the economyof the poor (newer)

8/14/2019 The Economyof the Poor (Newer)

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Abstract The paper focuses, by “good paradigms”/ not “practices”- on a“new” poor areas development concept, by a win-win-winmethodology [well known as “Papakonstantinidis Model”]. Ithighlights both: (a) the globalization and the local developmentmethodology contradiction in terms of “diversification rate” fromthe global economy practices and (b) the contradiction between

focus (DC) and focus necessity (L DC) in the world market:Globalization is a phenomenon, mainly based on bargainingbehavior rules and the individual winning strategies. From the otherhand, Local Development may be concerned as a human/ politicalintervention and will in the bargain: It is suggested to be measuredas the diversification rate from pure bargaining/and/or/ GlobalizationRules. It concerns the 4/5 of the world population, named the“society of the poor” From this point of view, the paper focuseson the “Local Development” term, as a discrete entity in a globaleconomy, or a dichotomy in the globalization (bargaining) process:

Local Development is more than economic term/ Globalizationmethodology : based on social capital building, includes socialcohesion, local skills, the sensitization process, etc instead of individual winning strategies, in the bargain It’s more than a win-win-winapproach, taking into account social capital & cohesionthan pure economic/ market Rules. Key-words: Local Development, Discrete Entity, Bargaining Problem (shares vs utilities) L.D methodological tools vs globalization social capital, social cohesion, win-win-winapproaches.

Professor Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis, Director of School of Management &Economics/ (2007-2011) Local Government Dept Head (2001-2007) . [email protected] /[email protected] detached in the Administrative Board of the Highest TechnologicalUniv Local Development Ph.D Regional Development M. Sc, Rural Development, M. A

Local Development:

The Economy of the Poor

& the win-win-win modelProfessor Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis (Ph. D)

ex S. D. O Director

School of Management & Economics The Highest Technological Educational Institute

Ionian Isles- GR.I.S.A: Barcelona Forum / 2008

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mailto:[email protected]






credits (U. C. Galway / IRL), Economist, Mathematician, Lawyer Member of the E.UCommission task force for the Leader E. U Initiative CEEP General Reporter /member of theE.U Commission (DG X) “Green Team”, Head of the ATEBANK’s “Local DevelopmentOffice” (1991-2001). 21 books & published, 3 contributions in “part of book” published,77 papers/ 117 presentations in W/Euro Congresses

1. Introduction

Economic Theories and Models concern a few people, allover the world. But the majority–over the 80% of worldpopulation- live in poor conditions (near/ or/under survivalline): These models and theories have a negligibleinfluence to those people, despite the UN organizationsefforts and world humanitarian aid. Economy itself israther a discipline, than a welfare expectation for thosepeople (more than 5 billion). For those people local

development methodological approach -so called “theeconomy of poor” – is the most appropriate tooltowards improving those people’s living standardsconditions The paper highlights the differentmethodological approaches between “globalizationrules” and the “local development” process, interms of “diversification Rate (R*) fromGlobalization Rules. Different characteristics betweenG-R and L-D Methodology are given, in points below:

Table 1G-R and L-D Methodology main characteristics

GLOBALIZATION LOCAL DEVELOPMENTMultinational enterprise-vertical structure (focus)

Local SME s, (handcrafts, smallindustries)horizontal structure

(focus necessity)Field of action: World Market

space, based on individualwinning strategies

Field of action: Local Areas,rural communities, mountain

and isolated areas, LD areas inurban centers

Cost/Benefit Analysis Social Cohesion, SocialConfidence, Social Trust ,

Social CapitalObjective/ priorities:capital accumulation

Objective/priorities:Creating new jobs in these

areas, social cohesionMETHODOLOGY: Marginal

Productivity of Capital (M. P. C)METHODOLOGY: sensitizing

local peopleThe win-win-win (L-P

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Model)Mass production Production Diversification

Urbanization due to market –led-process, based on

individual strategies / win-winapproach (Nash)

Sustainable Communities asDiversification Rate (R*) by a

win-win-win approach / FLAGTHEME

Bargaining analysis /and /or/ “Bargaining Problem” –strictly defined since 1950 by John Forbs Nash (The NonCooperative Games Theory) should be the FIELD on whichpaper’s concept concerned sustainable communities , asa political intervention and will must be based.Bargain is the core of the Globalization phenomenon, as itincludes the instant interactive behavior, toward creating

individual winning strategies, so to prevail each-other:Socioeconomic behavior is simulated by the physics Rules:

The rules that “energy density” defines a discreteentity, the substance, are the same that a bargain (as aninteractive –energy-game) defines who concentratespower / or succeeds a capital accumulation, thus derivinga discrete entity and who doesn’t, thus remaining in thebargain margin (Papakonstantinidis, 2008). The bargainingproblem may be the frame for us to show & prove the

contradiction between Globalization Rules and LocalDevelopment Methodology, in terms of individualstrategies and behavior in the bargain It is also a goodparadigm to prove that over the 80% of the worldpopulation should must adopt the Local DevelopmentRules and methodological tools, instead of thoseglobalization methodological tools, concerned a few onlypeople who have got a west type living standards. Inthe opposite, globalization rules represent the capital

accumulation operation, during the industrial, as well thepost-industrial age of civilization: “Local Development”may be concerned as a discrete unit of the global“economy” In this frame, communities sustainability allover the world is mainly depended on their people’sabilities to organize alone their own physical, labor andenvironmental resources on the base of LocalDevelopment operation. This includes social cohesion,local skills, the sensitization process, socialization,networking etc instead of profit and individual winningstrategies which are the “tools” of globalization process,

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but how? In real terms, it seems rather utopia: Know how,financial resources, educational, food and medical carebelong to those multinational companies which forms thebase of the Globalization Building The world economic

system is built to “guest” only the 5%-10% of the worldpopulation. In the opposite, a percentage about 90-95% of the world population has to looking for a new “economicbuilding/ and /or system” and try to live in it, bytransforming it into a new human condition status.

2. The aim The aim of this paper is to prove that:

• Local Development –the economy of the poor-

may be concerned as a unique diversification

(R*) from the globalization rules

• The discrete entity’s “diversification rate” from

globalization/ or bargaining rules, may be the

crucial parameter which would define “Local

Development” as a social cohesion result at local

level.

A

B

R*

win – win - win

Conflict

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Papakonstantinidis (08)

R*: diversification Rate

• Local Development is concerned as the limit-end

of a unique and continuous sensitized

development process , applied in a discrete

spatial entity

• Local Development is achieved via GOOD CASES

rather than “good practices”, due to the unique

identity each region has, as well as its people’s

own communication code, ethics, mentality,

customs.

• A win-win-win approach may be the appropriate

methodological tool toward introducing

“sensitization” in the development process. It may

strengthen social cohesion process by improving

its confidential indicators (so to trust each-other in

interrelations process).

2. Methodology followed

In order to meet with paper requirements it is

indispensable that the appropriate methodology be

adopted:

• It is necessary to strictly define the “Bargaining

Problem” (as the base of Globalization “rules”) by

its mathematical & philosophical validation and try

to define the “local development process” in terms

of diversification (R*) from Globalization Rules

• Next sep: A theoretical foundation is provided by

recent literature (in points) , connecting “Local

Development” with Social Capital/ Social Cohesion,

as well as with “The Bargaining Problem”- Games

Theory & the Modern Innovation Theory (M. I. T)

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• According to the afore-mentioned theoretical

background, next step is to create links between the

“local development process” (as a continuous

sensitization process) and the bargain in terms of diversification rate from G. R

• Finally, the Community is included in the model as

the third or invisible part of each bargain between

two persons, based on instant reflection, so each part

wins ( the win-win-win model)

3. The Bargaining problemA two-person bargaining situation involves two individualswho have the opportunity, either to be competitors toeach-other (win-lose)[von Neumann-Morgenstern,1928/1947zero sum two players game” Theory] or tomake coalitions, or even to create pure individualstrategies, based on bargainers’ instant reflectionbehavior (win-win)[ Nash, 1950

J. F. Nash focused on payoff shares/utilities combination:

Bargain may result either in agreement or disagreement.Utility expresses the constraint or the “fear factor” of disagreement for the negotiator who desires negotiationsto be led in agreement more than the other one. Whoneeds more, negotiation leading to an agreement expectsmore utility, but –probably there is a loss in terms of “shares”, due to lack of risk. On the contrary, who isindifferent about “agreement” or expects less utility /perunit, has- to win in “shares” under the dogma “the more

risk, the more profit”

It is necessary to analyze the Nash “non-cooperative-instant reflection game” /or a “win-win perception” asfollow:

Non-co-operative game, is a game between TWO (2)players/ individuals who have opposite interests

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Each player makes his own choices, based on instantreflections’ rational movements and his physicalcleverness

The game/ bargain is defined by the result (pay-off) andnot by players expectations- It presupposes best choicesby both players towards meeting individual interests[“winning strategies”]

Players/ or negotiators do not regret, a posteriori,from their own decision taken, based on personal choices,during the bargain. Each of the players knows a priori thatthe other negotiator (or player) is as clever as he is.

During the game/ bargain, a mutual respect betweenthe TWO bargainers to each other’s best choices’ isnecessaryIt is recognized that “The more DETERMINED to break down the negotiation (= less utility), the moresatisfied (=better shares) – the more risk, the moreprofit

Social behavior is not recognized as an acceptableone in the bargain, thus deriving unfair results: Thatmeans, “who needs the agreement as the result of a bargain, has to loose in shares, by accepting anyresult”.

Information may be the “link” between knowledgecreation and the bargaining process. In particular,“Information” is a power factor in pure individualswinning strategies.

The more information, the better winning strategy, themore profit. Each of the players / negotiators, startingnegotiations with the other, expects to gain the maximumprofit.

Interaction, based on instant reflection individual winningstrategies, is the base of the Nash Non CooperativeGames Theory A two (2) 2–person anticipation isbased on utilities.

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According to Nash Theory, a unique solution exists thatmaximises the product of the participants’ utilities. Thereis, therefore an interaction between “utilities” and

“strategies” In particular, “utility” expresses individualchoices based on individual necessities “Strategies”express choices + will in personal level, taking intoaccount the interaction factor (the other’s choices) Utilityis the subjective and strategy is the objective factorof the same anticipation.

Negotiation may lead either to “agreement” ordisagreement Utility expresses the “fear factor”

constraint of disagreement for those who desire theagreement, more than the other negotiators.

In conclusion, at any moment –according to the “N. C. GTheory”- there is only one “equilibrium point” at whichany individual–at any moment- makes the best choices forhimself, in relation with the other persons’ best choices.

3-1The bargaining problem Utility Theory (math)

Bargaining Problem is mainly based on “Utility Theory”- amathematical theory of the Neo-classical School of

Thought, able to satisfactory explain individualexpectations/ anticipations, of a possible outcome. Usuallyit is expressed in the form of a mathematical function,f(u) = u 1/2

Figure 1

Utility function f (u)

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[or, f’ (u) (A +B) = 0+k ,where, k is a stable parameter, explaining theexclusive personal preferences or priorities : that means, that either “A” or “B”meet exactly, on that point (F’(u) =0 , their unique personal preferences orpriorities, without influences by other people’ utilities who have to meet theirown needs.

From this point of view:

f’ (u) (A +B) = 0+k , f’ (u) (A +B) = k ,

d U(A) / d U(B)= f ΄(u) =( u1/2

)’ = k ( u 1/2-1)= k ½ u -1/2) = k f ΄(u) = k . ½ u -1/2]

Individual winning strategies are corresponding 1-1 toutilities U (A) and U (B)Utility theory of the individual is mainly based on the“concept of anticipation”.In the “Two-person utility Theory” there are two (2)individuals in a bargain who have the opportunity tocollaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. In its

simple/initial version, no action, taken by one of the twoindividuals without the consent of the other can affect thewell-being of the other one, but in real terms there is onlyONE decision, taken by the involved in a bargainindividuals.

If A & B represent two individual alternative anticipationsand small letters (a & b) represent real numbers, then theutility function will satisfy the following properties:u(A)>u(B) is equivalent to “A is more desirable than B”, if 0<p<1, then u [p A+(1-p)B= p u A+(1-p)u B If u1 , u2 are

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utility functions for two individuals and c (S) representsthe solution point in a set “S’ and pi are payoff functions for each player i, and (&) are strategies, thenfor every player, Pi(&)= max [pi(&), ri.. (ri= each

player’s desirable outcome)

Lim Pi(&)Qi(&)=max PiQi (1)ià∞

Ua =x , Ub = (100-x)k , k= is the keyfactor (2) f’ = [x (100-x)k ]’= 0 so that Ua +Ub=max

Especially,

• Utility in the bargain is a personal matter: Utility“units” are not compared.

• Utility “units” express “fear units of adisagreement outcome”

• If “A” needs more the “agreement” to be achieved,than the payoff coming from the bargain, then heshould be ready to accept any result of agreement,even if it is not favorable for him (loss of shares)

• If “A” has decided not to accept an agreement

during the bargaining process, then he risks more but–at the same time- has to win more from theagreement, in terms of shares.

• The “utility range” expresses the optimist and/or thepessimist instant reflection of each party.

3-2 Relation between Utility and Strategy

“Utility” expresses individual choices based on individual

necessities and will. It is rather a subjective thanobjective factor, influencing individual behavior. On theother hand, “individual strategies” in the bargain –theobjective factor- are defined by personal choices and“will”, resulting from the necessity to meet personal“needs”. From this point of view, “Utility”, as a subjectivefactor is expressed by “strategy” – an individual winningstrategy- in the bargain, so as to meet “Utility”. There are“links” between “Utility” and “Strategy”: “Utility” is the

ability to meet “needs” and “Strategy” is the plan – theindividual plan- to achieve this ability, step by step:

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“Strategy” presupposes “Utility” , but this is a one-wayrelation: “Utility” does not presuppose “Strategy” (by itscommon sense). In the same way, there are “links”between “Utility” and “Strategy” , in their mathematical

approaches: It’s rather easy to suppose two separate“factors” (the subjective “Utility” and the objective“Strategy”) , expressing each- other)

Pi x Qi→ Ua + Ub = maxPi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua+Ub+Uc=

max[(&) : set of individual good strategies]

3-3 A utility/shares combination’s example“Utility” is the subjective factor and the “Individual

Winning Strategy” is the objective factor of the same“thing”: Bargainers have needs (=utilities). In order tosatisfy these “needs”, they use “individual winningstrategies”, as the result of their “instant reflections” inthe Bargain. (table 1)

Lim U1i(&)U2i(&)=max U1iU2i (1)ià∞

3-4 Nash’ win-win random sharing/utilities- AnexampleTable (1) expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction

between two negotiators & (2) expresses the utilityfunction- as a shares/utility combination The bargainingproblem decision making during negotiations of A & B(Table 1):

Table 1BARGAIN

Random Sharing between “A” and “B”

ShareΑ

(%)

ShareΒ

(%)

UtilityA

UtilityB

UtilityAXB

100 0 0 71 090 10 1 70 7080 20 5 68 34070 30 10 64 96060 40 16 60 960

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50 50 23 52 11964 5 55 40 31 1 240

( max )30 70 45 24 1080

20 80 50 12 60010 90 61 4 2440 100 80 0 0

J.F. Nash highlighted the “payoffs” of the bargain,out of “personal expectations”

3-4-1 Solving the Utility function, in the bargain

Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are in a fineratio with the players’ (bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear

function: corresponds 1-1 to bargainers’ Utility Function),under the dogma “the more decisive to break the contractdown, the more satisfied from the bargain leading to thecontract”.

That is true: Bargainers expectations are 1-1 to expectedUtilities for each of them, coming from the bargain.

On the other hand, the more information, the moreuncertainty, leading human mind out of natural/ biological

rules. Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation. Peopleare competitive rather, than co-operative: Winningstrategies are led by bargaining rules (rules of purecompetition). Nash has described the “bargainingproblem” not by expectations, but, directly, by the results(pay-off) of the bargain.In mathematical form:

Pi x Qi→ Ua + Ub = max

If Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k

Then

Ua+Ub=max → [ x(100-x)k]΄ = 0 Then

x’ (100-x) + x [ (100-x)k]’ = 0then

1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0then

xk (100-x)k-1

= - 1(100-x)k

then

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(bargainer in a negotiation) should tryfor the best for himself –thusrecognizing that the other person maybe as clever as I am?

PART IILOCAL DEVELOPMENT AS DIVERSIFICATION /

DECLINATION RATE (R*) FROM G-R4. Recent literature – points

• Kenneth Wilkinson (1970) : Focus on the

endogenous local development process

• Friedman / Weaver – UCLA (1978) “Territory and

Function”: “The base of an autonomous localdevelopment may be a discrete value system, an

ideology, local people’s reaction to the dominant

local principles (including local communication code,

customs, culture), creating thus the “social cohesion

environment” at local level.

• Coleman (1988) “Social Capital describes the

cooperation processes of individuals, which minimizepossible dilemma, coming from individuals’,

networks and common actions.

• Putnam (2000) describes social capital as the basis

of social schemes creation (i. e networks)

• In conclusion, an increasing number of recent

literature in the local development field, currently

recognizes the existence of links among localdevelopment process, social capital & social trust

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• “ The Political Entity” (Freedman-Weaver,

UCLA, 1978, the “Selected Closed-Spatial

Discrete Entity” of the Intra-Scientific Vienna

Centre (Stohr & Todtling 1980), The “S.H.I.E.L.DModel, Papakonstantinidis, 1997, Rome) The

“Tre Italy” Model, Bagnasco, 1987, The

“parallel system” and “The sensitized

Community” (Papakonstantinidis, 1998 &

2002), The “political Democracy (LSE,

Fotopoulos, 1998), the “Grass Roots” Model in

Latin America (Luis Llambi, 2003).

SUGGESTION: WIN-WIN-WIN

5. What the suggested win –win- win isAccording to the afore-mentioned analysis papercontribution in the scientific thought, (a) is in alignmentwith the recent literature and (b) should besummarized in introducing “the third WIN” for theCOMMUNITY – “C” factor, (as the sum of our civilizationplus VALUES plus positive energy) According to mysuggestion, COMMUNITY –the “C” factor must

participate in any bargain by its “bargainers’characteristics” (shares/utilities), thus adding theTHIRD “WIN” at any two bargainers’ win-win expectationbetween TWO (the METRON analysis or the THREE POLESanalysis like in other fields i.e philosophy, economy,creating an interactional flow (triad, Plotinos, MARX,political intermediate space, intermediate civil class etc).By introducing the THIRD POLE in the bargain, then thecrucial bargainers’ QUESTION must be changed in:

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Each of these processes of “knowledgeconversion” corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information (as a form of human energy)(Papakonstantinidis L. A, 2003), i. e :

• Social Information-Sensitization

• External Information- Participation

• Internal Information-Involvement

• Combined Information-Networking

5-3The suggested win-win-win approach

According to the above analysis, paper contributionin the scientific thought (2007) should besummarized in introducing “the third WIN” or thethird “person” in a two-party bargain, i.e the “C”“invisible part, which should be the “ Communityinterest” = “C” , thus taking part as “community”be present in every two-party bargain, claiming itsown “share” from this

Suppose that:

• Ua = Pi, Ub = Ri , Uc = Qi , ....in amathematical approach (tables 1, 2):

• Ua = x , Ub = (100-x)k and f’ = [ x (100-x)k ]΄ = 0 , so that Ua + Ub = max On theother hand, final equation, coming from themathematical model development has theform of

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua +Ub + Uc

i→∞

or, how to transform a “competition” into anabsolute cooperation, taking into account theintegrated information, coming from knowledgetransfer AND the sensitization process in thecommunity, thus maximizing bargainers

utilities and the Community utility (U c)

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5.4 Suggesting “win-win-win” Sharing Vs NashSharing

The “Sharing problem” in a Bargain (Shares/ Utilitiescombination, in what point it is locked = the AGREEMENTPOINT) must be analyzing as follow:Having defined:• How information resulting from “knowledge creation

and knowledge transfer” should contribute to whatwe call “social market”

• How and why “sensitization” should be introducedto “given” information, so as to turn it to an

“integrated information”.• How “integrated information” should influence

human behaviour during the bargain, or negotiations

• How a human “social” behaviour could lead to a“new” perception of “thinking” or taking a decision,in the bargain

• How “socialization” could influence human choices or“winning strategies” during the bargain, in theframework of “instant reflection (Nash)

• How scientific thought could transfer the problemfrom “utilities” (personal perception”) to pay-offs(objective perception = counting size)

Bargain is been approached by its RESULT (PAYOFFS) Table 1 concerns TWO (2) bargainers. In Table 2, theCommunity- the “C” factor (as the accepted VALUECOMMUNITY SYSTEM) is included

TABLE 3 (Papakonstantinidis Proposal)Suggesting Sharing between “A , “B” and “C”

ShareA

(%)

ShareB

(%)

Utility A

UtilityB

Utility

AXB

Share C(%)

Utility C

UtilityAXBXC

90 4 1 71 71 6 1 71

80 13 2 70 140 7 2 28070 22 5 68 340 8 3 1020

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60 31 10 64 640 9 4 256050 40 16 60 960 10 5 4800

max41 50 23 52 1196 9 4 4784

32 60 31 40 1240 8 3 372023 70 40 24 960 7 2 192014 80 50 12 600 6 1 600

Note :• “C” is the Community , as the “third” invisible part

in the bargain- In real terms, it reflects the“confidence indicators”, in other words, if and atwhich level each member of the Community trusts

the other.• “C” as the “new” [ the third, or invisible] bargainer

in the bargain between two persons claims its ownshare cutting it from A+B’ s shares

• The suggested sharing –according to the win-win-winmodel- derives a new equilibrium point different fromthat of Table 1

Solving the Utility function, in the bargain: 3-part

bargain suggestion (Papakonstantinidis model)Let us define utilities (in math form) :Ua = xUc = lx, when l = is a factor of the “x” proportionUb = (100-x-lx)k

It is obvious –according to example 1- that:

Ua + Ub + Uc = max →x [ (100-x-lx) k ]’ = 0

then

x’ (100-x-lx)k + x [(100-x-lx)k]’ = 0then

1(100-x-lx)k + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0then

xk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)]

if (100-x-lx) # 0, thenxk = -[ (100-x-lx)]

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thenxk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100)

[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]x(k+1+l) = 100

and finally

If k=0 , l = 0, then each of a, b, c “bargainers” may winthe 100% of “bargaining result” (output)

If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% andthe bargainer “b” nothing at all

If k=1, l=1 then each of the a, b and c “bargainers” maywin the 33.33 % (equal portions) : This is the best point-

fair shari

If k>1, l>1 then “a” and “b” may win a percentage>33.33%, but there is a “portion” for the Community- “C”(as the third-or “invisible” part of the “bargain between

TWO”)

In any case, introducing the Community “C” , as thethird or “invisible” part in any bargain betweenTWO (2), there is the possibility of reforming the

world competitive perception:

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc =Ua+Ub+Uc

i→∞

or, how to transform a “pure competition” into theabsolute cooperation, taking into account the integratedinformation, coming from knowledge transfer AND thesensitization process in the community, thusmaximizing the bargainers’ utilities(Ua, Ub) and the

Community’s utility (Uc)

22

X = 100 /k+1+l



The resulted –from the above analysis- conclusions are inalignment with Prof. G. Swensen (Denmark) “SocialConfidence Indicators” according to which, a “FlagTheme” process may be built as follows (Flow Chart ,

below) :

FLOW CHART

Flag theme

PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS, 2007

“Flag Theme” may be concerned as an

innovative idea- an open discussion theme based onthe sensitisation process at local level which concentrateslocal resources, skills, abilities, talents, leader skills as well

as priorities and properties at local level, which is inalignment with the Rules from the Natural World: themore energy density or concentration in a point, the moreidentity, in the same point of the space.Socio-economic life & behavior follows this fundamentalRule from the Field of Physics: Capital accumulation (in aperson) is in alignment with the energy density (in apoint). Both of them, thus should be defined, not only as“discrete entities” (identities) but also as poles of power

concentration around them (energy density in the first andcapital density, in the other case, thus succeeding to

23

LocalAbiliti

Leaderskills

LocalPrioriti

Fla

ActiveParticipation Rolesin

Creatinga l-pteam

Jointingtheendogenous forces

Converging individual strategies“ ”



survive. In the case of the Community- the “C” factor-Social Trust or Social Confidence must be the key-world, thus creating Social Cohesion , facilitating /motivating the FLAG THEME process locally,

leading -in its limit-end- to the Local Development(L-D) goal.

CONCLUSIONS/ PROPOSALS

1. Social Cohesion –necessary for the L-D process- maybe , at the same time, the cause and the result of building the Social Capital at Local Level

2. Building the Social Capital at Local Level, may be

proved to be equivalent to “Social Confidence”Building at Local Level3. By building Social Confidence among local people,

then, Community [ the “C” factor” ] “participates” asthe THIRD or invisible part in any two-personnegotiations

4. By introducing the “C” factor in any 2-personnegotiation, then what should be result, couldimprove individual strategies and /or behavior in the

bargain, from a pure “conflict” to round the cornersof this conflict, then transforming competitors to“instant alliances” (including the Community profit:This is the paper’s contribution)

5. By including the “C” factor in any negotiationbetween two competitors who have oppositeinterests, then, a “new” bargaining behavior is beenaccepted (including winning individual strategies):thus, the negotiation result is transferred from the

win-loose perception to “shares” perception(the Community’s share included) instead of pure individual shares

6. Local Development is mainly based on this “new”perception

7. Based on this “perception” (round the conflictcorners-the Community within) it’s easy for localpeople to find a “FLAG THEM” for their L-D process:

8. That is a win-win-winMethodology/Papakonstantinidis Model-2002, VisbyUniversity, Cotland Isle Sw)

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9. According to win-win-win methodology, L-D process,or the “poor economy process” in terms of diversification rate (R*) from Globalization’s Rulesmay be justified, thus “creating” a new

organizational DISCRETE SPATIAL ENTITY, i. ethe “COMMUNITY”10. As it concerns the integrated information it should

be defined as information, plus sensitization Themore simple Information, the more uncertainty(negative entropy- the Information Age)

11. The two-poles system leads human relations todead-end and thus must be replaced by a 3-dimension integrated system -triangle form ( 3-

bargaining, religions, Plotinos, Platonas, the mid-classin urban space, the mid-political space / the value of the intermediate position in our 2-poles , Aristotle’srational conception

12. By Introducing a 3-poles bargaining system“bargaining perception” may be improved thusinfluencing social behavior towards rounding thecorners of a possible conflict, according toglobalization competitive individual winning

strategies- are in alignment with the Greek’sPhilosophy “METRON”

(the METRON analysis or the THREE POLESanalysis like in other fields i.e philosophy, economy,creating an interactional flow (triad, Plotinos, MARX,political intermediate space, intermediate civil classetc).

Each of the THREE parts (A, B, & C) in any bargain, may

ask itself THREE questions, thus maximizing its own profit(not only economic, but also, social, cultural,environmental etc

What should be the best for me, taking into accountthat the other person (bargainer in a negotiation)

should try for the best for himself –thus recognizingthat the other person as clever as I, AND taking

into account [at the same time] that “Community”

as the third or invisible part of negotiationsbetween TWO, also participates and also tries

25



under the same conditions [ “Community” as cleveras the two bargainers] so bargainers AND

Community to be winners (or win-win-win) ?

Papakonstantinidis (08)R*: diversification Rate

Two Greek win-win-win & (1 not good)cases

(1) Wet land area Amvrakikos Gulf (North West

Greece) may be an excellent paradigm of a win-win-winRural Tourism local development: Since 1992, AmvrakikosGulf -with a wonderful landscape including both a wet-landand α mountain area- had a limited tourist activity, due toits isolation, as it is far away from the metropolitancenters(over 600 km from Athens) . Fishing was the mainlocal population employment. Age average was 65+ asyoung people leaved their place, looking for a betterincome as well better living conditions in the nearest

urban centers. In 1992 –a year after L. E. A. D. E. R,European Union Initiative (Program) application in Greece-

A

B

R*

win – win - win

Conflict

26



included this in its BUSINESS PLAN. Ten (10) years later,the resulted situation has been far away from that startingpoint: Young people came back to their place. Income/capita increased twelve (12) times over the 1990’s

income. About a hundred thousand (100.000) visitors stayin Plastira Area per year(c) In the opposite, a wonderful mountain area in S-WPeloponnesus (by the same characteristics as the above),having assuring a double financial aid from E. U Funds, fora period 3-times over , has not succeeded to turn over itssituation, due to selfish, pure individual winningstrategies, without “spirit of cooperation” have lost , notonly the chance to their development process, but , even

more they have started to fight each-other at the locallevel It’s a pity !!

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Government level (trnsl-GREEK) : The Aegean University/Dept of Sociology (post graduate level)

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Economic and Regional Development” TypothitoPapakonstantinidis L. A (2003, Nov) “Building the SocialCapital and Local Capacities in Rural Areas” – special issue of Hungarian Academy of Sciences- Department of RegionalStudies, Nov, 2003

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TEIEP, issue 6

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “Knowledge Creationand the win-win-win model” Scientific Review of AppliedEconomics TEIPI Ed, Jan 2004

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Jan) “Rural Tourism:win-win-win” Journal of Hospitality and Tourism” , issue 2 ,India

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Febr) “ Digital Economyand Hyper-cube space” “Journal of Applied Economics andManagement”, issue 1, India

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Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004)“Sensitization as a formof knowledge creation and the Win-Win-Win Model…”Scientific Review of Applied Research, Vol VIII, No 2 /2003,pp 89-108, ISSN 1106-4110

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Management by a hyper-cube & win-win-win perspective: ALocal Development Approach” Journal of Applied Economicsand Management, Volume 2, issue 2,/ 2004, pp 111-130,ISSN 0972- 8937, JAEM- Institute of Economic and FinanceBundelkhand University, Jansi

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Tourism Impact through the 2008 Messinian Thruway- SimpleLinear Regression, the Holt-Winters Method andSensitization”- (part of the Book) New Facets of TourismManagement ABHIJEET PUBLICATIONS (Dr Robinet Jacob- TheEditor) Delhi 110 094 ISBN 81-88683-70-1 && “14”- pp194-258

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Tendencies- Case Study: Community Redefinition- TycheroEvros- ISA Ed.

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Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) : New trends in RegionalPolicy: Territory-Space Definition by a 3-level BargainingApproach- The Win-Win-Win Model. Case Study: TheLEADER EU Initiative Application in Greece” “Regional and

Rural Development Interface” Babes-Bolyai University,Faculty of Economics – Cluj-Napoca Romania, - EuropeanProgram “Reabalk European Project”.

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) “Le migrationeconomique polonaise dans quelque lieux du Peloponnese”I.S.A. Ed

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2005) “Networking SMEs: Awin-win-win approach ISA Ed special issue “Networks andPartnerships for 'Learning Regions' in everyday practice”-

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) “Bargaining win-win-win Model and the Hypercube (the MARTIX concept)Dimension” – Journal of Applied Economic & Management vol1 issue 1, JENSEN, India

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Papakonstantinidis L.A (2007) “ClusteringNetworking SMEs in Rural Areas & win-win-win Model” ISA

– World Congress’s minutes, Durban South Africa (July, 2006)Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) Win-Win-WinMethodology on Rural Tourism Activities / Good Practicesfrom Greece” The Asian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism(AJHT) – v1/iss 1 – Santo Tomas University ManilaPhilippines , pp 95-120

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) “Win-Win-Win Modeland GINI Index for South Peloponnesus” The Tourist and

Travel International Journal (D)Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) “Bargaining as the basic

Globalization Ideology” Review of Social Sciences –Dec2008-D

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2008) Local DevelopmentApproach: Building Social Capital by a win - win- winmethodology : The INTERMEDIATE POSITION- ISA-RC 26XXXI Conference “Building Institutional Space forSustainable Communities – Social Economy and InnovativeLocal Policies”, Molyvos/Lesbos Isle May, 19-22, 2008Papakonstantinidis L.A “The GINI Index and win-win-win model” The International Tourism and Travel

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Magazine ITTM- India, May, 2008 vol 1, issue 4 – (Prof Nimit)Papakonstantinidis L. A “Local Development – win-win-win Methodology: A tool for building social capital at

local level” (trnsl) Approved lecture to post graduateSociology Dept- The Aegean University, May 14, 2008

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Prof Papakonstantinidis L. A

Sept 2008

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the economyof the poor (newer)

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