The Euro Crisis & Greece: The Euro Crisis & Greece: 5 Mistakes5 Mistakes

Jeffrey FrankelJeffrey FrankelHarpel ProfessorHarpel Professor

MIT, Stata Center, room 32-155 MIT, Stata Center, room 32-155 5pm , Friday, Dec. 25pm , Friday, Dec. 2ndnd, 2011, 2011

22

5 mistakes made by euroland’s 5 mistakes made by euroland’s leaders regarding Greeceleaders regarding Greece

Slender rays of hope: Slender rays of hope: – The hour of the technocratsThe hour of the technocrats– Proposals for the futureProposals for the future

33

5 mistakes made by euro leaders5 mistakes made by euro leaders

Admitting Greece to the €, a country that was not ready.Admitting Greece to the €, a country that was not ready.

Pretending to enforce the fiscal criteria:Pretending to enforce the fiscal criteria:The Maastricht criteriaThe Maastricht criteria““No bail out” clauseNo bail out” clauseSStability & tability & GGrowth rowth PPact.act.

Allowing Mediterranean countries’ bonds spreads near 0Allowing Mediterranean countries’ bonds spreads near 0– helped by investors’ under-perception of risk helped by investors’ under-perception of risk (2003-07)(2003-07)– and artificial high credit ratings. But alsoand artificial high credit ratings. But also– ECB acceptance of Greek bonds as collateralECB acceptance of Greek bonds as collateral. .

When the crisis hit, the leaders buried their heads in the sand:When the crisis hit, the leaders buried their heads in the sand:2 years ago, sending Greece to the IMF was “unthinkable.”2 years ago, sending Greece to the IMF was “unthinkable.”1 year ago, restructuring of the debt was “unthinkable.”1 year ago, restructuring of the debt was “unthinkable.”

44

The Treaty of Maastricht The Treaty of Maastricht (1991) (1991) surprised many surprised many economists by emphasizing fiscal criteria economists by emphasizing fiscal criteria

as qualifications for membership: as qualifications for membership: BD < 3% of GDP & Debt < 60% of GDP.BD < 3% of GDP & Debt < 60% of GDP.

Why did the designers do it?Why did the designers do it?

TheoryTheory I: I: Jason Jason & the Golden Fleece& the Golden Fleece

TheoryTheory II: II: Theseus Theseus & the stone& the stone

TheoryTheory III: III: Odysseus Odysseus & the mast. & the mast.

Frankel, Economic Policy (London) 16, April 1993, 92-97.

55

The motivationThe motivationfor the Maastricht fiscal criteria is clearfor the Maastricht fiscal criteria is clear

the same as for the No Bailout Clausethe same as for the No Bailout Clauseand the Stability & Growth Pact (1997):and the Stability & Growth Pact (1997):

Skeptical German taxpayers believed that, Skeptical German taxpayers believed that, before the € was done, they would be asked to before the € was done, they would be asked to bail out profligate Mediterranean countries.bail out profligate Mediterranean countries.

European elites adopted the fiscal rules to European elites adopted the fiscal rules to demonstrate that these fears were groundless.demonstrate that these fears were groundless.

66

After the euro came into existenceAfter the euro came into existence

it became clear the German taxpayers had been rightit became clear the German taxpayers had been right– and the European elites were wrong.and the European elites were wrong.

E.g., Greece persistently violated the 3% rule.E.g., Greece persistently violated the 3% rule.

The large countries violated the rule too.The large countries violated the rule too.

SGP targets were “met” by overly optimistic forecasts.SGP targets were “met” by overly optimistic forecasts.

SGP threats of penalty had zero credibility.SGP threats of penalty had zero credibility.

Yet each year the ostrich elites stuck Yet each year the ostrich elites stuck their heads deeper & deeper into the sands.their heads deeper & deeper into the sands.

In most years, the true Greek budget deficit In most years, the true Greek budget deficit was far in excess of the supposed limit was far in excess of the supposed limit (3% of GDP).(3% of GDP).

77Source: Frankel & Schreger (2011)

and yetand yet the the official budget forecasts were always rosy.official budget forecasts were always rosy.

Until, in 2009, the bottom fell out of the budget.

At the time of Maastricht, At the time of Maastricht, some economists had hoped that euro some economists had hoped that euro countries with deficits/debts would be countries with deficits/debts would be kept in line, as U.S. states are,kept in line, as U.S. states are,– esp. by an automatic market rise in interest rates,esp. by an automatic market rise in interest rates,– with no expectation of federal bailout.with no expectation of federal bailout.– Alesina, et al Alesina, et al ((EPEP, 1992) and , 1992) and Goldstein Goldstein && Woglom Woglom (1992).(1992).

Why didn’t that mechanism work?Why didn’t that mechanism work?

88

99

Spreads help keep profligate US states in lineSpreads help keep profligate US states in line= reason why no state has ever been bailed out by = reason why no state has ever been bailed out by

the Federal government, despite some defaults.the Federal government, despite some defaults.

9Source: W.B. English, „Understanding the costs of sovereign default …,“ p. 269. as used by Holtfrerich (2011)Holtfrerich (2011)

Yield tomaturity

in %

1010

California Municipal BondsCalifornia Municipal Bonds(now the lowest rated of the 50- states)(now the lowest rated of the 50- states)

Credit Default SwapsCredit Default Swapshttp://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/06/08/muni-sweeps-lockyer-rides-again/http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/06/08/muni-sweeps-lockyer-rides-again/

1111

Spreads for Italy, Greece, & other Mediterranean Spreads for Italy, Greece, & other Mediterranean members of members of €€ were near zero, from 2001 until 2008. were near zero, from 2001 until 2008.

Market Nighshift Nov. 16, 2011

When PASOK leader George When PASOK leader George Papandreou became PM in Oct. 2009,Papandreou became PM in Oct. 2009,

he announced he announced – that “foul play” had misstated the fiscal that “foul play” had misstated the fiscal

statistics under the previous government:statistics under the previous government:

– the 2009 budget deficit the 2009 budget deficit ≠≠ 3.7%, 3.7%, as previously claimed, as previously claimed, but > 12.7 % !but > 12.7 % !

1212

1313

Missed opportunityMissed opportunity

The euro elites had to know that someday The euro elites had to know that someday a member country would face a debt crisis.a member country would face a debt crisis.

In early 2010 they should have viewed Greece as a In early 2010 they should have viewed Greece as a good opportunity good opportunity to set a precedent for moral hazard:to set a precedent for moral hazard:– The fault egregiously lay with Greece itself.The fault egregiously lay with Greece itself.

Unlike Ireland or Spain, which had done much right.Unlike Ireland or Spain, which had done much right.

– It is small enough that the damage from debt restructuring It is small enough that the damage from debt restructuring could have been contained at that time.could have been contained at that time.

Unlike Italy now, if the worst happens.Unlike Italy now, if the worst happens.

They should have applied the familiar IMF formula: They should have applied the familiar IMF formula: serious bailout, but only conditional on serious serious bailout, but only conditional on serious policypolicy reforms reforms && serious Private serious Private SectorSector Involvement.Involvement.

1414

But the ostriches But the ostriches stuck their heads stuck their heads ever further ever further down in the sand.down in the sand.

There is even less reason now to think There is even less reason now to think Brussels can impose fiscal constaints on Brussels can impose fiscal constaints on borrowers or ask unlimited transfers from borrowers or ask unlimited transfers from creditor country taxpayers than before.creditor country taxpayers than before.

1515

Slender rays of hope, #1Slender rays of hope, #1

Greece, IrelandGreece, Ireland & & Portugal did finally go toPortugal did finally go to the the IMF; IMF; Germany Germany && banks did finally agree to write down Greek debt. banks did finally agree to write down Greek debt. – But it has always been much too little, too late.But it has always been much too little, too late.

The only solution for the short-term: The only solution for the short-term: – a lot more money a lot more money

from ECB & from ECB & national governments, national governments,

– conditional country-by-country on reforms + PSI.conditional country-by-country on reforms + PSI.

1616

Slender rays of hope, #2Slender rays of hope, #2

A government of technocrats under Mario Monti A government of technocrats under Mario Monti in Italy is a huge improvement in Italy is a huge improvement over the disaster of Berlusconi. over the disaster of Berlusconi.

Similarly Lucas Papademos in GreeceSimilarly Lucas Papademos in Greece– But he has been given even less freedom of But he has been given even less freedom of

action than Monti: his term is only 3 months action than Monti: his term is only 3 months and he wasn’t allowed to pick his cabinet.and he wasn’t allowed to pick his cabinet.

1717

Proposals for the future: #1Proposals for the future: #1

Emulate Chile’s successful fiscal institutionsEmulate Chile’s successful fiscal institutions

a)a) Phrase budget targets in structural terms.Phrase budget targets in structural terms.

b)b) Give responsibility for determining what is Give responsibility for determining what is structural to an independent professional structural to an independent professional agency, to avoid forecast bias.agency, to avoid forecast bias. (Frankel, 2011)(Frankel, 2011)

1818

Proposals for the future: #2Proposals for the future: #2

PenaltyPenalty when a euro country misses its target:when a euro country misses its target:

a)a) The ECB then stops accepting new bonds as collateral.The ECB then stops accepting new bonds as collateral.b)b) => Sovereign spread rises, with automaticity.=> Sovereign spread rises, with automaticity.

c)c) Proposal from BrueghelProposal from Brueghel ((JvW & & ZD): D): All of euroland is liable for All of euroland is liable for blue bondsblue bonds

(issued up to SGP limits); (issued up to SGP limits); Issuing country is liable for Issuing country is liable for red bondsred bonds

(beyond those limits) .(beyond those limits) .

d)d) Blue bonds share advantages with other eurobond proposals:Blue bonds share advantages with other eurobond proposals:a)a) ● ● ECB can conduct monetary policy.ECB can conduct monetary policy.b)b) ● ● They could offer an alternative to US TBills They could offer an alternative to US TBills

for PBoC & other desperate global investorsfor PBoC & other desperate global investors

1919

EMU Ostrich

2020

References by the speakerReferences by the speaker

““The ECB’s Three Big Mistakes,” ,” VoxEU, May 16, 2011., May 16, 2011.  “Optimal Currency Areas & Governance", slides session on the session on the Challenge of Europe at the  at the Annual Conference of George Soros’ of George Soros’ INET, April 2011; , April 2011; video available, including my available, including my presentation. . ""Let Greece Go to the IMF," Jeff Frankel’s blog, Feb.11, 2010.," Jeff Frankel’s blog, Feb.11, 2010.Over-optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and Its Implications," 2011, ," 2011, forthcoming in forthcoming in Oxford Review of Economic PolicyOxford Review of Economic Policy..““A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality:  The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile,” ,” Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance,  Central Bank of Chile, 2011.  NBER  Central Bank of Chile, 2011.  NBER WP 16945, WP 16945, April 2011. 2011. “The Estimated Effects of the Euro on Trade:  Why are They Below Historical Evidence on Effects of Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries?” in ” in Europe and the Euro, , Alberto Alesina Alberto Alesina & & Francesco Giavazzi, eds. Francesco Giavazzi, eds. (U.Chic.Press), (U.Chic.Press), 2010.    2010.    "Comments on 'The euro: It can’t happen, It’s a bad idea, It won’t last. U.S. economists "Comments on 'The euro: It can’t happen, It’s a bad idea, It won’t last. U.S. economists on the EMU, 1989-2002,' by L.Jonung & E.Drea," slides. on the EMU, 1989-2002,' by L.Jonung & E.Drea," slides. Euro at 10: Reflections on Euro at 10: Reflections on American ViewsAmerican Views, ASSA meetings, San Francisco, 2009. , ASSA meetings, San Francisco, 2009. "The UK Decision re EMU: Implications of Currency Blocs for Trade and Business "The UK Decision re EMU: Implications of Currency Blocs for Trade and Business Cycle Correlations," in Submissions on EMU from Leading Academics (H.M. Treasury: Cycle Correlations," in Submissions on EMU from Leading Academics (H.M. Treasury: London), 2003.London), 2003."The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criterion" (with Andrew Rose),    "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criterion" (with Andrew Rose),    The The Economic JournalEconomic Journal, 108, no.449, July 1998., 108, no.449, July 1998.“‘Excessive Deficits’: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht; Comments on Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini,” Economic Policy, Vol.16, 1993.    

2121

Appendix: Blue bonds & red bondsAppendix: Blue bonds & red bonds

Gavyn Davies, FT