PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview2002,Vol. 6, No. 3, 168—187

Copyright© 2002byLawrenceErlbaumAssociates,Inc.

The Estrangementof Social Constructionism and Experimental SocialPsychology:History ofthe Rift and Prospectsfor Reconciliation

John T. JostStanfordUniversity

Arie W. KruglanskiUniversityofMaryland, CollegePark

Social constructionismand experimentalsocialpsychologyrepresenttwo comple-menraryparadigmsforunderstandinghumansocialbehavior~butoverthe lastquar-ter centurytheyhaveremainedoddly andunnecessarilyestrangedfromoneanother~In this article, we trace thehistoryofsocialconstructionistthoughtandfind thattheintellectual lineageandguiding assumptionsofthesetwo subculturesofsocialpsy-chologyare essentiallythesame.Next,we clarify thephilosophicalandideologicalbasesoftheirdivideto determinehowwidetheri:ft really is. Althoughthedifferencesmayappeartobeunbridgeable,wearguethata rapprochementis bothpossibleanddesirable.At thelevelofmetatheory,DonaldCampbellandWilliamJ.McGuirehavedemonstratedthatconstructionistandempirical insightscanbeusefiuity.integratedinsocialpsychology~At thelevelofempiricalresearch,studiesofthesituatedself-con-cept,social identity, collectiverepresentation,attitudesas temporaryconstructions,communicationandsharedreality, andculturalpsychologyhaveprogressedthroughtheincorporationofconstructionistthemes.Similaropportunitiesawait researcherswho explorethe contextualbasesofhistory, ideology,andothersharedsystemsofmeaningand their implicationsfor socialpsychology.Finally, we identifysomesub-stantiveandstylistic complementaritiesofsocial constructionismand experimentalsocialpsychologyandanalyzetheirjoint potentialfor contributing to a well-bal-anceddisciplineofsocialpsychologythat is worthyofbothpartsofitsname.

“In ourfather’shousethereaxemanyrooms.”(W. J. McGuire, 1973,P. 452)

For morethan a quarterof a century, the subjectmatterof socialpsychologyhasbeenapproachedfromtwo conceptualvantagepoints that have remainedoddly andunnecessarilyestrangedfrom oneanother.Theseareexperimentalsocialpsychologyandsocialconstructionism.Mainstreamsocial psychologyhasbeenlargely dominatedby experimentalistswho seetheir own methodsas providing thebest(andperhapsonly) way of garneringcumulativeknowledgeabout

We thankKenGergen,Eliot Smith,WolfgangStroebe,andsev-eral anonymousreviewersfor extremelyhelpful commentson anearlier version of this article. We are grateful as well to CurtisHardin,Tory Higgins,LawrenceJost,Bill Kessen,andBill McGuixefor helpfuldiscussionsoftheseissuesovertheyears.Portionsofthisarticlewerepresentedby ArieW. Kruglanskiatthe1992meetingoftheSocietyfor ExperimentalSocialPsychologyandby JohnT, Jostat theCity UniversityofNewYorkin 1998

Requestsfor reprints should be sentto JohnT. Jost, GraduateSchool of Business, StanfordUniversity, Stanford, CA 94305.E-mail: Jost_John@gsb,s~nford.edu

humansocialbehavior.In themostrecentHandbookofSocial Psychology,Aronson, Wilson, and Brewer(1998) refer to experimentationas “the workhorseofsocialpsychologicalresearch”and“the chiefmethodof choicefor socialpsychology”(p. 100).They sug-gestthat beinganexperimentalsocialpsychologistisbothablessingandacurseandthat “part of thebless-ing is thatexperimentalsocialpsychologistsareabletousetheir knowledgeandskill to performtheappropri-ateresearchtotesthypotheses... inasolidand...con-vincing manner” (p. 100). The curseis that method-ological sophistication“keepsus from rejoicing” at“potentiallymeaninglessdata” (pp. 99—100).

Social constructionistsobjectto thenotionthatanyparticularset of methodsoffers onean epistemolog-ically privilegedview of reality. Although Gergen’s(1999) An Invitation to Social Constructionoffers nodefinition ofthebook’scentralterm,hemakesclearthat“a chiefaimof Constructionistinquiry” is to do awaywith “themantleofscientificauthority” (p.52).Withinsocialpsychology,theconstructionistmovementis lessclearlyassociatedwith its ownsetof methodsorpostu-latesthanit is with therejectionof scientificapproaches

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tounderstandingsocialphenomenaingeneralandtoex-perimentationinparticular(e.g.,Gergen,1985a,1994a,1994b;Hare-Mustin& Maracek,1988;Ibanez,1991;Newman& Holzman, 1996; Parker, 1989; Parker&Shotter, 1990; Riger, 1992). Social constructionistshavecriticizedexperimentalistson bothmethodologi-cal andideologicalgrounds,andtheyhavehurled theSartreanaccusationof “bad faith.” Specifically, con-structionistsbalk at experimentalists’Conceptionsoftheirownmethodsandtheoriesasuniversallyapplica-ble,politically neutral,anduniquelypositionedtodis-tinguishtruthfromfalsehood.

Perhapsdueto theratherextremerhetoricalformsthat socialconstructionistcritiqueshavetaken,manyexperimentalsocialpsychologistshaverejectedvirtu-ally in toto the epistemologicalissuesthathavebeenraised(e.g.,Greenwald,1976;Jones,1985; Schaller,Crandall,Stangor,& Neuberg,1995;Schlenker,1974;Zajonc,1989).Thisisunfortunateinsofarassocialpsy-chologicalresearchcouldbenefitpracticallyaswellastheoreticallyfromadeeper,morenuancedappreciationof epistemology,conceptualanalysis,andthehistoryandphilosophyof science(e.g.,Campbell,1989,1993,1994;Greenwood,1989;Harrd& Secord,1972;Jost&Hardin, 1996;McGuire, 1989,1997).Many of socialpsychology’s,theoriesprobablyarehamperedby un-warranted,unrealisticassumptionsconcerningindivid-ualism and universalism(seeMarkus & Kitayama,.1991;Miller,1984;Moscovici,1988;Tajfel,1981),andmanyof ourmostcommonmethodologicalapproachesprobablyarenaivelysimplisticandborderingonthetau-tological (e.g.,seeMcGuire, 1973, 1997; Rosnow&Georgoudi,1986;Wallach& Wallach,.1994).Coulditreallybethatwehavenothingto learnfromourcritics?This taleof mutualrefusal(borderingon contempt)isparticularlyintriguingin thatit beliestheoncecloseaf-filiationbetweenthesetwoperspectives,apastthatisre-countedbriefly here.It alsO concealsthemanysharedassumptionsand goals of both approaches(seealso.Gergen,1998). Now, nearly threedecadessince theoft-described“crisis of confidence”in socialpsychol-ogywas broughton by theintroductionof socialcon-structionistthemes (e.g., Blank, 1988; Elms, 1975;Gergen,1973;Harrd & Secord,1972; Jackson,1988;McGuire, 1973; Ring, 1967;’Stroebe& Kruglanski,1989),wetakestockofhistoricalandintellectualdevel-opmentsin’ ourfield andaskwhether,atthestartofpsy-chology’ssecondcentury,thetimeis finallyripeforrec-onciliation.Ourownpositionis thatmuchmoreis tobegainedfrom agenuineand,meaningfulrapprochementthanfromcontinueddétente.

Thisarticleis structuredasfollows. First,wetracethe history of socialconstructionistthoughtboth in-sideandoutsideof the disciplineof psychology,not-ing thatthe coresocial-scienceroots of experimentalsocial psychologistsand social constructionistsareessentiallythesame.In fact, socialconstructionismin

psychologylargely grewout of the insights derivedfrom experimentalsocial psychology.Next, we dis-cussthe divergentphilosophicalcommitmentsof thetwo campsandcommenton someextrascientific(i.e.,sociopolitical) developmentsthat havecontributedtothe polarization.In analyzingthe majorcausesof thesplit betweenthetwo formerallies, we arrive at theconclusion that social constructionists andexperimentalistsare in fundamentalagreementwiththe notion humanbeingsactively and symbolicallyconstruct the world around them (e.g., Berger &Luckmann, 1966; Campbell, 1993; Fiske & Taylor,1991; Gergen & Davis, 1985; Greenwood, 1989;Hacking, 1999b; Kuhn, 1970; Markus & Zajonc,1985;McGuire, 1973, 1983,1997; Moscovici, 1988;Searle, 1995).

The main differencebetweenthe two viewpointsis that, becauseof their attractionto postmodernistthought,socialconstructionistshaveembracedtheax-gument that representationsof reality are arbitraryand relative, whereas experimentalistshave main-tainedthatprocessesof socialconstructionaredeter-minedby our cognitiveapparatusandby featuresofthe social context (seealso Jost & Hardin, 1996).Furthermore,experimentalists(but not construction-ists) believe that (a) it is useful and worthwhile toempirically investigate the, ways in whichdispositionaland situationalfactorsgovern the pro-cessof socialconstruction,and (b) adheringto spe-cific methodologicalstandardsincreasesthe likeli-hood that the experimenter’s(socially constructed)conclusionsbearsomeusefulrelationshipto externalreality. Thesepointsare cogentlydevelopedby twoexperimentalsocial psychologists,DonaldCampbell(1989,1993,1994;alsoCook& Campbell,1979)andWilliam J. McGuire (1973,’ 1983, 1997), both ofwhomhaveaddressedandincorporatedconstruction-ist critiquesratherthan ignoring them.

Finally,wediscusscurrentprospectsforreconcilingthe goals, values, and insights of social construc-tionism with the methodsand strategiesof inquirypracticedwithin experimentalsocialpsychology.Be-causesocialconstructionistsarefundamentallycorrectthathumanthoughtandbehaviorshouldbeunderstoodin relationto specifichistorical,cultural,andideologi-cal contexts(Campbell,1993; Gergen, 1973; Green-wood, 1989; Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Jost & .Hardin,1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; McGuire, 1973,1983,1989; Moscovici, 1988;Ross& Nisbett,1991),experimentalistswill beinabetterpositiontofulfill thedistinctivemissionof socialpsychologyby embracingconstructionistthemes.Justasresearchprogramsontheself-concept(Markus& Nurius, 1986;McGuire&McGuire, 1988), social identification and collectiverepresentation(Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Moscovici,1988; Tajfel, 1981), attitudes and social cognition(e.g.,Hardin& Higgins, 1996;Martin & Tesser,1992;

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Schwarz,2000;Wilson& Hodges,1992),andculturalpsychology(e.g., Hong,Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Marti-nez, 2000; Markus& Kitayama, 1991; Miller, 1984;Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996;Triandis, 1989)havebenefitedby incorporatingratherthansnubbingsocialconstructionism,attractiveoppor-tunities await historical psychologists,political psy-chologists,andanyotherswho takeseriouslythepro-pensityof humanbeingsto createsystemsof sociallysharedmeaningsandtheirimplications.

SocialConstructionismasHistory

CommonOrigins

The intellectualparadigmsof experimentalsocialpsychologyand social constructionismsprungfromthe very samesoil. Suchcelebratedforefathersof so-cial psychologyas Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim,Sinunel,Cooley,Dewey, andMead inspiredboththeobjective,scientificanalysisof socialbehaviorandthesustained,speculativestudyof subjectivedimensionsof mind (e.g.,Allport, 1962;Jones,1985).Thesewrit-ersanticipatedthesociallyconstitutednatureof histor-ical reality andwereamongthe first to addressthena-ture of the relationshipbetweenthe individual andsociety,especiallythewaysinwhich individualrepre-sentationsandcollectiverepresentationsare dialecti-.cally intertwined(e.g.,Gergen,1998;McGuire, 1986;Moscovici, 1988). In this sense,then, theintellectualorigins of experimentalsocialpsychologyandsocialconstructionismareessentiallythe same.

This is truenotonly ofvoices fromthedistantpast,but of ourrelatively recentancestryaswell. Contem-poraryworkinsocialdevelopment,forexample,buildsfundamentallyon the perspectivesof Vygotsky andPiaget,both of whom emphasizedthe waysin whichchildrengrowinto theintellectuallife aroundthembyconstructingsharedreality in the practicalcontextofsocial interaction (e.g., Averill, 1980; Doise, 1989;Kessen,1979,1990; Moscovici, 1988).This work, inturn, providesthe developmentalbasisfor regardingpeople as active, expectancy-ladenperceivers inever-changingsocialenvironments,a vision that hascometo besharedby experimentalsocialcognitivere-searchersandsocialconstructionistsalike (e.g., Fiske& Taylor, 1991; Gergen,197Th,1982, 1985b;Hardin& Higgins,1996; Jones& Gerard,1967;Jussim,1991;Scarr, 1985).ThesedevelopmentspromptedMarkusandZajonc (1985) to concludethat “the hallmarkofthe cognitiveperspectivein socialpsychologyis theconstructivenatureofsocialcognition” (pp.212—213).

Issuesof constructionand‘meaning-makingwerealsogivennewlife in sociologyin the1960sand1970slargely through theinfluenceof threemajor sources:thedramaturgicalapproachof ErvingGoffman(1959),

the landmarkpublicationof BergerandLuckrnann’s(1966) The Social ConstructionofReality,andthe re-naissanceof symbolicconstructionism(e.g.,‘Maths &Meltzer, 1972).Theseindependenteffortsmanagedtorenewgeneralinterestin questionsaboutsharedsub-jectivity andthe socialproductionof cultural forms,andthey alsopointedto niicrosociologicalprocesseswherebyspecific definitions of reality areproposed,challenged,andnegotiatedin thecourseofface-to-faceinteraction.Issuesof self-presentation,symbolicrep-resentation,andexpectancyconfirmationthencametooccupy the centerstageof socialpsychologyin the1960sand1970sinbothsociologyandpsychologyde-partments(e.g.,Gordon& Gergen,1968;Jones,1964,1985; Maths& Meltzer,1972).By this time,historiansandphilosophersof sciencesuchas Kuhn(1970)hadalsobegunto usesociologicalandpsychologicaltheo-riesto describethesocialconductandcognitiveprod-ucts of scientiststhemselves.It was preciselyat thispoint in timethat socialconstructionismfirst enteredthe worldof mainstreamsocialpsychology,andit didso with abang.

TheSocialConstructionistCritiqueofExperimentalSocialPsychology

Gergen’s(1973) article“SocialPsychologyasHis-tory” mostfamouslyjuxtaposedthe worlds of socialconstructionismandexperimentalsocialpsychology.His fundamentalthesiswas that socialpsychologicalresearcherswereengagedin the studyof historicallycontingentsocialandcultural practices(andtheir in-fluenceson groupsandindividuals) ratherthan thesearchfor universaltruths abouthumannature.Incor-poratinginto his socialconstructionistapproachthephilosophicaldoctrinesof skepticism,idealism, andrelativism,Gergen(1977b)wentfurtherin proposingthat“behavioraldata servemuchas blankslatesthatpermitthe investigatortoinscribethetheoreticalmes-sageof his or her choosing”(p. 168). Furthermore,considerationof the problemsof reflexivity anden-lightenmentled Gergen(1973)to concludethatsocialpsychologyproducesknowledgethat will alter theveryphenomenait studies.

Therearereally threeinterrelatedcritiquesthat so-cial constructionistsadvanceagainstexperimentalso-cial psychologists(see also Blank, 1988; Gergen,1977b,l985a;Jackson,1988).First,andmostfamous,thereisthemethodologicalcritiquethatexperimentersarenot,astheybelieve,usingobjectivemethodsto sepa-ratefactfromfictionandtodevelopaccuratetheoriesofthecausesandeffectsof socialbehavior(e.g..,Gergen,1999).Rather,thesocialconstructionistrejectstheno-tion thatit is possibletousescientificmethodstodevisea“Mirror of Nature”(Rorty, 1979).Otherobjectionstothewaysin whichexperimentalistsply theirtrade—or,moreprecisely,thewaysin whichtheyconceiveoftheir

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mission—pertainto methodologicalindividualismandabstractuniversalism.Gergen(1999),for instance,be-moansthepervasivenotion in socialpsychologythat“theprocessof worldconstruction. ~. takesplace‘in thehead,”andhe notesthat “for socialconstructionistswhatwetaketoberealis anoutcomeof socialrelation-ships” (p. 237). Furthermore,social constructionistsviewwhateverknowledgeisconstructedby experimen-tal socialpsychologiststobelimitedto specifichistori-cal, cultural, andideological contexts(e.g., Gergen1973),whereasexperimentalistsoftenviewthemselvesasinvestigatinggeneralfeaturesofhumannature.

Thepolitical critiqueis thatexperimentalistsarenotonlyepistemologicallywrongaboutthecapacityto de-velopuniversallyapplicabletheoriesof theabstractin-dividual,buttheyarealsogenerallyonthesideof elitistoppressors (e.g., Hare-Muslin & Maracek, 1988;Thanez, 1991; Newman & Holzman, 1996; Parker,1989;Riger,1992).Specifically,whenexperimentalists.fail to seetheideologicallimitationsof their theories,theyreinforcethestatusquoby claimingthat thewaythingscurrentlyareis the only way thatthey canbe,givenhumannature(Gergen,1999).Here,manysocialconstructionistsacceptpostmodernistcritiquesof sci-enceasaninherentlyoppressiveattempttocontrolandmasterthesubjectsof its relentlessinquiries(seealsoHacking, 1999b).Thus,Gergen(1998)writesconten-tiouslythat“the sociocognitiveposition[favoredbyex-perimentalsocialpsychologists]neverfully escapesitsWesternroots andthus operatessubtly as a form ofWesternimperialism”(p.303).

The badfaith critique buildson the political cri-tique.It is thatby suppressingits sociallyconstructedcharacter, experimentalsocial psychologistsmisin-form thepublic thatits findings aretrueregardlessofone’sparticularperspecti~(e.Thus,experimentalsocialpsychologistsare.saidto ,J,eguilty not only of misun-derstandingtheir properrole but alsoof exaggeratingandmisrepresentingit to servetheirown selfishends.

TheMainstreamResponds

The social constructionistcritique succeededinevoking heatedresponsesfrom leading social psy-chologists.Zajonc (1989) respondedby finding it cu-rious that the fact that “social psychologyproducesknowledgethat will altertheveryphenomenait stud-ies” was “taken as a criticism of social psychologyrather than a mark of its success”(p. 347). E. E.Jones(1985), Gergen’sformer mentor,was equallyresistantto Gergen’sarguments,remarking that his“pessimistic‘conclusionsarenot particularly novel,”and that “many social psychologists viewed‘~Gergen’s] ... statementsasintellectually irresponsi-ble invitations to despair”(p. 99). Jonesalsotook is-sue with what he called the “tendencyto caricaturepast psychologicalresearchand,to consign it to a

simplepositivistic trashbin alongwith reductionjstjclearning experiments,”and he ultimately dismissedthe constructiomstcntiqueas “a minor perturbationin the long history of social psychology” (p. 99).

Althoughdisciplinaryreactionsvaried(seeBlank,1988; Jackson,1988), the distribution of responseswas clearly skewedin the negative direction (e.g.,Greenwald, 1976; Schlenker, 1974; Stroebe &Kruglanski, 1989). Zajonc (1989) complainedthatthe epistemological“crisis” brought on by socialconstructionism“has discouragedpromisingstudentsfrom enteringthe field andgrantingagenciesfrom in-creasingsocial psychological researchbudgets” (p.347).Othercommentatorswelcomedthe openingupof thefield to historical,cultural, andpolitical factorsthat tended to be excluded (e.g., Hare-Mustin &Maracek,1988; Parker,1989; Riger, 1992).Still oth-ersexperiencedthe polemicalcritiquesas “much adoaboutnothing” andsaw’no reasonto altertheir “busi-nessas usual” attitude.

Ironically, thepredominantreactionof experimen-tal social psychologiststo the social constructionistcrisis may havebeento “close ranks” andemphasizethoseveryelementsof their approachthatwerecriti-cized the most. In this sense,the constructionistcri-tique.hasproduceda“boomerangeffect”thatachievestheoppositefrom whatwas intended.Ratherthanen-couragingopennessto new ideas’andthereadinesstotake risks and explorenew possibilities, socialpsy-chologistsappearto have reactedby becomingevermorecautious,risk averse,and conservativein theirapproachto methodology (Kruglanski, 2001). ReisandStiller(1992)commentedon thefield’s reactiontotheso-calledcrisisof the1970sandtothecriticism thatsocialpsychologyis not atrue science.Accordingtotheseauthors, socialpsychologistsrespondedto thethreatby becomingevermoreexactingin theirtheoret-ical andempiricaloperations,while journalsbecameevermorestringent.Higgins(1992)concurred,addingthatthismayhavecultivatedapreventionfocusamongsocialpsychologists:“to avoidtheperceptionof mis-takes,it is bestto work within traditional boundaries,useconventionalparadigmsandinterpretresultswithestablishedtheories” (p. 491). Needlessto say, suchrisk-aversionor preventionorientationis inimical totheexplorationofnewculturalandhistoricalpossibili-tiesandtherelaxationof scientism,asadvocatedby,so-cial constructionists(e.g.,Gergen,1999).

DoesSocialConstructionismFollowFromthe Lessonsof Experimental

SocialPsychology?

It is oftenforgottenthatsocialconstructionismas atheoryof theperson(e.g.,Gergen,1971; 1977b,1982;Gergen& Davis, 1985)emergedout of thefindings of

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mainstreamsocial psychology.That is, experimentsaboutthepowerofthesituation,fluidity of theself-con-cept,reconstructivememory,expectancyconfirmation,andconformitypressuresprovidedthevery inspirationforsocialconstructionisttheorizingandmetatheorizingin thefirstplace.Laboratorydemonstrationsofthehu-mantendencyto imposeoursubjectiveworldsontoob-jectivecircumstanceswereelaboratedandappliedbyGergenandotherstothedomainsof scienceandepiste-mology. As Gergenstatedatthe PrincetonconferenceheldposthumouslyforE. E. Jones(seeDarley& Coo-per,1998)socialconstructionismwassimplythe“nextmovein the game.”If socialperceiversareconstantlyfindingwhattheywantor expectto see,whatis to savetheexperimentalsocialpsychologistfromasimilarfateof self-deception?

SubjectivismandSituationalismasSharedDoctrines

The continuity betweenexperimentalsocial psy-chologyandsocialconstructionismstemsfromthefactthat subjectivistmetatheoryhas,by and large,domi-natedthephilosophicalimaginationof socialpsychol-ogists (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Jones,1985; Jussim,1991;,Ross& Nisbett, 1991).Although from time tolime therehavebeenobjectivistmovementsin socialpsychology—suchas theoriesof imitation,modeling,andsociallearninginspiredby Skinner’ssocialbehav-iorism (e.g.,Bandura,1986;Lott & Lott, 1985)or theGibsonianrealismintroducedinto socialpsychologyby McArthurandBaron(1983;McArthur & Ginsburg,1981)—it is saleto saythatsocialpsychologyhasgen-erallyemphasizedthesubjectivesideofhumanaffairs.This beganin manywayswith thefamousdeclarationby ThomasandZnaniecki(1918)that “if mendefinetheirsituationsasreal,thentheyarerealin theirconse-quences”(p. 117).

Theprevailingassumptionthatsubjectivity shapesthehumanconditionspanssuchdiverseresearchpro-grams as that of MuzaferSherif (andlater DonaldCampbell)on theemergenceof socialnorms,Asch’sexperimentson conformity, Festinger’swork on pro-cessesof social comparisonand social validation,Bruner’s “new look” atperceptionandcognition,andSchachterand Singer’s studieson the experienceofemotionandtheinterpretationof arousal.Conceptualandexperimentalwork by Heider,Kelley, Jones,andtheir colleagues on attribution, self-inference,self-presentation,expectancyconfirmation, stigma,andcountlessothertopics in mainstreamsocialpsy-chology led to the conclusionthat social eventsare“organizedin categoriesshapedby pastexperiences,andthey takeon their meaningsaspart ofan active,constructiveprocessin dealing with reality” (Jones,1985, p. 83, emphasisadded).

Thefirst centuryofexperimentalsocialpsychology,then,has beendevotedlargely to demonstratingthepowerofconstrualandthepowerofthesocialsitua-tion (e.g., Jones,1985; Ross & Nisbett, 1991), andtheseappearalsoto be thefoundationalprinciplesofsocial constructionism. Little wonder, then, thatGergenhasclaimedthatsocialconstructionismis thelogicalextensionof conclusionsdrawnfrom empiricalsocial psychology. Indeed, the theory’ of socialconstructionismin manywaysbeganasanempiricaltheoryaboutthepowerfulwaysin whichpeoplearein-fluencedby their socialandmaterialsurroundings,thewaysinwhichimmediatesituationsforceustoseeour-selvesdifferently andto behavein newanddifferentways, theways in whichculturalandhistoricalfactorsaffect our thoughts,feelings,andbehaviors,andtheprocessesthroughwhichsituationsaredefinedandne-gotiatedin thestreamof socialinteraction.Theseinter-ests correspondextremely well to the distinctiveagendaof socialpsychology(e.g., Taylor, 1998).

A CommonFocusonBias and Inaccuracy

Socialconstructionistclaims concerningselflioodandhumanbehaviorarenot only consistentwith ex-perimentalsocialpsychology,but theyarein factbasedonthefindingsof socialpsychologicalexperiments.Tosupport someof his claims aboutepistemologyandscientific observations,for example,Gergen(1977b,1982)describedhis ownearlierexperimentsin whichpeople’sprivateself-conceptswerealteredby publicexperiences,suchasthepresenceof others,self-pres-entationaldemandsof the situation, and contrastingframesof referencebroughton by consideringdiffer-encesbetweenthe self and other people (see alsoMarkus& Nurius, 1986;McGuire& McGuire,1988).Thus,socialconstructionistshave cometo arguethateventhemostcertainknowledge(suchasself-knowl-edge)is opento contextualvariation,multipleinterpre-tations,momentaryfluctuation,skepticism,anddoubt.In otherwords,Gergen(1982)andothershavedrawnon experimentalsocial psychologyto arguefor the“fundamental impossibility of accuraterepresenta-tion” (p. 146).

It doesseem,in fact, thatseveraldecadesof experi-mentalresearchinsocialpsychologyhavebeendevotedto demonstratingthedepthsandpatternsof inaccuracyin socialperception(e.g.,Fiske& Taylor, 1991;Nisbett& Ross,1980;for adiscussionseeKruglanski,1989).This applies not only to the pioneeringresearchbyJones,Gergen,McGuire,Markus,andotherson thesit-uatedself-concept,which is constructedandrecon-,structedin light of contrasteffectsandothercontextualfeatures,but it appliesto mostempiricalworkin socialcognition.The thrustof dozensof experimentson theself-fulfilling prophecyand expectancy-confirmation

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processes,forexample,is thaterroneousimpressionstendto beperpetuatedratherthansupplanted,becauseof theimpressiveextentto whichpeopleseewhattheywant to see andact as otherswant themto act (e.g.,Darley & Gross,1983; Lord, Ross,& Lepper,1979;Olson,Roese,& Zanna,1996;Snyder& Swami,1978;Snyder,Tanke,& Berscheid,1977; Word, Zanna,&Cooper, 1974).Parallelresearchprograms’on recon-structivememory(e.g., Goethals& Reckman,1973;Greenwald,1980),thecorrespondencebiasandthefrn-damentalattribution error (e.g., Jones,1985; Ross,1977),stereotypingandnonconsciousprejudice(e.g.,Banaji& Greenwald,1995;Hamilton,1981),andcog-nitiveheuristicsandbiases(e.g.Kahneman,Slovic,&Tversky,1982;Nisbett& Ross,1980)alsosupporttheconclusionthatpeoplearenotoriouslyinaccurateinfor-mationprocessors.Thus,Fiske andTaylor (1991) intheirscholarlyreviewof experimentalsocialcognitionreachverymuchthesameconclusionasdo Gergenandhisallies,namelythatpeopleengagein an activeandmotivatedconstructionof their ownrealities. Viewedfromthisperspective,socialconstructionismis lessofarebellionagainstexperimentalsocialpsychologythanitis aninspiredexpressionof thefield’s majorlessons.

Given all of the similarities betweensocial con-structionismandexperimentalsocialpsychology,onewonderswhetherit wasreally evernecessaryfor thepartnersto split. Onemajordifferencebetweenthetwoperspectivesisthatexperimentalsocialpsychologyre-tainsobjectivistmethodstostudysubjectivity,whereassocialconstructionistsuseevidenceconcerningthefal-libility of socialperceptionto rejectthevery methodsof scienceitself. We turnnowtoaconsiderationof thekeyphilosophicalandideologicalreasonsfor therift in’orderto determinehowwide it reallyis.

TheIssueof Truth

How Wide Is the Rift?

Perhapsthe single most significant and enduringboneof contentionbetweensocialconstructionismandexperimentalsocialpsychologyconcernsthe issueoftruth.To simplify things’greatly,experimentalsocialpsychologistsbelievein truth—atleast as something(like justiceandbeauty)to strivefor—whereassocialconstructionistsdonot.As wehaveseen,bothperspec-tives assumethathumanbeingssociallyconstructas-pectsof theirenvironments,butexperimentaiistsaddi-tionally believe that it is possible to make validempirical statementsabout the social and cognitiveprocessesinvolvedin the constructionof reality. Thisbeliefis antitheticalto acoreassumptionof manyso-cial constructionists.Issuesof trutharecentralto con-structionists’methodologicalcritique of experimentalsocialpsychology.

Thepositionthatobjectivetruth is elusiveandulti-mately unknowable is not unique to socialconstructionism,of course.Rorty (1982)tracesnumer-ousparallelsbetween19th-centuryphilosophicalide-alism and socialconstructionist/postmodernisttheo-ries of thelate 20th-century(for asimilar conclusionseealsoCafliicos, 1989;Jost& Hardin, 1996).How-ever,truth’sultimateunattainabilitydoesnotnecessar-ily negatethevalueoftruthasaregulatingidealfor sci-ence(Campbell,1993;McGuire,1973;Popper,1959).In otherwords,truthasaproductof thescientificpro-cessis different from truth as a regulatingidealthatmay guide epistemicactivity. According to this per-spective,notall conceptions(whetherlay orscientific)areequallyacceptable,andsomemaybecompellinglyadjudgedmorevalid thanothers.Whereassomesocialconstructionistcritiquesimplyagamelikearbitrarinessof social constructions(e.g., Gergen, 1977b, 1999;Hacking,1999b),mostexperimentalsocialpsycholo-gistsbelievethattheformationandchangeof beliefsisnotrifling matter.In practice,mentalrepresentationin-volves a complexbut predictableinterplay involvingdeeplyseatedmotivations(at leastin somecases),ex-tantknowledgebases(prior beliefs),andthe specificpresentationof newinformationor its activationfrommemorywithin a givensocialcontext. According tothisview, thebeliefformationprocessis far fromarbi-trary. Decadesof socialpsychologicalresearchpains-takingly document,in fact, that socialandcognitivefactorstypically outsideof theindividual’s controlde-terminewhichbeliefsandargumentstheyfind persua-sive (cf. Cialdini, 1988; Eagly & Chailcen, 1993;McGuire, 1986).

Admittedly,sayingthatattitudesandbeliefsarenotarrivedatarbitrarilyisnotthesameassayingthattheyare true,andthe questionof whethersomescientificstatementsmaybe consideredto bemoreaccurateorvalid thanothersremains.DonaldCampbell(1994),aswe see,mergedrealismandsocialconstructionism,ar-guingthat“the worldasit is” is a“co-selector”of con-sensualbeliefsamongscientists(p.131;seealsoCamp-bell, 1993). Latour (1987) takes a more agnosticpositionconcerningtheexistenceof truth,arguingthatsuccessesinsciencearethoseof “scientific inscriptionprocesses,rhetoric,andallianceformation.” However,eventhelatter,sociorelativisticview,doesnotvitiatethevalueofscienceasaknowledge-producingenterprise—evenif anygivenbit of knowledgemaybeultimatelyquestionedandsupplantedby another.

McGuire (1989) adoptsa tragic theory of knowl-edgebutgoesonto describethetheoretical’andpracti-cal utility of conductingbehavioral researchusingperspectivistmethods.Kruglanski(1994), too,hasar-guedthatthefactthatscientificconsensusrepresentsatentativesocialpsychologicalstatethat is capableofchanging“hardly implies that scienceis‘hopelessandunworthy of pursuit” (p. 210). Rather, its “powerful

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justification [is] the constructionof new knowledge,evenif thefruits of ourlabormayonly betemporary”(p.210).Whetherultimatelyjudgedto be valid or in-valid, knowledgeis anecessitywithout whichhumanactionisunthinkable(cf. McGuire, 1973,1989).Mostexperimentaliststhereforehold a pragmaticview oftruth thatis lessextremeandmorereflexivethanwhatis often ascribedto them by social constructionists.Fromapragmaticperspective,sciencestrivesto pro-ducethebestknowledgeof whichhumanbeingsarecapable,given their social and psychological con-straintsand the featuresof the world at large.Thus,whereastruth may not be ultimately attainable,thequestfor truth as aPopperianregulatingideal couldstill beusefulasameansof fueling productiveeffortsattheory constructionandvalidation (seeCampbell&Russo,1999;McGuire,1997).

Although theissueof truth is probablythebiggestsourceofcontentionbetweenexperimentalistsandcon-structionists,wearguethatthedivideisnotaswideasitfirst appears.Althoughconstructionistsbelievethatnu-merousalternativerepresentationsarepossible,theydonotdenythatpeopleshould(anddo)chooseamongrep-resentationsandadoptthosethattheyfindmostcompel-ling,oratleastsubjectivelyvalid,evenif onlyontheba-’sisofrhetoricorotherpragmaticgrounds(Billig, 1987;Gergen,1994b;Potter, 1998).Socialconstructiothsts,therefore,shareatleastsomeoftheexperimentalist’sin-terestin theprocessofpersuasionwherebycertaincon-structionswin out over others(cf. Eagly & Chaiken,1993; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, l999b;McGuire, 1986).Conversely,theexperimentalists’be-lief in theactualattainabilityof truththroughscienceisnot as filled with hubrisasit mightappear.‘Althoughmostexperimentalsocialpsychologistsavoiddebatesconcerningthephilosophyofscience(whichis, afterall,outsideof their immediateprofessionalpurview),theirepistemologicalviewswouldbebestclassifiedasprag-matic, fallibilist, and Popperian (Campbell& Russo,1999;Cook& Campbell,1979);theyarebasedonthefairly modestassumptionthat,“We don’t know,wecanonlyguess”(Popper,1959,p. 278).

The Roleof Language

A key featureof thesocialconstructionistpositionhasto do with therole of languagein epistemicde-bates(e.g., Gergen,’Hepburn,& Fisher, 1986), andthis is alsocentralto their methodologicalcritiqueofexperimentalism.Many constructionistsfeel that inthepostmodemera,scientificvoicesshouldno longerbe consideredsuperior to other ways of knowing.Rather,whatwehavearedifferenttypesof discourse.Thelanguageof sciencemaybe different from otherlanguagegames,but it is not privilegedin any deepepistemological sense. Some commentatorshavedrawnon the philosophicalauthorityof Wittgenstein

to defendthis point of view (e.g.,Bloor, 1983; Coul-ter, 1979; Gergen, 1988, 1999; Harrd, 1989; Rorty,1979; Shotter, 1991). Gergen(1994a),for example,arguedthat “social constructionismis a congenialcompanionto Wittgenstein’s (1953) conception ofmeaningas a derivativeof socialuse” (p. 52), andthis assumptionwas alsomadeby Parker(1996) inhis allegedly Marxist critique of Wittgenstein.

Other commentators,however, have’ questionedthe notion that Wittgensteinian argumentscan beused to defend epistemologicalversions of socialconstructionism. The philosopher Charles Taylor(1988) arguedin this connectionthat, accordingtoWittgenstein,genuinedescriptionsof humanbehav-ior mustmakereferenceto thebroadercontextof lan-guageand society (seealso Jost, 1995b).This doesnot meanthat all descriptionsareequallyvalid (Jost& Hardin, 1996; Rubinstein,1981),nordoes it meanthatscientificprogressinpsychologyis impossibletoachieve(Gustafson,1984). As experimentalistshavethemselvesshown,theability to constructsharedrep-resentationsis essentialto meaningful communica-tion aboutanytopic, whetherthetopic is scientificornot (e.g., Clark, 1985; Hardin & Higgins, 1996).Campbell (1994) arguedthat it is an “evolutionaryandpsychologicalfact that underjustifledperceptualreffication of ordinary objects and movementsis awidespreadprecursorof language,sharedby manyanimals and that our similarity in such reificationsmakesusefullanguagepossible”(p. 132). Thus, farfrom impedingmeaningful andvalid forms of com-munication, socially sharedconstructionsare whatmakeunderstandingandcommunicationpossible.Onthis issue,too, socialconstructionistsandexperimen-tal social psychologistsprobably agree‘more thanthey disagree.The successof discursivesocial psy-chology (e.g., Potter, 1998)—whichemploysempiri-cal (butnot usuallyexperimental)methodsto analyzeprocessesof socialconstructionin the contextof lan-guageuse—suggeststhat it is possibleto bring em-pirical andconstructionistformsof inquiry together.

The Issueof Politics

Hacking (1999a) observes that, “If nothing else,social constructionwork tends to be critical of thestatusquo” (p. 66). Within social psychology,a keyfeatureof socialconstructionismhasbeenits “rebel-lious” characterandthefact thatit posesa challengeto receivedworldviews and to the socialpsychologi-cal establishment.Gergen’svarious writings (1973,1977b, 1982, l985a, 1994a,1998)havebeenframedlargely as critiquesof mainstreamsocialpsychology.They fit very well with thespirit of political activismthat swept through universities in the l960s and1970s andthat entailedaprogressivesensethat en-trenchedpower was arbitrary, times werechanging,

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andinstitutionsandorganizationscouldandwouldbearrangeddifferently in thefuture.For all of’theserea-sons, social constructionismhas often appealedtopsychologistsof the left wing, including Marxists,feminists, and critical theorists (e.g., Billig, 1987;Fine, 1992; Thanez, 1991; Kitzinger, 1987; Newman& Holzman, 1996; Parker,1989).

Most experimentalsocialpsychologistsare indif-ferentto the political agendaof social construction-ists, and they seedebatesconcerningideologicalis-sues to be irrelevant and even inappropriate inscientific circles.Many in themainstreambelievethatscienceshouldbe valueneutral and that thereis noplace for politics in socialpsychology.Jost (1995a)arguedthat the dismissalof ideological issuesis amistake,insofaras socialpsychologicalresearchis asrelevantto societyandpoliticsas clinical psychologi-calresearchis to mentalhealth.From this perspec-tive, wehaveaprofessionalobligationtoweighin onideological issues,policies, and decisions.Further-more, if experimentalsocial psychologistsinsist onpolitical aloofness,thenweareboundto alienateandlose many young peoplewho enteredthe field be-causeof its potential for facilitating socialprogressand transformingpolitical institutions.They will bedrawn to social constructionistsand postmodernistswhoare (at leastinitially) morecomfortableandopenin discussingburning political questionsof the daythanareexperimentalsocialpsychologists.This is ar-guablyoneof the biggestreasonsfor the successofthe socialconstructionistmovementin recruitingnewmembersover the past 25 years.

It is of morethanhistoricalinterest,therefore,thatthecorephilosophicallegacyof socialconstructionistthought—mostespeciallythekeyideathatexternalre-ality is fundamentallyunknowable—isnotreally partof theleft-wing legacyat all. In fact, thisperspectivehashadalong andcheckOredphilosophicalpastasso-ciated with Berkeley, Descartes,Hume, Kant, and,Hegelandespeciallythedoctrinesof idealism,skepti-cismandrelativismandit hasbeencriticizedforcefullyby Marx, Wittgenstein,andmany others(Callinicos,1989; Jost& Hardin, 1996; Spears& Parker,1996).Marxism,it shouldbesaid,recognizestherole of soci-ety andhistory in determiniiigideologicalforms, butthis is conceptualizedasan objective,social,materialprocessth’at canbestudiedandanalyzed.AccordingtoMarx, ideologicalanalysisresultsin adeepersocialscientific understandingratherthana rejectionof thefeasibility of socialscience.Distinguishingthesocialproductionof ideasfromanidealistmetatheory,Marxwrote famouslythat, “It is not the consciousnessofmenthat determinestheir being,but, on thecontrary,their.socialbeingthatdeterminestheirconsciousness”(ascitedin Tucker,1978,p. 4).

Furthermore,Marx& Engels(1846/1970)arguedinTheGermanIdeologythatphilosophicalidealismfunc-

tionstopreserveexistingsocialarrangementsbyclaim-ing thathistorical,cultural,andpolitical problemsexistonly“in therealmof purethought”whichrequirecogni-tive orphilosophicalsolutionsratherthanpolitical ac-tionandsocialchange(p.39).Thenotionthatthereisnotruthorobjectivereality,forexample,providesaconve-nientobjectiontoanyclaimaboutthe(real,actual,ma-terial) existenceof injustice, inequality, exploitation,andoppression.The philosophicalimplication is thatpeoplearenotreallyoppressed;theyjustthinktheyare.This rendersthe perceptionof injusticeas just oneamongmanyequally(in)validsocialconstructions(Jost& Hardin, 1996; Spears& Parker,1996).

The socialconstructionistmovementemergedonthesocialsciencesceneasaforceforchangeandculti-vatedaleftist revolutionaryspirit thatposedadistinc-tive challengeto establishedscientific authority. Bycontrast, experimentalistshave generally espousedmore conservativeand system-justifying attitudes(e.g.,Jost,Kruglanski,& Simon, 1999),acceptingtheexisting systemof scientific practicesanddefendingscientific institutions,like majorjournalsandgrantingagencies.Yet, as we haveargued,the possibilitiesofprogress,revolution, and social changeare actuallymorecompatiblewiththescientificapproachthantheyarewith thesocialconstructionistdoctrinesof skepti-cism, idealism,or relativism.It could bearguedthenthatit was the system-challengingattitudemore thantheactualcontentsof idealistphilosophythatexplainsthehistoricalalliancebetweenleft-wing psychologistsandsocialconstructionists.It hasalsobeenarguedthatthecritique of unjustpoweris in factstrengthenedbyanawarenessof empirical data(e.g.,Jost,1995a)andthatthereis nothingabouthumanisticandprogressivevaluesthatexcludesthe utility of doing empiricalre-search (Smith, 1994). Thus, it is possible forexperimentaliststojoin socialconstructionistssuchasGergen(1999) in an ideologicalcritique of injusticeandinequalityinsocietyandto useempiricalmethodsto developandproposealternativesto thestatusquo.

Models of Integration:Campbell andMcGwre

Despitetheovertrejectionof socialconstructionismwithin mainstreamsocial psychology, many socialconstructionistthemeshavebeenechoedby socialpsy-chologistsinterestedin contextualistor perspectivistepistemologiesthat expandon previousphilosophiesof scienceandopenthe doorsto an understandingofrecursiveanddynamiceffects,theincorporationofhis-torical andculturalvariables,andtheconsiderationofmultiple levelsof analysis(e.g., Baumeister,Stillwell,& Heatherton,1995;Campbell,1989, 1993;Cook&Campbell,1979; Doise,1986;Harrd & Secord,1972;McGuire, 1973, 1983, 1989, 1997; Rosnow &

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Georgoudi,1986). Thesewriters havesought to im-provesocialpsychologythroughthe useof construc-tionist methods and concepts(see also Wallach &Wallach, 1994).

On thewhole,socialconstructionistsdeservecreditfor usheringingreateropen-mindednesswith regardtounconventionalresearchprocedures,mostespeciallythe increasedacceptanceof discursive,narrative,andother qualitative techniques (e.g., Billig, 1987;McGuire, 1997; Potter, 1998). They have also suc-ceededin raisingconsciousnessconcerningthe extentto which scientistsare driven (at least in part) bynonrationalsocial,cognitive,andmotivationalfactors(seeHacking, 1999b; Kuhn, 1970; Latour, 1987) in amaimer that parallels the epistemic processof laythinkers(Kruglanski,1989).

There are two socialpsychologistsin particular,DonaldCampbellandWilliam J. McGuire,who haveembracedsocialconstructionistthemeswithout aban-doning the experimentalmethod.Theyboth describethemselvesaspostpositivists.CampbellandMcGuirehaveacceptedthe constructionistchallengeto reflex-ively apply what we know aboutsocial cognitiontounderstandthe scientific process,andthey havede-veloped epistemologicalpositions and specific re-searchstrategiesthat are informedby this reflexiveapplication.In different ways, evolutionarycriticalrealism and perspectivism merge socialconstructionismandexperimentalsocialpsychology,andso they arevaluableas meta-theoreticalmodelsfor how to attempt integration.

Evolutionary Critical Realism

Campbell accepts Gergen’s (1973) radicalhistoricismwithoutgiving up on truth as aregulatingscientific ideal.He acknowledges,for instance,that

At anygiventime,evenin thebestofscience,wearein ahistoricalcontextandourexperimentsandourtheoreti-cal argumentsarehistoricallyembedded.Theyhaveahistoricalprovincialism;theyarereactionsto whathasgonebefore,theyaxedatedanduninterpretableoutsideof thatcontext.(Campbell& Russo,1999,p. 136)

The fact that scientific activity derives its meaningfrom historical,cultural, andpolitical contextsleadsGergenandmanyothersto embraceskepticismandre-jectthe possibilityof realism(that the externalworldis, in somesense,knowable).Campbell,by contrast,concludesthatwemustwork evenharderto minimizetheeffectsof irrelevantsocialfactorson scientific ob-servationanddiscovery.He writes

Outof this, I want tokeepthe goalof truth,andto at-temptto understandandfostera socialsystemof sci-encein whichit becomessociologicallyplausiblethat

theprocesseswould leadtobeliefsofincreasingvalid-ity. (Campbell& Russo,1999,p. 138)

Campbell’spositionis that therearesufficient butimperfectmethodologicalsolutionstoproblemsof sci-entific biasand error.This is becauseheendorsesanepistemologicalposition known as fallible realism orhypotheticalrealism (seeCampbell& Russo,1999).

Specifically, Campbellarguesthatscientificbeliefsaredeterminedby manysocialandcognitivefactors,someofwhicharerelevantandothersofwhichareirrel-evanttodrawingvalid scientificconclusions.Oneoftherelevantfactorsin determiningscientific beliefis thereferentofthatbelief—”theworldasit is.“ Individualre-searchersand the scientific community strive to in-creasetheprobabilitythatthe“real” worldisactingasa“plausibleco-selectorof belief’ (Campbell & Russo,1999,pp. 251—256).In fact, groundbreakingmethod-ologicalbooksby CampbellandStanley(1963/1966)andCookandCampbell(1979)hadastheirmajorgoalthedevelopmentof soundresearchdesignsthatwouldenablesocial scientiststo drawplausible,valid infer-encesevenin thefaceofmyriadthreatstointernalvalid-ity of preciselythekind thatsocialconstructionistsofscienceworry about.

Campbell’s(1989, 1993, 1994)philosophyof sci-ence(his so-calledcriticalevolutionaryrealism)placesgreatsignificanceon theconceptof ideationalvaria-tion, thatis, theimportanceof generatingmultiple al-temativehypotheses(or representations)suchthat agivensetof findingsmaybeunderstoodfrommultipleperspectives(seealsoMcGuire, 1997).Campbellseesvariationas akinto geneticmutation,butoneneednotbuy intohisassumptionthattheprocessof variationisdrivenby randomfactors.The secondpartof Camp-bell’s evolutionaryepistemologystressesthe processof selectiveretention,thatis, thepracticeof choosingamongcompetingalternativesto arriveataccountsthataremostcompelling,by meansof carefulresearchde-sign.Fromthisperspective,thedifferencebetweentheconstructionistandexperimentalistpositionsmayturnout to be a matterof relativeemphasisratherthan amatterof principle: Constructionistsemphasizevaria-tion over selection,whereasexperimentaliststendtoreversethepriorities.

Campbell,therefore,acceptstheargumentsmadebysocialconstructionisthistoriansofsciencethatapleth-ora of extrascientiflchistorical,cultural, andpoliticalfactorsinfluencescientificconductandbelief.Buthear-guesfurther,in amannerthatis consistentwith Marx’ssocialmaterialism(e.g.,Jost& Hardin, 1996),thatcer-tain socialconditionsaremorelikely tobeconducivetoaccuratescientific understandingthanareothersocialconditions.FollowingPopperandothers,Campbellan-guesthatademocratic,freesocietyof secularhumanistsis mostlikely to producegoodsciencethroughtheso-cial-evolutionarymechanismof selectiveretention:

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A socialideologyemphasizingindependencefrompo-litical or religiousauthority,theritualsofexperimenta-tion, with theideologyofeachbelievers’beingfreetoreplicatetheexperiment,andsoon,mightincreasethelikelihoodthat“theway theworldis” could influencebeliefselection.(Campbell,1999,p. 254).

Thus,heacceptsthebasicsocialconstructionistpointthatscience(andothersocialcognitive,activities)areconstructedin thesensethattheyarenot uniquely de-terininedby featuresoftheworldandaresubjecttotheinfluenceof socialconditions,butherejectstheskepti-calepistemologicalconclusionsthatareoftenassumedto followfrom socialcoñstructionism.Thisallowshimto statefirmly that“socially constructeddoesnotentailinvalid” (Campbell& Russo,1999,p. 249).He con-cludes,therefore,thatbecausethe“world asit is” par-tially determinesscientificbeliefandthatcertainmeth-ods and social systemsincreasethe likelihood thatusefulandaccuratescientificideaswill survive,social’constructionismiscompatiblewith validity in scienceafterall.

Perspectivism

McGuire’s (1973, 1983, 1989,1997)perspectivistepistemology, like Campbell’s, is postpositivist.McGuirebeginswith thepessimisticassumptionthatallknowledgeis tragically flawed(in partbecauseof itscontext-boundedness),buthealsoseeshopeandprog-ressin theresearcher’sability to constructmeaningfultheoriesandfindings fromhisor herownperspective.McGuireavoidsthe socialconstructionistassumption(e.g.,Gergen,1999) that all perspectivesareequallyusefulforperceivingandinterpretingtheworld, andhisepistemologicalpositionisprobablybestcharacterizedaspragmaticfallible realism.McGuire acknowledgesthe historical,cultural, andideologicalliniitations ofscientific knowledgeandof individual scientists,but,like Campbell,heoffersnumerousmethodologicalrec-ommendationsfor how to conductcreative,rigorousscienceandto assesstheempiricalrobustnessof one’stheoreticalideas,wherevertheycamefrom.

During the crisis period of social psychology,McGuire was sympathetic.tomanyof the epistemo-logical, ideological, and ethical criticisms raisedbysocialconstructionistsandothers,but heretainedhisfaith in experimentalsocial psychologyas a usefulandvalid form of knowledgeseeking.In his famous(1973)article “The Yin andYang of Progressin So-cial Psychology,”he wrote

In ourfather’shousetherearemanyrooms ... thereisaplacefor thephilosopherofmindandthesocialphi-losopher,aswell asfor the scientific psychologist.But the scientific psychologistcan.offer somethingbesideandbeyondthesearmchairthinkersin thatwe

not oniy generatedelusionalsystems,butwe go fur-ther andtestour delusionalsystemsagainstobjectivedataaswellasfor theirsubjectiveplausibility.(p.452)

Thus, McGuire acknowledges the socially con-structedcharacterof thescientists’theories(or delu-sional systems)without rejectingthe methodologicalideal of objectivity with regardto hypothesisassess-ment.Theseideaswere subsequentlydevelopedintoa broaderview that was first referred to as con-textualism (McGuire, 1983) and later as perspect-ivism (McGuire, 1989, 1997).

In McGuire’s(1989,1997)perspectivism,themainemphasisis ondevelopingmethodsforthecreativegen-erationandmultiplicationofnovelhypotheses—Camp-bell’s variation.One aimof perspectivistinquiry is togenerateaplausiblehypothesisandthentoexplorethefull richnessofits insightsand,usingthelogicofmoder-ationandthetools of research,to discoverthe limita-tionsofitsapplicability.Empiricaleffortsaregearednottoward “discoveringthe truth” but rathertoward“de-tectingpatternsof covariationin reality.” Researchersareencouragedtouseasmanydifferentmethodsaspos-sible;thereis no sanctityaccordedto theexperimentalmethod.McGuire’s own empirical researchstrategiesrevealanincreasingpreferenceforopen-ended,qualita-tivemeasuresthatallowtheresearchparticipanttocon-structhisor herowndata,indicatingthatheanticipatedandembracedtosomeextentthediscursive,qualitativeturn initiatedby socialconstructionists.

WhatDoesthe Experimental SocialPsychologistGainby Incorporating

Social Constructionist Themes?

Social constructionists deservecredit for elevatingthe level of debate concerning theoretical andmeta-theoreticalissueshavingto do with the social consti-tution of mind and behavior,epistemologyand phi-losophy of science,andthe role of values,politics,and ideology in social science.We haveseen thatCampbell and McGuire, for instance,respondedtothe introductionof constructionistthemesby devel-oping richer and more sophisticatedmethods andstrategiesfor conducting and evaluating relevant,meaningful empirical researchprograms in socialpsychologyandthe behavioralsciencesmoregener-ally. Their respectivecontributionsstand as modelsfor whatcanbe achievedby incorporatingratherthandismissing the methodologicaland ideological cri-tiques offered by social constructionists.

Another visible and enduringsign of social con-structionists’ progressis the adventand successofjournals that are sensitiveto the philosophical andmetatheoreticalunderpinningsof socialpsychologicalresearch.Journalsthat are dedicatedalmost exclu-

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sively to theseissuesinclude theJournalfor the The-oiy ofSocialBehaviou, Theory& Psychology,Femi-nism & Psychology,and Culture & Psychology.InEurope,evenprimarilyempiricaljournals suchas the‘EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychologyandtheBritishJournalofSocialPsychologyreflect an awarenessofandopennesstoward historical,cultural, philosophi-cal, andideologicalconcerns.Of the42 articlespub-lishedin theEuropeanJournalofSocialPsychologyinthe year2000, 6 of them (Higgins, Schwarz,Fiske,Kashima,Holmes,& Semin)focusedon socialpsy-chologicalmetatheory.Thisamountsto an averageofonearticleperissueor 14.3%ofthetotal.FortheBrit-ishJournalofSocialPsychology,7 of 36 articlespub-lishedin 2000(Antaki;Bangertner;Dickerson;Dixon& Durrhein; Hepburn; Markman; White) weremetatheoreticalinnature,for an averageof 1.75peris-sue or 19.4% of the total. Theseincludedexpositoryessaysonthesocialpsychologicalsignificanceof Mill,Bartlett,andDerrida,aswell asmoretypicalconstruc-tionist themessuchasculture,language,ideology,anddiscourseanalysis.Many additionalarticlespublishedin thesejournalstouchedonkeymetatheoreticalissuesin the courseof reporting on experimentalstudies,whichsuggestsagainthatrappmchementispossible.

Of course,thefactthatsomejournalsarepublishingsocialconstructionistanalysesorthatsomeresearchersarecombiningconstructionistandexperimentalmeth-odsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatsocialpsychologyasadisciplineisgainingor improving.In theremainderofthissectionwepointto severalareasof substantivere-searchthatwebelievehavebenefittedfromcarefulcon-siderationof socialconstructionistthemes.Thesein-cludethrivingempiricalresearchprogramsonpersonalidentity, socialidentity, collectiverepresentation,atti-tudes,communication,andculturalpsychology.

The Situated Self-Concept

As mentioned earlier, social constructionisminpsychologybegan as a theory of personhoodand’identity (e.g.,Gergen,1971, 1977b, 1982; Gergen&Davis, 1985). Specifically, it was claimed that theself-conceptis socially constructed,meaningthat itemergesandchangesin thecontextof social interac-tion with others.Ratherthanbeing fixed, stable,andunitary, therefore,the self-conceptwas hypothesizedto be flexible, dynamic, and multifaceted.This in-sight,whichwas centralto thesymbolicinteractionistmovementin sociology,gaveriseto fruitful empiricalresearchon the situatedself-concept.For instance,alargeresearchprogramsummarizedby McGuireandMcGuire (1988) on the “spontaneousself-concept”demonstratedthat children describethemselvesverydifferently from onesocialcontext(e.g., home) to an-‘other (school).Specifically, they defme themselvesaccordingto characteristicsthatareuniqueor distinc-

tive in relationto othersin the immediatesituation.Work by MarkusandNurius(1986)similarly stressedthe capacity of individuals to construct multipleselvesin relationto different possiblecircumstances.The notion that different featuresof the self-conceptareactivatedandconstructedin responseto differentsocialenvironmentsremainsa centraltenetof socialpsychologicaltheory.

Social Identity

Social constructionist critiques of narrow, decon-textualized experimentationthat had appearedto gripNorthAmerican laboratories servedto energizemanyEuropeansocialpsychologists,whohadbegunto takeexceptionto “social psychologyin avacuum”(e.g.,Is-rael& Tajfel, 1972;Moscovici, 1972).Gergen’s(1973)pleasaboutthesignificanceofhistory,culture,andpoli-ticsinthedeterminationofsocialbehaviorservedtoem-boldenthosewhoin the1970sand1980sweredevelop-ing theoretical research programs on socialidentification and intergroup relations (e.g., Tajfel,1981;Turner& Oakes, 1986)andon socialchangeandthetransmission of socialrepresentations(Moscovici,1976, 1988).Hogg andAbrams(1988), for instance,write that“it wasEuropethatmosteagerlytookupthegauntletthrowndownby the[socialconstructionist]cri-tique” andthat“the socialidentityapproachhasdevel-opedasaspearheadofthisattackonindividualisminso-cial psychology” (p. 13). Innumerableexperimentshave demonstratedthat individual behavioris deter-minedbyavarietyofcontextualfeatures,includingthenormsandcharacteristicsof socialgroupswithwhichpeopleidentify, the history and natureof relations be-tweengroups,andstructuralfeaturesof thesituationinwhichgroupsfind themselves(Hogg& Abrams,1988;Tajfel, 1981;Turner& Oakes,1986).Socialidentity re-searchershavebroughtaboutaveritabletransformationin thestudyof groupdynamicsandintergrouprelationsbyinvestigatingthefluid, sociallyconstructedcharacterofidentificationprocesses.

Collective Representation

TakinghismetatheoreticalimpetusfromtheworkofDurkheim, Moscovici (1988)advancedatheoryof so-cial representationthat is contrastedwith individual,cognitive theories of mental representation.Spe-cifically, studiesofsocialrepresentationareintendedtodemonstratehowandwhy groupscreateandusesharedabstractionsasameansof communicatingandcoordi-natingactivities.Thetheory of social representations,like socialidentity theory,exertsamajorinfluenceonsocialpsychologythroughouttheworld, in largepartbecauseit resonateswith manyof thetheoreticalandmetatheoreticalassumptionsof socialconstructionism(seeDeaux& Philogene,2000).Thesetheorieswel-

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comethe critique of individualistic’ reductionism,buttheystop short of rejectingexperimentalmethodsandothereffortsathypothesistesting.In fact,muchof cur-rentEuropeansocialpsychologypresupposesaview-pointthatisbothsocialconstructionistandyetempirical(Hogg& Abrams,1988).This developmentis afurtherindicationthatreconciliationbetweenexperimentalso-cial psychologyandsocialconstructionismis worth-while andfeasible.

Attitudesas“TemporaryConstructions”

In a recentreviewof theliteratureon attitudesandsocialjudgment,Schwarz(2000)concludedthat over

,thelast 20 yearsresearchershavemovedincreasinglytowardaconceptualizationof attitudesas“temporaryconstructions.”This follows from independentbutconvergentresearchprogramson constructprimingand attitude accessibility, assimilation and contrast,context effectsin surveyresearch,the disruptive ef-fects of introspectionon attitudinalself-report,andmomentarymetacognitionsaboutfeelings and otherinternalstates(seeJost,Kruglanski,& Nelson,1998;Martin & Tesser, 1992; Schwarz,2000; Wilson &Hodges,1992).Fromthisexhaustivebodyof empiri-cal research,WilsonandHodges(1992)havedistilledthecentraltenetsof aconstructionistapproachto atti-tudes.Theirargumentis that ratherthancallingup apreviouslyrecordedattitudinaljudgmentfrom mem-ory, peopledrawon apartial subsetof potentiallyrel-evantdata(including moods,beliefs, andbehaviors)in orderto constructtheir attitudesin relationto spe-cific socialcontexts.Thus,agreatdealof experimen-tal work on attitudesand social cognitionnot onlysupportssocial constructionistassumptions,but italsoshedslight on someof theprocessesinvolved inthe constructionof social judgments(seeMartin &Tesser,1992).

Communication and “Shared Reality”

Consistentwith thesocialconstructionistemphasisondevelopingadiscursive,“relational” theoryofmind(e.g.,Gergen,1994b,1998),severalprominentsocialpsychologistshavearguedthat cognitionarises frominterpersonalcommunication(Hardin& Banaji, 1993;Higgins, 1981;Markus& Zajonc, 1985).This fits wellwith aWittgensteiianperspectiveon socialpsychol-ogy (e.g.,Jost,1995b;Jost& Hardin, 1996), asdoesthenotion thatmembersof agivenlinguistic commu-nity mustshare“commonground” in termsof back-groundbeliefs andassumptionsto communicatewithoneanother(e.g.,Clark, 1985).The theory of sharedreality, as proposedby Hardin andHiggins (1996),makesan evenstrotigerclaim, which is that peoplecannotinterpretstimuli in meaningfulwaysin theab-

senceof a socially sharedbasis for interpretation.Thus,socialpsychologistshavemadetheoreticalandempiricalprogressby attendingto the waysin whichperception,cognition, language,andcommunicationdependonthe sociallysharedconstructionof reality.

“Dynamic Constructivism”inCultural Psychology

The“cross-culturalchallengeto socialpsychology”(Bond,1984),whichfollowedontheheelsofthesocialconstructionistchallengetosocialpsychology,appearsto havetakenhold. Overthelastdecade,agreatnum-ber of successfulresearchprogramshaveemergedtoaddressinterrelationsamongculture,cognition, andbehavior(e.g.,Markus & Kitayamna,1991; Nisbett&Cohen,1996;Triandis,1989).Specifically,researchershavedevisedincreasinglycleverwaysofexposingcul-turalvariationin thewaysin whichsocialandphysicalreality is represented(e.g., Miller, 1984; Morris &Peng,1994).Experimentalmethodspredominate,buttheemergingmetatheoreticalperspectiveisreferredtoasdynamicconstructivism(Hong et al., 2000).Thus,cultural psychologyrepresentsoneof the most suc-cessfulandsustainedattemptsto integrateexperimen-tal socialpsychologyandsocialconstructionism.

Stylistic and SubstantiveComplementaritiesof the

Two Enterprises

In addition to complementaritiesthat have beenlargely realizedin studiesof identity, language,atti-tudes, social representation,and culture, there areseveralotherways in which experimentalsocialpsy-chologyandsocialconstructionismmaybeprofitablycombined.Herewe seeopportunitiesat the level ofsubstanceand the level of style (cf. Doise, 1986;McGuire, 1997; Zajonc, 1989). With regard to sub-stantive research,historical and political psycholo-gists couldbeas successfulassocialandculturalpsy-chologists have been in recent years if they arewilling to bypassindividualisticparadigmsto get atthe sharedhistorical and ideological contexts thathelp to explain individual and collective behavior(e.g., Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Hogg & Abrams,1988; Hong et al., 2000). In addition, exper-imentalistsandsocialconstructionistsshouldteamupto makeparallel progresson issuesof representa-tional content as well as process (see Deaux &Philogene, 2000). Finally, social constructionistsmight benefit from experimentalistS’proclivities todevelopgeneralprinciplesto describeandunderstandhow reality is socially constructed(seeHiggins &Kruglanski, 1996).

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With regard to research styles, we think thatexperimentalistsare generallybetter thansocialcon-structionistsatpersuadingtheir opponentsto changeopinions, mainly becauseexperimentalistsare moreconcernedwith usingconsensuallyacceptedmethods(e.g., Aronsonet al., 1998; Cialdii, 1998; Eagly &Chaiken, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Greenwald,1976; Jones, 1985; McGuire, 1973, 1997; Ross &Nisbett, 1991). Social constructionists,on the otherhand,haveplenty to teachexperimentalistsin atleasttwo areas.First, constructionistsaremoreadeptthanare experimentalistsat enteringpublic discourseandparticipatingin cultural dialogueconcerningimpor-tant, timely matters(e.g., Fine, 1992;Gergen,1994b,1999; Hacking, 1999a, 1999b; Hare-Mustin &Maracek,1988; Kitzinger, 1987).They arealsomorewilling to engagein grandtheorizing,which presum-ablyentailstheacceptanceof greaterrisk butthepossi-bility of bigger payoffs (e.g.,Harré& Secord, 1972;Kruglanski,2001; McGuire, 1997; Moscovici, 1988;Tajfel, 1981).For all of thesereasons,wefeel thatso-cialpsychologywouldbestrongerif thetwo campsen-teredinto ameaningfulreunification.

Complementaritiesof SubstantiveResearchInterests

History,ideology,andthe“social” level ofanaly-sis. Onthelevelof substance,socialconstructionistshavebeenmoreopenthanexperimentaliststo historicalandideologicalfactorsinaccountingforhumanbehav-ior (e.g., Gergen,1973, 1977a, 1985a,l994a, 1999).Therearemanyreasonsfor thisdifferencein emphasis.Onereasonhastodo with experimentalists’greaterloy-altytoindividualisticparadigms,whichmaylendthem-selvesbetterto experimentalinvestigationthando col-lective,contextualistparadigms.Nevertheless,culturalpsychologistshavemanagedto find creativewaysofdemonstratingthecontextualeffectsof local andna-tional cultureon thinkingandbehavior.Historicalandpolitical psychologistscould beequally successfulbyadoptingalessindividualistic,morecontextualizedper-spective,associalconstructionistshavelongadvocated.

Anotherreasonthat experimentalsocialpsycholo-gistshaveneglectedtheroleof historicalandideologi-cal factorsin theconstitutionof mind andbehavioristheir keen interest in associatingthemselveswith“hard” scienceslike biologyanddistancingthemselvesfrom “soft” sciencessuchassociology.Thisis ironic inthatwhat is distinctiveanduniqueabouta socialpsy-chologicalperspectiveseemstohavemuchmoretodowithsociologicalvariables(e.g.,AIlport, 1962;Berger& Luckmann,1966; Billig, 1987; Bond, 1984;Clark,1985; Darley & Cooper,1998; Doise, 1986; Gergen,1971,1973, 1994b,1999; Greenwald,1980; Hardin&Higgins, 1996; Jones,1985; Jones& Gerard, 1967;

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Jost, 1995a; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; McGuire,1986; Miller & Ratner,1998; Morris & Peng,1994;Moscovici, 1972,1976,1988;Mugny,1982;Nisbett&Cohen, 1996; Potter, 1998; Ross & Nisbett, 1991;Snyder& Swann,1978; Tajfel, 1981; Triandis,1989)thanwith evolutionaryandbiologicalprocesses(e.g.,Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Nevertheless,sociobiologythreatensto dominatesociopsychology—apparentlywith theconsentof socialpsychologists—inprovidingpopularexplanationsforbehavioraldifferencesstem-ming fromgender,status,power,andotherfactorsthatarehistorically,culturally, andpolitically constructed.Socialconstructionistsremind us of theplasticity ofhumannature,and their conviction herecomespar-tialiy from laboratorydemonstrationsof thepoweroflocalsituationstoshapeandinfluenceattitudes,behav-ior, andthe self-concept.

Cynicsmightsuggestthatsocialpsychologistshaveembracedevolutionarybiology(while simultaneouslyspurningtheoreticalsociology)atleastinpartbecauseofthemore“scientific” neighbor’sgreaterprestigeandinfluencein attractinggrantmoney.Regardlessof mo-tives,if socialconstructionistsandexperimentalsocialpsychologistscould agreeon at leastsome commonmethodsandassumptions,theymightofferaninterest-ing andviable alternativeto sociobiologicalaccountsof humanbehavior.Perhapsit would be betterfor thescienceof socialpsychologyif experimnentalistswouldownupto thehistoricalandpolitical variability thatac-companiesatleastsomeof our subjectmatterandcon-tent ourselveswith becomingexpertsin, amongotherthings,theeffects of historical, cultural, andpoliticalcontextson attitudes,feelings,andbehaviors.Thereisnoshamein investigatingthesociallevelof analysisonits own terms, that is, without trying to reduceit toother,lowerlevels.

Contentandprocess. A second difference,whichcouldprovetobeuseful, is thatsocialconstruc-tionistshavegenerallyemphasizedthesignificanceofdifferentcontentsof lay beliefsor narratives,whereasexperimentalsocialpsychologistshave typically fo-cusedon theprocesseswherebypeopleperceiveandthink aboutothers,engagein socialinteraction,formanddissolvegroups,andcarryoutintergrouprelations.This is ageneralization,andthereareexceptionsthatprove therule. Experimentalsocialpsychologists—atleastbeforethe“cognitiverevolution”—focusedonat-titudinalcontentssuchas authoritarianismandpreju-dicefor theirown sake.Somesocialconstructionists—especiallythosewhoadoptempiricalmethods—inves-tigateprocesseswherebyshared(or conflicting) per-ceptionsofreality areconstructedthroughactsof con-versationor collaborativeremembering(e.g., Bfflig,1987;Middleton& Edwards,1990;Potter,1998).Nev-ertheless,experimentalistsare generallymore inter-estedin processesofcategorizationandmeaning-mak-

ESTRANGEDPARADIGMS

ing (e.g., Aronson et al., 1998), whereas socialconstructionistsare generallymore interestedin thecontentsof sociallysharedrepresentations(e.g.,Deaux& Philogene,2000).

Althoughcontents—almostby definition—arespe-cific and local, and processesare relatively general,both contentsand processesareessentialto under-standinghumansocialbehaviorin its manifoldforms.Within cultural psychology,we haveseenthat con-structionistpreoccupationswith thecontentsof sharedrepresentationshave influenced mainstreamsocialpsychology(e.g.,Markus& Kitayama, 1991;Miller &Ratner,1998;Morris & Peng,1994;Nisbett& Cohen,1996), where,appropriatelyenough,theyhavebeenapproachedvia empirical(andoftenexperimental)re-search.Along theselines, therehasbeen intriguingworkonthespecificstructuresof variouslay concepts,suchas child development,anger,intelligence,under-standing,ideals,andoughts.Socialdevelopmentalists(e.g.,Averill, 1980;Kessen,1979,1990),socialrepre-sentationalists(Deaux & Philogene, 2000; Doise,1989; Moscovici, 1988), and, more recently, socialcognitivists(e.g.,Dweck,1999;Higgins, 1987;Jostetal., 1998)havefocusedincreasinglyonthecontentsofmentalrepresentation.

Becauseattitudinalcontentsarelocal, specific,andmalleable,theyposeseveralproblemsfor socialpsy-chologicalresearchers.For onething,it isnecessarytojustify the choiceof theparticularcontentsof a socialconstructionelectedfor study.Given that thereis anear-infinitenumberof possibleconstructionsavail-able for study(e.g.,Gergen,1999; Hacking, 1999b),thechoiceof aparticularsocialconstruction(orapar-ticular aspectof a social representation)should becarefully justifiedin termsof its significance.Signifi-cancecouldbeestablishedin relationto differentob-jectives (e.g., on theoretical, social, or politicalgrounds),but its demonstrationis essentialbecauseinthe absenceof ajustification the investmentof timeandresourcesin depictingagivenconstructionwouldappeartobe senselessandarbitraryin light of thevastnumberofpossiblealternativeconstructionsthatcouldhavebeenchoseninstead.

Thesearchforgeneralprinciples. Anotherdifficulty facing social psychologistswho wish totake representationalcontentseriouslyis the chal-lengeof specifying the processeswhereby a givengroupof peopleat aparticular time andplace cometo representthe world inacertainway. This relatestoourmissionassocialpsychologiststo divine thegen-eralprinciples(of rhetoric,persuasion,judgmentfor-mation,,etc.) wherebysocialconstructionsareformedand alteredas function of manyvariables(includingmotivation, information, peerpressure, leadership,etc.).As socialpsychologists,we areexpectedto pro-vide answersto the questionof why a given individ-

ual (or group of individuals) embracesspecific be-liefs. Why do people forgethesespecificsocial con-structionsand not others, and under what circum-stancesmight their belief systemschange?

Thereis no apriori reasonwhy weshouldnottheo-rizeaboutthegeneralprocessesinvolvedin thesocialconstructionof reality (e.g., Berger & Luckmann,1966).Thedifficulty ofverifying ourstatementsaboutprocessis neithergreaternorlessthanthedifficulty as-sociatedwith defendingour statementsaboutthespe-cific contents of lay beliefs or constructions(Kruglanski,2001). Thereis no reason,furthermore,why socialpsychologistsshouldnotstudygeneralpro-cessesexperimentally(or in other empirical ways),eventhoughit is grantedthatourmethodsdonotguar-anteethetruthof our conclusions.Generalsocialpro-cessesassociatedwith representation,communication,influence,andpersuasionhavebeencentraltothecon-cerns of mainstreamsocial psychologyfor decades(e.g., Ailport, 1962; Aronsonet al., 1998; Eagly &Chaiken,1993; Jones,1985; McGuire, 1986; Taylor,1998),andsowearearguablyin thebestpossibleposi-tion to developgeneralprinciplespertainingto theso-cial constructionof reality (Berger & Luckmann,1966).Byunderstandingboththespecificcontentsandgeneralprocessesof socialconstruction,ourcollectiveability to addresssignificantsocialphenomenawill begreatlyenhanced.

Complementaritiesof ResearchStyles

Therhetoricof experimentation. Social con-structionistandexperimentalperspectivescomplementeachotherwellwith regardto’thestrategyaswellasthesubstanceof research.Althoughit is oftenoverlooked,thepurposeof conductingexperimentsis to persuadeone’sopponentson the strengthof evidencederivedfrom consensuallysharedmethods(Abelson, 1995).Thus,the researchenterpriseis inherentlyrhetorical(seealsoCampbell& Russo,1999).In ourview, socialconstructionistscouldbenefitby adoptingsomeof therigor in hypothesisassessmentthat characterizestheexperimentalists’approachandmakesit possibleforsomehypothesestoberejectedonthebasisof empiricalresults.Persuadingone’saudiencethatagiven socialconstructionis worth investigatingor thatits contents(presumedto existin atleastsomepeople’sminds)areassociatedwith aparticularlay theory(orintegratedbe-lief system)requirestheprovisionof evidencethatiscompellingandhardtorefute,andthisissomethingthatexperimentalistshave elevatedto an art form (e.g.,AronsonetaL, 1998).Socialconstructionistsignoretherhetorical.valueof experimentationwhentheyaredis-missiveoftheneedformethodologicalrigorandthepo-tentialforhypothesisdisconfirmation.

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On the otherhand,manyexperimentalistsseemtohavecarriedtheidealof methodologicalrigor abit toofar, andto adegreethathampersourability tobroadlytheorizeandaddresstopics for whichno precisedataareyet available.As severalcommentatorshaveob-served(e.g.,Higgins,1992;Kruglanski,2001;Reis &Stiller, 1992)our scientific cultureis risk averseand“prevention—focused,”andwe areextremelycarefulnot tomakestatementsthatgo beyondthelimitationsof ourdata.Suchriskaversionmayexactaprice.Spe-cifically, ourprofessionalcommunityhasfosteredatendencyto focusonly on theparticularsandto missthetheoreticalwhole andthereforeto becontinuously“rediscoveringthewheel.”Miller andPedersen(1999)identified this problemas “first on thelist of impedi-ments to scientific progressin contemporarysocialpsychology”(p. 150).Theygo onto arguethat “con-temporarysocialpsychologyis rife with implicit, butunsubstantiatedclaimsof discriminativeconstructva-lidity” (p. 150).We aresoreluctantto extrapolatefromaspecificmethodologicaloperationalizationtogeneralsocial phenomenathat our individual researchpro-gramsoften yield isolatedpocketsof inquiry ratherthancumulative, integrativeknowledgeaboutthe so-cialworld.

Enteringpublicdiscourse. Experimentalists’emphasison exactitudeandthespecificityof ouroper-ationaldefinitions mayalsohamstringourability asafieldto partakeingeneralintellectualdebatesconcern-ing societalissues.As Gergenhasarguedrepeatedly,socialpsychologycouldplaya“coloraturarole” in theexciting cultural dialogueaboutvalues,policies,andgoals.Socialpsychologyshouldhave“the capacitytochallengethe guiding assumptionsof the culture, toraisefundamentalquestionsregardingcontemporarysocial life, to foster reconsiderationof that whichis‘takenforgranted’... andtherebyto generatefreshal-ternativesto socialaction” (Gergen,1994b, p. 109)..Unfortunately,socialpsychologyhasnot yet fulfilledits potential as a distinctiveandlively participantinpublicdiscourse(seeKruglanski,2001).For betterorfor worse,socialconstructionismhascertainlymadeits voiceheardin “the American culture wars” (seeHacking, 1999b).Greaterinvolvementin societalde-batewouldmostlikely leadempiricalsocialpsycholo-giststo diversify their researchmethodsandto placemorevalue on ecologicalrealismrelativeto internalvalidity (e.g., Campbell& Stanley, 1963), as socialconstructionistshave beenurging for decades(e.g.,Elms, 1975; Gergen,1973;Ring, 1967).

Grand theorizing. Social psychologists havebeenunderrepresentedin publicdiscourseandculturaldebatein partbecauseof aconstitutionalreluctancetoengageingrandtheorizing.Socialconstructionistsarenot generallypossessedof this samelimitation (e.g.,

seeGergen,1999).Althoughthereis somethingto besaidfor theoreticalandprofessionalmodesty,a casecan be madethat experimentalsocial psychologistshave beenoverly circumspect(Kruglanski, 2001). Agreaterwillingnessto extrapolatefrom ourdatato thesocialworld atlargecouldincreasetheimpactofsocialpsychology.Contextualistsandsocialconstructionistshavebeenlessafraidof grandtheorizingin the socio~logical tradition, and their intestinalfortitude couldcomein useful. McGuire(1997)hasput in aplug foraudacious,“quixotic” theorizingasa way of stimulat-ing creativity in social science.A hybrid style thatcombines social constructionist theorizing (andmetatheorizing)andthecareful,rhetoricalmethodsofexperimentation(and quasi-experimentation)wouldbe mostadaptivefor ensuringthat socialpsychologywifi havea future that is successful,distinctive, cre-ative, andsocially relevant.Presumably,theseprofes-sionalgoalsaresharedby experimentalistsandsocialconstructionistsalike.

Conclusions:On the BenefitsandProspectsof Reconciliation

We have argued that, appearances aside,experimentalistsandsocial constructionistsharethesameintellectualheritageandarein fundamentalagree-mentthatpeopleactivelyandcollectivelyconstructrep-resentationsof their socialenvironments.Becauseoftheseconimonalities,thesocialconstructionistpérspec-tive hasbenefittedfrom the theoriesand findings ofmainstreamsocialpsychology,andit hasalsoenrichedandbenefittedmainstreamsocialpsychologicaltheoryandresearchinimportantways.Althoughthetwodisci-plinarysubculturesof socialpsychologyhaveattimespursueddiametricallyopposedtrajectoriesof inquiry,ourview is thatarapprochementnowis bothpossibleanddesirable,especiallyif socialconstructionistsarewilling to weakentheirpostmodemistallegiances.

Differencesin Emphasis

In general,we find that the seemingly unbridge-able divide betweensocial constructionismandex-perimental socialpsychologywith regardto truth andmethodhasbeenexaggeratedandis probablymoreamatterof relativeemphasisthanof principled incom-mensurability. Whereassocial constructionistsem-phasizeideational variation, experimentalistsfocuson the methodologicalprocessof selectingamongmore andless valid ideas;each side incorporatestheother’s views, even if only as “ground” to its pre-ferred figure. Rearedon Popper’sphilosophyof sci-ence, Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology, andMcGuire’s perspectivistmethodology,the pragmatic

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positionof today’sexperimentalsocial psychologistis a far cry from rashpositivism.

Experimentalistsrealizewell thatmultiple alterna-tive hypotheses(orconstructions)mightbeputforth to,accountformostempiricalfindings,thatsuchfindingsthemselvesaretheoryladen,andthatourability to se-lect themostcompellingaccountis fallible andsubjecttopotentialrevision(Campbell,1989,1993;McGuire,1983, 1989, 1997). Although most exp~rimentalists(andmanyof their constructionistcounterparts)dobe-lieve that there is a world “out there” (see alsoHacking,1999b;Searle,1995),thepossibilityof prov-ing its characterdefinitivelyisretainedasausefulreg-ulatory ideal (Popper,1959) rather thana readily at-tainable aspiration (McGuire, 1983, 1997). Socialconstructionists,for theirpart,recognizetherhetoricalpowerof thenotion thatsomesocialconstructionsaremorepragmaticallyusefulorpersuasive(to someaudi-encesatsomepointsin time) thanareotherconstruc-tions, therebyendorsinga selectionprocessof sorts(cf. Gergen,1994a).It doesnotseemtobethecasethatconstructionistepistemologyis necessarilymorecom-patiblewith humanisticvaluesandprogressivepoliti-calattitudesthanis thescientific,realistepistemologythatfuels experimentalwork. On the contrary,histori-cally it wasMarxandhisfollowerswhosematerialisticapproachsupportedthe social scientific gleaningofhardfactsandwhorejectedidealistphilosophies,thetenetsof whichcouldbeeasilyexploitedindefenseofthe statusquo.

Thespiritof inclusion

Fortunatelyfor thosewhohopefor reconciliation,thesocialconstructionistmovementis inclusionarybydefinition. Insofarasall formsof knowingarelinguis-tic representationsthat canbemoreor lessuseful,noway of knowing (including the knowledgeproducedby experimentalsocialpsychology)shouldbebannedfrom consideration on a priori grounds. Gergen(1994b)hasstatedthispointclearly: “~empiricist]en-deavors... offer asignificantalternativetomanycon-temporarywaysof framingtheworldandmaytherebyoffer new alternativesfor action.In this sensemuch‘empiricaV research... furnishesan effectiveway oflendingvivifying forcetovariousaccountsof reality.Ittranslatesabstracttheoreticallanguageintotheargotofdaily life, thusrenderingthatlife anew”(p. 141).De-velopmentsin discursivesocialpsychologysimilarlyindicatethat at leastsome socialconstructionistsareopento certain‘forms of empirical investigationandhypothesisassessment(e.g.,Potter, 1998).

We do not meanto suggestthat the differencesinemphasisthat separateexperimentalistsfrom socialconstructionistsare trivial or inconsequential.Butratherthanreflectinganunbridgeablerift, thetwoper-spectivesare in many ways complementaryin both

substanceand style, andthey arejointly capableofcontributingto socialpsychology’sscopeandimpactasafield of study.A numberof thriving researchpro-gramshaveincorporatedsocialconstructionistinsightsinto the empiricalstudyof attitudes,collectiverepre-sentation,language,the self-concept,social identity,and cultural psychology. These successesprovidesomeevidenceof thepotentialpayoffthatwouldcomefrom increasedintegration.

Recommendations

Experimentalists,we have suggested,would dowell to intensifytheireffortsto studysocially relevantattitudinalcontentsas well as processes,and socialconstructionistscould benefitfrom spinningtheoriesaboutgeneralsocialpsychologicalprocessesinvolvedin the sharedconstructionof reality. Socialconstruc-tionistsmight paygreaterattentionto justifying theconstructionstheychooseto studyandemploygreatermethodologicalrigorinarguingfor thespecificnatureof their characterizationsof lay theorizingas againstalternative hypotheses.Experimentalistsmight em-boldentheir approachto theorize(at least occasion-ally) beyondtheir immediatedata,discoverthecom-mon“forests” lurking behindthedisparate“trees” andrelateour conceptionsandfindings to broadersocialandpolitical issues.All this would lendus a strongerandmoreunified disciplinaryvoicein publicdiscourseaboutsocietyandtheworld atlarge.

There are, therefore,both scientific andpracticalreasonsfor experimentalsocialpsychologistsandso-cial constructioniststo overcometheir differencesinrhetoricalandresearchstyles.Byworkingtogether,wehaveabetterchanceof making serious,creative,andlastingprogressonourlong-standingandmutualmis-sion to analyzethe profoundlysymbolic andcontex-tual basesof humansocialbehavior (e.g., Berger&Luckmann,1966;Gergen,1971,1973;Hardin & Hig-gins, 1996;Israel& Tajfel, 1972;Jones,.1985;Markus& Kitayama,1991;McGuire, 1973,1989;Moscovici,1988;Ross& Nisbett, 1991;Tajfel, 1981).As Taylor(1998) observed,“Our special expertisehas alwaysbeenanunderstandingof theimpactof thesocialenvi-ronmentontheindividualandhowtheindividualcon-structsmeaningfrom socialsituations” (p. 86). Thisisthe crux of socialpsychology,andit is whatdistin-guishesour field fromotherknowledge-producingen-deavors.In thevastworldofideationalvariation,this isthenotion thatwehaveall selectedandretained.

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