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THE EFFECT OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING PRICING ON
THE LONG RUN STOCK RETURNS OF COMPANIES LISTED
AT THE NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE
BY
DAVID OBWOTO CHIBEKA
D63/73044/2012
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
OCTOBER 2014
ii
DECLARATION
STUDENTS DECLARATION
I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted
before for a degree in any other University.
Signed: ........................................................ Date: ...........................................
CHIBEKA DAVID OBWOTO
This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the
University supervisor.
Supervisor: Signed: ………………………....... Date: ……………………….
HERRICK ONDIGO
Lecturer,
Department of Finance and Accounting
School of Business,
University of Nairobi
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In front of you is the result of a yearlong struggling and hard work and a project to
establish the effect of IPO pricing on the long run stock returns of companies listed at
Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. It is the ending project of my Master of Science
in Finance at the University of Nairobi. During my master, I not only learned a lot
about the programme and everything that comes with it, I also learned a lot about
myself.
All would not be possible if it were not for my lecturers at the University of Nairobi,
the entire staff and fellow Msc students, thank you very much for your contributions
whichever way towards the success of this project. Special thanks to my supervisor
Mr. Herrick Ondigo for his excellent guidance , advice and encouragement during the
entire period . His expertise and extensive knowledge on the subject was an enormous
help in the realization of this project.
I would like to thank my parents for always standing by me, and their immense
support. I would like to thank my family, for all their support and understanding.
Because of their support and encouragements to keep going on, I was able to motivate
Myself and keep on going.
iv
DEDICATION
I must also dedicate this to my family members and mostly to my wife Frida,
daughters Valerie, Michelle, son Owen and my late father, Stephen and my mother
Margaret for their patience during the hard times.
Above all, I must thank God for His invisible hands that gave renewed hope despite
numerous challenges encountered.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION.......................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................iii
DEDICATION............................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................viii
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... x
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. xi
CHAPTER ONE .......................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background of the Study ...................................................................................... 1
1.1.1 IPO Pricing .................................................................................................... 3
1.1.2 Long-Run Performance of Shares ................................................................. 7
1.1.3 Effect of IPO on Long-Run Performance of Shares ...................................... 8
1.1.4 Nairobi Securities Exchange ......................................................................... 9
1.2 Research Problem ............................................................................................... 11
1.3 Objective of the Study ........................................................................................ 13
1.4 Value of the Study .............................................................................................. 13
CHAPTER TWO ....................................................................................................... 15
LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 15
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15
2.2 Theoretical Review ............................................................................................ 15
2.2.1 Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis .............................................................. 15
2.2.2 Lawsuit Avoidance Hypothesis ................................................................... 16
2.2.3 The Winners Curse Hypothesis ................................................................... 17
2.2.4 Information Cascades Hypothesis ............................................................... 17
2.3 Determinants of Long –Run Performance of Share Price .................................. 18
2.3.1 IPO Pricing .................................................................................................. 19
2.3.2 Age of the Firm............................................................................................ 19
2.3.3 Size of the Firm ........................................................................................... 20
vi
2.3.4 Number of Shares Issued ............................................................................. 20
2.3.5 The Subscription Percentage ....................................................................... 21
2.3.6 First Day Price Differential Between The Offer Price And Closing Price .. 21
2.4 Empirical Review ............................................................................................... 22
2.4.1 International Evidence ................................................................................. 23
2.4.2 Local Evidence ............................................................................................ 27
2.5 Summary of Literature Review .......................................................................... 28
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................... 30
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 30
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 30
3.2 Research Design ................................................................................................. 30
3.3 Population of the Study ...................................................................................... 31
3.4 Data Collection ................................................................................................... 31
3.5 Data Analysis ..................................................................................................... 32
3.5.1 Analytical Model ......................................................................................... 32
3.5.2 Test of Significance ..................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................................... 36
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .............................................. 36
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 36
4.2 Findings .............................................................................................................. 36
4.2.1 Age of the Firms .......................................................................................... 36
4.2.2 Size of the Firm as Measured by Total Assets ............................................ 37
4.2.3 Number of Shares Issued ............................................................................. 38
4.2.4 Day Pricing Differential between the Offer Price and Closing Day One
Price ...................................................................................................................... 39
4.2.5 Subscription Rate ......................................................................................... 40
4.2.6 Long Run Performance of Shares ................................................................ 41
4.2.7 Regression Analysis .................................................................................... 42
4.3 Interpretation of the Findings ............................................................................. 44
vii
CHAPTER FIVE ....................................................................................................... 46
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 46
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 46
5.2 Summary ............................................................................................................ 46
5.3 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 47
5.4 Recommendations for Policy ............................................................................. 48
5.5 Limitations of the Study ..................................................................................... 49
5.6 Recommendations for Further Studies ............................................................... 49
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 51
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................ 60
APPENDIX I : NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANIES AS
AT THE YEAR 2013 ............................................................................................... 60
APPENDIX II : INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS (IPOs) – 2000-2013 ......................... 62
APPENDIX III: FIRM AGE AND MARKET RETURN ....................................... 63
APPENDIX IV: ASSETS, BUY AND HOLD ABNORMAL RETURN (BHAR)
AND SUBSCRIPTION RATE ................................................................................ 64
viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIMS - Alternative Investments Market Segment
BHAR - Buy and Hold Abnormal Return
CDSC - Central Depository and Securities Corporation
CMA - Capital Markets Authority
FIMS - Fixed Income Market Segment
GEMS - Growth and Enterprise Market Segment
IPO - Initial Public Offering
MENA - Middle East and North Africa
MIMS - Main Investment Market Segment
MABHAR - Market Adjusted Buy and Hold Return
NSE - Nairobi Securities Exchange
WR - Wealth Relative
U.S - United States of America
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1: Model Summary ......................................................................................... 42
Table 4.2: ANOVA ...................................................................................................... 43
Table 4.3: Coefficient table .......................................................................................... 43
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4. 1: Age of the firms ........................................................................................ 36
Figure 4. 2: Size of the firm as measured by total assets ............................................. 37
Figure 4. 3: number of shares issued ........................................................................... 38
Figure 4.4: Day pricing differential between the offer price and closing day one price
...................................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 4.5: Subscription Rate ...................................................................................... 40
Figure 4.6: Long Run Performance of Shares .............................................................. 41
xi
ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of IPO pricing has long existed in the global stock market, although
the magnitude of under pricing varies from country to country. Several academic
researchers found in their studies that IPOs show underperformance in the long-run or
have negative abnormal returns over holding periods after the IPO issue date. There is
not sufficient evidence yet in the literature to conclude that the IPO pricing decisions
is the main explanatory factor for the long-run performance of firms. The objective of
this study was to investigate the effect of IPO pricing on the long run stock returns of
companies listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), Kenya.
This study used descriptive research design. The target population of this study was
all firms listed at the NSE in Kenya. From the listed companies in NSE, the researcher
studied all the firms that have issued IPO from 2000-2013. This study used secondary
data collected from the NSE, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), annual reports of
the firms, and other research material on share prices. The data was analyzed using
descriptive analysis and inferential analysis technique. Statistical Package for Social
Services (SPSS) software aided in data analysis. Further, the study used multivariate
regression was be used to test the influence of the explanatory variables on the long-
run performance, measured by market adjusted buy –and hold abnormal (BHAR).
From the regression analysis, the study revealed that 51.5% of the variation in long
run performance of shares was explained jointly by 1st Day pricing differential
between the offer price and closing day one price, age in years of firm is the
difference the between the offer firm‟s IPO year and the founding year, size of the
firm as measured by total assets, number of shares issued and the percentage
subscription as the obtained coefficient of determination (R2) from the model
summary was 0.515. The study further revealed that the regression model predicting
the relationship between the long run performance of shares and independent
variables was significant. The study deduces that holding all the other factors
constant, long run performance of shares would be 8.736. A unit change in the
difference between offer price and closing day one price holding the other factors
constant would lead to change in long run performance of shares by 0.068. For the
case of firm age, Size of the firm, number of shares issued, and percentage, the effect
they had on long run performance of shares was -0.371, 7.147*10-8
, -1.524*10-9
and
0.008 respectively.. The firms should put good strategic measures in place to ensure
continued performance of their shares in the long run. These findings have
implications for market regulators, company management and investors.
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Corporate organizations generally are stimulated to experience rapid growth so as to
meet the overall corporate objective of shareholders wealth maximization. The rapid
growth by the firm could be attained by investing in value creating investments
(Brealey and Myer, 2003). Hence, a firm needs to acquire funds for these investments
at the best price in order to maximize their returns and value creation over the long-
term (Pagano et al., 1998). One major source of funding to firms that desire rapid
growth is to go public, through a process known as initial public offering (IPO)
An IPO is defined as a process where a firm issues shares to the public for the first
time. These IPOs are often issued by small; younger firms seeking capital to expand
but also can be done by large privately owned firms looking to become publicly
traded (Ritter, 1991). Because of information asymmetry between the issuing firm and
investors, the issuing firm usually hires investment banks to assist in valuation of the
firm. The firms go through various valuation techniques coupled with massive
publicity of the company‟s past performance. They also disclose what they intend to
do with the new funds to be raised through IPO, and thus make the offer price to the
general public.
An IPO is generally perceived as one of the most important milestones in a firm„s
lifecycle. It allows the firm to access the public equity markets for additional capital
necessary to fund future growth. It also provides an avenue for trading the firm‟s
2
shares, enabling its existing shareholders to diversify their investments and to
crystallize their capital gains from investing in the company (Kim and Weisbach,
2005; Brealey and Myers ,2003).Also, this IPOs may lower the cost of funding the
firm‟s operations and investments.
Further, the act of going public itself shines a spotlight on the company, and the
attendant publicity may bring indirect benefits, such as attracting a different calibre of
management, gaining of publicity and status, employee ownership and liquidity of
shares (Grundvall, Melin-Jakobsson and Thorell, 2004). Despite the benefits that
accrue with IPOs, firms normally incur costs which may be direct or indirect (Ritter,
2006). Directly, firms incur cost such as underwriting fees, auditors„and lawyers„fees
for consultancy, and publication cost. Indirectly, management„s time and effort is
devoted to the process of conducting the offer.
However, it has been observed that immediately the company is listed in the securities
exchange, there follows the first day under pricing followed by long term period of
underperformance in terms of pricing. Researchers have noticed these intrigues of
IPO subsequent under pricing and the uniqueness of the long term underperformance
of IPO (Brav and Gompers, 1997). Hence, there has been a significant interest from
investors and academics to understand the decisions of why companies go public and
the short- and long-run performance of newly issued equities. In particular, empirical
research has investigated the under pricing and long-run performance of Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) in the U.S and in other countries (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). As a
result, a relatively consistent pattern of under pricing, initial returns, and long-run
performance of IPOs has emerged.
3
For most countries, studies on IPOs pricing find significant under pricing in the
primary market and consequently substantial initial returns in the secondary market
(Ritter and Welch, 2002). In contrast to the almost certain short-run outperformance
of IPOs there is, on average, a substantial underperformance over longer periods.
Therefore, this study undertakes to establish the impact of IPO pricing on the long-run
performance of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya.
1.1.1 IPO Pricing
The pricing of an IPO is a complex procedure as there are many firm specific and
market risk factors that can affect the market price the IPO (Rock, 1986). The pricing
is also difficult due to the uncertainty about future cash flows in the company.
Therefore, firms use multiple variables to determine the value of the IPO stock. The
most popular method is the discounted cash flow method (DCF), at which the firm´s
cash flows are discounted at the cost of capital and after that deducted by the market
value of debt to arrive at the equity value of the firm (Ritter ,2003).
Another one is the comparable firms‟ approach which capitalizes for instance the
earnings per share of the IPO firm at the average or median price/earnings ratio of
comparable publicly traded firms, like firms in the same industry, or with similar
transactions (Kim and Ritter, 1999). Finally, there is the asset-based method which
determines the value of the IPO based on the value of the separate assets of the
company. However, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) find that differences exist
between the offer price and the value of an IPO. Therefore, they argue that IPO
offering price is set in light of both available financial information and what the
underwriter learns about investor demand during the marketing phase.
4
The process of IPO pricing begins at the time the issue is filed. This initial stage
involves registering a preliminary prospectus relating to the company and the
proposed offering with the authority responsible for regulating the securities
exchange. Next, the prospectus is then filed with securities exchange authority. Before
meeting with potential investors, the lead underwriter determines the offer price band
within which the offer price is most likely set. Finally, it is the book-building process,
during which company management meets institutional investors. The actual setting
of offer price occurs after the securities exchange authority has given a green light to
go ahead. The issuer and lead underwriter will then hold a price meeting at which
offer price is agreed upon (Ritter and Welch, 2002). It is believed that the final price
is set after the market closes on the day before the offering.
Bensveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that issuers can feign themselves to investors as
high reputation than they really are in order to have a successful IPO. Further, the
situation is made worse by the fact that investment bankers act as an intermediary
between the investors and the issuing company. The investment bank, besides acting
as a professional advisor, also undertakes to underwrite and to distribute the firm‟s
shares to the public. Such an arrangement will provide investors with confidence as
regards the information contained in the prospectus and the pricing of IPO.
However, it is argued that the investor banker makes sure that the IPO is priced in
such a way so as to make the issue successful because the bank cannot risk the
possibility of issue failure. This is because if the underwriter undervalues the IPO
pricing, then the experienced investors who are also opinion leaders to rational
investors are able to obtain the information about the intrinsic value of the IPO, and
5
avoid overpriced securities, a condition known as Lemon dodge. The reality however
has pointed to the contrary.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) posit that the offer price by underwriters incorporates
both the available information from the prospectus and what the underwriters obtain
from the experienced investors. Hence, the underwriters use the information collected
from the experienced investors during the registration period to set the final price of
IPO just before the first day of trading. However, studies have shown that
underwriters do not incorporate all available information, the purpose being to under
price the IPO so as to keep it within the popular trading range of share prices of
companies in the particular economic sector (Lowry and Schwert, 2004).
Pricing of new instrument in corporate finance is a critical decision. Koop and Li
(2001) identified three roles played by valuation, including its significance in
corporate control transactions; the need for firms going public to value their stocks;
and its significance in determining capital structure of the firm. Where one party to a
transaction has quality information more than the other party, a market for lemon
arises (Akerlof, 1970). Further, Akerlof argues that this problem leads to a situation
where quality assets are driven out of the market because the owners of quality assets
are not willing to sell at lower price demanded by buyers. Buyers will seek risk
premium to compensate them for taking risk.
Further, Initial public offerings (IPO) involve problems regarding price discovery due
to uncertainties regarding aggregate demand and the quality of the issuer. This
concept of uncertainty suggests that investors will differ in their forecasts. Hence,
some investors will invest in the short-term and others in the long-term. This leads to
6
investors making differing returns from IPOs. It is argued that the longer the investor
holds to an investment, the larger should be the return. However, past research
suggests that IPOs over perform in the market in the short-run while in the long-run
there is underperformance. Derrien (2005) posit that pricing of IPOs is a daunting task
due to obscurity of discovering an appropriate comparable firm.
Another factor that could greatly influence the performance of IPO after the first day
of listing could be the significantly low initial offer price influenced by the politicized
offer terms when conducting IPOs (Dewenter et al., 1997). The politicized offer terms
consists of a number of state regulations that require shares of listing firms to be made
accessible to large portions of the local population. In developing countries such as
Kenya, such a large proportion of investors will include a sizeable number of low
income investors with no ability to hire security analysts to advise them on the
possible future post IPO listing. This will result in the immediate post IPO high price
which eventually will not be sustained thus resulting in cumulative negative return.
However, the marked variation in average IPO initial returns across time and across
issuer types has thus far eluded explanation because it simply means that investors are
just buying the IPOs at the offer price aware that there is a high chance of losing
money, a situation referred to as buying the block (Jagannathan et al, 2006). Thus, the
pricing of IPO is one of the most intriguing aspects of investment decisions. Under
pricing refers to the percentage difference between the offer price and the first day
closing price (Paleari and Vismara, 2007). Under pricing is a loss to the issuing firm
because it is a loss of money that could be utilized for profitable investment
opportunities.
7
1.1.2 Long-Run Performance of Shares
Most of the literature on IPO defines the long run as typically being in the region of
three years and above (Ritter and Welch 2002). Studies have shown that most IPOs
long run underperformance as measured by their respective subsequent market prices
in developed economies is as a result of a time-varying phenomenon. This adverse
under performance have caused considerable uncertainty to researchers as well as
academicians bearing in mind that under IPO, firms use their prospectus to invest
heavily in their companies.
Ritter (1991) examined 1,526 USA firms which went public between 1975 and 1984
and found that the average return on a firm‟s stock over the three years following its
IPO was significantly lower than the average on firms matched by size and industry.
Ritter (1991) suggested that over optimism on part of investors is the most likely
explanation for long-run underperformance, contending that investors in the IPO
market are systematically fooled into paying too high a price.
In addition to the intensively studied issue of IPO under-pricing and the positive first
day initial returns, there exist a large number of studies that empirically investigate
the long-run performance of initial public offerings. Following the earlier work of
Ritter (1991) for the U.S there have been numerous empirical studies for other
countries that support the view that, on average, IPOs underperform an appropriate
benchmark in the long-run (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994). Further, this was
demonstrated by Jain and Kini (1994) who found that, in general, firms undergo a
decline in operating performance following an IPO.
8
1.1.3 Effect of IPO on Long-Run Performance of Shares
There exists a large body of empirical research examining the impact of initial public
offerings (Ritter, 1991; Kunz & Aggarwal, 1994; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Sapusek,
2000; Drobetz et al., 2005). For instance, Ritter (1991) pointed out that buying shares
of a firm that has just gone public may result in abnormal negative risk adjusted
returns. Further, Ritter (1998) finds that the new issue under-pricing phenomenon
exists in every developed nation with a stock market, although the amount of under
pricing varies from country to country. Researchers have labeled this phenomenon as
“new issues puzzle” because it has defied arbitrage forces even after being so well and
so long publicized.
Ritter (1984) analysis shows an average under pricing of 26.5%,Welch (1989),
conducted a study on 1028 IPOs in the USA and reported an average under pricing of
26%, Kelohargu (1993) cites an average under pricing of 8.7% for Finnish IPOs and
Booth and Chua (1996) find an average under pricing of 13.1% . Further, Krigman et
al, (1999) in their study concluded that first day winners continue to be winners over
the first year, and first day losers continue to be losers except for extra hot IPOs,
which are seriously underpriced. Using a sample of more than 2000 IPO during 1980-
1997, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), find that on average, the offer price
substantially exceeds the corresponding intrinsic values computed from similar firms
in the peer group of the issuing firm. They posit that, overvalued IPOs have large first
day returns but low long run risk adjusted returns.
However, the results concerning long-run IPO performance are inconclusive. For the
Swiss market, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) suggest that there is no evidence for long-
run underperformance of Swiss IPOs for up to three years after the initial offering.
9
Brav and Gompers (1997) also challenge the view that IPO firms underperform in the
long run. They used a sample of U.S. IPOs from 1972-1992 and found no evidence
that IPO firms underperform the benchmarks. They provide evidence that
underperformance is typical of small firms with low book –to – market ratios and find
that when returns are weighted equally, firms backed by venture capitalists
outperformed, non-venture backed firms.
Further, Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that firms are more likely to underperform
regardless of whether they are IPOs firms or not. Hence, they conclude that
underperformance is not an IPO effect. In addition, Drobetz et al. (2005) also find no
evidence for long-run underperformance of Swiss IPOs after going public.
Most of empirical research on the IPOs is based on US data and to a lesser extent on
data from other large developed countries (Germany, United Kingdom).There have
been other studies in other emerging markets economies but with varying results. The
overall conclusion of the literature is that IPOs are underpriced; i.e., the offer price of
IPOs is on average lower than the corresponding first-day market closing price and
exhibit long-run underperformance (Ritter, 2003).
1.1.4 Nairobi Securities Exchange
In 1954, Nairobi Stock Exchange (now Nairobi Securities Exchange) was constituted
as a voluntary association of stockbrokers registered under the Societies Act (NSE
Website).Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is a market where securities are traded
in Kenya. Capital Market Authority (CMA) is the regulatory body that formulates
laws that regulate both the financial and the securities market traded at the NSE. The
NSE is one of the most vibrant markets in Africa which has attracted investors from
10
all over the world, and has grown considerably over the period. The NSE is,
characterized by liquidity, market capitalization and turnover; hence, it may be
classified as both an emerging market and a frontier market.
There are four investment market segments for companies listed at the NSE namely;
Main Investment Market Segment (MIMS), Alternative Investment Market Segment
(AIMS), Fixed Income Securities Market Segment (FISMS) and Growth and
Enterprise Market Segment (GEMS). The MIMS is further divided into ten sectors
namely; Agricultural; Automobile and Accessories; Banking; Commercial and
Services; Construction and Allied; Energy and Petroleum; Insurance; Investment;
Manufacturing and Allied firms; and Telecommunications & Technology. The
improved corporate governance at the CMA and the NSE and the demutualization of
the securities exchange has increased investor confidence leading to more companies
going public.
The NSE, like many other markets has had an improvement in the number of
companies getting listed. In the twenty five year period between 1988 and 2013, a
number of IPOs have been issued with varying performance. Between 2000 and 2013,
ten firms raised capital through initial listing in Nairobi Securities Exchange. Since
the KenGen IPO offer in 2006, the Kenyan equity market at large has experienced an
increase in subscriptions in IPO issues
However, the NSE has had very few IPOs compared to developed markets. Most of
the IPOs have been highly oversubscribed, with Eveready at 830%, and Safaricom the
biggest offer in the region at 382% among others. The number of shares sold at the
NSE is fixed and they are offered for a fixed period of time. Hence , those investors
11
who have information disadvantage relative to others will be worse off if they get the
shares they ask for, since they create an excess demand that leads to oversubscription.
This is evident from NSE where out of the 10 IPOs issued between the year 2000 and
2013 – 70 % had wide oversubscription margins (CMA website).
Whereas the subscription rates to IPOs have been high in the past, studies by Jumba
(2002) indicated that in the long run the average daily return for a sample of nine
IPOs for the period 1992- 2000 was 0.06% in three years after going public, compared
to the market return of 0.3%. Njoroge (2004) while studying 1984-2001 using a
sample of 14 IPOs observed that all the IPOs recorded an overall negative cumulative
growth of -68.46%. Ndatimana (2008), using a sample of 15 firms found out that any
underperformance for the first 3 years reverses by the 5th year.
1.2 Research Problem
The phenomenon of IPO pricing has long existed in the global stock market, although
the magnitude of under pricing varies from country to country. Several academic
researchers found in their studies that IPOs show underperformance in the long-run or
have negative abnormal returns over holding periods after the IPO issue date. Braun
and Larrain (2007) affirm that a single large IPO can have a significant effect in a less
developed markets and that IPOs as focal points, can stir the whole market.
There is not sufficient evidence yet in the literature to conclude that the IPO pricing
decisions is the main explanatory factor for the long-run performance of firms.
However, there is some empirical evidence that suggests some measurable impact on
the long-run performance in U.S. (Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Kale and Payne, 2000).
In the German market a number of empirical studies analyzed the under pricing and
12
long-run performance of initial public offerings (Ljungqvist, 1997; Stehle et al., 2000;
Bessler and Kurth, 2007). These studies, however, provide some conflicting results
such as huge spreads in under pricing within analyzed periods as well as long-run
underperformance and neutral performance dependent on the benchmark used so that
a number of open issues remain and await empirical explanations.
Daily (2005) argue that IPO offer pricing, which is a key factor in under pricing has
remained relatively unexplored in literature. Paleari and Vismara (2007) also agree
that although valuation of IPO is a critical subject, only narrow extant research has
addressed it. Labidi and Triki (2011) sought to find out if there were anomalous
patterns, namely under-pricing and long-run under-performance, in firms that go
public in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. They found that initial
IPO returns were highly related to over-subscription levels and listing lags hence
contradicting the idea of voluntary under-pricing.
However, in contrast, Chun et al. (2002) claim with a larger number of firms over a
longer time period reported that Korean IPOs outperformed the stock market with the
divergence widening over time in contrast to patterns observed in developed markets.
Further, the findings of Jelic et al. (2001), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) and Chorruk
and Worthington (2010) show IPO long-run over-performance in developing
countries such as Malaysia and Thailand.
For the Kenyan capital market there have been a number of empirical studies that
have focused on under-pricing and performance of IPOs such as Cheluget (2008) on
investor‟s demand for IPOs and first day performance: evidence from NSE,
Ndatimana (2008) on performance of IPOs, Leshore (2008) on medium-term
13
performance of IPOs, Simiyu (2008) on pricing and performance of initial public
offering: a comparison between state owned enterprises and privately owned
enterprises at NSE; Karitie (2010) on long-run performance of IPOs. However, these
results have provided mixed results depending on the methodology or the period of
study taken. Hence, lack of sufficient literature to explain effects on the long-run
performance at NSE remain largely unexplained necessitating this study.
Despite its importance, IPO pricing has remained unexplored in the Kenyan financial
market. Most of previous studies of IPOs are based in developed markets. It is
intriguing to study IPO pricing in developing markets such as Kenya. Given that no
study of this nature has been done in Kenya, this study sought to fill the knowledge
gap by establishing what is the effect of initial public offers pricing on the long-run
stock returns of companies listed at NSE in Kenya?
1.3 Objective of the Study
To investigate the effect of IPO pricing on the long run stock returns of companies
listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya.
1.4 Value of the Study
The findings of the study would be useful to investors as it would give guidelines to
them to enhance their understanding of the behaviour of share prices after the IPOs.
This would assist the investors in making informed decisions while investing in the
securities market.
The government, market regulators especially the Nairobi Securities Exchange,
Capital Markets Authority would gain more knowledge on how to handle future IPOs
14
in regard to the regulations and policies. Hence, this would result into improved
confidence to the investors who are investing in the securities market.
The firms listed in the NSE would appreciate the issues surrounding the long-run
performance of the IPOs. This would assist the firm‟s management in making prudent
decisions when they issue their shares through IPOs. Hence, they would make value
creating decisions when setting the offer prices of the shares during the IPOs. The
corporate managers would use the information to negotiate the framework of IPO
pricing with their underwriters so as to add value to shareholders.
The findings obtained would be useful to future researchers who want to advance
their knowledge and literature in the market values after the IPOs. In addition, it
would also add to the literature on the IPO subject as reference materials and simulate
further research in the field.
15
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature relevant in this study. It embraces defining and
highlighting the characteristics of initial public offering pricing and long-run
performance; understanding the various theories advanced on IPOs as well as
empirical studies conducted.
2.2 Theoretical Review
Theories of IPO pricing are categorized as to whether the information between the
issuer, the underwriter and other stakeholders are asymmetric or not. Many scholars
however advance the theories that explain mispricing of IPOs based on the
availability of information.
2.2.1 Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis
According to this theory the under pricing of IPO is beneficial both to the managers of
the issuing firm as well as the shareholders in the long run. Booth and Chua (1996)
propose that mispricing of IPO will lead to stock liquidity in the market in that there
will be increased demand for the company‟s shares. They argue that liquid stocks are
more attractive to investors since such stocks are considered less risky. The managers
of such funds can utilize the goodwill created to undertake profitable projects to
sustain the return that has already been set in the mispricing.
Further, Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that under pricing gives managers the
possibility to ensure a dispersed shareholder group. Hence, issuing firms may
intentionally under price their shares in order to generate excess demand and so be
16
able to have a large number of small shareholders. This will both increase the
liquidity of the market for the stock, and make it more difficult for outsiders to
challenge management. Goergen et al. (2007) found evidence that long-run
performance of an IPO stock is inversely related to the degree of change in ownership
in the process of IPO. Hence, Booth and Chua (1996), Brennan and Franks (1997), all
point out that under-pricing creates excess demand and thus allows issuers and
underwriters to decide to whom to allocate shares.
2.2.2 Lawsuit Avoidance Hypothesis
Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) propose that companies under price their
stock when going public in order to avoid lawsuits from investors who are
disappointed with the post-IPO performance of the stock. Hence, they argue that
under-pricing represents an insurance premium imposed by issuers and underwriters
to cushion themselves against the likelihood and magnitude of future legal liability
claims against them.
In addition, Hughes and Thakor (1992) argue that their legal insurance model of under
pricing could explain the long-run underperformance phenomenon. According to
them, the litigation threat gives the investors the opportunity to recover parts of
subsequent losses from the issuer. They posit that these damages are extra dividends
paid out to the investors and that long-run underperformance could be explained as
the failure to initially include the value of these dividends into the offer price. As
Ritter (2003) points out, fear of lawsuits has been mentioned as one rationale for why
Internet IPOs were under-pricing so much in 1999-2000.
17
2.2.3 The Winners Curse Hypothesis
This theory is based on information asymmetry. The winner‟s curse hypothesis
proposed by Rock (1986) suggests that some investors are better informed about the
true value of the IPO shares than are investors in general. Rock (1986) argues that
well-informed investors bid only for attractively priced IPOs, while the uninformed
investors also bid for unattractively priced IPOs. Therefore, he argues that this
imposes a „winner‟s curse‟ on uninformed investors.
Rock (1986) posits that if the uniformed investors bid on unattractive IPOs, they will
receive all the shares they have bid for. If they bid on attractive IPOs, they will not
receive all the shares they have bid for because the well-informed investors will bid
on these IPOs too. Therefore, in order to attract the less informed investors, IPOs have
to be priced at a discount. Further, Rock (1986) argues that primary market is
dependent on the participation of uninformed investors, because the well-informed
investors cannot bid up all the IPOs, even when they are attractive. Consequently, the
IPOs are underpriced on average, to avoid negative expected returns for the
uninformed investors, and thereby guaranteeing their participation.
2.2.4 Information Cascades Hypothesis
The „information cascades‟ or „herding hypothesis‟, developed by Welch (1992),
assumes that, in aggregate, investors hold perfectly accurate information about the
issuing firm. However, information concerning the value of the shares is highly
uncertain for investors. Furthermore, it is assumed that it takes investment bankers
time to approach interested investors because of their limited distribution channels.
The hypothesis draws from the notion that potential investors base their investment
18
decisions not only on their own information about the issue, but also on whether or
not other investors, who were approached earlier, are purchasing.
Further, Welch (1992) states that if investors learn about the value of the issued
company by observing the behavior of other investors, issuers will under price their
stock to create a cascade or herding of buyers. Subsequently investors either subscribe
overwhelmingly to new issues or largely abstain, with very few cases in between.
Welch (1992) concludes that pricing an IPO just a little too high leaves the issuer with
a too high probability of complete failure, just because others are not interested.
Hence, in order to prevent the situation from happening, an issuer may have to under
price the IPO to induce the first few potential buyers and later induce a cascade in
which all subsequent investors want to request irrespective of their own information.
2.3 Determinants of Long –Run Performance of Share Price
Share prices are influenced by numerous factors so that predictions using only a
number of select variables may give incorrect results. Researchers have striven hard
to build models which incorporate a diverse array of variables to predict the share
prices but have not been successful in having one such model. Bhabra and Pettway
(2003) find that prospectus information, i.e., pre-IPO profitability, research and
development spending, relative offer size, firm size, and number of risk factors listed
in the offer document help in predicting long-run performance of IPOs. They also
document that the underperformance is more severe for smaller and younger firms
than that of the large-sized mature firms.
19
2.3.1 IPO Pricing
From research, it has been shown that IPO pricing displays certain important
anomalies – such as the positive first day returns (under pricing) and long-run
underperformance. Hence, the under pricing of IPOs is one of the most studied
anomalies (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; among others).
It is argued that IPOs are deliberately under-priced on the day of listing, leading to
exploitable opportunities for investors (Rock, 1986). Thus, IPOs with upward offer
price adjustments have higher levels of under pricing (Harley, 1993). Therefore, the
high demands of IPO shares initially are attributed to information asymmetry of
information between the investors and the firm going public. While the company
wants to maximize subscription levels, the investor wants to maximize returns. The
company thus under-prices it‟s IPO. However, Miller (1977) finds that divergence of
investors‟ opinions drives the IPO price higher than its intrinsic value due to
optimistic investors.
However, this information of the firm is not known to all. The extent and nature of
under-pricing is also an unknown variable. Thus, the investors can make use of this
missing information, provided they have accessed to it. Hence, abnormal returns are
possible (Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).
Further, the time period for which this under-pricing can persist is also quite long –
from one year to up to five years (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005; Ritter and Welch, 2002).
2.3.2 Age of the Firm
IPO firms are subject to uncertainties regarding quality of the firm because of missing
track record and lack of public scrutiny. In order to compensate investors for value
20
uncertainty, investment bankers discount IPO offer prices (Beatty and Ritter, 1986;
Rock, 1986). Further, Carter (1998) argues that older firms have longer operating
histories and thus face less uncertainty. This observation was also echoed by Ritter
(1998) who argue that younger firms have shorter operating history and are subject to
great deal of uncertainty.
2.3.3 Size of the Firm
According to Chemmanur et al. (2005), only large old public firms with adequate cash
flows and private limited firms that have accumulated a track record of successful
performance find it optimal to go public by issuing IPO. Consequently, firms that
issue IPO are regarded by investors as having very high chance of success, hence, the
high demand during the first day of trading. The demand even escalates further if
there is information asymmetry with regard to possible oversubscription.
Existing research shows that firm size has a significant impact on IPO pricing. Ritter
(1984) argue that larger firms are easier to value because of ease of forecasting cash
flows. Teker and Ekit (2003) posit that a firm with larger amount of total assets
experience less uncertainty regarding its perpetuity, and hence commanding less
under pricing, and hence higher offer price. Also Dalton (2003) posits that the size of
the IPO firm has important implication for pricing as it is an important determinant of
stability of the firm.
2.3.4 Number of Shares Issued
McBain and Krause (1989) argue that higher valuations are experienced by firms
whose pre-IPO shareholders maintain relatively larger ownership positions following
the offer. Ofek and Richardson (2003) showed that a higher retention level of shares
21
means that fewer shares will be available for trading and hence IPO prices increase.
Habib and Ljngqvist (2001) posits that where owners sell fewer shares at the time of
IPO, they are likely to be more tolerant to under pricing (and hence higher offer price)
because the benefit of costly monitoring is minimal. It can be argued that the post-IPO
ownership retention may play a role in valuation process of IPO.
2.3.5 The Subscription Percentage
Aggarwal, Liu and Rhee (2008) studied an after-market pricing behavior of IPOs
issued in the Hong Kong market during 1993 to 1997. They studied the after-market
performance of the IPOs in relation to the subscription rate (the times at which an IPO
is subscribed by the investors). They found out those IPOs with high investor demand
realize a high initial excess return, but a negative long run return, while the reverse is
true for the low demand IPOs. Thus, it can be demonstrated that higher subscription
percentage can lead to higher price of the IPO.
2.3.6 First Day Price Differential Between The Offer Price And Closing Price
Empirical evidence shows that there tend to be an abnormal high returns caused by
the significant positive difference between the first market price and IPO offer price.
Ritter (1991) find that the high returns realized on the first day of trading may turn
into negative returns in the long run. He asserts that this could be attributed to the fact
that the closing price of the first day of trading might have been influenced by the
investor purchasing behavior wave and therefore may not reflect the intrinsic value of
the company‟s shares. However, the managers will have been provided by a goodwill
opportunity which they can take advantage off and turn the company round.
22
2.4 Empirical Review
Most of the research findings on the offer market performance study the IPO issuing
firms performance over a period of 3-5 years. Ritter (1991) finds that IPO issuing
firms performance over such period register a positive return which is less than
similar firms that did not issue IPO. This would suggest that firms may issue IPO to
raise funds to venture into new areas that already had well established competitors.
Hence, the need to undertake very strategic investment portfolios using funds rose
through IPOs.
Jegadieesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) assert that when managers take correct
strategic portfolio diversification measures, then the first day returns of IPO are just as
effective in inducing future issues as other returns after the first day. Hence, they
argue that there is strong evidence to support the fact that the offer market
performance is positively related to under pricing and negatively related to the size of
the public float.
Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) argue that the long run underperformance of IPO
may be due to insufficient correction of risk i.e. the manager‟s failure to take
advantage of the favourable condition to turn the company round before investors
change their mind. They argue that a favourable return on the IPO should be taken as
the first step towards the policy of forward ever and backward never with regard to
returns on the company‟s share returns. This would suggest that firms issuing IPO
must have very realistic strategic investment opportunities that they should
immediately undertake to sustain at least positive return on IPO for at least five years.
23
Baker and Wurgler (2000) assert that stock prices periodically diverge from
fundamental values and those managers and investment bankers take advantage of
over pricing by selling stock to overly optimistic investors. This is to suggest if the
IPO market is very attractive to investors during a given period, the overly optimistic
investors may over react and managers can take advantage of the situation. This will
result in short run good performance by the company‟s shares which cannot be
sustained in the long run. Thus, this will result in poor long run performance by such a
firm. Therefore, timing of IPO issue should also be taken into account.
2.4.1 International Evidence
Ritter (1991) revealed first positive but then evenly increasing negative abnormal
returns for the first three years following an IPO. The analysis of 1,254 IPOs for the
period from 1975 to 1984 by using wealth relatives resulted in substantial negative
abnormal returns of -29.1% for the 36 month‟s period after the IPO. These empirical
results for IPOs were confirmed in a number of studies for the United States.
In the UK, Levis (1993) investigated the long-run performance of a sample of 712 UK
IPOs issued during 1980-88 using long-run returns based on three alternative
benchmarks. His work confirmed that IPOs in the (UK) underperformed relevant
benchmarks for thirty six months after their first day of trading and noted that the
average UK sample appeared to be less excessive than in Ritter‟s (1991) US Sample.
Keloharju (1993) studies the Finnish IPO market and suggests that there is evidence
for the long-run underperformance of the IPO firms in Finland, by using a sample of
80 IPOs issued in Finland between 1984 and 1989. This studies offer a similar
conclusion that there is a poor long-run performance of IPO firms.
24
Using forty two IPOs in Swiss Market over the period 1983-1989, Kunz and
Aggarwal (1994) also reported significant under pricing. In contrast to previous
findings for the U.S., they find no evidence for long run underperformance for up to
three years in the aftermarket. Loughran and Ritter (1995), using an even larger
sample of U.S. IPOs and applying different benchmark portfolios to measure
abnormal returns, come to the same result. By using buy-and-hold abnormal returns,
they calculate a 26.9% underperformance against matched firms in three years. They
concluded that investing in firms issuing stock is hazardous to one‟s wealth.
Madhusoodanan and Thiripalraju (1997) analyze both short-run and long-run after-
market pricing performance of the Indian IPOs issued prior to 1997. They indicate
that in the short run, the Indian IPOs generate more market-adjusted initial return than
the international IPOs. In the long run too (after one year), Indian IPOs generate
higher returns compared to the negative returns reported from other countries.
Stehle, Erhardt, and Przyborowsky (2000) in a study of long-run performance of
German IPOs show that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks
than market portfolios. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns and accounting for the
size effect, they report a long-run underperformance for German IPOs of roughly 6%
over three years. They demonstrated that this underperformance is substantially
smaller than the corresponding numbers found for the U.S. Ritter and Welch (2002)
using U.S data from 1980 to 2001, report that at the end of the first day of trading, the
stocks of the average IPO trade at 18.6% above the price at which the company sold
them. Nevertheless, over three years, the average IPO underperforms the CRSP value-
weighted index by 23.4%.
25
Previous studies by Brav and Gompers (1997), Sapusek (2000), Brav, Geczy, and
Gompers (2000), among others, show that long-run IPO performance is sensitive to
the benchmark used. Gompers and Lerner (2003) study based on a large sample of
3,661 IPOs in the U.S. from 1935 to 1972, found evidence for a poor aftermarket
performance when buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used, but the poor aftermarket
performance disappears when cumulative abnormal returns are used. They argue that
long-run performance results that differ in empirical findings can be explained either
by the methodological approach taken in calculating abnormal returns or by the
difference in the benchmark employed for comparing returns.
Kooli and Suret (2004) examined the aftermarket performance, up to five years after
listing, of 445 Canadian IPOs listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Montreal
Stock Exchange, Vancouver Stock Exchange, Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE) and
over-the-counter (CDN). Their results indicated IPO underperformance in the long-
run and were not always statistically significant, depending on the methodology used.
Drobetz et al. (2005) estimated the under pricing and long-run performance of Swiss
initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1983 to 2000 by using a sample of 120 IPOs.
They found an average market adjusted initial return is 34.97%. To examine the long-
run performance of Swiss IPOs, they compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns,
skewness-adjusted wealth ratios, and cumulative abnormal returns using 120 months
of secondary market returns. They found only modest and mostly insignificant
underperformance of Swiss IPOs up to four years after the first day of trading. In the
very long-run they find evidence that Swiss IPOs severely underperform the market.
They conclude that the underperformance of Swiss IPOs is driven by the fact that
Swiss IPOs are generally those of small firms.
26
In the UK, Goergen et al. (2007) studied 252 IPOs listed on the London Stock
Exchange between 1991 and 1995. They also found poor long-run performance of UK
IPOs, in particular of the smaller firms while those of the large firms performed better
in a cross-sectional study. Similarly, Mazouz et al. (2008) investigated the long-term
performance of 537 IPOs in Hong Kong from 1990 to 2002. They reported that three-
year average cumulative abnormal returns (with an equally-weighted portfolio) were -
74.83%, using the market index as a benchmark and -17.78 when size matched. Their
findings were consistent with the literature on the long-run underperformance of IPOs
in an international context reported.
In a study of short-run under pricing and long-run underperformance for 92 Indian
IPOs issued during the period 2002-2006, Sahoo and Rajib (2010) reported that on an
average the Indian IPOs are underpriced to the tune of 46.55 per cent on the listing
day (listing day return vis-à-vis issue price) compared to the market index. Further ,
they examined the long-run performance of IPOs up to a period of thirty six months
by using the wealth relative (WR) and buy-and-hold abnormal rate of return (BHAR)
evaluation techniques , both being adjusted with market index. Their results evidence
that the underperformance is most pronounced during the initial year of trading, i.e.,
up to 12 months from the listing date followed by over–performance.
Labidi and Triki (2011) sought to find out if there were anomalous patterns, in the
stock price behaviour of firms that go public in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, and the impact of investors‟ optimism and divergence of opinions on
IPO under-pricing and long-term under-performance. They used data from (2000-
2010) for 159 companies in ten countries. The study found out that initial IPO returns
27
were highly related to over-subscription levels and listing lags hence contradicting the
idea of voluntary under-pricing.
2.4.2 Local Evidence
Although the time period available to study IPOs in Kenya is limited and the number
of IPOs is relatively small there have been a number of studies that have analyzed the
long-run performance of IPOs. A review of these studies confirms that the results are
very sensitive to both the methodology and the benchmark employed.
Jumba (2002) studied the performance of nine IPOs in NSE in Kenya for the period
1992-2000. Using a market model for three years buy and hold period, found that all
IPOs produced below market average. She concluded that in the short-run, IPOs over-
performed the market while in the long-run IPOs underperformed the market using
three year holding period. This was supported by Njoroge (2004) who analyzed initial
and long-run of 14 IPOs at the NSE during the period 1984-2001 and observed that all
the IPOs recorded a negative accumulative growth of -68.46% . He concluded that all
IPOs underperformed the market in the long-run using a three year holding period.
Simiyu (2008) in a study of IPOs in the NSE for the period 1984-2008 sought to find
out if there existed any difference in the pricing and performance of state owned and
private firms. It was found that both IPOs depicted negative cumulative returns of
32% and 6% respectively. The conclusion was that a long-term investor was better off
investing in the state privatization firms as compared to private firm IPOs.
Ndatimana (2008) studied the long-run of 15 IPOs over a five year period at the NSE
for periods 1992-2007 using a MABHR model. He found mixed results and
concluded that there is no discernible regularity of long-run performances when
28
gauged against the market benchmarks. Using wealth relatives defined as the average
gross total returns on IPOs divided by the average gross return on the market index,
both measured over five years after the IPO excluding the initial returns, he found that
the wealth relative was 1.086 at the fifth anniversary and -1.017 at the third
anniversary Hence, he asserted that any under-performance for the first three years
will reverse by the fifth year.
Karitie (2010) in a study of IPOs at the NSE using market adjusted buy and hold
returns methodology found that there was long run underperformance. However,
using the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) methodology, the IPOs over performed.
Hence, it demonstrated that the methodology used can give different results.
2.5 Summary of Literature Review
In summary, the literature shared common views on the most observed IPO pricing
performance anomaly, i.e., under pricing or over performance followed by
underperformance for IPOs. However, the literature indicates divergent findings
regarding the continuity of underperformance in the post-listing scenario. Most of the
studies document underperformance for the new issues up to a period of three to five
years from listing but there is lack of a clear pattern of over-or- under performance
after the first anniversary. Further, the lack of empirical evidence from the emerging
economies and the absence of examination of the impact of IPO pricing and long-run
performance of firms, are gaps that this review has found from the literature.
Further, from the studies by Jumba (2002), Njoroge (2004) and Ndatiamana (2008),
they conclude that IPO‟s underperform the market in the long-run using MABHR,
and that all IPOs underperform the market in the long-run. However, Karitie (2010)
29
disputes this assertion from the study and posit that the methodology used determines
whether IPOs will underperform in the long-run. Hence, this is a gap that this study
attempted to address.
30
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the rationales and techniques that were used in this study. It
covers research design, population of the study, data collection procedures to be used
as well as data analysis techniques applied.
3.2 Research Design
Research design is the plan, structure, and strategy of investigation conceived so as to
obtain answers to research questions. The plan is the overall scheme or program of
research. It includes an outline of what the researcher would do from writing the
hypotheses and their operational implications to the final analysis of the data.
Descriptive research involves collecting and examining data in order to answer
questions concerning the status or condition of the research subject at some point of
time. Thus, descriptive research seeks to determine the answers to who, what, when,
where and how questions. Its major purpose, as designed, is to describe characteristics
of a population or a phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003).
In this research, secondary data method was used. This research problem was best
studied through the use of descriptive survey design. It allowed the collection of large
amount of data from a sizeable population in an economical manner. Further, it allows
one to collect quantitative data which can be analyzed quantitatively using descriptive
and inferential statistics (Saunders et al, 2007). Since the researcher used quantitative
31
data to answer the research question, the descriptive survey method was more suitable
for this study. The data was collected, coded and analyzed using SPSS software.
3.3 Population of the Study
The target population of this study was all firms listed at the NSE in Kenya. From the
listed companies in NSE, the researcher studied all the firms that have issued IPO
from 2000-2013, so as to cover a minimum of three year period. There were sixty one
firms listed at NSE as at end of year 2013. The sample was the number of firms that
had issued IPOs in the period under study which were ten and of which two were
delisted (CMA).
3.4 Data Collection
There are many methods of data collection. The choice of a tool and instrument
depends mainly on the attributes of the subjects, research topic, problem question,
objectives, design, expected data and results. This is because each tool and instrument
collects specific data. Data used in this study was secondary.
The secondary data was collected from the NSE, the Capital Market Authority
(CMA), annual reports of the firms, and other research material on share prices.
Secondary data are data gathered and recorded by someone else prior to the current
needs of the researcher (Zikmund, 2003). Specifically, stock prices for the companies
were collected for period under study. This included the offer price and after market
prices, as well as the prices up to five years after the IPO. The prospectuses of issuing
firms provided provide vital information on the offer price and number of shares
offered and the background information on these firms. The data was coded and
analyzed through the use of analysis software, Statistical Package for Social Services
(SPSS), and then statistical computations were used to draw conclusions.
32
3.5 Data Analysis
Data analysis as related to this research work involved statistically analyzing the data
collected to form a basis of accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Descriptive statistics
was the main methods of data analysis that was suitable for this study. The research
was empirical in nature and was analyzed using descriptive statistics such as charts,
graphs, mean, and standard deviation, quartiles and regression analysis.
Zikmund (2003) defined an independent variable as a variable that is expected to
influence the dependent variable and the dependent variable as a criterion or a
variable that is to be expected or explained.
3.5.1 Analytical Model
For purposes of this study a multivariate regression was used to test the influence of
the explanatory variables on the long-run performance, measured by market adjusted
buy – and hold abnormal (BHAR). This study used the following model as applied by
Ritter (1991) who did a study on the long-run performance of initial public offerings
in USA and Bhabra and Pettway (2003) who did a study on the IPO prospectus
information and subsequent performance in USA.
A typical multivariate regression model is of the form:
Y= β0 + β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+β5X5+ε
Hence:
BHAR (Y) = β0 + β1IR+β2AGE+β3SIZE+β4 NO+β5SUB+ε
Where:
Y-Long run performance of shares measured by BHAR
Selected as follows:
33
X1 = 1st Day pricing differential between the offer price and closing day one price.
X2 = Age in years of firm is the difference the between the offer firm‟s IPO year and
the founding year
X3 = Size of the firm as measured by total assets
X4 = Number of shares issued
X5 = the percentage subscription
β0 = is the intercept; and reflects the constant of the equation.
βi = is the sensitive coefficient of each independent variable (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
ℰ = is the error term.
The intercorrelation matrix was used to check the suitability of the independent
variables in the multiple regression equation. This was necessary to avoid the effect of
multicollinearity.
3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables
The abnormal return of company i in event year t are BHARi, t.is calculated as:
BHARi,t (1 Ri,t ) 1t1
T
(1 Rm,t
t1
T
) 1
Where;
BHAR the market adjusted BHAR for the firm “i” over “t” year period
Ri, t and Rm, t are the yearly return on the stock i and the market index in event year t
respectively.
Therefore, the identification of IPO outperformance (underperformance) will be a
positive (negative) value of BHARi, t.
34
3.5.1.2 Independent Variables
a) Initial return – The returns of stocks in % in any given time period is given as
IRi,t = { (Pi,t – OPi,o )/ Pi,o}*100 ………………………………………1
Where:
Pi,t = Closing price of stock i at time t.
Pi,0 = Offering price of IPO Shares
To calculate the market return in the same time period is given by.
Rm, t = {(Pk, t – Pk,o)/Pk,0}*100 ………………………………………….2
Where:
Rm,t is the first day‟s comparable NSE share return.
Pk,t is closing NSE share index value on the first trading day.
Pk,o is the closing NSE share index value on the offering of the appropriate share.
The market adjusted abnormal return of each IPO on the first day trading is given as:
MAARi1= {(1+Ri,t/1+Rm,1)-1}*100 ………………………………………3
3.5.2 Test of Significance
To test the robustness of the long –run abnormal returns, the study computed the t-
statistic, which is the mean of BHAR equal for a sample of n firms.
The mean buy-and-hold returns are calculated as:
BHAR i,t iBHARi,ti1
n
BHARi, t = Average benchmark return for the year “t” for the sample
In order to test whether the average buy-and-hold return is significantly different from
0 or not, the t-statistic is calculated as:
35
BHARt,month BHAR i,t
(BHARi,t ) / n
Where:
“n” = number of observations in the year
“σ”=Cross-sectional standard deviation of the market BHAR for the year
36
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents analysis and findings of the study as set out in the research
objective and research methodology. The study findings are presented on the effect of
IPO pricing on the long run stock returns of companies listed at Nairobi Securities
Exchange (NSE), Kenya. The data was gathered exclusively from the secondary
source which included the records at Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
4.2 Findings
4.2.1 Age of the Firms
The study sought to establish the age firms under study which was computed by
establishing the difference the between the offer firm‟s IPO year and the founding
year. The age was expresses in years and the findings were presented in Figure 4.1
below and appendix IV.
Figure 4. 1: Age of the firms
Source: Research Findings
37
From the data findings, based on the difference between the year of firm‟s IPO and
the founding year, Kengen had the greatest age with 52 year followed by Co-operative
Bank with age of 40 years then Mumias Sugar with age of 40 years. Eveready had an
age of 39 years followed by Kenya Re with an age of 37 years then Scangroup with an
age of 24 years. British American Investment had an age of 16 years while Safaricom
was has the least age of 6 Years. This is an implication that Kengen was the oldest
company of all the companies incorporated in this study followed by Co-operative
Bank then Mumias Sugar Company.
4.2.2 Size of the Firm as Measured by Total Assets
The study sought to establish the size in the total assets of the firms in the year of
listing. The assets were expresses in thousand Ksh. The findings are presented in the
figure 4.2 below and appendix III.
Figure 4. 2: Size of the firm as measured by total assets
Source: Research Findings
38
According to the study findings, Kengen had the largest total assets amounting to
Ksh. 77,900,268. Co-op Bank followed with total assets valued at Ksh. 65,324,000.
Safaricom had total assets of Ksh 56,408,239 while British American Investment had
total assets worth Ksh.25,361,917. The total assets of Kenya Re, Mumias Sugar and
Scangroup amounted to Kshs. 12,982,833 Ksh. 8,232,256 and Ksh respectively.
Eveready had the list total assets worthy KSh. 818,067.
4.2.3 Number of Shares Issued
The study sought to establish the number of shares issued by the firms under study.
The findings are presented in the Figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4.3: Number of shares issued
Source: Research Findings
From the study findings, Safaricom issued the highest number of shares which
totaled to 10,000,000,000. Co-op Bank issued 701,000,000 shares followed by British
American Investment which issued 660,000,000 shares. Kengen on the other hand
issued Kengen 658,900,000 shares whereas Mumias Sugar and Kenya Re issued
39
300,000,000 shares and 240,000,000 shares respectively. Scangroup and Eveready
hand the least shares issue whereby they issued 69,000,000 shares and 63,000,000
shares respectively.
4.2.4 Day Pricing Differential between the Offer Price and Closing Day One
Price
The study sought to find out the trend in day pricing differential between the offer
price and closing day one price for the companies. The findings are presented in the
Figure below.
Figure 4.4: Day pricing differential between the offer price and closing day one
price
Source: Research Findings
According to the findings, Kengen had the largest difference between 1st Day pricing
offer price and closing day one price of Ksh, 28.1 followed by Kenya Re with a
40
difference of Ksh. 6.5 then Scangroup with a difference of Ksh 4.55. Safaricom,
Eveready and Co-op Bank had deferential of Ksh. 2.35, Ksh. 1.5 and Ksh. 0.95
respectively. Mumias sugar had no difference between 1st Day pricing offer price and
closing day one price whereas British American Investment had a differential of Ksh.
-0.55. It can be deduced that the closing day one prices for all companies under study
were higher as compared to the offer prices of the shares with an exception of British
American investment and also Mumias Sugar.
4.2.5 Subscription Rate
The study sought to establish the percentage subscription of shares of the companies
under study.The findings were as shown in the figure 4.5 below and appendix IV:
Figure 4.5: Subscription Rate
Source: Research Findings
From the study findings, Eveready had the highest subscription rate of 830%
followed by Scangroup with a subscription rate of 620% then Safaricom with
41
subscription rate of 532%. Kenya Re recorded a subscription rate of 334%, while
kengen recorded a subscription rate 333%. Co-op Bank recorded a subscription
rate of 81% while British American Investment and Mumias Sugar recorded a
subscription rate of 60% each. This implies that there was over subscription for
shares in Eveready and Scangroup, Safaricom, Kenya Re and kengen. The
findings further imply that the there was under subscription of shares in Co-op
Bank recorded, British American Investment and Mumias Sugar.
4.2.6 Long Run Performance of Shares
The study sought to establish the trend in the Long run performance of shares
measured by BHAR. Appendix IV and Figure 4.6 presents the data findings
Figure 4.6: Long Run Performance of Shares
Source: Research Findings
According to the study findings, the long run performance of shares as revealed by the
obtained BHAR values was negative for majority of the companies. Mumias Sugar
42
had a negative BHAR value of -5.18% same as Kengen which had a BHAR value of -
2.42%. Eveready had a BHAR of -2.96% while Kenya Re had a BHAR of -0.10%.
British American Investments had a BHAR of -0.33%. This was an indication that
market returns were higher. The study findings further revealed that Scangroup had a
BHAR 10.79% while Co-op Bank had a BHAR of 0.88%. Safaricom had a BHAR of
0.
4.2.7 Regression Analysis
In this study, multivariate regression was done to establish the relationship between
explanatory variables and the long-run performance of shares. The analysis was
undertaken at 95% confidence level and 5% significance level. Initially, the study
sought to establish variation in the dependent variable which was explained by the
independent variables under study by use of coefficient of multiple determinations
(R2). The table below presents the data findings.
Table 4. 1: Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the
Estimate
1 .717a .515 -.698 6.20525
Source: Research Findings
The R2 was used to establish the predictive power of the study model. The R
2, called
the coefficient of multiple determinations, is the percentage of the variance in the
dependent explained uniquely or jointly by the independent variables. The model had
an average coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.515 and which implied that 51.5% of
the variation in Long run performance of shares was explained by the independent
variables understudy (Percentage Subscription, 1st Day pricing differential between
43
the offer price and closing day one price., Number of shares issued, Size of the firm as
measured by total assets, and Age in years of firm).
The study further sought to establish the significance of the model by using Analysis
of Variance Technique (ANOVA). The table below presents the data findings.
Table 4.2: ANOVA
Model
Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
1 Regression 81.700 5 16.340 20.296 .047b
Residual 1.610 2 0.805
Total 83.310 7
a. Dependent Variable: Long run performance of shares
Source: Research Findings
From the ANOVA table, the regression model predicting the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables was significant as the probability-value obtained
was 0.043 which was less than α=0.05, the significance level. The F calculated at 5%
level of significance was 20.296 which was greater than F(5,2) critical = 19.30 which
implies that the model was significant.
Table 4. 3 : Coefficient table
Model Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) 8.736 9.882 .884 .470
1st Day pricing differential
between the offer price and
closing day one price (X1)
.068 .404 .135 3.169 .017
Age in years of firm (X2) -.371 .289 -1.176 -2.484 .028
Size of the firm as measured
by total assets(X3) 7.147*10
-8 .000 .465 2.682 .023
Number of shares issued(X4) -1.524*10-9
.000 -1.091 -2.106 .041
Percentage Subscription(X5) .008 .011 .499 3.348 .012
a. Dependent Variable: Long run performance of shares
Source: Research Findings
44
The established model for the study was:
Y= 8.736 + 0.068X1 - 0.371X2 +7.147*10-8
X3 -1.524 *10-9
X4+ 0.008X5
From the regression model obtained above, holding all the other factors constant, long
run performance of shares would be 8.736. A unit change in the difference between
offer price and closing day one price holding the other factors constant would lead to
change in long run performance of shares by 0.068; a unit change in Age in years of
firm holding the other factors constant would change long run performance of shares
by -0.371. A unit change in Size of the firm holding the other factors constant would
change the long run performance of shares by 7.147*10-8-5
. A unit change in number
of shares issued holding the other factors constant would change the long run
performance of shares by 1.524*10-9
while a unit changes in Percentage Subscription
holding the other factors constant would change long run performance of shares by
0.008 units. Based on the stipulated criteria for testing for significance, the study
found out that at 5% level of significance all the predicator variables were significant
since their corresponding probability values were less than significance level
(α=0.05).
4.3 Interpretation of the Findings
The findings of the regression analysis imply that shares of a firm would
underperform in the long run holding other factor constant as shown by a constant of
8.736. Age in years of firm and number of shares issued by a firm of shares have
negative impact on the long run performance of shares whereas 1st Day pricing
differential between the offer price and closing day one price, Size of the firm and
Percentage Subscription positively affect the long run performance of shares. The
45
findings are in agreement with Teker and Ekit (2003) who found out that firm with
larger amount of total assets experience less uncertainty regarding its perpetuity, and
hence commanding less under pricing and increased long run performance of shares.
The findings however contradict with Carter (1998) argument that older firms have
longer operating histories and thus face less uncertainty hence guaranteeing better
long run performance of shares.
From the study findings, based on the obtained coefficients, 1st Day pricing
differential between the offer price and closing day one price has the highest influence
on the long run performance of shares of a firm. The more the 1st Day pricing
differential between the offer price and closing day one price, the higher the long run
performance. Increase in the number of shares issued by a firm decreases the
performance of shares in the long run. The findings conform to Baker and Wurgler
(2000) assertion that if the IPO market is very attractive to investors, they take
advantage of the situation and this results in short run good performance by the
company‟s shares which cannot be sustained in the long run. According to the
regression analysis, the magnitude of the effect of the firm size and the number of
shares issued on the long run performance of shares is low as shown by coefficients of
7.147*10-8
and -1.524*10-9
respectively. These findings concur with Dalton (2003)
that the size of the IPO firm has important implication for pricing as it is an important
determinant of stability of the firm.
46
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the study summary, conclusions and recommendations based on
the study findings. The objectives of this study was to investigate the effect of IPO
pricing on the long run stock returns of companies listed at Nairobi Securities
Exchange (NSE), Kenya.
5.2 Summary
The study findings established that the shares of the companies under study were
underperforming. On average, over the study period, the study established that
Safaricom Company had issued the highest number of shares. The study revealed that
the closing day one prices of shares for all companies under study were higher as
compared to the offer prices of the shares with an exception of British American
Investment while the difference for Mumias sugar was zero. Further, the study
revealed that there was over subscription for shares in Eveready and Scangroup,
Safaricom, Kenya Re and kengen and under subscription of shares in Co-op Bank
recorded, British American Investment and Mumias Sugar.
From the regression analysis, the study revealed that 51.5% of the variation in long
run performance of shares was explained jointly by the independent variables
understudy as the obtained coefficient of determination (R2) from the model summary
was 0.515. The study further revealed that the regression model predicting the
relationship between the long run performance of shares and independent variables
47
was significant. The study deduces that holding all the other factors constant, long run
performance of shares would be 8.736 units. A unit change in the difference between
offer price and closing day one price holding the other factors constant would lead to
change in long run performance of shares by 0.068. For the case of firm age, Size of
the firm, number of shares issued, and percentage, the effect they had on long run
performance of shares was -0.371, 7.147*10-8
, -1.524 *10-9
and 0.008X5 respectively.
5.3 Conclusion
This study concludes that the difference between 1st Day offer price and closing day
one price affect the long run performance of shares whereby an increase in the
difference positively affects the long performance of shares of firms and vice versa.
From the findings, the study deduces that age of the firm i.e. the difference, in years
of firm is the difference the between the offer firm‟s IPO year and the founding year
affects the long run performance of the shares. The more aged a firm is, the lower
performance of its shares in long run.
The study further concludes that size of a firm affects the performance of shares of
that firm in the long run. Increased firm size increase the performance of shares in the
long run while decrease in firm size reduces the performance of performance of
shares in the long run. Teker and Ekit (2003) posit that a firm with larger amount of
total assets experience less uncertainty regarding its perpetuity, and hence
commanding less under pricing, and hence higher offer price hence in agreement with
this conclusion.
The study concludes that the number of shares issued influences the long run
performance of shares in the long run, whereby increase in the number of shares
48
issued reduce the performance of shares in the long run while a decrease in the
number of shares issued increase the performance of shares.
The study finally concludes that the percentage subscription affects the performance
of shares of a company in the long run. Increased percentage of subscription increase
the performance of shares in the long run while decreased in subscription rate reduces
the performance of shares in the long run.
5.4 Recommendations for Policy
This study found out there was under performance of the IPOs of the firms under
study in the long run. Based on these findings, the study recommends for the
implementation of policies by the NSE management so as to revert the situation. The
firms should also put in place measures to ensure continued performance of their
shares in the long run.
The study found out that increase in the number of shares issued negatively affects the
long run performance of shares of a firm. Hence, this study recommends for policies
to be enacted regulating the number of shares being issued by firms.
The study findings established that that size of a firm affects the performance of
shares of that firm in the long run. Based on this finding, this study recommends that
firms listed at the NSE need to put in place strategies that will ensure their continued
expansion as this is important for ensuring enhanced performance of shares in the
long run.
49
5.5 Limitations of the Study
A limitation for the sake of this study comprised of any factor that was present and
could have hindered the attainment of this study‟s research objective. The main
limitations of this study were: the firms under study commenced the issuance of IPO
at different period hence variability of the data collected in terms of time scope.
This data used in this study comprised of secondary data collected for other purposes
and was subject to various macroeconomic variables which may have influenced their
construction. This may however limit the applicability of the data in other
circumstances.
Further, the other limitation of the study was the number of firms selected which were
eight for the analysis based on the time period and limited variables. Data used in the
study was yearly because of the time constrained in mining the daily data obtained.
The result could differ probably if daily data were used.
5.6 Recommendations for Further Studies
The study revealed that 51.5% of the variations in long run performance of shares
were explained jointly by the independent variables under study. The subject matter
of this project still attracts considerable intellectual effort for further studies to
determine the factors explaining the remaining 49.5% variation in long run
performance of shares.
Given economic changes in developing countries which affect the performance of
shares, this study recommends for further research into the effect in variation of
economic stability on the long run stock return of shares the firms under study.
50
Further studies need to be done on the perception of investors (IPO share holders) on
the performance of share of the companies. This would be of importance in enhancing
the long run stock return.
A further research can be done to investigate whether IPOs of certain segments at the
Nairobi Securities Exchange perform better than others.
51
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60
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I : NAIROBI SECURITIES EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANIES
AS AT THE YEAR 2013
NSE LISTED COMPANIES
AGRICULTURAL CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED
Eaagads Ltd – Ord. 1.25 AIMS ARM Cement Ltd Ord. 1.00
Kakuzi Ltd Ord. 5.00 Bamburi Cement Ltd Ord. 5.00
Kapchorua Tea Co.Ltd Ord .5.00 AIMS Crown Paints Kenya Ltd Ord.5.00
The Limuru Tea Co.Ltd Ord. 20.00 AIMS E.A. Cables Ltd Ord.0.50
Rea Vipingo Plantations Ltd Ord. 5.00 E.A Portland Cement Co.Ltd Ord.5.00
Sasini Ltd Ord. 1.00
Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd Ord. 5.00 AIMS ENERGY AND PETROLEUM
KenGen Co. Ltd Ord. 2.50
AUTOMOBILES & ACCESSORIES KenolKobil Ltd Ord. 0.05
Car & General (K) Ltd Ord. 5.00 Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd Ord. 2.50
CMC Holdings Ltd Ord. 0.50 Total Kenya Ltd Ord. 5.00
Marshalls (E.A) Ltd Ord. 5.00 Umeme Ltd Ord. 0.50
Sameer Africa Ltd Ord. 5.00
INSURANCE
BANKING British American Investments Co.(K)Ltd Ord. 0.10
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd Ord.0.50 CIC Insurance Group Ltd. Ord. 1.00
CFC Stanbic of Kenya Holdings Ltd Ord.5.00 Jubilee Holdings Ltd Ord. 5.00
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd Ord. 5.00 Kenya Re Insurance Corporation Ltd. Ord 2.50
Equity Bank Ltd Ord. 0.50 Liberty Kenya Holdings Ltd Ord. 1.00
Housing Finance Co. Kenya Ltd. Ord. 5.00 Pan-African Insurance Ltd. Ord 5.00
I&M Holdings Ltd Ord. 1.00
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. Ord. 1.00 INVESTMENT
National Bank of Kenya Ltd. Ord. 1.00 Centum Investment Co.Ltd 0.50
NIC Bank Ltd Ord. 5.00 Olympia Capital Holdings Ltd. Ord 5.00
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ord. 5.00 Trans-Century Ltd Ord.0.50 AIMS
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ord. 1.00
MANUFACTURING & ALLIED
COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES A. Baumann & Co Ltd Ord 5.00 AIMS
Express Kenya Ltd Ord. 5.00 AIMS B.O.C Kenya Ltd Ord. 5.00
Hutchings Biemer Ltd Ord.5.00 British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd. Ord 10.00
Kenya Airways Ltd Ord. 5.00 Carbacid Investment Ltd Ord.1.00
Longhorn Kenya Ltd Ord. 1.00 AIMS East African Breweris Ltd .Ord. 2.00
Nation Media Group Ltd Ord.2.50 Eveready East Africa Ltd. Ord. 1.00
Scangroup Ltd. Ord. 1.00 Kenya Orchards Ltd .Ord.5.00 AIMS
Standard Group Ltd Ord. 5.00 Mumias Sugar Co.Ltd Ord. 2.00
TPS Eastern Africa Ltd. Ord. 1.00 Unga Group Ltd Ord .5.00
Uchumi Supermarket Ltd. Ord. 5.00
TELECOMMUNICATIONS&TECHNOLOGY
Safaricom Ltd Ord. 0.05
GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET SEGMENT (GEMS
Home Afrika Ltd Ord. 1.00
62
APPENDIX II : INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS (IPOS) – 2000-2013
Company Shares on Issue Year of Issue Issue
Price
Subscription
Level
Ordinary
Shares
Year/Month Kshs. %
African Lakes
Delisted in 2003
4,000,000 2000 March 94.50 150%
Mumias Sugar
Company Limited
300,000,000 2001 November 6.25 60%
Kengen Ltd 658,900,000 2006 April 11.90 333%
Scangroup Ltd 69,000,000 2006 June 10.45 620%
Eveready 63,000,000 2006 August 9.50 830%
Access Kenya
Delisted in 2013
80,000,000 2007 March 10.00 363%
Kenya Re 240,000,000 2007 July 9.50 334%
Safaricom Ltd 10,000,000,000 2008 June 5.00 532%
Co-operative Bank 701,000,000 2008 October 9.50 81%
British-American
Investments Co.Ltd 660,000,000 2011 September 9.00 60%
Source: CMA
63
APPENDIX III: FIRM AGE AND MARKET RETURN
Offer
Price
First day
Trading
Price ( List
Price)
Market
Returns
Incorporati
on Year
IPO
Year Age
Mumias
Sugar 6.25 6.25 1,478.71 1971 2001 30
Kengen 11.9 40 4,447.99 1954 2006 52
Scangroup 10.45 15 4,486.07 1982 2006 24
Eveready 9.5 11 5,093.51 1967 2006 39
Kenya Re 9.5 16 5,274.53 1954 2007 37
Safaricom 5 7.35 5,445.67 2002 2008 6
Co-op Bank 9.5 10.45 3,367.24 1968 2008 40
British
American
Inve 9 8.45 3,393.70 1995 2011 16
Source: CMA
64
APPENDIX IV: ASSETS, BUY AND HOLD ABNORMAL RETURN
(BHAR) AND SUBSCRIPTION RATE
Total Assets
(Ksh '000)
Shares
Floated
Subscripti
on rate
Buy and Hold
Abnormal Return
(BHAR) in
Mumias
Sugar 1,218,400
300,000,0
00 60% -5.18%
Kengen 10,194,762
658,900,0
00 333% -2.42%
Scangroup 1,021,563
69,000,00
0 620% 10.79%
Eveready 818,067
63,000,00
0 830% -2.96%
Kenya Re 12,982,833
240,000,0
00 334% -0.10%
Safaricom 56,408,239
10,000,00
0,000 532% 0.00%
Co-op Bank 65,324,000
701,000,0
00 81% 0.88%
British
American
Inve 25,361,917
660,000,0
00 60%
-0.33%
Source: CMA