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ADVANCE SHEET

THE

Dauphin County Reporter(USPS 810-200)

A WEEKLY JOURNALCONTAINING THE DECISIONS RENDERED IN THE

12th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

No. 5560, Vol. 123 June 30, 2006 No. 13

Entered as Second Class Matter, February 16, 1898, at the Post Office at Harrisburg, Pa.,under the Act of Congress of March 31, 1879

Morder v. Professional Aerials, Inc. 50Bar Association Page Inside Back Cover

Pages 50-73

THEDAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTER

Edited and Publishedby the

DAUPHIN COUNTY BARASSOCIATION

213 North Front StreetHarrisburg, PA 17101-1493

(717) 232-7536____________DONALD MORGAN

Executive DirectorJOYCE TAMBOLAS

Administrative AssistantBRIDGETTE L. HILBISH

Office Assistant___________Printed by

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Estate Notices

DECEDENTS ESTATES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that letterstestamentary or of administration have beengranted in the following estates. All personsindebted to the estate are required to makepayment, and those having claims or demands topresent the same without delay to the administra-tors or executors or their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF RUBY M. ROMANO, late of theCity of Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania (died May 31, 2006). Executor: JamesA. Romano. Attorney: Richard W. Stevenson,Esq., McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, 100 PineStreet, P.O. Box 1166, Harrisburg, PA 17108.Phone (717) 237-5208. j30-y14

ESTATE OF FLOYD G. MAJETTE, late ofthe Borough of Middletown, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executrix: Yvette Johnson, 3109Beethoven Way, Silver Spring, MD 20704.Attorney: James H. Rowland, Jr., Esq., 812 North17th Street, Harrisburg, PA 17103. j30-y14

ESTATE OF BILLIE M. BASTI, late ofHummelstown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania(died June 5, 2006). Co-Executors: Fae Kireta,796 Highland Street, Steelton, PA 17113 andDonald L. Staub, P.O. Box 14, Wellsville, PA17365. Attorney: Paul Taneff, Esq., Ricci &Taneff, 4219 Derry Street, Harrisburg, PA 17111.

j30-y14

ESTATE OF A. MOLLIE MCINTOSH a/k/a AMALIE MCINTOSH a/k/a MOLLIE O.MCINTOSH, late of Harrisburg, DauphinCounty, Pennsylvania (died March 15, 2006).Executor: Thomas W. McIntosh. Attorney:Elizabeth P. Mullaugh, Esq., McNees Wallace &Nurick LLC, 100 Pine Street, P.O. Box 1166,Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166. Phone (717) 237-5243. j30-y14

ESTATE OF MARY MARGARET SEGERT-RAINEY A/K/A MARY RAINEY, late ofSusquehanna Township, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania. Administrator: Joseph M. Rainey, 1801North Center Street, Ebensburg, PA 15931.Attorney: Timothy J. Sloan, Esq., 107 East LloydStreet, P.O. Box 330, Ebensburg, PA 15931.Phone (814) 471-6771. j30-y14

ESTATE OF BEVERLY ANN MILLER, lateof Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Administrator:Violet H. Miller, 501 Pine Swamp Road,Elverson, PA 19520. Attorney: John J. Ferry, Jr.,Esq., Gerber, Ferry & Tanner, 46 E. Main Street,Palmyra, PA 17078. j30-y14

ESTATE OF ELWOOD E. MICHAEL, late ofthe Borough of Gratz, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executrix: Helen M. Michael, 114W. South Second Street, Gratz, PA 17030.Attorney: Joseph C. Michetti, Jr., Esq., Dulge &Michetti, 921 Market Street, Trevorton, PA17881. j30-y14

ESTATE OF WOODROW W. REBER, late ofthe Borough of Middletown, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executor: Barry J. Reber, 2900Oley Turnpike Road, Apt. C-5, Reading, PA19606. Attorney: Bridget M. Whitley, Esq.,Skarlatos & Zonarich LLP, 17 South SecondStreet, 6th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17101. j30-y14

ESTATE OF CONRAD J. KRAFT, late ofHarrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (diedMay 23, 2006). Executrix: Anna Marie Kraft,1316 North Sixth Street, Harrisburg, PA 17102.Attorney: Jan L. Brown, Esq., Jan L. Brown &Associates, 845 Sir Thomas Court, Suite 12,Harrisburg, PA 17109. j30-y14

ESTATE OF MARGARET L. MILLER, lateof Swatara Township, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania. Administratrix: Lisa A. Ritter. Attorney:Shelly J. Kunkel, Esq., 3464 Trindle Road, CampHill, PA 17011. j30-y14

ESTATE OF ROBERT B. SMITH, late ofSouth Hanover Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died April 19, 2006). Executrix:JoAnn Smith. Attorney: Robert R. Church, Esq.,Keefer Wood Allen & Rahal, LLP, P.O. Box11963, Harrisburg, PA 17108-1963. j30-y14

ESTATE OF MARY A. SHORTER, late ofSusquehanna Township, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania (died May 20, 2006). Executrix: BarbaraJ. Waxman. Attorney: Marielle F. Hazen, Esq.,2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 202, Harrisburg,PA 17110. j30-y14

FIRST PUBLICATION

Estate Notices

SECOND PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF PHYLLIS M. KOPPENHEFFER,late of Millersburg Borough, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executrix: Cathy Bopp, 234 E.King Street, Shippensburg, PA 17257. Attorney:J. Chad Moore, Esq., 270 Market Street,Millersburg, PA 17061. j23-y7

ESTATE OF PATRICK M. FITZPATRICK,late of Susquehanna Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died May 19, 2006). Executor:Philip P. Fitzpatrick, 909 Cherrington Drive,Harrisburg, PA 17110. Attorney: Richard W.Stewart, Esq., Johnson, Duffie, Stewart &Weidner, 301 Market Street, P.O. Box 109,Lemoyne, PA 17043. j23-y7

ESTATE OF BRUCE A. DANNER, late ofLondonderry Township, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania (died April 12, 2006). Executrix:Beverly J. Danner. Attorney: David C. Miller, Jr.,Esq., 1100 Spring Garden Drive, Suite A,Middletown, PA 17057. Phone (717) 939-9806.

j23-y7

ESTATE OF HUGH CAMERON LILLY a/k/aHUGH C. LILLY, late of the Borough ofMiddletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania(died February 10, 2006). Co-Executors: DonaldLilly and Anthony Lilly, c/o PNC Bank, Agent,4242 Carlisle Pike, Camp Hill, PA 17011. j23-y7

ESTATE OF KATHRYN A. ARNOLD, late ofMillersburg Borough, Dauphin County, Pennsyl-vania (died May 23, 2006). Co-Executors:Ronald E. Arnold, 104 Long Road, Lykens, PA17048 and Randy L. Arnold, 5700 State Route209, Lykens, PA 17048. Attorney: Earl RichardEtzweiler, Esq., 105 North Front Street,Harrisburg, PA 17101. Phone (717) 234-5600.

j23-y7

50 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [123 Dauph.

Morder v. Professional Aerials, Inc.

The order appealed instantly does not require Dr. Naidu to produceany and all 1099s from any source but only those related to personalinjury litigation. This information is absolutely relevant to develop apotential for bias in a case such as the one before us. In the words of Mr.Justice Musmanno, Dr. Naidu should be required to “lift his visor so that[a] jury [might] see who he [is], what he represent[s], and what interest,if any, he ha[s] in the results of the trial, so that [a] jury [might] appraisehis credibility.” Goodis v. Gimbel Brothers, 218 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa.1966). On the other hand, our order does not encompass “the emptyingof one’s pockets and turning them inside out so that [Dr. Naidu’s] finan-cial worth can be open to scrutiny.” Mohn, supra, 515 A.2d 924. Webelieve that our present order strikes this balance and is in accord withthe present state of the law of discovery in this area.

_______o_______


Torts — Negligence — Causation — Res ipsa loquitor — Post-accident conduct —Spoliation — Comparative negligence.

Plaintiff sustained near-fatal injuries as a result of a co-worker’snegligence in operating a telescoping boom-lift at a construction site.After a jury returned favorable Plaintiffs’ verdicts, the Defendant filedpost-trial motions alleging several trial court errors, all of which weredenied.

1. A Plaintiff can amplify a cause of action that has already been listed in the Complaint.Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 501 Pa. 306, 461 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1983).

2. A party who has relevant evidence within its control and fails to produce said evi-dence, without a satisfactory reason for doing so, may have an inference drawn against itby a jury that “the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the offendingparty.” Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, 13 F.3d 76, 78 (1994).

3. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed bythe danger of unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 403.

4. The credibility of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue.Pa.R.E. 607(b).

5. A jury does not need an expert to know that negligence occurred. See, RestatementSecond of Torts, Section 328 (D), Comment (d). 1965.

Post-Trial Motions. C.P., Dau. Co., No. 2483 S 1997. Motions denied.

50 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 51


Orris C. Knepp, III, for Plaintiffs

C. Kent Price, for Defendant

CLARK, J., May 18, 2006. –

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Plaintiff, Barry R. Morder (Morder), was severely injuredin a construction accident in the City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Mr. Morder was employed at the time by PalmerConstruction Company, Inc., whose President and sole stockholder isWilliam L. Palmer (Palmer). Mr. Palmer is also President and sole stock-holder of the Defendant, Professional Aerials, Inc. (Pro Aer). Pro Aersells and leases man-lifts used at construction work sites.

On April 18, 1996, at approximately 3:15 in the afternoon, the Mr.Morder was asked by a co-worker, Herschel “Rusty” Dutton (Dutton),to help pin a metal strut to the steel structure of the building under con-struction. Mr. Dutton and Mr. Morder climbed into the basket of a JLG60F boom-lift (a type of man-lift), owned by Pro Aer. Mr. Dutton wasthe operator of the lift mechanism and the Plaintiff was the passenger.Significantly, Mr. Dutton had never been properly trained or certified tooperate this particular type of boom-lift.

Due to his near-fatal injuries, Mr. Morder did not know exactly whatcaused the accident, but from all the trial testimony, the following sce-nario is what most likely occurred. We must begin by explaining howa boom-lift operates. There are two primary parts of a boom-lift. Thebottom part is the motorized chassis. It is similar to an automobile inthat it contains the engine and driveline mechanisms to propel the liftforward and backward on four wheels. The top part of the lift is thearm, commonly called a “boom,” to which is attached the basket inwhich the workers stand. The boom can swivel around the chassis andit can also telescope up and down. The articulation of the boom andbasket is accomplished by mechanical and hydraulic components ofthe machine.

Inside the basket is the control panel which operates the machine. Onthe control panel is the drive lever and engine throttle. The drive leverpropels the machine forward or backward when it (lever) is pushed for-ward or backward. The drive lever has a collar that must be lifted inorder to move the lever forward or backward. The collar is a safety fea-ture that ensures that the drive lever cannot be moved accidentally.



From the control panel, an operator can drive the chassis as well asoperate the boom. However, since the boom can rotate, the operatormust always be cognizant that he may not always be facing in the samedirection as the “normal” forward motion of the machine when drivingthe boom-lift while standing in the basket. Thus, the basket is rotatedsuch that it is facing the rear of the chassis, then the operator will be fac-ing backward when driving the lift forward. In that situation, the drivermust be vigilant to remember that if he puts the drive lever in the “for-ward” position, the boom-lift will move forward although the driver willhave the perspective of moving backward. This reverse-movement sce-nario is part of what happened in the instant case.

It is also important to note that the boom-lift in the case at bar had adefective foot pedal. A foot pedal is a safety device in the basket at thebase of the control panel that prohibits the control panel from beingoperated unless the pedal is depressed by the machine operator. On thedate of the accident, the control panel would operate despite the footpedal not being depressed. A foot pedal helps ensure that an operatorwill not accidentally bump into the control panel and drive the lift. Italso forces the operator to face the control panel when driving the lift,thereby being able to directly view the labels and other informationalnomenclature printed on the control panel.

Mr. Dutton knew that the foot pedal was not operational. James Peck,a Palmer Construction foreman, testified that he rode in the boom-liftwith Mr. Dutton two weeks before the accident and Mr. Dutton notifiedhim that the pedal was not working. Randy Bunch, also a PalmerConstruction foreman, testified that he rode with Mr. Dutton in the lifton the morning of the accident and Mr. Dutton informed Mr. Bunch thatthe foot pedal was not operational.

Mr. Dutton and Mr. Morder were together in the basket of the lift atthe time of the accident. Mr. Dutton apparently tried to get the basket asclose to the building as possible. He drove the boom-lift forward towardthe building but the front wheels were apparently stopped by steel beamsthat were on the ground beside the building. Mr. Dutton attempted to getcloser to the building by rotating the arm that was holding the basket,around to the side facing the building. At this point the control panel wasfacing the rear of the lift. Mr. Dutton then raised the basket to the fourthfloor and Mr. Morder began attaching his strut to the building.

At some point, Mr. Dutton attempted to move the lift away from thebuilding. However, since the foot pedal was broken, Mr. Dutton did nothave to face the control panel in order drive the machine. Mr. Morder



and Mr. Dutton were facing the building at the time of the accident. Mr.Dutton merely reached back to the throttle while facing away from thecontrol panel.

Since Mr. Dutton was not facing the control panel, he apparentlybecame disoriented. He evidently pushed the throttle away from thebuilding attempting to have the lift move away from the building.However, since the basket was rotated and was facing the rear of thechassis, he in fact moved the boom-lift toward the building.

At first the lift did not move because the front wheels were stoppedagainst the steel beams on the ground. Mr. Dutton kept giving the wheelsmore and more torque until the wheels sped over the steel beam and theboom-lift crashed into the building pinning the workers against the con-trol panel. Mr. Morder felt the boom-lift suddenly lurch forward (towardthe building). Since Mr. Morder had been facing the building, he did notsee what exactly caused the man-lift to lurch.

Mr. Morder and Mr. Dutton were eventually extricated from the basket by their co-workers and were taken by ambulance to HersheyMedical Center. Mr. Dutton died from his injuries and Mr. Morder sustained severe damage to his abdomen, especially his lower intestinaltract, including the de-gloving of his bowel.

Mere hours after the accident, Mr. Palmer arrived on the work site andinstructed two (2) Pro Aer mechanics to inspect the boom-lift involvedin the accident. The mechanics determined that the lift had a faulty footpedal, in addition to significant other physical damage which was sole-ly caused by the accident.

Mr. Palmer ordered the mechanics to replace the defective foot pedalwith a worn (used) foot pedal from another identical man-lift at the worksite. He (Palmer) then ordered that a brand-new foot pedal be placed onthe other lift (the one from which the worn (used) pedal had beenremoved). This replacement of foot pedals occurred before Mr. Palmercontacted OSHA to inform them of the accident. The net effect of thispedal-swapping endeavor was to have a functional, but worn-appearingpedal installed on the lift involved in the accident, and a new pedalswitch installed on the machine unrelated to the accident.

Mr. Palmer also had the entire boom-lift subsequently refurbishedwithout ever informing the Plaintiffs. Only when Mr. Morder inspect-ed the boom-lift during the discovery phase of this lawsuit, and recog-nized that the lift had been altered, did the Defendant inform the



Plaintiffs of the changes. Further, the faulty foot pedal and otherreplaced parts were disposed of by the Defendant before the Plaintiffs’expert could inspect them.

PROCEDURAL HISTORYThe Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 29, 1997. A com-

panion lawsuit was filed by the Estate of Herschel Dutton against theDefendant, but that case eventually settled and is not directly relevant tothe case at bar. The Plaintiffs’ original Complaint alleged the followingclaims: Count I, Negligence; Count II, Products Liability; Count III,Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count IV, Loss ofConsortium on behalf of Mrs. Morder; and Count V, Spoliation.

The Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to paragraphs 22-32 ofthe Plaintiffs’ Count of Negligence (Count I). Significantly, noPreliminary Objection was EVER filed to paragraph 35 of the Plaintiffs’Complaint (a rather all-encompassing claim of negligence). TheDefendant also filed a Preliminary Objection to Count V, Spoliation. OnOctober 14, 1998, The Honorable Todd A. Hoover dismissed Count V,Spoliation, from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint but found the remainingcounts to be sufficiently pled.

We note that Judge Hoover did not dismiss the Count for Spoliationbased on the merits of the case, i.e. that spoliation of evidence did not infact occur or was not sufficiently pled. Rather, Judge Hoover concluded,that as a matter of law, “a cause of action for spoliation by an adverseparty is not a viable cause of action in Pennsylvania.” Opinion, p. 4,October 14, 1998, citing to Elias v. Lancaster General Hospital, 710A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. 1998). Therefore, although spoliation was dismissedas a separate count in the Complaint, this Court was not precluded fromadmitting evidence of spoliation in the trial of the case.

On or about November 4, 1999, Pro Aer filed an AdditionalDefendant Complaint against JLG Industries (JLG), the manufacturer ofthe boom-lift. On November 24, 1999, JLG filed an Answer to Pro Aer’sComplaint which alleged New Matter, including failure to properly trainusers of the lift, failure to properly inspect the lift, and failure to providethe proper manuals to the users of the boom-lift. None of these addition-al allegations of negligence were specifically pled in the Plaintiffs’ orig-inal Complaint.

Perhaps as a strategic plan, the Defendants moved to dismiss itsAdditional Defendant Claim against JLG after comprehensive discoveryhad taken place and shortly before the trial of the case. Since the



Plaintiffs’ theory of the case was based in negligence, it was compelledto dismiss its products liability claim (Count II) and concur in the dis-missal of JLG from this case. Once JLG was no longer a party, theDefendant moved to exclude all claims of negligence raised by JLGwhich were not specifically listed in the Plaintiffs’ original Complaint.

In the Defendant’s motion in limine, it correctly pointed out that thestatute of limitations had long since expired so the Plaintiffs could notamend their Complaint to add a new cause of action that may have beenraised by JLG. However, the Defendant appears to have also presumedby that limine motion that the Plaintiff could not, therefore, assert andoffer proof in support of the allegations of the various forms of addition-al negligence which had been averred by JLG, as part of the Plaintiffs’presentation of their case to the jury. The Defendant was incorrect in thatpresumption.

However, after full consideration of all issues, the Court denied theDefendant’s Motion on the ground that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint con-tained a general all-encompassing clause (Paragraph 35) in itsNegligence claim (Count I). Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ were permitted attrial to pursue theories of negligence that were not specifically pled intheir original Complaint, but could reasonably be includable in that gen-eral clause of negligence (Paragraph 35). Additionally, and prior to trial,the Plaintiffs’ also dismissed Count III, Negligent Infliction ofEmotional Distress from the case.

A jury trial was conducted in this matter that lasted one week. Thejury found in favor of the Plaintiffs and entered verdicts in favor ofBarry R. Morder in the amount of $648,263.00 and in favor of AmyMorder in the amount of $100,000.00. The Plaintiffs filed a motion forDelay Damages asking for an additional $325,601.20. The Defendant,Pro Aer, filed several post-trial motions. The parties have filed extensivebriefs in support of those post-trial motions (Defendant) and in opposi-tion thereto (Plaintiff). In-depth oral argument was also conducted, fol-lowed by the submission of post-argument memorandums. These vari-ous post-trial motions are now ripe for disposition.

ISSUESAs defined by the Defendant in its post-trial motions, the issues which

this Court must address are as follows:

1) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’SMOTION IN LIMINE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF



PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENCE, THEREBY PERMIT-TING THE PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE EVI-DENCE REGARDING MATTERS OTHER THANDEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPAIR AND MAIN-TAIN THE SUBJECT BOOM LIFT.

2) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’SMOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCEOF DEFENDANT’S POST-ACCIDENT CONDUCT,THEREBY PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFFS TOINTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT THATOCCURRED AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THAT HADNO PROBATIVE VALUE, AND WAS PREJUDICIALTO THE DEFENDANT.

3) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTEDREVERSIBLE ERROR IN PRECLUDING THEDEFENDANT FROM ARGUING THE COMPARA-TIVE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF BARRY R.MORDER TO THE JURY, IN REFUSING TOINCLUDE SPECIAL VERDICT INTERROGATO-RIES ON THE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLI-GENCE, AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THEJURY ON COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

4) THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED ANABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TOINCLUDE SEPARATE JURY QUESTIONS ON THEDEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE BASED UPON THETHEORY OF FAILURE TO REPAIR AND MAIN-TAIN THE BOOM LIFT AS ALLEGED IN THECOMPLAINT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND FAILURETO INSPECT THE BOOM LIFT, TO HAVE PROP-ER MANUALS ON BOARD THE BOOM LIFT,FAILURE TO PROVIDE JOB SITE SAFETYSUPERVISION, AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE ASAFE WORK SITE ENVIRONMENT, ON THEOTHER HAND, WHICH LATTER THEORIESWERE THE SUBJECT OF DEFENDANT’S AFORE-SAID MOTION IN LIMINE TO LIMIT THE SCOPEOF THE PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE.



5) THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANTDEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NONSUIT WHERETHE PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT, BARRIS EVULICH,DID NOT OFFER ANY OPINIONS REGARDINGCAUSATION BETWEEN THE ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFEN-DANT AND THE HARM SUFFERED BY THEPLAINTIFFS.

DISCUSSION

1) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’SMOTION IN LIMINE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OFPLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENCE, THEREBY PERMIT-TING THE PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE EVI-DENCE REGARDING MATTERS OTHER THANDEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN THE SUBJECT BOOM LIFT.

The Defendant is objecting because we allowed the Plaintiffs to argueclaims that were not specifically enumerated in the Plaintiffs’ originalComplaint. The Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, in paragraphs 21-30, listsnumerous specific claims against Pro Aer, sounding in negligence, thatare all related to Pro Aer’s failure to properly maintain and/or repair theboomlift. The Defendant asserts that these should have been the onlyclaims that the Plaintiffs could have raised at trial.

The Defendant claims that we should not have allowed claims alleging the Defendant’s failure to properly train Mr. Dutton in theoperation of the lift; failure to have manuals on board the lift; failureto provide job site safety supervision; and failure to provide a safework site environment. The Defendant argues that none of these afore-said claims of negligence are included in the charges of failure tomaintain and repair the man-lift. Further, the Defendant points out thatthe statute of limitations had already expired on this case at the time oftrial.

We agree with the Defendant that a party cannot add a new cause ofaction after the statute of limitations has expired. However, a Plaintiffcan amplify a cause of action that has already been listed in theComplaint. See, Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 501 Pa. 306,461 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1983).



After careful review of this matter, we found that the additionalclaims are mere amplifications of the Negligence cause of action whichwere reasonably includable in the wording of Paragraph 35 of thePlaintiffs’ Complaint. This paragraph states:

35. “The accident in the case at bar was caused by the negli-gence and carelessness of Professional Aerials, Inc., t/aPRO AER, its agents, servants, and employees in thescope of their employment.”

Complaint, filed December 29, 1997, Paragraph 35.

Therefore, based on the language of Paragraph 35, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant could be held potentially liable for ANY actof negligence committed by Pro Aer or its employees that caused theaccident. It is critical to the determination of this issue to remember thatthe Defendant NEVER challenged this broad and virtually all-encom-passing language by means of any preliminary objection.

In Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 501 Pa. 306, 461 A.2d 600(Pa. 1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that claims whichwere not specifically enumerated in a Complaint could still be heard ifthey were mere amplifications of claims that were already in theComplaint. In Connor, the employees of the defendant hospital,Allegheny General Hospital (Hospital or Allegheny) performed anenema with a barium solution on the plaintiff, Mrs. Connor. Mrs.Connor’s bowel (colon) was perforated during that procedure, and bari-um leaked into her body causing harm. Mrs. Connor’s Complaintalleged that the employees of Allegheny negligently perforated hercolon which caused the barium to leak. However, her Complaint alsoalleged that the Hospital was negligent in “otherwise failing to use duecare and caution under the circumstances.” Connor, 461 A.2d at 601.

Prior to trial, Mrs. Connor, was forced to obtain a new expert witness.Her new expert refused to testify that the employees of Allegheny neg-ligently perforated her colon. However, the expert would testify that thedoctors at Allegheny failed to diagnose and treat the barium leak in atimely fashion.

Allegheny filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Mrs.Connor was attempting to add another cause of action after the statute oflimitations had expired. The trial court granted the motion for summaryjudgment and the Superior Court affirmed. However, the PennsylvaniaSupreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court stated:



In this case, appellants’ proposed amendment does,in fact, amplify one of the allegations of the originalcomplaint. In their original complaint, appellantsdid not merely allege that the barium enema hadbeen negligently performed. Rather, appellants alsoalleged that appellee, acting individually andthrough its employees, was negligent “[i]n other-wise failing to use due care and caution under thecircumstances.” Appellants’ proposed amendmentsimply specifies the other ways in which appelleewas negligent in this case.

Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, 461 A.2d at 602,emphasis added.

We believe that this case is very similar to Connor. Although the spe-cific allegations in the other paragraphs of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint referto maintenance and repair of the man-lift, we believe that Paragraph 35is sufficiently broad to include the other negligence allegations againstthe Defendant, such as failure to train Mr. Dutton. Paragraph 35 statesthat the accident was caused by the negligence and carelessness of ProAer. Clearly, failing to train Mr. Dutton was an act of negligence thatsignificantly contributed to, if not outright caused the accident. At thetrial, the Plaintiff simply specified the other ways in which theDefendant was negligent and careless. Simply stated, the Plaintiffs left alarge “open door” in their Complaint, and the Defendant, for whateverreason, failed to close it in the early portions of the case, particularly bymeans of a preliminary objection. At trial, the Plaintiffs simply “walkedthrough” that open door.

As we noted earlier, the Defendant could have filed a preliminaryobjection against Paragraph 35 for lack of specificity had it chosen to doso. Instead, and quite remarkably, the Defendant answered this allega-tion with a general denial which implies it understood the far-reachingnature of the allegation. See Connor, 461 A.2d at 602, FN3.

The Defendant objects vigorously to our broad interpretation ofParagraph 35 and Connor. First, the Defendant attempts to argue thatParagraph 35 is not similar to the language expanded upon by Connor,because it does not use the word “otherwise” or in some other way denotethat it is including claims not already mentioned in the Complaint.

We are not persuaded by the Defendant’s semantical argument. Wesee no reason why the phrase, “The accident in the case at bar wascaused by the negligence and carelessness of Professional Aerials, . . .”



should be read to only include the specific allegations otherwise listed in the Complaint. This phrase can refer to any type of negligence andcarelessness.

The next argument of the Defendant is that Paragraph 35 had to beincluded in the Complaint, even if the Complaint was limited to theexpress claims, because the Defendant is a Corporation and thereforecan only be found liable through the actions of its employees.

We agree that the Complaint needed to have language holding theCorporation liable through the actions of its employees. However, thereis no reason the Defendant could not have filed a preliminary objectionto narrow the scope of the actions of the employees for which theCorporation could be found liable. Instead, the language which wasoriginally pled and survived in the Complaint permitted the Corporationto be found liable for any act of negligence and carelessness of theCorporation or its employees that caused the accident.

The Defendant next argues that Paragraph 35 should be read andinterpreted in context with the rest of the Complaint. The Defendantpoints out that the Plaintiffs had, in an earlier motion, stated that the ele-ments of the Complaint should be read together in context. We do notagree that each paragraph of a Complaint must be read together, regard-less of the Plaintiffs’ earlier statement in support of its position on a priormotion. The ruling in Connor clearly maintained that paragraphs in aComplaint should be interpreted independently for purposes of makinga determination of the types of issues presented herein.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the additional claims of thePlaintiffs should not be allowed because they are not mere amplifica-tions of earlier arguments but are entirely new causes of actions. We findthat this assertion is a gross mischaracterization of the facts of the caseand the pertinent pleadings. We will now review cases subsequent toConnor to determine if the claims at bar are mere amplifications orentirely new causes of action. We will begin with Reynolds v. ThomasJefferson University Hospital and Daniel Anthony Beneski, M.D., 450Pa. Super. 327, 676 A.2d 1205 (1996).

In Reynolds, Ms. Reynolds suffered massive heart failure and Dr.Beneski placed a breathing tube down her throat to prepare her for anemergency procedure. Subsequent to the procedure, Ms. Reynolds had asore throat and could not speak above a whisper. Her treating physician,Dr. Chambers, advised her for a number of months that her voice wouldreturn but it did not. Eventually, Ms. Reynolds underwent surgery torestore her voice.



Ms. Reynolds sued the Hospital and Dr. Beneski for improperly intu-bating her (placing the tube down her throat). However, after the statuteof limitations had run, Ms. Reynolds’ expert would not testify that Dr.Beneski was negligent but rather claimed that Dr. Beneski saved Ms.Reynolds’ life. Her expert did opine, however, that Dr. Chambers wasnegligent for not referring Ms. Reynolds to a throat specialist earlier.

The Defendant Hospital moved for summary judgment on the groundthat the claim against Dr. Chambers was a new cause of action whichwas not listed in the Complaint. Ms. Reynolds argued that herComplaint contained a catchall that stated, “failure to act properly underthe circumstances,” which should include the actions of Dr. Chambers.

The Superior Court denied Ms. Reynolds’ claims. The Court notedthat the catchall was not a separately numbered paragraph but was justa lettered paragraph (letter “n”) under paragraph 8 that stated “the intubation . . . was performed in a negligent manner consisting of: . . .(a-n).” Thus, the Superior Court determined that the catchall was not anindependent claim but a subordinate clause that specifically referred tothe intubation and not the aftercare.

The Superior Court also noted that this was a separate claim becauseit dealt with two different defendants (Dr. Beneski versus Dr.Chambers), regarding two different actions (intubation versus the after-care), and it occurred at two different times (Ms. Reynolds’ expertclaimed Dr. Chambers should only have known there was a problem tendays after the intubation).

Our case is much more similar to Connor than to Reynolds. Paragraph35 is its own separately numbered paragraph and is not subordinate toany other clause. Further, the claims are against the same Defendant, ProAer. Finally, all the claims of negligence involve the same incident.

The Defendant also cites to the case of Rachlin v. Edmison, 813 A.2d862 (Pa. Super. 2002). In that case, the Plaintiff, Ms. Rachlin, had twoeye surgeries to eliminate her need for contact lenses. Her eyesightworsened and she sued the Ophthalmologist who performed the surger-ies. Her Complaint listed the Ophthalmologist’s Office as well as itsemployees and agents.

Prior to trial and after the statute of limitations had expired, Ms.Rachlin’s expert opined that her Optometrist had provided defectiveaftercare. Ms. Rachlin claimed that she could sue her Optometrist (whohad an independent office) because he was an “agent” for herOphthalmologist.



The Superior Court would not allow her to sue her Optometrist. TheCourt ruled that in order to make a claim against an agent, the agentmust be identified in the Complaint and it (Complaint) must explain howthe principal ratified the actions of the agent. Therefore, the Court ruledthat Ms. Rachlin could not sue the Optometrist because he was nevernamed in the Complaint nor were any of his actions listed in theComplaint. The Court also concluded that the aftercare provided by theOptometrist was a separate cause of action and needed to have beenpleaded in her Complaint.

Rachlin is not similar to the case at bar. Like Reynolds, Rachlininvolves a Plaintiff trying to add a new Defendant to the Complaint.Further, the incident of the negligence (the aftercare) was not the sameincident that allegedly caused the Plaintiff’s injuries in the Complaint(i.e. the surgery).

The Plaintiffs’ Complaint adequately put Pro Aer on notice of theclaims against it. Pro Aer knew that it was being sued as a defendant andthat it was charged with causing the boomlift to injure Mr. Morder. Asfar as how it was alleged to have caused the injury, Pro Aer knew it wasalleged to have failed to maintain the lift and should have known (viaParagraph 35) that there were other allegations of negligence as well. IfPro Aer did not object to Paragraph 35, it cannot now claim that it wasnot put on notice of the possible claims against it.

2) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT’SMOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCEOF DEFENDANT’S POST-ACCIDENT CONDUCT,THEREBY PERMITTING THE PLAINTIFFS TOINTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT THATOCCURRED AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THAT HADNO PROBATIVE VALUE, AND WAS PREJUDICIALTO THE DEFENDANT.

The Defendant, Pro Aer, claims that it was prejudiced because weallowed testimony of its post-accident conduct. The Defendant lists thefollowing portions of the testimony to which it is opposed:

The proposed testimony included allegations thatPro Aer attempted to hide the alleged defect of thefoot pedal by changing the foot pedal within hoursof the accident (N.T. 417-419, 429, 577); WilliamPalmer, Pro Aer’s sole stockholder, visited Plaintiff



Barry Morder at the Critical Care Unit of theHershey Medical Center and allegedly attempted tosolicit information about the accident from BarryMorder and allegedly told Amy Morder that she hadto remove her husband’s vehicle from the job siteand that Palmer would personally drive her to thejob site to remove the vehicle (N.T. 435-439, 441,460-462); Marty Marcus visited Barry Morder atthe Hershey Medical Center while Mr. Morder wason a morphine drip, and allegedly attempted to elic-it information about the accident from Mr. Morder(N.T. 342-343, 505); and Pro Aer acted with deceitwhen it disposed of parts of the man-lift in questionbefore such parts could be inspected by an expert(N.T. 140-146, 148, 417-419, 427-429, 577, 584-585).

Brief of Defendant in Support of its Motion for Post-TrialRelief, August 8, 2005, p. 20.

Therefore, the incidents of post-accident conduct at issue are: 1) thechanging of the foot pedal, 2) the attempts to solicit information whileMr. Morder was incapacitated, and 3) the disposal of parts of the boom-lift (i.e. the foot pedal, control panel, and platform) before those partscould be inspected by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant admits that theseincidents occurred, but denies there was any malevolent intent to hideevidence. The Defendant’s assertions with regard to these matters aredisingenuous, at best.

The Defendant claims that whatever actions occurred after the acci-dent should not be admitted because they are not relevant. TheDefendant cites to Rule 402 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence thatstates, “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402.Rule 401 defines “Relevant Evidence” as: “evidence having any tenden-cy to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would bewithout the evidence.” Pa.R.E. 401.

Pro Aer argues that whatever happened after the accident is not rele-vant because it does not demonstrate any fact of consequence to be“more or less probable.” This is because all the facts of consequence (i.e.facts that relate to the cause of the accident) already occurred before orat the time of the accident, at least according to the Defendant.



We found, however, that the Defendant’s post-accident conduct wasrelevant to the determination of whether it committed spoliation. Wealso found that the fact that Mr. Palmer surreptitiously attempted toextract information from a seriously injured and incapacitated person(Mr. Morder), switched the defective foot pedal with a working wornpedal, and completely refurbished the boom-lift before the Plaintiffs’expert could examine it, showed a possible intent to deceive.

The Plaintiffs, from the outset of this case, have contended that theDefendant was guilty of spoliation. Indeed, the Plaintiffs had an originalcount of spoliation in their Complaint. However, as mentioned above,that matter was the subject of a Preliminary Objection sustained by theHonorable Todd A. Hoover based upon Elias v. Lancaster GeneralHospital, 710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. 1998). Nevertheless, the spoliationissue remained in the case as an evidentiary matter and not as a cause ofaction.

As a result of extensive pretrial motions, briefs, and oral arguments,this Court determined that the Plaintiffs made a very strong, pretrial,prima facie showing of spoliation. Therefore, we ruled that thePlaintiffs could put on their evidence of such matters during their casein chief and that we would reserve final ruling on whether or not thePlaintiffs were entitled to a jury instruction concerning spoliation atthe close of the case. When that moment arrived, we found that thePlaintiffs indeed had made the requisite showing and they were enti-tled to a spoliation instruction.

A party who has relevant evidence within its control and fails to pro-duce said evidence, without a satisfactory reason for doing so, mayhave an inference drawn against it by a jury that “the destroyed evi-dence would have been unfavorable to the offending party.” Schmid v.Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, 13 F.3d 76, 78 (1994) adoptedby Schroeder v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 551 Pa. 243, 710A.2d 23 (1998). In order to grant a jury instruction for spoliation acourt must look to the three Schmid factors: 1) the degree of fault ofthe party who altered or destroyed the evidence, 2) the degree of prej-udice suffered by the opposing party, and 3) the availability of a less-er sanction that will protect the opposing party’s rights and deter sim-ilar conduct. Schroeder v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 551 Pa.243, 250-51, 710 A.2d 23 (1998).

We will now analyze the three Schmid factors. The first factor is thedegree of fault.



Mr. Palmer changed the defective foot pedal on the very night of theaccident, before contacting OSHA, and he conveniently installed a used pedal instead of a new one so the switch would not be obvious toOSHA inspectors / investigators or other onlookers. Further, he and hisemployees attempted to garner information from Mr. Morder while he(Morder) was seriously sedated and totally incapacitated. Finally, Mr.Palmer disposed of the defective portions of the boom-lift (foot pedal)and refurbished the lift before Plaintiffs’ expert could examine themachine. Since Mr. Palmer owned the boom-lift, there is no reason whyhe could not have given notice to the Plaintiffs that he intended to repairit. Finally, Mr. Palmer did not even inform the Plaintiffs that the machinehad been repaired until after the Plaintiffs noticed the changes. Whenanalyzing the post-accident conduct in its totality, we believe that theDefendant’s degree of fault was very large. Again, we will simply statethat in our view the Defendant’s conduct, via the actions of Mr. Palmer,do not even begin to pass any test for a lack of malevolent intent.

With regard to the second Schmid factor, the degree of prejudice to thenon-offending party, the Defendant claims that there was very little prej-udice against the Plaintiffs because Pro Aer admitted the defects of theboom-lift before trial. This presumes, however, that the Plaintiffs’ expertwould not have found additional defects in the pre-destroyed evidenceor the pre-refurbished lift. We believe that the Plaintiffs were substan-tially prejudiced because they were forced to rely on the assertions of theDefendant.

Finally, we believe that there was no lesser sanction available than aspoliation instruction to protect the Plaintiffs and to deter the Defendantfrom this type of behavior in the future. We note that we even allowedthe Defendant’s counsel to draft the spoliation jury instruction. Further,our instruction did not tell the jury that they had to draw a negative infer-ence from the missing evidence, but that they could draw a negativeinference if they so chose. (N.T. 629, lines 6-13).

The Defendant also argues that even if the post-accident conduct wasrelevant, it should still not have been admitted because of Rule 403 ofthe Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. This rule states, “Although rele-vant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed bythe danger of unfair prejudice. . . .” Pa.R.E. 403.

The Defendant argues that the probative value of the post-accidentconduct was minimal. First, the Defendant notes that the Plaintiffs’ mainallegation at trial had nothing to do with a defect of the lift but rather



alleged that the Defendant failed to train Mr. Dutton to properly operatethe lift. Further, the Defendant asserts that it admitted the defects of thelift (including the defective foot pedal) prior to trial and therefore therewas no evidence of defects that needed to be proven.

In contrast to its probative value, however, the Defendant claims thatthe prejudice of the post-accident conduct was substantial. This caseinvolved a serious accident in which one person died and another wasnearly fatally injured. The Defendant contends that a jury could becomeinflamed if they believed that the owner of the lift attempted to concealevidence. We find that Mr. Palmer attempted to do exactly that.

While the Defendant’s argument might be mildly persuasive at firstglance, on further reflection we must strongly disagree. Aside from thePlaintiffs proving their case of spoliation during their case in chief, italso became apparent to us during pretrial discussions with counsels andafter examination (as on cross) of Mr. Palmer during the Plaintiffs’ case,that Mr. Palmer would also voluntarily testify on the Defendant’s behalf.At the conclusion of the as-on-cross examination of Mr. Palmer, theDefendant’s counsel declined an opportunity to examine Mr. Palmerstating, “I will defer until our case.” N.T. 125, line 25. Clearly, this con-firmed to the Court that Mr. Palmer intended to testify. As a result, whenMr. Palmer chose to testify, he put his credibility at issue before the jury.Therefore, an additional basis to allow the evidence of post-accidentconduct arose, namely, to impeach Mr. Palmer’s credibility due to hisalleged conduct in this case.

We point the Defendant to Rule 607 of the Rules of Evidence. Thisrule states, “The credibility of a witness may be impeached by any evi-dence relevant to that issue, . . .” Pa.R.E. 607(b).

We believe that Mr. Palmer’s attempt to conceal evidence, discoverinformation improperly, and destroy evidence is extremely probative ofhis credibility. Therefore, we ruled that the post-accident conduct wasrelevant and was of such high probative value that it outweighed anydanger of unfair prejudice, or the dangers listed in Pa.R.E. 403 namely:confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of unduedelay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

We further note that Mr. Palmer in his direct testimony specificallyaddressed the issue of whether or not he was hiding evidence. Heclaimed that the work order for the repair of the foot pedal was in hisfiles since the day of the accident. (N.T. 577, lines 4-25). Mr. Palmeralso stated that OSHA was informed of the switched foot pedal on the



day OSHA came to investigate. (N.T. 580, lines 14-20). Therefore, theissue of the motive for the possible concealment of evidence was not justraised during the Plaintiffs’ case, but was raised by Mr. Palmer himself.

The Defendant next argues that the post-accident conduct should nothave been admitted at trial because it was evidence of subsequent reme-dial measures. The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state:

When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused byan event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-ously, would have made the injury or harm less like-ly to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures isnot admissible to prove that the party who took themeasures was negligent or engaged in culpable con-duct. . . .

Pa.R.E. 407.

The Defendant claims that the switching of the foot pedal, the fixingand eventual sale of the lift, and the interviewing of the Plaintiff (Mr.Morder) in the hospital, were all attempts to preclude another accidentfrom occurring. Therefore, the Defendant claims that all of this evidencewas prohibited from being admitted at trial as remedial measures.

We first note that had the Defendant truly been concerned with ensur-ing that no one would become injured in another accident, it (Defendant)would have quarantined the boom-lift until it could be fully inspected byall parties and by OSHA. Therefore, we did not find that the Defendant’sactions constituted subsequent remedial measures.

However, even if we were to find that the Defendant’s actions consti-tuted subsequent remedial measures, the post-accident conduct wouldstill be admissible. This is because Rule 407 specifically states, “Thisrule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measureswhen offered for impeachment, . . .” Pa.R.E. 407. Since we additionallyadmitted the post-accident conduct for impeachment purposes, this evi-dence is not proscribed by Rule 407. For all of the reasons listed above,we believe the evidence of post-accident conduct was properly admittedat trial.

3) THIS HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN PRECLUDING THEDEFENDANT FROM ARGUING THE COMPARA-TIVE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF BARRY R.MORDER TO THE JURY, IN REFUSING TO



INCLUDE SPECIAL VERDICT INTERROGATO-RIES ON THE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLI-GENCE, AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THEJURY ON COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

We begin by noting that the Defendant did not address this issue in hisbrief; and we could therefore conclude that it had waived that issue. Wespecifically note that both parties were directed, via our Briefing Order,to file “a comprehensive Brief in support of all matters raised in [their]Post-Trial Motion,” emphasis added. Therefore, we will only addressthis issue for the purpose of ensuring the completeness of this writing.

The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence statute states, “any dam-ages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to theamount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 7102(a).We did not permit the jury to determine an amount of negligence attrib-utable to the Plaintiff (Mr. Morder) because we ruled, as a matter of law,that the Plaintiff committed no negligence in the case at bar.

Mr. Morder was a mere passenger in the boom-lift. There was no evi-dence that Mr. Morder was in control of the lift or in any way affectedhow Mr. Dutton drove or otherwise operated the lift. We also note thatthere are no responsibilities for a passenger on a lift under the ANSIstandards (N.T. 173). The possible proper person for the Defendant toallege a defense of comparative negligence against would have been Mr.Dutton, had that case involving his (Dutton’s) estate proceeded to trial.

It also cannot be argued that Mr. Morder was comparatively negligentby entering the lift in the first place. First of all, there is no evidence thatMr. Morder had any reason to know that Mr. Dutton would drive the liftinto the building. Second, there was no evidence that Mr. Morder was atrained lift operator or that he should otherwise have known that the liftwas being used improperly as a crane. Therefore, since the Plaintiff inno way caused the lift to crash into the building, nor did he knowinglyput himself in harm’s way, he could not be found to have committed anyact which would subject his claims to an instruction concerning compar-ative negligence.

4) THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED ANABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TOINCLUDE SEPARATE JURY QUESTIONS ON THEDEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE BASED UPON THETHEORY OF FAILURE TO REPAIR AND MAIN-TAIN THE BOOM LIFT AS ALLEGED IN THE



COMPLAINT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND FAILURETO INSPECT THE BOOM LIFT, TO HAVE PROP-ER MANUALS ON BOARD THE BOOM LIFT,FAILURE TO PROVIDE JOB SITE SAFETYSUPERVISION, AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE ASAFE WORK SITE ENVIRONMENT, ON THEOTHER HAND, WHICH LATTER THEORIESWERE THE SUBJECT OF DEFENDANT’S AFORE-SAID MOTION IN LIMINE TO LIMIT THE SCOPEOF THE PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENCE.

We again note that this issue was not briefed by the Defendant andwould be subject to being construed a waiver. Therefore, we shall againonly discuss it for the purposes of completeness. The Defendant wantedto have a separate jury question for the claims that were specifically list-ed in the Complaint (without the inclusion of the Paragraph 35 claims)and a separate jury question for the claims that we allowed to be arguedbased upon our reading of the rather all-encompassing language con-tained in Paragraph 35 of the Complaint (See our discussion above inIssue No. 1). We however, denied separate jury questions and had onequestion for all the allegations of negligence.

We saw no reason to have separate jury questions for the differenttheories of negligence because the liability would be the same no matter what theory of negligence the jury believed caused Mr.Morder’s injuries. We did not see the relevance of having the jurydecide exactly which theories they agreed or disagreed with. For liability purposes, each theory of liability would hold the Defendantequally liable. Further, there would be no difference if the jury foundthe Defendant liable for more than one theory of liability. Therefore,to keep the verdict slip as easy for the jurors to understand as possible,in this rather complicated case, we did not distinguish between the different allegations of negligence.

5) THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANTDEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NONSUIT WHERETHE PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT, BARRIS EVULICH,DID NOT OFFER ANY OPINIONS REGARDINGCAUSATION BETWEEN THE ALLEGED ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFEN-DANT AND THE HARM SUFFERED BY THEPLAINTIFFS.



The Defendant alleges that the Plaintiffs did not meet their burden ofproof because their (Plaintiffs’) expert, Barris Evulich, did not opine asto the exact cause of the accident. In particular, the Defendant points toMr. Evulich’s statement, “The specifics of how this accident actuallyhappened will never — no one will ever know,” (N.T. 174). TheDefendant is alleging that since the Plaintiffs could not prove the exactcause of the accident, they cannot prove that the Defendant’s negligenceled to Mr. Morder’s injuries absent conjecture or mere guessing.

The Defendant appears to be also attempting to analogize the case atbar to a case of medical malpractice. In a medical malpractice case, anexpert must give an opinion in order for a jury to decide the cause of theinjury. This is because the issues in medical cases are usually presumedto be beyond the understanding of the average lay person. See, Miller v.Sacred Heart Hospital, et al., 753 A.2d 829, 833 (Pa. Super. 2000).However, even medical malpractice cases do not need experts if theproof of negligence is obvious to the lay person. Miller, 753 A.2d at 833-34. The Defendant is alleging that because of the complicated nature ofthis case, if the Plaintiffs’ expert did not state a proper basis to provenegligence, then the jury could not decide on its own that the Defendantwas negligent.

It is true that a jury cannot speculate or guess as to the cause of anaccident. However, a jury is permitted to make reasonable inferencesbased upon the facts presented in the case. The Pennsylvania SupremeCourt has explained:

We have said many times that the jury may not bepermitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis ofspeculation or conjecture, but that there must beevidence upon which logically its conclusion may bebased. Clearly this does not mean that the jury maynot draw inferences based upon all the evidence andthe jurors’ own knowledge and experiences, for thatis, of course, the very heart of the jury’s function. Itmeans only that the evidence presented must be suchthat by reasoning from it, without resort to prejudiceor guess, a jury can reach the conclusion sought bythe plaintiff, and not that that conclusion must bethe only one which logically can be sought.

Smith v. Bell Telephone Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477, 479-80 (Pa. 1959), citations omitted.



We agree that Mr. Evulich did not claim to know exactly what hap-pened on the day of the accident. However, we believe that Mr. Evulichpresented more than enough evidence at trial to meet the Plaintiffs’ bur-den. We further find that this case is not so factually complicated that thejury could not find the Defendant liable without the evidence of anexpert. We will now evaluate the evidence that was admitted at trial todetermine if the jury could reach its verdict without resorting tounfounded speculation, conjecture or guess.

In this case, the Defendant owned and leased a boom-lift uponwhich Mr. Morder was a passenger and was seriously injured. Thesafety standards for owners of lifts, who are also dealers of that verysame type of construction equipment, require them (owners / dealers)to train the person who uses the lift and to make sure the lift is in safeoperating condition (See, American National Standards Institute(ANSI) standards, 9.2.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 5.6.1, 5.9, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6). Thejury must determine what caused the accident and if the owner’s fail-ure to either properly train the driver or to properly maintain the lift ledto the accident occurring.

It was admitted at trial that Mr. Dutton was never properly trained todrive or otherwise operate the boom-lift (See, testimony of William L.Palmer, N.T. 122). The Plaintiffs’ expert testified that the Defendant wasresponsible to train Mr. Dutton (N.T. 159, 160). Mr. Evulich testifiedthat Mr. Dutton was improperly using a man-lift as a crane (N.T. 161-162). Mr. Evulich stated, “a trained operator would not have used thatmachine,” (N.T. 173). Therefore, a jury could reasonably infer, basedupon the testimony of Mr. Evulich, that had Pro Aer properly trained Mr.Dutton, this accident would never have occurred because Mr. Duttonwould not have used the boom-lift for this type of assignment.

Mr. Evulich also testified that under the ANSI safety standards, man-lifts are supposed to have a “frequent inspection” every 150 hours or 90days, which ever comes first, as well as an “annual inspection” no laterthan 13 months from the last annual inspection (N.T. 168). However, thelift was overdue for its frequent inspection (N.T. 70-72) and overdue forits annual inspection by over a month (N.T. 105). Further, Mr. Evulichexplained that the lift was not properly inspected because the defectivefoot pedal and illegible safety placards were not compliant with ANSIstandards (N.T. 167). The lift also did not have the required manuals onboard as required by ANSI (N.T. 161). Further, James Peck testified thatthe lift had a defective foot pedal for at least two weeks (N.T. 214-15)and Randy Bunch knew it was defective that morning (N.T. 227-28).



Therefore, a jury could reasonably infer that had Pro Aer properlyinspected its lift, said lift would have been found to be non-compliantwith ANSI safety standards, would have been taken out of service, andwould not have been available for Mr. Dutton to use in the accident.

Finally, the testimony of Mr. Evulich was sufficient for a jury to rea-sonably infer that had Mr. Dutton been properly trained, he (Dutton)would not have crashed the lift into the building. Barring supernaturalcauses, there are only a limited number of reasons why a lift will crashinto a building. The Plaintiffs’ expert testified that the only item brokenon the lift was the foot pedal (N.T. 175-76). There was no evidence ofan engine malfunction that would cause the lift to drive itself into thebuilding. Further, there was a safety collar on the neck of the drive lever(N.T. 185-86). Therefore, even with a malfunctioning pedal, the liftcould not have moved without the driver intentionally lifting the collarand moving the lever (N.T. 189).

The drive lever was found in the “drive forward” position (N.T. 188).Therefore, Mr. Dutton must have lifted the collar and pushed the leverinto that position. We therefore can conclude that Mr. Dutton intendedto drive the lift. However, it is equally reasonable to conclude that Mr.Dutton would not have intended to drive the lift into the building.

No evidence was presented that Mr. Dutton intended to kill himself orthat he purposefully ran the lift into the building. Therefore, a jury couldproperly infer that Mr. Dutton drove the lift into the building by acci-dent.

Further, a jury does not need an expert to tell them that man-lifts arenot supposed to be driven into the side of buildings. We analogize thiscase to that of a medical malpractice case in which the doctor left asponge inside a patient. A jury does not need an expert to know that neg-ligence occurred. See Restatement Second of Torts, Section 328(D),Comment (d), 1965. The doctor’s thought process when he left thesponge is irrelevant, and as such, a jury needs no explanation as to whythe doctor forgot the sponge. The causes of this tragic construction acci-dent were readily discernable by the jury based on all of the evidenceadduced in the trial. Indeed, this is a classic example of the ancient doc-trine of res ipsa loquitor.

Mr. Evulich testified that Mr. Dutton, an untrained driver, intention-ally moved the drive lever to the forward position and this caused thelift to drive into the building. A jury can reasonably infer that Mr.Dutton was disoriented and did not realize what result would occur



from his action. This is especially plausible because the foot pedal wasbroken. Had the foot pedal been operational, Mr. Dutton would havebeen forced to realign himself to the control panel. Further, once Mr.Dutton realigned himself (and had the safety placards been legible,) Mr.Dutton may have read the safety placard on the control panel that stat-ed, “When turntable [is] rotated 180 degrees, basket over front wheels,drive and steer functions are reversed.” N.T. 66. This operational flawby Mr. Dutton was fatal to him (Dutton) and nearly fatal to Mr. Morder.

It is true that the jury did not know what thought processes were goingthrough Mr. Dutton’s mind when he acted. We find, however, that theseactions clearly indicate the true cause of the accident and subsequentinjuries to Mr. Morder.

We recognize that it might have been possible that Mr. Dutton pushedthe drive lever forward for some other, non-negligent reason. Perhapswe could speculate that he meant to push the drive lever in the reverseposition but at the exact moment he lifted the collar of the drive lever,he somehow slipped and pushed it in the forward position. While thisscenario would be theoretically possible, we find it extremely implausi-ble, indeed fantastic. Without some scintilla of evidence to support thistheory (or any other non-negligent theory), we find that a jury can, anddid, properly infer from the evidence that Mr. Dutton simply was notproperly trained and he became disoriented.

For these reasons, we find that the Plaintiffs met their burden of proofand the jury based its verdict upon reasonable inferences from the factsand not upon mere speculation, conjecture, or guess. We have, therefore,issued an appropriate Order of even date herewith, denying theDefendant’s post-trial motions.

ISSUED AT HARRISBURG, this 18th day of May, 2006.

ORDERAND NOW, to wit, this 18th day of May, 2006, pursuant to our

Opinion of even date herewith, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that theDefendant’s Post-Trial Motions are DENIED.

_______o_______

ESTATE OF PAUL D. BONAWITZ, JR., lateof Lower Paxton Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died May 28, 2006). Executrix:Vickie L. Bonawitz Powley, 107 Old York Road,Lot 121, New Cumberland, PA 17070. Attorney:Earl Richard Etzweiler, Esq., 105 North FrontStreet, Harrisburg, PA 17101. Phone (717) 234-5600. j23-y7

ESTATE OF EARL E. HIPPENSTEEL, late ofLower Paxton Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died May 29, 2006). Executrix:Pauline Gutshall. Attorney: Diane S. Baker, Esq.,P.O. Box 6443, Harrisburg, PA 17112-0443.

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Estate Notices

THIRD PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF GARY GUELDA, late of the Cityof Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.Administrator: Ronald D. Butler, 500 North ThirdStreet, P.O. Box 1004, Harrisburg, PA 17108-1004. Attorneys: Butler Law Firm, 500 NorthThird Street, P.O. Box 1004, Harrisburg, PA17108-1004. j16-j30

ESTATE OF MIRIAM D’AGOSTINO, late ofthe City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Co-Executors: Carol L. Spagnoloand John A. D’Agostino. Attorney: Richard L.Placey, Esq., Placey & Wright, 3631 North FrontStreet, Harrisburg, PA 17110. j16-j30

ESTATE OF SARAMARY (SALLY A.)WEIKEL a/k/a SARAMARY A. WEIKEL a/k/aSALLY A. WEIKEL a/k/a SALLY ANNWEIKEL, late of Lower Paxton Township,Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Executor:William F. Weikel. Attorney: Robert P. Kline,Esq., Kline Law Office, P.O. Box 461, NewCumberland, PA 17070-0461. j16-j30

ESTATE OF DUSHAN MUDRINICH, JR.,late of Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsyl-vania (died February 28, 2006). Administratrix:Deidre L. Scudder, 31 West Maple Avenue,Shiremanstown, PA 17011. Attorney: John S.Davidson, Esq., 320 West Chocolate Avenue, P.O.Box 437, Hershey, PA 17033-0437. j16-j30

ESTATE OF BRUCE D. KENT, late of WestHanover Township, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania (died May 21, 2006). Executrix: Joyce B.Kent, 2504 Blarney Drive, Harrisburg, PA 17112.Attorney: Stanley A. Smith, Esq., Rhoads & SinonLLP, One South Market Square, P.O. Box 1146,Harrisburg, PA 17108. j16-j30

ESTATE OF MADELYN M. DAY, late ofSouth Hanover Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died March 30, 2006). Executrix:Arloa M. Day, 4 Sycamore Road, Hummelstown,PA 17036. Attorney: James G. Morgan, Jr., Esq.,Tucker Arensberg, P.C., P.O. Box 889,Harrisburg, PA 17108-0889. j16-j30

ESTATE OF CARL F. CLOUSER, late ofLower Swatara Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executrix: Beverly Jean Bender,6798 Hickory Lane, Harrisburg, PA 17112.Attorneys: Snelbaker & Brenneman, P.C., 44West Main Street, P.O. Box 318, Mechanicsburg,PA 17055-0318. j16-j30

ESTATE OF CONSTANCE M. GREEN, lateof Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania(died April 15, 2006). Executor: Thomas Weller.Attorney: Marielle F. Hazen, Esq., 2000Linglestown Road, Suite 202, Harrisburg, PA17110. j16-j30

ESTATE OF DOROTHY DIANE EISEN, lateof Lower Swatara Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died May 16, 2006). Executrix:Pamela Eisen, 14 West Lawn Circle,Wormleysburg, PA 17043. Attorney: William L.Adler, Esq., 125 Locust Street, P.O. Box 11933,Harrisburg, PA 17108. j16-j30

ESTATE OF ELSA L. SHERRICK, late of theCity of Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Penn-sylvania. Administratrix: Crystal Ann Drake,Post Office Box 1291, Harrisburg, PA 17108-1291. Attorney: Louise A. Knight, Esq., SaulEwing LLP, Penn National Insurance Plaza, TwoNorth Second Street, 7th Floor, Harrisburg, PA17101. j16-j30

THIRD PUBLICATION

Estate Notices

ESTATE OF FRANK MERCURIO, late of theTownship of Derry, Dauphin County, Pennsyl-vania. Administrator: Hershey Trust Company,100 Mansion Road East, P.O. Box 445, Hershey,PA 17033-0445. Phone (717) 520-1126.Attorney: Charles Petrie, Esq., 3528 BrisbanStreet, Harrisburg, PA 17111. Phone (717) 561-1939. j16-j30

ESTATE OF ROBERT N. BOWSER, late ofthe Borough of Hummelstown, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. Executrix: Jeannette L. Bowser,256 Willow Street, Hummelstown, PA 17036.Attorney: Charles J. DeHart, III, Esq., Caldwell& Kearns, 13 East Main Street, Hummelstown,PA 17036. j16-j30

ESTATE OF JESSE L. BOWMAN, late ofWest Hanover Township, Dauphin County,Pennsylvania (died May 10, 2006). Executor:Jerry L. Bowman. Attorney: Diane S. Baker,Esq., P.O. Box 6443, Harrisburg, PA 17112-0443.

j16-j30

ESTATE OF MARY YVONNE BROOKS, lateof Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania(died April 26, 2006). Administrator: DavidBrooks. Attorneys: Beckley & Madden, 212North Third Street, Post Office Box 11998,Harrisburg PA 17108-1998. Phone (717) 233-7691. j16-j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a businesscorporation known as: GEODINE, INC., hasbeen incorporated under the provisions of thePennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988.

LAW OFFICEj30 SMOKER GARD MERSKY LLP

FIRST PUBLICATION

Corporate Notices

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication for Certificate of Authority has beenfiled with the Department of State of theCommonwealth of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg,PA on or about June 12, 2006, for a foreign cor-poration with a registered address in the state ofPennsylvania as follows: Amerimore FinancialCorporation c/o National Registered Agents,Inc.This corporation is incorporated under the lawsof the State of Delaware. The principal office is120 Delaware Street, New Castle, DE 19720. Thecorporation has been qualified in Pennsylvaniaunder the provisions of the Business CorporationLaw of 1988 as amended. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication for Certificate of Authority has beenfiled with the Department of State of theCommonwealth of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg,PA on or about June 1, 2006, for a foreign corpo-ration with a registered address in the state ofPennsylvania as follows: The CalaisCorporation of Virginia, c/o Mette Evans &Woodside Esqs., 3401 Front Street, Harrisburg,PA 17110.This corporation is incorporated under the lawsof Virginia. The principal office is 8595 LeesburgPike, Vienna, VA 22180. The corporation hasbeen qualified in Pennsylvania under the provi-sions of the Business Corporation Law of 1988 asamended. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that AmpexData Systems Corporation, a foreign businesscorporation incorporated under the laws of theState of Delaware, intends to withdraw its author-ity to do business in Pennsylvania. The address ofits principal office under the laws of its jurisdic-tion of incorporation is 1228 Douglas Avenue,Redwood City, CA 94063, Attn: GeneralCounsel. Its last registered office in this Commonwealth isc/o Corporation Service Company, which isdeemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located in Dauphin County,Pennsylvania. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania onJune 19, 2006, with respect to a proposed non-profit corporation S.W.A.V. – Sisters With AVision, which has been incorporated under thenonprofit Corporation Law of 1988. A brief sum-mary of the purposes for which said corporationis organized is: Youth Outreach Program to men-tor and offer life coaching skills to young ladiesages 12-19. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a LimitedCertificate of Authority for a foreign businesscorporation was filed in the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania forForza Group, Inc., doing business as ForzaDevelopment on May 22, 2006. The address ofits principal office under the laws of its jurisdic-tion is 5865 Hagman Drive, Toledo, OH 43612-3877. The address of this corporation’s proposedregistered office is Capitol Corporate Services,Inc. in the county of Dauphin. The Corporation isfiled in compliance with the requirements of theapplicable provision of 15 Pa. C. S. 4124(b) and54 Pa. C. S. 311. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that aCertificate of Organization for a DomesticLimited Liability Company has been filed withthe Department of State of the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, at Harrisburg, PA on May 17,2006, for the purpose of obtaining a Certificate ofOrganization for a limited liability company to beorganized under the Business Corporation Law of1988. The name of the limited liability companyis RHCC, LLC, and the location of the regis-tered office is 80 Larson Road, P.O. Box 96,Kylertown, PA 16847.

LUTHER E. MILSPAW, Jr., Esq.130 State Street

P.O. Box 946Harrisburg, PA 17108-0946

j30 (717) 236-3141

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for AUBREY HOHMAN, INC., a corpo-ration organized under the Pennsylvania BusinessCorporation Law of 1988. j30

FIRST PUBLICATION

Corporate Notices

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication was made to the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg, PA, on June 15, 2006, by REALOGY OPERATIONS, INC., a foreigncorporation formed under the laws of the State ofCalifornia, where its principal office is located at2711 Centerville Road, Suite 400, Wilmington,DE 19808, for a Certificate of Authority to dobusiness in Pennsylvania under the provisions ofthe Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of1988.The registered office in Pennsylvania shall bedeemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located c/o Corporation ServiceCompany, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for CAPE HORN GP, INC., a corporationorganized under the Pennsylvania BusinessCorporation Law of 1988. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for PEPPER ENTERPRISE, INC., a cor-poration organized under the PennsylvaniaBusiness Corporation Law of 1988. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for J & R PETROLEUM, INC., a corpo-ration organized under the Pennsylvania BusinessCorporation Law of 1988. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for NINA’S MINI MART, INC., a corpo-ration organized under the Pennsylvania BusinessCorporation Law of 1988. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication was made to the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg, PA, on June 14, 2006, by SUMMERS GROUP, INC., a foreign corpora-tion formed under the laws of the State ofDelaware, where its principal office is located at2711 Centerville Road, Suite 400, Wilmington,DE 19808, for a Certificate of Authority to dobusiness in Pennsylvania under the provisions ofthe Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of1988.The registered office in Pennsylvania shall bedeemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located c/o Corporation ServiceCompany, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication was made to the Department of Stateof the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, atHarrisburg, PA, on June 8, 2006, by TUMISTORES, INC., a foreign corporation formedunder the laws of the State of New Jersey, whereits principal office is located at 1001 DurhamAvenue, South Plainfield, NJ 07080, for aCertificate of Authority to do business inPennsylvania under the provisions of thePennsylvania Business Corporation Law of1988.The registered office in Pennsylvania shall be

deemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located c/o Corporation ServiceCompany, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication was made to the Department of Stateof the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, atHarrisburg, PA, on June 14, 2006, by LEHMANBROTHERS COMMODITY SERVICESINC., a foreign corporation formed under thelaws of the State of Delaware, where its principaloffice is located at 745 7th Avenue, New York,NY 10019, for a Certificate of Authority to dobusiness in Pennsylvania under the provisions ofthe Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of1988.The registered office in Pennsylvania shall bedeemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located c/o Corporation ServiceCompany, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. j30

FIRST PUBLICATION

Corporate Notices

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation have been filed with theDepartment of State of the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, at Harrisburg, PA, on June 16,2006, for the purpose of obtaining a charter of aNonprofit Corporation organized under theNonprofit Corporation Law of 1988 of theCommonwealth of Pennsylvania. The name ofthe corporation is: BROWNSTONE MANORHOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.The purposes for which it was organized are asfollows: to own, maintain, preserve, administerand operate any common property on all or a por-tion of the lands in the Township of Dover inYork County, Pennsylvania known asBrownstone Manor, a Planned Community. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that anApplication was made to the Department of Stateof the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, atHarrisburg, PA, on June 12, 2006, by AHOLDCENTRAL HOLDINGS, INC., a foreign cor-poration formed under the laws of the State ofDelaware, where its principal office is located at2711 Centerville Road, Suite 400, Wilmington,DE 19808, for a Certificate of Authority to dobusiness in Pennsylvania under the provisions ofthe Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of1988.The registered office in Pennsylvania shall bedeemed for venue and official publication pur-poses to be located c/o Corporation ServiceCompany, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for BLACK’S PEST CONTROL, INC., aBusiness-Statutory Close corporation organizedunder the Pennsylvania Business CorporationLaw of 1988. j30

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for INTEGRA ASSOCIATES, INC., acorporation organized under the PennsylvaniaBusiness Corporation Law of 1988. j30

FIRST PUBLICATION

Corporate Notices

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Articles ofIncorporation were filed with the Department ofState for DELHI PETRO, INC., a corporationorganized under the Pennsylvania BusinessCorporation Law of 1988. j30

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASOF DAUPHIN COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION – LAWCIVIL DIVISION

No. 2006-CV-1475-MF

NOTICE OF ACTION INMORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

CENTRAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,Plaintiffvs.JAMES P. FLYNN, Defendant

NOTICE

TO: JANES P. FLYNN

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on April4, 2006, Plaintiff, CENTRAL MORTGAGECOMPANY, filed a Mortgage ForeclosureComplaint endorsed with a Notice to Defend,against you in the Court of Common Pleas ofDauphin County, Pennsylvania, docketed to No.2006-CV-1475-MF. Wherein Plaintiff seeks toforeclose on the mortgage secured on your prop-erty located at 336 WEST BROAD STREET,WILLIAMSTOWN, PA 17098 whereupon yourproperty would be sold by the Sheriff of DauphinCounty.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED to plead tothe above referenced Complaint on or beforetwenty (20) days from the date of this publicationor a Judgment will be entered against you.

NOTICE

IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND, you must entera written appearance personally or by attorneyand file your defenses or objections in writingwith the court. You are warned that if you fail todo so the case may proceed without you and ajudgment may be entered against you withoutfurther notice for the relief requested by theplaintiff. You may lose money or property orother rights important to you.

FIRST PUBLICATION

Miscellaneous Notices

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TOYOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOTHAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONETHE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THISOFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFOR-MATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.

IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE ALAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TOPROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATIONABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFERLEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONSAT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.

DAUPHIN COUNTYLAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE

213 North Front StreetHarrisburg, PA 17101

(717) 232-7536j30


PENNSYLVANIA

CHANGE OF NAME NOTICE

No. 2006 CV 2092 NC

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on May 12,2006 the Petition of Dianne Marie Quill wasfiled in the above named Court, requesting adecree to change her name to Dianne MarieEvans Murray.

The Court has affixed August 7, 2006 at 8:15a.m. in the Dauphin County Courthouse, Frontand Market Streets, Harrisburg, PA as the timeand place for the hearing on said Petition, whenand where all persons interested may appear andshow cause, if any they have, why the prayer ofthe said Petition should not be granted.

JEFFREY S. SHANK, Esq.Gingrich, Smith, Klingensmith & Dolan

222 South Market Street, Suite 201Elizabethtown, PA 17022

j30-y7 (717) 367-1370

FIRST PUBLICATION



PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL DIVISION

No. 1852 CV 2006

NOTICE

GREEN TREE CONSUMER DISCOUNTCOMPANY, Plaintiffvs.IVAN RUPERT and TAMMI JO ALBERT,Defendants

YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If youwish to defend against the claims set forth in thefollowing, you must take action within twenty(20) days after this complaint and notice areserved, by entering a written appearance person-ally or by attorney and filing in writing with thecourt your defenses or objections to the claims setforth against you. You are warned that if you failto do so the case may proceed without you and ajudgment may be entered against you by the courtwithout further notice for any money claimed inthe complaint or for any other claim or reliefrequested by the plaintiff. You may lose money orproperty or other rights important to you.





(717) 232-7536

CHAD R. CALLAHAN, Esq.Voelker & Assoc. PC

429 Forbes Avenue, Suite 1410Pittsburgh, PA 15219

j30 (412) 765-0543


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 1974 CV 2006


GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION,Plaintiffvs.ERNEST L. LESTER, Defendant

NOTICE

TO: ERNEST L. LESTER

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on MAY5, 2006, Plaintiff, GMAC MORTGAGE COR-PORATION, filed a Mortgage ForeclosureComplaint endorsed with a Notice to Defend,against you in the Court of Common Pleas ofDAUPHIN County, Pennsylvania, docketed toNo. 1974 CV 2006. Wherein Plaintiff seeks toforeclose on the mortgage secured on your prop-erty located at 1424 VERBEKE STREET, HAR-RISBURG, PA 17103 whereupon your propertywould be sold by the Sheriff of Dauphin County.


NOTICE






(717) 232-7536j30


PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION – LAW

No. 2006 CV 1873 MF


FNLC FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,Plaintiffvs.DAWN DUNN a/k/a DAWN G. DUNN,Defendant

TO: Dawn Dunn a/k/a Dawn G. Dunn

PREMISES SUBJECTTO FORECLOSURE

223 SOUTH 14th STREETHARRISBURG, PA 17104

NOTICE

IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND, you must entera written appearance personally or by attorneyand file your defenses or objections in writingwith the court. You are warned that if you fail todo so the case may proceed without you and ajudgment may be entered against you withoutfurther notice for the relief requested by thePlaintiff. You may lose money or property orother rights important to you.


IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE ALAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAYBE ABLE TOPROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION

FIRST PUBLICATION


ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFERLEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONSAT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.



(717) 232-7536

TERRENCE J. McCABE, Esq.McCabe, Weisberg and Conway, P.C.

123 South Broad Street, Suite 2080Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19109

j30 (215) 790-1010


PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL DIVISION

No. 2005-CV-2837-CV


ASSET ACQUISITIONS GROUP LLC,Plaintiffvs.ROCHELLE DOZIER, Defendant

NOTICE

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TOYOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOTHAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORDONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICESET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHEREYOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.



(717) 232-7536

JAMES C. WARMBRODT, Esq.Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co.

2718 Koppers Building436 Seventh Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219j30 (412) 434-7955


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 406-CV-2005

ABN AMRO MORTGAGE GROUP, INC.,Plaintiffvs.JOSEPH A. HAYMAN, Defendant

NOTICE OF SHERIFF’S SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

TO: Joseph A. Hayman605 Cardinal DriveHarrisburg, PA 17111

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that yourhouse at 605 Cardinal Drive, City of Harrisburg,Dauphin County, is scheduled to be sold by theDauphin County Sheriff’s Department toenforce the Court judgment of $151,507.36obtained by Plaintiff ABN AMRO MortgageGroup, Inc. against you. The Sheriff’s Sale willbe conducted on October 12, 2006 at 10:00A.M. at the Dauphin County AdministrationBuilding, 4th Floor, Commissioner’s HearingRoom, Second and Market Streets, Harrisburg,Pennsylvania 17101.

NOTICE OF OWNERS’ RIGHTS

YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PREVENT THISSHERIFF’S SALE

To prevent this Sheriff’s Sale, you must takeimmediate action:

1. This sale will be canceled if you pay toABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. theback payments, late charges, costs andreasonable attorneys’ fees due. To find outhow much you must pay, you may call(610) 941-3600.

2. You may be able to stop the sale by filinga petition asking the Court to strike oropen the Judgment, if the judgment wasimproperly entered. You may also ask theCourt to postpone the sale for good cause.

3. You may also be able to stop the salethrough other legal proceedings.

You may need an attorney to assert your rights.The sooner you contact one, the more chance youwill have of stopping the sale. (See notice follow-ing on how to obtain an attorney).

FIRST PUBLICATION


YOU MAY STILL BE ABLE TO SAVEYOUR PROPERTY AND

YOU HAVE OTHER RIGHTS EVEN IF THE SHERIFF’S SALE

DOES TAKE PLACE.

1. If the Sheriff’s Sale is not stopped, yourproperty will be sold to the highest bidder.You may find out the price bid by callingthe Dauphin County Sheriff’s Departmentat (717) 232-7536.

2. You may be able to petition the Court toset aside the sale if the bid price wasgrossly inadequate compared to the valueof your property.

3. The sale will go through only if the buyerpays the Sheriff the full amount bid in thesale. To find out if this has happened, youmay call the Dauphin County Sheriff’sDepartment at (717) 232-7536.

4. If the amount due from the buyer is notpaid to the Sheriff, you will remain theowner of the property as if the sale hadnever happened.

5. You have the right to remain in the prop-erty until the full amount due is paid to theSheriff and the Sheriff gives a deed to thebuyer. At that time, the buyer may bringlegal proceedings to evict you.

6. You may be entitled to a share of themoney which was paid for your house. Aschedule of distribution of the money bidfor your house will be filed by theDauphin County Sheriff on or about thirty (30) days from the date ofSheriff’s Sale. This schedule will statewho will be receiving that money. Themoney will be paid out in accordancewith this schedule unless exceptions(reasons why the proposed distribution iswrong) are filed with the Sheriff withinten (10) days after the distribution sheetis posted.

7. You may also have other rights anddefenses, or ways of getting your houseback, if you act immediately after thesale.

You should take this notice to your lawyer atonce. If you do not have a lawyer, go to or tele-phone the office set forth below. This office canprovide you with the information about hiring alawyer. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, this

office may be able to provide you with informa-tion about agencies that may offer legal servicesto eligible persons at a reduced fee or no fee.



(717) 232-7536

THOMAS I. PULEO, Esq.CHRISTOPHER A. DeNARDO, Esq.

Thomas I. Puleo, LLP660 Sentry Parkway, Suite 210

Blue Bell, PA 19422j30 (610) 941-3600


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 2006 CV 924 MF


JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ASTRUSTEE RESIDENTIAL FUNDING CORPORATION, Plaintiffvs.H. SCOTT FRY a/k/a HARRY SCOTT FRYa/k/a SCOTT FRY and BRANDIE L. MEMORYa/k/a BRANDIE L. HOOPER, Defendants

NOTICE

TO: H. SCOTT FRY a/k/a HARRY SCOTTFRY a/k/a SCOTT FRY andBRANDIE L. MEMORY a/k/aBRANDIE L. HOOPER

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that you arehereby notified that on March 2, 2006, Plaintiff,JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ASTRUSTEE RESIDENTIAL FUNDING CORPO-RATION, filed a Mortgage ForeclosureComplaint endorsed with a Notice to Defend,against you in the Court of Common Pleas ofDAUPHIN County, Pennsylvania, docketed toNo. 2006 CV 924 MF. Wherein Plaintiff seeks toforeclose on the mortgage secured on your prop-erty located at 811 WHITEHAVEN ROAD,HARRISBURG, PA 17111, whereupon yourproperty would be sold by the Sheriff of DauphinCounty.

FIRST PUBLICATION



NOTICE






(717) 232-7536j30


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 2005-CV-3240-MF


CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,INC., Plaintiffvs.CATHY MITCHELL, Defendant

NOTICE

TO: CATHY MITCHELL

NOTICE OF SHERIFF’S SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

TAKE NOTICE that the real estate located at2314 LUCE STREET, HARRISBURG, PA17104 is scheduled to be sold at Sheriff’s Sale onThursday, OCTOBER 12, 2006 at 10:00 A.M.,Dauphin County Administration Building, 4thFloor, Commissioners Hearing Room,Harrisburg, PA, to enforce the court judgment of$74,676.16, obtained by CITIFINANCIALMORTGAGE COMPANY, INC. (the mort-gagee).

ALL THAT CERTAIN TRACT of land situatein the 13th Ward of the City of Harrisburg,Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, bounded anddescribed as follows, to wit:

BEGINNING at a point on the northern lineof Luce Street 211 feet more or less eastwardlyfrom the northeast corner of 23rd and LuceStreets at line of property No. 2312 1/2 LuceStreet; thence northwardly along said linethrough the center of a partition wall 100 feet toLawn Alley; thence eastwardly along said Alley14 feet to line of property No. 2314 1/2 LuceStreet; thence southwardly along said line 100feet to Luce Street; thence westwardly along thenorthern line of Luce Street 14 feet to the placeof BEGINNING.

BEING KNOWN AS 2314 Luce Street,Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

BEING THE SAME PREMISES whichRichard R. Suhay and Jane E. Suhay, his wife byDeed dated June 29, 1990 and recorded July 5,1990 in Record Book 1447, Page 51, grantedand conveyed unto Linda A. Strayer, single person.

BEING Parcel No. 13-088-029.TITLE TO SAID PREMISES IS VESTED IN

Cathy Mitchell, by Deed from Linda A. Strayer, asingle person, dated 1-20-94, recorded 1-24-94,in Deed Book 2151, page 406.

Front: .221 FEET Depth: 100 FEETBEING PREMISES 2314 LUCE STREET,

HARRISBURG, PA 17104.IMPROVEMENTS consist of residential

property.SOLD as the property of CATHY

MITCHELL.CONDITIONS OF SALE: THE HIGHEST

AND BEST BIDDER SHALL BE THE BUYER.

FIRST PUBLICATION


TERMS: The purchaser will be required topay the full amount of his bid by TWOO’CLOCK p.m. on the day of the sale, and ifcomplied with, a deed will be tendered by theSheriff at the next Court of Common Pleas forDauphin County, conveying to the purchaser allthe right, title, interest and claim which saiddefendant has in and to said property at the timeof levying the same. ALTHOUGH NOT PARTOF THE MINIMUM BID, PROPERTY SOLDFOR MINIMUM BID DOES NOT DIS-CHARGE DELINQUENT AND/OR OUT-STANDING TAXES AND THE PURCHASERWILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAME. Ifabove conditions be not complied with on thepart of the Purchaser, the property will again beoffered for sale by the Sheriff at THREEO’CLOCK p.m. on the same day. The said pur-chaser will be held liable for the deficienciesand additional cost of said sale.

TAKE NOTICE that a Schedule ofDistribution will be filed by the Sheriff withinthirty (30) days of the Sheriff’s Sale, distributionwill be made in accordance with the scheduleunless exceptions are filed within ten (10) daysthereto.

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TOYOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOTHAVE A LAWYER GO TO OR TELEPHONETHE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THISOFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH THEINFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE ALAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TOPROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATIONABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFERLEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONSAT REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.



(717) 232-7536

DANIEL G. SCHMIEG, Esq.Suite 1400, One Penn Center

1617 John F. Kennedy BoulevardPhiladelphia, PA 19103-1814

j30 (215) 563-7000


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 2006-CV-573-QT

NOTICE OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE

RYAN GROFF, Plaintiffvs.CAMP HILL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,SHARON McCALEBB a/k/a SHARON B. McCALEBB a/k/a SHARON BERNADETH McCALEBBand TORY McCALEBB, Defendants

TO: TORY McCALEBB

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that onFebruary 7, 2006, Plaintiff, Ryan Groff, filed aComplaint to Quiet Title endorsed with a Noticeto Defend against you in the Court of CommonPleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, docket-ed to No. 2006-CV-573-QT, wherein Plaintiffdesires to establish his title and right to posses-sion of the property located at Claster Boulevard,Dauphin Borough, Dauphin County, PA, TaxParcel No. 23-001-131, which Plaintiff obtainedby Tax Claim Bureau Deed dated July 1, 2005.The subject real estate is bounded and describedas follows:

ALL THAT CERTAIN piece or parcel of land,situate in the Borough of Dauphin (formerlyMiddle Paxton Township), County of Dauphin,Pennsylvania, more particularly bounded anddescribed as follows, to wit:

BEGINNING on the North side of a StateHighway (also known as Erie Street) at corner oflands of the Dauphin National Bank; thencealong said highway, North 49 degrees 11 minutesWest, 5.50 perches to a point in the intersectionof said State Highway with the Peter’s MountainRoad; thence up said Peter’s Mountain RoadNorth 22 degrees 00 minutes West, 7.20 perchesto a point; thence by the same North 42 degrees02 minutes West, 25.70 perches to a point; thenceby the same, South 34 degrees 20 minutes East,3.70 perches to a point; thence South 68 degrees00 minutes West 6.00 perches to a point; thencealong the rear of the lands of the various proper-ties fronting on the aforementioned Erie Street,North 58 degrees 30 minutes West, 19.20 perch-es to a point; thence by the same North 67degrees 00 minutes West, 21.00 perches to apoint; thence by the same, North 75 degrees 00minutes West, 22.00 perches to a point at the line

FIRST PUBLICATION


of lands, now or late of Sherman Fertig; thenceby said Fertig lands, North 11 degrees 30 minutesEast, 41.80 perches to a point; thence by thesame, North 11 degrees 15 minutes East, 70.00perches to a point; thence North 65 degrees 30minutes East, 39.00 perches to a point in the cen-ter of the aforementioned Peter’s Mountain Road;thence North 66 degrees 00 minutes East, 56.50perches to a point; thence South 7 degrees 16minutes East, 147.00 perches to a point; thenceSouth 14 degrees 00 minutes West, 26.50 perch-es to a point; thence South 4 degrees 00 minutesWest, 19.20 perches to a point; thence South 14degrees 00 minutes West, 28.20 perches to apoint; thence South 25 degrees 30 minutes West,4.20 perches to a point in Stony Creek Road;thence North 49 degrees 45 minutes West, 11.20perches to a point; thence North 57 degrees 30minutes West, 14.70 perches to a point at the lineof lands of the Borough of Dauphin; thence bysaid lands, North 40 degrees 49 minutes East,1.70 perches to a point; thence by said lands andthose of the Dauphin National Bank, aforesaid,North 49 degrees eleven minutes West, 4.30perches to a point; thence by the DauphinNational Bank South 40 degrees 49 minutesWest, 3.00 perches to a point and the place ofBEGINNING.

CONTAINING approximately 117.00 acres ofland.

IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND, you must entera written appearance personally or by attorneyand file your defenses or objections in writingwith the court within twenty (20) days. You arewarned that if you fail to do so the case may pro-ceed without you and a judgment may be enteredagainst you without further notice for the reliefrequested by the Plaintiff. You may lose moneyor property or other rights important to you.


IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE ALAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TOPROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION

ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFERLEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONSAT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.



(717) 232-7536

LATOYA C. WINFIELD, Esq.Purcell, Krug & Haller

1719 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17102

j30 (717) 234-4178


PENNSYLVANIA


No. 3729-CV-2005

FULTON BANK, Plaintiffvs.SAMMY DETRES, Defendant

IMPORTANT NOTICE

TO: Sammy Detres

YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOUHAVE FAILED TO ENTER A WRITTENAPPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BYATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITHTHE COURT YOUR DEFENSES OR OBJEC-TIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTHAGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHINTEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THISNOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE ENTEREDAGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING ANDYOU MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OROTHER IMPORTANT RIGHTS.

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TO ALAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVEA LAWYER, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THEFOLLOWING OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW.THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITHINFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER.


FIRST PUBLICATION




(717) 232-7536

SHAWN M. LONG, Esq,Barley Snyder LLC

126 East King StreetLancaster, PA 17602

j30 (717) 299-5201

SECOND PUBLICATION

AMENDED

NOTICE OF AUDIT

TO LEGATEES, NEXT OF KIN,CREDITORS AND ALL

OTHER PERSONS CONCERNED

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the follow-ing accounts have been filed by the respectiveaccountants in the Office of the Register of Willsor with the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Divisionof the Common Pleas of Dauphin County, as thecase may be, and that the same shall be duly pre-sented to the said Orphans’ Court Division at theOffice of the Court Administrator for Audit,Confirmation and Distribution of the said ascer-tained balances to and among those legally enti-tled there to on Tuesday, July 18, 2006. Pursuantto Dauphin County Orphans’ Court Rule 6.10.1,objections to an account must be filed in writingwith the Register or Clerk no later than the closeof business on Tuesday, July 11, 2006.

1. BALUNIS, MARIE B., Deceased, Firstand Final Account of Sovereign Bank,Executor.

2. BERGER, MARK, Deceased, First andPartial Account of Melvin Berger, Trustee(Trust Under Will F/B/O ChristopherBerger).

3. CAFFAS, MARY E., Deceased, First andFinal Account of Terrence J. Kerwin,Executor.

4. HAUG, DEVONA P., Deceased, First andFinal Account of Eileen H. Smink,Executrix.

5. HOUCK, JR., GARY L., Deceased, Firstand Final Account of Gary L. Houck,Executor.

6. HURWITZ, SOLOMON, Settlor, nowDeceased, First and Partial Account ofManufacturers and Traders TrustCompany, successor to Dauphin DepositBank and Trust Company, Trustee (Trustunder Agreement) Separate Trust f/b/oJudith Hurwitz.

7. KAHN, ROSE HERVITZ, Settlor nowDeceased, First and Partial Account ofManufacturers and Traders TrustCompany, Successor to Dauphin DepositBank and Trust Company, Ida Y.Singelenberg, and Lee H. Javitch,Trustees.

8. KING, WILLIAM J., Settlor, nowDeceased, First and Final Account ofManufacturers and Traders TrustCompany, Successor to Dauphin DepositBank and Trust Company, Trustee(Irrevocable Trust Under Agreement datedAugust 5, 1992).

9. SUMMERS, ROBERT RUSSELL,Deceased, First and Final Account ofMichael Andrew Glunt, Executor.

Dated: June 9, 2006/s/ SANDRA C. SNYDER

Register of Wills andj23-j30 Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Division


PENNSYLVANIA

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on June8th, 2006, the Petition of Thanh Kim was filedin the above named court, requesting a decree tochange his name from Thanh Kim to MatthewPuthea Eng.

The Court has fixed August 15th, 2006 inCourtroom No. 5, at 8:45 a.m., Dauphin CountyCourthouse, Front and Market Streets,Harrisburg, PA as the time and place for the hear-ing on said Petition, when and where all personsinterested may appear and show cause if any theyhave, why the prayer of the said Petition shouldnot be granted.

j23-j30 Thanh Kim

FIRST PUBLICATION


REAL ESTATE APPRAISALRepresentation, Consultation and Expert Testimony

MARK W. HECKMANCertified General Appraiser

Mark Heckman Real Estate Appraisers Valuation Specialists of1309 Bridge Street, Commercial, Residential, Industrial,

New Cumberland, PA 17070 Investment and Development Land [email protected] Real Estate since 1986

We offer:High Quality Service and Thorough Preparation

Experience in Litigation and Legal MattersA History of, and Reputation for Successful Results

(717) 774-7202

Vol. 123 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS I

UMULATIVE TABLE OF CASES

Bordner, Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Columbia Casualty Company v.Coregis Insurance Company, City of Harrisburg . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Connelly, et al., Rohrer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Coregis Insurance Company, City of Harrisburg,

Columbia Casualty Company v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Des-Ogugua v. For Sale By Owner Real Estate, Inc., et al. . . . . . . 14

For Sale By Owner Real Estate, Inc., et al., Des-Ogugua v. . . . . . . 14Fromm v. Hershey Medical Center, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Hershey Medical Center, et al., Fromm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Lawrence v. Bordner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Letteer v. Michalak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Michalak, Letteer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Morder v. Professional Aerials, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Professional Aerials, Inc., Morder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Ramer v. Ramer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Ramer, Ramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Rohrer v. Connelly, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

INCORPORATION ANDLIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

FORMATIONCONVENIENT, COURTEOUS SAME DAY SERVICE

PREPARATION AND FILING SERVICES IN ALL STATES

CORPORATION OUTFITS ANDLIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OUTFITS

SAME DAY SHIPMENT OF YOUR ORDER

CORPORATION, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANYAND UCC FORMS

CORPORATE AND UCC, LIEN ANDJUDGMENT SERVICES

M. BURRKEIM COMPANYSERVING THE LEGAL PROFESSIONAL SINCE 1931

PHONE: (800) 533-8113 FAX: (888) 977-93862021 ARCH STREET, PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103

WWW.MBURRKEIM.COM

BAR ASSOCIATION PAGEDauphin County Bar Association

213 North Front Street • Harrisburg, PA 17101-1493Phone: 232-7536 • Fax: 234-4582

Board of Directors

Thomas P. Gacki Thomas E. BrennerPresident President-Elect

Craig A. Longyear John D. SheridanVice President Treasurer

Renee Mattei Myers Joseph A. Curcillo, IIISecretary Past President

Adam M. Shienvold Robert M. WalkerYoung Lawyers’ Chair Young Lawyers’ Vice Chair

William L. Adler S. Barton GephartRandi Blackman-Teplitz James L. Goldsmith

Cara A. Boyanowski Jonathan W. KunkelJames F. Carl Royce L. Morris

Vincent L. Champion Mark J. PowellRobert E. Chernicoff J. Michael Sheldon

Steven R. Dade David F. TamaniniHelen L. Gemmill

Directors

The Board of Directors of the Bar Association meets on the third Thursday ofthe month at the Bar Association headquarters. Anyone wishing to attend or havematters brought before the Board should contact the Bar Association office inadvance.

REPORTING OF ERRORS IN ADVANCE SHEETThe Bench and Bar will contribute to the accuracy in matters of detail of the

permanent edition of the Dauphin County Reporter by sending to the editorpromptly, notice of all errors appearing in this advance sheet. Inasmuch as cor-rections are made on a continuous basis, there can be no assurance that correc-tions can be made later than thirty (30) days from the date of this issue but thisshould not discourage the submission of notice of errors after thirty (30) dayssince they will be handled in some way if at all possible. Please send such noticeof errors to: Dauphin County Reporter, Dauphin County Bar Association, 213North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17101-1493.

DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT SECTIONMotion Judge of the Month

JUNE 2006 Judge Todd A. HOOVERJULY 2006 Judge Bruce F. BRATTON

Opinions Not Yet ReportedJune 6, 2006 – Turgeon, J., Commonwealth v. Stevenson (No. 2005 CR 1314)June 13, 2006 – Clark, J., Susquehanna Area Regional Airport Authority v.

Middletown Area School District (No. 2005 CV 2052)

BAR ASSOCIATION PAGE – Continued

MISCELLANEOUS SECTION

Opinions Not Yet Reported

June 21, 2006 – Kleinfelter, J., Peterson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, etal. (No. 2003 CV 4018)

_______o_______

LEGAL SECRETARY/RECEPTIONIST — Duties include answering phone,scheduling, typing and related duties. Must be knowledgeable with Word. Pleaserespond with resume to Office Manager, Daley, Zucker & Gingrich, LLC, 1029Scenery Drive, Harrisburg, PA 17109. j16-30

PARALEGAL — Seeking experienced paralegal for busy corporate/litigationlaw firm. Salary commensurate with experience. Please respond with resume toOffice Manager, Daley, Zucker & Gingrich, LLC, 1029 Scenery Drive, Harrisburg,PA 17109. j16-30

PERSONAL INJURY - CASE COORDINATOR — for mid-sized Harrisburgbased law firm to coordinate flow of cases for attorney and assistants. Duties include scheduling, interviewing new clients, opening files and carrying outassigned tasks through trial. Position requires strong organizational skills and abilityto complete assignments efficiently. Previous law firm experience and ability towork with Word required. References required. Competitive salary and benefits. Onsite parking.

Please respond to: Dauphin County Reporter, ATTN: K, 213 N. Front Street,Harrisburg, PA 17101. j23-y7

ASSOCIATE — Established seven attorney firm in Pottsville seeks attorneywith 3 to 5 years general civil litigation experience, including practice in state courtand in land use litigation. Ideal candidate will have handled a variety of legalprocedures and matters, with varying degrees of oversight and client responsibility,and will possess strong communication skills. Excellent full benefits package. Salarynegotiable, please state any requirements. Please reply to Firm Administrator, P.O.Box 450, Pottsville, PA 17901. j23-y7

ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY — BennLawFirm, of York, Pennsylvania, seeks anassociate attorney with 1-5 years litigation experience. Salary commensurate withexperience. Send resume, writing sample and salary requirements to: Niles S. Benn,Esquire at BennLawFirm, 103-107 East Market Street, P.O. Box 5185, York, PA17405, Fax No. (717) 852-8797 or e-mail: [email protected]. j30-y14

BAR ASSOCIATION PAGE – Continued

MISCELLANEOUS SECTION

PeoplesBank, A Codorus Valley Company

TRUST COUNSEL

PeoplesBank, A Codorus Valley Company established in 1864 andheadquartered at 105 Leader Heights Road in York, Pennsylvania, isseeking Trust Counsel to work in our Trust and Investment ServicesDivision.

The position is responsible for reviewing all legal documents such astrust documents, wills, powers of attorney, etc. prior to the bank acceptingsuch appointments and recommending revisions as deemed appropriate.The position will work closely with outside attorneys regardingacceptance of appointments as trustee or executor and will work closelywith attorneys from the United States Department of Justice regardingacceptance of appointments as trustee for trusts administered undervarious federal statutes. Administrative responsibilities will include taxreporting and other reporting and research required to administer trustaccounts; assists with estate settlements, to include accountings,inventories, review of tax returns, collection and distribution of assets, andpayment of debt; and meeting with beneficiaries.

If you are interested in securing additional information, please contactMatt Clemens, Senior Vice President - Human Resources at (717) 747-1507 or e-mail at [email protected]. PeoplesBank is anAffirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. j30-y14

T R I A L A H E A D ?

CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE ROUTE:

Dauphin County Bar Association

Civil Dispute Resolution Program

Call (717) 232-7536 for details

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