the emergence of the counter terrorism command policing...
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The Emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing
model and its impact on intelligence sharing between the
Police and the Security Services.
By
Eric Halford
Student ID: 00221692
Dissertation thesis submitted to the faculty of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary
History, Salford University
In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Science
In
Terrorism and Security Studies
2008/09
Supervised by Dr Christian Kaunert
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Descriptive Abstract
The emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model is the most contemporary
change to Counter Terrorism within the United Kingdom in recent history. The creation of the CTC
and regional CTU’S has resulted in an unprecedented level of cooperation between the Police and
the intelligence agency, the Security Service. Their greatest area of cooperation is in the field of
intelligence sharing and as such this project aims to establish the impact of the creation of the CTC
Policing model on the levels of intelligence sharing between the two actors before ultimately
assessing the overall affect on the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat. Through
the conduct of a detailed research strategy consisting of a quantitative questionnaire and qualitative
interview process within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit this project will analyse information
and data obtained from serving Counter Terrorism staff in an effort to fill the missing dimension of
Counter Terrorism literature that is seemingly completely absent at the practitioner’s level whilst
adding to an identified general lack of empirical material surrounding Counter Terrorism study.
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Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank Dr Sarah Leonard whose support whilst completing the accredited
prior learning application was invaluable and fundamentally made my presence on the
program possible. From start to finish the support of Dr Christian Kaunert has been
exceptional, his level of knowledge and enthusiasm regarding the course content and his
continual motivational support during a number of confidence lapses has been vital in
maintaining focus throughout the project. I would also like to offer Dr Kaunert my thanks for
his support during the dissertation and apologise for the weeks of nervousness he spent
awaiting the projects final submission. This was an extremely enjoyable and interesting
project to conduct and it is only with thanks to Lancashire Constabulary and their funding
that the financial cost could be met. Finally, I reserve my greatest thanks until last and offer
them to both Chief Superintendant Tony Porter of the Greater Manchester Police and
Superintendant Edward Thistlethwaite from Lancashire Constabulary who without their
support the research that was fundamental to the project would not have even been
achievable.
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CONTENTS PAGE
Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 3
Table of Contents 4
Acronyms 6
List of Figures 7
List of Tables 7
Chapter
1. Introduction 8
2. An Introduction to Counter Terrorism
Literature
10
2.1 Counter Terrorism Literature Review
Methodology
11
2.2 Conciliation and Prevention as Tools
Against Terrorism
12
2.3 Enforcement as a Counter Terrorism
Response
13
2.4 Protection of Critical National
Infrastructure
14
2.5 Domestic Counter Terrorism, the Main
Players
15
2.6 The United States Counter Terrorism
Approach, All out War.
15
2.7 The Homeland Security Approach 16
2.8 The United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism
Approach, The Four P’s
17
2.9 Literature Review Conclusion 20
3. Practitioners Level Intelligence Sharing 22
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3.1 Introduction 22
3.2 Intelligence Sharing Solutions 24
3.3 The Importance of Enhanced cooperation 28
3.4 Conclusion 29
4. 4.1 Counter Terrorism Research Question 30
4.1 Research Methodology 31
4.2 Research Strategy 32
5. Bureaucracy, the Hidden Enemy Within
Counter Terrorism
34
5.1 Introduction to the Counter Terrorism
Command Policing Model
34
5.2 Need to Know or Need to Share 36
6. The Cooperative Approach to Counter
Terrorism
45
6.1 Introduction 45
6.2 BI-Lateral Intelligence Sharing Within the
UK’S Counter Terrorism Response
45
6.3 Conclusion 54
7. Bibliography 57
Appendices i Research Questionnaire 63
ii Sample of Interview Questions: Deputy
NCSB
81
iii Interview Matrix 82
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Acronyms
ACPO TAM Association of Chief Police Officers –
Terrorism and Allied Matters
CTC Counter Terrorism Command
CTU Counter Terrorism Unit
GPMS Government Protected Marking Scheme
MI5 Security Service
NCSB National Coordinator of Special Branches
NIM National Intelligence Model
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Comparison of intelligence sharing
blockers Pre and Post CTC Policing Model
Figure 2 Pre and Post CTC Levels of Face to Face
Liaison with the Security Service
Figure 3 The Affect on Intelligence Sharing as a
result of the CTC.
Figure 4 Level of Contribution to Increases in
Intelligence Sharing
Figure 5 Has the CTC/CTU Increased the UK’S
Counter Terrorism Ability?
Figure 6 What is the Best Way to Improve the
UK’S Counter Terrorism Ability?
List of Tables
Table 1 Structure of Counter Terrorism
Investigation with the United Kingdom
Table 2 Biggest Blocker to Intelligence Sharing
with the Security Service?
Table 3 The Biggest Blocker to Intelligence
Sharing with the Security Service Pre VS
Post CTC?
Table 4 Frequency of Face to Face Liaison with a
Member of the Security Service?
Table 5 Belief that Intelligence Sharing with the
Security Service has Increased as a Result
of the Creation of the CTC/CTU?
Table 6 What has Played the Greatest Role in
Intelligence Sharing?
Table 7 How Much do you Believe the CTC/CTU
has Increased the UK’S Counter Terrorism
Ability?
Table 8 Further Ways of Improving the UK’S
Counter Terrorism Ability.
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1. Introduction
Terrorism is undoubtedly an international threat. The attacks on the World Trade
Centre committed on September 11th 2001 resulted in victims from over 90 different
countries (Walker, 2006). Not only are the targets and victims of terrorism increasingly
international, so are their far reaching associations. Terrorist groups have been known to
utilise international support prior to the manifestation of the international Islamic
fundamentalists that we have witnessed in recent years. Terrorist groups such as the Irish
Republican Army and the Basque group, ETA, were well known to have sourced bi-lateral
cooperation and arms from international supporters (Wilkinson, 2007:158). As a result,
formulation of an international strategy and increased cooperation are widely acknowledged
as being the most effective ways of countering the terrorist threat (Wilkinson, 2007:162) and
as such this project begins with a review of literature regarding International Counter
Terrorism theories.
In an effort to gain a greater insight the review will also examine literature that has
been written regarding Counter Terrorism at a domestic level by utilising the United States
and the United Kingdom as case studies. This review will identify that the vast majority of
Counter Terrorism literature has been written from a strategic policy making level and as
such through further distilling of the material the attention will then centre on a review of
literature at a practitioners level in an effort to accurately assess the void of literature within
this missing dimension. Outlining the necessity for increased cooperation between Counter
Terrorism actors the area of intelligence sharing will be examined after being highlighted as
the fundamental process within Counter Terrorism cooperation. Subsequently combining
the missing dimension of practitioners level literature the recommendations for greater
cooperation between intelligence actors and the fundamental area of their cooperation,
intelligence sharing, an effort will be made to address the deficit in empirical evidence
within Counter Terrorism by examining if the introduction of the Counter Terrorism
Command Policing model within the UK has increased intelligence sharing between the
Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the United Kingdom’s capability to counter
the terrorist threat.
In an effort to answer this question a course of empirical research through the
circulation of a quantitative questionnaire and supporting qualitative interviews of serving
Counter Terrorism officers will be conducted within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit.
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Before analysing the data obtained an overview of the Counter Terrorism Command
structure will be provided. Through adoption of a combined data presentation and analysis
approach bureaucracy and the ‘need to know ’ principle will be examined as a barrier to the
level of intelligence sharing between the Counter Terrorism Command and the Security
Service in conjunction with the levels of face to face liaison between the two actors. This
examination will identify one major finding, that the emergence of the Counter Terrorism
Command has resulted in increased liaison between the Police and the Security Services but
that this increase has resulted in greater numbers of officers being exposed to the
bureaucratic ‘need to know’ principle thus evidencing a clear shift in the causation of
intelligence sharing blockers.
Intelligence sharing through bi-lateral, face to face contact will then be examined in
an effort to establish the factors that contribute greatest to information sharing levels within
the Counter Terrorism Command structure before analysing the overall impact of the CTC in
increasing the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability. The practitioner’s
recommendations for improving the UK’s Counter Terrorism ability offer several interesting
opportunities which will then be examined before formulating the hypothesis that joint
working and increased liaison between the two actors has a sealing point and as such a
recommendation for future progress through restructuring Counter Terrorism at a national
level will be outlined. The project will then be concluded by assessing whether the literature
reviewed provided just cause for the area of research and establish if the overall aims of the
hypothesis have been met and the weight of the evidence obtained before recommending
further areas of research to corroborate or negate the findings and recommendations
outlined.
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2. An introduction to Counter Terrorism literature
This review has identified through examination of a wide range of published academic
journals, books and policy literature that the study of Counter Terrorism has come from a
number of academic areas and from a large amount of authors and scholars. The review has
also highlighted that at present there is no international authority in existence that has
overriding control to introduce or enforce international law, policy or strategy and as such
there is no clearly defined universal approach to Counter Terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007:169).
Counter Terrorism literature, although present in many academic fields is most prevalent in
the areas of governmental policy, international relations, economics, sociology and conflict
studies. The governmental strategy and literature supporting Counter Terrorism policy is
extensive (Cressey, 2000; HMG, 2007; CO, 2008; CEU, 2005; EOTP, 2002; NSC, 2003;
Gunaratna, 2007; European Union, 2006; UN, 2009;), as is the literature in the field of
conflict studies (Malvesti, 2002; Scheurs, 2004; Hutcheson and Talev, 2006; Heyman, 2003;
Kennedy, Lum and Shirley, 2006; Hewitt, 2007; Gunaratna, 2006, 2007; Hoffman, 1998).
International relations academics have also contributed a large amount of material relating
to Counter Terrorism (Sandler, 2005; Ganor, 2005; Ek, Gallis and Miko, 2006; Deflem, 2006;
Keohane, 2005; Haine, Jaarva and Johnson, 2006; Walker, 2006; Gunaratna ans Steven,
2004; Bennis, 2003), along with academics from the field of sociology (Pressman, 2007;
Thacher, 2005; Dancs, 2008; Shapiro, 2005; Wardlaw, 1982; Crenshaw, 2007; Omand, 2005;
Wilkinson, 2007), however, although present, the literature written from an economics
perspective is much more scarce (Enders and Sandler, 2004; De Soto, 1989; Bruck, 2009).
Although the Counter Terrorism debate has provided us with an array of conflicting
theories from numerous academic fields as it has been outlined above, it is possible to
extract from the literature three commonly advocated Counter Terrorism responses. The
prevention of terrorism by tackling its fundamental causes (HMG, 2006; UN 60/288, 2006;
Omand, 2005; Gunaratna, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007; Ganor, 2006; Sederberg, 1995; CEU, 2005),
the enforcement of consequences, whether they be criminal or military (HMG, 2006;
Cressey, 2000; Shapiro, 2005; NSC, 2003; Scheur, 2004; UN 60/288, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007;
CEU, 2005; Ganor, 2005; Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006; Keohane, 2005; Sandler,
2005; Deflem, 2006; Omand, 2005), and finally, the increase in protection from the
commission of terrorist attacks (HMG, 2006; Sandler and Walters, 2004; Thacher, 2005;
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EOTP, 2002; UN 60/288, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007; CEU, 2005; Ek, Gallis and Milko et al, 2006;
Ganor, 2005; Heymann, 2003; Dancs, 2008).
2.1 Counter Terrorism literature review methodology
The sources of material being utilised for this review encompasses only English
language Counter Terrorism publications which includes books, information sourced from
the internet and journal and articles located within scholarly website based institutions who
subscribe to the Athens system. To enable a more refined review, the literature will be
narrowed to that outlining the three previously mentioned theories which will be examined
at two levels of Counter Terrorism, international responses and the domestic approach
which will use the United States and United Kingdom as case studies. This approach assists in
bringing the wide range of literature in existence under an easily manageable umbrella. This
method also offers the advantage of enabling the review to easily identify the theoretical
base of the three most commonly advocated responses and enables a more effective review
of the depth and quality of literature in that area of Counter Terrorism strategy. This
approach will also enable commonalities and distinctions to be more accurately identified at
the international and domestic levels of Counter Terrorism, thus enabling identification of
areas that require further examination or research.
It must however be acknowledged that this approach does have downfalls and that
it is not an exhaustive review of every theory of Counter Terrorism. As the review focuses on
literature that underpins the three most commonly advocated Counter Terrorism
approaches, it is restricted by the noticeable absence of material of a more radical or under
supported theoretical response. This weakens the review as until comprehensive empirical
analysis of all available theories, radical or otherwise, has been conducted, it may overlook
the most effective method of Counter Terrorism. The review is also restrictive in the amount
of literature that has been reviewed as although extensive research has been conducted, it
should be acknowledged that due to the vast amount of literature available along with a lack
of examination of non English language literature, there is likelihood that material worthy of
inclusion may be absent.
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2.2 Conciliation and Prevention as Tools against Terrorism.
The United Nations resolution 60/288 emphasises a need to address the conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism and promotes a strategy of integration and inclusion of
people, cultures and religions and promoting dialogue, mediation and conciliation (UN
60/288, 2006). The theory of tackling the underlying causes of terrorism as a Counter
Terrorism response has been championed by Martha Crenshaw since 1981 and is advocated
by both academics and politicians alike who agree policy makers should engage further with
communities to address their concerns and to avoid feeding the cycle of radicalisation
(Omand, 2005; Crenshaw, 2007). This mindset is supported by Rohan Gunaratna who
suggests enhancing the ability for moderate clerics to preach tolerism as a means of
reducing misunderstandings and conflicts between communities (2007:64). Further support
to this theory can be found in Paul Wilkinson’s book ‘Terrorism versus Democracy’ (2007) in
which he advocates such a response in his theory ‘Pathways out of terrorism’ in which he
argues that educating people that terrorism is unacceptable and counterproductive, in
conjunction with governments considering granting political concessions to terrorist groups
through peace processes to reduce their need to engage in terrorism, when appropriate,
offers the best Counter Terrorism response (2007:198).
Boaz Ganor further theorises that governments take a three strand approach to
Counter Terrorism in his publication ‘The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision
Makers’, with strand three concurring with Wilkinson that re-education, conciliation and
engagement may be the best ways of preventing the threat of terrorism from increasing
(Ganor, 2005:26). Peter Sederberg also advocates conciliation as a tool for Counter
Terrorism in his publication ‘Conciliation as a Counter Terrorist Strategy’ (1995:295). In the
theory he highlights that conciliation has been used successfully in previous Counter
Terrorism operations (1995:295) although it is argued that the differences in secular and
religious terrorism means this approach may not always work (Sederberg, 1995:307) and
that making concessions with moderate terrorist groups only increases the overall use of
terrorism by more radical elements (Ganor, 2005:146). This measure of social integration
and mediation is strongly emphasised as a Counter Terrorism response by the European
Union’s strategy to address the factors that contribute support for and recruitment into
terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007:172).
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2.3 Enforcement as a Counter Terrorism Response
The United Nations also advocate a strategy that encourages the creation of hostile
environments for terrorists and increased international cooperation in Counter Terrorism
enforcement (UN 60/288, 2006) which is where we first find the necessity for increased
levels of intelligence sharing between Counter Terrorism actors being outlined. The theory
of a pro-active Counter Terrorism response is widely supported amongst both academics
and politicians who often dismiss more conciliatory methods as being ineffective (Sederberg,
1995;298) and because of its simplicity which is identified by Todd Sandler in his publication
‘Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism’ in which he suggests that by targeting
terrorist groups, you reduce their ability to commit terrorist attacks (2005:75), the method
of targeting however is greatly debated (Crelinsten and Schmid, 1993:315).
Richard Rubenstein argues in his publication ‘Alchemist of Revolution: Terrorism in
the Modern World’ that those who view terrorism as an act of war favour military action,
those who view it as a crime favour law enforcement (1987:9). Regardless of the method the
theory has strong support and Peter Sederberg argues that failure to engage the terrorists
with enforcement would only lead to more terrorism (1995:299). Boaz Ganor suggests in
strand one, ‘eliminating terrorism’, of his three strand Counter Terrorism proposal that
complete elimination of the terrorist threat is one possible response (2005:25-26) a tactic
which Paul Wilkinson concurs within number 3 of his 6 ‘pathways out of terrorism’ plan, in
which he suggests complete eradication of the terrorist group by either law enforcement or
military intervention as one way of removing the threat by increasing the costs of their acts
(2007:197). Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter agree with the theory of repressive
enforcement but go further by warning that it should be targeted at supporters of terrorism,
their leaders and their assets (2006:64) and that care should be taken to reduce collateral
damage or you risk further adding to the threat (2006:72). The task of effective targeting is
itself a difficult task and it has been argued that regardless of the progress made post 9/11
there remains a lack of common understanding in Counter Terrorism of ‘who is doing what’
(Omand, 2005:115) and that greater steps need to be taken to improve cooperation in law
enforcement and intelligence sharing as a Counter Terrorism strategy (Omand, 2005;
Keohane, 2005), particularly between law enforcement and intelligence services at both a
domestic and international level (Keohane, 2005), again intimating at the necessity for
enhanced levels of intelligence sharing.
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2.4 Protection of Critical National Infrastructure
The United Nations encourages member states to share best practice in methods of
prevention and areas of expertise and for members to increase their protection of national
infrastructure (UN 60/288, 2006), the European Union action plan reaffirms this by outlining
the need to increase protection of international transport and border controls (Wilkinson,
2007:172) as it has been argued that open borders as present within the US and now Europe
offer increased opportunity for the planning and commission of terrorist attacks (Sederberg,
1995:298). The concept of risk management and protection from attack is known as critical
infrastructure protection and rational choice theory dictates that such target hardening is an
obvious and effective way of reducing the risk of terrorism as it increases the likely costs
(Kydd and Walter, 2006:65).
The theory is suggested by Boaz Ganor as one way of dealing with the threat of
terrorism in strand two, ‘minimising damage caused by terrorism’, of his three strand
approach (2005:26) and a theory that has widespread support amongst academics (Sandler
and Walters, 2004; Thacher, 2005; Wilkinson, 2007; Ek, Gallis and Milko et al, 2006;
Heymann, 2003; Dancs, 2008). However, the events of 9/11 served to emphasise the
necessity for protection of critical infrastructure and the result is very little detailed
literature debating the validity of this theory which is simply accepted as a must. The debate
has instead concentrated on the assessment of the risk and the methods of protection.
Many academics have added their own theoretical approaches to the risk assessment
process (Olwell, Wilson and Wilson:2006). A comprehensive assessment of this Counter
Terrorism approach was written by Theodore Lewis in his book ‘Critical Infrastructure
Protection in Homeland Security’ in which he attempts to formulate a theory of quantitative
vulnerability analysis in an effort to identify infrastructure in need of protection and how it
should be done (2006:107). Peter Orszag and Joseph Pechman further the theory by risk
assessment by arguing that simply identifying a need for infrastructure protection is not
enough and that regulatory or financial incentives are required to create compliance within
the private sector (2003:2).
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2.5 Domestic Counter Terrorism, The main Players
It can be argued that in recent years the two major domestic players in the Counter
Terrorism arena are the United States, brought about by the atrocity of the world trade
centre attacks on September 11th 2001 and the United Kingdom, who’s long Counter
Terrorism experience against Irish related terrorism and the attacks committed against the
London transport system in 2005 have given them both vast experience in domestic Counter
Terrorism. However, both these two nations adopt very different approaches to domestic
Counter Terrorism as it is argued they face very different threats and have varying levels of
resources, which has ultimately shaped their domestic policy (Shapiro, 2005). Such different
approaches are justified by Jeremy Pressman in his publication ‘Rethinking Transnational
Counter Terrorism: Beyond a National Framework’ in which he highlights the fact that
governments should acknowledge that Counter Terrorism strategies that may be successful
at an international level, may not be as useful on a domestic stage (2007:64).
2.6 The United States Counter Terrorism Approach, ‘All out war’
The literature surrounding the Counter Terrorism response by the United States is
dominated by two theories, one providing overwhelming support for military action as a tool
for defeating terrorism and the second concentrating on the protection of critical
infrastructure. The ‘all out war’ approach is strongly supported by many US academics
because they believe America is the primary global target for Islamic terrorism and their
main enemy in the holy war, ‘jihad’, and that as a result they are more likely to be subject to
nihilistic attacks such as 9/11 (Shapiro, 2005; Simon, 1987). The US national strategy is based
on a theoretical approach that advocates this response, although the provenance of this
theory is not identified. It sets out four objectives of Counter Terrorism; Defeat, Deny,
Diminish and Defend. Based on the theory that terrorist groups operate at three levels,
state, regional and global, with state level offering the lowest threat and global the highest
(NSC, 2003:1) it advocates reducing the terrorists capability at a global level through
defeating them using military action, forcing them to disperse to the regional level. At this
level, the strategy of denying them refuge through increasing weaker states capability to
fight terrorism will force organisations to disperse further, eventually operating at a state
level where they will revert to criminality to achieve their reduced aims and can be
subjected to standard law enforcement action and ultimately defeat (NSC, 2003: 11).
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Michael Scheur in his book, ‘Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on
Terror’, outlines the US theory of ‘Disengagement or War’ (2004). Although advocating all
out war against terrorism as a potential solution, Scheur suggests that disengagement from
the Middle East is attempted as the first option (2004). Scheuer furthers his argument by
suggesting that the best counter terrorist policy for the United States would be one of
reduced political intervention in the Middle East, the theorised result would be a decline in
radicalisation and terrorism targeting the United States as their motivation is slowly
diminished (2004). Jeremy Pressman offers some support for the US approach to Counter
Terrorism suggesting that the war model is the best strategic plan to reduce the terrorists
capability so they are in a constant state of catch up, always seeking to re-group and rebuild
but believes that overall, the ‘all out war’ strategy will not defeat ideological terrorism as it is
too ingrained (2007:17). James Loy and Robert Ross both suggest in their article ‘Meeting
the Homeland Security Challenge’ that the US theory of military action as a solution is based
on its historic use as one of their three transnational levers of power but that contemporary
threats such as terrorism require a more domestically orientated response (2001:2). Peter
Sederberg criticises the war response by arguing that once started, it cannot be scaled down
without appearing to be offering concessions and that it is not always proportionate as even
terrorist groups with nihilistic goals will often not have the capability (1995:300-301)
2.7 The Homeland Security Approach
The Department of Homeland Security was introduced in 2002 and they emphasise a
three strand Counter Terrorism strategy: Prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce
vulnerability to terrorism and minimise the damage caused through terrorist attack (EOTP,
2002:2). This counter terrorist strategy is based on the theory that terrorists are strategic
actors and will identify weaknesses in preparedness and defence capability to maximise
their efforts, as such, defence against a broad range of possible attacks is required (EOTP,
2002:VII). This approach is supported by game theoretic studies of Counter Terrorism
conducted by Todd Sandler and Walter Enders who adopt a cost benefit approach in their
publication ‘An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism’ (2004). They suggest a
three strand approach: Force terrorists into less harmful attacks, target their resources and
leadership and the protection of one’s self from multiple potential attacks (Enders and
Sandler, 2004:20). They theorise that if this strategy is followed, terrorists will be forced into
pursuing non-violent means to reach their goals (Enders and Sandler, 2004:20). This form of
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rational choice is also supported by Richard Lebow and Janice Gross Stein in their article
‘Rational Choice Theory: I Think Therefore I Deter’ in which they argue that terrorists are
rational actors and that a high cost benefit ratio will reduce the likelihood of them
committing attacks.
David Thacher suggests taking the theory of Homeland Security further in his
publication, ‘The local role in Homeland Security’, where he argues that Homeland Security
as a Counter Terrorism response could be increased through utilisation of the 600,000 local
Police officers within the US (2005: 635). The theory of enhancing the remit of law
enforcement is also advocated by Philip Heymann in his book, ‘Terrorism, Freedom and
Security: Winning without war’ in which he suggests that enhancing the responsibilities of
current law enforcement and intelligence gathering at a domestic level, offers a greater
capability for the United States to deal with the terrorist threat (2003:62). It has however,
been suggested that the Homeland Security approach concentrates too much on Counter
Terrorism and should be increased by broadening preparation and response to include
accidental and natural disasters which would, as a by product, increase their capability to
deal with threats from terrorism (Dancs, 2008).
2.8 The United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism Approach, The Four P’s
The strategy adopted within the United Kingdom is in line with the European ‘four P’
response; Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Prepare, also known as the Contest Strategy (HMG,
2006 and Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006) although it was in fact the United Kingdom
who developed this theory of Counter Terrorism (Haine, Jaarva and Johnson et al, 2006). It
is highlighted within the UK Counter Terrorism strategy that it has been formulated through
drawing on decades of experience gained through domestic Counter Terrorism operations
against Irish related terrorism and more recently, Islamist terrorism (HMG, 2006:5).
Although it does not outline any specific theory of Counter Terrorism, as done in the US
Counter Terrorism strategy it is highly evident that the Counter Terrorism response adopted
by the United Kingdom encompasses all of the most commonly advocated Counter
Terrorism theories that have been identified earlier in the review. This multi lateral
approach has been adopted by the UK as they believe this offers greater flexibility in the
fight against terrorism (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:36). This flexible approach is
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advocated by Martha Crenshaw in ‘The organisation of Terror’, an article in which she
highlights that to meet the ever changing threat of terrorism, government policy needs to
remain fluid so it can be easily adapted (2007:26). The result of the multi lateral approach by
the UK is that in contrast to US Counter Terrorism response’s, there is very limited literature
available analysing or debating the United Kingdom’s response as this has essentially been
done at the international level.
The Prevent theory is based around the concept that tackling the radicalisation of
people, the disadvantages that create vulnerability and deterring them from terrorism
through education and integration will diminish the root causes of terrorism (HMG, 2006:1).
This theory has widespread support amongst academics at both a national and transnational
level as evidenced in the publications ‘Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward’ by
Rohan Gunaratna (2007), ‘Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy’ by David
Omand (2005), ‘Terrorism versus democracy’ by Paul Wilkinson (2007) and Boaz Ganor in
‘The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers’ (2005).
The increased protection of national infrastructure as outlined in the Protect strand
and the consequence management approach adopted through the Prepare strand of the
Contest strategy, are both extremely similar to the Homeland Security strategy adopted by
the United States (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:37). The Homeland Security approach also
has strong support as a protective measure against terrorism and this is evidenced in the
literature produced by Todd Sandler and Walter Enders in ‘An Economic Perspective on
Transnational Terrorism’ (2004), David Thacher in ‘The Local Role in Homeland Security’
(2005) and also within the National Strategy for Homeland Security as written by the United
States (2003). This approach however is not without its criticisms as outlined in Anita Dancs
publication ‘Terrorism or All Hazards? Broadening Homeland Security’ in which Dancs
highlighted the draw backs of concentrating too heavily on Counter Terrorism (2008). Some
literature suggests that these draw backs are mitigated against in the United Kingdom’s
approach to Homeland Security through the fact that they have built on already existing
departmental and governmental infrastructure, maintaining and improving core resources
and skills creating a greater response capability to any disaster, ultimately increasing their
ability to respond to a terrorist attack (Ek, Gallis and Miko et al, 2006:37), producing exactly
the ‘All hazards’ concept advocated by Dancs (2004).
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Concentrating on the disruption of terrorists and their ability to commit attacks, the
Pursue strand is aimed at improving law enforcement, prosecutions of terrorists and
intelligence gathering capabilities (HMG, 2006:2). This direct targeting theory has huge
support both academically and amongst governments, particularly the United States (NSC,
2003:1). Literature that has been reviewed supporting this approach has been produced by
Todd Sandler in his publication ‘Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism’ (2005)
and Paul Wilkinson in number 6 of his ‘pathways out of terrorism’ in his book ‘Terrorism
Versus Democracy’ (2007) and Boaz Ganor in strand one, ‘eliminating terrorism’, of his three
strand Counter Terrorism proposal (2005, 25-26). However, it should be highlighted that the
United Kingdom’s theory of ‘Pursuing’ terrorists falls some way short of the ‘all out war’
approach advocated by some of these theories. Jeremy Shapiro suggests in his publication
‘Where You Stand Depends Where You Get Hit’, that this is due to the fact that Europe and
in this case the UK can be described as a ‘near enemy’ and although under threat from
terrorism, it is only through association with the US, the ‘far enemy’, the result being that
they could conceivable use conciliatory means to reduce their risk as the threat to them is
more politically orientated (Shapiro, 2005).
It was extremely evident through examination of UK Counter Terrorism literature
that material examining the Pursue strategy was very limited, potentially due to the fact that
the four P strategy and in particular the restructuring within Counter Terrorism Policing and
the Pursue strand is so contemporary. However, Professor Frank Gregory and Antony Field
go some way to examining the current structure in their articles ‘The Police and the
Intelligence Services-With Special Reference to the Relationship with MI5’ and ‘The
Problems of Intelligence Sharing within the UK Intelligence Community’. Gregory outlines
the creation of four Police Counter Terrorism Units and the Counter Terrorism Command
within the Metropolitan Police, created by ACPO-TAM in an effort to standardise Counter
Terrorism Policing after the failure of Police force amalgamations (Gregory; 2009:55). Field
identifies the same structural developments as Gregory but goes further by identifying the
increased presence of Security Service employees within the regional Counter Terrorism
Units and the emergence of what he describes as community Counter Terrorism Intelligence
Officers, however, Gregory’s publication is far from a critique or analysis and purely an
outline of current structures. Fields examination goes some way to assess the success of the
new Counter Terrorism structures within the United Kingdom and considering the obvious
restrictions on access to those within the arena his publication offers an insight into the level
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of success, however it is clear that his analysis is born purely from openly publicised material
and lacks the cutting edge obtained from first hand evidence.
2.9 Conclusion
This review has succeeded in identifying the main academic areas from which the
largest contributions to the theory of Counter Terrorism have been made and that the vast
amount of material offers a wealth of responses to the terrorist threat. In spite of having
ascertained that much of the available material is conflicting in its response, three
commonly advocated Counter Terrorism responses were identified. A need to prevent the
root causes of terrorism, enforce consequences on those who commit terrorist attacks and
to protect against and minimise the consequences of terrorism. These three approaches
were all theories widely acknowledged as being the most effective methods of Counter
Terrorism.
Splitting the literature into two levels, international and domestic enabled the
review to identify vast differences in response on both stages and identified the manner in
which the available literature diminished as the stage decreased. Firstly identifying that the
literature reviewed at an international level was vast and that the large majority was written
from a strategic perspective, the review also identified a clear lack of material that was
specific to domestic Counter Terrorism. The vast majority of the literature that purported to
be written in the context of domestic Counter Terrorism had in fact drawn upon the
literature and theories highlighted at the international level and were not based on any form
of empirical research, at best being underpinned through experiential learning.
The comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom proved a
useful examination as it highlighted the fact that literature that was present regarding
Counter Terrorism at a domestic level differed dramatically between the United States and
the United Kingdom. This factor is largely due to the adoption of two very clear and
controversial US approaches to Counter Terrorism, the all out military response as seen in
the invasion of Iraq and the Homeland Security approach, as evident with the creation of
The Department of Homeland Security, both of which has resulted in large debate within the
US and production of vast amounts of literature. The United Kingdom’s response to Counter
Terrorism on the contrary has been more understated. Simply reinforcing their present
structures and aligning their policy with that of the European Unions and United Nations
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Counter Terrorism strategies, both of which are in line with contemporary, post 9/11
Counter Terrorism theories. The result is a breadth of literature available analysing the
threat, legislation or government policy and its implementation but a clear absence of
literature outlining theory unique to or debating Counter Terrorism within the UK,
essentially due to the fact that this has taken place at the international level.
The review notably highlighted that Counter Terrorism literature at both
international and domestic level was directed at a policy level and as such appears to have
left a complete void of literature that is written from a ‘front line’ or ‘practitioners’
perspective and a clear absence of material and research into the implementation of
Counter Terrorism responses or their effectiveness. The literature that is available
concentrates on the tactical implementation of military or law enforcement Counter
Terrorism approaches (Bolz, Bolz jr, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002; Burke, 2000) or are written by
ex-military personnel in the form of individual anecdotal accounts of their experiences in
Counter Terrorism (Thompson, 2004). This level of material is essential as it offers us the
opportunity to assess if the Counter Terrorism theories outlined at a strategic policy making
level are in fact being implemented at a practitioner’s level and also takes us some way to
achieving a measurement of their success.
The most surprising revelation of the review is that there is an obvious lack of
empirically tested assessments of Counter Terrorism theories and those that have been
produced have simply been to provide academic justification for government policy
(Jackson, 2007). The only notable study that was identified was a systematic review
conducted by the Campbell organisation into the effectiveness of Counter Terrorism
strategies (2006). This review concurred with Jackson by identifying that Counter Terrorism
responses do not produce the results argued in the theoretically based literature that is used
to underpin them, suggesting that most Counter Terrorism literature was created to support
policy, not policy being created to implement Counter Terrorism theory (Kennedy, Lum and
Sherley, 2006:32). This revelation adds considerable weight to the necessity for research
into two areas identified in the review as potentially the most effective Counter Terrorism
responses, the need for greater community engagement, education and conciliation to deal
with the root causes of terrorism (United Nations, 20/688; Wilkinson, 2007; Ganor, 2005;
Sederberg, 1995 and Gunaratna, 2007) and the requirement for greater cooperation
between law enforcement and intelligence services at both international and domestic
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levels (Keohane, 2005; Omand, 2005; United Nations, 20/688; Kydd and Walter, 2006 and
Wilkinson, 2007).
3. Practitioners level intelligence sharing
3.1 Introduction
A review of Counter Terrorism literature at international and domestic levels was
successful in identifying the absence in literature of an empirical nature. The review also
highlighted that although present, domestic Counter Terrorism literature is to a great extent
dominated by material regarding the response of the United States and that there is a clear
deficit of literature available on the response of the United Kingdom. By reducing the stage
even further the review enabled the identification of a missing dimension by highlighting
that Counter Terrorism literature written from the perspective of the practitioner was
almost completely absent and as such there had been no clear assessment on the
implementation of the theories and policy being advocated. The review also distilled three
clear theories of Counter Terrorism but again highlighted a dramatic absence of empirical
material to underpin their theoretical basis. Conciliation, enforcement and protection were
all identified as possible Counter Terrorism responses. However, it was established that
previous terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have cemented the theory and policy of critical
infrastructure protection as a response, resulting in widespread agreement of its necessity
between both academics and policy makers. This left the protection debate concentrating
on the process of risk assessment and not the theory itself, leaving only two real areas for
contention, conciliation and enforcement.
Further review of the literature regarding the two afore mentioned theories was
successful in again identifying that both lacked empirical analysis and required further
research, in line with Counter Terrorism as a whole. However, it was within the enforcement
theory that a single consensus recommendation was stressed by both academics and policy
makers alike. The recommendation was a need for greater cooperation between law
enforcement and intelligence services. As a result the overall aim of this chapter is to
combine the missing dimension established as a practitioner’s level perspective, which
showed a clear absence of quality empirical literature and one of the predominant
recommendations within Counter Terrorism, the need for greater cooperation between law
enforcement and the intelligence services. This area of examination is necessary to
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accurately measure the standard and depth of literature at the practitioner’s level so that
the material demand gaps can be identified.
It should be highlighted that the main area of cooperation between law
enforcement and the intelligence services is in the exchange of intelligence (Wilkinson,
2007; Gregory, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008; Aldrich, 2004 and Reveron, 2008) and as such this is
the field in which the practitioner’s level examination concentrates. The intelligence services
are traditionally viewed as the dominant actors in the world of intelligence gathering,
however, adoption by law enforcement agencies of intelligence-led policing has seen their
ability and potential in the intelligence world increase greatly (Ratcliffe, 2008). Paul
Wilkinson argues in his book ‘Terrorism Versus Democracy’ that above all else, the most
important area for cooperation in Counter Terrorism is between the Police and the
intelligence services which is also the area that has seen the most development in recent
years (2007:164). Peter Gill argues that the reason for advancements in such close
collaboration is because their networks have been brought together to fulfil a single
strategy, aligning their responsibilities in support of traditional policing objectives (2002).
This creates, as previously established, an increased need for the two actors to effectively
share the gathered intelligence in an ethos of increased cooperation. The result, in line with
the overall aim of combining both the missing dimension and recommendation is a review of
literature that concentrates on the practitioner’s level sharing of secret intelligence.
Naturally the vast bulk of material relating to the intelligence services is within the
field of intelligence studies. A review of material within this field is necessary as it will greatly
assist in the identification of the theories used to underpin their cooperation and highlight
both the benefits and problems encountered in intelligence sharing so it can be examined
from a more informed position. Publications within the field of intelligence studies adhere to
varying forms of what academics describe as the intelligence cycle (Gill and Pythian, 2006:3).
The cycle follows a structured process of planning, collection, processing, analysis and finally
dissemination (Gill and Pythian, 2006:3) and it was found that the publicised literature dealt
with all, or selected areas of the intelligence cycle. For the benefit of this review the
literature examined was concentrated solely on the area of dissemination and the methods
used to facilitate intelligence sharing amongst the intelligence services and law enforcement
to establish the depth of literature available that offers an insight into the practitioner’s level
of intelligence sharing.
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3.2 The Intelligence Sharing Solutions
The dominant theory used in intelligence sharing is known as the ‘need to know’
principle (Colby, 1976). Need to know follows the basic principle that secret intelligence
should be shared with those who require it to complete their roles but circulation beyond
those individuals is not necessary (Colby, 1976; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Harfield, 2006;
Harfield, 2008 and Gregory, 2009). Academics have outlined that such intelligence sharing
principles where established during the cold war at a time when secrecy of information was
essential (Wilkinson, 2007:164) but that the modern day threat of terrorism requires a
rethink of these fundamentals (Wilkinson, 2007:164). It has also been suggested that this
bureaucratic principle excludes input from potentially valuable partners by refusing access
to intelligence and information (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:242). Research conducted by
Clive Harfield and Maren Kleiven within the European Police agency Europol established that
potentially as much as fifty percent of staff believed that the ‘need to know’ principle
hindered their ability to effectively share secret intelligence (2009:200) although it should be
acknowledged that this figure is not statistically significant due to the restrictive level of the
study and that it was not based around the field of Counter Terrorism intelligence sharing
which is often complicated even further by the involvement of the Security Services.
The need to know principles main role was to protect the source of secret
intelligence (Colby, 1976:9 and Aldrich, 2004:734) and it has been suggested that some
intelligence agencies place too high an emphasis on this factor (Aldrich, 2004:734). William
Colby argues that the source can be protected through a process of sanitisation, removing
any information that would enable identification of the source but leaving the core of the
secret intelligence intact, thus producing a product that is suitable for general circulation
(1976:9). It is argued that such an approach would remove dissemination constraints on
intelligence officers who often unwittingly restrict circulation of intelligence through a
misguided understanding of the need to know principle (Colby, 1976:9 and Gregory,
2009:59). Ultimately, William Colby suggested that equal importance should be placed on
the sharing of secret intelligence as it is on the gathering (1976:9) as at present there is a
clear disparity in the perception of importance between these two areas (Aldrich, 2004:734).
Clive Harfield and Maren Kleiven concur with Colby’s argument and urge the need for a
culture shift from ‘need to know’ to ‘the more we share the more we get’ (2009:203). It
should be noted that although literature was available outlining and debating the ‘need to
know’ principle there was a clear absence of material that outlined any form of research into
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its impact on intelligence sharing, further outlining necessity for greater empirical
examination in this area.
Often going hand in hand with the need to know principle are the internal systems
used within law enforcement and intelligence services that are used to grade secret
intelligence. Clive Harfield and Maren Kleivens study of Europol’s intelligence sharing
practices was particularly illustrative of this area. Utilising questionnaires circulated to
Europol staff they identified 25 different systems being used to grade intelligence
(2009:199). This created great confusion over ownership and dissemination restrictions
resulting in reduced levels of intelligence sharing (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:199). Not only
is this issue evident at an international level but also domestically, for instance the United
Kingdom Police services adhere to the national intelligence model 5x5x5 grading system
(Home Office, 2009) yet this system is not adopted by the intelligence services within the UK
creating immediate potential for bureaucracy in ownership of the intelligence and the speed
of dissemination. Such grading systems identify a dissemination level which dictates who
the information may be exchanged with without prior authority, with dissemination outside
of the authorised requiring a process of ratification from the originator (Home Office, 2009
and Aldrich, 2004). It is argued that such classification systems only serve to create overly
restrictive protocols which hinder the sharing of the intelligence between front line staff and
that such an approach is clearly outside the public interest (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:203).
Jerry Ratcliffe suggests in his book, ‘Intelligence-Led Policing’ (2008) that such blockers to
effective cooperation and communication are as a result of a system designed at a time
when secrecy was essential (2008:228).
David Pozen claimed in his analysis of the Mosaic theory, a jigsaw concept often
used to justify the restriction of information disclosure that it was illogical to grade single
pieces of secret intelligence (2005:633). Pozen argues that each piece of intelligence is part
of a larger mosaic and that it is the mosaic as a whole which should be graded and not the
single pieces of intelligence, unless it contains added factors that justify its secrecy
(2005:633). As such, intelligence exchange is vital to ensure that a concise view of the
mosaic is created as no single agency can hope to construct the wider picture by their selves
(Pozen, 2005:651). Derek Reveron suggests an overarching solution to the problems
encountered in intelligence sharing through standardised training, grading and classification
systems, security clearance and information technology (2008). As was evidenced with the
need to know principle there was again a total lack of empirical examination of the affects of
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such internal policies on the levels of intelligence sharing, reiterating the assessment that
such examination is vital to the field of Counter Terrorism.
There are two clear routes through which secret intelligence is exchanged by
practitioners, formal exchange structures (Keohane, 2005, Aldrich, 2004: Richelson, 1990;
Walsh, 2006 and Deflem, 2006) and in formal bi-lateral, trust based relationships (Aldrich,
2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Svendsen, 2008; Sullivan
and Wirtz, 2009; Wilkinson, 2007 and Johnson, 2000). Formal structures for intelligence
sharing cooperation increased greatly post 9/11 and Daniel Keohane highlights the
introduction of the Hague programme which is a plan solely intended to increase
cooperation in Counter Terrorism amongst European member states (2005:17) and the
Counter Terrorism Group which was set up as an effort to bring together heads of security
services to share intelligence through a memorandum of understanding (Deflem, 2006: 341).
Prior to the atrocities in America, efforts were already being made to improve the policing of
terrorism and increase the exchange of Counter Terrorism information within Europe
through adding terrorism to the remit of the European Police, Europol for who a major role
is the dissemination of information amongst intelligence services and law enforcement
(Deflem, 2006: 343). Although undoubtedly a step in the right direction and with some
history of success (Walsh, 2006:13) it has been suggested that the effectiveness of these
formal avenues of intelligence sharing as a route for practitioners are low because
intelligence services are inclined to resist widespread intelligence sharing because of a lack
of trust (Aldrich, 2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006 and Johnson, 2000) and to protect
what they perceive as high grade, golden nugget intelligence (Aldrich, 2004; Sheptycki,
2004a and Sheptycki, 2004b). It is also argued that formal conventions hinder the day to day
exchange of more mundane intelligence because the exchange protocols are too rigid
(Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:200).
Used much more effectively are the in-formal, bi-lateral trust based relationships
between practicing intelligence officers in their respective intelligence or law enforcement
agencies. Evidence would suggest that these bi-lateral relationships are much faster at
exchanging information then the formal channels (Harfield and Kleiven, 2009:200).
Highlighting successes in previous bi-lateral intelligence sharing relationships John Sullivan
and James Wirtz suggest that bi-lateral exchanges underpin formal arrangements and that
they should be positively encouraged (2009:4), a stance that has support amongst
academics and politicians (Svendsen, 2008). Paul Wilkinson offers some limited empirical
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analysis of bi-lateral relationships through the examination of previously successful
collaborations (2007:162). Through his brief examination Wilkinson concluded that Bi-lateral
cooperation can be one of the greatest ways to counter the terrorist threat (2007:162). This
argument is supported by Ludo Block who suggests that his study of bi-lateral intelligence
sharing through cross border liaison officers highlights their use in increasing cooperation
(2009:194). Block also highlighted their potential to contribute to the wider national and
international strategic aims (2009:194), however, it should be acknowledged that Block’s
study focused on the issue of organised crime though it could be argued the two are now so
closely linked that it is reasonable to assume similar potential benefits within Counter
Terrorism. It has also been suggested that this form of intelligence sharing used on a case by
case, mutually beneficial exchange creates what can effectively be described as a global
metropolitan policing network, more capable of responding to global threats such as
organised crime and terrorism (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:3).
However, front line bi-lateral relationships are not without their own complications
brought about by often opposing organisational cultures (Sheptycki, 2004a and Sheptycki,
2004b). Nina Copes research in ‘Intelligence-led policing or policing withintelligence’ (2004)
highlighted the friction present in relationships between British Police officers and civilian
analysts and identified that sworn Police officers were reluctant to accept recommendations
from civilian employees as they viewed them as lacking the required legitimacy (Cope,
2004). Frank Gregory utilised copes study to underpin an analysis of the relationship
between the Police service in the United Kingdom and the Intelligence services, MI5 (2009).
It was concluded that although the status of civilian intelligence officers as members of the
security services granted them legitimacy in the eyes of sworn Police officers, it was still
evident that confusion over organisational structures, lead agency status particularly in the
area of organised crime and the ever present ‘need to know’ policy adopted by the
intelligence services were all negative influences on the practitioners level, intelligence
sharing relationship between the Police and MI5 (Gregory, 2009:59) a stance that is firmly
supported by Antony Field in his examination of ‘The Problems of Intelligence Sharing Within
the UK Intelligence Community’ (2009: 3)
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3.3 The Importance of Enhanced Cooperation.
The importance of intelligence sharing and enhanced cooperation in the field of
Counter Terrorism are widely documented (Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001; Isaacson and
O’Connel, 2002; Best, 2007; Cope, 2004; Gregory, 2009; Fields, 2009; Reveron, 2008; Walsh,
2006; Richelson, 1990; Aldrich, 2004; Block, 2009; Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002). It is
accepted by academics, intelligence services, Law enforcement and politicians alike that the
failure to share intelligence and information between agencies was one of the primary
reasons for failing to identify those involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Best, 2007:1),
and again similarly prior to 7/7 (Field, 2009), facts that are the greatest advertisements for
the benefits of intelligence sharing. The modern day terrorist network is globalised, with
connections and associations throughout both terrorist and organised crime groups across
the world (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:1). The new global dimension to terrorism results in a
need for greater communication, cooperation and collaboration by law enforcement,
intelligence services, military and civilian agencies at both an international and domestic
level (Kilcullen, 2005:607).
However, the challenge has been identified as the development of key relationships
that encourage and nurture such information sharing across borders and jurisdictions
(Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001). It is widely acknowledged that this effective cooperation
between law enforcement agencies and civilian intelligence service’s is fundamental to a
successful strategy of Counter Terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007; Block, 2009; Wood and Shearing
2007; Best 2007). Jerry Ratcliffe argues that the new policing environment and in particular
Counter Terrorism now needs to place a higher value on information sharing if policy makers
hope to achieve their strategic objectives (2008:229) and Jeffrey Isaacson and Kevin
O’Connell both highlight that the need to unlock the secrecy in intelligence sharing is the
first obstacle to achieving these objectives (2002). Antony Field who has produced one of
the most in depth and up to date reviews of intelligence sharing in the UK in his publication
‘The Problems of Intelligence Sharing Within the UK Intelligence Community’ has also
identified the importance of intelligence sharing by examining the intelligence failures
present during the lead up to the London bombings on 7/7. Field stresses above all else the
need to share information to compensate for the inadequate IT capability caused through
the array of varying intelligence systems held by actors in the field (2009:5).
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3.4 Conclusion
Having established that there is a clear deficiency in Counter Terrorism literature
that is written from the practitioner’s level examining the impact and implementation of
policy and theories on Counter Terrorism strategy I combined this missing dimension with
the recommendation for greater cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
services. This combination resulted in identification of the necessity for a deeper
examination of their intelligence sharing practices. Concentrating on literature from within
the field of intelligence studies and in particular the subject of dissemination resulted in
identification of the ‘need to know’ principle as the dominant protocol for the sharing of
intelligence (Colby, 1976). It was also established that classifications and the grading systems
used by organisations played an important role in intelligence sharing at a practitioner’s
level (Home Office, 2009 and Aldrich, 2004). Two main channels were also highlighted within
the intelligence sharing relationship between law enforcement agencies and the intelligence
services. The use of formal information sharing agreements and forums were identified as
having had some success but their use was limited on a day to day basis or when real time
intelligence sharing was required (Keohane, 2005, Aldrich, 2004: Richelson, 1990; Walsh,
2006 and Deflem, 2006). In-formal bi-lateral, practitioner level, trust based relationships
were identified as playing a much larger role than anticipated and often with great success
although it was highlighted that distinct organisational cultures can play a negative role in
such information sharing relationships (Aldrich, 2004; Richelson, 1990; Walsh, 2006; Harfield
and Kleiven, 2009; Svendsen, 2008; Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009; Field, 2009 and Johnson, 2000).
Having outlined the principles, channels and cultures that all play major roles within
the intelligence sharing arena it was overwhelmingly established that intelligence sharing
between the Civilian Security Services and Law Enforcement actors was vitally important in
Counter Terrorism (Hutchinson and Ashcroft, 2001; Isaacson and O’Connel, 2002; Best,
2007; Cope, 2004; Gregory, 2009; Fields, 2009; Reveron, 2008; Walsh, 2006; Richelson,
1990; Aldrich, 2004; Block, 2009; Bolz, Dudonis and Schulz, 2002). Playing a major role in
outlining and achieving strategic objectives (Wilkinson, 2007; Block, 2009; Wood and
Shearing 2007; Best 2007 and Ratcliffe, 2008), building relationships between partner
agencies and compensating for inadequate intelligence systems (Field, 2009 and Ashcroft,
2001), intelligence sharing was clearly established as the key tool in the prevention of
further attacks through intelligence breakdowns and the disruption of wider terrorist
networks. It was also clearly evidenced that there is a distinct lack of research examining
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many of these areas, in particularly the impact of the implementation of the ‘need to know’
principle and internal classification systems on the levels of intelligence sharing between
agencies.
4. Counter Terrorism Research Question
Literature available in the field of Counter Terrorism is extensive and a review of the
area was successful in establishing that although material written at an international level
was extensive there was a clear disparity with that written at a domestic level. Brief reviews
of domestic Counter Terrorism literature within the United States and United Kingdom
helped identify that although there have been a mass of publications on US Counter
Terrorism, the same could not be said for literature on British Counter Terrorism for which a
clear void was identified. A gradual reduction in the field of the review also enabled the
identification of a missing dimension in available literature, the practitioner’s level. By
establishing that the vast majority of Counter Terrorism literature that had been written at
both international and domestic levels was from a strategic perspective and that there was
almost a complete absence of material written from the perspective of the front line
practitioner.
Analysis of the literature reviewed was able to identify two areas that were
recommended for further research and justified a more comprehensive examination. Due to
the number and strength of the recommendations identified in the literature the area of
cooperation between law enforcement and the intelligence services was selected for further
review. An initial assessment of the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the
intelligence services established that the predominant area of cooperation was in the
sharing of intelligence and as it had already been established that there was a missing
dimension of literature at a practitioners level, this factor was combined with the
recommendation resulting in an examination of literature regarding the practitioners level of
intelligence sharing between the two actors. The increased adoption of intelligence-led
policing has resulted in a number of studies of intelligence sharing practices (Cope, 2004;
Sheptycki, 2004a; Sheptycki, 2004b; Ratcliffe, 2008 and Block, 2009) but many of these have
been limited to Intelligence sharing amongst law enforcement agencies and have
concentrated on cultural blockers leaving an absence of a comprehensive analysis of
intelligence sharing. As such this process of distiallation and combination has established
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that there is a distinct lack of research specific to intelligence sharing between British law
enforcement agencies and the intelligence services, with only three being identified
(Gregory, 2009, Field, 2009 and Harfield and Kleiven, 2009) all with great limitations. Frank
Gregory’s research was based upon a small focus group of retired Police officers with
experience of working with MI5 (2009:50), Fields examination was based purely on
assessments of limited existing data and Harfield and Kleivens interviews were limited in
number and all arranged and vetted by senior officers, as such their impartiality was
questionable (2009:198). Ultimately the review of Counter Terrorism literature and
practitioners level intelligence sharing has provided comprehensive justification for further
research into domestic Counter Terrorism responses and a need for greater empirical
analysis of intelligence sharing between law enforcement actors and the intelligence
services.
Taking into consideration the disparity of available material highlighted during the
case studies of the US and UK Counter Terrorism Response’s, I have chosen to combine the
two for mentioned areas by conducting research into the United Kingdom’s main law
enforcement Counter Terrorism response and the current state of the intelligence sharing
practices between the Police and the Security Services, MI5, through empirical research in
an effort to answer the question:
4.1 Has the introduction of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model increased
intelligence sharing between the Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the
United Kingdom’s capability to counter the terrorist threat?
4.2 Methodology
It has previously been outlined that the creation of the Counter Terrorism Command
model is the United Kingdom’s predominant response to recent terrorist attacks such as
9/11 and 7/7 and that this has resulted in increased partnership between Police services,
special branches and MI5 with the establishment of a number of regional Counter Terrorism
units (Filed and Gregory, 2009), however, to date there has been no empirical assessment of
the Counter Terrorism model as a response to the terrorist threat or its impact on
intelligence sharing. To attempt to ascertain the answers to these issues a research strategy
combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches will be utilised.
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Before embarking on any formal study within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit
(NWCTU), authority was required at a senior level to conduct the research and as such a
formal request was submitted to both the Chief Superintendant in charge of the NWCTU and
the Superintendant in charge of the Lancashire Counter Terrorism Branch to seek
permission. This process was undoubtedly assisted by the fact that the author is a serving
Police officer within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit and I am certain that a course of
research by anyone outside of the Counter Terrorism arena would have been unlikely to be
authorised. Taking advantage of this factor to conduct the project has added weight to its
uniqueness but it is important to acknowledge that it creates obvious questions over the
impartiality of the research and potentially the responses offered by those taking part.
However, it should be outlined that at every stage the author has maintained a stance of
critical impartiality so as to not affect the course, depth or response to any of the research
conducted. In an effort to further increase the scope, accuracy and weight of the research a
senior member of the Security Service was approached for permission to mirror the research
being done within the NWCTU in their organisation. Unfortunately due to their security
constraints it could not be authorised although assurance was given it had been considered
at the highest level by the director general of the Security Service.
4.3 Research Strategy
A questionnaire was sent via email to every member of staff both Police officer and
civilian within the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU). This approach has been
chosen as it enables the quickest, easiest and most manageable way of obtaining the
required level of data that would be needed for a meaningful analysis. The questionnaire
included a total of 43 multiple choice questions covering demographics such as length of
service, rank, role and Police force, to questions concentrating on the methods, frequency
and blockers to intelligence sharing. The multiple choice questions offered a sliding scale
response and always offered a minimum of five choices so as to offer a more balanced
response and leave room for all extremes. The questionnaire was split into two areas, pre
and post Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) Policing model with the questions in both areas
essentially remaining the same with only a change of perspective thus offering capability to
analyse the changes as a result of the Counter Terrorism Commands establishment. For
those completing the questionnaire who were not employed within Counter Terrorism prior
to the CTC’s establishment, there was only the necessity for completion of the post CTC
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questions which reduced their responses to 25. In total the questionnaire was circulated to
in the region of 500 members of staff within the NWCTU with a response rate of
approximately 10 percent, in total 52 respondents. It is estimated that the total number of
Counter Terrorism staff within the United Kingdom is in the region of 3000 (NWCTU, 2009)
although this figure is not exact and as such any calculations derived from it are only
approximate. With this factor in mind the approximate overall level of response to the
questionnaire disseminated was 1.7 percent.
To underpin the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires analysis the use
of information from key informant interviews has been utilised to offer a more in depth
practitioner’s opinion based response. Utilising a series of questions closely linked to those
in the questionnaire process the multiple choice answers were removed and the interviewee
invited to give their own perspective, free from the guidance offered by predetermined
responses, those selected to be interviewed were also removed from the questionnaire
process in an effort to avoid tainting their responses. In total ten interviews were conducted
all of which were of currently serving Police officers or civilian Police staff directly employed
by the Northwest Counter Terrorism Unit or the wider Counter Terrorism field. The
interviewees were selected on the basis that they offer a distinct range of perspectives and
cover a wide demographic encompassing both sexes, varying ranks and roles and a mixture
of sworn Police officers and civilian Police staff. Due to the nature of the employment of the
interviewees and the obvious potential dangers associated with release of their personal
information, all interviewees have been given anonymity and referenced through use of a
randomly assigned alphabetical identifier. This process was chosen as although there is no
intention to publicise this project, those involved required a level of reassurance and this
method assisted in creating an interview atmosphere that was conducive to obtaining a
more open and honest response and offered the reassurance required to those involved.
The conduct of a focus group was considered as a third source of primary data and
permission was sought and granted. However it was assessed that the level of data that
would be obtained from the questionnaire and interviews was sufficient and offered both
the qualitative and quantitative levels of data being sought and as such this method of
research was not conducted.
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5. Bureaucracy, the Hidden Enemy within Counter Terrorism
5.1 Introduction to the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model
The Counter Terrorism Command Policing model is a new approach to Counter
Terrorism in the United Kingdom. Emerging in 2006 as a result of a decision made by the
Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters, better known as ACPO-
TAM. The Counter Terrorism Command was established within the Metropolitan Police
Service through an amalgamation of their two specialist operations departments known as
SO12 which was the traditional Special Branch and SO13, the Anti Terrorist Branch (MPS,
2009). The Counter Terrorism Command, also known within Counter Terrorism as the CTC is
supported by a number of regional Counter Terrorism Units, or CTU’S. The work undertaken
by the CTU’S is a mixture of intelligence gathering and law enforcement and is best
explained by the Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches.
“The CTU is based at the region and has become an amalgamation of the force special
branch and the old regional intelligence cells. They are expected to chair regional meetings
and direct tasking and in the CTU case, be the function that moves from traditional
intelligence gathering to the law enforcement capability and offer the support to forces in
their region that need them” (Interviewee E)
Table 1 overleaf illustrates the current structure of Counter Terrorism within the
United Kingdom and outlines the subservient relationship adopted by the Police service,
particularly whilst the investigation is in the intelligence phase. It also illustrates the varying
levels of capabilities not only between the Police and the Security Service but within the
Counter Terrorism Units themselves.
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Table 1: Structure of Counter Terrorism Investigation within the United Kingdom (Interviewee E).
Actor Legal Powers Capability Organisational Makeup Position within CT
Security Services (MI5) Separate Legislation:
Security Services ACT
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination
Civilian Intelligence
Agency
Lead Actor for CT
Intelligence
Investigations
Counter Terrorism
Command (CTC)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination. Law
Enforcement and
Investigative Capability.
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff .Regionally
based Security Services
Staff.
National Lead Law
Enforcement and
Secondary in
Intelligence.
South East Counter
Terrorism Unit (SECTU)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff .Regionally
based Security Services
Staff.
Secondary Actor
Nationally Regional
Lead Law Enforcement.
Secondary Actor in
Intelligence.
West Midlands Counter
Terrorism Unit
(WMCTU)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination. Law
Enforcement and
Investigative Capability.
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff .Regionally
and Locally based Security
Services Staff.
Secondary Actor
Nationally, Regional
Lead Law Enforcement
and Investigation.
Secondary Actor in
Intelligence.
North West Counter
Terrorism Unit
(NWCTU)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination. Law
Enforcement and
Investigative Capability.
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff. Regionally
and Locally based Security
Services Staff.
Secondary Actor
Nationally, Regional
Lead Law Enforcement
and Investigation.
Secondary Actor in
Intelligence.
North East Counter
Terrorism Unit (NECTU)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination. Law
Enforcement and
Investigative Capability.
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff .Regionally
and Locally based Security
Services Staff.
Secondary Actor
Nationally, Regional
Lead Law Enforcement
and Investigation.
Secondary Actor in
Intelligence.
Wales Extremism and
Counter Terrorism Unit
(WECTU)
Regulation of
Investigatory Powers act,
various Terrorism ACTs
and amendments.
Intelligence gathering,
analysis and
dissemination
Sworn Police Officers and
Police Staff .Regionally
based Security Services
Staff.
Secondary Actor
Nationally, Regional
Lead Law Enforcement
Secondary Actor in
Intelligence.
As can be seen from the table above, the Security Service is staffed entirely by
civilian intelligence officers, operates under separate legislation to the Police service and has
no law enforcement capability, it also outlines their position as the lead agency for Counter
Terrorism investigations but only whilst they are in the investigation phase. Once a need for
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law enforcement or executive action as it is referred to within Counter Terrorism arises it is
at that stage the relationship changes and the Police become the lead agency, continuously
underpinned by the intelligence work of the Security Service.
With the emergence of the CTC and CTU’s, the ever increasing threat from
international terrorism, and the continually developing relationship an unprecedented level
of cooperation has been developed between the Security Service (MI5) and the Police.
However, it is unknown if such huge changes in the relationship between these two actors,
the pressure from which they were borne and the swiftness of the developments has been
successful in increasing the flow of intelligence or has only resulted in increased stresses in
an already precarious arena. Research conducted in the course of this project was quick to
establish the fact that an over whelming 96% of those surveyed outlined that intelligence
sharing with the Security Service was an important part of their role, with 76% describing it
as essential. However, bureaucracy was quickly established as playing an incredibly
influential role in the effectiveness of intelligence sharing, both past and present, often
hindering the exchange of potentially important information. As such this chapter aims to
outline the principles and procedures that are present within Counter Terrorism and
establish how the emergence of the CTC Policing model has influenced the levels of
bureaucracy encountered and ultimately the effect on intelligence sharing between the
organisations in question.
5.2 Need to Know or Need to Share?
Earlier in this project it was established that the secrecy surrounding intelligence
within the Counter Terrorism arena can have a hugely negative effect on the exchange of
vital information. The dominant theory behind the concept of intelligence sharing was
established as the ‘Need to Know’ principle which states that secret intelligence should be
shared with those who require it to complete their roles but circulation beyond those
individuals is not necessary (Colby, 1976; Harfield and Kleiven, 2009; Harfield, 2006; Harfield,
2008 and Gregory, 2009). The research conducted in pursuit of this thesis has clearly
reaffirmed with some empirical weight that under the CTC’s current structure the ‘need to
know’ theory greatly hinders the flow of intelligence between the Police and the Security
Service. One Counter Terrorism Financial Investigator highlighted that it can even go as far
as affecting the standard of work you can conduct stating:
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“They will only tell you what they want you to do, not why they want you to do it. You need
more information so you can make the right enquiries, it can make things difficult. By not
giving us more information I actually think our ability to complete the task is quite restricted”
(Interviewee I).
A large majority of the staff surveyed, almost half, 25 of the 52 in total sighted this
factor as the main blocker to them sharing or receiving intelligence from the Security
Service. Interestingly prior to the establishment of the CTC Policing model, although it was
identified as an issue only very few of those surveyed, just 16 percent believed that it
affected intelligence sharing with the security service, although it should be acknowledged
that the number of responses from officers with experience within Counter Terrorism prior
to the CTC’S establishment was considerably less, just 12 of the total 52. Table 2 below
clearly illustrates the weight of the responses by illustrating that the largest frequency of
post CTC respondents believed bureaucracy to be the primary factor hindering intelligence
sharing.
Table 2: What do you consider the biggest Blocker to Intelligence sharing with the Security Service?
Question: What do you consider the biggest
Blocker to Intelligence Sharing with the Security
Service?
Number/ Choice of Respondents
Nothing. It worked Perfectly. 0
National Intelligence Model Dissemination
Grading
2
Government Protected Marking i.e.
Secret/Confidential.
3
ICT 6
Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of Trust or Ability 8
Lack of Liaison. 8
Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know Principle 25
The finding established in table 2 were also underpinned by the responses of those
interviewed who were able to offer a greater insight into the realities of dealing with the
concept of ‘Need to Know’.
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One Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer offered their opinion on why the Security Service
so strictly adhered to the principle by suggesting:
“I don’t think it is necessary but that’s how it has always been so why rock the boat, if it’s not
broken, why fix it” (Interviewee A).
However, not all officers are accepting of the justification behind the failures to share
Information with one Counter Terrorism Examinations officer stating:
“Some people are just parochial with the information, knowing they have something that
may be of use but not sharing it. Sometimes they may have had very good reasons but on
occasions it was just because they were being awkward and a bit over the top” (Interviewee
L).
An intelligence coordinator, whose role regularly involved disseminating intelligence to the
Security Service, also highlighted that it is not just the intelligence agencies that stringently
follow this principle by stating:
“It’s like this for a reason so I am not happy to send anything to them without a form of
authority from my management” (Interviewee M).
This particular statement is a good example of the hoops that are created by the “Need to
Know” principle and highlights that even if it does not stop the transition of the intelligence
at the very least, it slows the flow of the information.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter the ‘Need to Know’ principle was not always
considered the main blocker in intelligence sharing between the Police and the Security
Service. By obtaining responses from those with experience of pre CTC Counter Terrorism it
was established in the frequency distribution table overleaf that the main factors were
considered to be a lack of face to face liaison and cultural blockers such as a lack of trust or a
perception that the Police service lacked the ability to deal within intelligence effectively as
they are institutionalised to handle evidence and criminality.
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Table 3: What do you consider the biggest Blocker to Intelligence sharing with the Security Service pre and post CTC?
Question: What do
you consider the
biggest Blocker to
Intelligence Sharing
with the Security
Service?
Number/ Choice of
Respondents Pre CTC
Question: What do you consider the
biggest Blocker to Intelligence
Sharing with the Security Service?
Number/ Choice
of Respondents
Post CTC
Nothing. It worked
Perfectly.
0 Nothing. It worked Perfectly. 0
National Intelligence
Model Dissemination
Grading
0 National Intelligence Model
Dissemination Grading
2
Government Protected
Marking i.e.
Secret/Confidential.
0 Government Protected Marking i.e.
Secret/Confidential.
3
ICT 9 ICT 6
Cultural Blockers i.e.
Lack of Trust or Ability
17 Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of Trust or
Ability
8
Lack of Liaison. 17 Lack of Liaison. 8
Bureaucracy i.e. Need
to Know Principle
9 Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know
Principle
25
As we can see in table 3 there has been a clear rise in bureaucracy as a result of the
establishment of the CTC with almost half of all post CTC respondents surveyed sighting the
‘Need to Know’ principle as the main blocker which is a rise of 33 percent. Conversely, as
figure 1 overleaf highlights, it is also apparent that there has been a considerable reduction,
some 50 percent, in the number of staff identifying the lack of face to face liaison and
cultural blockers as factors affecting the level of intelligence sharing which would indicate
that these concerns have been addressed as a direct result of the introduction of the CTC.
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Figure 1: Comparison of intelligence sharing blockers Pre and Post CTC Policing Model.
Having already established through the review of Counter Terrorism literature the
theory that bi-lateral communication channels increase intelligence sharing I was able to
construct the questionnaire to more accurately assess this factor. Table 4 confirms the
increase in bi-lateral communication by evidencing the fact that since the CTC and the CTU
Policing model has been introduced nearly half of all staff within the Policing of Counter
Terrorism now have ready access to a member of the Security Service on either a daily or
weekly basis which was previously unheard of.
Table 4: How often do you have access to Face to Face Liaison with a member of the Security Service?
Question: How often
do you have access to
Face to Face Liaison
with a member of the
Security Service?
Number/ Choice of
Respondents : Pre
CTC
Question: How often do you have access to Face
to Face Liaison with a member of the Security
Service?
Number/ Choice of
Respondents: Post CTC
Daily 0 Daily 23
Weekly 0 Weekly 12
Monthly 17 Monthly 7
Quarterly 17 Quarterly 6
Yearly 10 Yearly 3
Never 8 Never 0
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The data in table 4 is better analysed in a chart format as can be seen in Figure 2
which enables us to compare the information in both tables 3 and 4 with much greater ease
and as a result, when viewing the evidence collectively it becomes apparent that there is a
direct correlation between the increase of face to face liaison and the increase in staff
encountering bureaucratic boundaries.
Figure 2: Pre and Post CTC levels of face to face liaison with the Security Service.
It could be suggested that this increase is purely because prior to the establishment
of the CTC Police staff had little contact with the Security Service and so an increase in
liaison has now resulted in more Police staff simply encountering already existing
bureaucracy in the national security arena which they were previously not exposed to. A
more sceptical argument could be the fact that as the low levels of liaison and cultural
blockers have reduced, which previously assisted the Security Service in controlling and
managing the intelligence sharing with the Police, they have resorted to a more bureaucratic
stance to maintain this control. Analysis of these findings is clearly somewhat subjective as
without a comparative survey of Security Service members accurate interpretation of the
data is restricted. It should also be acknowledged, as identified earlier that the number of
respondents with experience of pre CTC Counter Terrorism was low in comparison to those
with current CTC experience and as such this large disparity in data range may have affected
the analysis but nevertheless it offers an interesting insight but a greater data range would
be required for the analysis to be conclusive.
Throughout the research conducted during this project the second major
bureaucratic factor that was identified was the restrictions imposed through the National
Intelligence Model and the dissemination grading of intelligence. The Deputy National Co-
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ordinator of Special Branches outlines the strategic difficulties encountered through use of
conflicting systems by stating:
“The National Intelligence model is an entirely Police mechanism so there is sometimes
tension with the Security Services in how we use this model to work out how to set objectives
and deploy resources against National Security threat and share intelligence” (Interviewee
E).
It should be immediately outlined that this factor was not identified through the
quantitative data obtained, most likely due to the self imposed restrictions on completion of
the questionnaire by limiting respondents to just one response. However, during the course
of interviewing Police officers and staff from a wide range of roles within a Counter
Terrorism Unit it became clear that second only to the ‘Need to Know’ principle the national
intelligence model was heavily sighted during the interviews as a heavy bureaucratic burden
on the sharing of intelligence. The national intelligence model is an intelligence led business
model utilised by the Police service to assist in directing the tasking of resources and assist
decision makers (Home Office, 2009). A major factor of the model is the grading of
intelligence on a three tier scale known as the 5x5x5, covering the source or the intelligence,
its reliability and dissemination instructions (Home Office, 2009).
As outlined above by the Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches, the national
intelligence model is an entirely Police system but as highlighted by one intelligence co-
ordinator there is even confusion amongst Police staff regarding the dissemination
restrictions:
“I think a national problem is the 5x5x5 system, particularly the dissemination grading 5 as it
causes problems sending intelligence and confusion about what it means. Does it mean when
it says only circulate within your own force or department that this is the force you work in or
the Counter Terrorism Units?” (Interviewee M)
As outlined above, it is the dissemination grading that is the bureaucratic factor of
the national intelligence model and often over cautious grading of the intelligence causes
great difficulties in its onward dissemination and as outlined below prior consent is required
from the originator:
“Sometimes I have to go back to them (the originator) to get a form of words when they send
us intelligence that we think is suitable to send to other people” (Interviewee M).
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The mentality created by the dissemination restrictions is outlined by one Counter Terrorism
intelligence officer when describing the national intelligence model and dissemination
states:
“It is the legislation and disclosure of the secret information. The environment we work in is
very secretive the mentality makes you very wary of what you tell people” (Interviewee I).
As we have established from the findings outlined above the creation of the Counter
Terrorism Command Policing model has had varied results, increasing the level of liaison
through face to face access but conversely creating increased levels of bureaucracy. What is
unclear however is if regardless of these factors whether the creation of the CTC has in fact
increased the levels of information sharing between the Police and the Security Service. It
should first be acknowledged that without access to accurate intelligence sharing data from
within the CTC obtaining an answer to this question conclusively could not be achieved.
However, it has been possible as can be seen from the data in table overleaf, to obtain a
practitioners level opinion on the success of the CTC in increasing the flow of intelligence.
Table 5: Do you believe that the level of intelligence sharing with the Security Service has increased as a result of the creation
of the CTC/CTU?
Question: Do you believe that the level of intelligence
sharing with the Security Service has increased as a result
of the creation of the CTC/CTU?
Number/ Choice of Respondents
Increased it a lot 18
In creased it a Little 16
No Change 14
Decreased it a Little 2
Decreased it a lot 2
Again, as we can see from figure 3 overleaf, the importance of these figures is plain
to see when analysed in a chart format offering a clear visual representation of the divided
opinions as to whether the CTC has been successful in increasing intelligence sharing with
the Security Services. However, what is clear is that the majority of the respondents felt that
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it had increased some 34 out of the 52 surveyed which equated to 60 percent of those
questioned.
Figure 3: The overall effect on intelligence sharing with the Security Service as a result of the creation of the CTC Policing
model.
34.00%
26.00%30.00%
5.00% 5.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
Increased it a
Lot
Increased it a
Little
No Change Decreased it a
Little
Decreased it a
Lot
This increase is reaffirmed by the stance of the deputy national co-ordinator of special
branches who outlines the high level of intelligence now forwarded to the regional
representatives of the Security Service by stating:
“Some units now even copy the region into every single piece of intelligence they create
which some struggle to cope with” (Interviewee E).
Although conversely the interviews conducted also highlighted the divided opinions with
one Terrorism Examinations Officer stating:
“ I think at a local level it has made things a lot easier but from a regional and national
perspective I don’t really see that it has changed much” (Interviewee L).
As we have established that the majority of staff within the CTC believe that the creation of
the CTC has increased intelligence sharing within the Counter Terrorism the most natural
question to be asked next is what have been the major contributories to the increase and
why, both questions that it is endeavoured to address in the following chapter.
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6. The co-operative approach to Counter Terrorism
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter was successful in outlining the makeup of the CTC and its
relationship with the Security Service and the levels of bureaucracy encountered during the
sharing of intelligence between the two actors. Also having outlined the majority of the key
data obtained during the research phase of this project we have gone some way to forming
conclusions from the analysis of the information. The most striking observation was the
correlation between face to face contact between the two actors and the increase in
bureaucracy encountered during the intelligence sharing process. However, it was also
established that regardless of the increased levels of bureaucracy the majority of the staff
surveyed from within the CTC felt that intelligence sharing had increased as a result of the
emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model. What is yet to be
established is what the major factors behind the increased levels of intelligence sharing have
been and as such this chapter intends to address this question. It will also make efforts to
establish if ultimately the creation of the CTC and CTU’S and the increased levels of
intelligence sharing have been successful in increasing the United Kingdom’s ability to
counter the terrorist threat before outlining the practitioners opinion on the best way
forward for Counter Terrorism in the United Kingdom.
6.2 Bi-lateral intelligence sharing within the UK’S Counter Terrorism response.
You would think that with such a close working relationship such as between the
Police and the Security Services that the need for bi-lateral communications would have all
but been replaced by streamlined and effective formal intelligence sharing agreements and
protocols. This may in fact be the case for high grade, threat to life intelligence in a real time
Counter Terrorism operation but it is the day to day relationships which are formed through
bi-lateral trust building that really makes the cogs of the Counter Terrorism machine run
smoothly. The data compiled from the projects questionnaire shown in the descending
frequency table below highlights the weight of support behind the feeling that not
surprisingly but interestingly and somewhat in contradiction, face to face contact with the
Security Service has played a significant part in increasing intelligence sharing even if it has
been responsible for the increased exposure to the bureaucratic ‘need to know’ principle.
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Table 6: What has played the greatest role in the increase of Intelligence sharing with the Security Service?
Question: What has played the greatest role in the increase of Intelligence sharing
with the Security Service?
Number/ Choice of Respondents
Increased Liaison i.e. Face to Face contact. 26
Reduction of Cultural Blockers i.e. Trust / Ability. 14
Improved ICT 12
Reduced Bureaucracy i.e. Need to Know Principle 0
Effectiveness of the Government Protected Marking i.e. Secret/Confidential. 0
Effectiveness of the National Intelligence Model Dissemination Grading 0
Table 6 also highlights that the formal communications channels in place such as the
national intelligence model appear to have offered little influence in the increases discussed
earlier.
Figure 4 again offers a very visual representation of the data by clearly highlighting
that increased liaison through face to face contact with members of the Security Services is
felt to have played the biggest role in the increase of intelligence sharing, with half, some 26
of the 52 respondents all identifying it as the main influence on the increases experienced in
the flow of intelligence.
Figure 4: Level of contribution to increases in intelligence sharing with the Security Service.
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We can also see from figure 4 that the reduction of cultural blockers such as a lack of
trust or ability where also heavily sighted as an influencing factor in the increased sharing of
intelligence. These two factors may not play as surprising a role as you may first expect as it
has been widely acknowledged, as evidenced in the earlier literature review that bi-lateral
relationships play a major role in the effectiveness of intelligence sharing. Due to a historic
lack of accessibility to face to face contact with the security service it is fair to say that it has
not previously been possible to nurture these bi-lateral relationships but as more and more
members of the Security Service are stationed around the country and within the CTU’S the
level of contact has increased greatly resulting in a new era of trust and mutual respect
which has served to further oil the cogs of the intelligence sharing machine.
As outlined earlier in the examination of Counter Terrorism literature successes in
previous bi-lateral intelligence sharing relationships have long suggested that bi-lateral
intelligence exchanges offer great support to the more formal arrangements and their
growth should be positively encouraged (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:4) and it would appear
that with the ever increasing face to face liaison being experienced by Police staff from
within the CTC that senior managers within the Security Service and the Police both
recognise this fact. It has also been suggested that this form of face to face intelligence
sharing and the long term relationships that are formed effectively create what can be
described as a global metropolitan policing network, which is more capable of responding to
global threats such as organised crime and terrorism (Sullivan and Wirtz, 2009:3) because of
the ease and speed at which intelligence can be shared and the manner in which it is able to
initiate potentially lifesaving responses, long before the formal channels of communication
have been opened.
The consensus amongst those interviewed was also in agreement with the literature
researched and in line with the analysed data with almost every interviewee sighting
increases in face to face liaison as one of the biggest influences on the overall rise in levels of
intelligence sharing. The most obvious benefits of face to face bi-lateral relationships are
outlined by a Counter Terrorism financial investigator who states:
“I prefer having a face to face meeting as it often gives you a better return of information. I
think this is because it enables you to discuss things in a more open manner” (Interviewee I)
The more candid benefits of such mutually beneficial relationships are offered by a
Terrorism Examinations officer who stated:
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“When I worked in the operations team some of the best information I got was from a single
particular contact I knew and trusted and who was particularly helpful and I milked it, but
this happened both ways. If I hadn’t formed this relationship I would never have got as much
information as I did” (Interviewee L).
The deputy national co-ordinator of special branches re-iterates the experiences of the front
line Counter Terrorism staff by highlighting the change in the approach to bi-lateral
communication and its impact on the cultural barriers between the organisations:
“The fact that staff can build real relationships with individual people, and practitioners in
the Police are not just dealing with a faceless desk officer in Thames House has helped in the
dispersal of that servant master relationship which was previously present........so I would
agree that personal relationships have been amongst the biggest factors in increasing
intelligence sharing but not the only factor” (Interviewee E).
Having clearly identified that intelligence sharing has increased through improved
face to face liaison we have also been able to conclude that the initial assessment that this
raised the exposure to the ‘need to know’ principle has not completely stalled
improvements in intelligence sharing. However, it is still to be seen if this improvement and
the creation of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model have ultimately increased
the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat. Answering this question is
difficult as the data obtained clearly only gives the practitioner’s perspective and an answer
to this question in itself is almost impossible to quantify at the best of times as the deputy
national co-ordinator of special branches outlines:
“We have heard some home secretaries say that we cannot arrest our way out of this
situation so there are some that wince when we quote arrests statistics to reinforce our
success” (Interviewee I).
As such, any attempt to answer this question is extremely fraught and open to
scrutiny but nevertheless an attempt was made and as table 7 outlines it would appear that
the overwhelming opinion of the practitioners within Counter Terrorism was that the United
Kingdom’s ability to counter the terrorist threat has increased.
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Table 7: How much o you believe the emergence of the CTC/ CTU has increased the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?
Question: How much o you believe the emergence of the CTC/ CTU has increased the
UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?
Number/ Choice of
Respondents
In creased it a Little 28
Increased it a lot 20
No Change 4
Decreased it a Little 0
Decreased it a lot 0
As we can see from the data present in table 7 above, the overwhelming majority of staff
believed the UK’S Counter Terrorism capability has increased, a fact that is greater
illustrated in figure 6 below.
Figure 5: Has the emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command increased the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the
terrorist threat?
We can clearly see from the analysis in Figure 5 that in total 48, 91 percent of the 52
members of staff questioned believed that there had been an increase in the United
Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability and not a single respondent felt it had decreased in
any way with only a negligible amount believing there had been no change. These figures
show a high degree of confidence within the CTC that they are equipped to deal with the
threat of international terrorism with their confidence boosted by the fact that there has
been no loss of life due to international terrorism within the United Kingdom since the
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creation of the CTC and the regional CTU’S. Arising from this conclusion is the question, how
has the CTC increased the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability? The evidence
would suggest that it is largely due to the increases in intelligence sharing that has arisen
through greater face to face liaison, a conclusion that was theorised in the earlier literature
review by Paul Wilkinson who suggested that Bi-lateral cooperation can be one of the
greatest ways to counter the terrorist threat (2007:162). However, as the deputy NCSB has
previously outlined, bi-lateral face to face liaison has increased intelligence sharing and has
assisted but it has not been the only factor that has played a major role in the increase in the
Counter Terrorism capability of the UK (2009).
The supporting interviews that where conducted during the research phase offered
a great insight into the effectiveness of the CTC Policing model and go some way to
identifying, although it should be acknowledged, neither extensively or conclusively, how
the CTC has increased the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability.
The deputy national co-ordinator of special branches offers the strategic perspective
regarding the CTC’S effectiveness by outlining:
“The biggest difference is the regional tasking meetings which give you the opportunity to
bring together a greater amount of resources to meet a particular threat whenever those
resources are needed or a better co-ordinated response by more than one force to issues that
affect more than one force” (Interviewee E).
The influence of the regional tasking process co-ordinated by the CTU’S is also recognised at
the practitioner’s level with one Terrorism Examinations officer highlighting the reduction of
bureaucratic blockers within Counter Terrorism as a result of the removal of jurisdictional
boundaries:
“Before when you looked at Cumbria, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Merseyside or Manchester they all
did their own surveillance and intelligence gathering, you had five different barriers, five
different forces to speak to, now it’s just one so in terms of getting things done it must be
easier” (Interviewee L).
In hand with the effective tasking process the creation of the CTC and CTU’S have also
ensured a greater preparedness for a Counter Terrorism response with a development and
tasking manager outlining:
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“We are definitely more prepared, we have resources in place, structures in place so if an
incident happens we know who will run it and where from, who will provide surveillance,
intelligence, briefings etc so it is all in place if a job broke tomorrow” (Interview H).
Regardless of the successes of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model
there is still room for great improvement with some suggesting the construction of the initial
CTC model may have been somewhat off the mark:
“It is a bit of folk lore that some elements of Policing went to the Security Service and said
where could you do with some extra support? The Security Service said investigations and of
course the Security Service meant intelligence investigations. The Police interpreted this to
mean investigations in the sense of detections, criminal investigations and
prosecutions...........so the tale is that the Police built this huge machine full of detectives
ready to do executive action........just when the government wanted to shift to PREVENT,
underpinned with better intelligence” (Interviewee E).
So in essence what is being suggested here is that although the creation of the CTC has
ensured the UK is better equipped and prepared it still falls short somewhat of the long term
strategic intelligence game that is required (Interviewee E). The deputy NCSB also argued
that the Police and the CTC’S role within intelligence, is still not clear:
“The big question is do we have the right intelligence understanding so that we know when
such terrorist plots are in the making? Personally I am not entirely convinced that there is a
completely settled view of what the Polices role in that area is” (Interviewee E).
Such a stance creates ambiguity within the Counter Terrorism Command and the
wider Counter Terrorism family and the deputy NCSB believes that it is time for both the
Police and the Security Service to acknowledge that MI5 alone cannot control all of the
intelligence workload by stating:
“We (the Police) have tended to see the long term strategic intelligence and analysis work as
a role for others to do or only to serve to assist us in fast time Stockwell type incidents or a
kidnap situation. Now there is a need for a long term strategic understanding requirement
that 3000 people in Thames House are not going to be able to do all of the work on their
own, even if they have got a few people scattered around the country”.
So in light of all these revelations we can clearly see that improvements within the
United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism are still needed and in an effort to establish the
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practitioners perspective on where they believed these improvements should take place the
final question within the survey of CTC employees aimed to answer this and can be seen in
the data presented in table 8.
Table 8: What would you suggest as a further way of improving the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?
Question: What would you suggest as a further way of
improving the UK’S ability to counter the terrorist threat?
Number/ Choice of Respondents
Increased Joint Working i.e. increased regional presence of the
Security Service.
21
Improved ICT capability i.e. joint access to intelligence
systems.
10
A CTC/CTU and Security Service merger. 9
A national Counter Terrorism Police force. 7
Joint ownership of intelligence investigations. 5
When the data in table 8 is again presented in chart format in figure 6, a better
understanding of the divided opinions on the way forward can be seen. However, one
feeling rises above all others and far from a dramatic restructuring of the United Kingdom’s
Counter Terrorism response or grand mergers between the Police and intelligence agencies
we can see that most practitioners feel that simply increasing the level of joint working
would be the best way forward.
Figure 6: What is the best way to further improve the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism capability?
There also appears to be little motivation to increase such working through the fore
mentioned mergers, restructuring or a change in the lead agency status and would appear
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from this analysis that the majority of staff are happy with the progress that has been made
within Counter Terrorism and feel that simply more of the current arrangements such as
Security Services employees based within the region is the most productive way forward.
Although as the NCSB has outlined earlier there is a clear resourcing disparity between the
3000 Security Service staff and the 150,000 Police employees in the UK and as such there
still requires an acknowledgement by the Security Service that they cannot conduct all of the
work themselves by simply underpinning it with the ill informed more mundane intelligence
gathering currently conducted by Police resources in the CTC and CTU’S. What is required by
both the Police and Security Service is a true acceptance that the level of contribution the
Police can provide is much greater than the current levels with clear room for improvement
for instance in the area of intelligence analysis. Most importantly it identifies a necessity for
an acceptance by the Security Service that there is effectively a ‘sealing point’ on the
resource capacity of their 3000 staff and overall, the UK’S Counter Terrorism capability
unless more responsibility is given to the Police.
However, to achieve this, as this research project has identified will require a
noticeable reduction in the level of bureaucracy being experienced through barriers such as
the ‘need to know’ principle. Without this the standard, depth and breadth of work that can
be conducted by the Police is severely restricted by the level of intelligence being shared,
regardless of the evidenced improvements. Even if greater numbers of Security Service
employees were stationed at a regional level as suggested as a way forward by the
practitioners questioned, the evidence obtained in this project leads me to hypothesise that
although offering some benefit would simply result in further increased levels of Police
Counter Terrorism staff experiencing the fore mentioned bureaucracy without ever reaching
the relationships true potential. As such it could be hypothesised that to further raise the
levels of intelligence sharing and ultimately the United Kingdom’s capability to counter the
terrorist threat will in fact require a substantial realignment of the influence of the actors
involved, equalising their contributions to Counter Terrorism intelligence investigations. The
concern with this is that as real progress has already been made the decision makers in a
position to continue these advances will see no real necessity and that as with 7/7 and the
subsequent creation of the CTC, it will take another major UK terrorist attack to force the
level of political shift required to fully reach the potential of the United Kingdom’s Counter
Terrorism capability.
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6.3 Conclusion
From the outset the overall aim of this project has been to assess if the introduction
of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model has increased intelligence sharing
between the Police and the Security Services and ultimately, the United Kingdom’s capability
to counter the terrorist threat. In an effort to achieve the aims and objectives of the project
a mixed strategy of qualitative and quantitative research techniques was employed. The
utilisation of a questionnaire was chosen in an effort to obtain sufficient quantitative data to
add weight to the data analysis. Without using this technique collation of sufficient data
would have been almost impossible as the void of previous research outlined during the
literature review and restrictions on publication of data surrounding national security arenas
such as Counter Terrorism meant the availability of high quality primary data was extremely
low. Although the theory of circulation of such a questionnaire is simple, the reality was very
different with a prolonged period of consultation being required at a senior management
level within the North West Counter Terrorism Unit and Lancashire Constabulary and in
hindsight this process should have been anticipated and the process instigated at a much
earlier stage as final authority was only granted very late in the project. This resulted in a
restricted amount of time for circulation of the questionnaire and a reduced period to await
responses, with no opportunity for any form of ‘second request’ process which may have
increased responses. The overall affect was a reduction in the number of responses that
where received although the level was still surprisingly high.
The interview process was also hampered somewhat because of this factor as it
resulted in a restriction on the availability of interviewees through operational and personal
commitments. Had a greater time period been available for the implementation of the
research process then there would undoubtedly have been more room for manoeuvre to
accommodate such commitments. The overall affect was that the rank or grade of those
interviewed was restricted to Constables or Sergeants and their Police staff equivalents and
did not include any interviews of middle or senior management practitioners with the
exception of the national coordinator of special branches which may have impacted on the
breadth of the data obtained, although overall all interviews where of an exceptionally high
standard.
The result of this research conducted provided a number of extremely interesting
conclusions, firstly that the emergence of the Counter Terrorism Command Policing model
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has increased the level of face to face liaison but has conversely resulted in an increased
exposure to bureaucracy in the form of the ‘need to know’ principle. It was also identified
that the levels of intelligence sharing had increased as a result of the emergence of the CTC
and that face to face, bi-lateral relationships where believed to be the greatest factor in this
perceived increase in intelligence sharing and ultimately, the overall assessment was that
the CTC had been successful in increasing the United Kingdom’s ability to counter the
terrorist threat. Having established these conclusions it is clear that the objectives of the
project have remained in sight throughout and the continual focus ensured that the
research was successful in supplying the sufficient amount and quality of data to ensure an
informed analysis was possible, ultimately ensuring that all of the overall aims and
objectives of the project where successfully met.
It is somewhat disappointing that none of the identified conclusions provided what
could be described as controversial or revealing insights and as a rule simply reaffirmed the
theories that had been identified earlier in the literature review stage. This assessment
however may be too self critical as it was overwhelmingly established at the beginning of the
project that there was a distinct lack of empirical research that had been conducted to
either confirm or refute any of the theories outlined and as such any research that adds
evidence that can be utilised to underpin the theories within Counter Terrorism should be
viewed as a positive contribution.
Although this project was successful in identifying a number of conclusions there
was only one that could be translated from the data into a clear recommendation to achieve
further progress which was the requirement for increased joint working, which in this case is
manifested through the presence of regionally stationed Security Service employees.
However, as the data also evidenced, increased joint working and face to face liaison only
served to increase the exposure to bureaucracy in the ‘need to know’ principle and as such
the radical hypothesis was reached that only a realignment of influence, equalising both
actors contributions would be sufficient to encourage further developments and increases in
intelligence sharing. However, such realignment would require substantial political backing
and as such is unlikely to be progressed purely through an increase in academic theories
underpinning the hypothesis. Regardless of this fact efforts will be made to influence change
by supplying senior managers within the Counter Terrorism Command with copies of the
project and consideration will also be given to publication in an effort to gather further
support and development.
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To aid in the development of the work conducted within this project there are a
number of areas that would benefit both the development of the hypothesis reached and
the overall contribution to empirical research surrounding Counter Terrorism. To accurately
assess the conclusion that the Security Services restrictively adhere to the ‘need to know’
principle to maintain control on the management of intelligence a study of the culture,
practices and policy with the Security Service would be required. This would provide
opportunity to conduct comparison between the two actors and as such create a more
accurate assessment of the hypothesis. An examination of the potential options of
realignment would also be required in an effort to establish the feasibility of the hypothesis
and finally and most importantly an examination of the internal policies which dictate the
levels of intelligence sharing such as the national intelligence model, in particular the
dissemination category along with a review of the equivalent Security Service policies,
however, with the heavy restrictions, barriers and strict adherence to secrecy within the
Security Service unfortunately means that conduct of any of these further research projects
would be extremely difficult. However, with the threat of terrorism still ever present, the
continued presence of allied forces in Islamic Republic’s and convictions of UK based
terrorists seemingly continuous, there appears no end in sight for the ‘war on terror’. As
such the necessity to keep one step ahead is more important than ever and the price of
‘resting on our laurels’ in the fight against terror could be high, higher than any cost of
political or organisational Counter Terrorism realignment and the powers that be should ask
themselves, is the cost of change, higher than the human cost of another 7/7.
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Appendices
i. Research Questionnaire
Thesis
The formulation of the Police Counter Terrorist Command (CTC) and emergence of Counter
Terrorist Units (CTU) across the United Kingdom has increased the level of national
cooperation in relation to counter terrorist information and intelligence sharing. As a result
the CTC/CTU model has ultimately increased the effectiveness of the United Kingdoms
ability to counter the threat of international terrorism.
Completion:
Please simply complete the questionnaire by placing an X in your chosen field or type your
written response in the areas provided. Once completed simply save to your document file
and then return as an attachment to: [email protected]
1. How long have you served within the North West Counter Terrorist Unit?
<1 Year
1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
4> Years
2. Which Police Service are you employed by?
Cheshire
Cumbria
Greater
Manchester
Lancashire
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Merseyside
3. What is your current role within the North West Counter Terrorist Unit?
Researcher
Analyst
Operations Officer
Financial Investigator
Intelligence Officer
Source Handler
Security Advisor
Senior Management
4. Which strand of the Contest Strategy does your role fall under?
Prevent
Pursue
Protect
Prepare
5.
Police Officer
Police Staff
6. What is your rank or Police staff grade?..................................................
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7. How integral is it to your role to share intelligence/information with the Security Service?
Essential
Quite Important
Moderately Important
Not Important
Completely Irrelevant
8. Do you have experience of working within the Special Branch prior to the formation of theCounter Terrorism Command model? If your answer is NO, please go direct to question29.
Yes
No
Pre Counter Terrorist Command Model
For those who have experience of working within the Counter Terrorism Arena Pre and Post
CTC/CTU please answer all questions.
9. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC who did you consider as your main partner forissues of Counter Terrorism?
Metropolitan Police
Other Police Services
Security Services
Europol
Interpol
Do Not Know
Other (Please specify
below)
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10. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you shareintelligence/information with the Security Service?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
11. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you shareintelligence/information with other special branches/Police Services?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
12. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you rate the ease ofintelligence/information sharing with other Special Branches and Police Services?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
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13. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you rate the ease ofintelligence/information sharing with the Security Service?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
14. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how often would you have face to face contactwith a member of the Security Service?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
Never
15. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how easy was it to access a member of theSecurity Service?
Very Easy
Easy
Moderately accessible
Difficult
Impossible
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16. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how do you feel the Security Service rated theability of the Police to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
17. Do you believe negative perceptions of the Police as intelligence actors and culturaldifferences affect the level of information/intelligence sharing?
Yes
No
18. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with the Security Services?
ICT
Lack of Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of
trust/ability.
Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to
know” principles.
Other (Please specify below)
Nothing, it worked perfectly
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19. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with other Special Branches and Police Services?
ICT
Lack of Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of
trust/ability.
Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to
know” principles.
Other (Please specify below)
Nothing, it worked perfectly
20. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options where available as a method ofcontact with the Security Service?
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
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21. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options where available to you as a methodof contact with other Special Branches and Police Services? Select more than one option ifappropriate.
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
22. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what method of communication did you use mostoften when contacting other Special Branches or Police Services?
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
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23. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what did you consider as the biggest blocker toinformation/Intelligence sharing with Police Special Branches and other Police Services?
ICT
Lack of Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Cultural Blockers i.e. lack of trust.
Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to know”
principles.
Other (Please specify below)
Nothing, it worked perfectly
24. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how did you feel the Security Service rated theability of the Police to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
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25. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what options were available as a method ofcontact with the Security Service? Select more than one option if appropriate.
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
26. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what method of communication did you use mostoften with the Security Service?
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
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27. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC what would you of suggested as a way ofimproving intelligence/information sharing with the Security Service?
Improved ICT
Increased Liaison
Joint Working
Reduced Bureaucracy
Other (Please specify below)
28. Prior to the emergence of the CTU/CTC how would you have rated the United Kingdomsability to counter the terrorist threat?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
Post Counter Terrorist Command
29. Who do you consider as your main partner agency for Counter Terrorism?
Metropolitan Police
Other Police Services
Security Service
Europol
Interpol
Do Not Know
Other (Please specify
below)
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
74
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
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30. How often do you share intelligence/information with the Security Service?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
31. How often do you share information/intelligence with other Counter Terrorist Units?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
32. How often do you share information/intelligence with Police Special Branches notencompassed by a Counter Terrorist Unit?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
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33. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with the Security Service?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
34. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with other Counter TerroristUnits?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
35. How do you rate the intelligence/information sharing process with Police Special Branchesnot encompassed by a Counter Terrorist Unit?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
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36. How often do you have face to face contact with a member of the Security Service?
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
37. How easy would you rate access to such face to face contact with a member of theSecurity Service?
Very Easy
Easy
Moderately accessible
Difficult
Impossible
38. What options are available to you as a method of contact with other Counter TerroristUnits? Select more than one option if appropriate.
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
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39. What method of communication do you use most often with other Counter TerroristUnits?
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
40. What do you consider as the biggest blocker to information/Intelligence sharing with otherCounter Terrorist Units?
ICT
Lack of Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Cultural Blockers i.e. lack of
trust/ability.
Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to know”
principles.
Other (Please specify below)
None, it works perfectly
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41. How do you feel the Security Service rate the ability of the Police to gather, analyze anddisseminate intelligence?
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Extremely Poor
42. What options are available as a method of contact with the Security Service? Select morethan one option if appropriate.
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
Other (Please specify below)
43. What method of communication you use most often with the Security Service?
Telephone
Postal
Face to Face
Intermediary
Internal ICT systems
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Other (Please specify below)
44. What do you consider as the biggest blocker to information/Intelligence sharing with theSecurity Services?
ICT
Lack of Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Cultural Blockers i.e. Lack of
trust/ability.
Bureaucracy i.e. “Need to know”
principles.
Other (Please specify below)
45. How much do you believe the emergence of the Counter Terrorist Command model hasincreased or decreased information/ intelligence sharing with the Security Service?
Increased a lot
Increased a little
No change
Decreased a little
Decreased a lot
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46. What do you believe has assisted most in the increase of intelligence/information sharing?
Improved ICT
Increased Liaison
GPMS Marking
NIM dissemination grading
Reduction of Cultural Blockers
Other (Please specify below)
47. How much do you believe the emergence of the Counter Terrorist Command model hasincreased the United Kingdoms ability to counter the terrorist threat?
Increased a lot
Increased a little
No change
Decreased a little
Decreased a lot
48. What would you suggest as a further way of improving the United Kingdoms ability tocounter the terrorist threat?
Increased Joint Working
Increased ICT capability
Joint ownership of intelligence
investigations
A national CT Police service (FBI
model)
A CTC/CTU and SyS merger
Other (please specify below)
49. Any comments/suggestions you wish to add?
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ii. Sample of Interview Questions: Deputy NCSB
1. Introduction of interviewee.2. What is the role of the Special Branch?3. What is the Counter Terrorist Unit?4. What is the structure of the CTU? i.e CTC/Regional CTU5. What is the CTU’S role?6. Why was it created?7. How are the objectives of the CTU identified?8. How does the CTU differ from the traditional “Special Branch”?9. Are the CTU’S intended to replace the Special Branch?10. Do you for see any further CTU’S being created in the near future?11. What does the CTU model offer that the traditional Special Branch does not?12. Who controls intelligence investigations within the CTU? i.e SyS led.13. How is CT information/intelligence shared between CTU’S, Police, Security Services? i.e SPOE14. Is this different from previous methods used by the Special Branch, if so, how/why?15. Which method do you believe is most productive? i.e speed, standard etc16. Has information/intelligence sharing increased/decreased between Police services because
of CTU’S, if so, how/why?17. Has such increase/decrease had any affect on Police service capability to counter the
terrorist threat, if so how/why?18. How would you describe pre CTU relationships with the Security Services (SyS/SIS/GCHQ)?19. Has the creation of the CTU increased/decreased working relationships with Security
Services in comparison to that of a traditional Special Branch? If so, how/why?20. Has such increase/decrease had any affect on Police service capability to counter the
terrorist threat, if so how/why?21. Has emergence of the CTU created any cultural/relationship change with Security Services, if
so, how? i.e perception of Police ability to gather intelligence/use covert intel gatheringtechniques such as HUMINT/CHIS.
22. Do you believe the Polices ability to gather, manage, analyse and disseminateinformation/intelligence has increased/decreased since 9/11? Please explain your answer.
23. Has the emergence of the CTU played a role in the increase/decrease in expertise withinintelligence gathering, management, analysis and dissemination in Police services, if so,how/why?
24. Do you for see any further advancement’s in information/intelligence sharing within theCTU, if so, how/why?
25. What would you suggest to improve intelligence/information sharing betweenPolice/Security services?
26. Closing thoughts of interviewee.
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A. iii. Interview Matrix
Interviewee Randomly Assigned
Reference Indicator
Detective Superintendant DavidShaylor: Deputy National Co-ordinator of Special Branches.
E
Detective Constable David
Macauley: Ports Examination Officer
L
Police Staff Susan Saddoo: CounterTerrorism Financial Investigator
I
Detective Sergeant Musserat Khan:Counter Terrorism Direction,analysis and Targeting Manager.
H
Police Staff Pamela Waring:Intelligence Co-ordinator.
M
Detective Constable Robert Mowat:
Counter Terrorism Intelligence
Officer
A
Detective Constable Peter Denson:
Counter Terrorism Intelligence
Officer
F
Detective Constable Gregory
Anderton: Counter Terrorism
Intelligence Officer
O
Detective John Tomlinson: Counter
Terrorism Intelligence Officer
R
Detective Constable Simon
Davidson: Counter Terrorism
Intelligence Officer
D