the dual nature of european identity
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European identity, subjective awarness and coherenceTRANSCRIPT
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The dual nature of Europeanidentity: subjective awarenessand coherenceJames A. Caporaso & Min-hyung KimPublished online: 04 Dec 2008.
To cite this article: James A. Caporaso & Min-hyung Kim (2009) The dual nature ofEuropean identity: subjective awareness and coherence, Journal of European PublicPolicy, 16:1, 19-42, DOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155
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The dual nature of European identity:subjective awareness and coherenceJames A. Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim
ABSTRACT We conceptualize European identity as a dual concept (subjectiveawareness and coherence) that contains both perceptual and behavioral components.We provide a set of indicators for European identity and analyze the data to assesschanges in European identity over the last 50 years. Our goal is to offer a conceptualframework and method of assessing identity in an empirically sensitive way. Ourfindings show that EU citizens have multiple identities of which EU identityis part and that there is strong evidence for the development of a coherent EU.We suggest that future research pay attention to a broader range of indicatorsthan examined here.
KEY WORDS Coherence; European identity; European integration; EuropeanUnion; subjective awareness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of identity has played an increasingly central role in the study ofEuropean integration, especially in the last 15 years or so (Weiler 1997;Herrmann et al. 2004; Bruter 2005; Green 2007). There have been numerousefforts to define European identity (Habermas 1992; Cerutti 1992; Wintle1996; Risse 2004; Bruter 2005), resulting in distinctions between personaland social identity (Breakwell 2004: 28–31), civic and cultural identity(Bruter 2005), and patriotism versus nationalism (Li and Brewer 2004: 728).It is not surprising, nor is it necessarily a bad thing, that the concept of Europeanidentity has meant different things to different people.The distinction between civic and cultural identity is an important one.
Bruter (2005) distinguishes a civic component of European identity (referringto the European Union (EU)) from a cultural one (referring to Europe as awhole) and argues that when European citizens explain they feel ‘European’,they have more a civic conception in mind. On the other hand, Wintle et al.(1996) conceptualize European identity in more general cultural terms asbased on a shared historical heritage among Europeans. We accept this distinc-tion and attempt to build on the concept of civic identity in this paper.Also, as befits a concept newly applied to the field of integration, there is dis-
agreement about the usefulness of the concept. Some analysts think that it willplay an increasingly important role in the process of integration (Follesdal and
Journal of European Public PolicyISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2009 Taylor & Francis
http://www.informaworld.com/journalsDOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155
Journal of European Public Policy 16:1 January 2009: 19–42
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Hix 2006; Schmidt 2006). It is plausible that, as the easy phase ofmarket-makingand collective gains is exhausted, and as questions of redistribution becomeprominent, citizens of the EU will be called upon to make sacrifices for thecommon good. The move to redistributive politics, should it occur, wouldrequire widespread trust and recognition of commonalities, if not affection,across 27 states and diverse peoples. Other analysts are more skeptical aboutidentity and perhaps some even see ‘identity talk’ as the misguided efforts ofacademics and Euro-enthusiasts to conjure this concept up before it becomesa reality (Majone 2006; Duchesne and Frognier 1995).In this paper, our goal is a modest yet important one. First, we attempt to
conceptualize identity as a dual concept, distinguishing this term from itsclose relatives such as interests and preferences. Second, we offer a set of indi-cators of identity that contains both perceptual and behavioral components –a subjective and objective side to the integration process. We refer to theformer as subjective awareness and the latter as coherence. Third, we provideevidence for these indicators to assess whether there is change in the develop-ment of Europe’s subjective identity and coherence. Fourth, we assess the evi-dence for subjective identity and coherence and speculate about what itmeans for European integration today and in the near future.
II. BACKGROUND
Before our comments on identity, a few words on the increasing prevalence ofusage of this concept may be helpful. First, as the borders of the EU haveexpanded (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2007) the question of ‘whatis Europe?’ has acquired a sharper edge. Far from being a unified or hom-ogenous entity, Europe is a large, diverse, and complex place. The EuropeanCommission’s map of Europe shows at least 35 European countries, 27 ofwhich are presently in the EU. The EU grouping does not include Turkey,Belarus, Bosnia, Ukraine, Moldova, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, or the microstates of Andorra, San Marino, and the Vatican City. A comprehensive list ofEuropean states would exceed 40. As the EU has expanded, it has taken inmuch of what used to be called Central Europe before the Cold War, EasternEurope, parts of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), three Republics of theformer Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and several Balkancountries (Greece and Bulgaria). In doing so, it has moved its externalborders right up to Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Turkey. The EU hasbecome a sprawling entity with little resemblance to its original Carolingiancore (Ash 1994) comfortably situated in a small corner of north-west Europe.The EU has a presence in places where Catholic and Orthodox Christianitymeet, and where Western Christianity and Islam adjoin one another. Multiplelanguages are spoken in the member countries and different traditions areobserved. As the EU expands, its members are bound to ask, ‘Who are we?’and ‘where does Europe begin and end?’
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Second, identity discussion is more prevalent because people (the people ofthe EU) have a greater stake in what the EU does. The passage of the SingleEuropean Act (SEA) and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) instriking down obstacles to free movement have led to the creation of aunified market. As the free movement provisions of the treaties are realized,individuals are increasingly affected by market and policy externalities, i.e.they increasingly have a stake in the EU.
III. CONCEPTUALIZATION: SUBJECTIVE IDENTITYAND COHERENCE
Our basic argument is that the term identity is most usefully seen as containingtwo separate but closely related components, which we call subjective identityand coherence. At the moment we simply stipulate this twofold definition ofidentity, recognizing that it departs from the standard approach. By subjectiveidentity we refer to shared feelings about the ‘we-group’, shared values, andcommon mental frames. The subjective aspect of identity is often all that ismeant by the term. The second aspect of identity is coherence. Coherencehas to do with how the parts of the group fit together in some orderly ensemble,how the group works together to solve problems and how interdependent itsparts are (Li and Brewer 2004). We address each component in turn.
Identity as subjective awareness
If the most basic question people can ask is ‘Who am I?’, social identity theory(see Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986) provides an answer in terms of thesocial groupings to which individuals are attached and to which they feelsome sense of belonging. Identity involves a conception of self rooted in attach-ments and feelings of belonging to a group. Social identities have two faces; oneturning inward to the individual person, the other outward toward the groupwith which one identifies (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 577). In terms ofbasic orientations, identities can have cognitive, affective, and evaluative com-ponents (Risse 2001). Following Risse (2001: 201), individuals may holdmany different identities which may or may not conflict. Thus, it may behelpful to see identities as parts of a repertoire that can be selectively activatedunder different circumstances.Identities are different from related concepts in a number of ways. First, iden-
tities rest on a more stable core than preferences, which can change rapidlydepending on varying situational factors. As Brubaker and Cooper put it, iden-tity is often invoked to point to ‘something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, orfoundational ’ (italics in original) in contrast to ‘the more superficial, accidental,fleeting, or contingent aspects or attributes of the self ’ (2000: 7). This statementdoes not at all deny the mutable character of identities (see the extended discus-sion by Risse (2001: 201–2). Second, following Brubaker and Cooper, identi-ties are invoked to describe and explain the more non-instrumental modes of
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human interaction, as opposed to changing calculation of costs and benefits(2000: 6). Bruter makes the non-instrumental nature of identities the methodo-logical cornerstone of his attempt to construct an indirect (residual) measure ofidentity (see 2005: appendix 3, pages 195–210).
Identity as coherence
We argue that we can usefully employ a second component of identity that isless subjective and more behavioral or process-oriented. We call this secondcomponent coherence. Taking the individuals, roles, institutions, and processesof the member states of the EU as the starting point, we can ask to what extentthey fit together in a coherent syndrome. To use the language of Karl Deutschet al. (1966) in their study of national and international community formation,we can ask to what degree the separate parts have amalgamated, merged, andformed a distinct new entity at the supranational level. To the extent that amal-gamation takes place, a new entity comes into existence with a problematic iden-tity of its own.1 From this perspective, the question of identity is not exclusivelysubjective nor is the existence of the group taken as given.We are aware that this conceptual move in the direction of a bifocal view of
identity is likely to be controversial. Since we are interested in accumulation ofresearch findings, we would be hesitant to strike out in new directions if we didnot believe that doing so may be productive. Still, the departure requires arationale.Our response comes in two parts. The first has to do with the framing of iden-
tity and how we think about it. The second has to do with the conceptual andtheoretical affinity of the two facets of identity. We argue, regarding the framingissue, that our move is not as radical as some might think, in that identityrequires some ‘external’ aspect. While it may be customary to think of identityas a purely internal concept, a good part of what we know about it comesfrom observations of people’s behavior in their relation to groups. Assertionsabout ties to a group, testimonials about the positive value of one’s group,and demonstrations of loyalty inscribed in efforts on behalf of the collectivity –sometimes quite costly efforts – all allow us to make inferences about groupattachments that are not directly observable. As formulated by social psycholo-gists such as Roger Brown (1965: 421) and Donald Campbell (1988), attitudesand identities are inferences based on dispositions to act in certain ways.We trust we can say this without denying an individual’s internal identityexperience.Second, we argue that there is a solid basis for the position that group coher-
ence and subjective identity are so closely related that it is best to either see themas tightly connected or as part of the same phenomenon. It is theoretically poss-ible to detach these two properties from one another, as in the identities ofpeople in diasporas, but in almost any other conceivable situation, group func-tion and group perception are best seen together. Li and Brewer argue that thereare two different bases for group formation, one having to do with perception of
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shared attributes and the other with regard to perception of common problems,joint or coordinated problem-solving, and the interdependence of parts (Li andBrewer 2004: 729). We hypothesize that the second form of group formation ismore relevant for our purposes, because the diversity of the member statesmakes shared attributes a less likely candidate for group formation, andbecause the activities and civic practices of the EU’s institutions highlight theconnection between group function and group identity.
IV. INDICATORS OF SUBJECTIVE IDENTITYAND COHERENCE
In this section we offer some indicators of our two components of identity. Indi-cators serve as a bridge between conceptual definitions and empirical obser-vations. We sense that there is a great deal of distance between concept andobservation so we attempt to close the gap.
Identity as subjective awareness
The first component of identity is a subjective awareness of individuals that theyare members of a group. There are three indicators that, we hypothesize, tap intosubjective awareness. We call them self-reference, presumption of relevant unit,and common attitudes and values.Before getting to each of these indicators, we would like to add a few words on
the data we use. To measure subjective awareness of European identity, we useEurobarometer survey data. Several scholars, most notably Michael Bruter(2003: 1154; 2005: 101–2), have identified problems with some of the ques-tions in the Eurobarometer survey. One problem lies in the ‘forced choice’nature of some of the questions and response categories whereby individualsare forced to choose among several identities. This imposes a zero-sum structureon the overall pattern of identities whereby one is less European to the extentthat one is more British or French. A second problem arises because of thetime frame imposed by questions such as ‘In the near future, will you see your-self as [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European?’ Questions like thisassume that individuals can correctly predict their future attitudinal states, thusconfusing predictive and attitudinal issues.We do share these concerns about Eurobarometer data. Nevertheless, we
chose to use them to measure the subjective component of European identityfor the following reasons: first, despite some weaknesses, they are the best data-base we have at the moment, in terms of comprehensiveness, accessibility, andcomparability; second, the repetition of some questions at least twice a yearenables the analysis of trends that is critical for time-series analysis (Cautres2007: 130); third, it is worth noting that a number of scholars (to name onlyseveral, Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Green2007) still rely on Eurobarometer surveys to measure European identity. Thisenables us to carry out a conversation with other researchers.
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Self-reference, the ‘we-group’For a group identity to exist, it must think of itself as a group. The process ofcollective self-reflection and collective self-reference is crucial. If there is no col-lective self-reflection, then there is no group identity.This fits in with our understanding of the evolution of European identity as
part of the process of community building. Deutsch emphasized that a crucialpart of the protracted process of integration had to do with the development of a‘we-feeling’.While conceptions of group identification are notoriously difficult to assess,
since 1992 the Eurobarometer has included a question intended to measureEuropean identity: ‘In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality]only, [nationality] and then European, European and then [nationality], orEuropean only?’ Table 1 shows the change of Europeans’ identification withtheir own countries and Europe as a whole between 1992 and 2005.Some findings are worth noting. To begin with, if we look at the bottom two
rows, we see that the percentage of respondents who identify themselves asEuropean first is very low. We can easily see this if we compare the bottomtwo rows with the top two rows. Next, while there was no overall change inEuropean identification between 1992 and 2005, the number of respondentswho put their nationality first and European next exceeded the number ofrespondents who say that they think of themselves only in terms of their nation-ality, except for the period between 1996 and 1999 (in 1998 and in 2001, thepercentage of respondents for these two groups was the same).A couple of inferences can be drawn from this observation. First, despite the
absence of strong evidence for European identity at the non-elite level, the datashow that a majority of respondents do have either a primary or secondaryidentification with Europe. This was the case even when the overall supportfor European integration substantially declined in the 1990s (Citrin andSides 2004: 167). Second, European and national identity go hand in hand –most Europeans think ‘country first, but Europe, too’. Since maintaining aEuropean identity does not hurt people’s feeling about their own countries, itseems that European identity is compatible (as opposed to competitive) withnational identity.
Presumption of the relevant unitClosely related to self-reference is the question of what unit one thinks of when aproblem presents itself. In any multi-level system, a given problem could end upat different levels of government. What we are trying to get at in our word‘presumption’ is the more or less automatic, presumptive tendency to turn tothe EU to solve a broad range of problems previously within the purview ofthe member states.To assess Europeans’ preference for joint problem-solving, the Eurobarom-
eter asked EU citizens the following question: ‘For each of the followingareas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [nationality] govern-ment or made jointly within the European Union?’ Since the number as well as
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Table 1 Europeans’ identification with their own countries and Europe as a whole in percentages
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
[Nationality] only 38 40 33 40 46 45 43 45 38 44 38 40 41 41[Nationality] and European 48 45 46 46 40 40 43 42 49 44 49 47 47 48European and [nationality] 6 7 10 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 7 7 7 7European only 4 4 7 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, and 64.Note: Percentage for ‘don’t know’ is not shown.
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the content of key policy areas included in the survey varies over time, we cat-egorize them into two groups – the EU policy domain and the national policydomain. The EU policy domain refers to the policy areas that the plurality ofcitizens prefer to be decided at the Union level whereas the national policydomain points to the policy areas in which the public is least likely tosupport EU decision-making.Table 2 presents Europeans’ support for the level (joint or national) of
decision-making in the EU policy domain whereas Table 3 illustratesEuropeans’ support for the level of decision-making in the national policydomain since 1992.A few points need to be made. First, support for joint decision-making has
generally decreased in most policy areas of the EU domain (‘currency’ is anexception here). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the number of policiesin the EU domain (i.e. a Union responsibility) has always exceeded that in thenational domain (i.e. a national responsibility) from 1992 to 2006. Second, amajority of Europeans favor joint decision-making in the policy areas thatwere traditionally regarded as the core of national sovereignty. These areasinclude foreign policy,2 currency, immigration, defense, and political asylum.Third, while EU citizens favor the European level decision-making in manypolicy areas, they still want national governments to decide in the areas whereconsideration of local contexts is necessary (e.g. education, health and socialwelfare, cultural policy, broadcasting rules of the media, justice, and police).Indeed, the data show that support for national decision-making in theseareas increased if we compare the starting and end year.In sum, this tension between desired institutional level of decision-making/
problem-solving and the level at which loyalties and identifications are primarilylodged may be important for understanding the EU in the years ahead.
Common attitudes and valueAs much of the literature on social identity theory illustrates, the process offorming a group identity is a process that involves not only an in-group butan out-group. While there is controversy about the extent to which an in-group needs to have an out-group which it can disparage, there is general agree-ment that the existence of an ‘Other’ reinforces group solidarity. There are anumber of candidate out-groups that could be used for comparison. Whencomparing themselves against large swathes of the rest of the globe, WesternEuropeans are likely to frame the comparison in terms of civilizations, to seethemselves as representing ‘Christendom’ and to set themselves apart fromOrthodox Christianity, Hindu civilization, and Islam. If civilization is not thepoint of reference but rather economic and social differences with politicalrivals, then the United States may be used as the other (Ash 2004; Reid 2004).Despite the underlying commonalities between Europe and the US, there is a
growing sense that Europe considers the US to be different on economic, ideo-logical, and political grounds. For instance, while the US is sometimes held upas a model of ‘jungle capitalism’ where there are few protections for workers
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Table 2 Support for community or national decision-making in the EU policy domain
% Community(national) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Science andtechnology
77(17)
71(22)
71(22)
76(18)
71(22)
67(26)
70(24)
66(29)
67(28)
68(27)
68(27)
66(28)
67(28)
69 70
Protectingenvironment
72(24)
66(30)
64(31)
69(27)
69(26)
64(32)
66(31)
59(37)
60(37)
64(33)
61(35)
62(34)
67(29)
66 64
Foreign policy 70(21)
67(24)
68(22)
70(20)
67(23)
68(22)
71(21)
69(22)
69(23)
71(22)
71(20)
72(20)
68(25)
Defense 58(40)
44(51)
50(45)
55(40)
45(49)
50(44)
50(44)
48(46)
47(48)
51(45)
51(45)
50(45)
57(38)
Currency 56(38)
49(44)
51(41)
58(36)
54(39)
54(39)
67(28)
60(35)
57(39)
65(31)
67(29)
63(32)
63(32)
Immigration 58(38)
54(40)
54(40)
58(36)
59(34)
54(40)
58(37)
49(46)
46(49)
49(48)
48(47)
51(45)
58(37)
57 57
Unemployment 49(47)
46(50)
52(44)
62(34)
59(37)
55(41)
57(40)
52(44)
51(45)
53(44)
50(46)
44(53)
47(50)
39 38
Political asylum 58(36)
54(38)
55(38)
59(33)
56(35)
53(58)
55(37)
51(43)
48(46)
51(45)
50(44)
53(41)
58(37)
Regional support 67(26)
62(30)
61(31)
64(29)
60(33)
60(34)
63(32)
59(34)
58(36)
60(35)
57 57
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66.Note: Several areas in the EU policy domain were omitted here owing to space concerns as well as lack of over-time data. These include
information on the EU, the fight against drugs, Third World cooperation, the fight against international terrorism, and agriculture andfishing.
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Table 3 Support for community or national decision-making in the national policy domain
% Community(national) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Justice 38(58)
34(62)
38(58)
35(61)
32(65)
36(60)
Police 33(63)
30(67)
34(63)
30(66)
27(70)
30(66)
Health and socialwelfare
40(56)
31(65)
31(64)
41(54)
39(56)
33(62)
35(61)
34(62)
32(64)
37(59)
36(60)
29(67)
33(63)
29 29
Education 40(55)
32(64)
30(65)
40(56)
37(58)
33(62)
35(60)
34(62)
32(64)
36(61)
34(61)
32(64)
33(62)
29 29
Rules for media 46(46)
40(51)
40(51)
45(46)
37(54)
42(50)
38(55)
34(58)
34(60)
38(56)
36(58)
34(60)
34(59)
Cultural policy 51(42)
38(55)
36(58)
42(50)
34(57)
35(57)
37(56)
39(53)
36(57)
44(49)
44(48)
42(51)
34(60)
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66.Note: Some areas in the national policy domain omitted here are workers’ representation, taxation, pensions, urban crime prevention,
juvenile crime prevention, etc.
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built into the labor market, Europe presents its social model as relentlesslyegalitarian and a unifying force among Europeans. Also, ideological oppositionacross the Atlantic has occurred with regard to the International CriminalCourt, capital punishment, the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, theKyoto Protocol on global warming, and, most recently, the Iraq War. Inaddition, the presumed efforts of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and the realiz-ation of such nuclear ambitions by North Korea evoke different responses fromEurope and the US.To assess Europeans’ perception about the international role of the US and
the EU, the Eurobarometer asked the following question: ‘In your opinion,would you say that the United States (or the European Union3) tends to playa positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor a negative roleregarding. . .?’ Table 4 presents the trends of Europeans’ perception of therole of the US and the EU in five issue areas between 2002 and 2006.First, in all the five issue areas, EU citizens think that the role played by the EU
is muchmore positive than that of the US. Second, the proportion of EU citizenswho feel that the US plays a positive role substantially decreased in the areas ofthe fight against terrorism (from 54 percent in 2002 to 37 percent in 2006) andpeace in the world (from 32 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2006). While therewas no big change in the other three areas (the protection of the environment,the growth of the world economy, and the fight against poverty in the world)between 2003 and 2006, EU citizens’ perception of the positive role of the USin these areas was very negative (e.g. 18 percent, 38 percent and 21 percent,respectively in 2006). Third, EU citizens’ positive perception of the inter-national role played by the EU had increased to a large extent since 2003,except for the area of peace in the world (which was high to start with).In sum, the trend data presented here for subjective awareness are partly con-
tradictory. The data do not provide strong evidence for the existence of
Table 4 EU citizens’ perception of the positive role of the US and the EU in the world
The US (the EU)in %
Fall2002
Spring2003
Fall2003
Fall2004
Spring2005
Fall2005
Fall2006
Peace in the world 32 23 27(60)
22(61)
25(63)
24(63)
23(60)
The protection of theenvironment
16 14 14(46)
17(58)
18(62)
17(61)
18(60)
The fight againstterrorism
54 45 43(54)
39(59)
43(60)
38(61)
37(59)
The growth of theworld economy
38 34 34(40)
35(49)
38(50)
37(49)
38(53)
The fight againstpoverty in the world
20 18 17(36)
18(45)
20(49)
20(49)
21(49)
Source: Eurobarometers 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, and 66.
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity 29
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European identity at the mass public level.4 Despite the fact that the majority ofEU citizens identified themselves not just in terms of their nationality but asEuropeans, the proportion with primarily national identity generally increasedwhile that of European identity did not really change between 1992 and 2005.However, this does not necessarily imply that the deepening process ofEuropean integration since the early 1990s has had a negative impact onEuropeans’ sense of belonging. Above all, Europeans’ taken-for-granted pre-sumptions of the EU as the relevant unit for problem-solving as well as theirincreasingly positive perception about the role of the EU (in contrast withtheir increasingly negative perception about the role of the United States)regarding critical global issues indicate that the EU is developing its ownsense of self. In addition, the fact that EU citizens’ attachment to Europe hassubstantially increased5 since the mid-1990s, despite a remarkable decline ofpublic support for European integration in the same period, may illustratethat the EU is gradually becoming a part of Europeans’ multiple identities.The discussion so far has to do with one (perceptual) component of our con-
ceptualization of European identity, i.e. subjective awareness assessed by sharedfeelings of ‘European’ and common attitudes/values. Now, we turn to the other(behavioral) component of European identity, which is coherence.
Identity as coherence
As mentioned, Karl Deutsch and his collaborators talked about the formation ofpolitical communities as a process of amalgamation and blending of the parts(1966: 26–38). The actual process of amalgamation, i.e. the adoption of dis-tinctive and autonomous institutions, is facilitated by a number of factors,including a compatibility of main values, the weakening of discordant compet-ing values, and the development of a distinctive conception of one’s politicalunit as separate from related political entities of which the new units may havebeen a part. We read Deutsch and his collaborators as saying that the valuesand subjective identity dimensions are closely related to the formation of auton-omous political entities. The formation of these autonomous entities seemssimilar to our basic notion of coherence. But how can coherence be observedand measured? Donald Campbell (1958) held out a research method for asses-sing the degree of coherence, or what he called entitativity, in complex socialaggregates. While we usually take the entities on which we base our analysis asgiven,6 Campbell argued that the degree to which something (an aggregate) con-stitutes an entity should be treated as a testable hypothesis.Campbell proposed common fate and similarity as indicators of the coher-
ence of a complex social aggregate (1958: 17–8).7 These indicators suggest anumber of questions. Concerning common fate, do the components exhibitcovariation whereby the parts prosper and suffer together, or where parts sacri-fice for the good of the whole? Second, are the parts similar in key economic andpolitical aspects, i.e. are they convergent as one expects in an increasingly unifiedarea? What role does diffusion (imitation, interdependence, and competition)
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play in the convergence process? (Botcheva and Martin 2001; Knill 2005;Holzinger 2006).
Common fate, or interdependence of partsOur first measure of common fate is a proxy based on export reliance betweenmember states and others within the region. When countries import and export,they send and receive price movements, share cyclical economic activity, addand subtract jobs from the economy, increase competition among firms, andentangle themselves through financial movements associated with the balanceof payments. Our export figures were obtained by calculating each country’sexports to the other five (or 11) in the EU and dividing by total exports. Aswe follow these shares through time, we can trace the degree of concentrationof trade within the area. We use two membership groupings, based on the orig-inal six membership and the EU of 12.Table 5 shows that it is not universally true that the original six members
of the European Economic Community increased their share of export relianceon one another. Belgium’s share increased from 0.59 in 1950 to a high of 0.71in 1970 but steadily declined to 0.55 in 2000. Italy, the Netherlands andLuxembourg increased their reliance on the original six, if we compare 1950with 2000, but the high-water mark for these three countries was 1970 afterwhich export shares declined. Perhaps surprisingly, France and Germany showa non-dramatic pattern – no huge change either way. The high-water mark is50 percent for France and 40 percent for the Federal Republic of Germany,both again in 1970, just three years before the first oil crisis. Based on theexport data for the Six, there is no clear evidence for the conclusion that the orig-inal six members are moving more closely together.However, there is evidence of growing interdependence within two distinct
sub-groups of the six member states. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-bourg increasingly form one group and Italy, France, and Germany formanother. We can clearly see this if we examine the variation within these sub-groups in the earlier periods and compare with the later periods. In 1950,there was a significant disparity among the members in terms of their exportreliance. By 1980, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had identicalshares of within-EU exports (63 percent) while Italy, France, and Germanycame in at 41 percent, 44 percent, and 39 percent respectively. This patternholds up rather firmly to the year 2000.Table 6 provides additional evidence for the trade patterns among the 12 and
the original six. In contrast to the figures for the original six, export patternsfor the 12 show that all countries except Ireland, Denmark, and Greeceincreased their export reliance on the 12. Of course, we expect the absolutevalues of exports to be larger, because we have added six countries to our defi-nition of the EU. However, it is still valid to look at trends because whateverinflation takes place by adding these six members should take place throughoutthe time period. This table suggests not so much a weakening of the Carolingeancore (Ash 1994), the original six members, as a broadening of it to incorporate
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity 31
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Table 5 The proportion of exports to EU-6 among total exports, 1950–2000
Country 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 0.59 0.50 0.60 0.67 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.61 0.55Netherlands 0.44 0.42 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.56Luxembourg 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.64 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.64Italy 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.34France 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.42 0.36Germany 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.31
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.Note: Owing to some abnormal values of the Gleditsch data, the figures for France 2000 were reproduced by Xun Cao using the IMF
DOT data.
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Table 6 The proportion of exports to EU-12 among total exports, 1950–2000
Country 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Belgium 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.72Netherlands 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.74 0.74Luxembourg 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.78Italy 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.49 0.59 0.55 0.52France 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.59 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.65 0.63 0.60Germany 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.49 0.48United Kingdom 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.54Ireland 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.70 0.76 0.71 0.59Denmark 0.73 0.65 0.57 0.53 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.52 0.51Greece 0.51 0.63 0.43 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.65 0.59 0.40Portugal 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.64 0.75 0.78 0.76Spain 0.46 0.56 0.61 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.72 0.71 0.68
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.
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other members. Within-EU export shares increase for Belgium, the Netherlands,Luxembourg, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Germany’sfigures are exactly the same if we compare the starting and end dates, thoughthey do show a small decline from the high-water mark of 1990 (the year ofGerman reunification), from 0.53 to 0.48. This interpretation (broadeningthe core) seems strongest if we look at the trade patterns of the UnitedKingdom, Portugal, and Spain (three states which are progressively incorpor-ated) and less so if we look at Denmark, Ireland and Greece (three stateswhose export reliance on the EU declines).Ireland’s substantial decline from 0.96 in 1950 to 0.59 in 2000 is not so sur-
prising if we take into account the dramatic growth of the Irish economy overthis time period, the diversification of their trade, and the decrease of theirreliance on their former colonial master, England. Greece’s export reliance onthe EU declined from 0.51 in 1950 to 0.40 in 2000. Since 1990, Greece’sexports have increasingly gone to the countries of Eastern and CentralEurope, particularly Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Albania, not all EUcountries, of course. Indeed, the Eastern and Central European countries nowabsorb about 25 percent of Greece’s exports, compared to 14.5 percent in1955 (Kakridis 2007).8
While international trade is important, it is just one part of the elaboratenetwork of interdependence in Europe. The flow of capital across countries isalso important in that it creates joint production facilities when capital flowstake the form of foreign direct investments. We have analyzed foreign directinvestment among EU countries in comparison to the world but space limit-ations prevent us from presenting this information here.9 Investment datasupport the same basic patterns found in the trade data.In summary, there is evidence from trade and investment data that there is a
strong and growing tendency to direct economic activity toward EU members,in relation to the rest of the world. We believe such growth reflects more thanthe high volume of trade accounted for by the EU. Rather, we think it reflectsincreasingly a preference for intra-regional trade, a preference that is backed bythe elaborate commercial rules and regulatory environment of the EU.
Similarity and convergenceIf an emerging regional system has a coherent identity, it should display simi-larities in certain relevant aspects. When the European Economic Communityformed, there were important differences. The south of Italy, along withIreland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece formed Europe’s semi-periphery. Theywere relatively poor members when they joined, though their economies(except for Greece’s) grew rapidly and the gap was narrowed and sometimesclosed. The arrival of the United Kingdom and Denmark in 1973 broughttwo quite Euro-skeptical members with strong ties to the European FreeTrade Association into the fold. The entry of Austria, Sweden, and Finlandin 1995 added three wealthy social democratic states whose welfare systemswere much more developed than those of other member states. And the
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expansion of the EU to include ten new members from Central and EasternEurope in 2004 added difference and complexity on many different dimensions.Given these differences, we ask to what extent, and in what ways, have the
member states converged or diverged along with the development of the EU.Our working hypothesis is that membership pushes countries more closelytogether. Since we want to capture the changes in similarities and differ-ences over time, it makes sense to look at a measure of dispersion applied tovarious indicators, such as rates of unemployment. Following Holzinger(2006) and Holzinger and Knill (2005) we use changes in the standard devi-ation as our primary measure of convergence. Because of the possible bias intro-duced when comparing standard deviations based on different means, we alsoemploy the coefficient of variability (which is obtained by dividing the standarddeviation by the mean of the distribution). The first indicator is unemploymentrates for the member states from 1980 to 2004. If we look at Table 7 we can seethat the standard deviations rise from 2.78 in 1980 to a high of 5.30 in 1986and then they slowly but systematically decline until in 2004 the dispersionhas dropped to 2.34. With autonomous national economic policies, measuresof unemployment are expected to vary in accordance with national prioritiesregarding inflation and unemployment as well as natural cyclical fluctuationsin the economy. To the extent that economies are insulated, divergences maybe large. To the extent that countries are embedded in the same economic, pol-itical, and cultural networks, these gaps can be expected to narrow. Since passageof the SEA in 1986, there has been a steady convergence in unemployment rates,as measured by a decline in the standard deviations and coefficient of variability.This convergence seems to be robust in light of up and down movements inaverage unemployment rates.Similarly, if we analyze inflation rates in Table 8 we see the same pattern – the
standard deviations reach a high of 6.32 in 1984 and then decline, not dramati-cally at any one point, but the overall pattern is that the dispersion drops withfew small exceptions so that in 2004 it is 0.79 (or 0.42). The only substantialincrease after 1984 occurs in 1990, the year of German reunification. Therun-up to European monetary union narrowed inflation rates even further,since the convergence criteria required individual national rates of inflationnot to exceed by more than 1.5 percent the inflation rates of the three best per-forming members. By 2004, the standard deviation for national rates ofinflation was 0.79.Finally, Table 9 presents data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(constant dollars). Here we find an increase in the standard deviation overtime and almost no change in the coefficient of variability. The standard devi-ation increases from 4.88 in 1982 to 8.91 in 1990 to 12.04 in 2004 (though thismay be a one-time increase). The coefficient of variability ends slightly belowwhere it begins (0.37 in 2004 and 0.39 in 1980)Two of our measures (unemployment and inflation) provide support for our
hypothesis about convergence while the data for changes in GDP per capita donot provide conclusive support one way or the other.
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity 35
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Table 7 Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of unemployment rates for EU-15
Year 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Mean 6.16 7.49 9.52 9.26 8.39 7.19 8.49 10.23 9.75 8.44 6.87 6.49 7.31S.D. 2.78 3.95 4.88 5.30 5.02 4.24 4.40 5.19 4.55 4.13 3.46 2.77 2.34COV 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.32
Source: World Development Indicators.Note: COV ¼ the coefficient of variability which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.
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Table 8 Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of inflation rates for EU-15
Year 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Mean 11.35 10.85 8.22 4.83 4.30 6.33 4.75 3.26 2.47 1.64 2.57 2.58 1.89S.D. 5.48 4.90 6.32 5.98 3.50 5.13 3.63 2.37 1.71 0.95 1.04 1.09 0.79COV 0.48 0.45 0.77 1.24 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.73 0.69 0.58 0.40 0.42 0.42
Source: World Economic Outlook.
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Table 9 Means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variability of GDP per capita for EU-15, in 2,000 constant dollars(in thousands)
Year 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Mean 21.79 14.51 12.40 16.29 21.10 24.45 24.73 22.71 26.99 26.99 23.22 24.05 32.66S.D. 8.52 4.88 4.46 6.16 7.86 8.91 8.60 9.04 10.10 9.13 8.49 8.62 12.04COV 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.37
Source: World Economic Outlook.
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V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Identity is a complex concept. The method we propose involves a dualconceptualization of identity which includes subjective awareness and beha-vioral coherence. The former implies consciousness of a ‘we’ and provides ananswer to the question ‘who are we?’ in terms of attributes that distinguishthe group from those outside. The latter component (coherence) attempts tocome to grips with the extent to which the ‘we’ fits into a coherent syndrome.What did we find? Summarizing radically, we find that multiple identities
exist among the people of the EU member states, including identificationwith the EU. When questions are of a ‘forced choice’ nature (forcing respon-dents to pick one or the other level of identification), national identificationstrump EU identities. However, respondents are able to distinguish feelings ofidentification and attachment from the level of decision-making they deemmost optimal. There are surprisingly high levels of support for Communitydecision-making, far in excess of what one would predict from levels of identity.We expect this gap – between identity with the EU and belief that the EU is theright level to make many policies – to be a source of tension and hence changein the years ahead.The evidence for the emergence and development of a coherent EU is sub-
stantial. Intra-EU trade and investment levels are quite high, and for themost part growing, though there are exceptions. The fact that levels of intra-EU trade and investment are growing faster than trade and investment toother destinations suggests a specialized process of European integration thatis not a simple regional spin-off of globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001).We find that the gradual yet punctuated enlargement of the EU has not ledto a weakening of economic integration but to a more encompassing scope ofintegration, often realigning economic patterns but in such a way as to keepmost economic activity within the region. This is more than an accounting arti-fact of expanding membership.Further, there is strong evidence for growing convergence of EU economies
with respect to national rates of inflation and unemployment. This convergenceis no doubt fueled by the passage of the SEA in 1986 and the move to monetaryunion during the 1990s. While we have not systematically explored the mech-anisms of convergence, the progressive decrease of differences among countriesis possibly due to intensified competition and the regulatory harmonization,institutional arbitrage, and adoption of best practices that such competitionbegets.We recognize that what we have attempted here is only a beginning. In terms
of the subjective awareness side of the research agenda, recent rejections of theproposed constitution suggest closer attention to the differences between eliteand mass attitudes toward the EU. Second, future research should pay attentionto a much broader range of indicators than examined here. One could researchthe development of a single EU legal personality, the growth of a public sphere,the extent to which the EU speaks with one voice (as in commercial affairs), the
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity 39
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fashioning of a distinctive mission in world politics, perhaps centered aroundthe projection of soft power in support of European ideals, and the constructionand enactment of external borders, i.e. the outer borders of the EU as distinctfrom any of its members (Andreas 2003). Our limited effort suggests that theEU is increasing its performative powers and that its performance has had aneffect on the attitudes and behavior of its member states and peoples, if noton European identity.
Biographical note: James A. Caporaso is a Professor in the Department ofPolitical Science at the University of Washington, USA. Min-hyung Kim is aVisiting Assistant Professor in Political Science at Hobart and William SmithColleges, Geneva, New York, USA.
Addresses for correspondence: James A. Caporaso, Department of PoliticalScience, Box 353530, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195, USA.email: [email protected]/Min-hyung Kim, Department of PoliticalScience, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, 14456, USA.email: [email protected]
NOTES
1 Note that if a pluralistic community comes into being, with the separate parts main-taining autonomy and distinctiveness, the issue of identity does not arise.
2 The Transatlantic Trends in 2005 reports that a majority of Europeans (60 percent ofEU-9), including 62 percent of French and 64 percent of German citizens, support asingle EU seat on the United Nations Security Council even if it would replace theseats currently held by France and the UK. Only the majority of British respondents(55 percent) opposed.
3 The question on the EU was added in 2003 for the first time and asked since then.4 A different approach to the problem of measuring identity is taken by Michael Bruter
in his book Citizens of Europe ? (2005). Bruter attempts to construct a measure ofidentity by a sophisticated process of ‘cleaning’ (removing) the effects of several vari-ables on an index of support for the EU, in effect leaving (as residual) the effect due toidentity. For a thorough description of this approach, see appendix 3 of his book,pages 195–210.
5 We do not present our data on the ‘degree of attachment of people to their city, theirregion, their country, and Europe’ here for space reasons, but are happy to providethem if requested by interested readers.
6 The ‘working ontology’ of most social science research starts with entities (states,organizations, institutions), and then goes on to explore variables and their relationsattached to these entities. The entities themselves do not enter the theoretical discus-sion. There are important exceptions, such as the work of Charles Ragin’s case-oriented analysis, but they are a distinct minority.
7 Campbell also proposed proximity as an indicator. We think proximity is at best aproxy for diffusion processes which should result in greater similarity and conver-gence of countries in the region over time.
8 Denmark’s declining reliance on its EU partners remains a puzzle to us.9 If readers are interested in these data, they are welcome to write to the authors who
will be happy to provide a more complete version of the paper.
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