‘iPress,1983),p.108.

35–Xu Shen, Shuowen jiezi zhu (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1981),p.470a.

36–ChadHansen,“Fa(Standards:Laws)andMeaningChangesinChinesePhiloso-phy,”Philosophy East and West44(1994):435–488,atpp.452and456.

37–Xunzi 23.2a, cf. 25.18. Knoblock’s translation interprets li as being createdbefore,andformingthebasisfor fa,althoughtheChinesetextcouldalsobetranslatedas“thesagescreatedliyiandinstitutedfadu.”

38–Xunzi jijie, ed.WangXianqian (Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1988), p. 33. SeediscussioninYangXiugong,Kong Meng Xun lifa sixiang de yanbian yu fazhan(EvolutionanddevelopmentofConfucius’,Mencius’,andXunZi’sthinkingonli and fa) (Taipei:Wenshizhe Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 152–159. Cai RenhoucharacterizesthisrelationshipintermsofConfucianstreating“liassubstanceandfaasuse,”inhisRuxue yu lifa(Confucianism,rites,andlaws)(Singapore:InstituteofEastAsianPhilosophies,1986),pp.21.Cf.YangJingfanandYuRong-gen,whoseeliasincludingfaandxing,inKongzi de falü sixiang(Confucius’legalthought)(Beijing:QunzhongChubanshe,1984),p.49.

39–ChenFeilong,Xunzi lixue zhi yanjiu (StudyofXunZi’sritualtheory)(Taipei:WenshizheChubanshe,1979),p.152.

40–MeiZhongxie,Faxue zhulun(Selectedworksinlegaltheory)(Taipei:ZhongguoWenhuaDaxue[ChineseCulturalUniversity],1989),p.83.SeealsoYangandYu,Confucius’ Legal Thought,p.59:“Governmentby rites isakindof legalthought,”whereinritesaremorallaws.MostChinesehistoriesoflegalthoughtinChinabeginwithadiscussionofthe“ruleofritual”andtherelationshipbe-tweenliandfaduringthepre-Qinperiod.Forexample,ZhangGuohua,Zhong-guo falü sixiangshi xinbian(HistoryofChineselegalthought,newed.)(Beijing:PekingUniversityPress,1991),Lecture1andLecture2,secs.1and2;MaXiao-hong,ed.,Zhongguo falü sixiang fazhan jianshi(Simplifiedhistoryofdevelop-ment of Chinese legal thought) (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue, 1995),chaps.2and3.

41–RobertoM.Unger,Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory(NewYork:FreePress,1976),pp.49,101–103.

42–Alford,“TheInscrutableOccidental?”p.930.

43–Ch’üT’ung-tsu, Law and Society in Traditional China (Paris: Mouton, 1961)(EnglishversionofaChineseworkpublishedin1947,Chinese Law and Chi-nese Society).SeealsoMacCormack,Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law.

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44–Ainsworth,“CategoriesandCulture,”pp.35,36.

45–Wm.TheodoredeBary,Asian Values and Human Rights(Cambridge,MA:Har-vardUniversityPress,1998),pp.30,32.

46–Foranexampleofritualsprovidingsuchrestraint,seeRonGueyChu,“RitesandRightsinMingChina,”indeBaryandTu,Confucianism and Human Rights,pp.169–178.Onwhetherlawsarenecessarilymoreeffectivethanritesinem-powering thepeople, see Sor-hoonTan,Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,2004),p.184.

47–JosephNeedham,Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1956),vol.2,p.519,pp.530–532.Boddealso treated thedistinctionbetweenritualandlawasonebetweenmoralityandlaw,paralleltothat between natural law and positive law (Derk Bodde, Essays on Chinese Civilization[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1981],pp.179–180).

48–IndiscussingDewey’sviewsaboutlaw,Ideliberatelyhavenotusedtheterm“legalpragmatism.”UndoubtedlyDewey’sviewsintheareaoflawwereinflu-encedbyOliverWendellHolmes,himself identifiedasaPragmatistphiloso-pherandwhoseworkThe Common Law (1881) is seenasaclassicof legalpragmatism.However, there isnoconsensusabout the subsequentdevelop-ment of legal pragmatism or the current role of pragmatism in law. RichardWarnerpresentslegalpragmatismasadoptinganon-foundationalistapproachtojustification:“Legalpragmatismurgesustounderstandthelawbyfocusingon the practices that comprise our actually-in-use norms, on the pattern ofactualconflictandconflictresolutionthatwefinddisplayedinthejudicialde-cisionmaking”(RichardWarner,“LegalPragmatism,”inA Companion to Phi-losophy of Law and Legal Theory[Cambridge:Blackwell,1996],pp.385–393,atp.393).Incontrast,RichardPosnerarguesthatphilosophicalpragmatismhaslittleinfluenceinlegalcircles;legalpragmatism,whichbestdescribesAmerica’slegalethos,isbasedoneverydaypragmatism,whichsupportsaSchumpeterianelitedemocracyratherthanaDeweyandeliberativedemocracy(RichardPosner,Law Pragmatism, and Democracy[Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2003]; seealsoMichaelBrintandWilliamWeaver,eds.,Pragmatism in Law and Society[Boulder:WestviewPress,1991]).

49–OnthisConfucianizationoflaw,seeBoddeandMorris,Law in Imperial China,pp.27–43;Ch’u,Law and Society in Traditional China,pp.267–279.

50–H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961; Oxford: Oxford University Press,1994),2nded.,pp.100–110.Deweydoesnothaveasystematicphilosophyoflaw, and the discussions about law scattered in short essays throughout hisworkscannotreallybecomparedwithacarefullyworked-outtheorysuchasHart’s.Giventhatthementionoflawrequiringauthoritativestatementandfor-mulationwasmadeasapossiblechallengetoapositionadoptedinabookhewasreviewing,itcarrieslessweightthantheotherstatementsthatplacehimclosertotheGermanconceptionoflaw.


51–Hansen,“Fa(Standards:Laws)andMeaningChanges,”p.463.

52–Cf.MarthaNussbaum’sdiscussionofthecomplexnatureofshameanditsroleinlaw;shewarnsthatshameposesdangersantitheticaltoaliberalsociety,andatitsmostprimitiveinvolves“hidingfromourhumanity”(MarthaNussbaum,Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law [Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,2004]).Discussionsofshameinconnectionwithlawhaveatendencytotreatitassocialsanction,evenlegalpunishment,treatingitasanemotionthatresultsfromothers’reactionstoone’sownactions(RichardPos-ner,Law and Social Norms[Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000],chap.6).Itisimportanttostressthat“thesenseofshame”thattranslateschirefers toanemotionbasedonone’sevaluationofoneselfratherthanothers’treatment;inhisdiscussionofMencius’philosophy,Kwong-loiShuncontrastedchiwithru in thesenseofdisgrace,andremarkedabout theformer’s“morereflective concern with self” (Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought[Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1997],pp.58–62).Westerncon-ceptionsofshamethatcomeclosetochiincludethatofBernardWilliams,whomaintainsthat“Shamecantranscendbothanassertiveegoismandaconven-tional concern for public opinion” (BernardWilliams, Shame and Necessity[Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1993],p.88). Formore recentdis-cussionsofshame,seeJohannA.Klaasen,“TheTaintofShame:Failure,Self-Distress,andMoralGrowth,”Journal of Social Philosophy32(2001):174–196;BryanVanNorden,“TheEmotionofShameandtheVirtueofRighteousnessinMencius,”Dao2(2002):45–78.

53–WangXianshen,Hanfeizi jijie,p.205.Thephraseyi fa jiao xin(usinglawstorectifythemind)mayalsobetranslatedas“educateheart-mindwithlaws.”Thecommentaryreferstojiao(educate)asanerror,andW.K.Liaosubstitutedjiao矯(rectify)forjiao教(educate)inLiao,The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu,1:271.Ineithercase,theresultingchangegoesbeyondexternalbehavior.Con-fucianswillobjectthatHanFei’sideaofreformisoneofharshconditioningandhardlythesamethingasConfucianeducation.

54–Cf.discussion in Joel J.Kupperman, “Xunzi:Morality asPsychologicalCon-straint,”inVirtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi,ed.T.C.KlineIIIandPhilipJ.Ivanhoe(IndianapolisandCambridge:HackettPublishing,2000),pp.89–102,atpp.95–96.

55–SunXidan, Liji jijie,p.618.Cf.translationinJamesLegge,The Li Ki,inSacred Books of the Eastseries(1885),vol.27,p.390.Formoredetaileddiscussionoftherelationbetweenliandyi,seeTan,Confucian Democracy,pp.83–88.Cf.Antonio Cua, Ethical Argumentation (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,1983),pp.160–163.

56–Dewey’scritiqueagreeswiththeviewofConfucianismasadvocatingobedi-encetoanobsoletetradition,aviewpopularamongDewey’scloseassociatesinChina,manyofwhomsawConfucianismas thealbatrossaroundChina’s

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neckasChinaenteredthetwentiethcentury.Againstthis,onecouldpointoutthatAnalects9.3explicitlyadvocateschangeinaritualpracticeevenasitre-sistedanother,whichindicatesthatideallyli禮shouldriseabovemerecustom,eventhoughinpracticeithasbeendifficulttodoso.

57–SeealsoDewey’s“NatureandReasoninLaw”(M7:56–63),firstpublishedinInternational Journal of Ethics25(1914):25–32.

58–SeeDewey’sdefinitionof theaestheticinL10:53,andthecontrastbetweenrationalandaestheticordersinDavidHallandRogerAmes,Anticipating C hina: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Cultures(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1995),pp.116–117.

59–Book20inKnoblock,Xunzi,vol.3.

60–RobertEno,The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1989),chap.2.

61–Hansen,“Fa(Standards:Laws)andMeaningChanges,”p.461;DavidL.Hall,andRogerT.Ames,Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China(LaSalle:OpenCourt,1999),p.204.

62–Peerenboom,Law and Morality in Ancient China,p.125.

63–Ithanktheanonymousreviewerforsuggestingcomparisononthispoint.

64–Ithanktheanonymousreviewerforpointingthisouttomeandobservingthatapreviousdraftgavetheimpressionof foistingadualismoftherationalandaesthetic,whichDeweytriedhisbesttorepudiate—animpressionthatisdefi-nitely against my intention as I agree completely with the reviewer aboutDewey’sdeliberateunderminingofsuchdualism.

65–Foranexception to thisgeneral trend,seeThomasAlexander, John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature: Horizons of Feeling(Albany:StateUni-versityofNewYorkPress,1987).

66–Ibid.,pp.269–272.

67–Formoreontheroleofliinsocialinquiry,seeSor-hoonTan,“DemocracyasCommunities of Friends,” in Ewing Chinn and Henry Rosemont, Jr., eds.,MetaphilosophyandChineseThought(NewYork:GlobalScholars,2005),pp.95–114.