the emerging threat? south africa's extreme right
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [The University of Manchester Library]On: 09 October 2014, At: 13:11Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Terrorism and Political ViolencePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20
The Emerging Threat? South Africa'sExtreme RightMARTIN SCHÖNTEICH aa Open Society Justice Initiative , New York, New York, USAPublished online: 10 Aug 2010.
To cite this article: MARTIN SCHÖNTEICH (2004) The Emerging Threat? South Africa's Extreme Right,Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:4, 757-776, DOI: 10.1080/095465590884368
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/095465590884368
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The Emerging Threat? South Africa’s Extreme Right
MARTIN SCHONTEICH
Open Society Justice Initiative, New York, New York, USA
In the run-up to South Africa’s first non-racial election in 1994, extremist right-wingorganizations, and their sympathizers in the state security forces, posed a real dan-ger to the country’s future democratic order. After 1994, violent, right-wing extrem-ist activities virtually dissipated. However, during a single night in late 2002, eightbomb blasts rocked Soweto, South Africa’s largest black township. An unknownorganization, Boeremag (Boer force=power), claimed responsibility for the bomb-ings. Some two dozen alleged Boeremag members, including serving military offi-cers, were subsequently arrested and charged with terrorism-related offenses. TheBoeremag makes an interesting case study of how the extreme white right in SouthAfrica mixes politics and religion, and seeks to exploit popular grievances to garnersupport for the creation of a secessionist Afrikaner state. The South African whiteright does not have the resources, capacity, or support to successfully execute a coupd’etat. The Boeremag serves as a reminder, however, that the extreme right cancreate instability and destruction on a significant scale in South Africa.
South Africa is a multi-ethnic country. The country’s population can be divided intofour main ethnic groups: black (78% of the population), white (10%), colored orpeople of mixed race (9%), and Indian (3%).1 The majority of whites are Afrikaners,descendants of Dutch, German, and French-Huguenot settlers from the 17th andearly 18th centuries. Historically, Afrikaners were known as ‘‘Boers,’’ a term popularamong right-wing Afrikaners today.
In 1902, after defeat in a bitter and protracted war against the British, Afrikanerslost sovereignty over their BoerRepublics. Dominated by the British, and at risk of beingabsorbed into British culture, Afrikaner nationalism blossomed. The notion of beingsecond-class citizens boosted Afrikaner nationalism and lead to ethnic mobilization—a process which eventually led to the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948.2
During the 1950s and 1960s, the National Party implemented a plethora of raciallaws in accordance with its apartheid policy to secure Afrikaner domination overmost parts of South Africa. However, by the late 1970s, support for organizationsto the political right of the National Party grew as the latter sought to reform,and eventually dismantle, the apartheid system.
Because of its multi-faceted nature, it is difficult to satisfactorily define the whiteright in South Africa. According to Van Rooyen the right wing in South Africa is:
[a] segment within the white, and in particular Afrikaner, society whichadheres to a specific ideology founded on the dual pillars of the separ-ation of the white and the black races and on Afrikaner nationalism.3
Address correspondence to Martin Schonteich, E-mail: [email protected]
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.16, No.4 (Winter 2004), pp.757–776Copyright � Taylor and Francis, Inc., 2004DOI: 10.1080/095465590884368
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.16, No.4 (Winter 2004), pp.757–776Copyright � Taylor and Francis, Inc., 2004DOI: 10.1080/095465590884368
757
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
The contemporary extreme white (predominantly Afrikaner) right in SouthAfrica should be understood against the background of the influential role national-ism played in the development of Afrikaner political thought during much of thetwentieth century. Throughout their history Afrikaner nationalists tended to believethat the only way to confirm and protect the status and identity of the Afrikaner,and to prevent the group from being dominated by other ethnic groups or races,was to exercise power through self-determination in an ethnically homogenousterritory.
For the Afrikaner right, nationalism entrenches the belief that Afrikaners form adistinct and separate nation which has a right to self-determination. Zille argued thatthis type of ethnic nationalism is particularly effective as a cohesive force: ‘‘Ethnicnationalisms which cleave homogeneous racial groupings are the primary force bind-ing groups with a common historical experience, language, religion and culture.’’4
Smith pointed out that ethnic nationalism is a potentially powerful mobilizing forceby extending the scope of an ethnic community,
[f]rom purely cultural and social to economic and political spheres: frompredominantly private to public sectors.. . . Nationalism endows ethnicitywith a wholly new self-consciousness and legitimacy, as well as a fightingspirit and political direction.5
Past Support and Violence
In retrospect, it is clear that the South African white right was at the zenith of itsstrength in the years immediately prior to the country’s first non-racial election in1994, as fearful whites and nationalist Afrikaners sought to reverse the rulingNational Party’s plants to hand over power to a black majority government. Thepro-apartheid Conservative Party was the official opposition in South Africa’swhites-only parliament. The militant Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging or AWB(Afrikaner Resistance Movement) successfully disrupted National Party publicmeetings across the country, as the former interpreted the latter’s negotiationswith the African National Congress (ANC) as a betrayal of white, and, specifically,Afrikaner interests.
In mid-1993 almost two-dozen right-wing organizations joined forces and formedthe Afrikaner Volksfront or AVF (Afrikaner People’s Front), with the goal of promo-ting right-wing unity and the realisation of an Afrikaner volkstaat (people’s state). TheAVF sought to negotiate an autonomous territory for Afrikaners, but was also preparedto use force to create a secessionist state should the negotiations fail.
The leader of the AVF was a retired head of the South African Defence Force(SADF), Constand Viljoen. With an impressive military record fighting both Cubanand local forces in Angola, Viljoen commanded the ‘‘respect and loyalty not only ofthe more threatening of the para-military forces of the Right (including over fiftyretired security force generals) but also of sections of the South African DefenceForce.’’6 Indeed, it was not impossible to imagine that had Viljoen headed an armedinsurrection in the country that ‘‘neither the Army nor the Police, or major elementswithin them, would have refused to take up arms to end the rebellion.’’7 The fact thatin addition to Viljoen, the AVF was led by a number of former military and policegenerals, gave impetus to the scope and prospect of violent resistance by the whiteright.8
758 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
The AVF rapidly mobilized widespread support among the white right. Accord-ing to Viljoen, within six weeks of the AVF’s founding the organization had enrolled150,000 members, many of whom had ‘‘expressed their willingness to take up arms insupport of the AVF.’’9 The AVF focused its mobilization efforts on obtaining thesupport of the SADF’s Commando, or Territorial Reserve Force, units. The AVFalso enjoyed widespread support in the South African Police (SAP), especiallyamong its lower ranks.10
In the years leading up to South Africa’s first non-racial election in 1994, right-wing extremists engaged in numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism. In late 1993,members of an overtly right-wing farmers’ organization raided a SADF arms depotin the north of the country. More than three tons of military equipment, including100,000 rounds of ammunition, 400 hand grenades, and 200 mortars were stolento arm the right-wing underground.11
By early 1994 South Africa appeared to be at the precipice of a civil war, andserious analysts argued the white right potentially had the power to break up SouthAfrica:
With some military back-up, technical know-how and the alleged loyaltyof the well-trained and equipped forces of the 100,000 members of theCommando units which the AVF claimed to enjoy, a secessionist rightwing might be able to successfully create and defend a secessionist regionin one or more right-wing strongholds and enclaves in the northern oreastern part of the country.12
In the months immediately prior to the 1994 election, the South African governmenttook the threat of a right-wing rebellion seriously enough to declare a state of emerg-ency in the northwest of the country—an area of South Africa where right-wing sup-port was particularly strong. It was the first time that a state of emergency had beendeclared in Sough Africa in response to white political activity. This was done tocounter an elaborate right-wing plan to establish an independent Afrikaner statein that part of the country. The plan focused around some 50 towns, and includedthe stockpiling of armored vehicles and ammunition. Most of these towns were con-trolled by right-wing councils, and many had awarded militant right-wing organiza-tions the ‘‘freedom of the town.’’13
In the weeks prior to the election, members of the Afrikaner Resistance Move-ment set off a series of bomb blasts. These were targeted mainly at taxi ranks, busstops and terminuses where black people usually congregated, and at polling sta-tions, ANC and National Party offices, and the Johannesburg International Airport,killing about two-dozen people and injuring some 200.14
Militant right-wing activities decreased significantly after the 1994 election,which brought about the country’s first black government under the reconciliatorypresidency of ANC leader, Nelson Mandela. However, violent activity on the fringesof the white right did not dissipate completely. In 1996, two bombs at a WesternCape shopping center killed four colored shoppers and injured 60. A few weeks latertwo explosions at a mosque injured one person. A group calling itself the BoereAanvals Troepe (Boer Attack Troops) claimed responsibility for the bombings. Thegroup demanded that the Afrikaner people be given their own sovereign territory.15
In 1997, a dozen members of a right wing group, called the Pretoria Boerekom-mando (Pretoria Boer Commando), unsuccessfully attempted to steal weapons and
South Africa’s Extreme Right 759
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
military equipment from a military base in the Northern Cape province. The leaderof the group, Willem Ratte, was a high-ranking ex-special forces member of theapartheid-era South African Defence Force.16
In 1998, a group of men broke into an army base and stole over 100 weapons,including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars. The same groupalso robbed an army truck (and murdered its black and colored occupants) of rocketand grenade launchers, bombs, and various weapons including machine guns andammunition. The four men arrested and tried for the theft, robbery, and murderswere members of a right-wing organization known as Die Volk (the nation=people).17 The organization was set up to arm whites to take over the country.The group had also planned to assassinate the South African president, ThaboMbeki, and poison the drinking water in black areas.18
The aforementioned incidents were inspired by small groups of individuals, noneof whom had any direct ties to the new post-apartheid South African NationalDefence Force (SANDF). This changed in 2002, when a new right-wing organiza-tion, the Boeremag (Boer force=power), was identified by the country’s intelligenceservices. The Boeremag had serving military officers as members, and appeared tohave a wide network of supporters spread across large parts of the country.
The Boeremag also makes an interesting case study of how the extreme right inSouth Africa mixes politics and religion. The Boeremag’s sabotage campaign wasdriven by a philosophy based on extreme nationalist views and a sense of divinelyinspired purpose—a lethal cocktail, given the damage religiously inspired terrorismhas caused throughout the world.
Rise of the Boeremag
During 2002 almost two dozen alleged members of the Boeremag were arrested bythe South African authorities.19 They were charged with terrorism-related offenses,sabotage, and treason. Three of the arrestees were serving SANDF officers at thetime of their arrest. It is alleged that at least one of these officers met with formerstate president P.W. Botha, to seek the latter’s advice on the possibility of a whitegovernment ruling South Africa again. Botha is alleged to have responded that itwas possible, but ‘‘definitely not through an election.’’20
Coup Preparations and Bombing CampaignThe activities of the Boeremag came to light in September 2001, when a high-rankingwhite officer in the SANDF was contacted by alleged Boeremag members, and pre-sented with a plan to stage a coup d’etat in South Africa. The goal of the coup was torid the country of the ‘‘Boer’s enemies,’’ and take over the country’s strategic mili-tary, economic, and communication centers.21 The SANDF officer was given adocument containing detailed information on police stations and military installa-tions, indicating that its authors had access to classified information. The officerreported his attempted recruitment, including the coup plan, to the South AfricanPolice Service (SAPS). In response, the police placed suspected white, right-wingextremist groups under covert surveillance.
Within a year the police managed to foil an elaborate Boeremag plan to disruptthe World Summit on Sustainable Development. The Summit was held in Johannes-burg in September 2002, and attended by dozens of heads of state and some 30,000accredited delegates. The Boeremag planned to insert 120 powerful explosives into
760 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
portable gas canisters that were to be delivered to the Summit venue as part of thecatering equipment.22 It was later revealed that other Summit-related targetsincluded the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, and the main bridge across a majorJohannesburg highway—one of the busiest roads on the continent.23
In September 2002, the police uncovered an abandoned truck equipped withcomputer and medical equipment, food, two-way radios, and thousands of roundsof military-caliber ammunition, pipe and petrol bombs, base compounds for home-made explosives, and right-wing insignia.24 The owner of the truck was arrested andlinked to a Boeremag cell. Two of his sons would later be arrested for allegedly blow-ing up railway lines on the outskirts of Johannesburg.
According to the police, the truck was part of convoy of vehicles that had beenmaking its way to the rural and more conservative northern part of South Africa.Moreover, the police revealed that letters had been sent to right-wing sympathizersin various parts of the country, urging them to attend a ceremony in the vicinity ofwhere the truck was found, to celebrate the declaration of a Boer Republic. Recipi-ents of the letter were told to bring along a Bible, weapons and ammunition, militaryuniforms, medication, camping equipment, and enough food and water to last a fewdays.
Letters had also been sent to the media and political parties announcing a ‘‘stateof war.’’ The letters were issued in the name of the Interim Government of the SouthAfrican Boer Republic, stating that the Boer people had declared war against theRepublic of South Africa, its partners, ‘‘traitors of the Boerevolk and any other allywho tried to assist the ANC [South Africa’s governing party] regime.’’25 The letterfurther read: ‘‘Our aim is to live in our own independent and autonomous statewhere we only answer to our Almighty Father and ourselves, as an autonomousnation.’’26
In early October 2002, the police uncovered a major arms cache, including largecylinder bombs, SANDF assault rifles, handguns, homemade hand grenades, andtwo dozen boxes of ammonium nitrate (a basic ingredient for homemade bombs).The cache was found on a farm belonging to a suspected Boeremag member in thenorthern part of the country. At a media briefing, held in response to the find, thenational commissioner of police, Jackie Selebi, revealed that there were about 100key Boeremag members in the country, many of whom had access to weaponsbelonging to the SANDF’s Territorial Reserve Force. Selebi expressed his surpriseabout the youthfulness of the Boeremag suspects—all between the ages of 17 and40 years—and that many of the suspects were qualified professional people and pros-perous farmers. Selebi also announced that a number of police stations would bepatrolled by armed guards after it was revealed that police weaponry could behanded over to the Boeremag (presumably by Boeremag sympathizers within thepolice).27 Shortly thereafter, armored vehicles and other extraordinary security pre-cautions were deployed around a number of state buildings in the country’s capital,Pretoria.
On 30 October 2002, eight bomb blasts rocked Soweto, the country’s largestblack township, situated on the outskirts of Johannesburg. Seven of the blastsdamaged or destroyed commuter railway lines running through the township. Thedamage to the railway lines was extensive and estimated at about two million rand.28
One of the explosions flung a piece of railway line a few hundred meters onto ashack, killing its sleeping occupant—the only fatality of the explosions. The eighthblast occurred at a mosque, forcing parts of the building to collapse. A ninth bomb
South Africa’s Extreme Right 761
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
was found at a vacant service station and diffused by the police. Some hours after theSoweto blasts, the detonator from another bomb exploded at a Buddhist temple,about 30 kilometers east of Pretoria, injuring two security guards.
The direct and indirect financial consequences of the bombings were substantial.Almost a quarter of a million commuters were prevented from going to work onthe day of the bombings, invariably impacting on the economy of the greaterJohanesburg area, the country’s economic powerhouse. News of the bomb blastsalso caused the South African currency, the rand, to loose 21 cents to the US dollaras the markets initially panicked, but recovered some of the lost ground at the closeof trading that day.
At the time, various newspapers received an e-mailed letter, purportedly fromthe Boeremag, which read:
It is the end of suppression of the Boer nation, and for that we honouronly God. For this reason the ANC must also know that it is not onlydealing with the Boer nation, but with the revenge. . . of the God of theBoer nation. Here in the Southland we will establish a nation for ourGod that will honour only Him.29
Over the following weeks, the Boeremag claimed responsibility for damaging a policehelicopter through the bombing of a building containing the Police Air-wing nearJohannesburg, and the detonation of an explosive which damaged a bridge travers-ing a river dividing the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces.
In December 2002, the police arrested five alleged Boeremag members througha police informer who had successfully infiltrated the right-wing underground.During the arrests police seized almost 900 kg of explosives, handguns, and bomb-making equipment. At the time of writing the trial against the arrestees (includingalleged Boeremag members apprehended in other police raids across the country)had begun, and is unlikely to be finalized before the end of 2004. The accused havebeen charged with, inter alia, terrorism-related offenses, sabotage, and treason.Unlike many right-wing saboteurs of the early 1990s, the typical Boeremag defend-ant is not an impoverished farmer, blue-collar mineworker, or socially marginalindividual. Many of the defendants are middle class and professional family men,and some hold senior positions in the SANDF.
In March 2003, police crime intelligence reports alleged that the Boeremagwas planning a renewed bombing campaign to stop the aforementioned trial, andthat the remnants of the organization were regrouping after the December arrests.30
However, over a year later, with the trial proceeding at a snail’s pace, no furtherBoeremag activities had been reported.
The prosecution intends using a number of documents, which were found in thepossession of alleged Boeremag members, to prove charges of high treason againstthem. The level of detail contained in the confiscated documents reveals that itsauthors were methodical and well informed about the personnel and militaryequipment kept at virtually every military base in the country. The documentswere written by someone with a sound understanding of the military strengths andweaknesses of the SANDF. The documents further reveal that the Boeremag wasplanning to:
. recruit, train, and employ receptive Afrikaners in the SANDF and its TerritorialReserve Force system;
762 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
. infiltrate military and police structures to obtain weapons, ammunition, andcommunication equipment; and
. attack selected strategic military, economic, and political targets.
The confiscated documents also show how the Boeremag’s raison ’detre is based onan ideology containing a mix of extreme nationalism and religious prophecy.
Religious FanaticismOne of the confiscated Boeremag documents states that the struggle of the Afrikanerpeople has an important spiritual dimension. Namely, that Afrikaners are threatenedby the Illuminati, an organization which manipulates international events to bringabout a global, one-world government. According to the document, such a govern-ment will be ruled by Satan, as has been foretold in prophecy in the New Testamentbook of Revelation. (The Illuminati is a popular scapegoat for conspiratoriallyminded, religious right-wing extremists throughout the world. It is held that a secretorganization, the Illuminati, was founded in eighteenth-century Europe to amasspower and wealth for its members, and ultimately to destroy Christian civilizationand create a one-world government ruled by the anti-Christ.31 In terms of such aworldview, politics is a life-and-death struggle between good and evil with no roomfor compromise.)
According to the Boeremag document, the Illuminati is opposed to the terri-torial sovereignty of states and the God-given right of every nation to rule itself.Moreover, in South Africa, the Illuminati advances its objectives by exploitingblack nationalism and establishing an ineffective and corrupt black government.Thereafter political unrest is created to enable the Illuminati to further its expansio-nist neo-colonialist project by extracting the country’s minerals at low prices. TheBoeremag document identifies a range of Illuminati front organizations, such asthe United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the BritishCommonwealth, Zionism, and international communism. The main South AfricaIlluminati front organizations are said to be the African National Congress, theSouth African Communist Party, the South African (Jewish) Zionist movement,the media and the South African Council of Churches.
Another document linked to the Boeremag contains a detailed nationwide mili-tary plan to rid the country of the Afrikaner’s perceived enemies and take over thecountry’s strategic military, economic, and communication centers. The documentmakes provision for the creation of a Boer Republic as a defensive reaction to ablack attack on whites. The document provides two scenarios for the commencementof hostilities. That is, an attack by blacks on whites in Johannesburg, or an attack byAfrikaners on the country’s infrastructure to create widespread chaos. The planfurther proposes that all blacks and Indians be driven out of the country or intothe country’s eastern province of KwaZulu-Natal.
The belief that black people will attack whites in Johannesburg, appears to bebased on the prophecies of an Afrikaner prophet, Nicolaas van Rensburg. VanRensburg (1864–1926) is said to have had many visions about the Afrikaners andtheir future.32 In the post-1994 era the Afrikaner right has placed increasing signifi-cance on the prophecies of Van Rensburg.
Van Rensburg prophesized that ‘‘total reform’’ would take place before the Afri-kaner nation would get its own Republic, provided such reforms are similar to thereforms God expected of Israel during the days of Nehemiah. (Nehemiah was the
South Africa’s Extreme Right 763
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
governor of Judea around 440 BC.)33 In the Old Testament book of Nehemiah 13,God tells Israel how they have sinned against Him and how He expected them toreform. Namely, excluding all foreigners from the community, making the Sabbatha day of rest and forbidding mixing between the people of Judah and those of othernations.
Van Rensburg predicted the ‘‘coming into power of a black government’’, butthat this would be of a short duration only.34 Thereafter, ‘‘the bloodiest period inour [the Afrikaner’s] history begins—hundreds of innocents are murdered in theirhouses.’’35 In a vision Van Rensburg revealed that it is only after the violent deathof a black leader, and a massive strike cripples the country, that a surprise nightattack on Johannesburg by black people takes place, during which thousands ofwhite people are killed.36
The Boeremag’s planning documents reveal the influence religious prophecy canhave on the thinking and actions of the extreme right in South Africa. In the mindsof a number of Boeremag members, the prophecies were real enough to initiate anelaborate plan to topple the country’s democratically elected government and createan independent Afrikaner state through armed rebellion.
How seriously should individuals and organizations which operate on the fringesof the political right in South Africa be taken? Does the South African extreme righthave the ability to exploit popular white, and especially Afrikaner, grievances to cre-ate widespread sympathy for their cause among their own ethnic group? The nextsection will explore the level of support the extreme white right can hope to musteramong conservative white South Africans, and the threat it may pose to thecountry’s political stability.
Mobilizing Support
In the post-1994 era most right-wing whites grudgingly accepted the permanence ofblack rule and withdrew from active political activity. The number of remainingextreme right wingers, who are prepared to use violence to achieve their aims, issmall. Even in 1994, when the white right was organized and powerful, only a fewdozen people actively engaged in acts of sabotage and terrorism. A decade later, withdisillusionment and division rife within the remaining right-wing organizations, thenumber of potential saboteurs is likely to be even smaller.
While violent actions of the extreme right are unlikely to ever engender the activeparticipation of a significant number of Afrikaners, it is a sobering fact that for asabotage campaign to be successful and create long term instability this may notbe necessary. At the height of its activities the Irish Republican Army (IRA) prob-ably did not have more than a few hundred active members. The secret of its successwas its large number of sympathisers who provided the organization with safe housesand logistical support. In this way members of the IRA could plan their acts ofsabotage—and evade the police after the event—among a fairly wide range ofsupporters spread throughout the Irish countryside. In South Africa, with its vastand often inhospitable rural hinterland, a small group of right-wing saboteurs wouldbe difficult to apprehend should they enjoy widespread sympathies among thecountry’s Afrikaner farming community.
Had the Boeremag, for example, been more successful in its sabotage campaignit may have generated a significant level of sympathy and even support. In fact,both the South African League of Former Police, Soldiers and Officials, and a
764 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
spokesperson for the Afrikaner Resistance Movement have openly voiced their sup-port for the Boeremag.37
One of the Boeremag documents seeks to give a populist spin to the organiza-tion’s activities. The document cites post-1994 levels of crime, unjust affirmativeaction policies, and the sidelining of the Afrikaans language to justify the need foran independent Afrikaner state. Given the real high levels of violent crime, risingwhite unemployment, and the state-sponsored campaign against white farmers inneighboring Zimbabawe, such arguments may be capable of eliciting widespreadsympathy among conservatively minded Afrikaners.
In response to the Boeremag bombings, a respected South African political ana-lyst argued that the appearance of the Boeremag can be explained in terms of realand perceived grievances that exist in the Afrikaner community:
[t]here is as substantial and growing feeling of alienation felt by manywhites, especially Afrikaners. They feel their language rights are beingdisregarded, especially with moves to downscale Afrikaans in courts,the police, the military, the prisons and the public service. There are alsofears that there will soon be no universities with a mostly Afrikaanscharacter.
Conservative communities believe the government does not careenough about the large numbers of murders of white farmers. They fearthat the government’s softly-softly approach towards the land-grabbingand mistreatment of white farmers in Zimbabwe means that the samecould one day happen in South Africa. Affirmative action and blackempowerment make them feel that under the present regime there is nofuture for their children.38
Shortly after the Boeremag bombings, the Group of 63 wrote an open letter to SouthAfrican president, Thabo Mbeki. Founded in 2000, the Group of 63 is a formationof Afrikaner intellectuals seeking to stimulate public debate on issues they deem tobe critical to the future of Afrikaners. A number of the Group’s patrons arerespected Afrikaners who favored and worked for negotiation with the ANC inthe 1980s when it was still a banned organization in South Africa. In its letter theGroup condemned the bombings but warned that it would not be enough to appre-hend and punish the bombers. The bombings were a sign of growing Afrikaneralienation under the ANC-led government and, the letter urged, if Afrikaner alien-ation was not addressed there was a danger of further violence.
The Group listed several causes of Afrikaner alienation. Two of the causes ident-ified were the ‘‘elimination’’ of Afrikaans in the courts and the civil service, and thetargeting of historically Afrikaans schools be the government’s ‘‘policy of Anglicis-ation.’’ Reinforcing causes delineated by the Group were the negative impact onAfrikaners of affirmative action and the ‘‘apparent reticence’’ of the governmentto prevent the murderous attacks on farms in which the victims were ‘‘mainlyAfrikaners.’’39
Other commentators who hold no brief for the white right have come to similarconclusions. Namely, that there are a substantial number of Afrikaners who feelthreatened by their government’s ambiguity towards land seizures in Zimbabwe,violent crimes committed against white farmers in South Africa and the lack ofofficial protection for the Afrikaans language and culture.40
South Africa’s Extreme Right 765
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
Violent Crime and Farm AttacksThe expectation which many whites had in 1994 that crime, especially violent crime,would decrease has not materialized. Consistently high levels of violent crime, andthe media coverage of it, have resulted in a significant increase in the public’s feelingsof insecurity. This is especially the case among white South Africans whose suburbsand farming communities received a disproportionate amount of protection from thestate’s security forces before 1994.
Between 1995 and 2002, some 1,060 farmers, members of their families, andfarm workers were murdered. Most of the victims were white farmers and membersof their immediate family.41 Significantly, shortly after the commencement of theBoeremag bombing campaign, the chairman of a district agricultural union said thatwhile ‘‘most farmers do not condone the actions of the wanted and arrested [i.e.Boeremag] men, they do understand their frustrations which inspired theiractions.’’42
Conservative Afrikaners largely interpret the killing of farmers as a raciallyinspired campaign to force white farmers of their land.43 In mid-2001, the right-wingFreedom Front (an Afrikaner nationalist party) appealed to the United NationsHuman Rights Commission to place pressure on the South African government todo something about the murder of Afrikaner farmers, which ‘‘had taken on theshape of an ethnic massacre.’’44 Freedom Front leader, Pieter Mulder, said mostfarm attacks seemed orchestrated, and that the motive for the attacks was not onlycriminal. Mulder further claimed that ‘‘a define anti-Afrikaner climate had takenroot in South Africa. People accused of murdering Afrikaners were often applaudedby supporters during court appearances.’’45
According to the organization ‘‘Action Stop Farm Attacks,’’ which is supportedby commercial farmers’ unions, ‘‘evidence strongly suggests that many farm attacksare concerted efforts to intimidate the farming community,’’ which is why ‘‘farmattackers do not merely intend killing their victims, but instead want to inflict pain,humiliation and suffering, especially on elderly people and women.’’46 A country-wide signature campaign launched by Action Stop Farm Attacks in May 2000, inprotest against the high number of attacks on farmers, was endorsed by the FreedomFront. Within six months the petition had received 372,000 signatures.47
Crime-ridden communities, which are badly policed and bear the brunt ofviolent crime, are increasingly engaging in vigilante activity.48 Among rural Afrika-ners, violent crimes against farmers and their families have contributed significantlyto a hardening of attitudes. A poll among commercial farmers (a substantialmajority of who are white and Afrikaans-speaking) in early 2001 found that almosttwo-thirds of respondents would ‘‘take the law into their own hands’’ if farmviolence was not stopped.49 Such opinions hold serious implications for the internalsovereignty of the state. A substantial number of Afrikaners do not trust the state’sability to fulfill one of its most important functions—to protect its citizens fromviolent criminals.
White UnemploymentWhite employment is low by South African standards. In 2001 the white unemploy-ment rate was 10%, compared to a national average of 37%.50 White unemploymenthas, however, experienced the greatest proportional increase compared to that ofother ethnic groups in South Africa. Between 1995 and 2001, white unemploymentincreased by 197%, compared to the national average of 27%.
766 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
The South African government’s affirmative action policy, and the legislationenforcing the policy, is frequently blamed by the white right as a cause of whiteunemployment. One consequence has been a significant increase in the membershipof the trade union ‘‘Solidarity,’’ which has traditionally been supported by the whiteright. The union’s membership grew from 33,000 members in 1994 to 128,000 inearly 2002 (of whom almost 90% were Afrikaners).51 Speaking in March 2002,Solidarity’s information and strategy officer expressed himself bitterly about howaffirmative action was applied in South Africa:
Affirmative action is one of the most burning issues for our membership.We experience more and more a feeling of alienation in the workplace.. . .It is our experience that numerous enterprises regard affirmative actionprogrammes as methods of ridding themselves of whites in the workplace,in order to replace them with blacks. This is not affirmative action—it isethnic cleansing.
The question arises whether there is any difference between confis-cation of white farms in Zimbabwe on the basis that these are not propor-tionally owned, and the confiscation of white posts in South Africabecause these posts are not proportionally occupied. . . numerous adver-tisements are encountered for posts which have been earmarked solely foraffirmative action purposes. A feeling of powerlessness prevails, whichcould lead to various forms of resistance.52
LanguageAccording to Smith, most nationalists identify nationality with language.53 ForAfrikaner nationalists the Afrikaans language is regarded as one of the majorjustifications for the belief that the Afrikaner constitutes a distinct and separate volk,with a legitimate right to self-determination. A prominent Afrikaner nationalist, PietMeyer, wrote in the 1960s: ‘‘An own language is the most important precondition forthe development and continued existence of a people, as a separate people among thepeoples of the world.’’54
In a 1997 survey, only 16% of Afrikaners felt that their language was adequatelytreated. Nearly 90% felt that Afrikaans enjoyed less than its rightful place in publiclife.55 Over the last few years a number of towns and cities with historic Afrikaansnames dating back to the early 19th century have had their names Africanized. In2002 the government decided that state departments had to choose a single languagefor inter- and intra-departmental communication, effectively compelling publicservants to communicate in English with one another.56
The government’s language policy in respect of education has probably been themost contentious in the eyes of the Afrikaner right. The constitution recognizes theright to mother tongue education in any of the 11 official languages, but this is quali-fied by the proviso that it must be reasonably practicable. The post-1994 educationalauthorities have resisted Afrikaner demands that public schools and universitiesretain their cultural identity. According to the government’s language policy forhigher education,
[t]he notion of Afrikaans universities runs counter to the end goal of atransformed higher education system, which . . . is the creation of highereducation institutions whose identity and cultural orientation is neither
South Africa’s Extreme Right 767
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
black nor white, English or Afrikaans-speaking, but unabashedly andunashamedly South African.57
In late 2002, Freedom Front member of parliament, Corne Mulder, argued that inrelation to Afrikaner frustrations, the Boeremag bombing campaign constituted‘‘the tip of the iceberg.’’ The government’s approach towards things like Afri-kaans-language universities and the lower status of Afrikaans generally have putAfrikaners on edge, Mulder claimed.58
Also in 2002, Ton Vosloo, a politically moderate member of the Afrikaner elite,and chairman of the board of both Naspers (a large Afrikaans publishing house) andSanlam (one of South Africa’s largest insurance companies) stated:
It is not to spread panic when one says that Afrikaner people are in acrisis with red lights flashing along their survival path. The examples ofmarginalization are numerous; the places where space to exist had beenconquered, negotiated or established on own initiative are increasinglybeing questioned. This includes even the self-evident right to be servedby the authorities in a language that is officially recognized.59
Creating MartyrsAny small group of right-wing extremists requires the tacit support of its broaderethnic community to conduct a successful and lengthy insurgency. One way of mobi-lizing ethnic support is to exploit popular grievances as discussed above. Anotherway is to alienate the broader ethnic community from the agencies of the state,and to create martyrs whose ‘‘suffering’’ and ‘‘sacrifices’’ can be idealised and usedto enlist new impressionable young recruits.
According to Wilkinson, security forces in multi-ethnic societies have to beespecially careful not to create the perception that they are victimising members ofthe public who share the same ethnic affiliation as the terrorists:
The terrorists can make enormous propaganda capital out of violationsof the law by members of the security forces and use these as additionaljustifications for their own campaigns. Thus they conveniently divert thepublic’s gaze away from the violations of the law and outrages stemmingfrom their own petty tyranny, and attempt to portray the incumbentauthorities as monstrous blood-soaked oppressors.60
The SAPS was able to arrest the suspected Boeremag bombers within a relativelyshort period of time. This was because of good intelligence, detective and forensicwork, and the fact that the police knew within days of the first bombings who thelikely perpetrators were. Yet it appears that the police used unnecessarily robust,and even extra-legal, methods in its activities against the Boeremag.61
In a large operation designed to apprehend suspected Boeremag members, theSAPS raided some 90 farms and homes of right-wing suspects throughout the coun-try. Reports soon filled the press of ‘‘police barging into private homes before dawn,without warrants, permission or explanations.’’62 An unnamed police legal advisoradmitted ‘‘the police may have acted outside the law . . . if they were not in possessionof a valid warrant.’’63 A number of people were arrested because they were unable tofind their firearm licences quickly enough.64 As one of the arrestees wrote in a letter
768 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
published in a daily newspaper: ‘‘This [the raids] was a finishing expedition whichhas set back reconciliation many years.’’65
One of the country’s largest farmers’ associations, the Transvaal AgriculturalUnion, complained that the police arrested several union members for offenses suchas being in possession of a firearm licensed in a brother’s name, and keeping aflare.66 In a press release the union stated angrily: ‘‘In typical Zimbabwe style thegovernment is using the SAPS to intimidate law abiding citizens, some of whomare our members, through night time raids without search warrants.’’67
Potentially more serious are allegations that Boeremag suspects were tortured bythe police. According to press reports a white homeless man was mistakenly arrestedin connection with the Boeremag bombings in Soweto. The arrested man alleged thatthe police ‘‘tortured him, including electric shocks to his toes, and had demandedinformation about bombs and right-wing operatives.’’68 Allegations have also beenmade by the legal representative of some of the Boeremag arrestees that their clientswere tortured by the police.69
It would be a victory for the extreme white right if any of these allegations turnout to be true. Firstly, it can result in the acquittal of guilty accused if crucial con-fessions were made under duress and torture. This would be an acute embarrassmentto the criminal justice system and the government, while providing a moral boost tothe extreme right. Secondly, such abuses would enable the extreme right to create themartyrs they need to generate popular sympathy and support for their cause.
Political MarginalizationSouth Africa is essentially a unitary state with some weak federal elements. It is alsoa country where the electorate votes largely along racial lines. For example, in the1999 national election the ANC received over 80% of the black vote. Only 1%of Afrikaners and 4% of white English-speakers voted for the ANC.70 In a post-election poll 77% of black ANC voters said they would still vote for the ANC evenif it failed to fulfill its promises over the following five years (and less than 9% saidthey would vote for another party).71 This suggests that there is little prospect of achange in government for many years to come. A consequence of such racial consoli-dation is that ‘‘the opposition tends to be peripheral to the system.’’72 Unsurpris-ingly, in a national opinion survey in early 2000, a third of white respondentsindicated that they had not voted in the previous election (compared to 13% of blackrespondents)—a likely consequence of the political alienation experienced by whiteSouth Africans. Responses by Afrikaners only were not provided.73 An opinion sur-vey conducted in early 2002 found that nearly 40% of whites were disinterested orundecided whether to participate in a national election. In an analysis of the 2002survey, director of the Johannesburg-based Helen Suzman Foundation, LawrenceSchlemmer, stated that whites ‘‘are now more alienated from party politics than theyhave ever been in their entire political history.’’74
South Africa’s political system, and the racial solidarity of its voters, sidelinesracially based minority groups to a position of perpetual opposition and politicalmarginalization. Even liberal commentators argue that the drafters of the country’sconstitution should have given ‘‘more serious consideration to balancing the numeri-cal principle with more substantial provisions for the incorporation of minorityinterests.’’75
In mid-2001 a national survey, commissioned by the South African Institute ofRace Relations, sought to gauge South Africans’ views on race relations and racism
South Africa’s Extreme Right 769
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
in everyday life. Overall, the survey results were positive, with twice as many respon-dents stating that race relations in South Africa had improved in the five years priorto the survey compared to those who felt that they had deteriorated. The surveyresults did, however, indicate that Afrikaners (defined as ‘‘white Afrikaans speak-ing’’) were significantly more negative in their views on race relations in the countrythan respondents from other ethnic groups:76
. To the question: ‘‘Over the past few years, relations between people of differentraces in South Africa have: improved, stayed the same, or become worse?,’’ aquarter of the respondents (25%) said that race relations had got worse. Afrika-ners were the most negative, with 44% stating that race relations had got worse.
. To the question: ‘‘Compared to a few years ago, do you trust your fellow SouthAfricans more, less, or about the same?,’’ almost two-thirds (66%) of the respon-dents said they trusted their fellow South Africans less. Afrikaners were again themost negative, with almost three-quarters (75%) expressing the view that theytrusted their compatriots less.
. To the question: ‘‘What counts these days for a person trying to make progress ina career?,’’ 14% of respondents said ‘‘one’s race group.’’ Afrikaans respondentswere the most likely to give this answer, with 42% doing so.
. To the question: ‘‘These days some people complain about racism that has contin-ued despite the changes that have taken place in South Africa. How serious do youthink the problem of racism actually is ?,’’ 59% of respondents thought that it wasserious. Afrikaans respondents were the most likely to say that it was serious, with87% doing so.
Possibility of a Coup D’etat
Under favorable circumstances, and a right-wing organization capable of exploitingpopular Afrikaner grievances, it is possible that a right-wing sabotage campaigncould be condoned—and even tacitly supported—by a small, but significant, numberof Afrikaners. What is unlikely, however, is that the extreme white right can attractsufficient popular support, and develop the organizational capacity, to execute a suc-cessful coup d’etat in South Africa. Writing shortly before the 1994 election, whenthe extreme right was well organized and enjoyed significant popular Afrikaner sup-port, Adam and Moodley rejected the likelihood of a right wing coup in SouthAfrica:
The ultra-right is unlikely to provoke a military takeover under presentconditions. Even if such a seizure of power were to take place during afuture civil war, the right wing alone could not govern the country.Unlike military juntas in Latin American states, who can count on dom-estic financial endorsement and influential international support, a mili-tary coup in South Africa would meet with determined opposition. Thehope of the ultra-right, despite its military rhetoric, lies not in a takeoverbut in secession from an increasingly integrated non-racial state.77
According to Williams, a South African military analyst, the prospects of a success-ful right wing coup d’etat are virtually zero. Williams argues that for a coup to besuccessful in any country it is vital that a number of preconditions are in place—all of which are absent in respect of the South African right wing:78
770 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
. a high level of political will and mass mobilization must exist to ensure that thecoup plotters possess the required levels of legitimacy and political support;
. the coup plotters need to be able to secure control over the most important of thecountry’s strategic installations; and
. the bulk of the officers corps, or a significant part thereof, need to support theobjectives of the coup, and possess the political will to govern.
With every passing year since 1994 the extreme white right’s chances of violently tak-ing over the reigns of power, or establishing an independent Afrikaner state, havediminished. Most of the country’s senior civil servants are ANC appointees. TheSANDF and SAPS have become multiracial organizations at all command levels.Moreover, senior officers in the defense force and the police with known right-wingbeliefs have been sidelined or given early retirement.
In mid-1991 some 43% of the police personnel in the former South AfricanPolice (SAP) were white. Officers’ ranks were virtually exclusively white. Even inmid-1994, some 95% of the officer corps in the SAP was white.79 In 2003, only aquarter (25%) of all police personnel in the SAPS were white, and under half(47%) of the commissioned officers and 22% of the non-commissioned officers(NCOs) were white.80 In May 1995, the SANDF employed some 76,000 full timeuniformed personnel (excluding civilians), of whom 28,413, or 37%, were white.By the end of 2002, the proportion of white SANDF full-time uniformed soldiershad declined significantly. Among senior officers, for example, the proportion ofwhites had declined from 87% in 1995 to 67%.81
Conclusion
In 1996 South Africa’s present constitution came into force. The ANC refused toaccept a power-sharing cabinet as a principle enshrined in the constitution. Shortlythereafter, National Party leader, and South Africa’s last white president until the1994 election, F. W. de Klerk, took the National Party out of the government ofnational unity. De Klerk lamented that no balanced political settlement of the kindhis government has sought had occurred, but rather a surrender of power and with ita loss of sovereignty:
The decision to surrender the right to national sovereignty is certainlyone of the most painful any leader can be asked to take. Most nationsare prepared to risk war and catastrophe rather than to surrender thisright. Yet this was the decision we had to take. We had to accept thenecessity of giving up on an ideal on which we have been nurtured andthe dream for which so many generations had struggled for and for whichso many of our people died.82
The National Party’s withdrawal from the cabinet symbolised the political displace-ment of the party that had ruled South Africa for over 40 years and that of theAfrikaner ruling group. Only ten years earlier Afrikaners occupied most of the seniorpositions in the central government, the security services and the public corpora-tions. The country’s military machine was widely believed to be the most effectivein Africa, and even the widening black resistance and revolt of the 1980s and early1990s never seriously challenged the Afrikaner-dominated security forces.
South Africa’s Extreme Right 771
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
It is difficult to find historical examples of the Afrikaner elite’s voluntary surren-der of state power to an erstwhile bitter enemy. De Klerk correctly pointed out thatmost nations wage wars to protect their sovereignty. The Afrikaner elite relinquishedits sovereignty by going to the negotiating table to, ultimately unsuccessfully,negotiate a power sharing arrangement with the country’s black majority. Giventhe Afrikaner’s almost complete loss of political power, their sidelining in thepublic service, and the South African government’s ever firmer application of affirm-ative action legislation in the private sector, some may argue that the countryhas been fortunate not to have experienced more right-wing terrorism and violentresistance.
It needs to be borne in mind that the Afrikaner elite, while losing political power,has generally not suffered economically from the changes in the country’s powerstructures. The Afrikaner professional class has successfully exploited the country’sstrong economic growth and readmission to the international community after 1994.Many previous Afrikaner civil servants used their generous retrenchment packagesto open their own businesses. Through the Truth and Reconciliation Commissionprocess former senior white police officers and soldiers, guilty of human rightsabuses, received amnesty and have not been prosecuted.
However, in defense of cultural and linguistic rights, which are perceived to beunder pressure, many Afrikaners are beginning to mobilize around ethnic issues.This mobilization is taking place not only within rural and conservative communi-ties, but also among traditionally liberal Afrikaner academics and in the editorialoffices of the country’s largest Afrikaans-language newspapers. Other, less ethnicallyaware Afrikaners, are emigrating. These are primarily well-educated people who aredisillusioned with the new South Africa.
Less-educated Afrikaners—blue-collar workers, artisans and small-scale farmers—the traditional support base of the right, have seen their economic positiondeteriorate under South Africa’s democracy. Unable to compete with an increasinglyeducated and numerically stronger black workforce, many lower-middle and work-ing class Afrikaners have seen their real incomes drop sine 1994. While there is muchdiscontent among this group, the radical white right is too disillusioned and frag-mented to draw any significant following from this section of Afrikaner society.
The rise of the Boeremag has shown, however, that individuals exist who areprepared to build alliances with like-minded radicals to plan and implement violentacts in the name of Afrikaner nationalism. Certainly, the extreme right does not havethe resources, capacity or support to successfully execute a coup d’etat in SouthAfrica. It also lacks the broad popular support and access to military weaponry tosuccessfully proclaim and defend a secessionist Afrikaner state. It would be naıve,however, to presume that the extreme right cannot create instability and destructionon a significant scale.
According to Canadian political scientist, Thomas Homer-Dixon, the twenty-first century may well see the world becoming increasingly vulnerable to smallgroups of extremists. This vulnerability is the product of two key social and techno-logical developments. Firstly, the growing complexity and interconnectedness ofmodern societies. Secondly, the increasing geographic concentration of wealth,human capital, knowledge, and communication links. For Homer-Dixon, the grow-ing technological capacity of small groups to destroy infrastructure and people, andthe increasing vulnerability of a country’s economic and technological systems tocarefully aimed attacks, has empowered small groups of extremists.83
772 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
South Africa’s industry, wealth, and human capital are concentrated in a fewmetropolitan areas. A number of powerful bombs, strategically placed, could causeconsiderable harm to South Africa’s fragile economy. A dozen bombs targeting, forexample, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, key bridges along national roads, abusy international airport, the country’s sole nuclear power station on the outskirtsof Cape Town, a prominent foreign embassy, and a luxury hotel filled with foreigntourists would see the country’s already volatile currency plummeting, tourists flee-ing the country, and a halt to foreign investment. Alternatively, the assassination oftwo or three key cabinet ministers, and popular black political or religious leaderscould take the country to the brink of a race war.
Notes
1. J. Kane-Berman (ed.), South Africa Survey 2002=03 (Johannesburg: South African Insti-tute of Race Relations 2003) p.3.
2. M. Schonteich and H. Boshoff, ‘‘Volk, Faith and Fatherland. The Security Threat Posedby the White Right,’’ ISS Monograph Series 81 (March 2003), p.28.
3. J. Van Rooyen, Hard Right. The New White Power in South Africa (London: I B TaurisPublishers 1994) pp.2–3.
4. H. Zille, ‘‘The Right Wing in South African Politics,’’ in P. L. Berger and B. Godsell(eds.), A Future South Africa. Visions, Strategies and Realities (Cape Town: Human &Rousseau=Tafelberg 1988) p.65.
5. A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress 1981) pp.19–20.
6. J. Van Rooyen, ‘‘The White Right,’’ in A. Reynolds (ed.), Election ’94 South Africa.The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects (Claremont: David Philip 1994) p.89.
7. D. Welsh, ‘‘Right-Wing Terrorism in South Africa,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 7=1(Spring 1995), p.261.
8. The Afrikaner Volksfront’s ‘‘Committee of Generals’’ comprised General Viljoen; Gen-eral Mike Geldenhuys, a former Commissioner of Police; General Kobus Visser, ex-SouthAfrican Police; and Generals Tienie Groenewald and Dries Bischoff, both former armygenerals.
9. P. Stiff, Warfare by Other Means. South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s (Alberton: Galago2001) p.537.
10. B. Sass, ‘‘The Might of the Right,’’ African Defence Review 15 (1994), p.2, <http:==www.iss.co.za=Pubs=ASR=ADR15=Sass.html> (17 Nov. 2003).
11. Van Rooyen (note 3) p.198.12. Ibid, pp.208–209.13. Stiff (note 9) p.544.14. Schonteich and Boshoff (note 2) p.28.15. P. Honey, ‘‘Terrorism & the Right Wing. No Sudden Revival,’’ Financial Mail, 8 Nov.
2002.16. No author, ‘‘Willem Ratte Convicted for 1997 Sabotage,’’ Daily Dispatch, 17 Feb. 2001.17. No author, ‘‘Court Hears of Bizarre Rightwing Plot to Take Over the Country,’’ South
African Press Association, 8 May 2001.18. A. Maykuth, ‘‘A White Plot for Race War Was Far-Fetched, but Some Believed,’’ The
Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 May 2001. No author, ‘‘Tempe Accused Tells of Plot to KillMbeki,’’ Daily Dispatch, 29 May 2001.
19. The arrestees are referred to as ‘‘alleged’’ Boeremag members because, at the time ofwriting, they have not been convicted for engaging in subversive and terrorism-relatedactivities under the auspices of the Boeremag. Their trial is unlikely to result in a verdictbefore 2005.
20. E. Momberg, ‘‘FW de Klerk Was Bought,’’ The Citizen, 23 Aug. 2002.
South Africa’s Extreme Right 773
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
21. H. Otto, ‘‘Hunt for Boeremag Coup Plotters,’’ Pretoria News, 10 Sept. 2002.22. R. Munusamy, ‘‘Summit Bomb Plot Foiled,’’ Sunday Times, 8 Sept. 2002.23. S. Sole and S. Brummer, ‘‘The Rise of the Boer al-Qaeda,’’ Mail & Guardian, 1 Nov. 2002.24. C. Thompson, ‘‘Boer Rebels’ Foiled,’’ The Citizen, 16 Sept. 2002; R. Munusamy, ‘‘Right
Wing Targets Premier,’’ Sunday Times, 15 Sept. 2002; D. Schuettler, ‘‘S. Africa PoliceArrest Fugitives in Extremist Plot,’’ Reuters News Service, 20 Sept. 2002.
25. M. le Roux, ‘‘Mandela Slams Right-Wing Plot,’’ Pretoria News, 18 Sept. 2002.26. B. Naidu, ‘‘We Take Great Pleasure in Inviting You to Our Civil War,’’ Sunday Times
Metro, 29 Sept. 2002.27. B. Beukman and V. Keppler, ‘‘Regse ‘terroriste’ kan nie staatsgreep uitvoer,’’ Naweek-
Beeld, 5 Oct. 2002.28. About US$300,000.29. E. Momberg, ‘‘Boere Threats ‘Serious’,’’ The Citizen, 12 Nov. 2002.30. C. Hills, ‘‘Right-Wing Campaign to Disrupt Bomb Trails,’’ The Citizen, 14 March 2003.31. P. J. Pretorius, $ell-Out! The Truth Behind the History Of Sourth African Politics (No
place: Published by the author 1997) p.16.32. A. Snyman, Voice of a Prophet (Mossel Bay: Vaandel Publishers 1999).33. Ibid, p.210.34. Ibid, p.175.35. Ibid, p.213.36. Ibid, pp.327–328.37. No author, ‘‘No Choice but to Back Boerlmag: Ex-Solidiers,’’ The Citizen, 3 Dec. 2002;
F. Rundle, ‘‘Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?,’’ The Citizen, 9 Oct. 2002; J. Basson, ‘‘Host-erie oor Boeremag grens aan paniek,’’ Die Afrikaner, 29 Nov. 2002.
38. M. du Preez, ‘‘Seeds of Right-Wing Violence Are Buried in Real Fears,’’ The Star, 31 Oct.2002.
39. P. Laurence, ‘‘ANC Should Heed the Group of 63’s Warning,’’ Focus 29 (March 2003).40. See. J. Battersby, ‘‘No Sympathy for Terrorists in Modern SA, but Why Did They
Do It?,’’ Sunday Independent, 3 Nov. 2002; G. Wannenburg, ‘‘Marginalization of RightHelps It Recruit for Terror. Address Right-Wing Concerns Before Support for ExtremistsGrows,’’ Sunday Independent, 3 Nov. 2002.
41. For a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of farm attacks in South Africa seeM. Schonteich and J. Steinberg, Attacks on Farms and Smallholdings. An Evaluation ofthe Rural Protection Plan (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2000).
42. L. Oelofse, ‘‘Bela-Bela: A Town Where Still Waters Run Deep. Rightwing SentimentsFlourish,’’ Pretoria News, 15 Nov. 2002.
43. E. Sidiropoulos et al., South Africa Survey 1997=98 (Johannesburg: South African Insti-tute of Race Relations 1998) p.510.
44. E. Momberg, ‘‘Stop Afrikaner Massacre – FF,’’ The Citizen, 20 July 2001.45. Ibid.46. No author, Action: Stop Farm Attacks, <http:==www.tlu.co.za=AKSIE%20STOP%
20PLAASAANVALLE.htm> , (13 Jan. 2003).47. B. Manby, Unequal Protection. The State Response to Violent Crime on South African
Farms (New York: Human Rights Watch 2001) p.145.48. M. Sekhonyane and A. Louw, ‘‘Violent Justice. Vigilantism and the State’ Response,’’ ISS
Monograph Series 72 (April 2002) p.36.49. C. Thompson, ‘‘Militant Farmers’ Myth,’’ The Citizen, 2 April 2001.50. J. Kane-Berman et al., South Africa Survey 2001=2002 (Johannesburg: South African
Institute of Race Relations 2001) p.213. Note that Statistics South Africa’s ‘‘expandeddefinition’’ of unemployment is used. That is, the economically active population whohave not worked during the last seven days prior to being interviewed; and want to work,and are available to start work within a week of being interviewed.
774 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
51. No author, ‘‘Solidariteit. Wie is ons?’’ <http:==www.solidarity.co.za=Home=wie.asp>,p 1, (19 Nov. 2003); A. Mischke, ‘‘Afrikaners maak steeds so,’’ Rapport, 19 May 2002.
52. D. Hermann, Balancing Affirmative Action. Paper delivered at a South African DefenceCollege symposium on equal opportunities and affirmative action, <http:==www.solidarity.co.za=home=content.asp?Parentid ¼ 14&ID ¼ 179> , (19 Nov. 2002).
53. Smith (note 5) p.45.54. P. J. Meyer, ‘‘Nasionalisme: Die onsigbare vlam,’’ in F.A. van Jaarsveld and G.D. Scholtz
(eds), Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Agtergrond, Ontstaan en Toekoms (Johannesburg:Voortrekker Press 1966) p.289 [author’s translation].
55. Giliomee, The Majority, Minorities and Ex-Nationalities in South Africa and the ProposedCultural Commission. Report of the proceedings of a Konrad Adenauer Stiftung confer-ence on ‘‘The Moral Renaissance: Government, Politics, Ethics and Spirituality,’’ Johan-nesburg, 3–4 May 2000, p.42.
56. No author, ‘‘New Language Policy for Civil Service Welcomed,’’ South African PressAssociation, 4 Dec. 2002.
57. Language Policy for Higher Education, Ministry of Education, Pretoria, Nov. 2002, p.12.58. T. Cohen and C. Benjamin, ‘‘Is Radical Right a Real Threat to SA’s Democracy?,’’ Busi-
ness Day, 7 Nov. 2002.59. T. Vosloo, ‘‘Afrikaans verenig,’’ Die Burger, 21 Sept. 2002.60. P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan Education 1986),
pp.127–128.61. Schonteich and Boshoff (note 2) pp.89–91.62. E. Momberg, ‘‘Police ‘Were Out of Order’,’’ The Citizen, 6 Dec. 2002.63. Ibid.64. C. Hills, ‘‘Ornamental Guns Seized in Swoop on Derby-Lewis,’’ The Citizen, 30 Nov.
2002.65. G. Derby-Lewis, ‘‘No Solid Evidence, but Right-Wing Raids Continue,’’ The Citizen, 12
Dec. 2002.66. F. Ismail and J. Battersby, ‘‘Maps, Bombs Seized in Swoop on Rightwingers,’’ Sunday
Independent, 1 Dec. 2002.67. No author, ‘‘Nog ‘n regerings-aanslag teen boere?,’’ TAU-SA press release, Pretoria,
3 Dec. 2002, <http:==www.tlu.co.za=pg16 1 02 49.htm> , (11 Dec. 2002).68. M. Sithole, ‘‘Suspect Claims Torture,’’ Daily News, 25 Nov. 2002.69. C. Hills, ‘‘Police Beat Up Sabotage Suspects—lawyer,’’ The Citizen, 13 Dec. 2002; H. Otto,
‘‘Rightwingers ‘tortured’ by police,’’ Pretoria News, 24 Dec. 2002; H. Otto, ‘‘Man JailedAfter Secret Meeting,’’ Pretoria News, 24 Dec. 2002.
70. H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers 2003), p.660.71. R. W. Johnson, ‘‘How to Use That Huge Majority’’ Focus 16, Nov. 1999, <http:==www.
hsf.org.za=focus 16=f16Election survey.html> , (17 Jan. 2003).72. H. Giliomee, J. Myburg, and L. Schiemmer, Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties
and Minorities in South Africa. Report of the proceedings of a conference hosted by theKonrad Adenauer Foundation and Department of Political Studies at Rhodes University,Kariega Game Reserve, 28–30 June 2000. p.39.
73. Ibid, p.46.74. L. Schlemmer, Can South Africa’s Democracy Survive Its History and Political Culture? A
Study of Trends in Party Political Support Over Time and the Complex Basis of VoterChoice (Johannesburg: Helen Suzman Foundation 2002), p.7.
75. Giliomee, Myburg and Schlemmer (note 72) p.48.76. L. Schlemmer, ‘‘Race Relations and Racism in Everyday Life’’ Fast Facts 9, Sep. 2001,
<http:==www.sairr.org.za=publications=pub=ff=200109=life.htm> , (16 Jan. 2003).77. H. Adam and K. Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution. Society and Politics in Post-Apart-
heid South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers 1993) p.149.
South Africa’s Extreme Right 775
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4
78. R. Williams, ‘‘Are the Right-Wing Coup Plotters Just Tilting at Windmills?,’’ PretoriaNews, 11 Oct. 2002.
79. J. Rauch, N. Levine, M. Lue and K. Ngubeni, ‘‘Creating a New South African PoliceService: Priorities in the Post Election Period,’’ CSVR Occasional Paper (July 1994).
80. Statistics as of 1 August 2003. Personal communication, SAPS Human Resource Divison,Pretoria, 25 Sept. 2003.
81. Personal communication, South African Department of Defence, Human ResourceDivison, Pretoria, 25 Sept. 2003.
82. Verbatim copy of speech by F.W. de Klerk, 21 Jan. 1997, as quoted in Giliomee (note 70)p.656.
83. T. Homer-Dixon, ‘‘The Rise of Complex Terrorism,’’ Foreign Policy (Jan.=Feb. 2002).
776 M. Schonteich
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
The
Uni
vers
ity o
f M
anch
este
r L
ibra
ry]
at 1
3:11
09
Oct
ober
201
4