T h e E n c y c l o p e d i a o f

Libertarianism

Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names; nor was he deceived inhis expectation, that the senate and people would submit to slavery, provided theywere respectfully assured, that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.

—Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

T h e E n c y c l o p e d i a o f

R o n a l d H a m o w yE d i t o r - i n - C h i e f

Libertarianism

Professor Emeritus of History, University of Alberta

J a s o n K u z n i c k i

A a r o n S t e e l m a n

A s s i s t a n t E d i t o r s

Research Fellow, Cato Institute

Director of Research Publications, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

D e i r d r e M c C l o s k e y

C o n s u l t i n g E d i t o r

Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, Chicago

J e f f r e y D . S c h u l t z

F o u n d i n g a n d C o n s u l t i n g E d i t o r

A project of the Cato Institute

Copyright © 2008 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The encyclopedia of libertarianism / editor Ronald Hamowy.p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4 (cloth)

1. Libertarianism—Encyclopedias. I. Hamowy, Ronald, 1937-

JC585.E53 2008320.51’2—dc22 2008009151

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

08 09 10 11 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Publisher: Rolf A. JankeAcquisitions Editor: Jim Brace-ThompsonProduction Editor: Tracy BuyanCopy Editor: Heather JeffersonTypesetter: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd.Proofreader: Penelope SippelIndexer: Julie Sherman GraysonCover Designer: Ravi BalasuriyaMarketing Manager: Amberlyn Erzinger

List of Entries vii

Reader’s Guide xi

About the Editors xv

Contributors xvi

Editor’s Introduction xxi

General Introduction xxv

Entries

Contents

A 1B 23C 45D 111E 133F 165G 201H 217I 233J 261K 269

L 277M 309N 347O 363P 369R 411S 449T 499U 517V 521W 529

Index 547

vii

List of Entries

AbolitionismAbortionActon, LordAdams, JohnAffirmative ActionAmerican RevolutionAnarchismAnarcho-CapitalismAnti-Corn Law LeagueAntitrustAquinas, ThomasAristotleArts and Public SupportAssurance and Trust

Banking, Austrian Theory ofBastiat, FrédéricBauer, PeterBecker, Gary S.Bentham, JeremyBill of Rights, U.S.BioethicsBlack MarketsBöhm-Bawerk, Eugen vonBranden, NathanielBright, JohnBrown, JohnBuchanan, James M.Buckle, Henry ThomasBureaucracyBurke, EdmundBurlamaqui, Jean-Jacques

Campaign FinanceCantillon, RichardCapitalismCapital PunishmentCato’s Letters

CensorshipCharity/Friendly SocietiesChildrenChilds, Roy A.Chodorov, FrankCicero CitiesCivil SocietyCivil War, U.S.Clark, Ed Classical EconomicsCoase, Ronald H.Cobden, RichardCoercionCoke, EdwardCollectivismCommon LawCommunismCompetitionComte, CharlesCondorcet, Marquis deConscienceConscriptionConsequentialismConservatismConservative Critique of LibertarianismConstant, BenjaminConstitution, U.S.ConstitutionalismContractarianism/Social Contract CorruptionCosmopolitanismCrime. See Restitution for Crime;

Retribution for CrimeCulture

DecentralismDeclaration of Independence

Declaration of the Rights of Manand of the Citizen

DelegationDemocracyDevelopment, EconomicDicey, Albert VennDiderot, DenisDivision of LaborDouglass, FrederickDrug ProhibitionDunoyer, CharlesDutch Republic

Economics, Austrian School ofEconomics, Chicago School ofEconomics, ExperimentalEconomics, KeynesianEducationEmerson, Ralph WaldoEminent Domain/TakingsEnglish Civil WarsEnlightenmentEntrepreneurshipEnvironmentEpicureanismEpstein, Richard A.EqualityEuthanasiaEvolutionary PsychologyExistentialismExternalities

FamilyFascismFederalismFederalists Versus Anti-FederalistsFeminism and Women’s RightsFerguson, AdamFisher, AntonyForeign PolicyFoucault, MichelFreedomFreedom of SpeechFreedom of ThoughtFree-Market EconomyFree TradeFrench RevolutionFriedman, DavidFriedman, MiltonFusionism

GamblingGarrison, William LloydGeneticsGladstone, William EwartGlobalizationGlorious RevolutionGodwin, WilliamGoldwater, BarryGovernmentGreat Depression

Harper, Floyd Arthur “Baldy”Hayek, Friedrich A.Hazlitt, HenryHealth Care Heinlein, RobertHerbert, AuberonHess, KarlHobbes, ThomasHodgskin, ThomasHospers, JohnHumanismHumboldt, Wilhelm vonHume, DavidHutcheson, Francis

Illicit DrugsImmigrationImperialismIndividualism, Methodological Individualism, Political

and EthicalIndividualist AnarchismIndividual RightsIndustrial RevolutionIntellectual PropertyInternet InterventionismIslamItalian Fiscal Theorists

Jacobs, Jane Jefferson, ThomasJouvenel, Bertrand deJudiciary

Kant, ImmanuelKirzner, Israel M.KleptocracyKnight, Frank H.

viii The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

La Boétie, Étienne de Labor UnionsLaissez-Faire PolicyLane, Rose WilderLao TzuLas Casas, Bartolomé de Law and EconomicsLaw MerchantLeFevre, RobertLeft LibertarianismLeggett, WilliamLevellersLiabilityLiberal Critique of LibertarianismLiberalism, Classical Liberalism, GermanLiberty, Presumption ofLiberty in the Ancient WorldLimited GovernmentLocke, John

Macaulay, Thomas BabingtonMacBride, Roger Lea Madison, JamesMagna CartaMaine, Henry SumnerMandeville, BernardMarket FailureMarriageMarxismMason, GeorgeMaterial ProgressMencken, H. L.Menger, CarlMercantilismMethodological Individualism.

See Individualism, Methodological Meyer, Frank S.Military-Industrial ComplexMill, John StuartMilton, JohnMinimal StateMises, Ludwig von Molinari, Gustave deMoney and BankingMontaigne, Michel deMontesquieu, Charles

de Secondat deMont Pelerin SocietyMurray, Charles

Nathan, TonieNationalismNatural Harmony of InterestsNatural LawNew DealNietzsche, FriedrichNock, Albert JayNonaggression AxiomNozick, Robert

ObjectivismOppenheimer, FranzOrtega y Gasset, José Orwell, GeorgeOstrom, Vincent and Elinor

Paine, ThomasPaternalismPaterson, IsabelPaul, RonPeace and PacifismPhilosophic RadicalsPhysiocracyPolitical PartiesPopper, KarlPornographyPositive LibertyPosner, Richard A.Pound, RoscoePraxeologyPrice, RichardPrice ControlsPrivacyPrivate PropertyPrivatizationProgressProgressive EraProhibition of AlcoholProudhon, Pierre-JosephPsychiatryPublic Choice EconomicsPuritanismPursuit of Happiness

RacismRand, AynRawls, John Read, Leonard E.RegulationReligion and Liberty

List of Entries ix

x The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

Rent SeekingRepublicanism, ClassicalResponsibilityRestitution for CrimeRetribution for CrimeRevolution, Right ofRicardo, DavidRights, Individual. See Individual RightsRights, NaturalRights, Theories ofRight to Bear ArmsRöpke, WilhelmRothbard, MurrayRousseau, Jean-JacquesRule of Law

Say, Jean-BaptisteScholastics/School of SalamancaSchumpeter, JosephSecessionismSelf-InterestSenior, Nassau WilliamSeparation of Church and State SexualityShaftesbury, Third Earl ofSidney, AlgernonSimon, JulianSlavery, WorldSlavery in AmericaSmith, AdamSocial Contract. See Contractarianism/Social ContractSocial DarwinismSocialismSocialist Calculation DebateSocial SecuritySociology and LibertarianismSowell, ThomasSpencer, HerbertSpontaneous Order

Spooner, LysanderStateStigler, George J.Stirner, MaxStoicismSubsidiaritySumner, William GrahamSzasz, Thomas

Taft, Robert A.TaxationTax CompetitionTerm LimitsThoreau, Henry DavidTocqueville, Alexis deTracy, Destutt de TransportationTucker, Benjamin R.Tullock, GordonTurgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques

Urban PlanningUtilitarianism

VirtueVoltaireVoluntarismVoluntary Contract Enforcement

WarWar on TerrorWar PowersWashington, GeorgeWealth and PovertyWelfare StateWhiggismWicksell, Knut Wilberforce, WilliamWollstonecraft, Mary

Biographical

Acton, LordAdams, JohnAquinas, ThomasAristotleBastiat, FrédéricBauer, PeterBecker, Gary S.Bentham, JeremyBöhm-Bawerk, Eugen vonBranden, NathanielBright, JohnBrown, JohnBuchanan, James M.Buckle, Henry ThomasBurke, EdmundBurlamaqui, Jean-JacquesCantillon, RichardChilds, Roy A.Chodorov, FrankCiceroClark, EdCoase, Ronald H.Cobden, RichardCoke, EdwardComte, CharlesCondorcet, Marquis deConstant, BenjaminDicey, Albert VennDiderot, DenisDouglas, FrederickDunoyer, CharlesEmerson, Ralph Waldo

Epstein, Richard A.Ferguson, AdamFisher, AntonyFoucault, MichelFriedman, DavidFriedman, MiltonGarrison, William LloydGladstone, William EwartGodwin, WilliamGoldwater, BarryHarper, Floyd Arthur “Baldy”Hayek, Friedrich A.Hazlitt, HenryHeinlein, RobertHerbert, AuberonHess, KarlHobbes, ThomasHodgskin, ThomasHospers, JohnHumboldt, Wilhelm vonHume, DavidHutcheson, FrancisJacobs, JaneJefferson, ThomasJouvenel, Bertrand deKant, ImmanuelKirzner, Israel M.Knight, Frank H.La Boétie, Étienne deLane, Rose WilderLao TzuLas Casas, Bartolomé deLeFevre, RobertLeggett, William

xi

Reader’s Guide

The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating articles on related topics. It classifies articles intothree general categories: Biographical, Policy, and Topical.

Locke, JohnMacaulay, Thomas BabingtonMacBride, Roger LeaMadison, JamesMaine, Henry SumnerMandeville, BernardMason, GeorgeMencken, H. L.Menger, CarlMeyer, Frank S.Mill, John StuartMilton, JohnMises, Ludwig vonMolinari, Gustave deMontaigne, Michel deMontesquieu, Charles de Secondat deMurray, CharlesNathan, TonieNietzsche, FriedrichNock, Albert JayNozick, RobertOppenheimer, FranzOrtega y Gasset, JoséOrwell, GeorgeOstrom, Vincent and ElinorPaine, ThomasPaterson, IsabelPaul, RonPopper, KarlPosner, Richard A.Pound, RoscoePrice, RichardProudhon, Pierre-JosephRand, AynRawls, JohnRead, Leonard E.Ricardo, DavidRöpke, WilhelmRothbard, MurrayRousseau, Jean-JacquesSay, Jean-BaptisteSchumpeter, JosephSenior, Nassau WilliamShaftesbury, Third Earl ofSidney, AlgernonSimon, JulianSmith, AdamSowell, ThomasSpencer, HerbertSpooner, Lysander

Stigler, George J.Stirner, MaxSumner, William GrahamSzasz, ThomasTaft, Robert A.Thoreau, Henry DavidTocqueville, Alexis deTracy, Destutt deTucker, Benjamin R.Tullock, GordonTurgot, Anne-Robert-JacquesVoltaireWashington, GeorgeWicksell, KnutWilberforce, WilliamWollstonecraft, Mary

Policy

AbortionAffirmative ActionAntitrustArts and Public SupportBioethicsBlack MarketsCampaign FinanceCapital PunishmentCensorshipConscriptionCorruptionDevelopment, EconomicDrug ProhibitionEducationEminent Domain/TakingsEnvironmentEuthanasiaFamilyFeminism and Women’s RightsForeign PolicyFreedom of SpeechFreedom of ThoughtFree TradeGamblingGeneticsGlobalizationHealth CareIllicit DrugsImmigrationIntellectual PropertyInternet

xii The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

InterventionismJudiciaryLabor UnionsLaissez-Faire PolicyLaw and EconomicsLiabilityMarket FailureMarriageMilitary-Industrial ComplexMoney and BankingPaternalismPolitical PartiesPornographyPrice ControlsPrivacyPrivatizationPsychiatryPublic Choice EconomicsRacismRegulationRent SeekingRestitution for CrimeRetribution for CrimeRight to Bear ArmsRule of LawSeparation of Church and StateSexualitySocial SecurityTaxationTerm LimitsTransportationUrban PlanningWarWar on TerrorWar PowersWelfare State

Topical

AbolitionismAmerican RevolutionAnarchismAnarcho-CapitalismAnti-Corn Law LeagueAssurance and TrustBanking, Austrian Theory ofBill of Rights, U.S.BureaucracyCapitalismCato’s Letters

Charity/Friendly SocietiesChildrenCitiesCivil SocietyCivil War, U.S.Classical EconomicsCoercionCollectivismCommon LawCommunismCompetitionConscienceConsequentialismConservatismConservative Critique of LibertarianismConstitution, U.S.ConstitutionalismContractarianism/Social ContractCosmopolitanismCultureDecentralismDeclaration of IndependenceDeclaration of the Rights of

Man and of the CitizenDelegationDemocracyDivision of LaborDutch RepublicEconomics, Austrian School ofEconomics, Chicago School ofEconomics, ExperimentalEconomics, KeynesianEnglish Civil WarsEnlightenmentEntrepreneurshipEpicureanismEqualityEvolutionary PsychologyExistentialismExternalitiesFascismFederalismFederalists Versus Anti-FederalistsFreedomFree-Market EconomyFrench RevolutionFusionismGlorious RevolutionGovernmentGreat Depression

Reader’s Guide xiii

HumanismImperialismIndividual RightsIndividualism, MethodologicalIndividualism, Political and EthicalIndividualist AnarchismIndustrial RevolutionIslamItalian Fiscal TheoristsKleptocracyLaw MerchantLeft LibertarianismLevellersLiberal Critique of LibertarianismLiberalism, ClassicalLiberalism, GermanLiberty in the Ancient WorldLiberty, Presumption ofLimited GovernmentMagna CartaMarxismMaterial ProgressMercantilismMinimal StateMont Pelerin SocietyNationalismNatural Harmony of InterestsNatural LawNew DealNonaggression AxiomObjectivismPeace and PacifismPhilosophic Radicals

PhysiocracyPositive LibertyPraxeologyPrivate PropertyProgressProgressive EraProhibition of AlcoholPuritanismPursuit of HappinessReligion and LibertyRepublicanism, ClassicalResponsibilityRevolution, Right ofRights, NaturalRights, Theories ofScholastics/School of SalamancaSecessionismSelf-InterestSlavery in AmericaSlavery, WorldSocial DarwinismSocialismSocialist Calculation DebateSociology and LibertarianismSpontaneous OrderStateStoicismSubsidiarityUtilitarianismVirtueVoluntarismWealth and PovertyWhiggism

xiv The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

Ronald Hamowy is Professor Emeritus of IntellectualHistory at the University of Alberta. He is the editorof Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, and theauthor, among other works, of The Scottish Enlighten-ment and Spontaneous Order and The PoliticalSociology of Freedom: Adam Ferguson and F. A.Hayek, and of numerous articles on 18th-centuryBritish and American political theory and on publichealth during the Progressive Era.

Jason Kuznicki earned a PhD in history fromJohns Hopkins University in 2005. His work there

specialized in early Modern France and Britain,with a particular interest on religion, governmentoversight, and the Enlightenment. He is currently aResearch Fellow at the Cato Institute, where hisongoing interests include censorship, church–stateissues, and civil rights in the context of libertarianpolitical theory.

Aaron Steelman is director of research publicationsat the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

xv

About the Editors

AC Andrew CoulsonCato Institute

AdJ Anthony de JasayAuthor of The State,Against Politics, andJustice and ItsSurroundings

AeS Aeon SkobleBridgewater StateCollege

AF Antony FlewUniversity of Reading

AK Alan Charles KorsUniversity ofPennsylvania

AlC Alejandro A. ChafuenAtlas EconomicResearch Foundation

AM Andrew MorrissUniversity of Illinois

AMP Allen M. ParkmanUniversity of NewMexico

AmS Amy SturgisBelmont University

AS Aaron SteelmanFederal Reserve Bankof Richmond

AV Alexander VolokhGeorgetown University

BAS Bradley Smith Capital University LawSchool

BBG Bettina Bien GreavesFoundation forEconomic Education

BC Bryan CaplanGeorge MasonUniversity

BDo Brian DohertySenior Editor, ReasonmagazineAuthor of Radicals forCapitalism

BJW Bart WilsonGeorge MasonUniversity

BK Bill KauffmanAuthor of LookHomeward America

BL Brink LindseyCato Institute

BLB Bruce BensonFlorida State University

BP Benjamin PowellSuffolk University

CB Clint BolickGoldwater Institute

ChB Charles BairdCalifornia StateUniversity, East Bay

CD Christie DaviesUniversity of Reading

CH Charles HamiltonThe Clark Foundation

CMS Chris SciabarraCo-Editor, Journal ofAyn Rand StudiesNew York University

CoB Colin BirdUniversity of Virginia

CP Christopher PrebleCato Institute

DAH David HarperNew York University

DB David BoazCato Institute

DBa Doug BandowCompetitive EnterpriseInstitute

DBK Daniel KleinGeorge MasonUniversity

xvi

Contributors

DBR Douglas B. RasmussenSt. John’s University

DC David ConwayCivitas: The Institute forthe Study of CivilSociety

DD Detmar DoeringFriedrich NaumannStiftung

DDU Douglas Den Uyl Liberty Fund

DFM Dario Fernández-MoreraNorthwestern University

DG David GordonLudwig von MisesInstitute

DJB Donald BoudreauxGeorge MasonUniversity

DJM Daniel J. MahoneyAssumption College

DK David KelleyThe Atlas Society

DLP David PrychitkoNorthern MichiganUniversity

DM Daniel MitchellCato Institute

DMC Deirdre McCloskeyUniversity of Illinois,Chicago

DMF David FitzsimonsUniversity of RhodeIsland

DMH David HartLiberty Fund

DMK Douglas MacKenzieState University of NewYork Plattsburgh

DNM David MayerCapital University LawSchool

DRL Dwight R. LeeSouthern MethodistUniversity

DRS David Ramsay SteeleAuthor of From Marxto Mises

DS David SchoenbrodNew York Law School

DT David TrenchardCato Institute

DTB David BeitoUniversity of Alabama

DTG Dan GriswoldCato Institute

EF Edward C. FeserPasadena City College

EFP Ellen Frankel PaulBowling Green StateUniversity

EM Eric MackTulane University

EO Eric O’KeefeAmericans for LimitedGovernment

ES Edward StringhamSan Jose State University

FM Fred MillerBowling Green StateUniversity

GC Guy CalvertOxford University

GH Gene HealyCato Institute

GHS George H. Smith Author of Atheism, AynRand, and OtherHeresies

GMAG Gregory GronbacherActon Institute

GR Gabriel RothIndependent Institute

GWC George CareyGeorgetown University

HLE Hans EicholzLiberty Fund

IDA Imad-ad-Dean AhmedMinaret of FreedomFoundation

IK Israel KirznerNew York University

IV Ian VásquezCato Institute

JAD James A. DornCato Institute

JaK Jackson KuhlFreelance Journalist

JAS Jeffrey A. SchalerAmerican University

JB James BuchananGeorge MasonUniversity

JD Jarett DeckerPublic CompanyAccounting andOversight Board

JGH Guido HülsmannUniversité d’Angers

Contributors xvii

JH Jim HarperCato Institute

JHA Jonathan AdlerCase Western ReserveUniversity

JK Jo KwongAtlas EconomicResearch Foundation

JKT Joan Kennedy TaylorManhattan Institute

JM John MuellerOhio State University

JMB John M. BradySan Jose StateUniversity

JN Jan NarvesonUniversity of Waterloo

JoH John HasnasGeorgetown University

JoN Johan NorbergCato Institute

JoR Jonathan RoweMercer CountyCommunity College

JR Jeff RiggenbachLiberty Magazine

JRH Jeff HummelSan Jose StateUniversity

JSa John SamplesCato Institute

JSh Jeremy ShearmurAustralian NationalUniversity

JSo Jason SorensUniversity of Buffalo

JT John ToobyUniversity of Californiaat Santa Barbara

JTK Jason KuznickiCato Institute

KB Karol BoudreauxGeorge MasonUniversity

KZ Kate ZhouUniversity of Hawai’iat Manoa

LC Leda CosmidesUniversity of California,Santa Barbara

LE Lee EdwardsThe HeritageFoundation

LH Lester HuntUniversity of Wisconsin

LHW Lawrence H. WhiteUniversity of Missouriat St. Louis

LL Leonard LiggioAtlas EconomicResearch Foundation

LT Louis TorresEditor, Aristos

LWR Lawrence W. ReedMackinac Center forPublic Policy

LY Leland YeagerAuburn University

MaS Mark SkousenGrantham University

MC Michael ChapmanCybercast News Service

MFC Michael CannonCato Institute

MI Malou InnocentCato Institute

MK Maureen KelleyUniversity of Alabamaat Birmingham

MLS M. L. SchutUniversity of Chicago

MM Michael MungerDuke University

MP Mark PenningtonUniversity of London

MR Matt RidleyAuthor of The Origins ofVirtue and Nature viaNurture

MT Michael TannerCato Institute

MV Michiel VisserEdmund BurkeFoundation

MZ Michael ZuckertNotre Dame University

NA Nigel AshfordGeorge MasonUniversity

NB Norman BarryUniversity ofBuckingham

NL Nelson LundGeorge Mason University

NS Nick Slepko

PB Patrick BashamDemocracy Institute

PDA Paul Dragos AligicaGeorge MasonUniversity

xviii The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

PJB Peter Boettke George MasonUniversity

PKK Peter Kurrild-KlitgaardUniversity ofCopenhagen

PTL Peter LeesonGeorge MasonUniversity

RA Richard AdelsteinWesleyan University

RBo Richard BoydGeorgetown University

RE Richard EpsteinUniversity of Chicago

REB Randy BarnettGeorgetown UniversityLaw Center

RGH Randall HolcombeFlorida State University

RH Ronald HamowyUniversity of Alberta

RL Roderick LongAuburn University

RMB Ralf BaderUniversity of SaintAndrews

RMD Robert McDonaldU.S. Military Academy

RoB Robert BannisterSwarthmore College

RoE Rod L. EvansOld DominionUniversity

RoH Robert HiggsIndependent Institute

RoW Robert WhaplesWake Forest University

RW Richard WagnerGeorge Mason University

RWP Robert W. PooleThe Reason Foundation

SBP Stephen B. PresserNorthwestern University

SC Stephen CoxSenior Editor, LibertyUniversity of California,San Diego

SD Stephen DaviesManchesterMetropolitan University

SFR Sigrid Fry-RevereCato Institute

SH Steven HorwitzSt. Lawrence University

SI Sanford IkedaPurchase College

SMS Stephen M. SheppardUniversity of Arkansas

SP Sharon PresleyCalifornia StateUniversity at East BayCo-Founder of Laissez-Faire Books

SRCH Stephen HicksRockford College

SS Solveig SingletonCompetitive EnterpriseInstitute

TB Tom BethellSenior Editor, TheAmerican Spectator

TC Tyler CowenGeorge MasonUniversity

TGC Ted Galen CarpenterCato Institute

TGP Tom G. PalmerCato Institute

TLP Terry PriceUniversity of Richmond

TM Tibor MachanChapman University

TMH Thomas M. HumphreySenior Economist,Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

TMS Timothy SandefurPacific LegalFoundation

TPB T. Patrick BurkeTemple University

VLS Vernon L. SmithChapman University

WAN William A. NiskanenCato Institute

WD Wayne DynesHunter College

WME Wendy McElroyIndependent Institute

WO Walter OlsonManhattan Institute

WW Will WilkinsonCato Institute

Contributors xix

In preparing this encyclopedia, our hope has been tooffer a general guide to the social and political philos-ophy that today goes by the name of libertarianism.Although the title is comparatively new, the doctrineis not. Libertarianism is the heir to 19th-century clas-sical liberalism and to the Whig ideology in the periodprior to that. Indeed, its roots can be traced back to the earliest discussions of the nature of freedom inWestern philosophy. At its most general, it embracesthe view that men should be treated as autonomousindividuals, free to make their own decisions regard-ing how to live their lives and how to determine theirown salvation without being constrained to act againsttheir wishes. Of course, this is not to suggest that theirdecisions will invariably conduce to their greatesthappiness, nor that they will never be hurtful to oth-ers. But so long as their decisions were made freelyand do not directly harm their fellow men, the onlyoption open to others in trying to divert them fromtheir chosen path is moral suasion and not force.

It is for this reason that libertarians are so distrust-ful of government, not because they fear the behaviorof all collectivities, but because governments rest onlaw and all law is ultimately based on the threat offorce. All law seeks to alter behavior, either by preventing people from acting in ways that, in theabsence of law, they would freely choose to engage inor by inducing them to behave in manners foreign totheir more agreeable wishes. These modifications inbehavior are in every instance brought about by thegovernment’s threat to use force or by its actual use.Thus, fines, imprisonments, and even death itself areattached to engaging in certain actions or dissuadingus from doing others. This aspect of law is seldom, ifever, considered. We often encounter distasteful con-duct that we feel can be eradicated by the passage ofsome law or another. However, we seem unaware ofthe fact that, although we might benefit from the law’s

effectiveness, it has as its corollary that numbers ofpeople will be punished for disobeying the law andeven greater numbers will be thwarted from engagingin activities they would freely choose under pain ofpunishment. It is a basic principle of libertarian poli-tics that no one should be forcibly prevented from act-ing in any way he chooses provided his acts are notinvasive of the free acts of others. John Stuart Mill’sjustifiably celebrated words in the first chapter of OnLiberty, written almost a century and a half ago, giveeloquent testimony to this view:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simpleprinciple, as entitled to govern absolutely the deal-ings of society with the individual in the way of com-pulsion and control, whether the means used bephysical force in the form of legal penalties, or themoral coercion of public opinion. That principle is,that the sole end for which mankind is warranted,individually or collectively in interfering with theliberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which powercan be rightfully exercised over any member of acivilized community, against his will, is to preventharm to others. His own good, either physical ormoral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot right-fully be compelled to do or forbear because it will bebetter for him to do so, because it will make him hap-pier, because, in the opinions of others, to do sowould be wise, or even right. These are good reasonsfor remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him,or persuading him, or entreating him, but not forcompelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in casehe does otherwise.

This noble principle has, since the dawn of civiliza-tion, found itself at war with the notion that privatedecisions are not solely the prerogatives of individuals

xxi

Editor’s Introduction

who are immediate parties to their outcome, but bygroups of experts or committees representing the wishesof the larger population who claim to have some inter-est, however tenuous, in the consequences. Thisapproach is predicated on the perception that nothing istotally private, that all acts affect the general public insome way or another, and that the entire collectivity hasa legitimate interest in the results of any decision wemake, whether it is what we read, what we ingest, whomwe choose as our sexual partners, indeed any and every-thing that touch our lives that might be viewed as harm-ful to the community or ourselves. What is trulyremarkable about the millions who support extensivegovernments is that they seem to have lost sight of thefact that those whom we empower to write and enforcethe laws are no more moral and decent than the rest ofus. Indeed, they are no less unethical and corrupt; infact, there is substantial evidence that they are oftenmore so than those over whom they govern, that for themost part their overriding interest is their own immedi-ate welfare and their concerns extend no further than thenext election. Yet we constantly rely on them to correctthe evils we see around us and express surprise when noimprovement occurs.

The facts are that ultimately we are eitherautonomous individuals empowered with primarycontrol over ourselves and the property we create, orwe are not. There are those who would claim that weare a mix of both, but these philosophers have beenunable to locate the point at which individuals havesurrendered their autonomy to some sovereign entityor in what that entity consists, whether an individualsovereign or a collectivity, or who is empowered todetermine when the decisions of the sovereign takeprecedence over the wishes of the individual. Perhapsthe most compelling of these theories of politicalobligation, however, and one embraced by almost alllibertarians is that put forward by John Locke and thatformed the theoretical underpinnings of Jefferson’sDeclaration of Independence. “We hold these truths tobe self-evident,” Jefferson wrote,

that all men are created equal, that they are endowedby their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, thatamong these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit ofHappiness. That to secure these rights, Governmentsare instituted among Men, deriving their just powersfrom the consent of the governed. That whenever anyForm of Government becomes destructive of theseends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish

it, and to institute new Government, laying its founda-tion on such principles, and organizing its powers insuch form, as to them shall seem most likely to effecttheir Safety and Happiness.

Despite attempts by some political theorists totranslate these words into a defense of an all-pervasivegovernment, their intent is clear. The crucial test of all government, no matter how constituted, lies inwhether it respects the inalienable rights with which allmen are endowed. These rights, Locke and Jeffersonmaintained, owe their existence neither to conventionnor to the presence of a sovereign who both createdthem and made their exercise possible. They are rootedin man’s very nature and are unconditional and non-transferable. Men do not, nor can they, compromisethem by entering into civil society, nor can these rightsbe modified in some way to conform to the dictates ofthe magistrate. The transcendent purpose of govern-ment is the preservation of these rights. The rights towhich Jefferson refers—and here he clearly followsLocke—are to be understood not as mandating indi-vidual or collective acts of any kind, but rather asrestraining men from acting in certain ways. Put moresimply, my right to something, say my liberty, entailsonly prohibitions on others and not positive com-mands. To the extent that I am free, I am “let alone,”not “forced,” “required,” “commanded” by others todo (or not to do) something that I “can,” “am able,”“have the capacity” to do. The only boundaries limit-ing the actions of other men are those prohibitionsagainst others that extend around my liberty.

The protection of this sphere constitutes the legiti-mate boundary of state action. When rights are under-stood in this manner, the rights of individuals cannotconflict because their rights do nothing more thanconstrain others from acting toward rights possessorsin certain ways. The notion that rights are forevercompeting with each other arises when one includesin an enumeration of rights those that impose obliga-tions on others and afflicts most contemporary discus-sions of the subject. We commonly speak of the rightsof members of a community as in perpetual conflict,but this is in large part due to the fact that politiciansand others who have vulgarized the language of polit-ical theory have found it to their ideological advan-tage to encourage the view that such conflicts are aninvariable part of political life. Thus, my right tosmoke directly conflicts with your right to a smoke-free environment and my right to spend my wages as

xxii The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

I alone see fit conflicts with your right to a superhigh-way. For once it is conceded that rights, of necessity,compete, there can be only one referee, and that is themodern democratic state.

In the past 100 years, the language of politics hasbecome so mutilated by politicians and their ideolog-ical henchmen that no principled position makessense, and we are reduced to a war of all against all inwhich the battlegrounds are our periodic elections.The result is the creation of a leviathan state thatattempts to cater to an increasingly broad spectrum ofmore specialized interests. Even with the end of aworld conflict to which the federal government haddedicated the blood and treasure of its citizens, thevarious levels of American government currentlyexpend no less than 32% of all the goods and servicesproduced in the nation. This scenario is hardly whatthe Founders had in mind when it limited the func-tions of government to securing the lives, liberties,and estates of its citizens. Nor is there any truth to thevicious canard, so often broadcast without the leastevidence, that in the absence of a massive governmentapparatus the charity and compassion of private indi-viduals would be insufficient to help the needy.

What this volume seeks to do is to offer a seriesof brief articles on the historical, sociological, and

economic aspects of libertarianism and to place themwithin their broader context. They offer a commentaryon the unending attempts of countless individuals toemancipate themselves from the control of an oppres-sive and overweening state, whether one is controlledby a despot or one is acting in the name of the wishesof the people. What these articles have in common isthe search for a world in which man’s subjection to thewill of others is brought to a minimum. We do notseek, as those who would malign us claim, emancipa-tion from the laws of God or the forces of nature, towhich we are all, depending on our beliefs and our cir-cumstances, more or less subject. Rather, we wish anopen and divergent society, in which each may act ashe thinks best, despite the consequences of his actions.We may exhort others from acting in ways that we feelmay harm them, but we cannot use the police power ofthe state to punish them from so acting. This open soci-ety, to which Periclean Athens inclined, was, we aretold, an education to all of Greece. So there was a timewhen America was an education to the world, and it isto this time to which we seek to return.

Ronald HamowyRockville, Maryland

Editor’s Introduction xxiii

Libertarianism is a major feature of intellectual andpolitical life as we enter the first years of the new cen-tury. It is at one and the same time a movement in pol-itics, a recognized philosophy, and a set of distinctivepolicy prescriptions. As such, libertarianism, and theindividuals who espouse it, play a prominent role inintellectual and political arguments in several countries.In disciplines such as philosophy, political science,jurisprudence, and economics, there is a recognizedand substantial libertarian position and body of litera-ture. All of that is in marked contrast to the situationthat prevailed 30 or 40 years ago. At that time, libertar-ian ideas and analyses had little public visibility. Thisrecent growth might lead one to conclude that libertar-ian ideas and politics are a phenomenon of the late20th and early 21st centuries and should be placed insome kind of post or late modern category.

In fact, that is untrue. Contemporary libertarianismis only the latest manifestation of an intellectual, cul-tural, and political phenomenon that is as old asmodernity, if not older. It is the movement earlierdescribed as liberalism. The great problem with con-temporary usage of the term liberal, at least in theAnglo-Saxon world, is that in the United States (andto a lesser extent in the British Commonwealth), it hascome to refer to a body of ideas known in the rest ofthe world as social democracy or even simply associalism. It is this shift in terminology that has led tothe term libertarianism being used in English-speakingcountries for what elsewhere is still called liberalism.The important thing to realize, however, is that con-temporary libertarianism, in the United States andelsewhere, is only the most recent chapter in a longstory that, in the Anglo-Saxon world, traces itself backto classical liberalism.

In what does libertarianism consist? This questionis more difficult and profound than one might at firstsuppose. It is easy to think of political philosophies as

concrete, reified entities handed on from one genera-tion to another like the baton in a relay race. The reality is more complex. The major ideologies ofmodernity—the most prominent of which are liberal-ism, socialism, conservatism, and nationalism—canbe thought of differently, and each can be analyzed indistinct ways. One approach might look at the variouspolitical movements that share similar goals or havesome other form of affinity, which would involvefocusing on the history of political parties, on pressuregroups, and on political biography. A second approachmight concentrate on the development of philosophi-cal concepts and abstract ideas. A third approachmight center on the exploration of distinctive vocabu-laries or languages in which public affairs are dis-cussed and debated. Yet another might examine thetexts central to the specific ideology and try both tounearth the original meaning or intention of theauthors and to relate them to their social and politicalcontexts. Finally, one can explore the distinctive cul-tural content and consciousness, or mentalité, associ-ated with a particular political label.

The intention of all such approaches is to constructa cogent analysis that explains how ideas, movements,and philosophical systems that exist in the presenthave come about and how they have changed overtime. These analyses trace the origins of ideas, move-ments, and philosophical systems and relate them toother historical phenomena that they have influencedand by which they have been shaped. The aim is toavoid the problem of anachronism, of reading the pre-sent into the past and so misunderstanding both pastand present. We should be careful to avoid the Whigform of intellectual history, which interprets pastideas only in terms of their connection to the present.What emerges, with libertarianism as much as anyother system of thought, is a narrative in which wediscover neither a timeless, ahistorical object, nor a

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progressive discovery of truth, but the slow growthand unfolding of a particular way of thinking. We alsodiscover, in the case of libertarianism/liberalism, apattern of elaboration in which these ideas flourished,followed by a period in which they were disregarded,only to revive again more recently.

The word liberalism refers to a distinctive set ofbeliefs and an associated political movement thatappeared in the early 19th century. The first recordedoccurrence of the term was in Spain in 1823 when the term liberales, or freedom lovers, was used todescribe supporters of the constitutional regime estab-lished after the Napoleonic wars. (The liberals’ oppo-nents, supporters of the absolute rule of the Bourbons,were known as the serviles, or servile ones.) InFrance, the economist Jean-Baptiste Say and his fol-lowers began to use the adjective liberal to mean “infavor of freedom” following the Restoration of theBourbons in 1815. In England, the word entered pop-ular discourse at about the same time; one prominentearly example was the name given to the journal TheLiberal, published by Leigh Hunt and Lord Byron.The term liberal was well known in the 18th century,but was generally associated with its older meaning of“generous, open hearted” and so referred only to qual-ities of character. However, to adapt an expression ofByron’s, although the word had not yet taken on itslater meaning, the thing it came to describe hadalready come into existence.

Beginning with the later 17th century, the West haswitnessed the gradual appearance of a way of thinkingabout the world and human society that has provideda perspective radically different from the providentialapproach that preceded it. This change grew partly outof intense political conflict and generated a particularpolitical program. All of those developments cametogether in the later 18th century and the early part ofthe 19th century. Conservatism was to appear at thesame time, as a reaction to the emerging liberal world-view, whereas socialism, both the word and the phe-nomenon, appeared only later.

The origins of classical liberalism lie in the great tur-moil and upheaval of the period 1549 to 1688. In thatterrible century and a half, Europe was torn by a seriesof wars larger and more devastating than anythingexperienced since the 14th century. Two forces hadworked to produce that state of affairs. The first was theclash of Reformation and Counter Reformation, whichhad a profoundly destabilizing effect on the politics ofevery European state. The second was the “military

revolution,” a transformation in the nature and scope ofwar that took place in the first part of the 16th century,which made war vastly more expensive and damagingthan it had ever been in the Middle Ages. The result ofboth developments was the rise of absolutism, both asit was explicated in the philosophies of authors such asJean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes and in the practice ofgovernment. During this period, a weakening of repre-sentative institutions and the growth of central poweroccurred, not least in the area of taxation. This growthof centralized power did not happen without resistance.Throughout Europe, scholars defended the older ideasof mixed or limited government, and rebels took uparms to uphold established constitutional settlementsagainst the innovations of reforming monarchs andtheir ministers. The military power of the new monar-chies was such, however, that any opposition to thegrowing power of strong central governments wasdefeated throughout Europe, with two exceptions: theDutch Republic and Britain. There, constitutional gov-ernment survived and became the established form ofgovernment. In Britain, the climactic event was theGlorious Revolution of 1688–1689.

The clash of ideas in those years led to a change inthe arguments used to defend limited governmentagainst absolutism. As a consequence, new ideasemerged and were vigorously articulated. These ideaswere then advanced in new ways by some authors toyield surprising conclusions. Two issues had emergedas central by the later 17th century: (1) constitutionalversus absolute government, and (2) religious tolera-tion, or freedom of conscience, versus the confessionalstate. Originally, the case for constitutionalism and(relative) toleration had been made on the basis of tra-dition and conservative, or historical, arguments.Those arguments proved inadequate, and there was agradual shift toward arguments based on autonomyand ideas of natural right. Such new formulations wereexpressed in England during the Civil War, between1637 and 1653. A political faction known as theLevellers emerged in London and became a significantminority in the New Model Army. In a series of essays, manifestos, petitions, and other documents, theLevellers argued the case for a constitutional govern-ment with strictly limited powers and complete reli-gious toleration. The argument used to support theirprogram was partly historical, but rested in the mainon the connected ideas of property in one’s own person(or self-ownership) and natural rights. Individuals,they argued, were sovereign, and government derived

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its powers by delegation from the individuals overwhom it ruled—hence, a strict limitation on its powers.Those ideas did not disappear with the restoration ofthe monarchy in 1660, but remained alive—amongexile circles on the Continent, particularly in theNetherlands, and in underground groups in London.

The unresolved political crisis in Britain came to ahead in the later 1680s and led to the creation of a polit-ical settlement usually known by the name contempo-raries gave it—the Glorious Revolution. This settlementinvolved the creation of a consensus between the twomain political factions of the time, Whigs and Tories, soas to avoid the prospect of a second Civil War. The out-come was a limited constitutional government and alimited (and contested) degree of religious toleration,supported by a mixture of arguments, some of whichincorporated both progressive and more conservativeand retrospective elements. The more radical ideas thathad appeared in the 1640s had not disappeared, how-ever, and found expression in what was to become oneof the key texts of liberal thought, Two Treatises ofGovernment by John Locke. In that and other works,especially Letter on Toleration and On the Reason-ableness of Christianity, Locke put forward an argu-ment for a system of government withdrawn from mostreligious matters and dedicated to the protection ofindividual rights, or property—a term that then had adifferent and wider meaning (“Lives, Liberties, andEstates, which I call by the general Name, Property”)than it has today.

For about 100 years, Locke’s ideas remained some-what marginal. They were taken up and developed bythe so-called true Whigs or Commonwealthmen,including such figures as John Trenchard and ThomasGordon, who jointly published a series of essays underthe pseudonym Cato, which were to have a greatimpact on the thinking of colonial America. The Com-monwealthmen constructed a critique of the emergingmodern state as it appeared under Walpole and the OldCorps Whigs. Walpole, the British prime minister from1721 to 1742 and the first holder of that office, wasresponsible for several of the institutions of the mod-ern state, particularly the cabinet government andmodern public finance. His followers, the Old CorpsWhigs, remained in office after he fell from power.

The arguments put forward by the Common-wealthmen also drew heavily on the ideas and lan-guage of civic humanism, or classical republicanism,which were a central medium of public argument atthat time. Early American thought also drew on ideas

circulating on the Continent. The author who playedthe greatest part in transmitting those ideas over theAtlantic was the Swiss writer Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui,now almost forgotten, but at one time a best-sellingauthor.

In retrospect, the 18th century can be seen as theformative period of liberalism. Although a self-con-scious movement and associated set of ideas did notyet exist, a number of intellectual developments tookplace that, when combined with the ideas that hadcome out of the earlier period in Britain, produced adistinctive style of reasoning. That, in turn, led to theappearance of an intellectual and, increasingly, politi-cal movement for reform of existing institutions in anumber of countries. Two important sets of ideas tookshape that played a central part in the gradual emer-gence of the liberal worldview. The first centered onthe critical rationalism that grew out of both theNewtonian revolution in science and the skepticalreaction against religious enthusiasm of the 17th cen-tury. This way of thinking found expression in deism,Unitarianism, and even atheism, all of which werecommonly, although not invariably, associated withthe earlier ideas of a limited contractual state and free-dom of opinion and expression. When critical reasonwas applied to existing institutions and beliefs,many—among them slavery, an established church,and the existing systems of law and government—were subjected to radical criticism and analysis (intoday’s language, deconstructed). The second wasthe gradual emergence of a new way of thinkingabout wealth, production, and exchange, which cameto be called political economy. It involved a moreabstract way of thinking about economic relations,rather than limiting itself to the more concrete andspecific notions of trade and manufacture. It led toan emphasis on the beneficial effects of trade andcommerce and stressed the connection between themand a civilized way of life. This view of commercewas in sharp contrast to the republican notion thatluxury led to a corruption of the manly qualities anda degradation of manners. Political economy alsoproduced, in the writings of Adam Smith and others,the belief that it was possible to expand wealth andoutput almost indefinitely, thus undermining the tra-ditional view of economic life as a zero-sum game inwhich the greed of the few was the cause of thepoverty of the many.

As the 18th century progressed, the British consti-tution became an object of admiration and envy for the

General Introduction xxvii

growing critical philosophical movement on the conti-nent. The government and politics of Britain wereincreasingly used as a point of contrast with the defectsof the systems found elsewhere in Europe. AfterBritain’s decisive victory over the French, ratified bythe Peace of Paris in 1763, continental observersincreasingly saw Britain as more advanced than herrivals. The irony, of course, was that the British consti-tution was more medieval (i.e., limited) than those on the Continent. By being more old-fashioned, theBritish were more modern. Not everyone saw emula-tion of British models as the way forward, however. A rival strategy focused on the way an enlightenedruler could reform and modernize the state. By the late18th century, European thinking had been overtakenby the ideal of improvement, not quite the same thingas the later belief in progress but a related notion,deriving from the belief that it was possible to bothdiscover what was best for human beings and bringabout beneficial change by conscious action.

The apparently stable world of the ancien régimewas torn apart in the great crisis of what the historianR. R. Palmer has called the age of the democratic rev-olution. The central events in this process were the twocontrasting revolutions of France and America. Forsome, the events of 1776–1783 were not a revolutionat all, but the secession of 13 self-governing coloniesfrom the British Empire and their combining togetherto establish a common government with delegatedpowers. Others see the same events differently, as aLockean revolution in which the political bonds ofobligation were severed and a new contract and gov-ernment established. This division of views was pre-sent from the beginning, as the near-contemporaneoushistoriography of the event reveals. In either case,however, the American Revolution did not seek toreshape the entire social, legal, and political order.Rather, the participants aimed to protect an establishedorder and traditional liberties from the innovations of aBritish government facing a fiscal crisis as a result ofthe Seven Years’ War. One result was to give freshexpression to the more radical individualist ideas ofthe Levellers, Locke, and the Commonwealthmen bothin the writings and publications of the time, such asPaine’s Common Sense, and in the principles articu-lated in the Declaration of Independence and, moredebatably, the Constitution. There was no question,however, of overturning the entire social order partlybecause many of the institutions of the Europeanancien régime did not exist in the American colonies.

What did emerge in the writings of both the Federalistsand Anti-Federalists was a much more elaborate ver-sion of the older ideas, of a constitutional regime witha government having limited and enumerated powers.The controversy over ratification of the new Consti-tution also led directly to a specific enumeration andprotection of rights held by individuals in a free state,in the first eight amendments to the Constitution,whereas the 9th Amendment made explicit the doc-trine of unenumerated rights—“The enumeration inthe Constitution of certain rights shall not be construedto deny or disparage others retained by the people”—and the 10th Amendment unequivocally expressed thedoctrine of enumerated powers—“The powers not del-egated to the United States by the Constitution, norprohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the Statesrespectively, or to the people.”

Events took a different course in France. Anattempt to reform and restructure the government ofthe kingdom led to a sudden unraveling of the entirepolitical fabric and a political and social revolution ofa kind the modern world had not previously seen.Even now, more than 200 years later, there is a gooddeal of controversy regarding why the FrenchRevolution developed as it did. The view that com-mands increasing acceptance is that it sprang from acombination of fortuitous circumstances, the influ-ence of particular ideas, and the impact of war oninternal French politics. Among the most significantevents were two decisions taken by the ConstituentAssembly—to nationalize the property of the Churchas a solution to public debt, followed by the rapidprinting of new money. The acute political crisis of1791–1792 witnessed the appearance of a new politi-cal phenomenon, the attempt to sweep away all of theexisting social and political institutions and replacethem with something fundamentally different fromwhat had gone before. Even more significant for thefuture history of Europe was the appearance of themodern nation-state, single and indivisible, alongwith its ideological offspring, the mass army. Theperiod also saw the terror and, in the shape of theNapoleonic regime, the first modern despotism.

If the period before 1789 was a formative one inthe history of liberalism, the mid-19th century was itsclassical period. During this period, most of the polit-ical vocabulary we now use came into being, withnew terms created and the meanings of older onesaltered. It was then that liberal ideas were fullyworked out and a consistent set of ideas were created.

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Much of this work was in response to the intellectualand political challenge posed by the events of1789–1815. For those who neither supported the reac-tionary or conservative policies of Metternich and theHoly Alliance nor espoused the revolutionary idealsof Jacobinism, it was necessary to work out a moreexplicit understanding of what it was they believedand sought to achieve. By that time, it also hadbecome apparent that a process of profound socialchange was underway in Britain, and by 1830, thatprocess had already started to spread outside its coun-try of origin. These events were later to be mislead-ingly referred to as the Industrial Revolution.

Its central phenomenon was the appearance of sus-tained, long-term economic growth and a rapid rise inthe total amount of wealth and the living standards ofthe great mass of the people. This material progresswas accompanied by rapid and widespread urbaniza-tion that brought about an alteration in the nature ofsociety that still continues and is more profound in itsnature than anything since the rise of agriculture in thelater Neolithic period. The great intellectual challengefor 19th-century thought was to explain and under-stand this revolutionary process. Classical liberalismcame about by building on the ideas already devel-oped in the 18th century, which provided the languageto both give an account of what was happening and toadvocate a specific kind of society, government, andpublic policy.

By the 1830s, there were recognizable liberal polit-ical movements in every European state except Russia,and the term had widely entered the political discourseof the great European languages. In the United States,in reaction to the Federalist period, we can discern aseries of movements that pushed for greater liberty:Jeffersonian Republicanism, the Jacksonian move-ment of the 1820s and 1830s, and the growing aboli-tionist and “free soil” movements after 1840. InBritain, the 1820s saw the appearance of a new gener-ation of reformers, men such as Henry Brougham,Sydney Smith, James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and thePhilosophic Radicals. Richard Cobden and JohnBright, the great figures of a growing liberal move-ment, became prominent in the 1830s, and in 1846,liberalism gained perhaps its greatest triumph with therepeal of the Corn Laws and the conversion of theBritish state to a policy of free trade. A recognizableBritish Liberal party came into being in 1857, whichincluded among its ranks the man who was to be thedominant figure of 19th-century British liberalism,

William Ewart Gladstone. In France, there were politi-cians such as François Guizot and the “Doctrinaires”and intellectual figures such as Antoine Louis ClaudeDestutt de Tracy, Benjamin Constant, and MadameGermaine de Staël. Germany had perhaps the mostactive and successful liberal movement outsideBritain, including individuals such as Karl vonRotteck, Karl Welker, and Friedrich Dahlman. Muchof that movement was influenced by such great figuresof the Enlightenment as Immanuel Kant and Wilhelmvon Humboldt. Italy, Spain, Hungary, and the Nether-lands each had its own leading figures and movements.This proliferation was not a matter of separate, dis-tinct, national movements. Rather, there was a gen-uinely transnational movement with a flourishingexchange of ideas among writers in the three major lin-guistic cultures, English, French, and German. Theexistence of a “transatlantic persuasion” in Britain, theUnited States, and Canada is well known, but many ofits ideas and arguments came from France or Germanyvia multilingual scholars such as J. S. Mill and LordActon. British liberalism, in turn, had a powerful effecton continental Europe.

What set of beliefs and arguments united thoseindividuals and movements? Some authors, examin-ing the robust arguments among liberals over issuessuch as land ownership, the franchise, intellectualproperty, and education, have argued that there was nocoherent liberal political movement, nor a systematicset of beliefs and arguments. Liberalism, in their view,amounted to little more than a style of argument orvocabulary, which could be used to advocate a bewil-dering variety of ends. Undoubtedly, there was greatdiversity, but this point should not be overstated: Theideas of classical liberalism were not so diverse as tobe incoherent. In fact, despite much variation (such asthe importance of utilitarianism for British liberalsand romanticism for Germans), there was a markeddegree of agreement regarding a number of commonthemes, even when those were given a distinctivelyAmerican, French, or German accent. Many of theseideas figure prominently in contemporary libertarianthought; others, although still of marginal concern,have faded in importance.

In the first, although not always the most impor-tant, place are a set of ideas about economic life andpublic policies conducive to prosperity and harmony.The conventional intellectual genealogy of those ideasregards them as having been originally formulated byAdam Smith and developed by classical economists

General Introduction xxix

such as David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and J. S.Mill. In fact, in much popular and public argument, asecond line of descent from Smith was equally impor-tant, including such figures as Jean-Baptiste Say. Theunderlying idea was that the economic life of the com-munity is a dynamic yet self-regulating system that,given the correct framework of laws and then left toitself, will produce wealth and convert the pursuit ofindividual, self-regarding ends into public benefits. Anumber of principles for public policy followed,notably a general principle of noninterference by thestate in the outcome of private decisions (laissez-faire), the abandonment of protectionism and otherrestraints on trade, and support for free trade, low tax-ation, and government frugality, hard money, andfreedom of contract. All of those principles are inter-connected and were often summarized under the gen-eral heading of free exchange. It is significant that,although these are economic arguments, they were notgenerally advocated solely or even primarily on thegrounds of economic efficiency. The usual argumentswere moralistic and emphasized such themes asautonomy, personal responsibility, and the connectionbetween free exchange—particularly free trade acrossnational borders—and peace.

Another significant point is that these ideas werenot in any sense conservative. Instead, they were profoundly radical and had implications reaching far beyond the straightforwardly economic, includingimplications for the relation between the sexes and thestatus of different races and ethnic groups. In particu-lar, they combined with, and led to, a sharp attack onstate-sanctioned privilege, social inequality, andunjust class divisions.

An almost forgotten element of classical liberalismis its theory of class and social divisions. Nowadays,this kind of analysis is associated primarily withMarxism, but it actually originated in the writings ofliberal thinkers—something that Marx freely acknowl-edged. Classical liberal class theory was, however, dif-ferent from that put forward by Marx and his epigones.Its fundamental premise is that there are only two waysto obtain wealth: either through production andexchange or by plunder (i.e., by using force). It fol-lowed that the basic division in society is that betweenthe industrious or productive classes, on the one side,and the parasitic or exploitative classes, on the other.Classes are defined by their relation to the coerciveinstitutions of political power, rather than productiveor exchange relations. The exploitative ruling classes

are those who use their access to political power andforce to enrich themselves at the expense of the indus-trious classes who create wealth. The former groupincludes, according to most liberal accounts, aristo-crats, the clergy of established churches, state bondholders and rentiers, slaveholders, and also able-bodied paupers who are on relief. The exploited classincludes peasants, artisans, proletarians, merchants,middlemen of all sorts, and entrepreneurs. Liberalclass theory originated in Scotland, in the writings ofauthors such as James Millar, but it found its fullestexpression in France, where it was developed andrefined by Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer, andAugustin Thierry. Their analysis involved a theoreticalaccount of the origins and nature of the state and polit-ical power leading to the formulation of a historicalsociology. Their analysis also was intimately con-nected with a distinctive theory of historical develop-ment, which originated in the writings of the ScottishEnlightenment authors, among them Adam Smith, butwhich was more fully elaborated by Comte andDunoyer. According to this theory, history consisted ofa succession of stages or levels of economic and socialdevelopment, culminating in the final stage of com-mercial or industrial society. Each stage was markedby distinctive kinds of social and political relation-ships. The English liberal Herbert Spencer elaboratedthis historical account as the movement from militantsocieties, dominated by relations based on force,exploitation of the productive classes, and hierarchy, toindustrial society, marked by voluntary, contractualrelations. This evolution was described by anotherclassical liberal, Sir Henry Sumner Maine, as themovement in social relations and law “from status tocontract.” All these thinkers agreed that as society pro-gressed, the sphere of compulsion, and hence of thestate and power, would shrink, just as the area of vol-untary cooperation expanded. The end result would bea minimal state or even, according to some radicalthinkers such as the economist Gustave de Molinariand the young Herbert Spencer, no state at all.

Classical liberals had a clear set of ideas aboutpolitical arrangements. Their main goal was to reducethe scope of power and compulsion in society. Politicalpower, they maintained, should be used only to protectand sustain individual rights. The two central politicalideals of liberalism, constitutional government and therule of law, were limited. These ideals were combinedin Germany in the idea of the Rechtsstaat (the termRecht in German means both “law” and “right”), an

xxx The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism

idea influential throughout Europe. This conceptionimplied that the law would recognize and protect awhole range of personal rights, such as the rights ofassembly, free association, contract, and conscienceand belief. Perhaps most important, it implied that thestate was governed by law.

A compelling reason for restraining or reducing thescope of government was the intimate connectionbetween state power and war. A major goal of mostliberal movements and politicians was the replace-ment of war by arbitration as a means of settling international disputes. The abolition of identificationpapers and restrictions on the free movement of indi-viduals was, therefore, an important goal.

Another important idea was the privatization ofreligious belief, or the separation of church and state.Religious persuasion, it was argued, is a matter of pri-vate choice and of no more concern to the governmentthan one’s choice of clothes or food. Living as we doin a largely secular age, it is difficult to realize howradical this demand was and what a revolutionarychange it would produce. It remains, in some parts ofthe world, particularly in many Islamic countries, acontroversial issue. Its underlying contention, that thestate has no business in promoting a particular visionof the good life, continues to find expression in awhole range of intense political debates. It is oftensaid that anticlericalism and secularism were featuresof continental European or Latin American liberalism,as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon variety, but that inter-pretation is not sustained by a reading of the writingsof both American and British authors of the 1820s and1830s. One should not think, however, that, becausethese thinkers wished to separate church and state,classical liberalism was intimately linked with athe-ism or free thought. Although some liberals wereatheists, the majority were not, and indeed the connec-tion between organized liberalism and certain reli-gious denominations was close in some countries.

Another complex idea, often related to particularreligious beliefs, was voluntarism, which refers both toa theory of social action and an account of the idealform of social organization. Voluntarism implied thatthe only appropriate form for collective action was thefree association of individuals, all of whom enjoyed aright of withdrawal. In the Protestant countries ofEurope and in the United States, this idea derived fromthe form of church governance espoused by dissentingProtestant churches: The Church was a free associationof self-governing congregations, each of which was, in

turn, a free association of believers. However, the ideaalso was to be found in certain sections of CatholicEurope and was perhaps most fully elaborated in Spain,where its advocates looked back to the brotherhoods of medieval Spain. This way of thinking had radicalimplications for the political arrangements compatiblewith liberalism and implied a marked degree of decen-tralization. Its other principal application was in thearea of social policy. Here it led to support for mutualaid or collective self-help as the solution to social prob-lems, such as the need for protection against loss ofincome or ill health and old age. This notion foundexpression in a wide variety of mutual or friendly soci-eties throughout Europe and North America, most ofwhich have now been destroyed by the rise of the wel-fare state. Another application that has shown greaterpowers of survival was that of “people’s banks,” orcredit unions, which were advocated by one of the greattheoreticians of voluntarism, the German liberalHermann Schulze-Delitzsch.

The last main element of classical liberalism,which in many ways united the other ones, was a par-ticular conception of human individuality and thevalue and uniqueness of each human being. This indi-vidualism led to great emphasis on a particular kind ofculture and human character compatible with one’sfull humanity. The idea of character was in fact cen-tral for most 19th-century liberals; Acton’s famousremark about the corrupting effect of power referredto its impact on the character of those who held it.Although this notion played a central role in liberalthought throughout Europe and North America, as anelement of liberal discourse it came in the firstinstance from Germany and the idea of Bildung, vari-ously translatable as formation, development, cultiva-tion, or self-realization. It led to strongly libertarianconclusions about the impropriety of restricting indi-vidual choice by coercion or even through social pres-sure. The two classic works in this area are Wilhelmvon Humboldt’s The Limits of State Action and, later,John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which was stronglyinfluenced by Humboldt’s work. A further aspect ofthis element of liberal thinking was its emphasis onpersonal responsibility, independence, and self-help,expressed in a multitude of works, of which SamuelSmiles’s Self-Help was one of the best known.

Democracy, understood in terms of an extremefranchise and majority rule, is prominently absentfrom the basic tenets of liberalism. Certainly, as the19th century progressed, many classical liberals came

General Introduction xxxi

to stress the need for a democratic form of governmentand the extension of the franchise. Some had advo-cated this idea even earlier, as was the case with theJacksonians and the British Philosophic Radicals. Theattitude of classical liberals toward democracy wasalways ambivalent, however. They were aware of thepotential in an unbridled democracy for oppression ofminorities by majorities. The franchise was seen not somuch as a right as a responsibility, bringing duties andobligations, one reason that many, among them J. S.Mill, opposed the secret ballot. The main argumentused by liberals in favor of extending the franchise wasthat governments exercised only a delegated authority(this idea had been put forward as early as 1647 by oneof the Levellers, Thomas Rainborough) and that demo-cratic political institutions served as a protectionagainst the use of political power by exploitativeminorities. Rousseauian arguments of popular sover-eignty and the general will were not generally used byliberals. Moreover, 19th-century liberals, preciselybecause they had an elevated vision of politics, arguedthat certain preconditions must prevail for democracyto function properly: a wide diffusion of property, eco-nomic independence, education, independence ofmind on the part of voting citizens, and an elevatedpublic culture. Those considerations, rather than dis-dain for the masses, led them to advocate that the fran-chise only be gradually extended and that it be linkedto economic independence and, frequently, the bearingof arms.

These liberal arguments were partly defined bywhat they opposed or sought to refute. Until the lastthird of the 19th century, the main opponents of clas-sical liberalism were conservatives of various sorts:royalists and “ultras” in France, traditional Tories inBritain, Federalists and Whigs in the United States,and defenders of “throne and altar” in most parts ofEurope. A persistent locus of opposition to liberalismdoes not clearly describe this category of conserva-tive; they are best described as populist or republican.This group included such figures as Thomas Carlyle,John Ruskin, Orestes Brownson, and Jean Simonde deSismondi, and political movements such as Chartism.What all of those thinkers and movements had incommon was a critical or hostile view of modernity.Whereas liberals saw the economic and social trans-formations of modernity as on balance beneficial,their critics saw them as darkly destructive. Againstliberal values of reason, liberty, individualism, andcosmopolitanism, they upheld tradition, authority, and

particularism. Socialism is best understood as a middle-way doctrine; its central thesis, especially inits Marxist variety, was that while accepting the pop-ulist critique of modernity it was not necessary toabandon modernity in its entirety. The contradictionsand tensions could be resolved by advancing to ahigher level of social and political organization inwhich it was possible to have the benefits of moder-nity without the perceived costs, understood as eco-nomic exploitation, alienation, social disruption anddistortion, and loss of community.

Two other significant doctrines appeared in the 19thcentury that had a complex relationship with classicalliberalism. The first was nationalism. Althoughnational consciousness had existed from an early date,it had few political implications until the FrenchRevolution. The political doctrine of nationalism—that each nation should have its own state and that thenation was the only proper basis for the state—appeared in fully fledged form soon after 1815.Initially, there was a close relationship between liber-alism and nationalism, whereas conservatives, com-mitted to upholding dynastic states, were generallyhostile. Some figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini fall inboth the nationalist and the liberal traditions. In theUnited States, nationalism, which tended toward a par-ticular view of the nature of the American state and theconstitutional compact, was first formulated and artic-ulated by Alexander Hamilton and further developedby Whig politicians such as Henry Clay and DanielWebster. Generally speaking, classical liberalsembraced national self-determination as a part of their ideology. It was consonant with their oppositionto imperialism and colonialism, and national self-determination was seen as the collective counterpart toindividual liberty. In Germany and central or easternEurope, national self-determination was regarded as aprerequisite for the achievement of liberty. Incre-asingly, classical liberals became aware of the practi-cal problems inherent in nationalism, but saw thesolution as lying in minimal government, individualrights, and autonomy for minorities through someform of federalism. There was a minority view amongliberals that was hostile to conventional nationalism. Itwas put forward by Lord Acton and by the Hungarianliberal Jozsef Eötvös. As both of those authors real-ized, nationalism became problematic for liberalswhen coupled with the idea that there could be onlyone sovereign power within a state. Unfortunately,their warnings were not heeded, and the combination

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of nationalism with the sovereign territorial state wasto prove deadly to liberal ideals and hopes. Thatproved to be the case in many places, but particularlyin Germany and the United States.

The other doctrine that occasioned theoreticalproblems for liberalism was feminism. “The womanquestion,” as it was called, became one of the centraldebates of the 19th century. The critical rationalismand individualism associated with liberalism entailedquestioning the traditional views of women, as didliberalism’s emphasis on individual rights and choice.When an organized feminist movement appeared bythe mid-19th century in Europe and America, someorganizations were hostile to liberalism. However, themajority were strongly committed to liberal ideas onthe grounds that the adoption of liberal goals wouldlead to the liberation of women. An almost forgottenfact is that many prominent 19th-century feministssuch as Harriet Martineau, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,and Josephine Butler were, in some respects, mili-tantly individualist.

In the period up to 1860, liberal movements gaineda series of victories. Free trade was progressivelyextended, its high point being the Cobden–Chevaliertrade treaty between Britain and France in 1860.Generally speaking, there was a movement every-where from mercantilism and government control tomarket economy, from absolutism toward representa-tive constitutional government, from confessionalmonopoly toward freedom of expression and con-science, and from hierarchy toward social and legalequality. Slavery, until then widespread, was abol-ished, as were serfdom and other forms of unfreelabor. There was a reaction against colonialism andimperialism, which were now seen as backward relicsand part of the old system. A true world economycame into being through the free movement of goods,capital, and labor and through technological advancessuch as the transoceanic cable, the steamship, and therailway. It was at precisely that moment of triumphthat classical liberalism suffered a series of criticaldefeats, which were to lead, in another generation, toa sharp reversal in its fortunes.

Some of the setbacks took the form of apparentvictories. The year 1861 saw the final triumph of themovement for Italian unification, the Risorgimento, along-standing liberal cause, under the leadership ofCamillo di Cavour, one of the century’s great liberalstatesmen. However, the outcome was not solely theunification of the rapidly developing, liberal, northern

half of Italy, as Cavour had intended, but the creationof a state including the backward and reactionarysouth due to Giuseppe Garibaldi’s conquest of theKingdom of the Two Sicilies. The result was to reduceItalian liberals to the status of a permanent minority ina population deeply hostile to liberalism, and liberalpoliticians were able to remain in power only byincreasingly corrupt and desperate expedients. Cavourdied immediately after the unification, and there wasno one of his quality to replace him.

More significant in both the short and long run werecontemporaneous events in Germany. After 1815,Prussia was the great hope of German liberals—theRhenish provinces of Prussia were the heartland of lib-eralism. However, the 1850s saw a policy of reactionby the increasingly insane King Frederick William IV.Nevertheless, in 1859, the liberals gained a clearmajority in the Prussian parliament, or Landtag. The liberal goal of Kleindeutschland, a united, liberalGermany excluding reactionary, absolutist Austria,seemed about to be realized. Then in 1862, the newPrussian ruler, William I, appointed his arch-conservativeambassador to Paris as Prussia’s minister president.Otto von Bismarck gained a crushing victory over theAustrians in the Seven Weeks War of 1866. This mili-tary success united northern Germany under Prussiancontrol and completely outmaneuvered and dividedthe Prussian liberals. They split into two parties, one ofwhich supported Bismarck, and liberalism in Germanysuffered a defeat from which it never recovered. In1871, Germany was indeed united, but underBismarck’s terms and in a way that marked the totaldefeat of his liberal opponents.

The same period also saw critical turning points inthe Anglo-Saxon countries. In 1874, Gladstone’s firstgreat reforming government suffered an unexpectedelectoral defeat, with the conservatives gaining a par-liamentary majority for the first time since 1846. Theliberals had run on a platform that included abolishingthe income tax—they opposed it on the libertariangrounds that government had no right to know howmuch people earned—and its replacement by a duty onalcohol. The Tories owed their success to a revivedimperialism, symbolized a short time later by BenjaminDisraeli’s proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empressof India in 1876. Even more significant were events inAmerica. The Civil War led to the long-sought emanci-pation of slaves, but at a terrible cost, not only in termsof casualties of war, dreadful though those were in thefirst “total war,” but in the transformation of the nature

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of the American republic. The view of the state articu-lated by Hamilton, Clay, and Webster had triumphedcompletely, and although there was a considerable“rollback” of government power in the aftermath of thewar, a whole range of precedents had been set, includ-ing the rudiments of the welfare state in the form ofCivil War pensions. The common thread uniting all ofthose defeats for liberty—in Germany, Britain, and theUnited States—was nationalism, the idea of a sover-eign, national state acting to achieve a collective nationalpurpose or destiny.

The last third of the 19th century saw the decline ofclassical liberalism as both a body of ideas and a polit-ical movement. The period, described variously as theGilded Age or La Belle Epoque, appears in retrospectas a kind of Indian summer of liberal civilization. Inreality, the foundations of that civilization were beingsteadily eroded. Many states saw a movement in pol-icy away from liberal prescriptions that had beeninstituted earlier—a crucial event in Britain was thefirst Gladstone government’s creation of compulsorystate education in the Education Act of 1870. By the1870s, the growth of interventionist legislation hadbecome marked enough for Herbert Spencer to mounta vigorous attack in The Man versus the State, declar-ing that “those now passing as liberals are tories of anew type” and forecasting “the coming slavery.” After1870, liberal arguments lost much of their radical con-tent and cutting edge and became increasingly defen-sive and conservative. Liberal ideas no longer set theagenda. One aspect of this development was an ever-growing focus on economic matters and arguments atthe expense of other areas of debate. Another was adramatic change in the content of culture. Most earlyand mid-19th-century artists, composers, and writershad been sympathetic to classical liberalism, andthese views were reflected in their work. Verdi,Stendahl, Hugo, Trollope, Beethoven, Brahms, andManzoni were all ardent liberals. The major artisticfigures of the later part of the century, including Zola,Ibsen, and Wagner, were almost without exceptionhostile to liberalism and bourgeois civilization.

One aspect of the decline of classical liberalism as adoctrine was a change in the content and form of muchof what passed as liberal argument. In every country,liberalism bifurcated into two distinct but related dis-courses, described variously as moderate/radical as inItaly and Scandinavia or classical/new as in Englandand North America. The 1890s saw the rise of new lib-eralism in Britain and progressivism in the United

States. In Germany, the new variant of liberalism, artic-ulated by authors such as Friedrich Naumann, almostcompletely replaced the older form put forward byEugen Richter and Ludwig Bamberger. New liberalismwas a collectivist variant of liberalism that retained thecommitment to freedom as the highest political good,but redefined the term as positive liberty or capacity,rather than negative liberty, which referred only to theabsence of coercion. New liberalism gave a muchlarger role to the state in both economic and social mat-ters and defined social development not in terms ofincreasing freedom, but as growing sociability and col-lective cooperation. This change did not go unchal-lenged. The 1880s and 1890s saw a vigorous debate inall countries, but particularly in Britain and the UnitedStates, between self-styled individualists and collec-tivists. In Britain, the case for limited government wasput by organizations such as the Liberty and PropertyDefense League and the Personal Rights Association,ably supported by the older generation of feministssuch as Helen Blackburn, Jessie Boucherett, andJosephine Butler. In the United States, a major individ-ualist liberal was William Graham Sumner, a severecritic of the move to imperialism after 1896 in essayssuch as “The Conquest of the United States by Spain.”The debate is best understood as centering on the mean-ing of key terms such as liberty and progress. The shiftin the meaning of these ideas was described in 1900 byE. L. Godkin in The Nation:

In the politics of the world, Liberalism is a declining,almost defunct force. The condition of the Liberalparty in England is indeed parlous. There is actuallytalk of organizing a Liberal-Imperialist party; a com-bination of repugnant tendencies and theories asimpossible as that of fire and water. On the otherhand there is a faction of so-called Liberals who solittle understand their tradition as to make commoncause with the Socialists. Only a remnant, old menfor the most part, still uphold the Liberal doctrine,and when they are gone it will have no champions.

The outcome of this debate was a decisive victoryfor the collectivists. In the United States, the turningpoint was probably the depression that followedGrover Cleveland’s second victory in 1892. It led tothe crushing defeat in 1894 of the Democrats, at thattime the party of free trade, limited government, andlaissez-faire, and the start of a prolonged period ofRepublican domination of Congress. One feature of

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the later 19th century was the appearance of a newkind of conservatism, founded on an alliance betweengovernment and big business. It was that alliance,forged in the United States by Republican “fixer”Mark Hanna, that lay behind much of the movetoward a more collectivist and interventionist state.The Progressive Era saw further significant moves inthe direction of statism in 1913, with the ratificationof the 16th and 17th Amendments, which introduceda federal income tax and the direct election of sena-tors. In Britain and Europe, the defeat of classical lib-eralism cannot be so clearly dated, but there is nodoubt that by the 1890s, a definite movement awayfrom its ideas and programs occurred.

The last 3 decades of the 19th century saw a sud-den upsurge of a wide range of antiliberal ideas.Socialism, formerly a minor doctrine with limited support, suddenly became a major political force.Imperialism was revived on a massive scale; mili-tarism grew and gave rise to an unprecedented armsrace that turned Europe by 1900 into an armed camp ofmutually hostile states. Other ideas that gained groundat the time were eugenics and racism. Socialism,nationalism, racism, and imperialism were all closelyconnected and frequently supported by the samepeople. There also was a marked growth in movementsfor the use of compulsion to reform people’s behavior,particularly sexual activity and drinking. The leadersin those campaigns for social purity and prohibitionwere often leaders of feminist movements, which hadmoved away from their earlier libertarianism.

The most significant change, however, was in theeconomic and social policies of governments. Thepacesetter here was Germany. In 1879, Bismarckabandoned free trade and instituted a policy of eco-nomic nationalism based on the ideas of the Germaneconomist, Friedrich List. This program involvedlarge-scale government support for and encourage-ment of industrialization, a pattern soon imitatedthroughout the world, notably in Russia. The UnitedStates, which had already pursued a policy of protec-tion before the Civil War, also adopted it wholesaleafter 1860, abandoning the argument that tariffs weremerely a revenue-raising device. Government supportfor the railroads led to the Interstate Commerce Act of1887, the first significant piece of regulatory legisla-tion, passed under the guise of protecting consumers.Imperial Germany led the way in social policy as wellwith the adoption by Bismarck of the policy ofsozialpolitik, or state welfare, in 1883, providing yet

another model that was to be emulated throughoutEurope and, ultimately, America. The protectionistpolicies of the major states, together with a mistakenmonetary policy, caused the Panic of 1893, but, as sooften happens, that actually redounded to the benefit ofinterventionists. More serious was the impact of thechanged economic policies of major states on interna-tional relations. The growing economic and fiscalproblems of imperial Germany led the German elite toadopt increasingly risky policies until, in 1914, theytook the insane gamble of fighting a war on two fronts.

The Great War of 1914–1918 destroyed the liberalcivilization that had been built in the previous century.Among its consequences were not only 10 milliondead, but the collapse of the international monetarysystem, a communist revolution in Russia, and, ashort while later, a national socialist revolution