Parliamentary History, Vol. 18, pt . 2 (1999), jp 16S187

The Evolution of Specialist Advice to Select Committees of the House of Commons in the

Twentieth Century

PETER J. L A U G H A R N E London Guildhall Univenity

Select committees are important parliamentary organs for legislative decision making and the scrutiny of executive action. The receipt of specialist advice fiom external experts is now a common and arguably an integral aspect ofthe operation ofmany select committees of the house of commons. This article briefly examines the nature of com- mittee advice up to the end of the nineteenth century and then provides a detailed exposition of the progressive changes that have occurred in the provision of specialist advice to select committees during the twentieth century.

The evolution of specialist advice to select committees can be divided into four rea- sonably well defined periods, viz. the utilisation of external professionals 1848 to 1920; the introduction and containment of the modem adviser 1920 to 1964; the era of expansion and consolidation fiom 1964; and the post-1979 systematization.

The Utilisation of External Professionals 1848- 1920

Prior to the nineteenth century assistance to committees in both Houses was confine4 to the role performed by clerks. They aided and advised committees generally, per- forming largely administrative and procedural duties. From the middle of the nineteenth century the house of commons began to make more extensive use of com- mittees. The committees existed on an ad hoc basis and were utilized for specific purposes, rather than being integrated into the mainstream operation of the House.’ Perhaps because ofthis very fact, matters which select committees investigated began to warrant the appointment of external professional assistance. This development occurred midway through the nineteenth century with committees deploying qualified individuals to conduct investigations and report back to them.

In June 1848 the select committee on the National Land Company was ordered by the House to appoint Mr Grey as ‘accountant to examine the accounts of the Com- pan^'.^ Grey was called in to be examined by the committee in the manner ofan ordinary witness. The room in which the committee met was cleared before it deliberated, but it is

Michael Rush, ‘Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary Government: The British and

Select commttee on the National Land Company, Sixth Report. HC 577, 1847-8, p. vii. Canadian Experience’, journal of Commonwalth and Comparative Politicc, XX (1982). 141.

170 Peter]. hughame

unclear whether the accountant was privy to these private discussions. No record was made of a payment of fees or expenses to him for services rendered.3

Similarly, in 1887 Lord Randolph Churchill reported from the select committee o n army and navy estimates:

that in their opinion it would be highly beneficial and advisable, for the purposes of their inquiry, that the House should authorise them to take such steps as they deem necessary to secure an independent professional examination and audit of the Departments, and of the books on which those Accounts have been based.4

The committee, being so ordered, appointed F. Whinney, president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants to conduct the examination and report back.’

The introduction of external professional assistance initially occurred relative to committees with a commercial o r financial remit. As early as the nineteenth century such matters had advanced to the extent that expert assistance was required for them to be dealt with by a committee oflaymen. However, the authorization for a select com- mittee to appoint qualified outside assistance was not always specifically worded. A case in point occurred in 1912 when a select committee, though possessing a relatively closely defined remit being ‘appointed to consider and inquire into the question of the sale of patent and proprietary medicines and medical preparations and appliances, and advertisements relating thereto’ was granted the highly generalised power ‘to order analyses’, to facilitate its investigation.6

The qualified individuals, whilst bringing much needed information and expertise to a committee’s operation, can be conceived as forms ofspecial witnesses as much as expert advisers, albeit with an enhanced role of supplying information and analysis on the spe- cific matter which they were requested to report. The introduction of external professional assistance bridged the gap between.the use solely ofgeneralist clerks and the later addition ofspecialist advisers who normally deploy their expertise in a defined field.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century and during the early part of the twen- tieth century the use of professional external assistance by select committees, whilst not in any way rivalling the current practice with specialist advisers, did markedly increase in frequency. Between 1872 and 1914 there were 25 extraordinary pay- ments to individuals for services performed on behalf of committees of the house of commons.’ The payment of these individuals is material in that it placed them on a similar footing to the committees’ regular staff, their clerks. It also indicated that their work was of sufticient value to the committees that they were willing to accept an increased financial burden in return for their assistance. The external professionals successfully supplemented and complemented the work of the clerks without it

’ Ibid., pp. viii-x. ‘ CJ., CXLII. 399.

Select committee on anny and navy estimates, Fijih Reporf, HC 259, 1887, p. iii. The comniittre also empowered Whinney ‘to elect as his associate one other accountant ofeminence for the better and more speedy prosecution ofthe task. Mr. Whinney selected for this purpose Mr. Edwin Waterhouse, of the firm Messn. Price, Waterhouse, and Co’.

CJ.. CLXVII, 124. See also CJ.. CLXVIII. 18; CLXIX, 252. ’ Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings ojParliamenf, ed. Sir Charles Gordon (20th

edn., 1983). p. 708.

Specialist Advice to Select Committees 171

would seem threatening the stafirig statirs quo, the latter being a fear which was the implicit foundation o f some o f the arguments deployed by opponents of expert assistance in subsequent periods.

The Coniptroller arid Auditor General

A germane development in 1861 was the establishment of the committee of public accounts as the Commons’ first permanent investigatory It was created ‘to ensure that public expenditure was properly incurred for the purpose for which it had been voted and in conformity with the relevant act’.‘’ This extant select committee bases its work on the reports to parliament of the coniptroller and auditor general and his department. These were established margmally later under the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866, and were reformed after a succession o f parliamentary reviews by the National Audit Act of 1983, which created the national audit o f ice with the coniptroller and auditor general at the helm. T h e coniptroller and auditor general has been cited as one of, if not the, earliest example of an expert adviser to a select committee.“’

T h e establishment o f the 0 t h of comptroller and auditor general and his depart- nient was a milestone in the provision o f advice to select committees for two reasons. Firstly, it set the precedent for permanently establishing expert advice and assistance to a select committee. This engendered at the very least a tacit acceptance o f the need for such assistance to facilitate increasingly important institutions of executive scrutiny. Secondly, the comptroller and auditor general, became a frequently cited bench-mark by committees and refomiers seeking the extension of expert advice to other commit- tees. As a consequence the of ice became a strategic component in the debate over the future of expert legdative advice.

I t has been suggested by Johnson regarding the period up to 191 4, that it is ‘not with- out significance for later arguments about select committees that apparently matters o f great legal or technical complexity were often mastered by Members who were rarely “experts” and worked with no more than the support of clerks of the House’.” This view has some validity for those committees, admittedly in the majority, which did not appoint qualified outside assistance, or enjoy the fomi ofassistance provided to the pub- lic accounts committee. Be that as it may, those Committees with a primary financial dimension (such as the public accounts committee, the select committee on the National Land Company and the select committee on army and navy estimates) did find it necessary to receive expert advice. T h e experiences of the latter conimittees may have been ofequal ifnot greater significance than the former to the debate over expert advice if its eventual outcome is anything by which to judge.

“ Rush, ‘Parliamentary Committees’. p. 142.

‘ I J K. C. Wheare, Government b y Committee. Arr Essoy oti thr British Corrstitutiurr (Oxford, 1955).

II Nevi1 Johnson, ‘Select Committees and Administration’. in The House o j Commotrs i r i the

Philip Norton, The Comniotis in Persprrtive (Oxford, 1981). p. 127.

p. 219.

Twentieth Century, ed. S. A. Walkland (Oxford, 1979). p. 438.

172 Peter J . Laughortic.

During the period to 1920 both the national expenditure committee and the esti- mates committee were created neither of which appointed expert advisers. Indeed Johnson is of the opinion (paradoxically in view of his coninlent cited above) that the national expenditure committee in the period 191 7-20 ‘was hampered by the absence of expert staff to assist it in the designation of topics of inquiry and in the provision of infomiation. As a result the committee was unable to achieve an acceptable definition of its role’.” The committee was not to be alone in that predicament.

The lntrodurtioti and Contnititiient of the Modern . M i h e r 1920-64

The period from 1920 witnessed the introduction of assistance to select committees with a role which begns to resemble that ofspecialist advisers. From this period we can map the changes that have led to the current model of the specialist adviser’s role.

Norton has contended that calls for parliamentary refonii have been most vociferous during periods of economic depression and decline.’” This is undoubtedly the case if the theory is applied to the internal refomi of appointing expert assistance to select coniniittees. Notwithstanding the fact that calls for refonn have been most salient dur- ing periods ofdecline, the enactment ofthe refomis does not in the case ofthe provision of expert advisers, totally correlate with the periods during which the refomis are first espoused. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, a government would be unlikely to accede to refomi without first assessing the potential negative impact on its parliamentary programme through the increased workload engendered by the more searching and thus effective operation ofselect committees which one might posit is the possible outcome ofdeploying expert assistance. Secondly, government inertia towards the enactment ofparliamentary reform might be reinforced by the fact that calls for such reform, if they are conteniporaneous with periods of economic recession or depression, coincide with periods at which governments are most wary of radical change. They would be hostile to criticism that might exacerbate an already precarious position.

In the period 1920 to 1964 new powers for some select coniinittees to appoint expert assistance were granted in the early 1920s and the war years, whilst demands or recom- mendations for the introduction ofexpert staffwere most prominent in the early 1930s. This was a decade after the introduction ofthe first expert adviser to assist a committee, and a decade before the next committee was to be so empowered. During the relatively more prosperous period of the 1950s, though successive select committees put the case for increased assistance, their demands were not vociferous. The corollary was that reforms were not enacted and one has to look towards the more turbulent era of the mid-1 960s before more belligerent demands are tnade and reforms executed.

Nevertheless the period which begins in 1920 saw a move away from the practice of committees being granted powers to employ external professionals to conduct their own inquiries and report back. This was in the direction of the niodern day position where they are able to consult with persons ofspecialist expertise. However, the right of

l 2 [bid., p. 442. I’ Philip Norton, ‘The House ofCommons in the 1970s: Three Views on Reform’, Hull Papers I ~ I

Politics, 111 (1978), 6-9.

Specialist Advice to Select committees 173

select committees to appoint expert advisers was hard fought for and only accorded to a number o f ad hor select committees in the early part of this period. I t was denied to the sessional estimates and later the nationalized industries committees.

It is important in determining why this occurred to place these developnients in their political context. Both parliament and Whitehall tend to be conservative institutions, suspicious and begrudging o f change. Indeed, Hennessy asserts that n o genuine refomi in Whitehall is possible without the agreement of the prime minister.” Since the exec- utive nomially controls the legislature the situation is compounded by the fact that changes proposed in parliament, counter to the executive’s interests niay effectively be vetoed by it. Thus at best conceding only incremental change and at worst producing inertia. When the position is reversed and the executive seeks legislative reform change can be rapid, though this is a rarity.

Some though by n o nieans all back-bench nienibers w h o comprise the personnel o f select committees have sought to increase their influence on, and scrutiny of, the exec- utive through attempts to improve and strengthen the role of the committees. O n e o f the methods by which it has been believed this may be achieved is through specialist expert assistance. This might go soine way to redressing the imbalance produced by the provision ofassistance and expertise to the executive by the Whitehall bureaucracy, and outside specialist institutions. However any concession of an increase in parliament’s influence on, o r effective scrutiny of, and thus power over the executive, would pro- duce a conconlitant diminution in the power o f government and bureaucracy. Consequently, it has been rigourously opposed by both.

In March 1921 a landmark event in the evolution of the provision ofexpert advisers to select coninlittees occurred. A select committee was appointed to inquire into the organization and administration o f the telephone service and the method o f making charges. A motion was proposed by Colonel Gibbs ‘That the Coninlittee have power to appoint from outside its own body such persons as it niay think fit for the purpose of obtaining special expert o r scientific information, o r advice, upon the subject matter of their order of reference.’ An amendment was proposed by Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy to the effect that the word ‘appoint’ would be omitted and the words ‘call, subject to the approval o f the Treasury’, be inserted. T h e original question was put and voted upon with the result that the matter was resolved in the afirniative by 107 votes to 16.15 T h e consequence of the defeat o f the amendment was that a precedent was set for a select committee to appoint outside expert assistance in its own right, provided that it had been granted such authority by the House. Any notion of a requirement of further treasury approval was quashed. T h e precedent was buttressed when the committee was reappointed in 1922 with the same powers.“

T h e original motion contains many of the elements of the modern specialist adviser role. T h e appointment is couched in the plural thus enabling the committee if it so wished to appoint several advisers. This iniplicitly recognizes that different specializations could be called upon. T h e motion also states that the persons would

Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (1990). p. 31 l 5 CJ., CLXXVI, 50. I h CJ., CLXXVII, 25.

174 Peter J . Laugkarnc.

provide special expert information, scientific infomiation o r advice, which expressly acknowledges the variety of assistance that the committee may require.

Over 30 years later the estimates committee in its recommendation to the House that it should be granted the power to appoint expert advisers was to cite the precedent of the telephone service committee. I t stressed that under that power the committee had appointed an engmeer, w h o not only advised them on technical problems, but also travelled on their behalfto Scandinavia and North America.” In the latter respect the adviser’s role was more extensive than that of current specialist advisers w h o may accompany committees o n overseas visits but d o not usually independently represent them on foreign fact finding missions.

In January 1944 a select conimittee on house ofcommons (rebuilding) obtained the ‘power to invite any specially qualified persons, whom they may select, to attend any of their meetings in an advisory capacity’.’’ This final point is important for at both the meetings of the rebuilding committee and the telephone service committee of 1921-2, the individuals concerned not only advised but also attended meetings at which the comniittees deliberated, a practice corresponding with that of current day specialist advisers.”

By the early 1930s the prevailing view was that some select committees, and in particular the estimates committee, were not performing as well as they might. T h e select committee on procedure on public business thus recommended, irirrr alia, that the operation of the estimates committee should be improved by the formation of a closer association with the public accounts committee. This was to be achieved by having its tenns ofreference widened to include questions ofpolicy and the relation- ship between public expenditure and national income. But also through the provision o f qualified staff, drawn from either the exchequer and audit department, o r taking the form of a new body of advisers.”’ Suffice it to say that these proposals were not enacted by the government, and the estimates committee continued t o provide an amateur examination of a crucial area o f executive activity.

In 1944 the statutory instruments committee was established and unusually for a ses- sional select committee at that time obtained the services ofan expert legal adviser in the person of Sir Cecil Carr. Thenceforth, it was to enjoy the assistance o f an officer of the House in the form of counsel to Mr Speaker for the entirety of its existence.”

Also during the Second World War, an experiment was conducted by the select committee on national expenditure involving the attachment of two economists to its staff of clerks. This was referred to in the discussions over expert staff conducted by the 1945-46 select committee on procedure. These considered whether an officer equiva- lent to the comptroller and auditor general should be appointed to assist the estimates committee. However, witnesses in evidence to the procedure committee made it clear that the national expenditure committee’s staff had made itself very unpopular in

Estimates committee, F$h Special Report, HC 161, 1964-5, p. 4. I ” C J . , CXCIX, 29. ’’ Erskine May, ed. Gordon, p. 708.

Johnson, ‘Select Committees’. p. 444. refemng to The Special Report from the select committee on procedure on public business, HC 161. 1931-2.

Wheare, Government b y Committee, p. 218.

Specialist Aduice to Select Committees 175

Whitehall, and that the temporary appointees’ knowledge of economics was not utilised because it was not wanted.’’ The experiment with the economists was conse- quently short lived, a fate which was similarly incurred by later select committee experiments which met with Whitehall disapproval.

The antipathy of the post-war leader of the house of commons, Herbert Morrison, towards the provision of expert staff to the estimates committee is conspicuous in his evidence to the procedure committee. The appointment ofan oficer ofsiniilar status to the comptroller and auditor general was resisted on the rather tenuous grounds that no precise comparison could be made between an officer concerped with inquiring into retrospective expenditure, and that proposed to examine prospective expenditure in the form of government estimates.”

The ofice of comptroller and auditor general again figured prominently in a debate over expert staff this time regarding the potential appointment of a select committee to inquire into the operation of public sector industries. The select committee on nation- alized industries was established to consider the relationship between the industries and the House and reported in 1953. Amongst the propositions on committee staffing pre- sented in evidence to the committee were that the comptroller and auditor general might himself undertake the work on the nationalized industries which he then per- formed on government departments. Additionally, it was advocated that the pernianent officer ofthe proposed committee should be drawn from a central department ofstate, perhaps the trea~ury.’~ The committee concluded that the first suggestion was inappro- priate, and after considering the second expressed the view ‘that the permanent officer ofthe Committee, once appointed, should be a servant ofthe House ofCommons, and not of the Government or of any of the corporations, and not removable except by an address from each House of Parliament’. Independence of the executive was evidently the paramount criterion in the appointment of any expert assistance. The committee recommended that the staff would necessarily include a clerk, which was the normal practice. In addition there would be a permanent oficial of a status roughly equivalent to that of the comptroller and auditor general or interestingly, in the light of the statu- tory instruments committee, Mr Speaker’s counsel. I t was envisaged that the permanent official would work with the assistance ofat least one professional accountant, and such other staff as the committee might deem appropriate. The oficial would examine the reports and accounts of the nationalized industries in order to direct the committee’s attention to any matters that might require investigation.” Though a new select com- mittee on nationalized industries was created in 1956, the previous committee’s recommendations uis-d-uis staffing were not fully enacted, the only official assistance coming from one clerk until the session 1959-60 when an extra clerk was appoirled.2h The latter addition was the corollary of a special report from the select committee on nationalized industries in the session 1958-9. This took the shape of a retrospective

22 See David Coombes. The Member oJ Parliament and the Administration. The Cast- of the Select

23 Ibid., refemng to The Report from the select cornniittee on procedure, HC 189-1, 1945-46. 24 Select committee on nationalised industries, Report. HC 235, 1952-53. p. xi. 25 Ibid., pp. xi-xii. 2h Coombes, Member of Parliament, p. 75.

Cqmmittee on Nationalized Industries (1966). p. 208.

176 Peter J. LmXharne

analysis of the facets of the committee’s work that could have been improved by the provision ofadditional assistance, together with reconiniendations for future action.

The committee intimated that there were two ways i n which the assistance of specialists would have helped. First, the appointment of an accountant with experi- ence of industrial and conimercial accounts would have been useful in analysing the formidable tables that were laid before them and in pointing out their significance. Second (foreshadowing the appointment of the present day specialist assistants), a research worker with training in economics could have infornied them of the litera- ture on the subject, and might have helped them decide which lines of inquiry would prove most p rod~c t ive . ’~

The committee reconsidered the proposals of the nationalized industries committee of 1953 which had not been fully and referred to the ‘assessor’ appointed to the select committee on the telephone service of 1922. I t noted the value ofthe experiment where the committee recorded ‘their high appreciation of [his] tech- nical assistance and advice . . . throughout the proceedings, and of his excellent reports,.?’ The committee, quoting the leader ofthe House as stating that they were ‘on the edge ofan innovation here which we want to watch very carefully’, recognized that if they were granted powers for themselves and for their successors to seek advice from outside the House as a permanent practice they would be breaking new ground, ~ n d refrained from making any radical recon~mendations. They simply stated they would prefer that additional help gven to them came from within the House. Even so they acknowledged that some of the help they needed was of a specialist nature which the House did not, and one might argue could not, from within its own staffprovide:’”

Opponents ofthe appointment ofexpert advisers from the 1050s onwards were to deploy a number of arguments against their introduction, and once some were appointed. the extension of the practice to other conin~ittees.~’ The view was expressed that members of parliament should not be expected to be experts i n any and every field with which the House or any of its constituent organs is concerned. Members it was argued, are traditionally lay-people who bring their judgement to bear on matters before them and decide and vote accordingly. Though the work of the House was becoming ever more specialized, complex and technical, opponents of expert assistance held that clerks could adequately resolve problems or misinter- pretations that might arise. There was a good deal of scepticism about, and circumspection towards expert advisers. Increasingly, fears that advisers might take over committees producing an informed but narrow and privileged dialogue between witnesses and experts through the committee chairman, but over the heads of committee members, came to be expressed more regularly. This view was bol- stered by references to the rather disquieting role of advisers to congressional committees in the United States. Analogies were drawn between committees of the

*’ Select coniniittee on nationalised industries. Special Report (Reporls and Accourtts), HC 276, 1958-59. p. iv.

*“ Ibid., p. v. ?’ /bid. , p. x. ’I Ibid., p. xi

See Anthony Barret, ‘The Department ofthe Clerk ofthe House’, in 7 h e House ofCommotis, ed. Walkland, pp. 604-5.

Specialist Advice to Select Coriiniittees 177

British and American legislatures without elucidating their very different roles and powers in their respective legislative systems.

The start ofthe period was promising, though it did not bring forth its full fruits, and with the notable, albeit minimal and exceptional instance of the statutory instruments committee (which received the assistance ofan expert legal officer ofthe House rather than an outsider), the sessional select committees were frustrated in their pursuit of expert advice. The executive, and in particular successive leaders of the House, were unwilling to concede or relinquish any vestige of extra influence to the legislature.

The Era ?f Expansion and Consolidation jwri 1 Y64

The year 1964 heralded the return ofa Labour administration committed rhetorically if not whole-heartedly to parliamentary reform. In 1966 this was augmented by an influx of young and zealous back-bench members eager to make their mark upon and influ- ence the executive. The climate ofchange was heightened by the appointment as leader of the house of commons of Richard Crossman. Despite (even perhaps because 00, as he admitted, being rather unacquainted with the procedural niceties of the Commons, Crossman to the consternation of some of his cabinet colleagues, embarked upon a series ofreforms that would tilt the balance ofpower slightly less towards the executive. Be that as it may, as has usually been the case with proposals for the reform of parlia- ment, change though markedly more rapid than in previous decades continued to be both tentative and incremental. Moreover, it was not to be without the occasional committee casualty.

Academics who favoured the introduction of new specialized select committees were concerned that they should be adequately staffed and assisted. Bernard Crick’s view was apparent from his comments on the 1958-9 nationalized industries com- mittee’s report concerning special or expert assistance. He castigated members who feared ‘that the experts might come out on top, not just on tap’, arguing that ‘no one who knows what he wants is dominated by his expert assistants or specialized advis- e r ~ ’ . ~ ~ Similarly, both Hanson33 and Wisenian34 advocated that the specialist committees should be able to employ expert or technical assistance on an a d hoc basis. Interestingly, another pair of parliamentary reformers, the pseudonymous Hill and Whichelow resisted the trend by opposing the appointment of expert advisers. They averred that ‘Their [the committees’] comments should be the comments of politi- cians, not of a range of resident experts on the pattern of Congressional Committees, which are entrusted constitutionally with a governing function of far wider scope.’35 They favoured the existing committee staff supplemented by experts called as wit- nesses. The authors were themselves clerks, and thus may have had some misgivings towards inviting outsiders into their domain.

’* Bernard Crick, 7he Ref.rm of Parliament ( 1 968). pp. 97-8. ” Select committee on procedure, Fourth Rt-porf, HC 403, 1964-5, p. 53. J4 fb id . , pp. 66-7. M A. Hill and A. Whichelow. What’s Wrong With Parliamenr! (1964). p. 80

178 Peter J . L m q h a r t i e

T h e estimates conimittee in its fifth special report o f 1965, on temporary technical or scientific assistance for sub-comniittees, set a positive tone for what was to be the make or break period for specialist advisers. It did so by, on the one hand, acknowledging t h ~ t the assistance it was possible to obtain from witnesses and clerks might often be all that they required, o n the other, recommending that the precedents set by the select c o n - mittee on telephone services and the select committee on house of coiiinions (rebuilding) in appointing special expert o r scientific advisers should be followed as an experiment, and that the House should pass an order p n t i n g the coinmittee a similar power. T h e coinmittee bold as it undoubtedly was, did concede that the order would need to be renewed every session, though if the experiment was successful the power might be incorporated in standing orders. In spite of the fact that the committee expected any demand for the appointment ofexperts to orig+iate in sub-committees, i t cautiously recommended that the power to make appointments should not be extended in the sessional order to those committees.””

The proposal gained approval from the procedure committee four months later which also noted the conclusions of the nationalized industries committee’s special report o f 1959. T h e procedure committee accepted the evidence of the chairman of the estimates committee that there was never any question ‘of Committees of the House setting themselves up as rival technical experts to Government Ikpartnients’, and that ‘there would be n o obstacle to the payment of professional fees to technical advisers, were the power to employ them on a temporary basis granted’. Accordingly, they rec- ommended that the new select committee they envisaged would be developed from the estimates committee should have the power to employ temporary technical and scientific assistance..

T h e probleni for the executive of dealing with the appointment of expert assistance was postponed by the referral of the matter to the new house o f commons’ services committee by the leader of the House, Herbert Bowde11.”~ Notwithstanding this delay, the cornmittee reporting in early 1966 could ‘find n o reason why permission should be withheld’. It suggested that persons employed as specialist assistants either to act as expert assessors or . .)r the purpose of undertaking particular tasks for select c ~ n i i n i t t e e ~ should be entitled to attend meetings of the committee when invited to d o so, whether it was meeting to take evidence or deliberate. T h e comriiittee considered that the appointees would not have the power to vote or examine witnesses and the l-louse would have to be invited to pass a specific motion so empowering a committee before it could avail itself of such a facility. T h e committee further suggested, chiming with the report from the estimates committee, that in future sessions consideration might be given ‘to the desirability of including this power in the order of reference of select committees likely to require

T h e estimates committee was empowered in February 1960 ‘to appoint persons with technical or scientific knowledge for the purpose of particular enquiries, either to

37

’ I ’ Estimates committee, Fqth Spetiul Report, 7tnrporary 7 d i t i i t a l or SCietit(fic ,4ssisrutire Jir

’’ Procedure committee, Fourth Report, p. ix. ’” Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., DCCXVIII, cols. 185-0. 27 Oct. 1965. ”’ Select committee on house of commons (services), First Report. HC 70, 1965-0. p. 4 .

Sub-Committers. H C 161., 1964-65, pp. 3-4.

Specialist Advice to Select Committee! 179

supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee’s order ~freference’.~’ Up until the end ofthe 1967-8 session it only appointed two experts, an academic for its inquiry into government statistical ser- vices, and a chartered accountant for its inquiry into the public building programme. Partington argued that in light ofthis the estimates committee’s original suggestion that standing order 80, which contained its basic order ofreference, be amended to include the power to appoint expert advisers should be taken up.4’ Though this did not occur, the wording of the empowerment was, with slight variations, to form the basis for future committee empowerment.

The select committee on nationalized industries followed suit in March 1967, obtaining the power ‘to appoint persons with specialist kr~owledge’.~~ Also during the 1966-7 session, the Commons appointed a select committee on the parliamentary commissioner for administration, which was given the assistance of the newly appointed parliamentary commissioner to examine his reports and any connected matters. 43

The procedure committee’s report of 1965 formed the basis for the later ‘Crossman’ reforms that introduced new ‘specialist’ select committees, to monitor the functioning of a specific government department or subject area.44 These new select committees were also to encounter problems appointing advisers. As Walkland related ‘none of the new specialist committees was given this power automatically, and each has had to make a case for The difficulties experienced can be viewed as part of a wider gulf between the legislature and executive. In the debate about parliamentary competence in the field of science, for example, one of the preoccupations discerned by Walkland was ‘the helplessness of Parliament in the face of growing executive expertise and secrecy, particularly in those fields of “closed” politics in which government decisions are taken as a result ofexpert advice, to which Parliament has no access’. The impotence ofthe legislature in its relationship with the executive engendered by the latter’s exper- tise and power was a cross-party issue which was in the early 1960s a key factor in the agitation for parliamentary reform.46

The select committee on science and technology in its first report of 1966-7 was concerned about its inability to appoint advi~ers,~’ and had to reiterate its concern in its fourth report ofApril 1967 before the power was conferred.48 In one respect the delay was unsurprising, as in its memorandum to the procedure committee, the parliamentary and scientific committee did not recommend that a proposed select committee on

40 CJ., CCXXI, 83. ‘I Michael Partington. ‘Parliamentary Committees: Recent Developicents’, Parliamentary Af i i rs .

XXIlI (1970), 368-9. 42 CJ.. CCXXII, 379. 43 Enkine May, ed. Gordon, p. 727.

Gavin Drewry, ‘The Ouig’der and House of Commons Reform: Some Evidence fiom the

S. A. Walkland, ‘Committees in the British House of Commons’, in Committees in Legislatures. A

S. A. Walkland, ‘Parliament and Science since 1945’. in The Commons in Transition, ed. A. H.

Crossman Diaries’, Parlicl.:;enfary AJairs, XXXI (1978). 424-35.

Comparative Analysis, ed. John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw (1979), p. 264.

Hanson and Bernard Crick (1970), p. 153. 47 Select committee on science and technology, First Report, HC 330, 1966-7. * Select committee on science and technology. Fourth Report, HC 447, 1966-7.

180 Peter]. Laugharne

science should have such as~is tance.~~ Walkland was of the view that the committee’s failure to recommend such a power for the proposed committee was explicable only on the grounds that the proposal represented a compromise between radical and conserva- tive members.50 Without the unequivocal support of an influential committee the government probably felt an additional justification for refusing such power. Once empowered, the science and technology committee appointed Professor D. D. Eley for their report on coastal pollution and two advisers each for their inquiries into defence research and carbon fibres.”

Though the science and technology committee was to be retained until the reforms of 1979, the select committee on agriculture announced contemporaneously in December 1966 met its demise substantialiy earlier in February 1969. The agriculture committee was less successful in its pursuit of expert advisers, being denied such assis- tance throughout its first session. I t was only given ‘power to appoint persons with expert knowledge’ in the February of 1968, a year before its own ter~ninat ion.~~ The committee managed to appoint four experts in all, three assisting for only one meeting each,53 and proved to be a particularly painful thorn in the government’s side over the European Economic Community.

Committee staffing problems were not confined to the appointment of expert advisers. Some select committees were suffering from a shortage of clerks, a view expressed by the clerk of the house of commons,54 and admitted as much by Crossman himself.55 Other committees experienced difficulties over appointing advisers such as the select committee on education and science which (probably mindful of the experiences of its fellow committees) stated in a report during its first year that ‘we would not wish . . . to employ specialist assistance without good reason and we recommend that when a Committee is next appointed it should be gwen power at the same time to . . . employ specialist as~istance’.~~ The committee, when reappointed for the session 1968-69 was however denied this power and only after reiterating their request in the first special report of 1968-69,’’ were they finally granted the ‘power to appoint persons with technical k n ~ w l e d g e ’ . ~ ~

By this time it had become the norm for select committees to appoint specialist advis- ers, though they still had to make a request after establishment. The select committee on Scottish affairs was authorized to appoint advisers soon after its creation,59 and accord- ing to Myers they ‘proved to be of great value’, performing three principal functions.

49 Procedure committee, Fourth Report, pp. 143-4. 51’ S. A. Walkland. ‘Science and Parliament: The Role of the Select Committees of the House of

5’ Partington. ‘Parliamentary Committees’, p. 369.

53 Partington, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, p. 369. 54 See the report on the request for additional committee clerks &om the clerk of the house of

55 Hansard. Commons Debs, 5th ser., DCCXLV, col. 605, 19 Apr. 1967. 56 Select committee on education and science, Third Report, HC 317. 1967-8, cited in Partington.

s7 Select committee on education and science, First Special Report, HC 20, 1968-9, c;ted in

5R CJ., CCXXIV, 86. 59 lbid.. p. 220.

Commons’, Parliamentary Afiin, XVIII (1965), 277.

52 C.J.. CCXXIII, 95.

commons. Sir Bamett Cocks, in Apnl 1967, in The Economist, 29 Jun. 1968, pp. 43-4.

‘Parliamentary Committees’, p. 368.

Partington, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, p. 368.

Specialist Advice to Select Committees 181

Firstly, they aided the committee in assessing the significance of evidence presented by witnesses. Secondly, they assisted the chairman by suggesting lines of inquiry and possi- ble questions to witnesses. Finally, they also helped in the drafting of the committee’s report.6o The advisers therefore acted in a similar manner to those of the post-1979 era, with their assistance being of some import. The race relations and immigration com- mittee was also empowered6’ and even the procedure committee itselfwas granted the power6’ and made use ofmemoranda submitted by its specialist adviserJ. H. Robertson in its report on the scrutiny of public expenditure and admini~tration.~~

An analysis of the perceptions of committee members regarding expert commit- tee assistance at that time is provided by Oram. Of members surveyed, 86 per cent thought that it was important for select committees to have the help of expert advis- ers of the type already being used by some of the committees, with only eight per cent d i~agree ing .~~ In response to the more radical question, ‘Do you think it would be practical for specialist committees to appoint expert advisers on a FULL-TIME basis?’ (original emphasis), 27 per cent of committee members replied ‘Yes, in many cases’; a further 56 per cent replied ‘Yes, in some cases’; with only 13 per cent reply- ing ‘No, never’.65 Of those who had been members of committees that had already appointed advisers though, 59 per cent were content that their committee had appointed expert advisers sufficiently often, with only 18 per cent being of the oppo- site view.66 Finally, in reply to the question, ‘How valuable do you think the advisers appointed to your committee have been?’ (put to the same sample as the latter), 57 per cent responded ‘Very useful’; 29 per cent replied ‘Sometimes useful’; with not a single committee member surveyed being of the view that they were ‘Of no value’.67 Patently, advisers had made a marked and favourable impression, which is consistent with the fervour with which the committees pursued their case for the power to appoint them in the first instance.

As a corollary of the report of the procedure committee 1968-9,68 and the 1970 Conservative government’s Green Paper on Select Committees,” the estimates com- mittee was in 1971 superseded by the expenditure committee. The new arrival made the most extensive use of advisers to date. That is not to say that either the concept of strengthened select committees or the notion of expert advisers went unopposed. Emi- nent members from both sides of the House such as Michael Foot, Enoch Powell and

P. Myers, ‘Theselect Committee on Scottish Affairs’, Parliamentary AJairs, XXVII (1974). 369. 61 C J . , CCXXVI. 467. 62 C J . , CCXXIV. 69. 63 Select committee on procedure, First Report, HC 410, 1968-9. 6* Edwin Oram, ‘Investigative Committees in the 1966 House of Commons: The Effects of an

Experiment in Parliamentary Reform upon the House of Commons, the Political Parties, the Execu- tive and the Public’, University ofStrathclyde Ph.D., 1974, Table A 28, p. 456. A questionnaire was sent to 201 committee members (M.P.s who for at least part ofa session during the years 1959-70 had been members ofat least one ofthe investigative committees). A response was received from 142 M.P.s some 71 per cent of those surveyed.

65 Ibid., Table A 29, p. 456. Ibid., Table A 30, p. 456. This question was not applicable to 52 ofthe 142 committee members,

therefore the sample is reduced to 90. 67 Ibid., Table A 31, p. 456. Reduced sample as for above.

6y Cmnd. 4507, Select Committees of the House ./ Commons, 1970. Procedure committee, First Report, 1968-9.

182 Peter]. Luughame

John Mendelson7’ argued the case against the removal ofbusiness from the floor of the chamber to the committees ‘upstairs’. Powell was also hostile to ‘committee bureau- cracy’, or committee staK7’ and even amongst post-1979 select committee chairmen the use of specialist advisers has continued to be an issue of ~ o n t e n t i o n . ~ ~

It was suggested that the debate on staffing and other aspects of select committees in part reflected the uncertainty in the minds ofcommittee members and others over what exactly the role of the select committees was and/or should be. Whether what was required was not the provision of extra staff or advisers but rather a fundamental alter- ation of the settlement between government and parliament in favour of the latter.73 The balance of the executiveAegislature power relationship was considered to be of strategic importance by both those seeking intra-, and those seeking extra- parliamentary reform. This was not lost on the executive, which in attempting to preserve its ascendancy avoided fundamental change and only sanctioned minimal reforms as placative measures.

The expenditure committee was divided into six sub-committees - defence and external affairs; environment and home ofice; social services and employment; educa- tion and arts; trade and industry; and general - each of which at one time or another utilized specialist advisers for inquiries, with the greatest use in the period to 1977 being made by the general and trade and industry sub-committees and the least by social services and e m p l ~ y m e n t . ~ ~

The assiduity with which some specialist advisers set about their duties is recorded in contemporary accounts. Ofparticular note was an adviser to the general sub-committee, Wynne Godley, of the department of applied economics at Cambridge and a former treasury civil servant. According to Byrne the sub-committee was heavily reliant on his guidance and he worked continuously for it throughout the period to 1976. So much so that ‘the Reports gave an impression of a dialogue between Mr. Godley and the Trea- sury, with the sub-committee struggling rather breathlessly to keep up’.75 Similarly, for Arthur Silkin M.P. on one occasion the committee’s ‘conclusions were very largely based on the calculations of Mr. Godley; the Treasury team - the only witnesses who were asked to give evidence - being confronted with Mr. Godley’s rival figures, the basis ofwhich was not always clear to them’.76 It was then not only committee members who were sometimes taken aback by a specialist adviser and the quality ofthe work provided. However the high intellectual and specialised nature of Godley’s analysis was not

7‘1 See for example, John Mendelson, ‘The Chamber as the Centre of Parliamentary Scrutiny’, in The Growth ofParliamentary Scrutiny b y Committee, ed. Alfred Moms (Oxford, 1970), pp. 109-23, esp. p. 113.

71 Procedure committee, Fourth Report, 1964-5. p. 88. 72 See for example John Golding. ‘The Chairman’s View’, in 7 h e Commons Select Committees.

73 See Study of Parliament Group, ‘Specialist Select Committees: The Experience of a Decade’,

74 Ann Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending. The Expenditure Committee ojthe House ofcommons,

75 Paul Bvme, ‘The Expendlture Committee: A Preliminan, Assessment’, Parliamentary Afairs,

CatalystsJor Progress, ed. Dermot J. T. Englefield (Harlow, 1984). p. 32.

Political and Economic Planning, XLll (1976), 13.

(1978). pp. 171-2. . -

XXVIl (197’4), 277. 76 Arthur Silkm. ‘The Expenditure Committee: A New Development?’ Public Administration, LIIl

(1975), 52

Specialist Advice to Select Committees 183

without its pitfalls. Again for Byrne the committee’s ‘ “technical” Reports have been highly sophisticated and, as such, have attracted little or no attention tiom lay-men MPs in the House’.77 This situation did not go unnoticed by Fleet Street commentators, as Peter Jay explicitly put it:

Despite - perhaps even partly because of - the highly sophisticated work of the House’s Expenditure Committee, it has at times been difficult for the ordinary member to decide whether he is to treat this occasion [a debate on a White Paper] as a prime opportunity to express his gut political feelings about national priorities or whether, instead, it is a private ritual to be celebrated only by economic specialists.”

The general sub-committee was unusual in that it did enjoy an exceptionally large degree of unofficial assistance. As Robinson observed ‘Although only one person, Wynne Godley or Terry Ward, has been the designated and paid specialist adviser at any one time, teams of workers have contributed to the analysis of the economy produced by the Cambridge department as background papers and memoranda.’ Thus for Rob- inson ‘In its links with Cambridge the sub-committee has acquired a staff of sorts through the back door’.79 She also identified a potential problem. The utilization of outside bodies to provide an independent critique posed a danger in that they might transcend their role as mere suppliers of information to members and conduct a lofty dialogue with a government department. Echoing Byme, she related ‘Certainly some of the material produced by the Cambridge Department of Applied Economics is of such sophistication that it is clearly aimed not at the General sub-committee but at the Treasury.’*’ Notwithstanding that, the committee avoided the charge of being partial or narrow minded by appointing a range of advisers tiom a variety of institutions, such as for its inquiry into the civil service.”

Other sub-committees also made full if less spectacular use of advisers. The mode of utilization was variable both between committees and within them for different inqui- ries. The specialist advisers to the environment and home office sub-committee produced independent analysis of the matter under scrutiny and provided papers that were published with the committee’s minutes of evidence in much the same way as Godley’s team at Cambridge had furnished papers for the general sub-committee. They also provided assistance and advice in sifting and interpreting information supplied by witnesses in a similar fashion to the manner in which the specialist adviser to the defence and external affairs sub-committee, Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, operated.” The defence committee enjoyed the additional services of accountants fiom the comptroller and auditor general’s d e p a r t ~ n e n t . ~ ~ According to Hyder the committee was ‘a success- ful working partnership between committee members and staff, and developed ‘a

TI Byme, ‘Expenditure Committee’, p. 278. 7he Times, 7 Feb. 1973, quoted in Ibid., p. 280.

79 Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending, p. 106. Ibid., p. 107. See Expenditure committee, Eleventh Report, The Civil Service, H.C. 5354, 11, 111, Session

Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending, pp. 112-13. 1976-7.

sj See Masood Hyder, ‘Parliament and Defence a i r s : The Defence Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee’, Public Administration, LV (1977), 76.

184 Peter]. Laugharne

satisfactory “adversary relationship” with the Ministry of Defence, its chief object of ~crutiny’.’~ The education and arts sub-committee appointed one adviser for its inquiry into postgraduate education in session 1973-4, and two for its inquiry into policy mak- ing in the department of education and science.*’ However, the social services and employment sub-committee worked without advisers until 1977, when Rudolf Klein assisted on a study of parts of the public expenditure white paper.R6 Conversely, the trade and industry sub-committee was according to Robinson ‘well served by specialist advisers, such as Garel Rhys of University College, Cardiff, who have prepared for it many long analytical papers on the economics of the motor vehicle indust~j’ .~’

During the 1970s ad hor select committees also enjoyed the services of specialist advisers such as the select committee on wealth tax which instructed Professor J. R. M. Willis, a former deputy chairman of the inland revenue, to assist it in session 1974-5.’* I t was the expenditure committee though which made by far the greatest use of specialist advisers of any select committee.

The unsystematic nature and breadth ofselect committee activity and specifically that of the expenditure committee, contributed to an announcement in the 1975-6 session by the leader of the House, Edward Short, that a substantial review of parliamentary procedure and practice would be c o n d ~ c t e d . ~ ~ This was generally welcomed, though Short’s pronouncements during the ensuing debate concerning the need to accelerate legislative procedures did make several members wary of his motives.g0 A select com- mittee on procedure was established in June 1976 to conduct a review and reported some two years later in July 1978.”

The procedure committee recommended the abolition of the majority of existing select committees, proposinga new structure founded upon subject areas within the pur- view of a single or groups of government departments. Moreover, it advocated the establishment ofa system of 12 select committees whose powers would include, inter aha, the ability to engage more permanent and specialist staff and to appoint specialist advisers as and when they chose.

The concept ofdepartmental select committees was favoured by a study group ofthe national executive committee of the Labour Party chaired by Eric Heffer M.P. How- ever it rejected the notion of ‘consensus government by all-party committees’. Select committees were perceived as pluralist vehicles for dispersing power within the legisla- ture and to political parties at large. Consequently, the investigatory committees would ‘be staffed and advised by specialists and on party political lines’.’’ This was a significant

M Ibid., p. 62. RS Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending. p. 112. Hh Ibid., p. 113. 87 Ibid., p. 115.

Ann Robinson and Cedric Sandford, T a x Policy-Making in the United Kingdom. A Study o j

See Priscilla Baines. ‘History and Rationale ofthe 1979 Reforms’, in The New Select Committees.

Ibid. See also W. A. Proctor ‘The House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure,

Rationalify, Ideology and Politics (1983). p. 173.

A Study $the 1979 Refrms, ed. Gavin Drewry (2nd edn., Oxford, 1989). p. 26.

1976-79’, The Table, XLVII (1979). q1 Select committee on procedure, Firsf Report, HC 588-1. 1977-8. y2 David Judge, ‘Considerations on Reform’, in The Politics ojParliamenrary Reform, ed. David Judge

(1983), p. 192.

Specialist Advice to Select Committees 185

departure from the prevailing method of operation and would have substituted an adversarial model akin to that which exists on the floor of the House. However, that was not to be the case. The Labour government fell in March 1979 before the leader of the House, Michael Foot could place any proposals for reform before the Commons.

Post- 1979 Systematization

Notwithstanding the change in government, a new system ofdepartmental select com- mittees was established as a consequence of the new Conservative administration’s partial acceptance of the recommendations of the procedure committee. This was announced in June 1979 by the incoming leader of the House, Norman St John-S teva~ .~~ In debate, the views of members differed on the staffing levels appropri- ate for the new committees, though most recognised the need to appoint sufficient, but not excessive numbers. Committees required support services and expert advice but this should not extend to the provision of a counter-bureaucracy: particular reference being made to the avoidance ofanything resembling the United States The 12 select committees originally proposed were supplemented by the Scottish and Welsh affairs committees after the outcomes of the devolution referendums. Under standing order 99(5b) all 14 ofthe departmental select committees - agriculture; defence; educa- tion, science and arts; employment; energy; environment; foreign affairs; home affairs; industry and trade; Scottish affairs; social services; transport; treasury and civil service; and Welsh affairs - were able to enjoy to a varying extent the services ofspecialist advis- ers. Moreover, the foreign affairs, home affairs and treasury and civil service committees were also allowed to appoint specialist advisers to their respective sub-committees.

Some of the specialist advisers who had served the sub-committees of the expendi- ture committee were to provide an invaluable source of continuity when they were reappointed to advise the new departmental select committees. The fact that when these new committees were created their authority to appoint specialist advisers was enshrined in their standing orders, emphasises the degree to which specialist advisers had become an established part of the systematized framework of select committees. It was a far cry from the position just 15 years earlier when neither the estimates commit- tee nor the nationalized industries committee were allowed even the power to appoint advisers. Since 1979 the departmental system itself has evolved, mirroring the changes to the machinery of central government that it shadows.

The departmental committees have been far from the only select committees entitled to appoint specialist advisers in the post-1979 era. Indeed the number ofselect commit- tees authorized by their standing orders to appoint specialist advisers has proliferated to such an extent that even ardent proponents of the view that advisers are essential to effective committee operation could be forgiven for having reservations about the requirement of some committees for such assistance. This would certainly seem to be the case as far as the select committee on house of commons (services) refreshment

93 Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., CMLXIX, cols. 33-6. 25 June 1979. See also ‘House of Commons-Select Committees’, The Whitley Bulletin, LXlX (1979). 144.

q4 Hansard, Commons Debs, 5th ser., CMLXIX, cols. 215-16, 25 June 1979.

186 Peter J . Laugharne

department sub-committee is concerned, which is empowered under standing order 103(1 l).95 A sub-committee which the parent committee may appoint on computers to

join with any sub-committee appointed by the Lords select committee on house oflords offices is also empowered to appoint specialist advisers under standing order 103( 1 2) .96

More orthodoxly, in the Commons the authority has been extended to the select committee on the parliamentary commissioner for administration which can under standing order 100(2b) appoint specialist advisers in addition to the services which it receives from the parliamentary commi~sioner.~' The select committee on European legislation under standing order 105(4), and the select committee on sound broad- casting under standing order 106(5) are also invested with the authority to appoint specialist advisers.98 In the upper House, the science and technology committee regularly exercises its prerogative, as does the European Communities ~ o m m i t t e e . ~ ~

Members value the contribution of advisers, though opinions still differ in relation to the optimum level of adviser deployment.'00 To a certain extent this is reflected in the wide variation in utilization of specialist advice by committees. For example in session 3994-5, a total of 132 specialist advisers were used by select committees in the Com- mons."' Sixteen of the then 17 departmental select committees utilised advisers for their inquiries, the exception being the select committee on national heritage. The home affairs and employment committees used only one apiece, but the environment and health committees were less sparing, and engaged 17 and 18 advisers respectively. Of the non-departmental select committees in the Commons, the accommodation and works, information, and broadcasting committees, used one each with the latter also being assisted by the supervisor of parliamentary broadcasting.

In the same session, there were equally wide variations in expenditure on fees and expenses for advisers, who are remunerated on a per diem basis on a scale equivalent to a real or notional academic rank (lecturer, senior lecturerjreader, professor). This ranged in the case of the departmental committees from L131 .OO in respect of defence (seven advisers), to L29,092.77 for health (18 ad~isers).'~' It should be noted that not all advisers claim fees or expenses; for many the kudos derived fiom association with what are fiequently dubbed in the media as 'influential' legislative committees more than suffices.

Conclusion

The assistance at the disposal of select committees of the contemporary house of com- mons is a world away from the position a century and a half ago. A number of conclusions can be drawn fiom the evolution of specialist advice.

95 Erskine May, ed. Gordon, p. 1130. 96 lbid., pp. 1130-1. 97 lbid., pp. 1128-9. 98 lbid., pp. 1133-4. * lbid., p. 653. IM Michael A. Jogeat, Reform in the House 4Commons. 7he Select Committee System (Lexington, KY,

1993). pp. 199-200. I"' House of Commons, Sessional Returns 1994-95, House, Committees oj'rhe Whole House, Standing

Committees and Select Committees, HC 132, 1995-6. This figure includes one adviser who served the treasury and civil service committee sub-committee.

IU2 lbid.

Specialist Advice to Select Committees 187

Paralleling the enlargement of government activity in the nineteenth century, the increasingly complex and technical nature of the matters that were delegated to select committees engendered the appointment of external professionals from 1848. Several of the host committees dealt with financial matters. This set the future trend whereby those committees that are concerned with economic, commercial or financial affairs have tended to make copious use of expert advisers. The nineteenth century also wit- nessed the establishment of the ofice and department of the comptroller and auditor general, which fiequently became the model for requests by select committees for expert assistance.

The early part of the period fiom 1920 to 1964 saw the piecemeal introduction of the modern form of adviser to a few ad hoc select committees. These, what now may be regarded as experiments, were by all accounts successful and demands were increasingly made for the power to appoint expert assistance to be extended to sessional committees. In spite of this, the executive was to deny that power even amidst ever more vocal calls for improved facilities and assistance for select committees fiom reformers, both within and without parliament.

The era of change from the mid-1960s onwards produced a gamut of procedural reforms that included giving sessional select committees the power to appoint expert assistance. This period produced an expansion and consolidation of expert advisers as actors in the select committee framework. The right of select committees to appoint such assistance was hard fought for, and only begrudgingly granted by an executive anxious to retain its pre-eminence in legislative affairs.

In the 1970s the practice of appointing specialist advisers was expanded and entrenched in the sub-committees of the expenditure committee, and the other select committees that continued from the 1960s. that did not have to endure the vicissitudes of their predecessors. This presaged the post-1 979 systematization where the power to appoint specialist advisers is enshrined in the standing orders of the departmental and several other select committees, and there has been further growth in adviser utilisation.

There has been a progressive ifat times somewhat staccato evolution in the provision of expert assistance to select committees. As well as not always being smooth, the appointment of expert assistance has not gone unquestioned or unopposed, both by members who elevate the floor ofthe House to an ascendant position, ensuring the sub- ordination of other organs, and by the executive which has exhibited at times implacable hostility towards the introduction and extension of expert committee assis- tance. What is patently transparent, is that with an increasing amount of complex, technical and specialized duties being delegated to select committees, the appointment of specialist assistance, once precipitated, would inexorably evolve to a position today that satisfies the majority ofcommittee members and enables them to expedite commit- tee responsibilities without detracting from their other important obligations. In the twentieth century, for good or bad, the cult of the expert has pervaded an increasingly professionalized parliament no less than other social, economic and political institutions of the British polity.