1

THEDEEPHISTORICALROOTSOFMODERNCULTURE:ACOMPARATIVEPERSPECTIVE.*

BasedonKeynotelectureat2ndWorldCongressinComparativeEconomics,June2017.

RevisedDecember52019GerardRoland,UCBerkeley,CEPRandNBER

Keywords:comparativeeconomics,comparativehistory,institutionsinancienttimes,culture,individualism,collectivismJELcodes:N00,P40,P50Abstract:Thispaperpresentsevidenceshowingthattherehavebeensinceantiquitytwoopposedtypesofinstitutionalsystems:oneresemblingcentralplanningandpresentinancientChina,ancientEgypt,theIncaEmpireandotherterritorialstates,andanotheronewithstrongmarketinstitutions,protectionofpropertyrightspresentmostlyincity-states,notjustintheMediterraneanbutthroughouttheworld.Evidenceispresentedthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesdatingbacktotheantiquityareshapedbyspecialgeographicalconditions.Theseinstitutionaldifferencescanbeseentobeattherootofthetwoculturalsystemsintoday’sworld:individualismandcollectivism.Theseculturaldifferenceshaveeffectsoneconomicperformanceandinstitutionsintoday’sworld.*IamverygratefultoLiDuan,YunhaoZhang,YueMaandespeciallyShaoyuLiuforexcellentresearchassistance.

2

1. IntroductionInrecentyears,avibrantnewliteraturehasdevelopedontheeconomicsof

culture.Alargepartofthatliteratureexaminestheeffectsofculturalvaluesandbeliefsoneconomicoutcomes(growth,institutions,fertilitychoices,femalelaborforceparticipation,….)Itismorechallengingtounderstandtheoriginsofdifferentcultures.Theexistingliteratureontheoriginsofcultureaimsatunderstandingtheroleofparticularhistoricalvariablesonparticularculturaltraits.AgoodexampleistheresearchbyAlesinaetal.(2011)onhowdifferencesinsoiltypesledtothechoiceofuseoftheploughorthehoeinworkingthefields,andhowthisaffectedgenderrolesandculturalnormsrelatedtogender(otherexamplesarediscussedbelow).Tothisday,therehasnotbeensystematicanalysisoftheroleofhistoricalinstitutionalsystemsonbroadculturalsystems.Thisiswhatwetrytodointhispaper.

Economistsinterestedincomparativeinstitutionalanalysistendto

emphasizeinstitutionaldifferencesfromtherecentpast(thesalientexamplebeingthedifferencebetweencapitalistandsocialisteconomicsystemsinthetwentiethcentury),andthereisoftenthepreconceptionthatpre-industrialeconomicsystemswereroughlysimilar,orthattheirdifferenceswerenotthatmarked.However,ifwegobackinhistory,asearlyaswhatJaspers(1951)callstheaxialage(betweenthe8thand3rdcenturyBC),wewillfindthatthereexistedverydifferentinstitutionalsystemsamongearlystates.Thephilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedduringtheaxialagewereareflectionoftheexistinginstitutionsofthetimeandonecanarguethattheirdifferencesreflectedinstitutionaldifferencesacrossthemajorexistingcivilizations.Surprisinglyandinterestingly,thephilosophiesandreligionsoftheaxialage(ancientGreekphilosophy,Hinduism,Bhuddism,Zoroastranism,Confucianism,Judaism,etc…)nearlyallstillplayanimportantroleinthemodernworld.Theyarethemaininspirationbehindmodernculturesandculturaldifferencesobservedintoday’sworld.

Lookingateconomicsystemsintheancientworld,wefindthatsomesystems

(Egypt,China,PeruundertheIncasandothers)weremorelikecentrallyplannedeconomies.Therewasnoprivatepropertyofland(thelandbelongedtotheEmperororruler),agriculturalgoodsandcraftgoodswereallocatedbythegovernment.Marketswerehardlydevelopedandforeigntradewasunderthecontrolofgovernment.Forlackofabetterwording,Iwillcallthemstatistsystems.Othereconomies,likeancientMesopotamia,Athens,theAztecsinMexico,theChampa(coveringroughlytoday’sSouthVietnam)weremoreclearlymarketeconomieswithprivatepropertyoflandanddevelopedmarkets,bothdomesticallyandinternationnally.Iwillcallthemmarketsystems.Manyothersystemswereinbetweenbothofthesesystems,asdocumentedbelow.

3

Thesedifferenceshavebeennotedbefore.MaxWeber(1922)usedthetermofpatrimonialstatetocharacterizestateslikeAncientChinaandotherswheretheabsolutedominationofthefatherfigureinafamilyisprojectedontothestate.Privateandpublicpropertyarenotdifferentiatedinthepatrimonialstate.

Wittfogel(1957)theorizedaboutorientaldespotismandhypothesizedthat

theabsolutistruleinancientChinaandEgyptwasbasedonfactthattheabsolutistrulefacilitatedwhathecalledthehydraulicstatewherethestateorganizedlargescaleirrigationsystems,whichcreatedconditionsthatmadebureaucraticandgovernmentdespotisminevitable.

Polanyiandcoauthors(1954)documentedthelimitedroleofmarketswhere

privategoodswereexchangedinmanylocationsintheAntiquity.Trigger(2003)providesaveryinterestingclassificationofancientsocieties,

basedonarcheologicalevidence.Heemphasizesmostlythedifferencebetweenterritorialstatesandcity-statesbuthisclassificationisquitecomprehensiveandbasedonextensivescholarlyevidence.

Amongeconomists,GreifandTabellini(2017)analyzetherelative

importanceofclansinformationofcitiesinChinaandEurope.TheyfindthatinChinesehistory,thedevelopmentofcitieswasbasedonclansandclanorganization,whichhasplayedanextendedroleinChinesehistory.Incontrasts,citiesinWesternEuropedevelopedonthebasisofindividualcitizenship.Theytracethesedifferencestoculturaldifferences:generalizedmoralityinEuropeversuslimitedmoralitywithintheclaninChina.Theculturaldifferencestheyemphasizeareclosetothedifferencebetweenindividualismandcollectivismthatweputforwardinthisstudy.

BritishhistorianMacFarlane(1978)foundthatasearlyasthe13thcentury,

individualistculturewasmoreprevalentinGreatBritainthanontheEuropeancontinentandthathouseholdstendedtobemorenuclear,relyingmoreonthemarketineconomictransactionsthansocietieswherepeoplewereembeddedinlargerclans.

Maysharetal.(2017)emphasizetheroleoftransparencyinproduction.

Wheneveroutputcouldeasilybemeasured,peasantsworkeddirectlyforthestate,aswasthecaseinancientEgypt.Whenoutputwasinsteadlesstransparent,peasantshadpropertyrightsoverlandlikeinMesopotamia.

Inthispaper,IpresentadatabaseconstructedIthepastfewyearsbasedon

historicalandarcheologicalresearchtocharacterizethemajordifferencesbetweenstatistsystemsandmarketsystemsintheantiquity.Theevidencepresentedshowsclearlythatthesetwosystemsformdistinctinstitutionalclustersthatarecomparabletothedifferencebetweensocialismandcapitalisminthetwentiethcentury.Thesedifferentsystemsoperatedinmostlyruralsocietieswheremodern

4

industrialtechnologywasabsentandwherelaborandlandwerethemajorfactorsofproduction.

Whydothesedifferencesmattertoday?Whystudythedifferencebetween

statistandmarketsystemsinthedistantpastexcepttosatisfyournaturalhistoricalcuriosity?Theargumentputforwardinthispaperisthattheseinstitutionaldifferencesfromthepastmatteralottounderstandtheworld’slongruneconomicandsocietaltrajectories.Indeed,followingBisinandVerdier’s(2001,2017)canonicalanalysisofthedynamicsofculturaltransmission,andespeciallythejointdynamicsofinstitutionsandculture,wecanhypothesizethatparticularearlyinstitutionshaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefs,whichhasinturnhelpedconsolidateboththeseinstitutionsandtheunderlyingculture.GiventheinertiaofculturepredictedfromtheBisin-Verdiermodel(seealsoRoland,2004),institutionsmayhaveaffectedculturalvaluesandbeliefsthatarestillpresentintoday’sworld.

Themainculturaldivideintheworldtoday,accordingtocross-cultural

psychology,istheonebetweenindividualismandcollectivism(seeHeine,2008;seealsothesurveyinGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).Individualistcultureplacestheindividualatthecenter,valuesindividualrightsandfreedom,opportunityandindividualsuccess.Collectivistcultureseesinsteadtheindividualasembeddedinacommunity(tribe,clan),emphasizesconformity,adaptationandharmony.

Theseculturaldifferenceshaveimportanteffectsintoday’sworld.In

GorodnichenkoandRoland(2017),itisshownthatindividualistcultureprovidesaboosttoinnovationandlongrungrowth.Individualismalsoaffectsinstitutionalchange.InGorodnichenkoandRoland(2015),individualismleadstoearlieradoptionofdemocracythancollectivism,andthelattermayleadtostableautocracy.Thedegreeofverticalintegrationinmulti-nationalcompaniesisalsoseentodependonculturaldifferences,especiallybetweenindividualismandcollecvitism(seeKukharskyyetal.2016).Manyothervariablescanbearguedtobeaffectedbytheseculturaldifferences(seeGorodnichenkoandRoland,2012).

Whileeconomistshaveincreasinglyrecognizedtheimportanceofculture,

alongsideinstitutions,oneconomicoutcomes,thereisalsoalargeliteraturetryingtoexplaintheoriginofculturaldifferences.Thisisnotaneasytopicbecauseitisdifficulttodisentangletheeffectsofculturefromtheircauses,andfilteringoutthecausesofcultureisimportanttobetterunderstanditseffects.

PsychologistsKashimaandKashima(1998)remarkedthatculturalvalues

couldbetracedbacktolinguisticdifferences.Totheextentthatthestructureofalanguagereflectsculturalvaluesandbeliefs,onecananalyzelinguisticandgrammaticalstructurestodiscoverculturaldifferences.KashimaandKashimapointedoutanimportantdifference:whetherornotalanguageprohibitstodropthepersonalpronouninasentence.ThisisforexampleprohibitedinFrench,GermanandEnglish,butnotinItalianorSpanish.Theideaisthataprohibitionwouldindicateamoreindividualistcultureasitinsistsondifferentiatingindividuals

5

byaclearindicationofthepronounused(first,secondorthirdperson).Anotherdistinctioniswhetheralanguagehasornottwodifferentpronounsforthesecondperson(TuandVosinLatin)todifferentiatebetweenamoreinformalandamoreformalwayofaddressingaperson.Theexistenceoftwodistinctpronounsforthesecondpersonofthesingular(existinginFrenchandItalianbutnotinEnglishforexample)wouldindicateamorehierarchicandlessegalitarianculture.Similarly,theyalsosingleoutwhetherthereisasingleorseveralexpressionsforthefirstpronounofthesingular.Forexample,thereisonlyoneexpressioninEnglish(I),butseveralinotherlanguageslikeJapanese.Theideaisthatiftherearemultipleexpressions,languageemphasizesmorethesocialfunctionofthepersonwhereasifthereisonlyoneexpression,languageemphasizesmoretheindividuality.KashimaandKashima(1998)documentthestatisticalcorrelationbetweenthelinguisticmeasurestheyputforwardandmeasuresofculturesuchasHofstede’sindividualismscore.Someoftheirvariableshavebeenusedasinstrumentalvariablestoanalyzetheeffectofcultureoninstitutions(seee.g.Lichtetal.2003,Tabellini,2008).

Otherresearchershaveemphasizedtheroleofthedistributionofparticular

variantsofgenesindifferentcountriesinshapingculturalvalues.Forexample,ChiaoandBlizinsky(2009)analyzedtheroleofvariantsofgenes(calledallelesinlifesciences)thatleadmoreeasilytodepressionwhenfacedwithstressfulsituations.Similarly,WayandLiebermann(2010)analyzedtheroleofvariantsofgenesthatcreatemorepainfromsocialexclusion.Theseauthorsfoundthatahigherfrequencyofthosevariantsofgenesweremorepresentinsocietieswithcollectivistculture.Thebasicideaisthatthosesocietiesandcommunitieswithhigherfrequencyofthoseallelesthatdevelopedculturalvaluesandsocialnormstoprotectindividualsfromstressfulsituationsandsocialexclusionwouldfarebetterthanthosethatdidnotdevelopsuchvaluesandnorms.

Asimilarlogicisfoundwiththehistoricalpresenceofparticularpathogens.

Fincheretal.(2008)andMurrayandSchaller(2010)findthatcountrieswheretherewasastrongpresenceofpathogensbeforethe20thcenturydevelopedmorecollectivistcultures.Again,theideaisthatinareaswithhighpresenceofpathogens,thosecommunitiesthatdevelopedmorecollectivistnorms,restrictingindividualbehaviorandshowingalessopenattitudetowardsforeignerswouldbemorelikelytosurvivebetter.

Otherexplanationsfortheoriginofindividualismversuscollectivisminvolve

thehigherfrequencyofricecropsoverotherwheatcropssincericeismorelabor-intensiveandrequiresbettercoordination(Thalhelmetal.,2014)orahigherpresenceofirrigation(Buggle,2015),inthespiritofWittfogel(1957).Ontheotherhand,Knudsen(2017)findsthatahigherrelianceonfishingforone’slivelihoodinhistoryismoreassociatedtoindividualism.

Theseareallinterestingexplanations,andmostofthosevariableshavebeen

usedasinstrumentalvariablesforindividualismandcollectivism.Nevertheless,itis

6

relativelyeasytoseethattheseexplanationsarepartialatbest.Giventheimportanteffectsofcultureoninstitutionsandeconomicperformance,onewouldgainfromcomingupwithamorecomprehensivehistoricalexplanationoftheemergenceofculturaldifferences.Inparticular,wefinditusefultodothiswithinaconceptualframeworkofcoevolutionofinstitutionsandculture.Thisispreciselyourgoalinthispaper.Wehavegatheredanumberofvariablesthatcharacterizeinstitutionaldifferencesintheancientpastaswellasgeographicalvariablesthatmayexplaintheseearlyinstitutionaldifferences.

Insection2,weprovidesomenarrativesfromtheantiquitytoillustratethe

institutionaldifferencesinancientsocietiesthatwefocuson.Onthatbasis,wedevelopinsection3aclassificationofvariablesthatshouldmattertounderstandtheseinstitutionalclustersofthepast,theiroriginandtheircoevolutionwithculturalvaluesystems.Insection4,wedescribethedatabasewehavebeenbuildingtomeasurethosevariables.Insection5,wegivesomepreliminarydescriptiveregressionresultsbasedonthisnewdataset.Section6concludes.

2. StatistversusMarketSystems:SomeNarrativesfromtheAntiquity.

ItisusefultostartwithanarrativecomparisonofancientEgyptandancientMesopotamiatoillustratetheinstitutionaldifferenceswehaveinmind.

Egyptwasaterritorialstate.ThePharaohhadauthorityovertheextentof

Egypt’sterritory.Theareaaroundthe800kmlongNilewasofexceptionalfertility.SeasonalfloodingdepositedmineralsonbothsidesoftheNile,makingtheearthveryfertileforgrainlikebarleyandwheat.WhatisimportantforourpurposeisthattheproductionconditionsalongthesidesoftheNileweregeographicallyrathersimilar,creatinghomogeneousconditionsofproductionontheproductivepartsoftheterritory.ThismeansthattherewerenogreatbenefitsintradinggrainfromoneregionoftheNilewithanotherregion.Becauseofthehomogeneityinconditionsofproduction,insteadthereweregreatadvantagesincoordinationandspecializationproducingsuchgreatmonumentsasthepyramids,butalsovariousspecializedcraftwork(Trigger,1993).InancientEgypt,resourceswereingeneralallocatedbythegovernment.Internalmarketswerelimitedandforeigntradewascarriedoutbythegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.351).Ordinarypeasantsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverland.Theywereworkingthelandandthegovernmentinstructedthemhowmuchgraintodelivertothegovernment(Trigger,2003,p.320).NotealsothatwhileslaverywaswidespreadinEgyptlikeintherestoftheancientworld,slaveswereingeneralpropertyofthegovernment,notofprivatehouseholds.Ineffect,householdsdidnot,asarule,ownprivateslaves(Trigger2003,p.160).LawsthatwerecodifiedinEgyptweremainlyaboutregulatingattitudesandbehaviorofordinaryEgyptianstowardsthePharaohandtherulingelite(Trigger,2003,p.228-233).IncontrasttoMesopotamia,therewasnoformallegalcoderegulatingrelationsbetweencitizens,butprovincialofficialshadrightsoflifeanddeathovertheirsubjects.Thereweredetailedregulationsdefining

7

punishmentsincaseoftheftofstateproperty,evasionofcorvée,dutytowardsthegovernment,theftsfromtemples,royaltombrobberies,conspiraciesagainsttheking.Socialstratificationinsocietywasratherlow.Therewasrelativeequalitybetweenordinarycitizens.Theywerenotslavesbutweremostlyunfreeastheylackedanybasicrights.TheEgyptiangovernmentadministrationfunctionedinarelativelymeritocraticway.Highlevelofficialsenjoyedhighprestigeandbecomingahighlevelofficialwasthemostimportantaspirationamongordinarycitizens(Trigger,2003,p.627).

Onmostoftheseaspects,Mesopotamia,locatedalongtheTigrisand

Euphratesriver,nottoofarfromEgypt,wascompletelydifferent.Mesopotamiawascomposedofcity-statesforalargepartofitshistorystartingfromtheSumeriancity-states.IncontrasttotheNilewhereconditionsofproductionwerequitesimilarandhomogenous,thereweremarkeddifferencesbetweenNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia.SouthernMesopotamiawasquiterichinagriculturalgoodsbuthadfewothernaturalresources.TheNorthinsteadhadlotsofstone,timber,bronzeandproducedluxurygoods.Becauseofthisgeographicalheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction,therewasalotoftradebetweencitiesofNorthernandSouthernMesopotamia(Finer,1997,p.106).TradeinsidecitieswaslessdevelopedasnotedinPolanyietal.(1954).PrivatemerchantshadanimportantroleinMesopotamiasincetradewasquitedevelopedandorganizedtoalargeextentbytheseprivatemerchants(Trigger,p.343).Craftworkwasalsomostlydonebyprivatecraftsmen(Trigger,p.364).Marketsforlandwerehighlydeveloped,incontrasttoEgypt(Trigger,p.333),andmarketsforprivateslaveswerethriving(Trigger,p.158).AlsoincontrasttoEgypt,thelawcodifiedrelationsbetweencitizens,inparticularregardingconflictsoverprivateproperty.Oneofthebiggestaspirationsinsocietyforcitizenswastobecomeanowneroflargetractsofprivateland(Trigger,2003,p.333).

Ifwelookatotherancientcivilizations,wefindthatancientChinahadmany

similaritieswithancientEgypt.Fromwhatweknowevenabouttheearliestdynasties,theShangdynasty(1600-1046BCE)andtheZhoudynasty(1046-256BCE),thesesimilaritiesarealreadyquitestriking.ThesedynastiesdevelopedaroundtheYellowRiver.LikeinEgypt,conditionsofproductionwerequitehomogenous,mostlypropitiousforgrowingwheat(Keightley,2014).Thereisevidenceofstrongspecializationanddivisionoflaborincraftworkinimperialworkshops(Trigger2003,p.371-373).FarmersdidnothaveprivatepropertyoverlandasalllandbelongedformallytotheEmperor(Trigger,p.325-26).LawsweredesignedtoregulaterelationsbetweentheEmperorandhissubjects,specifyingpunishmentsassociatedtobreachofobligationsofsubjectstowardstheEmperor.WhenChinawasunifiedforthefirsttimebytheFounderoftheQindynasty(221-206BC),thedoctrineof“legalism”statedthattheEmperorshouldusethetooloftheLawtoexercisehispowerovercitizens.TheLawisthusseenasaninstrumentofoppressiontofurthertheinterestsoftheruler.ThisisstillthecaseinmodernChina.MaoZedongwasanadmirerofthefounderoftheQindynasty,YingZheng,subsequentlynamedQinShiHuangDi.WhenpresidentXiJinpingmentionsthe

8

RuleofLaw,hehastheChineselegalisttraditioninmind.LikeinEgypt,therewerenoprivateslavesinancientChina,onlypublicslavesworkingfortheEmperor,forexampleintheconstructionoftheGreatWall.Prisonersofwarwereusuallykilledinsteadofbeingtakenasslaves.OnedifferencebetweenancientEgyptandChinaisthatclansplayedamuchlargerroleinChina.ClanswereregroupedincitiesandtheEmperormanagedrelationswithhissubjectsviatheheadsofclans(Finer,p.450;seealsoGreifandTabellini,2017).AnimportantadministrativeinnovationinancientChinaistheestablishmentofpopulationregistriestocontrolthemovementofpopulations.IncontrasttomedievalEurope,peopleneededanofficialpermittoliveinaparticularplace.ThemodernHukouthusalreadyexistedthousandsofyearsbeforetheCommunistRegime,putativelyalreadysincetheXiadynastyandthelegendaryYutheGreat.Interestingly,theMongolstookovertheinstitutionofpopulationregistryfromtheChineseinotherterritoriesthattheycontrolled,inparticularinRussiawhenitwasunderTatarcontrol,andtheRussianstookitoverintheirturnafterthecollapseoftheMongolEmpireandtheEstablishmentoftheRussiantsaristregimeoutoftheGrandDuchyofMoscowandkeptitundercommunismasthefamouspropiska,whichhelpedlimitfreedomofmovementofSovietcitizens.

OtherancientcivilizationslookedmuchmorelikeMesopotamia.Thiswas

verymuchthecaseforAssyria(growingoutofNorthernMesopotamiatotheWest,ancientGreece(coveringmodernGreecebutalsoAsiaMinorandtheSeainbetween)orancientPhenicia(locatedroughlyintheterritoryoftoday’sLebanon).Thesecivilizationswereabletobenefithighlyfromtradeandhadquitedevelopedforeignaswellasdomestictrade.Theyalsohadstrongsocialstratificationwithononehandfreecitizensenjoyinghereditarystatus,citizenshipandpoliticalparticipationrights,andontheotherhandpeoplewithoutrightsandfreedom,suchasslaves,butalsointermediatecategories.AncientGreeceinparticularwasdifficulttoconquerbecauseofitsgeography,alternatingmountainousterrainswithproximitytothesea,bothimportantobstaclestoexternalconquest.Proximitytotheseamadealsotaxationdifficultasmerchantscouldsmugglegoodsviatheseaandevadecustoms.

Thesedifferencesinancientcivilizationscouldbeobservedondifferent

continents.Everywherewherestateshadformed,somecountrieshadinstitutionsclosertoEgyptandChina,whileothershadinstitutionsclosertoMesopotamiaandancientGreece.

TheIncaEmpireinPeruandtheAndesregionwasforexampleverymuch

likeEgyptandChina.Tradewasverylimitedandproductionwasorganizedbythestateinwhatwascalled“verticalarchipelagos”(Murra,1968).TheAztecEmpireinCentralMexicoandtheMayasinSouthernMexicowereinsteadmoreorganizedascity-stateswheretherewasalargerolefortradeandmarkets(Trigger,pp.114-16).

9

3. InstitutionalclustersintheAncientWorldandtheireffectsonmodernculture.

Thenarrativeoftheprevioussectiongiveusasenseofthekindofvariables

thatmaymatterindescribingancientsystemsaseitherstatistsystemsormarketsystems.

3.1. ClassifyinginstitutionsoftheAncientworld.

Thebasicforcesatplayleadingearlysocietiesintheancientworldtobeeither

statistormarketsystemscanbecharacterizedintermsoftwoofthemostimportant,arguablyeventhetwomostimportantprinciplesineconomics:thebenefitsfromtradeversusthebenefitsfromdivisionoflaborortaskspecialization.ThetheoryofcomparativeadvantagecreatedbyRicardoexplainshowtradecanmakeeverybodybetteroff.OnedoesnotevenneedRicardo’sideaaboutspecializinginone’scomparativeadvantagetounderstandthebenefitsfromtrade.TheCoasetheoremalreadyexplainshowtrademakeseverybodybetteroff.ThetheoryofdivisionoflaborcreatedbyAdamSmith,andhisexampleofthepinfactory,explainshowtaskspecializationcanspectacularlyexpandproductivity.Thesetwoprinciples1)thebenefitsfromtrade,2)thebenefitsfromdivisionoflaborcandeliverthekeyinsightsforwhywecouldobservethetwosystemsintheantiquity:marketsystemsversusstatistsystems.

Thesetwoprincipleshaveusuallybeenputforwardinthecontextof

industrialization.Notethattheforceoftheseprinciplesisequallyvalidinsocietieswherecapitalandtechnologywerelessdeveloped.Indeed,benefitsfromtradeareuniversallyvalid,buttheybecomestrongerwhenthecostsfromtradearebroughtdownviareductionintransportcostsmadepossiblebytechnologicalprogress.Similarly,thebenefitsfromspecializationcanbereapedwithoutmachines.Allthatisneededisadivisionoflaborandtaskstoproduceacertainkindofoutput.Ofcourse,machineshelpincreasethebenefitsfromthedivisionoflabor,buttheyarenotapreconditiontoenjoyitsbenefits.

Differentsocietiesfaceddifferentinitialconditions.Somewerefacing

heterogeneousconditionsofproductionintheirgeographicalsurroundings.Thiscreatedstrongpotentialbenefitsfromtrade,therebyencouragingtheformationofmarketsandaclassofmerchants,aswellasdemandforprotectionofprivatepropertyrights.Conversely,insocietieswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneousandwherepotentialbenefitsfromtradeweresmaller,itwaspossibleinsteadtoenjoylargerbenefitsfromdivisionoflaborbyhavingalargernumberofpeopleparticipateinproductionsoastoestablishamuchfinerdivisionoflaborandspecializationoftasks.Inthosesocieties,strongstatesdevelopedthatexercisedcontroloverallofsociety,withthemeansavailabletothematthetime.

Othergeographicalvariablescouldaffectthebenefitsoftraderelativetothe

benefitsofspecialization.Afirstoneiseasinessoftransport.Lowercostsof

10

transportmadeitpossibletoengageintradeoverlargerdistances,makingitmorelikelytofindlargerbenefitsfromtrade.Geographicalclosenesstoahottradingzonewouldsimilarlyaffectthebenefitsfromtrade.

Geographymayalsohaveaffectedtheeasinessoftaxation,whichwould

favorthedevelopmentofthestate.Traderoutesoverlandmadeiteasiertopostcustomsofficerstotaxmerchantstravelingfromoneplacetoanother.Maritimetraderoutesontheotherhandmadeiteasiertosmugglegoods,especiallyifcommoditiescouldbeloadedandunloadedatdifferentplacesalongthecoast.

Geographicalvariablesmayalsoaffecttheeasinesswithwhichaterritory

couldbeinvaded,whichwouldalsofavorthedevelopmentofaterritorialstate.Plainsarethemostvulnerable.Mountainousareasoffermoreprotectionfrominvaders,aswellasbeingsurroundedbythesea.

Afewclarificationsareinorderhere.First,wheneconomistshear"task

specialization",theythink"gainsfromtrade".ThewaywethinkoftaskspecializationinantiquesocietiesisnotintheRicardiansenseofsectoralspecialization.ItismoreintheSmithiansense,asexplainedabove.Whenmorepeopleareinvolvedintheproductionofsomegood,itispossibletoorganizethedivisionoflaborbyallocatingspecializedtaskstoindividualssoastoenjoyproductivitygains.Somecoordinationisneededtodothat,andstatesabletoorganizethiscoordinationmayusetheirpowerforthispurpose.Second,onemaythinkthatproductivitygainsfromdivisionoflaborwereinexistentinancientsocieties.Theywereobviouslymorelimitedthaninindustrialsocieties,buttheywerenotinexistent.Weknowthatdivisionoflaborinplantationsviathe"gangsystem"helpedimproveagriculturalproductivity.Centralizedtransportmayhelpreducetransportcosts,taskspecializationinoperationsafterharvesting(threshing,drying,storing)canalsoimproveproductivity,etc..Asimilarreasoningcanbemadeforcraftworkinceramics,bronzeandthelike.

Thedifferenceinbenefitsoftraderelativetobenefitsofdivisionoflaborled

toacertainnumberofsharpinstitutionaldifferences.Thefirstrelatestopropertyrightsandthelaw.Statistsystemsdidnothaveprivatepropertyoralegalsystemtoprotectprivatepropertyrights.Onecanseethistypicallyforlandandslaves.Intheantiquity,landandslavelaborweretwoimportantfactorsofproduction;landbecauseoutputwasmostlycomposedofagriculturalproducts,andslavesbecausetheirlaborforcecouldcontributetoallsortsofproductsandservices.Instatistsystems,peasantswerenotowneroftheirland,whichbelongedtotheruler.SlaveswereputtoworkongovernmentprojectsliketheGreatWall,ofChinabuttherewasnoprivatemarketwherehouseholdscouldbuyandsellslaves.

Legalsystemswouldbedifferentinstatistandmarketsystems.Inmarket

systems,theroleofthelawwouldbetoprotectprivatepropertyrightsandtherightsoftheminorityoffreemenandwomen.Inotherwords,thelawwouldprotectcitizensfromboththestateaswellasfromothercitizensencroachingontheir

11

rights.Instatistsystemsinstead,thelawisseenasaninstrumentusedbytherulertoensureobedienceofhissubjects.Thisis“rulebylaw”insteadof“ruleoflaw”.Inthiscase,thelawspecifiesthedutiesofsubjectstowardstheruleraswellasthepunishmentsassociatedtobreachoflaw.Thelawisthusmoreaninstrumentofoppressionthananinstrumentofprotection.Thebestexampleforthisisthe“legalist”doctrineinChinaintroducedbythefirstEmperorwhounifiedthecountryQinShiHuang,thefounderoftheQindynasty.

Differencesinpropertyrightsandlegalpropertyrightprotectionwould

translateintodifferencesindevelopmentofmarkets,bothdomesticandforeign.Marketsystemswouldhavedevelopedprivatemarkets.Privatemerchantswouldplayanimportantroleintrade,andtheirroleinsocietywouldbeimportant.Instatistsystems,domesticmarketswouldbelessdeveloped,foreigntradewouldbeconductedmostlyfortherulerorviagovernmentchannels.Privatemerchantswouldbemoremarginalizedinsociety.

Similarly,citieswouldplayamoreimportantroleinmarketsystems

comparedtostatistsystemssincemarketdevelopmentisassociatedtothedevelopmentofcities.Incontrast,instatistsystems,onewouldtendtoobservemorethedevelopmentofterritorialstatessinceastronggovernmentwouldbeabletocoordinateproductionoversufficientlylargeterritories.Statistterritorialstateswouldthusalsobemorecentralizedwhilemarketsystemswouldhavemoredecentralizedformsofgovernment.

Statistsystemswouldtendtobelesstoleranttowardsforeignerswhereas

marketsystemswouldbemoretolerant.Indeed,ahighleveloftradeisassociatedwithhighlevelofethnicdiversityasmerchantstravelinandoutofcountries.Instead,statistsystemswouldbewaryoftoleratingtoomanyforeignersonitsterritoryasitislesseasytoexercisecontroloverforeignersthanoverlocalsubjects.1

Similarly,weakclansystemswouldbemorefavorabletomarket

developmentwhereasstrongclansystemswouldbeassociatedwithnonmarketallocationofresourceswithintheclan.Whetherclanswerestrongorweakdependedmuchonexistingkinshipsystems.Manykinshipsystemsintheworldareunilineal,meaningthatsomeone’sdescendanceistracedthrougheitherthefather(patrilinealsystem)orthroughthemother(matrilinealsystem).Unilinealoragnaticsystemsaremorefavorableforclandevelopmentassomebody’smembershipofaclaniseasilytraceabletomaleorfemaleancestors.Livinginlargeclansmeansallocationofresourceswithintheclan,thuswithoutusingmarkettransactions.OtherkinshipsystemslikethebilinealorcognatickinshipsystemthathasbeenprevalentinNorthernEuropethroughouthistoryforexamplemeanthatone’sancestorsshouldbetracedthroughbothone’sfatherandmother.Withbilineal1SeetheveryinterestingarticlebyMichalopoulos(2012)onthegeographicaloriginsofethnicalandlinguisticdiversityintoday'sworld.

12

systems,thereisnomoreaclearcutmembershipofaparticularclan.Householdstendtobemorenuclearfamilieswithlessextensivetiestootherfamilymembers.Asaconsequence,membersofnuclearfamilieshavetomakemoreuseofthemarketbyexchanginggoodsandserviceswithpeopleoutsidetheirfamily.Bilinealkinshipsystemswouldthustendtobeassociatedwithstrongerdevelopmentofmarketsandpropertyrights,whereasunilinealkinshipsystemswouldbeassociatedwithstrongclansandasmallerdevelopmentofmarkets(ontheeffectsofkinship,seetherecentpaperbyEnke,2017).AswasthecaseinancientChinaforexampleintheShangdynasty,theEmperorwouldruleoverhisterritoryviarelationswithclanheads,whereclanswerelivinginurbanconcentrations.

Onewouldalsoexpecttoseestrongersocialstratificationinmarketsystems

comparedtostatistsystems.Indeed,thisisimpliedbythecombinationofprivatemarketsforslavesaswellaslawsprotectingpropertyrightsofcitizens.InAthensforexample,freecitizensenjoyedthemostrightsastheycouldholdpoliticalofficesandvote.Metics,residentaliens,werefreebutdidnothavepoliticalrights.Finally,slaveshadnorightsatall.ThecastesysteminIndiaorhereditaryaristocracyinfeudalEuropeareillustrationsofstrongsocialstratification.Socialstratificationtendedtobelowerinstatistsystemsasmostpeoplewereunfreeandsharedthislackoffreedominaratheregalitarianway.

Table1summarizesourdiscussionofthecomparisonbetweenstatistand

marketsystems.Roland(2018)alsocontainsadetaileddiscussionofthiscomparison.

INSERTTABLE13.2. Theeffectofancientinstitutionsonmodernculture.Wenowdiscusstheeffectsofstatistandmarketsystemsonculture.Our

conceptualframeworkisverysimilartothecanonicalmodelofBisinandVerdier(2017)aboutthejointdynamicofinstitutionsandculture.Weindeedasktowhatextentthedifferentinstitutionalsystemsoftheancientworldaffectedsubsequentculturalvaluesandbeliefs.Wemakeseveralargumentstothatextent.Giventhefactthatthesedifferentinstitutionalsystemsexistedforaverylongtime,culturalsystemshadthetimetoemergeinaconsistentway.Giventheinertiaofculture(seeinparticularRoland,2004),itisplausibletothinkthatculturaldifferencesintheworldtodayare,atleasttoapartialextent,thelegaciesoftheculturalsystemsthatformedintheancientworld.

Firstofall,socialstratificationmayhaveworkedasapowerfulforceforthe

emergenceofindividualistculture.Indeed,animportantcharacteristicofindividualistcultureisthesocialprestigerewardfromstandingout.Socialstratificationleadsthoseatthetopofthesocialhierarchy(freecitizensinAthens,BrahmincastemembersinIndia,DukesandCountsinfeudalEurope)tostandout.Sincetheeliteplaysanimportantroleinelaboratinganddiffusingculturalvalues,

13

onecanunderstandhowsocialstratificationleadstovaluesglorifyingsuchstratification.

Atthesametime,privatepropertyisalsoafactorleadingtothedevelopment

ofindividualistvalues.Theextentofprivatepropertymaybeseenasdefiningsomebody’sintrinsicvalue.Thelargerthesizeofone’sproperty,themoreonestandsoutandthehigherone’ssocialstatus.

Onecanalsounderstandhowstatistsystemswouldhavefosteredcollectivist

values.Firstofall,insidelargeclans,somedivisionoftasksexistedbetweenmembersoftheclan.Fulfillingone’spositionandfittinginthelifeofthecollectivity,whateverone’sposition,wouldberewardedbysocialprestige.Asimilarlogiccanbeseentoapplyoutsidetheclanandinsocietyatlarge,inparticularforthosehavingapositioninthegovernmentadministration.BeingaloyalservantoftheEmperorandfulfillingone’sdutieswouldberewardedbypromotion,butalsobysocialprestige.

Theseargumentsmayseemsomewhatabstractbutacomparisonofsomeof

themainphilosophiesandreligionsthatemergedintheAncientworldcanmaketheseideasmoreconcrete.Confucianistphilosophyisagoodexampleofacollectivistphilosophy.IthasbeenarguedthatthesuccessofConfucianistphilosophyatthetimeoftheZhoudynastywasduetothefactthatitcodifiedexistingsocialnormsandculturalvalues.WithoutexplainingindetailConfucianistphilosophy,itisquitestrikingthatitinsistsonpeopleholdingtheirrankinsocietyandfulfillingthedutiesoftheirrank.Thus,ayoungerbrotheristoshowrespecttowardsolderbrothers,asontohisfather,thelivingtotheirancestors,subjectstowardstheEmperor.Stabilityandorderrequirethatpeopleadheretoandobservethenormofbehaviorassociatedtotheirrankinsidethefamilyandwithinsociety.Similarly,underConfucianism,fatherswereobligedtotreattheirsonsfairly,andtheEmperorhadthedutyofbehavinginabenevolentwaytowardshissubjects,orelsehewouldrisklosingthe“MandateofHeaven”.Buddhistphilosophyalsohasstrongelementsofcollectivism.Buddhismdoesnotencourageindividualstostandout,butareinsteadencouragedtolosetheirindividuality,abstractfromtheirdesiresandmergewiththesurroundinguniverse.TheseEasternphilosophiesstandincontrastwithGreekphilosophyaswellasJudeo-Christianreligion(andlaterIslam),thataremoreindividualist.Greekphilosophyencouragesindividualstoexcel,beitasasoldier,aphilosopher,apoliticianoramerchant,andconsiderscompetitionashealthymeanstoexcellence.ChristianreligionemphasizessalvationoftheindividualandtherelationbetweentheindividualandGod.TheseaspectsofChristianreligionwerereinforcedlaterwiththedifferentvariantsofProtestantism.

Ifourhypothesesarevalid,thenweshouldseeanempiricallinkbetween

variablescharacterizingstatistsystemsandcollectivismononehand,andvariablescharacterizingmarketsystemsandindividualismontheotherhand.Itisnotthefirsttimesuchhypotheseshavebeenformulated,butIamnotawareofany

14

historicaldatacollection,similartowhatwepresentinthispaper,withthepurposeofinvestigatingwhetherthesehypothesesholdwater.

4. AdatabaseonComparativeHistoricalInstitutions

Usingextensivehistoricalandarcheologicalsources,wecollecteddataon

thevariableslistedinTable1for97countries.Thecountrylistisnotexhaustive.WerestrictedourselvestothelistofcountriesforwhichwehaveHofstedeindividualism/collectivismscores,sincetheprimaryaimofourresearchistounderstandhowancientinstitutionalsystemsstillaffectmodernculture,i.e.valuesandbeliefs.

Thisfirstdatacollectionisbaseduniquelyonthereadingofhistoricaland

archeologicalscholarlysourcesonthetopic.Needlesstosay,thisinvolvesahugeeffortinthecollectionofhistoricalinformation.Indoingthisdatacollection,wehadtomakeseveralchoices.

Afirstchoicewehadtomakewasontheexacttimeperiodtofocusonfor

eachcountryforthedatacollection.Thebasicchoicewemadewastochoosetheoldestperiodofearlycivilizationforwhichwehavehistoricalandarcheologicalsources,andwhichcoincideswithancientstateformation,butnotalways.2Sincethereisarelativeinvarianceininstitutionalcharacteristics,especiallyatthetimeoftheformationofancientcivilizations,wecanbeconfidenttomeasurevariablesthathadacertaindegreeofpersistence.Thereisofcoursenoabsolutetimeinvarianceonallvariables,butitisneverthelessquitestrongwhenweconsiderallvariablestogether.Thistimechoicewasrelativelystraightforwardinmostcases,astheseancientcivilizationsaffectedfuturehistoricaldevelopments.ThisisobviousforexampleinthecaseofChina,ancientRomeorancientGreece.ItisnotobviousatallforancientEgypt,thelongestlastingancientcivilization,thatwasnotonlywipedouttwothousandyearsago,butthatdoesnotseemtohaveleftmanytracesincontemporaryEgypt.Onemightargueinthatcasethatlaterperiodsmightbemorerelevant.Itwould,inourview,howeverbearbitrarytodothingsthisway,andthiskindofdataselectionwouldbiasourdatacollectiontowardsfindingstrongpersistenceofearlyinstitutions.Wethinkitismoretransparenttolookasfaraspossibleinhistorytounderstandtheemergenceofparticularinstitutionalclustersandtheirhistoricalimpact.Ontheotherhand,insomecases,notonlyhaveancientcivilizationsdisappeared,buttheirancientpopulationswerereplacedbynewandcompletelydifferentpopulations.ThisisthecaseforexamplewithBritishcoloniesintheUnitedStates,Australia,CanadaandNewZealandwhereimmigrationandthequasi-eliminationofindigenouspopulationsbythenewmigrantsprofoundlytransformedthosecountries.Forthosecountries,wesimplyusedtheinstitutionaldatawehavefortheUKsincethisisthelargestorigin2Forexample,thePhilippinesdidnotreallyhavestateformationbeforeSpanishcolonization.ThisisalsothecaseforsomeAfricantribes.

15

ofthemigrants.Similarly,forSingapore,weusedthedatafromChina.Wemadesimilaradjustmentsinsomeothercasestoreflectlastinginvasionsandimportantpopulationmovements.Countrycompositionofmigrantsthusplayedanimportantroleinourchoiceoftimeperiodforacountry.Achoicethatispotentiallymorecontroversialisthechoiceofthepost-TatarDuchyofMuscowyforRussia.RussianhistoriographyalwaysemphasizesKievanRusasthecradleofRussiancivilization,butthishasbecomemoreandmorecontroversialovertime.WethinkourchoiceisreasonablesincetsaristRussiareallystartedtodeveloponlyaftertheeliminationoftheTataryoke,andourdatacollectionshowsthattheTatarsleftadeepinfluenceonRussia’sinstitutions.

Asecondissuehastodowiththeabsenceofoverlapbetweencurrent

countryboundariesandancientboundaries.Ifancientboundariesarelargerthanthecurrentones,thereisnoproblem.Theproblemariseswhenancientboundariesweresmallerthanthecurrentones.Thisismostlythecaseforsomebigcountries.ThemostobviouscaseisIndia.Here,wecollecteddataontheinstitutionsofthreeancientempires/kingdoms:theMauryanEmpire(322BCE-185BCE)thatcoveredmostlyNorthernIndiabutexpandedmosttotheSouthunderEmperorAshoka;theBengalKingdomthatstraddledcurrentBanglaDeshandcurrentWestBengalinIndia,aswellastheTamilkingdoms.Similarly,thecurrentterritoryofSouthVietnamwascoveredforaverylongtimebytheChampaEmpire(27BCE-1453CE),whileNorthVietnamwaspartofChinaformorethanthousandyears.

Athirdissuehastodowiththefactthatinsomecases,therehavebeen

multipleinfluences.Wetriedtoavoidasmuchaspossibletochoosemultipletimeperiodsinhistory,butinsomecasesitwasimpossibletodootherwise.ThemostobviouscaseisthatofLatinAmerica.Ononehand,importantancientcivilizationshaddevelopedthere,whichareimpossibletoignore:theIncaintheAndesregion,theAztecinCentralMexicoandtheMayaaroundtheYucatanpeninsula.Ontheotherhand,Spanishcolonizationlastedmorethan400yearsandhadanenormousinfluenceonLatinAmerica.Insomecases,theinfluenceoftheSpanishwaspredominantastheyoccupiedterritoriesinhabitedbytribesthathadnotyetreachedstatehood,thatdiedoutorwerequasi-exterminated,andforwhichwehaveverylittleinformation.Againthepopulationcriterionplayedanimportantroleinourchoices.ThePhilippinetribeshadnotyetreachedstatehoodbythetimeofSpanishcolonization,buttheautochtonouspopulationremainedverylarge,sowetooktheirinfluenceintoaccount.AchoicethatmayappearcontroversialisthatwedidnottakeintoaccountanycolonialinfluenceinAfrica,exceptforSouthAfricacolonizedbytheBoers.Indeed,thecolonialerainAfricahasbeenmuchshorter(roughly100years)thaninLatinAmericaandonecanarguethatcolonialpowersinAfricadidnotleaveanimprintasbigastheSpanish(orthePortuguese)leftinLatinAmerica.

TableA1inAppendixAshowsthemappingbetweenmoderncountriesand

ancientfoundingcivilizations.

16

Wescoredmostofthevariableswecollectedwithnumbersfrom1to10,usingparticularcriteriaforourscoring.Insomecases,weconstructedvariablesassumofparticularsub-indicators.Thepurposeistocaptureasmuchaspossiblecontinuityinmeasurementofvariables.Othervariableswerebynecessitycodedasdummyvariables.Thisisthecaseforkinshipvariables(unilinealvsbilineal)aswellaswhethertheancientcountrieswerecity-statesorterritorialstates.Theappendixcontainsthescoringcriteriausedforeachofthevariablesforwhichwecollectedinformation.A500pagelongwebappendixisavailablethatcontainsnotonlythescoresbutalsothesupportinghistoricalevidence.AppendixBcontainsthescoringrulesweusedforthemostimportantvariablesforwhichwecollecteddata.Manyofthesevariablescanbebettermeasured,especiallythosedeterminedtoalargeextentbygeography,somethingwhichwearedeterminedtodoinacomprehensivewayinfuturework.

Thedisadvantageofourmethodisthatwecanbeaccusedofarbitrarinessin

thescoring.Thisiswhywewanttomakethedataavailableinatransparentwaysoastocorrectpossiblemistakesofjudgment.

5. Preliminarydataanalysis

Westartbyshowingthecorrelationmatrixbetweenthevariableswe

collected.ThisisshowninTable2.Aswecanseefromsignificancelevels,manyofthevariablesarestronglycorrelated,whichisnotsurprisinggivenourexpectationsofobservinginstitutionalclusters.

INSERTTABLE25.1.Institutionalclustersinancienttimes.Toputsomeorderinourdescriptiveanalysis,westartbylookingatthe

relationbetweenexogenousvariablesandinstitutionalvariables.InTables3and4,welookattheeffectofgeographicalvariablesontheintensityoftradeinancienttimes.InTables5to10,welookatinstitutionalandsocialeffectsassociatedtohigherlevelsoftrade,andinTable11,welookatlongtermeffectsofearlyinstitutionsonculture.InTable12,welookattheeffectsofadifferentsetofgeographicalvariables,basedonobjectivemeasurement,showingthedirectionofsomeofourfuturework.

Table3looksattherelationbetweenheterogeneityofproduction

conditions,easeoftransportation,easinessoftaxationandclosenesstoahottradingzoneonintensityofdomestictrade,intensityofforeigntradeaswellasontheimportanceofmerchantsinsociety.NotethateasinessofconquestwasnotsignificantlycorrelatedwiththosevariablesandweomitteditintheTable.Thevariableshavetherightsignandaremostlysignificant.

INSERTTABLE3

17

Table4looksattheimportanceofcitiesinancienttimesasafunctionofthe

samevariablesandtheresultsareroughlysimilar.Notethateasinessoftaxationandeasinessofconquestarenotsignificant.Thelattereffectissomewhatsurprising.Citieswereusuallynotonlyhubsforcommerce,butalsoplacesofprotectionofcitizensfromoutsideaggression.Bettermeasurementisneededtobetterunderstandtheissueofeasinessofconquest.

INSERTTABLE4Table5looksatthedeterminantsoflegalsystems,i.e.whetherlegalsystems

were“citizentocitizen”protectingpropertyrights,orinstead“rulertosubject”regulatingthebehaviorofsubjectstowardstheirruler.Thisisthedistinctionbetween“ruleoflaw”and“rulebylaw”specifiedabove.Inthisrevisedversionofthepaper,weuseacompositelawindextomeasurethisasobjectivelyaspossible.Asdescribedintheappendix,thisvariableiscomposedofthreesub-variables:theextentoflawonprivateproperty,theextentofcontractlawanddevelopmentofprocedurallawinpubliclaw.Asonecansee,ahighervalueofourlawcompositeindexisassociatedwithahigherintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeaswellastheimportanceofcitiesandmerchants.Itisalsoassociatedwithclosenesstoahottradingzone,which,asseeninTables3and4,affectedtheintensityoftrade.

INSERTTABLE5NotethatinTable5andallsubsequentTables,wedonotmakeanyclaims

ofcausality.OnlygeographicalvariablesusedinTables1and2sofarareplausiblyexogenous.Firstofall,causalchainsbetweenthevariableswearelookingatarearguablyquitecomplex.Forexample,intensityofprivatetrademayaffectdemandforlegalsystems,butprotectionofpropertyrightsshouldalsofosterintensityofprivatetrade.Similarremarkscanbemadeaboutalltheothervariableswearelookingat.Wedonotarguethatcausalityisnotimportant.Rather,inthisfirstexplorationofdate,wefinditextremelyusefultodocumentfirstsignificantandmeaningfulcorrelationsbetweenthevariableswecollected.Findingconvincingcausallinksbetweendifferentvariablesismoredemanding,andinsomecases,maybeoutofourreach,givendataavailability.Wearewellawareofthislimitationintheempiricalanalysispresentedinthispaper.

Table6looksattheextentoftheinstitutionofprivateslavery.Ourvariable

fortheextentofprivateslaveryisbasedonthesumoffoursub-indices:1)theprevalenceofprivateslavery,2)theextentofthelegalnormforprivateslavery,3)theextentofmarketsforslavesandslavetrade,4)therelativeimportanceoftheprivateslavepopulationinthetotalpopulation.RegressionresultsshowsimilareffectsasinTable5.Privateslavemarketsweremorepresentinplaceswheretherewashighintensityofdomesticandinternationaltradeandwheremerchantsandcitiesplayedamoreimportantrole.Itisalsocorrelatedwithgeographicalvariables

18

affectingtheintensityoftrade,inparticulartheeaseoftransportationandheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction.

INSERTTABLE6Table7looksattheextentofprivatepropertyofland.Theresultsarequite

similartothoseofTable6.Note,however,thatheterogeneityinconditionsofproductionisnotsignificanthere,whereasclosenesstoahottradingzoneis.ThisistheoppositeofwhatwehadinTable6.

INSERTTABLE7Table8looksattheextentofsocialstratificationinancienttimes.Aswecan

see,itispositivelycorrelatedwiththeimportanceofmarketsforprivateslaves,withthelawbeing“citizentocitizen”,withtheimportanceofmerchantsandwithprivatelandownership.Itisnotsignificantlyassociatedwithclanstrength.Itispositivelyassociatedwithheterogeneityinconditionsofproduction.Theseresultsarenotsurprisinggivenourabovediscussionthatmarketsystemstendtocreatemoresocialstratificationthanstatistsystems,wheremostpeoplearenotfree.

INSERTTABLE8Figures1and2lookattherelationshipbetweensomevariablesthattake

onlytwovalues.InFigure1,wecanseethatclanstrengthwasstrongerinunilinealkinshipsystemsrelativetobilinealkinshipsystems.Thisisnotsurprisinggivenourdiscussionofkinshipsystems.InFigure2,weseethatpropertyrightsoflandweremoredevelopedinplaceswithbilinealkinshipsystems,whichalsocorrespondstoouranalysisabove.

INSERTFIGURES1AND2Table9looksatclanstrength.Itisnegativelyassociatedwithvariables

relatedtothedevelopmentofmarkets,butwhenweincludeunilinealkinshipintheregression,mostofthesevariablesbecomenonsignificant,exceptfortheimportanceofmerchantsinsociety,withwhichitissignificantlynegativelycorrelated.

INSERTTABLE9Table10looksatthecorrelatesofpowercentralization.Thisisacomposite

variablethatcombinesthedegreeofconcentrationofpoweroftheexecutiveattheCenterandfiscalcentralization.Itissignificantlynegativelycorrelatedwithvariablesofmarketdevelopmentaswellaswitheaseoftransportation.

INSERTTABLE10

19

Fromthesedescriptiveregressions,wegetaprettygoodpictureofstatistversusmarketsystems.Statistsystemshadalowerintensityofdomesticandforeigntrade,citiesplayedlessofaroleandtheroleofmerchantswassmaller;legalsystemswerefocusedontherelationbetweenrulerandsubjectsratherthanrelationsbetweencitizens,theinstitutionofprivateslaverywaslesspresentandprivatelandownershipwaslessdeveloped;socialstratificationwasalsolessdevelopedandtherewasmorepowercentralization.Ourempiricalanalysisalsoshowsthatstatistsystemsweremorelikelytoemergeundergeographicalconditionswhereconditionsofproductionweremorehomogeneous,wheretransportwaslesseasybutwhereconditionsoftaxationwereeasier.Theseresultsareallconsistentwithourtheoreticaldiscussionfromsection3.

NotethatFenske(2014),followingBates(1983)showsempiricallythatin

pre-colonialAfrica,countrieswithhigherecologicaldiversity(whichcanbeinterpretedashigherheterogeneityofproduction),hadahighercentralizationofgovernmentinthesenseofMurdock'sEthnographicAtlas.Whilethisseemstobeincontradictiontothegeneralresultswefound,thisismostlyaboutwherestatesemergedversuswheretheydidnot.Thereisalargeliteratureonthequestionoftheconditionsofemergenceofstates,butthatisnotwhatisdiscussedinthispaper.OursampledoesnothavemanySub-Saharancountries,butthedatawecollecteddonotseemtocontradictourgeneralstory.Forexample,theYoruba(incurrentNigeria)haveahighindexinMurdock'scentralizationindex,butwereessentiallyorganizedalongcity-statesandhavealowgovernmentcentralizationindexinourdatabase,aswellasaveragescoresontradeandlegalvariables.

5.2.Ancientinstitutionsandmoderncultures.Wenowexaminetowhatextenttheseancientinstitutionalsystemsmay

haveaffectedmodernculture,aswehypothesizedinsection3.Inparticular,welookattheextenttowhichmarketsystemstendedtodevelopamoreindividualisticculture,whereasstatistsystemsdevelopedamorecollectivistculture.

First,weseeinFigure3thatindividualismscoresarehigherinplacesthat

usedtobeorganizedascity-statesratherthanasterritorialstates.Indeed,individualistcultureisassociatedwiththecultureofcitizenship,whichhasdeeperrootsinsocietiesthatwereorganizedascity-states.Figure4showsthatindividualismscoresarehigherinsocietiesthathadbilinealcomparedtounilinealkinshipsystems.Indeed,thelatterhadstrongerclansystems,whichismoreconducivetocollectivistculture.

INSERTFIGURES3AND4Table11looksattherelationbetweenacertainnumberofvariablesandthe

Hofstedeindividualismscores.Column1showsapositiveandsignificant

20

correlationbetweenprivateslaveryinantiquityandindividualism.Thiscanbeinterpretedasareducedformregressionasthelinkfromprivateslaverytoindividualismiscertainlynotdirect.Column2showsthesameforprivatepropertyofland.Column3showsthatancientlegalsystemsemphasizingrelationsbetweencitizensarepositivelyandsignificantlyassociatedwithindividualismscores.Column4showsanegativeandsignificantpositiveassociationwithclanstrength.Column5showsapositivebutnonsignificanteffectofsocialstratification.Column6showsthesameresultwithallthesefivevariablesinajointregression.Column7looksonlyatthegeographicalvariablesandshowsapositiveandsignificanteffectforeaseoftransportation.

INSERTTABLE11Wemustbecarefulininterpretingtheseresults.Theybynomeansprove

causalityfromancientinstitutionstomodernculture,buttheyaresuggestivethatthismightbethecase.Theseresultsareconsistentwithourviewthatancientmarketsystemsfosteredindividualistculturegivingsocialprestigetoindividualachievementwhereasstatistsystemsbredacollectivistcultureawardingsocialstatustoconformityandembeddedness.

5.3.Usinggeographicalregressors.Mostoftheresultsreportedinthispaperarebasedonscoringvariables

usinghistoricalandarcheologicalvariables.Inthissubsection,wereportsomeresultsusingmoderngeographicalvariables.Thejustificationisthatgeographydoesnotchangemuchovertimesothecorrelationsweareabletoreportbetweenthesegeographicalvariablesandourhistoricalvariables,whilenotaproofofcausality,shouldbeindicativeoftheforcesthathaveshapedinstitutionsandcultureovertime.Theresultswereportbelowshould,however,beseenonlyasaveryfirstexerciseinthisdirection.Wewouldneedamuchmorecomprehensivesetofgeographicalmeasurementsinordertofullycapturealltherelevantdatawecollectedfromthehistoricalandarcheologicalliterature.

Themostobviousvariablesrelatetotransportcosts.Distancetotheseais

measuredbythedistanceinkmtothecapitalofthepolityconsidered.Alowerdistanceshouldfacilitatetrade,duetothelowercostsoftradebysea.Itwouldthusmakeitpossibletoincreasethebenefitsfromtrade.RuggednessisavariablethathasbeenusedextensivelyinthedevelopmentliteraturestartingwithNunnandPuga(2012).Itcanplayaroleinmanyways.Highruggednessimplieshightransportcosts,andisthusnotbeneficialfortrade.Ontheotherhand,itmayprotectfromforeigninvadersandreduceeasinessofconquest,which,asarguedabove,shouldfavormarketsystems.Here,weuse100kmdistanceinalldirectionstomeasureruggednesscenteredaroundthecapitaltocountries'capital.3Weuse3Wealsolookedatruggednessat50kmdistance,withsimilarresultstothosewereporthere.

21

thelogofruggednessasadependentvariable.Wealsousethelogofthedistancetoacountry'scapitaltotheclosesthottradingzone,measuredhereinkms.Lowerdistanceshouldalsoincreasethebenefitsfromtrade.

Whileitisrelativelyeasytoconstructvariablesthataffecttransport(and

trade)costs,itismuchmoredifficulttocomeupwithcomprehensivegeographicalvariablesthatmeasurewelltheheterogeneityofconditionsofproduction.WeuseheresoilfractionalizationdatafromtheHarmonizedWorldSoildatabase.Soilfractionalizationcalculationsarecenteredaroundthecountries'ancientcapitals,usinga100kmradius.Thisisclearlyanimperfectmeasureasitonlycapturespotentialheterogeneityinagriculture,andisonlybasedonsoilconditions,notonactualcropsgrownintheantiquity.Infutureresearch,weshouldalsolookatthepresenceofnaturalresourcesandtheirgeographicaldistribution.

WeshowthemostrelevantregressionsusingthesevariablesinTable12.

Weuseaslefthandvariablesourtwomeasuresoftrade(domesticandinternational),thethreemainlegalinstitutionalvariables(privatepropertyrightsofslavesandoflandaswellasthelawcompositeindex)andsocialstratification.Thelastcolumnisareducedformregressionwhereindividualismisregressedonthefourgeographicalvariables.

INSERTTABLE12Theresultsarequiteencouraging.Weseethatdistancetotheseais

generallysignificant,andhastheexpected(negative)signfortradeandmarketinstitutions.Thesamethingistrueforthedistancetoahottradingzone.Therethusseemstobeacleareffectoftransportcostsontheformationofmarketsystems.Distancetotheseaisalsopositivelyrelatedtopowercentralization,whichisalsoconsistentwithwhatwewouldexpect.Theresultsaresomewhatmoremixed,intermsofsignificance,forruggednessandsoilfractionalization.Ruggednessalwayshastheexpectedsignifweinterpretitasrelatedtotransportcosts.Soilfractionalizationdoesnothavetheexpectedsignforforeigntrade,butisstronglynegativelycorrelatedwithpowercentralizationandpositivelyrelatedwithindividualism.Thereducedformforindividualismisparticularlyinterestingbecauseallcoefficientshavetherightsignandtheyareallsignificant,exceptfordistancetothesea.Whiletheseresultsareobviouslypreliminary,theytendtobeconsistentwiththeothertablesinthispaperaswellaswiththehypothesesformulated.

6. Conclusions.Wehaveputtogetheranewdatabaserelativetoinstitutionsinancient

history.Wefindthatsomesocietieswereorganizedasstatistsystemswithresourceallocationdonebythestate,underdevelopmentofpropertyrightsandlegalsystems

22

focusingonenforcingthepoweroftheruler.Othersocietiesweremoremarketoriented,withabigrolefortrade,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Thesesocietieshadlegalsystemsfocusingmoreonconflictsbetweencitizens,suchasconflictsoverproperty.

Itappearsthatgeographymayhaveplayedanimportantroleindetermining

whetherancientsocietiesbecamestatistormarketsystems.Oneimportantvariablerelatestoheterogeneityorhomogeneityofconditionsofproduction.Heterogeneitycreatedlargebenefitsfromtrade,whichmayhaveledtotheemergenceofmarketsystems,whereasgreaterhomogeneitymayhavegeneratedbenefitsfromdivisionoflabor,whichmayhaveledtotheformationofstatistsystems.

Wehaveshownthatcountriesthatusedtoberuledbystatistsystemstend

todaytohaveamorecollectivistculture,whilecountrieswheremarketsystemsdevelopedinthepast,tendtohaveamoreindividualisticculture.

Thisresearchisonlyinitsbeginningandmanyquestionsareraisedrelative

tothedeeperreasonsbehindtheemergenceofthesetwodifferentsystemsintheantiquity.Forexample,howtoexplainwhycouldthebenefitsfromtradenotbereapedviacentralizedresourceallocation?

Amajorweaknessofthecurrentpaperisthatitdoesnothaveatheoretical

modeltoformulatehypothesesabouttherelationsbetweenthedifferentvariablesforwhichdatawerecollected.

Thedatacollectionneedstobemuchimproved.Inparticular,manyofthe

geographicalvariablesusedtoexplaindifferentinstitutionscancertainlybebettermeasured.Amorecompletesetofgeographicaldataaccountingfortheheterogeneityofconditionsofproductionindifferentpartsoftheworldwouldinparticularbemuchneeded.Giventhattheinstitutionaldatahavebeencollectedandscoredviaexistinghistoricalscholarship,onemayalsobeconcernedofpotentialbiasesindatacollection.Wewillputonlinenotonlyourscoresforparticularvariables,butalsoliteraturenotestojustifyparticularscores.

Finally,itisimportanttodisentanglerelationshipsbetweenmanyofthe

variablesintroducedhere.Wearewellawarethatthecurrentpaperdoesnotgobeyondbroadquantitativedescription.Nevertheless,giventhenoveltyofthedataandtheapproach,wethinkthisdescriptiveexerciseisanimportantfirststep.

23

REFERENCES

Bates,R.(1983)EssaysonthePoliticalEconomyofRuralAfricaCambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeU.K..

Bisin,A.andT.Verdier(2001)“TheEconomicsofCulturalTransmissionandthe

DynamicsofPreferences,”JournalofEconomicTheory97,298-319.Bisin,A.andT.Verdier(2017)“OntheJointEvolutionofCultureandInstitutions”

NBERworkingpaper.Buggle,J.(2015)“Irrigation,CollectivismandLongTermTechnological

Divergence”workingpaper,UniversityofLausanne.Chiao,J.Y.,andK.D.Blizinsky(2010)“Culture-genecoevolutionofindividualism-

collectivismandtheserotonintransportergene,”Proceedings-RoyalSociety.Biologicalsciences277(1681),529-537.

Enke,B.(2017)“KinshipSystems,CooperationandtheEvolutionofCulture”,

workingpaperHarvardUniversity.Fenske,J.(2014)"Ecology,TradeandStatesinPre-ColonialAfrica",Journalofthe

EuropeanEconomicAssociation12(3):612-640.Fincher,C.L.,R.Thornhill,D.R.Murray,andM.Schaller(2008)“Pathogen

prevalencepredictshumancross-culturalvariabilityinindividualism/collectivism”Proceedings-RoyalSociety.Biologicalsciences275(1640),1279-1285.

Finer,S.(1997)TheHistoryofGovernmentfromtheAncientTimes,Oxford

UniversityPress,Oxford,UK.Gorodnichenko,Y.,B.KukharskyyandG.Roland(2015)“CultureandGlobal

Sourcing,”NBERWorkingPaperNo.21198Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2012)“UnderstandingtheIndividualism-

CollectivismCleavageanditsEffects:LessonsfromCross-CulturalPsychology”inAoki,M.,T.KuranandG.Roland(ed.)InstitutionsandComparativeEconomicDevelopmentPalgraveLondon.

Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2015)“Culture,InstitutionsandDemocratization,”

NBERWorkingPaperNo.

24

Gorodnichenko,Y.andG.Roland(2017)“Culture,InstitutionsandtheWealthofNations,”ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics.

Greif,A.andG.Tabellini(2017)“TheClanandtheCorporation:Sustaining

CooperationinChinaandEurope,”JournalofComparativeEconomic.Heine,S.J.(2007)Culturalpsychology.W.W.Norton&Company.Jaspers(1951)TheOriginandGoalofHistoryRoutledge.Kashima,E.,andY.Kashima(1998).“Cultureandlanguage:Thecaseofcultural

dimensionsandpersonalpronounuse,”JournalofCross-CulturalPsychology29,461-486.

Keightley,D.N.“WhatdidmaketheChineseChinese?SomeGeographical

PerspectivesinTheseBonesShallRiseAgain:SelectedWritingsonEarlyChinaSUNYPress,NewYork,pp.75-86.

Licht,A.N.,C.GoldschmidtandS.H.Schwartz(2003)“CultureRules:The

FoundationsoftheRuleofLawandOtherNormsofGovernance,”JournalofComparativeEconomics35(4),659-688.

Mayshar,J.,O.MoavandZ.Neeman(2017)“Geography,Transparencyand

Institutions”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview111,622-636.Michalopoulos,S.(2012)"TheOriginsofEthno-LinguisticDiversity",American

EconomicReview102(4):1508-1539.Murra,JoseVictor(1968)“AnAymaraKingdomin1567”Ethnohistory15(2),p.

115-151.Murray,DamianR.,andMarkSchaller(2010)"HistoricalPrevalenceofInfectious

DiseasesWithin230GeopoliticalRegions:AToolforInvestigatingOriginsofCulture,"JournalofCross-CulturalPsychology41(1),99–108.

Polanyi,K.,C.MArenshergandH.M.Pearson(1954)TradeandMarketintheEarly

EmpiresFreePress,GlencoeIllinois.Roland,G.(2004)“UnderstandingInstitutionalChange:Fast-MovingandSlow-

MovingInstitutions,”StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment38(4):109-131.

Roland,G.(2018)"ComparativeEconomicsinHistoricalPerspective"Comparative

EconomicStudies60(4):475-501.

25

Tabellini,G.(2008)“PresidentialAddress:InstitutionsandCulture,”JournalofEuropeanEconomicAssociationVol.6,255-294.

Talhelm,T,X.Zhang,S.Oishi,C.Shimin,D.Duan,X.LanandS.Kitayama(2014)

“Large-ScalePsychologicalDifferencesWithinChinaExplainedbyRiceversusWheatAgriculture”Science344(6184):603-608.

Trigger,B(1993)EarlyCivilizations.AncientEgyptinContext.UniversityofCairo

Press,CairoEgypt.Trigger(2003)UnderstandingEarlyCivilizations,CambridgeUniversityPress

CambridgeUK.Way,B.M.andM.D.Lieberman(2010)“Isthereageneticcontributiontocultural

differences?Collectivism,individualismandgeneticmarkersofsocialsensitivity,”SocialCognitive&AffectiveNeuroscience5(2-3),203-211.

Weber,M.(1922)EconomyandSocietyrepublishedin1978byUniversityof

CaliforniaPress.Wittfogel,KarlA.(1957)OrientalDespotism.AcomparisonofTotalPower.New

HavenYaleUniversityPress.

26

TABLES TABLE 1. Statist and Market Systems Compared.

market institutions statist institutions

Comparative advantage of trade heterogeneity of production conditions strong weak

easyness of transport strong weak closeness to hot trading zone strong weak Other geographical variables

easyness of taxation weak strong easyness of conquest weak strong strength of property rights

Legal system citizen-citizen Ruler-subject Land ownership Private and public Public Right to own slaves private and public public only Development of markets

internal markets strong weak, central allocation foreign trade private for the ruler role of merchants strong weak Importance of cities large weak Government and society

type of state city-state territorial state government decentralization strong weak tolerance to foreigners strong weak ethnic diversity strong weak social stratification strong weak strength of clan weak strong kinship bilineal unilineal

27

Table2.Correlationmatrix

***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.

28

TABLE3:PotentialbenefitsofTradeandintensityofTradeinAncientTimes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES tradewithin

politytradewithinpolity

tradeacrosspolities

tradewithinpolity

importanceofmerchants

importanceofmerchants

Easeoftransportation 0.333*** 0.284** 0.091 (0.105) (0.113) (0.103)Hetero.cond.production 0.473*** 0.308*** 0.439*** 0.328*** 0.282*** 0.167* (0.095) (0.103) (0.090) (0.091) (0.096) (0.100)Closetohottradingzone 0.232** 0.272** 0.322*** (0.103) (0.108) (0.104)Easinessoftaxation -0.293*** -0.227*** -0.414*** -0.242*** -0.407*** -0.330*** (0.082) (0.072) (0.087) (0.081) (0.069) (0.079) Observations 95 83 95 83 95 83R-squared 0.230 0.510 0.316 0.600 0.251 0.426Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

29

Table4.Importanceofcitiesinancienttimes(commercialcities+urbanization) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)VARIABLES importanceofcities importanceofcities importanceof

citiesimportanceofcities

importanceofcities

Easeoftransportation 0.431*** 0.435*** 0.433*** (0.132) (0.125) (0.130)Hetero.cond.production 0.408*** 0.372*** 0.406*** 0.369*** 0.370*** (0.135) (0.112) (0.131) (0.111) (0.112)Closetohottradingzone 0.156 0.162 0.159 (0.127) (0.133) (0.131)Easinessoftaxation -0.160 -0.025 -0.022 (0.100) (0.096) (0.093)Easinessofconquest 0.137 -0.018 -0.012 (0.110) (0.094) (0.090) Observations 95 83 92 83 83R-squared 0.124 0.410 0.115 0.410 0.411Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

30

Table5.InstitutionaleffectsonlawcompositeindexVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Tradewithinpolity 0.505*** -0.008 (0.086) (0.146) Tradeacrosspolities 0.536*** 0.043 (0.083) (0.187) Roleofmerchants 0.751*** 0.731*** (0.067) (0.129) Importanceofcities 0.362*** -0.014 (0.092) (0.096) Easeoftransportation 0.059 (0.149)Hetero.cond.production 0.154 (0.136)Closetohottradingzone 0.317** (0.158) Observations 93 93 93 93 93 81R-squared 0.249 0.264 0.455 0.132 0.455 0.201Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

31

Table6.Institutionaleffects.Privateownershipofslaves.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tradewithinpolity 0.396*** -0.126 (0.072) (0.130) Tradeacrosspolities 0.500*** 0.321** (0.069) (0.160) Roleofmerchants 0.528*** 0.350*** (0.074) (0.116) Importanceofcities 0.334*** 0.062 (0.071) (0.096) Easeoftransportation 0.370*** 0.266** (0.067) (0.105)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.249** 0.283*** (0.110) (0.100)Closetohottradingz. 0.068 (0.105) Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 83R-squared 0.238 0.352 0.359 0.180 0.422 0.284 0.298Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

32

Table7.Institutionaleffects.PrivateOwnershipoflandVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Tradewithinpolity 0.709*** 0.105 (0.075) (0.125) Tradeacrosspolities 0.787*** 0.518*** (0.066) (0.142) Roleofmerchants 0.833*** 0.479*** (0.055) (0.121) Importanceofcities 0.339*** -0.230*** (0.108) (0.078) Easeoftransportation 0.539*** 0.263** (0.083) (0.127)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.183 0.061 (0.128) (0.129)Closetohottradingz. 0.323** (0.130) Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 84R-squared 0.474 0.538 0.563 0.117 0.669 0.323 0.330Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

33

Table8.Institutionaleffects.Socialstratificationinancienttimes.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Privateslavery 0.190* -0.172 (0.096) (0.143) Lawcomposite 0.241*** 0.237** (0.078) (0.117) Roleofmerchants 0.269*** 0.365*** (0.074) (0.129) Privateland 0.147* -0.147 (0.076) (0.122) Strengthofclan -0.097 0.018 (0.066) (0.069) Easeoftransportation -0.077 (0.080)Hetero.cond.production

0.183**

(0.090)Closetohottradingz. 0.157** (0.079) Observations 95 93 96 95 96 91 84R-squared 0.052 0.128 0.134 0.050 0.031 0.222 0.122Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

34

Table9.ClanstrengthVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Tradewithinpolity -0.300** -0.043 0.462*** (0.122) (0.114) (0.173) Tradeacrosspolities -0.342** -0.174 -0.232 (0.133) (0.112) (0.228) Roleofmerchants -

0.562***-0.297** -0.432**

(0.116) (0.130) (0.191) Importanceofcities -0.049 (0.122) Unilinealkinship 3.605*** 3.514*** 3.120*** 3.590*** (0.617) (0.588) (0.657) (0.691) Easeoftransportation -

0.358***-0.133

(0.113) (0.186)Hetero.cond.production

-0.077 -0.002

(0.154) (0.153)Closetohottradingz. -0.248 (0.182) Observations 96 90 96 90 96 90 90 96 84R-squared 0.060 0.323 0.073 0.340 0.180 0.365 0.403 0.096 0.106Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

35

Table10.PowercentralizationVARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Tradewithinpolity -0.243*** -0.214 (0.078) (0.146) Tradeacrosspolities -0.236*** -0.206 (0.079) (0.156) Roleofmerchants -0.162* 0.099 (0.092) (0.134) Importanceofcities -0.062 0.123 (0.079) (0.084) Easeoftransportation -0.251** (0.103)Hetero.cond.production

-0.193

(0.118)Closetohottradingz. 0.168* (0.097) Observations 93 93 93 93 93 82R-squared 0.095 0.084 0.036 0.007 0.121 0.069Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

36

Table11.Longruneffectsofearlyinstitutionsonindividualism.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Privateslavery 4.227*** -0.176 (0.927) (1.330) Privateland 5.885*** 7.641*** (0.552) (0.974) Lawcomposite 3.328*** -3.343*** (0.600) (0.960) Strengthofclan -2.952*** -1.450** (0.575) (0.593) Socialstratification 0.949 0.020 (1.047) (0.771) Easeoftransportation 4.082*** (1.032)Hetero.cond.Prod. 0.098 (0.952)Closetohottradingz. -0.038 (1.038) Observations 94 94 92 95 95 90 83R-squared 0.169 0.532 0.166 0.192 0.006 0.598 0.274Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

37

Table12.Usinggeographicalregressors.VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Trade

withinthepolity

Tradeacrossthepolity

Privateslavery

Privateland

Lawcompositeindex

Powercentralization

Socialstratification

Individualism

Distancetothesea -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002 0.003** -0.002** -0.014 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010)Log(rugged.100km) -0.160 -0.098 -0.161 -0.164* -0.012 0.196** 0.129 -2.292*** (0.099) (0.092) (0.119) (0.086) (0.119) (0.085) (0.083) (0.762)Soilfractionalization -2.601 -6.239*** -0.280 1.178 2.028 -4.968** -2.606 54.300*** (2.505) (2.196) (3.315) (2.693) (3.210) (2.008) (1.848) (20.312)Log(distancehottrad.zone)

-0.903*** -1.154*** -1.593*** -1.121*** -1.077*** 0.008 -0.238 -6.379***

(0.252) (0.225) (0.301) (0.220) (0.303) (0.233) (0.164) (1.610) Observations 80 80 80 79 78 80 80 79R-squared 0.203 0.313 0.349 0.324 0.205 0.188 0.100 0.308Notes:Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses.***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

38

FIGURESFigure1

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

bilineal unilineal

Kinshipsystemsandclanstrength

39

Figure2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

bilineal unilineal

Kinshipsystemsandlandpropertyrights

40

Figure3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

city-state territorialstate

EarlyStateTypeandaverageindividualismscores

41

Figure4

.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

bilineal unilineal

Kinshipsystemsandaverageindvidualismscores

42

APPENDIXA.

TableA1.Timeperiodchoicefortheanalysis.Country Time period(s) Albania Ottoman Albania (1385-1912) Angola

Pre-colonial kingdoms: Kongo Kingdom (1390-1857), Ndongo Kingdom, Matamba Kingdom

Argentina

Spanish colony early 16th century (1516)-1816

Australia British colony (1788-1850) Austria Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century) Bangladesh Bengal (5th century BC- 6th century AD) Belgium

- Ancient Rome (22BC-5th century) - Independent cities (1100s-1600s)

Bhutan Pre-modern Bhutan Theocracy government (Early 17th century-1907)

Brazil Portuguese colony (16th century (1500)-1822) Bulgaria

- First Bulgarian Empire (618-1018) - Second Bulgarian Empire (1185-1396) - Ottoman Bulgaria (1396-1878)

Burkina Faso Pre-colonial Mossi States (16th century-1896) Canada English colony after 1763 Chile - Inca Empire (1438-1533)

- Spanish colony (1541-1810) China

Shang Dynasty (c. 1600 BC- c. 1046 BC) Western Zhou Dynasty (c. 1046 BC-771 BC)

Colombia

- Inca Empire (1438-1533) - Spanish Colony (early 16th century (1525)-1810)

Costa Rica

Spanish Colony (early 16th century (1524)-1810)

Croatia - Ancient Rome (1st century AD-476AD) - Duchy, Kingdom of Croatia (8th century-925-1102, Frankish vassal) - Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik, 13th-19th century)

Czech Republic Bohemia (Přemyslids) (867-1306) Denmark The Vikings (8th century-mid-11th century) Dominican Republic Spanish Colony (1492-1795) Ecuador Inca Empire (1438-1533), Incan Conquest of Ecuador,

1463-1500 Spanish colony (1534-1822)

Egypt Ancient Egypt (3150 BC-525 BC) El Salvador Spanish Colony (1525-1821) Estonia

Estonian tribes (8th century-13th century, before the Crusade)

Ethiopia Kingdom of Axum (c. 100- c.900) Fiji British Colony (1874-1970) Finland

Finn tribes (8th century-13th century, before Christianization)

France

- - Ancient Rome (509 BC-476 AD)

43

- - The Franks (3rd century AD-7th century AD) Germany Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century AD) Greece Classical Greece (510BC-323BC) Ghana Ashanti Confederacy (mid-17th century-1902) Guatemala - Mayan city-states (c. 250 AD- 16th century)

- Spanish colony 1524-1821 Honduras - Maya city-states (c. 250 AD- 16th century)

- Spanish colony 1526-1821 Hungary Arpad Dynasty (c. 895-1301) Iceland Icelandic Free State (Vikings) (c. 930-1262) India

- Mauryan Empire (326 BC-180 BC) - Tamil kingdoms (4th century BC-5th century AD) - Bengal (5th century BC-6th century AD)

Indonesia Early Indianized Kingdoms (1st century AD -1377 AD, end of Srivijaya)

Iran Achaemenid Empire (550 BC-330 BC) Iraq Assyria, Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Ireland Irish Kingdoms (5th century-9th century) Israel

Ancient Israel (c. 1000 BC- 586 BC, end of Kingdom of Judah)

Italy Ancient Rome (509 BC-476 AD) Jamaica

Spanish Colony (1494-1655) British Colony (1655-1962)

Japan Yamato and Asuka Japan (c.250-710) Kenya

Swahili city-states (8th century or 9th century-16th century) Kikuyu tribes (3d-13th century)

Korea Old Choson (3rd century BC-108 BC) Kuwait Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Latvia

Medieval Livonia (Bishoprics, archbishopric of Livonia, Livonian Order, Municipal City of Riga) (13th century-16th century)

Lebanon Phoenicia (c. 1500BC- 539 BC) Libya Same as Saudi Arabia Lithuania Grand Duchy of Lithuania (c. 1236-1569) Luxembourg Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century) Malawi Pre-colonial kingdoms (17th century-19th century) Malaysia

Early Indianized Kingdoms (1st century AD-1377 AD, end of Srivijaya)

Mexico

- Maya city-states (c. 800 BC-c. 1600 AD) - Aztec Empire (1428-1521) - Spanish colony (1521-1821)

Morocco

Berber Morocco Dynasties: Idrisid Dynasty (788-974) Almoravid Dynasty (1040-1147) Almohad Dynasty (1121-1269)

Mozambique Portuguese Colony (1498-1975) Namibia German colony (1884-1915) Nepal Licchavi Kingdom (c. 400AD -879 AD) Netherlands Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th century)

Independent cities (1100s-1600s) New Zealand British colony (1841-1907) Nigeria Yoruba states (1300s-1896) Norway Viking Age (8th century-mid-11th century)

44

Pakistan

Ghaznavid Empire 977-1186 Ghurid Empire 1186-1215

Panama Spanish Colony (1510-1821) Peru

- Inca Empire (1438-1533) - Spanish colony (1534-1821)

Philippines

- Pre-colonial Philippines (900-1565) - Spanish Colony (1565-1898)

Poland Piast Dynasty (c. 960-1370) Portugal Medieval Kingdom of Portugal (1139-15th century) Romania

Ancient Rome (Roman Dacia) (106 AD-271 AD) Medieval: Transylvania (Hungary), Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia ( in 14th century-16th century)

Russia Muscovy (1283-1584) Saudi Arabia Arab tribes (early 7th century), Rashidun Caliphate (632-

661), Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) Senegal

Pre-colonial states and kingdoms (Bundu and Gajaaga states, Wolof kingdoms, Fulani Futa Toro) (1600s-1885)

Serbia

Nemanjić dynasty (1166-1371) Ottoman Serbia (14th or 15th century-1817)

Sierra Leone

The Temne and the Mende states (17th century? –before the 20th century) British colony (1808-1961)

Singapore

- China - Malaysia

Slovakia Same as Hungary Slovenia Ancient Rome + Slav tribes South Africa Dutch Cape Colony (1652-1795) Spain - Reconquista Castile (1065)-Leon(910); Crown of

Castile (1230-1492) (1492: end of Reconquista) - Aragon (est. 1035) - Catalonia (12th century-15th century)

Sri Lanka

Ancient Sri Lanka (Anuradhapura Kingdom) (377BC-1017)

Sweden Viking Age (8th century-mid-11th century) Switzerland Germanic tribes Germanic tribes (1st century to 6th

century) Syria Assyria, Mesopotamia (c. 3000 BC-539 BC) Taiwan China Tanzania Swahili city-states (8th century or 9th century-16th century)

Sukuma tribes (14th -19th century) Thailand Dvaravati Kingdoms (6th century-13th century) Trinidad and Tobago Colony (1498-early 19th century)

Turkey Seljuk Rum Sultanate (1077-1308); Ottoman Empire

(c.1299-1922) Evidence from early Ottoman Empire. United Arab Emirates Arab tribes (early 7th century), Rashidun Caliphate (632-

661), Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) United Kingdom Anglo-Saxons (5th century- 11th century AD) United States British colony (17th century-1776) Uruguay Banda Oriental (Spanish Colony and Portuguese Colony)

(1624 (First permanent settlement founded Banda

45

Oriental (Spanish Colony and Portuguese Colony) by the Spanish; 1680 Colônia do Sacramento founded by the Portuguese)-c. 1830)

Venezuela Spanish Colony (1522-1811) Vietnam North Vietnam Chinese rule and domination (111BC-

938AD) Champa city-states (2nd century-1832)

Zambia Pre-colonial kingdoms (Lozi, Kazembe, Bemba, 18th -late 19th century)

Table A2. Mapping between modern countries and ancient or founding civilizations Albania Illyria France Franks Angola Kongo, Mbundu, … ancient Rome Argentina Spanish colony Germany Ancient Germanic tribes Australia English colony Ghana Ashanti Austria ancient Germanic tribes Greece Ancient Greece Bangladesh Bengal Guatemala Spanish colony Belgium independent cities Honduras Spanish colony Bhutan Bhutan Hungary Hungary Brazil Portuguese colony Iceland Viking Bulgaria Blakanic Bulgaria India Mauryan Empire Burkina Faso Mossi kingdoms Tamil states Canada British colony Bengal Chile Inca Indonesia Indonesian Islands Spanish colony Iran Ancient Persia

China Ancient China (Shang and later) Iraq Mesopotamia

Colombia Inca Assyria spanish colony Ireland Celtic Ireland Costa Rica Spanish colony Israel ancient Israel

Croatia Ancient Rome + Eastern Adriatic coast Italy Ancient Rome

Czech Rep. Bohemia Jamaica Spanish colony Denmark Viking Japan Ancient Japan Dominican Rep. Spanish colony Kenya Swahili kingdoms

Ecuador Inca Korea Ancient Korea (Gokuryo, Baekje, Silla)

spanish colony Kuwait Mesopotamia Egypt Ancient Egypt Latvia Livonia El Salvador Spanish colony Lebanon Phenicia Estonia estonian tribes Libya Arabia Ethiopia Aksum Lithuania Grand Duchy of Lithuania Fiji Fiji Luxembourg Germanic tribes Finland Finnish tribes (continued below)

46

Table 2 (continuation) Malawi Maravi South Africa Boers Malaysia Malaysia + Sumatra Spain reconquista Castille Mexico Aztec Catalonia Maya Aragon Spanish colonizer Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Morocco Morocco Sweden Viking

Mozambique Tonga, Makua, Maravi and Karanga Switzerland Germanic tribes

Namibia German colony Syria Mesopotamia Nepal Nepal Assyria Netherlands Independent cities Taiwan China New Zealand English colony Tanzania Swahili kingdoms Nigeria Yoruba Thailand Dvaravati Norway Viking Trinidad and Tobago Spanish colony Pakistan Ghaznavid Turkey Seljuk/Ottoman Panama Spanish colony Assyria Peru Inca United Arab Emirates Arabia Spanish colony United Kingdom Saxons Philippines Spanish colony United States English colony pre-colonial Uruguay Spanish colony Poland Piast dynasty Venezuela Spanish colony Portugal reconquista Portugal Vietnam Champa

Romania Balkanic region Vietnam

North Vietnam/Southwest China/Tonkin

Russia Russia post-Tatar (Muscowy) Zambia Bemba Kingdom

Saudi Arabia Arabia Serbia Balkan Sierra Leone Tribes of Sierra Leone Singapore China Slovakia Hungary

Slovenia Ancient Rome + Balkan

47

APPENDIXB.SCORINGCRITERIA.

Heterogeneityofproduction.1-2:Veryhomogeneousgeographicalenvironment,oneoronlyafewkindsofresources.Typically,barrenlandduetoclimateorothergeographicalconstraints;alluvialplainonlyforgrainproduction;plantationeconomy3-4:Afewkindsofresources/products,somedifferencesofenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundings.5-7:Somediversityofnotableresources,adifferentiatedenvironmentacrossthegeographicalsurroundingsandclosenesstoplaceswithdifferentresources.8-10:Verydiversegeographicalenvironment,manykindsofresources.Typically,vibrantinterregionaltradeofnaturalresourcesTradewithinPolity1-2:Noprivatetrade.Mainlydistributionviathestateapparatus.Somebarter.3-4:Verylimitedprivatetrade.Distributionandsubsistenceproduction.5-6:Tradelimitedinscope(goodstraded),locationandtime.7-8:Activetradewithsomelimitsandsignificantnon-marketactivity.9-10:Intensiveinternaltradeanimportantengineoftheeconomy,possiblyinconjunctionwithintensiveinternationaltrade.TradeacrossPolities1-2:Mostlyautarkyorforeigntradeconductedonlybygovernmentemissaries.3-4:Foreigntradecontrolledbythegovernment,usingsomeprivatemerchants.5-6:Substantialprivateforeigntradebutoveralllimitedrelativetothesizeoftheeconomy.Significanttradebarriersandcontraband7-8:Largeforeigntradewithtradebarriersbutquitewidespreadsmuggling9-10:Intensiveinternationaltradeconductedbyprivatemerchantsplayingakeyrolefortheeconomy.RoleofMerchants1:Almostallexchangeisbasedonreciprocityorredistribution.Nomarketsandmerchantsinrealsenseexistintheeconomy.2:Mostexchangeismainlybasedonreciprocityorredistribution.Merchantsarefewinnumberandaregenerallyrulers’agents.Marketsbarelyexist.3:Mostmerchantsarerulers’agentsandworkfortheruler,orrulersthemselvesaremerchants.Marketsarelimited.

48

4:Merchantsaregenerallyrulers’agentsbutalsoparticipateinprivatetrade.Thestatehasstrongmonopolyandregulationintheeconomy.Marketsarelimited.5:Privatemerchantsparticipateinastrictlyregulatedmarketsubjecttostateinterference.Somemerchantsmaybestateagents.Merchantsaresubjecttoclosesupervision,regulationandpredationfromthestate.Thestatemayhavemonopoliesinmanyindustries.Marketsexist.6:Privatemerchantsparticipateinastrictlyregulatedmarketsubjecttostateinterference.Merchantsaresubjecttosupervision,regulationorpredationfromthestate.Thestatemonopolizescertainindustries.Marketsexist.7:Privatemerchantsparticipateinaregulatedmarket.Merchantsaresubjecttocertainregulation,monopolyorpredationfromthestate.Marketsexist.8:Privatemerchantsparticipateinapartlyfreemarket.Merchantsaresubjecttocertainregulation,monopolyorpredationfromthestate.Largemarketsexist.9:Privatemerchantsparticipateinamostlyfreemarket.Largeandnumerousmarketsexist.10:Privatemerchantsparticipateinafree,developedmarket;largeandnumerousmarketsexist.

ImportanceofCitiesEstimatedurbanizationrate(U)0:completelyrural1:thepolityhasonlyafewsettlements/towns,citiesintherealsensedonotexist;verylowurbanpopulation.==0%2:thepolityhasafewtownsorlargesettlements;relativelylowurbanpopulation.<5%3:thepolityhasanumberoftownsorcities,mediumlevelurbanpopulation.5%-10%4:thepolityhasanotablenumberoftownsandcities;urbanpopulationisrelativelyhigh.10%-15%5:thepolityishighlyurbanized.Urbanpopulationisveryhigh.>15%CommercialFunctionofcities(C)1:almostallcitiesareadministrative/ceremonial/militarycenters;citiesarenotcommercialcenters2:citiesmostlyareadministrative/ceremonial/militarycenters;somecommercialfunction3:citiescombinedthefunctionofadministrationandcommerce4:citiesareprimarilycommercialandmanufacturingcenters5:citiesarecommercialandmanufacturingcentersTotalscore:Adding(U)and(C)LandOwnership

49

1:Noevidenceofprivateownership,alllandpropertybelongstothestateortheruler.2:Noevidenceofprivateownershipinsociety,stateownershipandinstitutionalownership.3:Noevidenceofprivateownership,communalownershipdominates.Landexchangeisverylimited(mayonlyexistbetweentribes,villagesorcommunitiesunderveryspecificconditions)4:Privateownershipislimited,andcoexistswithcommunalorinstitutionalownership.Landisinheritablewithinthefamily.Landtransactionisrare.5:Privateownershipcoexistswithcommunalorinstitutionalownership.Landisconditionallyinheritable.Landtransaction(leasing,purchaseandsale)ispresentbutconditional,limitedorrestricted.6:Privatelandownershipdominates.Landisconditionallyinheritable.Landtransactionisveryrare.7:Privatelandownershipdominates.Landisinheritable.Landtransactionisrare.8:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landisinheritable.Someevidenceoflandtransaction(leasing,purchaseandsale)9:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landcanbeinherited,rent,orsoldanddisposedattheowner’sownwill.Landtransactioniscommon.10:Mostlyprivatelandownershipbyindividual.Landcanbeinherited,rent,orsoldanddisposedattheowner’sownwill.Landtransactionisverycommonandlandmarketexists.PrivateslaveryFoursubvariablesA)prevalenceofprivateslaveryB)legalorsocialnormofslaveryC)PresenceofSlavetradeandslavemarketD)(private)slavepopulationA:Prevalenceofprivateslavery:1:Almostallunfreelaborsareownedaspublicslavesworkingfortheruler,thestateorpublicinstitutions(temples,armies,etc.);noprivateslavery2:Mostunfreelaborsarepublicslaves3:Privateslavesandothertypesofunfreedependentlaborsuchasserfscoexist4:Mostunfreelaborareprivateslaves5:PredominantmostunfreelaborsareownedasprivateslavesB:Legalorsocialnormofslavery:1:Slavesarenotrecognizedaspropertybutusuallybeingregardedasservantsordependentsoftheruler.Slavescannotbemortgaged,boughtorsold;ornoslaves2:Slavesarenotdefinedaspropertybutusuallybeingregardedasservantsordependentsoftherulerormaster.Slavescanrarelybetransferredormortgagedunderspecialconditions3:Slavesarenotdefinedaspropertybutretaincertainrightsasperson.Slavesareboundedtolandorclansandgenerallycannotbebought,mortgagedorsoldconditionally(debtbondage,limitedserviceslavery,etc.)

50

4:Slavesarenotdefinedasfullprivatepropertybutonlypartiallyorconditionallyortheyretaincertainrightsasperson.Slavescanbemortgaged,boughtorsold5:Slavesaredefinedinlaworcustomasfullprivateproperty,andtheycanbemortgaged,boughtorsoldattheowner’swillC:PresenceofSlavetradeandslavemarket:1:absenceornearabsenceofslavemarketorslavetrade2:slavemarketsandslavetradeexistsbutlimitedinscale3:slavemarketandslavetradeexist4:activeslavetradeandslavemarket;largenumberofslavesaretraded.5:veryactiveprivateslavetradeandprivateslavemarket;verylargenumberofslavestradedinmarketsD:Privateslavepopulation1:No(private)slavepopulation2:Privateslavesconstituteaverysmallportionoftotalpopulation3:Privateslavesconstituteaportionoftotalpopulation4:Privateslavesconstitutealargeportionoftotalpopulation5:PrivateslavesconstituteaverylargeportionoftotalpopulationLawSumofthreevariables:propertylaw,contractlawandformalpubliclaw.A.Propertylaw0:Nomentionofprivatepropertynoritsprotectionornoconceptofprivateproperty.Strongemphasisagainsttransgressionagainststateproperty.1:Nomentionofprivatepropertynoritsprotection,ornoconceptofprivateproperty2:Noexplicitmentionofprotectionofprivateproperty,butwrittencodesontransferofproperty,inheritanceofpropertyofindividualsandhowtosolvedisputesonproperty.3:writtencodesontransferofproperty,inheritanceofpropertyofindividualsandhowtosolvedisputesonpropertyandthelawalsoexplicitlymentionsprotectionofprivatepropertyagainstpotentialexpropriation.B.Contractlaw0:nomentionofcontractinlaws(theexistenceofCommercialLawusuallysuggestscontractlaw)1:unwrittenorcustomarylawthathascasesrelatedtocontract2:writtencontractlawmentioningcasesofcontractandenforcement3:writtencontractlawthathasdetailedconditionsonregulationandenforcementofcontract

51

C.ComparisononPubliclaw0:Noprocedurallaw,usuallynospecificprocedureisfollowed1:Procedurebutlittleprotection2:Someformalizedwayofprocedure4:Writtenprocedurallaw*Customarylaw=0or1ImportanceofClanScoresarebasedonthesumofscoresofthefollowing5variables.A:familytype(nuclearfamilyvsextendedfamily)(2)0:nuclearfamilyisthemostcommonfamilytype1:mixed(stemfamiliesormixednuclearandextendedfamily)2:extendedlargefamily/compoundisthemostcommonfamilytypeB:importanceofunilinealdescentgroupinsociety(2)0:nounilinealdescentgroup1:unilinealdescentgrouponlyexistsinparticularsocialgroups(e.g.onlyimportantinnobility)2:unilinealdescentgroupisprevalentinallpartsofsocialgroupsC:localizedvs.nonlocalizeddescentgroup(2)0:thedescentgroupisdispersed.Unilineallyorbilaterallyrelatedindividualsarenotlocalizedinoneparticulararea.1:mixed2:thedescentgroupislocalized.Unilineallyrelatedindividualsliveinproximity(withinavillage,settlement,community,etc.)D:cooperationwithindescentgroup(2)0:thedescentgroupisnoncorporate.Individualreliesmoreonkindreds,networksofrelativesandfriends.1:thedescentgroupisaneconomicorpoliticalcorporationtosomeextent,butitsroleinsustainingcooperationislimited.2:thedescentgroup,actingasaneconomicandpoliticalcorporation,sustainscooperationwithinthegroupbyprovidingmemberspublicgoodsandsocialsafetynets,includingeducation,defenseandprotection,rituals,commoneconomicactivities,regulationofmarriage,ormutualassistance,etc.E:conflictresolution(2)0:authoritiesofthedescentgrouphasnoformalpowertoresolvedisputebetweenindividuals1:mixed

52

2:authoritiesofthedescentgrouphavesupremepowertoresolvedisputesbetweenindividualswithinthegroup.Thewholedescentgrouphascollectiveresponsibilitywhileinconflictwithoutsiders.Socialstratification1:societyisnotstratified.Statusisnothereditary.Typicallyseeninpre-statesorintribes,clansbasedonkinship2:Fewdistinguishablesocialstrataexistedinsociety.Statusisnothereditaryforthemostcasesandwidespreadmobilitybetweendifferentsocialstrata3:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Statusisnotstrictlyhereditaryandverticalmobilityispossiblethroughmeritocracy,individualskill,valor,pietyorwisdom4:Societyhasafewsocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.(Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Lackedhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossibleandprevalent)5,6:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Somestrataarehereditarywhilethereismobilityintheothers.(Example:Hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Weakhereditaryaristocracywithinfreemen.theverticalmobilitywithinthegroupoffreemenispossible)7:Societyhasmanysocialstrata.Moststrataarehereditary;limitedverticalmobilitybetweenstrata.Example:hereditaryfreemenandslaves.Withinthefreemengroup,therewerethedistinctionsbetweenhereditaryaristocraticgroupsandcommoners/peasants/serfs8:Societyishighlystratified.Casteexistsinmostsocialclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisalmosthereditary.Limitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy9:Societyishighlystratified.Casteexistsinmostsocialclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisalmoststrictlyhereditary.Limitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchy10:Societyishighlystratified.Strongcastedistinctioninalmostallclasses/groups.Anindividual’sstatusisstrictlyhereditary.VerylimitedverticalmobilityamongdifferentstratainthehierarchyGovernmentcentralizationSumoftwovariables(concentrationofpoweranddegreeofcentralization)Concentrationofpowerinexecutiveinthecentralgovernment1-51:Theruler’sexecutivepowerisgreatlylimitedbylegislatureandjudiciaryinstitutions.Therulerissubjecttochangesmadebyelectionsorassemblydisapproval.2:therulerhaslargepowerintheexecutiverealmbutislimitedinothers.3:Therulerhaslargepowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealmsbuthispowerconstrainedbyotherorganizationsorinstitutions(termlimits,assemblyconsent,legalconstraintsetc.)

53

4:Therulerhaslargepowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealmsbuthispowerispotentiallyconstrained.5:Therulerhasunlimitedpowerinlegislature,executiveandjudiciaryrealms.Therulergenerallyrulesforlife.Relationshipbetweencentralandlocalgovernment1-51:decentralized.Thelocalgovernmentisindependentfromthecenter.Thecentralgovernmenthasnopowerinappointinglocalofficialsorinterveninglocaladministration.2:decentralized.Thelocalgovernmentisdefactoautonomousfromthecenter.Thecentralgovernmenthaslimitedpowerinappointinglocalofficialsorinterveninglocaladministration.3:centralizeddelegationalsystem.Thelocalgovernmentisadministeredbyhereditarylocalrulers,andthecentralgovernmentcannotreplacelocalofficialsatwill.Noseparationofdifferentaspectsoflocaladministration.4:centralizedbureaucracy.Thelocalgovernmentisdirectlyappointedbyandresponsibletothecentralgovernment.Theseparationofpowersandregulartransferoflocalofficialsarenotinstitutionalizedornotexecuted5:centralizedbureaucracy.Thelocalgovernmentisadministeredbyseparateofficialswhoaredirectlyappointedbyandresponsibletothecentralgovernment.Localofficialscannotappointlower-levelofficialsatwill,andtheyaretransferredatregularintervals*Atotalscoreof1ifnopoliticalauthoritybeyondcommunity(e.g.,autonomousbandsandvillages)