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Government in America:People,Politics,and Policy, Brief Ninth Edition, Study Edition, by George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, and Robert L. Lineberry.Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc.

The Federal Bureaucracy

POLITICS IN A CT ION: RECULATING FOOD America ns do not want to

worry about the safety of the food we cat. Indeed, food safety is something we take for granted. BLlt who assures this safety? Bureaucrats. It is their job to keep OllT food safe from con tamination. Although we rarely th ink about food inspections, they represent one of the most important regulatory fune· lions of govemment.'11c fact that we rarely think about food safety is testi· mony to the success of burea Llcrats in carryi ng out their tasks,'

Poli cing th e food supply is not a straightforward task, however. It involves a complex web of federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. 1welve agencies and 35 statutes regulate food safety. Eggs in the shell fall under the purview of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but once cracked and processed, they come und er the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Chapter Outline

The Bureaucrats

How Bureaucracies Are Organized

Bureaucracies as Implementors

Bureaucracies as Regulators

Understanding Bureaucracies

Summary

411


422 Chapter 13 The Federal Bureaucracv

Department or Agriculture (USDA). The USDA is responsible for regulating meat and poultry, while the FDA handles most other rood products, including searood and produce. Cheese pizzas arc the FDA's responsibility, but irthey have pepperoni on top, Agriculture inspectors step in .

Other parts of the government also playa prominent role in enrorcing rood sarety laws. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency oversees pesticides applied to crops, the Cente~ ror Disease Control and Prevention track food-related illnesses, and the Departmenl or Homeland Security coordinates agencies' safety and security activities.

Is this complex system the result or bureaucratic mlllleuvering? No, Congress c.reated th e system layer on top of layer, with little regard to how it shou ld work as a whole. Critics argue that the sys l'em is outdated and that it would be better to create a siogle food safcty agency that could target inspections, strea mline safcty programs, and use resources more efficiently. Such proposals have genera ted little en thusiasm in Congress. however, where committees:ne sensitive about losing jurisdiction over agencie~. For exa mple, in the House, the Energy .md Commerce Committee has oversight over th e FDA, while the Agriculture Committee has responsibility for the

You Are a Federal USDA. Growers and manufacturers fear a single agency would impose onerous Administrator new regula tions, prod uct recalls, and fin es- and could be used by empire

building burea ucra ts to expand their budget and regulatory .authority. So little change occurs.

Bureaucra ts face other challenges in insuring safe food.lne FDA has only about 430 inspectors to keep tabs on more than 53,000 establishments that produce, process, Qr store food olher than meat and poultry. The agency carries out al>oLlI 5,OOO inspections per yea r, so the average company is subjecl lo an FDA inspection just once every 10 }·ears.

Bureaucrats arc central to our lives. They provide essential publiC services. TIley possess crucial information and expertise that make them partners with the president and Congress in decision making about public poli cy. Wh o knows marc than bureaucra ts about Social Security recipients or the military capabili ties of China? Bureaucrats are also cen tral to pol itics. They do much more than simply follow orders. Because of their expertise~ bureaucrats inevitably have discretion in carrying out policy decisions, which is why congressional committees and interest groups: lake so much interest in what they do.

Bureaucra tic power extends to every comer of An~crican economic and social life, yet bureaucracies are scarcely hinted at in the Constitution. Congress creates each bureaucratic agency, sets its budget, and writes th e policies it administers. Most agencies are responsible to Ihe president, whose constitutional responsibility to "lake care that the laws shall be faithfully executed" sheds only a dim light on the problems of managing so large a government. How to manage and control bureaucracies is a central problem of democratic government.

Reining in the power ofbureaucTdcies is also a common theme in debates over the scope of government in America. Some political commentators see the bureaucmcyas the prime example of a federal government growing out of control. Th ey view the bureaucracy as acquisitive, consta ntly seeking to expa nd its size, budgets, and authority while being entwined in red tape and spewing forth senseless regulations. Others see the bureaucracy as laboring valiantly against great odds to fulfill the missions elected


officials have assigned it. Where docs the truth lie? The ,llIswer is less obvious than you may think. Clearly, bureaucracies require closer examination.

The German sociologist Max Weber adva nced his classic conception of bureauc racy. stressing that the bureaucracy was a "rational" way fo r a modem society to conduct its business."2Accordi ng to Weber, a burea ucracy depends on certain elements: It has a hierarchic(ll authority 8truchm~, in which power flows from the top down and responsibil ity flows from lhe bottolll up; it uses task specialization 50 that expem instead of amateurs perform tech nica l jobs; and it develops extensive rules, wh ich may seem extreme at times but which allow similar cases to be handled similarly inste<ld of capriciously.

Bureaucracies operate on the merit principle, in which entrance and promotion are awarded on Ule basis of demonstrated abilities ra ther than on "who YOll know." Bureaucracies behave WiUl impersonality so that they treat alliheir clients impartially. Weber's classic prototype of the bureaucratic organization depicts the bu reaucracy as a well-organized machine with plenty of working but hierarchica l parts.

The Bureaucrats Bureaucrats arc typica lly ml Lch less visible thun the president or members of Congress. As a result, Americans tlsua l1y know li ttle about them. ' n lis section examines some myths about bureaucrats and explains who tJley are and how they got thei r jobs.

Some Bureaucratic Myths and Realities Bureaucrat b<liting is a popular American Ih1stime. G corge W<lllace. former Al<1bam<l governor and frequen t presidential hopeful, warmed up his crowds with a line about "pointy-headed Wash ington bureaucrats who can't even park their bicycles straight." Even successful presidential candidates climbed aboard the antibureaucrncy bandwagon. Jimmy Carter complained about America's "complicated and confused and overlapping and wastefu l" bmeaucracies, Gerald Ford complained about the "dead weight" of bureaucrJcies, and Ronald Reagan insisted that bureaucrats "overregulated" the American economy. causing a decli ne in productivity.

Any object of such unpopularity will spawn plenty of myths. The following are some of the most prevalent myths about bureaucracy:

• Amer icans dislike bureaucrats. Despite the· rh etoric abou t burea ucra cies, Americans li re generally satisfied with bmeaucrats and the trcabnen! they gel from them. Americans may dislike bureaucracies. but they like individual bureaucrats. Surveys have fonnd that two-thirds or more of those who have had encounters with a bureaucrat eva luate these encoun ters positively. In most ins tance~. people describe burcaucrtlts as helpFul, effi cien t, fair, courteous, and working to serve their cl ients' interests.}

• Bureaucrncies are growing bigger each year. Th is myth is ha lf true and half fal se. TIle number of governmen t employees has been expanding but not the number of federal employees. Almost all the growth in U1C number of public employees has occurred in state and local governmen ts. The 19 million state

The Bureaucrats 423

bureaucracy According to MaK Weber, a hiel"llrchicaliluthorily struet re

that U.eli tas.i!; ~pcci~ li7.atj0l1.,

opc'flItes 0 11 the merit prineir.Ie, mId behaves with impersonality. BurcaucllIcies govern modern $tales


424 Chapter 13 The Federal Bureaucracy

Bur~aucrats are the scapegoats of Aterican politics, Paperwo", and ed tape represent the ima e of bureaucracy to many Americans. Yet no society can operate without bureaucracy, and ~osl people are satisfied with their encounters with bureaucrats.

Th, Changing

Face of the Federal

Bureaucracy

•

•

and local public employees far oUhlllmber the il Pproximately 4.1 million civilian and military federal govemment employees (see Figure 13. 1). As a percentage of America's tota l workforce, federal government employment has been shrinking. not growing; it now accounts for about 3 percent of all civilian jobs.

Of course, many state and local employees work on programs t.hat are fede rally funded, and the federa l government hires many private contractors to provide goods and services ranging from hot meals to weapons systems." Such people provide services directly to the federal government or to citizens on its behalf. At the same time, private contractors generally lack the discretionary authority of federal empio),ccs, and high-level officials have less authority over state and local officials and private companies than they do over federal employees. Most federal bureaucrats \\-"Qrk in Washington, D.C. Only about 12 percent of federa l civilian employees work in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. California leads the nation in federal employees, with 245,000. Texas has 166,000 and New York 133,000. About 93,000 federal civilian employees work in foreign counlries and American territories.s You can see where federal bureaucrats work by looking in your local phone book under "U.S. Covemlllent." You will probably find listings for the local offices of the postal service, the Social Security Administration, the FB I, the Department of Agriculture'S county agents, recruiters for the armed services, air traffic controllers, the Internal Revenue Service (1 RS), and many others. Bureaucracies a re ineffective, ineffic ient, and ~ll ways mired in red tape, No words describing bureaucratic behavior are bette r known than "red tape."6 Bureaucracy, however, is si mply a way of organizing people to perform work. Ceneral Motors, a college or un iversity, the U.S. Army, the Department of


The Bureaucrats 425

Figure!3.! Growth in Civilian Government Emplovees

The number of government employees has grown since 1965. The real growth, however, has been in the stale and local sector with its millions support

of leachers, police officers, and other service deliverers. Many state and local employees and programs, though, are

'" z g ~

~

~ r z ~

~ 9 ~

I: ~

z ~ ;; 0

ed by federal grants-in-aid. (Note that the figures for federal employment do not include military personnel.)

21

20 SLlte and Loa!

• '''''''' -

!6

14

" f ~

, 6

• 2

0 1965 '71 '73 '75 77 '79 '81 '83 '85 'ff7 '89 '91

YEAR

'93 '95 "fl '99

Source: Budget ofth, Ullited St.t" Govel'Tlflllmt, Fisc" Yelr lOOT: Historic.1 T,bJufWeshington. OC: U.S. Government Primiog Office. 20061. table 11.S.

Health and I-Iuman Services, and the Rom,1Jl Catholic Church are all bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are a little like referees: When they work well, no one gives them much credit, but when they work poorly, everyone calls them unfair, incompetcnt, or inefficient. Burea ucracies may be inefficient at times, but no one has found a substitutc for them, and no one has yet demonstrated that governrnent burea ucracies are more or less inefficient, ineffective, or mired in red tape than private bureaucraciesJ

Anyone who looks with disdain on American bureaucracies should conternplate life without them. Despite all the complaini ng about bureaucracies, the vast majority of lasks carried out by governments at all levels are noncont roversial. Bureaucrats deliver mail, test milk, issue Social Security and student loan checks, run national parks, and perform other routine governmental tasks in ,I perfectly acceptable manner. Most of the people who work fo r cities, slates, and the national govemment are typical Americans, the type who are likely to be your neighbors.

'0'

• ,



Table 13.1 Federal Civilian Employment

EXECUTIVE. DEPARTMENTS

Defense (mililary fullC\ion.~) Veter.ms Affairs Homeland Security Treasury Justice Agriculture Interior Health ;lnd Human Services Transportation Commerce State Lobo< Energy Housing and Urhan Deve\opmcnL Education

lARGER NONCABrNET ACENCIES

U.S. Postal Service Social Security Administration Corps of Engineers National Aeronautics and Space Administration Environmental Protection Agency Tennessee Valley Authority General Services Admin.istration

'Figures are for 2006.

NUMBER OF El\'IPLOYEES"

666.700 122.8{)() 146,600 t 12,500 J 18,500 100,100 70,200 61,300 55,400 37,400 30,300 16,800 15.700 9,800 4,300

732,348 64,000 22,900 18,600 17,400 12,700 12,200

Sou~: Budg,-! or thll UniterfStotl1i Cowrmmrul,. /liscn/ YeDr 2007: Analytical Perspective. (WaJhington. DC: U.S. C()\lcnlll1enl Printing Office, 20(6), tables 2'1.1 Hnd 24.3.

Most federa l civilian employees work for just a few of tile agencies (see Table l3.l ). The Department of Defense (000 ) employs about one-fourth of federal civilian worker:; in addition to the more than 1.4 million men and women in unifonn. Altogether, the DOD makes up more than half the federal bureaucracy. The Postal Service accounts for an additiona l 30 percent of Ihe federal civilian employees, and the DepMtment of Veterans Affuirs, clearly related to national defense, has nearly 223,000 employees. All other functions of government, including homeland securi ty, afe handled by the remaining quarter of federa l employees.

Who They Are and How They Got There Because there arc more than 2.6 million civilian bureaucrats, it is hard to ilmlgine a statistically typical bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are male and female, all rnces and religions. well paid and not so well paid. Like other insti tutions. the federa l govemrnent


Figure 13.2 Characteristics of Feder.1 Civilian Employees'

AVERAGE AGE

47 Years

~ IIOt IOOude j>()\I.aI won:ers.

EDUCATION

41% CoUl'8e

graduates

~ndudes AfrIan ArnerIc2ru,"""" Am .. rlc.IlU. NJ~ AI!'o!fIa<ll, Md Hispinla.

GENDER

45% Female 55%

"",

Sourcll:Oata from United States Office of Personnel Management, Thfl Faetboo/(, 2005IWashington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 20061, 1G-13.

has been under pressure to expand its hiring of women and minorities. Congress has ordered federal agencies to make special efforts to recruit and promote previously disadvantaged groups, but women and non-Whites still cluster at the lower ranks. As a whole, however, the pennanent bureaucracy is more broadly representative of the American people than are legislators, judges, or presidential appointees in the executive bnl11ch8 (see Figure 13.2).

The diversity of bureaucratic iobs mirrors the diversity of private-sector jobs, including occupations literally ranging from A to Z. Accountants, bakers, census analysts, defense procurement specialists, e lectricians, foreign service officers, guards in federal prisons, home economists, Indian Affairs agents, judges, kitchen workers, la'N)'ers, missile technologists, narcotics agents, ophthalmologists, postal carriers, quarantine specialists, radiologists, stenographers, truck drivers, underwater demolition experts, virologists, wardens, X-ray technicians, youth counselors, and zoologists all work for the government (see Table 13.2).

Civil Service: From Patronage to Protection. Until roughly 100 yea rs ago, a person got a job with the government through the patronage system. Patronage is a hiring and promotion system based on political reasons rather than on merit or competence. Working in a congressional campaign, making large donations, and having th e right con nections helped people secure jobs with the government. Nineteenth-century presidents staffed the government with their friends and allies, following the view of Andrew Jackson that ~to the victors belong the spoils." Scores of office seekers wou ld swann the While House after Inauguration Day. It is said that duri ng a bollt with malaria, Lincoln told an aide to "send in the office seekers'" because he finally had something to give them.

A disappointed office seeker named Charles Guiteau helped end this "spoils system" of federal appoilltrnents in 1881. Frustrated because President lames A. Garfield

The Bureaucrats 427

RACE

31% Mlnorttles·

Who Wants to Be a Bureaucrat?

patronage

69% White

Ont orthe key inducements used bypotitical machines. A p.,tronagt job, promotion, or CO!l\l';1ct is olle that is g;\'en for pltitical rtaSOl1S r~thtr than for mcrit or competence atone.

The Merit System


428 Chapter 13 The Federal Bureaucra cy

Pe I dleton Civil Ser iee Act Pa~sedhllS8l.i!ni\cttl"ll

cr~~ed a fedeml civilscn'ice su thatlhirillg amI promtHion ""(l\Ild be: ~scd UII merit mther thllll p;ln'onage.

civ I service 1\ kill of hilil!!; and pmmotian

~n the merit ptincillic and

~lle i~ to ClCOltC a nonpartisan gOl mment service.

me it principle '11\ idell that hiring $hould be.-;

11.:1 ot1eutI1UICCe'kllllf~OO

p otiou mtings to produce ~dn inistmriou by people wilh tillc It and skill.

He ch Act 1\ fctJer;lllaw prohibitllig

~n!m(,I.'t.e'n~IO):es f,0,1I1 aChl'e parllcl]);lhon 11\ partll;i1)

]loli iC$,

Table13,2 Full-Time Civilian While-Collar Employees of the Federal Government

SEI.ECJ""ED OCCUPA'H ONAL CKI""ECORIES NUMB fo:R OF EMPLOYEES

Cetler:J1 administrative, clerical, :lIId office service; Medical, hrupit31, dental, and pnblic he<lJth Engineering and architecture Accounting and budgcl Investigation Business and Industry LCg:J1 and kindred Social scic l1ce, psychology, and welfare Biological sciences TI'.lnsportation Penonnel mlmOigement and industrial relations PhysiC'JI sciences Educalion Supply InfOffilation and thc arls Mathematics and statidics Equipment, facilities, and services Quality aSSUfilllce, inspection, und grading LibrMY and archives Copyright. p<ltent, and trademark Veterinary medical science

363,95~

139,132 123,183 II S,369 93,897 87,292 86,3n 67,496 58,779 45,864 40,673 33,470 32,632 3),272 18,197 13,624 12, 164 10,028 8,045 3,864 2,088

Source: U.S. Officc of Personnel Managemcnt, Occu(I<Jlionl of Federal Whitll-Collar and Blue~lI<Jr Workers, f<vdl!ral CM/io/J WOTk{Orc~ SMisticr, asofSllplember 30, 1999 (Washingkln, DC: U.S. C~rnment Printing OIHcc, 2000), t~ble W.2.

wou ld nol give him 9 iob, Cuileau shot and killed Carfield. ' 11e so-called Pri nce of Patronage himsclf, Vice President Chester A. Arthur, then bcc<l1l1e president. Arthur, who had becn collector of th e customs for New Yo rk-u putronagc·rich postsurprised h is critics by cncoumging passage of the Pendleto n C ivil Service Act ( 1883), which created the federal civil service. To<klY; most federal agencies arc coy· ere<! by sollie sort of civil service system.

All civi l service systems are designeclto hire and promote members of the bureaucracy on thc basis of mcrit and to c reate a nOll pa rtisan government service, The merit principle-using e ntrance exams ;Ind promotion ratings to rewa rd qualified individuals- is intended to produce an administration of people with talent and skill. Creating a nonpartiS<111 civil service llleans insu lat ing govemmcnt workers fr0111 the risk ofl:)Cing fired when a new party comes to power. AI the same ti me, the Hatc h Act, origi nally passecl ill 1939 and a mended most reccntly in 1993, prohibits civi l service cl11ployees from actively pa rticipating in partisan politics while 011 duty. \Vh ile off ditty they may engage in political activities, but they cannot run for p;ntisan elective offices or solicit contributions from the public. Employees with sensi tive positions, 5uch as those in the nationa l sccurity area, Illay 1101 engage in political activities even \Vh ilc off dUly,


,11e O rfice o f Personnel Management (OPM) is in charge of hiring for most fcderal agencies. The president appoints its director, who is eon finned by the Senatc. ' 11C OPM has elaborate rules abou t hiring. promotion, working conditions, and firing. To get a civil service job, usually candida tes must first tilke " test. If they pass, Ihdr names are sent to agencies when jobs requiring their pa rticu lar skills become aV'dilablc. Fo r each position open, the OPM wi ll send three names to th e agency. Except undcr unusual circumstanccs, th e agency must hi re onc of UtesI' three individuals. (This process is called the "rul e oflhree.") Eac h job is assigned;} CS (Cener.:!1 Sc hedule) rating rangi ng from CS I to CS 18. Salarics are keyed 10 rating and e"-llerience. You can see how lIIany people are e mployed in each rating and their average salaries in Table l3.l

AI the ve ry top of the civil service system are about 9,000 members o f th e Senio r Executive Service, the "crealll of the crop" of the federal employees. These executives earn high salaries, and the president may move them from one agency to another as leadersh ip needs change.

O nce hired , and after a probationary period, the civil service syste m protec ts civil servants -overprotects them, critics claim. EnsllTing;J nonpartisan civil service requires that workers have protcction fro m dismissals Ulat are polilically motlV"dled. Protecti ng al l workers against political firin gs may also protect a few from dismissal for good cause. Firing incompetents is hard work. and is UlllIStial. According to civil service regulations, e mployees must exhaust their right of appeal before the governmenl call stop their paychecks. Appeals can conSli me weeks, months. or even years. More than one agency has decided to tolerate incompetents, assigning thcm trivial or no duties, rather than invest its resources ill the nea rly hopeless task of disc harging

Table 13,3 GS Employment and Salaries

CENmtAL SCIIi!:DULE CRADE

I 2 3

• , 6 7 8 9

10

" 12 13

" "

NUMlmR OF EMPLOYEES

270 955

8,445 45,327

100,984 81,255

130,828 51.413

123,437 16,975

180.333 207,566 174,575 80.105 41,845

AVERACESALARY

$18,081 2U,%3 23,960 27.3 1): 31,412 35,666 W,n? 44,77 1 47,601 53,493 57,555 69,'55 83,672 99,285

11 9,134

Source: u.s. Office of Peoonnei M:lIlagel1!cnt, I'a)' Slrudull! oflhl! Fed,ral Ci~i1 Smict QS ofMu~h 3/, 2001 (Washington, DC: ll.S. Governmellt Prill tmg Office, 2005), (~hl e 4.

The Bureaucrats 429

Office of Personnel Management " 'e officc in charge: of biril~ for most agencies of the (edera gO\lenmlcnt, using cl;looral ndes in lire prI)CCSlI.

GS (General Schedule)

rating I 1\ schedule fOr federal employees, mllsi llg from G~ I 10 CS 18, by whieh salaries can be keyed 10 flIti lig lind cxpcriclrc.

Senior Executive se~'c. 1111 etitc c;,drc of HOOul 9. fedcr~ 1 gOI'Cftlll1 cn( 11I~l1ag ,

e&l.abli$hcd II)" the Civil Service Rcform Act of 1978, who ar " 'oMl)· calcer off'lCiab but include wine political appointr!el who do Ollt Il'qll re SClUlIe confirmntion.



obtain positions in <hJ: ,,,',,,' bureaucracy

a merit system are protected against

their jobs because political views. If i

substantial perof bureaucrats, it

that they would be responsive to the

but also likely I be less

to serve the pubtoday's

them. Firing incompetent fe male, minori ty, or older workers may be even more difficult than dislodging incompetent young or middle-aged White males. T hese grou ps not only have the uSlial civil service protections but also can resort to antidiscrimination st<l tutes to appeal thei r di smi~ ls . After a protracted battle, Congress agreed to President George W. Bush's proposal to limit job protection for employees in the Department of Homeland Security.

The Other Route to Federal Jobs: Recruiting from the Plum Book. As an incoming administration celebrates its victory and prepares to take control of the government, Congress publishes the plum book, which lists top federal jobs (that is, "plums") available for direct presidential appointment, often with Senate conflmlation. rn lere are about 500 of these top poli cymaking posts (mostly cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs) and about 2,500 lesser positions.

All incomi ng presidents launch a nationwide talent sea rch fo r qualified personnel. Presidents seek individuals who combine executive talent. political skills, and sympathy for policy pos itions similar 10 those of the administration. Often, the president tries to incl ude men and women, Whiles and non-Whites, people from different regions, and party mem bers who represent different interests (although fe w recent presidents have appointed as high a percentage of middle-Hged White males as did Ronald Reagan). Some positions, especially ambassadorships, go to large campaign contributors. A few of these appointees will be civil servants, temporarily elevated to a "politica!"' status; most, though, wi ll be political appointees, "in-andou lers" who stay for a while and then leave.9

Once in office, these administrative policymakers consti tute what Hugh Hecla has ca lled a "government of stra ngers." Their most imports nl trait is their transience. The average assistant secreta ry or undersecretary las ts less than two years.IO

Few top officials stay long enough to know their own subordinates well , much less people in other agencies. Admin istrative routines, budget cycles, and lega l complex ities are often new to them. To these new political executives, the possibilities of power may seem endless. Nevertheless, although plum book appointees may have the outward signs of power, many of them find it challenging to exercise real control over much of whal their subordinates do and have difficulty leaving their Illark on policy. They soon learn that they are dependent on senior civil servants who know more, have been there longer, and will outlast them.

How Bureaucracies Are Organized A complete organizational cha rt of the American federal government would be big enough to occupy a large wall. You could pore over this chart, trace the lines of responsibil ity and authori ty, and see how government is organ.ized-at least on paper. A very simplified organizational chart of the executive branch appears in Figure 13.3. A mllch easier way to look at how the federal executive branch is organized is to group agencies into four basic types: cabi net departments, independent regulatory commissions, government corporations, and independent execI,tive agencies.


How Bureaucracies Are Organized 431

Figure 13.3 Organization of the Executive Branch

II -~'-' .- -- I

Dtpartment ~nment Department or .... of tl)(> TI'NSUI)' of Defense

I I • I

Department of [)epJrtment of Department Department the Interior Agriculture of Commerce of labor

I , 1 Departmem

""""""'" of Housing and of Health OepiIrtment Department

U""" and HUINJl of Energy of EdUCltlon DevElopment Services

I [)ep.Jrtmeflt of

Veterans AIf;{irs

I

Department

"" .. of J

""" rtment of pomllon Tr.ms

Departmen of Hornela

"",""

INDEPENDENT ESTABlISHMENTS AND GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

African Development foundOltion BroodGSling Board of Governors Ctntralintellilleoce "seney Commodity Futures Trading Commission Consumer Product Safety Commission CorporatiOn for National and

Community Service Defense NucIelr FacUlties Safety BoiIrd Environmental l'rot«tiOfl AIleflC)' Equal Employment Opportunity

Commls.slon Export-Import Bank of the United States Farm Credit Administration Federal Communications Commission Federal Deposit Insur.mct Corporation Feder.l! Election Commission federal H0u9JlI ANnee 8o.ard Federal Llbor Relations Authority Feder.lll Muitlme Commission Federal Mediation lnd Condlliltlon Servia f«iel';ll Mine Sarety and Health Review

Commission

Federal Resel""Yt> System Feder.ri Rerlrement Thrift Investment Bolrd Feder.lt Tr.K!e Commission Genel';ll Services Admlnistr.llfon Inter-American foundation Merit Systems Protection Board NatlONI Aeronlut\cs ,md S~

Admlnlsmtlon National Archives .. nd R«Ords

Adminismtion Natlorlll Capital Plannlna Commission NJtlorlll Credit Union Admlnlsmtlon National foundation on the Arts and

Humanities Natlorul Labor Relations Board Natlon.ll Mediation Board N~tIonill R..lilruad Passenaer Corpor.uiOn

[Amtr.lk) Natlorll[ Sdence Foundation National Transportation Safety Boord NlKiear Reguliltory Commission OccuPJtlonill Sarety and Health Review

Commission

OffIce of the Director of National Intf'illgence

Office of Government Ethics Office of Personnel Management Office of SpecIal Counsel Overse.u Pt1Vo1te In\o1:'!MlT1ent

Corpor.ltiOn

""'''''''' PensIon Benefit Gwr.mty Corpor;atlon /'osQI Rate Commission R..lllroad Retirement Board Securfties and Exchange Commission Selectl~ Service System Small Business Administration SocIal Security Admlnlstr.ltlon Tennessee Valley AutOOrtty Trac:ft and DM!opment Agency U5.AaelKY lOr Intematlorlll

Development U.S. Commission on 0vI1 R.lghts U5.lnternatlonal Trade Commission U.s. Postal Servke

Soure,:Offiee olthe rederal Reoister, United $t/ltes G01I,mrn,nt Milr/ua/ ~2001(Washingllll1, DC: U.S. G0V9mmanl Printing Office, 2006), 21.


432 Chapter 13 The federal Bureaucracy

regulatory the ReseNe Board,

~t::~~i~~;~1~be~some-the I' . Thei. makes

CI",n,,,th.," other agenIt also provides the

not the

• view and act-

in the public interest

regulatory

I agent)' for $Ome: sector of

11 ,making and ., niles to prole<:1 Ihco

i interest II ~Jso itld~s i It h

go\·crnmenl ;'Klependent

agency.

The Cabinet Departments Each of the 15 cabinet depa rlments is headed by a secretary (except the Department of Justice, which is headed by the attorney genera l) chosen by the president and tlpproved by the Senate. Undersecretaries, deputy undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries report to the secretary. Each department manages specific policy areas (sec the list in Table 12.3, p.1ge 387), and each has its own budget and its OWl 1 st<lff.

Each department has a unique mission and is organized somewhal differently. The real work of a departmcnt is done in the bureaus, which divide the work into more specialize<l areas (a bureau is sometimes called a service, office, administratioll, or other n<l 111e).

Until the 1970s, the largest cabinet clepnTtment in persoll1lei and budget was the Dep'1.mnent ofOcfense. From thell until 1995. the Deparhllentofl-lealtll and Human Services (HHS) was the largest federal depa rtment in dollars spent (although the Department of Defense still had more employees). 111e Social Sccurity Administration spl it from I-II-1S and becal ne an independent agency in 1995, spending one-third of tile. federa l budget on tile massive programs of Social Security and Medic-d.re.

Sometimes slahlS as a cllbinet deparhllcnl can be controversial. For several years, Republ icans tried to disband the Depa rtments of Education, Energy. and Commerce, arguing that they wasted tax dollars and implemented policies thai should be terminated.

The Regulatory Commissions Each indepcnden t regulatory commission has responsibility for some sector of tile econom y, lll<1king and enforcing ru les designed to protect th e public interest. The independent regulatory cOJllmissions also judge disputes over th ese mles. ll Some also ca ll them the alphabet soup of American govemmen t because most such agencies are known in Washington by their initials. Some examples follow:

• FRB (l ite Federal Resen'e Board), charged with governing banks and, even more important, regu lating the supply of money and thus interest rates

• NLRB (the National Labor Relation! Board), crealed to regu late labormanagement relations

• FCC (the Federal Com munications Com mission). charged with licensing radio and l V stations and regulating tlleir programming ill the public interest as well as with regulating interstate long-distance telephone rales, cable television, and the Internet

• FTC (the Federal Trade Commission), responsible for regulating business practices and con trolling monopolistic behavior and now involved in policing the accuracy of advertising

• SEC (the Securities and ExchalJge Commission), created to pol ice the stock market

Each of these independent regulatory commissions is governed by a small COlO

mission, usually with 5 to 10 members appoi nted by the president and confirmed by the Senate for fixed tenns. 111e president cannot fire regulatory commission members 11 ~ eas ily as he C,m cabinet officers and members of the White House staff. The


Supreme Court determined this mle after President Franklin Roosevelt fired a man named Humph rey from the f<1'c. Humphrey took the matter to court but died shortly afterward. The angry executors of his estate sued for back pay, and the Court held that presidents could not fire members of regulatory agencies without just came (Humphrey's Executor v. United Silltes, 1935). "Just cause" has never been defined clearly, and no member of a regulatory com mission has been fired since.

Interest groups consider tJ,C ru le making by independent regulatory commissions (and, of course, their membership) very important. The FCC can deny a Imllti·million·dollar TV station a license renewal-a power that certainly sparks the interest of the National Association of Broadcasters. The FTC regulates business practices-a power that prompts both business and consu mers to pay careful attention to its activities and membership.

Interest groups are so concerned with these regulatory booies that some critics point to the "captmc" of the regulators by the regulatecs. 1Z It is common for members of commissions to be recmited from the ranks of the regulated. Sometimes, too, members of commissions or staffs of these agencies move on to jobs in the very industries they were regulat. ing. Some lawyers among them usc contacts and infonnation gleaned at the agency when they represent clients before their fonne r employers at lhe agency. A lalcr section of this chapter discusses the bmeuucracy's relationship with interest groups.

How Bureaucracies Are Organized 433

The Government Corporations an important ii"""""""""",, "'''>Iv' overseeing the administration of all

TIle federal government also has a handful of government corporil- mental legis lation. Here, EPAw""""""1 tions. 'nlese are not exactly like private corporations in which YOll hazardous waste. can buy stock and coll ect dividends, but they are like private corporations-and differen t from other parts of the government-in two ways. First, government they provide a service that could be hand led by the private sector. Second, they typica lly cha rge for their services, though often at rates cheaper than those the consumer would P.1y to a private-seclor producer.

The granddaddy of the government corporations is the Tennessee Valley Authority (1VA). Established in 1933 as part of the New Deal, it has controlled floods, improved nllVigation, protected the soil against erosion, and provided inexpensive electricity to millions of Americans in Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, and neighboring stales. 11nollgh COinsat-a modem.(]ay government corporation that sells time-sharing on

, i · husine5!l oorpor:l!ioru.

provides a stI'Yicc I provided by Ihe

and typically chargc$ 5Crvices. 'nle U.S. Pmla! is all e):3mpll'. Compare independelll I·

NASA satel lites-yoll can rent time on a sp::lce satellite for radio cOlllmunications. 111e executi l'l!: ~gcncy. post office, one of the original cabinet departments (first headed by Benjamin Franklin), has become the government's largest corporation: the U.S. Postal Service.

Occasiona lly the government has taken over a "sick industry" and turned it into a government corporation. Amtrak, the railroad passenger service, is one exam ple. Congress gmmbles about Amtrak's Illulti·hillion.(]ollar subsidy (although some critics point out that billions of dollars in federal high .... 'ay funds also constitute someth ing of



a subsidy for the auto industry), but members of Congress have only reluctantly agreed to let Amtrak shed irs most unprofitable runs.

The Independent Executive Agencies indtn>endent executive

ag.~, cy TIle vemment not accounted for b cabinet dep:1rtments, indo: ndenl regulatory commu,iOI1$, and gO\'emmenl co~ratiOlu. Its administrnton

The independent executive agencies are essentially all the rest of the governmentnot cabinet departments, not independent regulatory commissions, and not government corporations. TIleir administrators typically are appointed by the president and serve at his will . The 45 to 50 of such bureaus are listed in the current issue of the United Stales Covemmenl Manual. A few of the biggest independent executive agencies (in size of budget) are the following:

are bylhe ; .1

• General SeIVices Administration (GSA), the govemment's landlord, which handles buildings, supplies, amI purchasing

. NASA • National Science Foundation (NS F), the agency supporting scientific research I. • National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the agency that takes

Americans to the moon and points beyond

A Career in Foreign Service

this current age of globalization. a career in foreign

::t~'~:;~'i?~;~3 rewarding and exciting experience for who wi~h to fulfill their civic duties. the word "bllre;ll1cracy" generally has a negative

~~~:5'::~;:~i;~';i;i'~,":,,~<o~:,~,g~h bureaucratic organizations-i service-that a great deal of policy is Most college graduates inler-

foreign service apply to either the State or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

train their members to be "area on a given region's political culture,

, and politics. Due 10 its global nllture, reach, changing environment, the foreign ser

in need of qualified applicants from diverse

~~~:7.~~:;~:,~W~':·:'h:n~':h':~C:hr',n[:'::':~'O;6'~:~rk on olle of 250 I wilhin a bureau-service is anything but mundallel

'I"'"'' Difference McGehee worked for the CIA from 1952 to 1977.

completing his initial training, McGehee spent fl',rt,,,nyears workillg in variolls field stations around

the world. I -Iowe~-er, after leaving the organization. he became an outspoken critic of some of its practices. In 1983 11e released Deadly Deceit: My 25 Years ill the CIA-a book that outlilles his experiences wilh the CIA abroad alld al home. McGehee also developed CIABASE, a computer database of CIA figures and programs compiled from available public infonnatiOIl. It provides a vital, easy-to-use resource fo r policymakers, academicians, jOllmaiists, and students.

What you can do: • Finish college. Most fo reign service organizations

requi re that you have a college degree, though it need not be in international relations or political science.

• Download and complete an application from either the State Department (http;lIcareers.state.goli/ gcnerallindex.htm/) or the CIA (http://www.cia.gov/ cmploymentlirzdcx.html).

• If needed, study and prepare to take a foreign service qualifying exam. Cener.dly, foreign service qualifying exnlllS are required for iooo with the State Departmcnl


Bureaucracies as Implementors 435

Bureaucracies as Implementors Bureaucracies arc essentially implementors of policy. llley take congressional, presidentia l, and sometimes even judicial pronouncements and develop procedures and rules for implementing policy goa ls. 1ney also manage the routines of government, fTom delivering mail to collecting taxes to training troops.

What Implementation Means Public policies are rarely self-execu ting. One of the few policies that administers itself is the president's decision to "recognize~ a foreign government. It is entirely the chief executi ve's preroga tive to do so, and, once it is done. diplomatic relations with the country are thereby established .

Mosl policies. however, are not self-executing. Congress typically announces the goals of a policy in broad temls, sets up an administrative apparatus, and leaves the bureaucracy the task of wo rking out th e details of th e program. in other words, the burca ucracy is left to implement the program. Pol icy implementation is the stage of policymaking between the establ ishment of a poli cy (such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulga tion of a regulatory rule) and the resul ts of the policy for individuals. \3 To paraphrase loosely a mmous line about war frolll German Ceneral Karl von Clauscwitz, "Implementation is the continuation of policymaking by other means."I" At a minimum, implementation includes three elements:

I. Creation of a new agency or assignment of a new responsibili ty to an old agency 2. Translation of policy goa ls into operational rules and development of guide

lines for the program 3. Coordination of resources and personneilo achieve the intended goab l5

Why the Best-Laid Plans Sometimes Flunk the Implementation Test The Scottish poet Robert BUllls once wrote, "'n le besllaid schemes 0' mice and men I Cang aft a-gley [often go awry)." So, too, with the best intended public policies. Pol icies that people expect to work often mil. In 1996, Congress overwhelmingly passed a bill to guarantee health insurance to millions of Americans whcn they change or lose their jobs or lose coverage. Yet the law has been ineffective because insurance companies often charge these individuals premiums fa r higher than standard mtes. 16 High expectations followed by dashed hopes are the frequent fa te of well-intended public policies..

Program Design. implcmentation can break down fo r several reasons. One is faulty program design . "It is impossible," said Eugene Bardach, "to implement well a policy or program that is defective in its basic theoretical conception." Consider, he suggested, Ihe fo llowing hypothetical example:

l{Congress IlIt'Te to establish ml IJb'<fflC}' charged with squaring the circle with compass and ~traigh' edge-a task mathumaticians have {oug agoshllwn i.~ im~ihlu-we could

policy implementation The slagt: of policymaki ng l between the estabJ ishment f a poliey and the eon5eCJUencf of

the poliey for the people w~'m it aifeeb;. ImpleLllenlatioll involVe! translating the goa and objcdi\ft$ of a poliey into a opt:rdling. ongoing progtlln .


Chapter 13 The federa' Bureaucracy

envision an aplllC)' coming into being, hiring" msl 'lUmber of rorzsuitants, commissioning sludies, reporting Ihal progress \.\1$ being made, ",hile allhe same time urging in their appro. pnations requesl for the oom;IIg rear that the umgress augmenl the agencys budget. 17

And the circle would remai n round.18

lack of Clarity. Congress is fond of stating a broad policy goal in legisla tion and then leaving implementation tip to the bureaucracies. Members of Congress ca n thus escape messy details and place blamc for the implementation decisions elsewhere (see "You ng People and Politics: Dmg Offenses and financial Aid").

Bureaucratic Reform

Such was the case with the controversial Title [X of the Education Act of 1972,19 which said, "No person in th e United States shall , 011 the basis of sex, be excl uded from participation in, be den ied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

Drug Offenses and Financial Aid , Congress wrote a provision into the law go\'eming

fip,,"'i'] aid for coUege students that prohibits students who been convicted of dmg offenses from receiving grants

loons from tile federnl gQ\~mment. It docs not matter

~!t;~:~I:i~I;i~~~ was relati\'Cly minor or whether the years ago- if ~ student has ever been offense as all adult, he or she can be

I oue year Itt life. depending on the of offenses and severi ty of conviction. Not surpris

. the law has been a maHer of contention. 11Iw itself might seem a bit severe, bill there is

Someone convicted of armed robbery. rape, or murder would not he in the same predicament. oul of prison, such a person is entitled to gO\"f:m

t gran Is and loans with no questions asked. But the I,IW, tens of thousands of would-be col lege stuh:lVc been denied finan cial aid because of drug

op'm"" even though the crimes may havc been com· long ago and the sentences already sen·ed.

Members of Congress ha\'c accused the Clinton and administrations of distorting the law's intent TIley that the Department of Education, which adminis

financia l aid programs, shou ld !lot be strict in its

~~~;~~~ of the law. 11le dcr~artlllent responds thai ~ wrote a \1ague law-one that refers to "'a student

been convicled~ -and that the dcparhllent is ~i;;'h,;iy illlplemenling the letter of the law. In effect.

tl lc d('partmeut is Hguing thai it has no discretion in the matter and cannot act on its own to make financial aid policy more just.

It miglll seem easy for Congress to simply ('hunge the law. No such luck. A bill to repeal the law is a long way from having enough support to come 10 a floor vole, IIlllch less 10 pass. The George W. Bush administration suggested ending the prohibition on aid for those who violated drug la\\'$ before entering college. However, it wants to continue the aid ban for those who commit such crimC$ while enrolled in college. lis goal. lhe adminislmtion said. is 10 discollrage students from using drugs. "11c problem. as others see it , is that such a rule wOlild still impose stiffer penalties for dntg use than for any other crime. It would al'lO have the effect of barring somc fimt· lime, minor offenders from getting fimmcial ~id while restoring it for more serious drug lawbreakers.

Anticipating implementation problems is difficult. Putting together couli liOi lS within Congress i~ also difficult. One consequence of Ihese difficulties is thatlaw$ are often \IlIgue-and often have unintended consequences as well.

Questions for Discussion • I-Iow much discretion should a bureaucratic IInit

have to correct injustices in laW$? • Why do yOIl thin!.; it is so difficult for Congress to

anticipate problems implemeutillg 11Iws?


under any educa ti on program or activity receiving federal financ ial assista nce." Because al Ulosl every college and l1l1iversity receives some federal financial assistance, al most all were thereby forbidden to discriminate on the basis of gender. Interest groups supporting women's ath letics convinced Congress to include a provision about college alhletics as well. 11ms, Section 844 reads,

The S£cretarr of(Heal/h, Education, and Welfare then. today Education} shall prepare and publish . .. propo!ed regula/ionr implemenlillg the prolIisions of Tille IX . .. relating 10 prohibilion of sex discrimillatiOIl ill fll!derally assisted education programs which ~ha ll include with respect to illiarcollegiale athletic actil'ilies reasonable provisions considering the nalure of the particlilar sporb.

Just what does this section mean? Proponents of women's alhlet· ics though I it meant that discrimination against women's sports was also prohibited. Some, with good reason , looked forward to seeing women's sports 011 an equ;]1 fooling with me11's. One member of the HOIlse--Senatc Conference Committee proposed language specifically exempting "revenue-prod ucing athletics" (meaning men's football :lIld basketball) from the prohibition. The com mittee retected this suggestion, but (0 colleges ;]l1d universi ties with big.timc athletic pro-grams and 10 some alumni, the v<lgue Secl"ioll 844 ca!ted for equali ty in golf and swim ming, not men's football and basketball programs, which cou ld con linue to have the lion's share of athletic budgets.

HEW's interpretation of the 100 or so words of Section 844 of Ti tl e [X, announced in December 1978, numbered 30 pages. The


unclear laws. Wilen Congress decided to Ilibit gender discrimination in I for example, it left to bureaucrats ating guidertnes Ihat would end j

while addressing the diverse needs sports. I esttlblisll the law's meaning.

interpret;] I ion recognized that football was "unique" among college ~porls. If footb;][l was unique. then the interpretation implied (but did not directly say) thai male-dominnted footb;]]] programs could con l·inue to outspend women's alhletic programs.

Supporlers of equa l budgets for male and female athletics were outraged. A 10(}.word scclioll in a congressional shllute, which prompted a 30.page illierpretat ion by the bureaucracy, in tum prompted scores of court cases. The courts have had to rule 011 such matters as whether Tille [)( requ ires that exactly equivalent dollar amoun!! be spent all women's and men's athletics. Litigation continues to this day.

The complex case of implementing Title IX for intercollegiate athlctics contains an imporla nl lesson: Policy problems that Congress cannot resolve are not lil;ely to be easi ly resolved by bureaucracies.

Bureaucrats receive nol on ly unclear orders but also con tradictory ones. James Q. Wilson points out that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was supposecl 10 keep ou t illegal imm igrants but let in necessary agricultural workers, to carefully screen foreigners seeking to enter the COUHt:ry but fdcil itate the entry of foreign !ouris!!, and to find and expel illegal aliens but nol break lip families, impose hardships, violate civil rights, or deprive employers oflQ\v-paid workers. "No organi. zation can accomplish all of these goals well, especially when advocates of each have the powcr to mount newspaper ;]nc! congres~it'l1ia l investigations of the


Chapter 13 The Faderal Bureaucracy

Hurricane Katrina and

New Orlaans

agency's 'fai!ures .'''lO Similarly, Congress has ordered the National Park Service to preserve the environmental quality of national parks; it has also obliged it to keep the parks accessibl e to tourists at the same ti me. The forest Service is supposed to help ti mber companies exploi t the lumber potential in the national fore~ts and preserve the natur:ll environment.

Lack of Resources. As noted earlier, bureaucracies arc often perce.ived as bloated. 111e important issue, however, is not the size of the bureaucracy in the abstract but whethcr it is the appropriate size to do the job it has beCIl aSSigned to do. As big as a bureaucracy may seelll in the aggregate, it frequently lacks the staffalong wil h the necessary training, funding, supplies, and equipment-to carry out the tasks it has been assigned. Recently, for elGlmple, the news has been filled with complaints such as the following:

• U.S. troops in Iraq had iusufficient numbers of body armor and armored Humvees and trucks to protect them against roadside bombs.

• 'Tile Food and Drug Administmtion (FDA) lacks the personnel to evaluate the safety of gcneric dm~ that would lower the soaring cost of health care in the United States.

• Because of lack of funding. the popular Head Stnrt program serves only about half the children who are theoretically eligible to participate.

• The Immigration and Na tu ra li za tion Service (INS) lacked the personnel to track aliens who overstayed their visas or who engaged in suspiciolls activities such as taking flight training thal did not include takeoffi and landings. The INS also lacked the resources even to identify. much less deport, more Ulan 10 percent of the 200,000 convicted cri minal aliens in the United States. It even lacked the personnel to open leiters containing checks for application fees.

• In their inspections of facilitics handling and storing hazardOllS wastes, inadequa tely trained inspectors for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) overlooked more tllan half the serious violations. The computer system the EPA uses to track and control water pol lution is obsolete, full offaul tydala, and does not take into account thousands of significant pollution sources.

• 'TIle FBI lacks computers at its headquarters that allow it to search its own databasC$ for mllltipJe temlS such as "aviationn and "schools." II also has a serious shortage of translators for intercepted communications.

• National Guard Units have on ly a third oCthe equ ipment they need to respond to domestic disasters and terrorist attacks.

• The federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lacks lhe proper personnel and equipment to di rect the nation's air trnffic safely,

• The lack of fi nancing to maintain national parks may lead to permanent deterioration of such treasured American vacation spots as Yosemite and Yellowstone.

• The IRS lacks the appropria te computer systems to integrate the dozens of d<1tabascs that contain the information necessary to coll ect the more than $2 trillion in taxes that finance the federal govemmcnt.

• There is a shortage of epidemiologists who are trained to recognize and investigate the outbreak of infectious disease.



Agencies may also lack the authority necessary to meet their responsibilities, For example, many observers believe that the FDA lacks adequate powers 10 protect the public from dangerous drugs such as the sleeping pill Haki0l1 and the sedative Versed. Tile FDA does no testing of its 0\ ..... 1 and must rely entirely on the test resu lts submitted by manufacturers. Yel it lacks the subpoena power to obtain doclJ[nents when it suspects that drug companies are withholding data about adverse drug reactions or misrepresenting test results. It oAen lacks access 10 potentially damaging company documents that have been involved in private product-l iability cases. Similarly, the Deparhnent of Agricultu.re lacks authority to close meat processing plants -even ones with serious violations of food safety sta ndards.

Administrative Routine. For most bureaucrats, administration is a routine matter most of the time. They follow standard operating procedures, better known as SOPs, to help them make numerous everyday decisions. Standard rules save timc. If a Social Security caseworker had to invent a new rule for every potential client and then have it cleared at higher levels, few clients would be served. Thus, agencies write detailed manuals to cover as many particular si tuations as officials can anticipate. The regulations el aborating the Internal Revenue Code compose an IRS agent's bible. Similarly, a customs agent has binders filled with rules and regulations about what can and cannot be brought into the United States duty free.

SOPs also bring uniformity to complex organizations. Justice is better served when officia ls apply rules uniformly, as in the implementation of welfare policies that distribute benefits to the needy or in the lerying of fines for underpayment of taxes. Uniformity also makes personnel interchangeable. 111e anny, for example, can transfer soldiers to any spot in the world, and they can find out how 10 do their job by referring to the appropriate manual.

Routines are essential to bureaucracy. Yet they sometimes become frustrating to citizens, who temlthem "red tape" when they do not seem appropriate to a situation. SOPs then become obstacles to action. An October 1983 terrorist attack on their barracks outside Beirut, Lebanon, killed 241 Marines wh ile th ey slept. A presidential commission appoi nted to exa mine ~le causes of the tragedy concluded thai, among other factors contributing to the disaster, the Marines in the peacekeeping force were "not trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat."21 In other words, they had not altered their SOPs regarding security, which is basic to allY military unit, 10 meet the unique challenges of a terrorist attack.

The F'AA's protocols for hijackings assumed that the pi lot of a hijacked ai rcraft would notify an air traffic controller that there had been a hijacking, that the FAA could identify the plane, that there would be lime for the FAA and NORAD to address the issue, and that the hijae.king would nol·be a suicide. mission . As the 9/1 1 Commission put it, these SOPs were ~ unsllited in every respect" for the 9/11 terrorist hijackings.22

Sometimes an agency simply fails to establish routines that are necessary to complete its tasks. For example, in latc 1997, the General Accounting Agency fOllnd that the I'M failed to detennine whether the violations its inspectors uncovered at aircrafi repair stations were ever corrected. The FAA did not keep the proper paperwork for adequate follow-up activities,

Bureaucratic R~:,::,~t A case can be n

increasing the available to implement policies, it i possible that the of ,,,,,'om,," ,,,,feel would improve.

standard operating I procedures

Bcttcr known 3$ SOPs. tit proct:dures arc used by buruucl"Iils 10 bring unif< .ty 10 oomplex olg~f1i1~tiollf. Unifonnity improves mim and rn~kcs pcrsolrncl intcrcJlangcablc.



. d I;n;"",; •• d;",.';on nlhority of adminill!'lltil'c to :w'leci among \1Iriou$

1U to a given problem.

Di:w'fion is greatest " hen wnti, es, or 5tand~rd opernting

proc UTes. do nol fil a case.

..... L ... I bu'eaue,a" A ph l5C coined b)' Mich~d

Lip!k . referring to those llUre" Icrnts who arc;n conS\llllt

coni" with the publ ic ami h~ve

colui c!'llb1!' administrative

di.'IC' f ion.

Bure, ucrats typically apply thousands of pages 01 rules in the pt rformance of routine tasks

1 but many bureaucrats

espe~ially street·level bure~ucr8ts-must use

admi~.strative discretion as well. ese border patrol office S, shown arresting illegal immi rants on the U.S.-Mexican bord ,must decide whom they will s.arch carefully and wnom Ihey J..ill iet pass with a quick chec .

Administrators' Dispositions. Paradoxically, bureaucrats opcr<l te not on ly within the confi" es of routin es but often with considerable discretion to behave independently. Ad ministra tive d iscretion is the lluthority of administr<1tive <1ctors to select among various responses to a given problem. B Discretion is grea test when ru les do not fit a particular case, and th is is often the case-even in agencies with claborate rules and regulations.

Although the income tax code is massive and deta iled, the IRS wields vast discretion becausc of the complexity afthe U.S. economy and the multitude aftax situations it produces. Here are a few examples:24

• Congress and the IRS code say Ihat medical expenscs above a certain percentage of income are deductibl e, bu t how about the expenses of a vasectomy? ( rhe IRS sa id yes.)

• A girl who had been ordered to take strenuous exercise under the supervision of a doctor was enrolled by her father in $8,436 worth of ball et lessons. Was it deductible? (11le IRS sa id no.)

• Congress and the IRS code say that busi ness expenses are dedllctible, bu t can an airline flight <Ittend<l llj deduct lhe cosl of uniforms? n11C IRS said yes.}

• Are taxi exp enses incurred in visiting your stockbroker a deductible eXI>Cllse? Cl11e IRS said yes.)

Some adm in istrators exercise more disc retion th an others. Michael Lipsky coined the phrase street-level burea ucrats to refer to those bureaucrats who arc in constant contact with the publ ic (often a hostile one) and have considerable discre.tion; they include police officers, welfare workers, <Ind lower-court judgcs.2S No amount of ml es, not even the thousands of pages of IRS rules, will e liminate thc need for bu reaucratic discretion on some policies. The highway patrol officer who stops you can choose 10 issue you il w;lming or a ticket.


Bureeucracies 8S Implementors 441

Because bureaucrats will inevitably exercise discretion, it is importan t to undcrst:md how they use it. Ultimately. how they use discretion depends 00 their dispositions about the policies and rules they administer. Although bureaucrats may be indifferent to the i11lplementation of many policies, other policies may conflid with their views or their personal or organizational interests. When people are asked to execul"e orders with which they do not agree, slippage is likely to occur between policy dccisions and perfonnance. A great deal of mischief may occur as well.

On one occasion, President Nixon ordered Secrctary of Defense Melvin l.'lird to bomb a Palestine Liber<l ti on Organization hideaway, a mOlle LoIird opposed. According to the secreta ry, "We had bad weather for forty-eight hours. The Secretary of Defense can always find a reason not to do something."16 ' 111e president 's order was st:lllecl for days and eventually rescinded.

Controlling the exercise of discretion is j difficult task. It is IlQ! easy to fire burl"mlc.rat! in the civil service, and remolling appointed offi cials may be politically embarrassing to the president, especially if those officials IIslie strong support in Congress and among interest groups. In the private sector, leaders of org<lnizations provide illcentives sllch as pay raises to encourage employees to perform their tasks hI a certain way. In the public sector, howeller, special bonuscs lire rare, :l1ld pay raises tend to be small and across the board. Moreoller, there is not necessarily room at the top for qualified bureaucrats. Unlike a typical priYate business, a government agency cannot expand jlls! because il is pcrfornling a serllice effedivcly and efficiently.

In the absence of positive and negatille incentilles, the goveml1lent relies heavily 011 rules to limit the discretion of implementors. As former Vice President AI Core put it in a rcport issued by the National Perfom]<lllce Review,

Because we dO/I 't wallt politicians families, (rielld$, dlld supporters placed in "Ilo-show~ jobs, we ha~'e mort!' than 100,000 paget of ~rsonlJel roles alld regulations definillg in e1quisite detail how to hire, promote, or (ire fe<leral employee,. Because we don'tlllilllt employees or priwlle compnllies pro{iteen"lIg from (edl!rai contracl$, we creale procurement processes Ihlll require endless ~ignature5 lind long months to bu)' IIlmost oll)'lhillg. Because we don't want agencies using t(l.X dollaf! for an)' unopprcJ\.ro pu~ I4\l dictale preciltlly ho'll' IIl11ch they can .pelJd on fNtl)'lhing {rom telephones 10 Iravel.27

Often these nIles end up creating new obstacles to effective and effi cient governing. hov.'ever. A5 U.S. forces were slTeaming IO\vard the Persi<lll Gulf in the fil II of 1990 to iillCrdte Kuwa it from Iraq, the air force placed an emergency order for 6,000 Motorola commercial radio receivers. But Motorola refused to do business with lhe air force because of a govenunent reqllircrnellt that the COlnpany set lip separate :IccOllnting :md cost-conlTol systems to ml the order. The only way the U.S. Air force could acquire the much-needed receivers was for Japan to buy them and donate them to the United States! For un example of the imp..1c1 of rules affecting implementation of pol icy ill the war in IT'Jq, see '1s.sues of the 'li mes: "le Impact of Procurement Rules in Wartime."

Fragmentation. Sometimes responsi bility for a policy is dispersed among seYern l units withinlhe bureaucracy. 'n1e federal government has had as many as 96 agencies invoJllcd with the issue of nucl ear proliferation. Similarly, in th e fi eld of welfare, 10 different departments and agencies administer morc than 100 federal human services programs. '11e Department of Health and Human Services has responsibility



for basic welfare grants to the states to aid fa milies, the Deparbnent of I-lousing and Urban Development provides hOllsing assistance for the poor, the Department of Agriculture runs the food stamp program, and the Department of Labor administers training programs and provides assistance in obtaining employment.

'n ,e resources and authority necessary for the president to attack a problem com~ prehensiveiy are often distributed among many bureaucratic units. President George W. Bush's creation of the Office ofHornc1and Security in 200 I dramatically illustr.:ltes tIle challenge of diffusion of responsibi lity. TIle president ordered the office to coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to protect the Uni ted States from terrorist threats or attacks. T11is involved directi ng the counterterrorism efforts of 46 federa l agencies, encompassing much of the federal govemment. Of course, each of these agencies also reported to other officials for other purposes.

One piece of the puzzle of homeland security is securi ng OllT borders. Table 13.4 lists the agencies with responsibilities for border control in 2002. As you can see, at least 33 departments and agencies had responsibility for protecting America's borders, focusing on threats ranging from illegal immigrants and chemical toxins to missiles and electronic sabotage. It is difficult to coordinate so many clifferent agencies, espeCially when they Jack a history of trust and cooperation. Moreover, there are often physical obstacles to cooperation, such as the largely Illcomp..1l"ible computer systems of the INS and the Coast Guard . Once the borders have been breached and 3n attack has DCturred, many other offices get involved in homeland security, including hundreds of state and local agencies.

Ta~le 13.4 Departments and Agencies with Responsibility for Border Security in 2002

De rtmcllt of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Cen al LntelligenceAgency

DJ rtment of Commercc Crilica llnfraslmctureAssutance Office National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

De rtment of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency Inspector General National Guard National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency North American Aerospace Defense Command

De rtment of Energy [Office of Science and Technology Policy

EllYironmental Protection Agency IOffice orlntemational Activities

Dep rtment of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Dmg Enforcement Administration Federal Bureml oflnve~tiga t i(ln

Immigration and Naturalization Service Marshals Service Office or Special Investigations

Deparbnent of State Bureau or Consular Affairs BureDu of Intelligence and Research Bureau of Population. Refugees. and Migrntion Bureau for International NarcoliC!i and Law

Enforcement Agencies Passport Office

Postal Service

Department of Treasury CustOTilS Service Finunciai Crimes Enforct'1iJent Nehl/ork Intemal Revenue Service Office of the Inspector Cener.d Secret Service

Departlllent of Transportation Coast Guard F'ederal Avi~tion Administration federal Motor Carrier Administration Maritime Administration


Bureaucracies as Regulators 443

Fragmentation also allows some agencies to work at cross-purposes. For years, one agency supported tobacco farme rs while another discouraged smoki ng. One agency encouraged the redevelopment of inner ci ties while anothe r helped build highways making it easier for people to live in the suburbs. One agency he lped farme rs grow crops more efficiently whil e another paid them to produce less. As long as Congress refuses to make clea r decisions about priorities, bureaucrats will implement contradictory policies.

If fragmentation is a problem, why not reorganize the government? The answer lies in hyperplurnlism and the decentraliz.1tion of power. Congressional committees recognize that they wou ld lose jurisdiction over agencies if these agencies were merged with others. Interest groups (such as the nuclear power industry) do not want to give up the close relationships they have developed with "their" agencies. Agencies themselves do not want to be submerged within il broader bureaucratic unit. All these forces fight reorganization. and they usually win.Z8 President C linton's proposal to merge the Drug Enforcement Administration and the C usto ms Service met with immediate opposition frOIll the agencies and their congrcssion<l l allies. Purnuing the merger became too costly for the president, who had to focus on higher-priority issues.

evertheless, under the right conditions, reorganization is possible. In 2001, congressional Democrats proposed a new Department of Homeland Securi ty. In the summe r of 2002, President George W. Bush concluded that the only way to overcome the fragmentat ion of agencies i nvolved in prOVIding homeland security was to creale a new department., one thai combined m<ll1y of the agencies listed in Table 13.4. Congress created the new department at the e nd of 2002, the largest reorganization of the federal government in half a cen tury.

Bureaucracies as Regulators Covemmenl regulation is the use of governmental authority to control o r change SOme practice in the private seclor. Regulations by government pervade Americans' everyday lives ,lIld the dealings of businesses, uni ve rsities,ILOspi tal s-, and o ther institutions. Federal regulations now fill more than 200 volumes. Regu lation is the most controversial role of the bureaucracies, yet Congress gives bureaucrats broad mandates to regu late activities as diverse as intcrest rates, the location of nuclear power plants, and food additives.

Regulation in the Economv and in Everydav Life The notion that the American economy is largely a "free en terprise" system, unfettered by government intervention, is about as lip fo date as a Model T Ford. You can begin to understand th e sweeping scope of governmental regulation by examining how the automobile industry is regulated:

• The Securities and Exch<lnge Commission regulates buying and sell ing stock in an automobile corporation.

• Relations betwecn the workers and managers of the company come under the sCrL Ltiny oftfte National Labor Relations Board .

The Department of Homeland Security

regulation 'nH~: I~ of ~mnu:nt~t

outhority to control or challge: $Ollie pr~ctice in the: pdvwte sector. Regulations pclVlld~ the daily li\'e5 of pe<lIlle: and institutions.



Mostgvernment regulation is clearl in the public interest. For e ample, the U.S. DePR

I enl of Agriculture is

charged with regulating the Quali~ of meat products, a task it wai given after novelist UPto~ Sinciair exposed the meat'packaging industry's unsa tary conditions at the turn 0 the cenwry.

• The Department of Labor and the E(lu al Employment Opportunity Commiss ion mandate affirmative action in hiring workers in automobile production plants because automakers are major government contractors.

• The EPA, th e National Highway Traffic Safety Admini stration, and the Department of Transportation require pollution-control, energy·saving, and safety devices.

• Unfair advertising and deceptive consumer pmctices in ma rketing cars corne under the watchfi..l eye of the FTC.

A Full Day of Regulation. Eve ryday life itself is the slIbject of bureilucrati c regulation. Almost all bureaucratic agencies-not merely the ones callcd independent regulatory commissions-are in the regulatory business. Consider a typical factory worker (we'll name him John Smith) who works in the city of C hicago and lives with his wife, Joan Smith, and their three young children in suburban Mount Prospect, Illinois. Federal regulations affect John's life both at work and at home. At 5:30 A.M. he is awakened by his clock radio, which is set to a country musi c station licensed to operate by th e FCC. For breakfast he has ce real , which has passed inspection by the FDA, as has the lunch Joan p.1cks for him. The processed meat in his sa ndwich is packed under the supervision of the Food Safety and Quality Service of the U.s. Department of Agriculture.

John takes the train to work and buys a qu ick cup of coffee before the jOlJr

ney. The FDA has warned that the ca ffeine in his coffee has caused birth defects in laboratory animals, and there is disc ussion in Washington about rcgul:Jting it. After paying his fare (regulated by the state governm ent), he hops abOMd and shortly arri ves at work, a small firm that makes refr igeration equipment for the food industry.



At home, Joan Smith is prepari l"tg breakfast for the chilclren. Thc price of thc milk she serves is affected by the dairy price su pports regulated by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conscrvation Service. As the children play, she takes note of the toys they use, wanting to avoicl ally that could be cla ngerotls. A Washington agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, also evaluates children's toys. regulating their manufacture and sale. The Consumer Product Safety COlllmission also regulates th e lawn mower. the applia nces, the microwave oven, and numcrous other items around the Smi th house.

Setling out for the grocery store and the bank, Joan enCOllnters even more government regulations. The car has sea t belts mandated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Departmcnt ofTransportalion certifies its gas mileage, 'nlc car's poilution-control devices arc now in need of service because they do not meet the re(luirements of the EPA. The bank where Joan deposits money and writes iI check is among the most heavily regulated insti tutions she encounters in her daily life. Her passbook savings rate is regulated by the Depository Institutions Deregu lation COlllmittee, ancl her account is insured by the Federal Deposi.t Insurance Com mission.

Meanwhile, Johll Smith is at ...... ork assembling food-processing machinery, He and the other workcrs are members of the International Association of Machinists. Their negotiations with the finn ure held under rules lnid clown by the National Labor Relations BO<lrd. NOI long ago, the firm was visi ted by impectors from the OCcllp<ltional Safety and Health Aclministration (OS HA), a federal Olgcncy charged with ensuring worker safely. OSHA inspectors noted severa l violations and forwarded a letter recommemling safety changes to the head of the firm.

Back at home, John has 3 beer before dinner. It was made in il brewery carefully supervised by the Smeal! of Alcohol, 'tobacco, and Firearms, ,md federal and sta le taxes were coll ected when it was sold. After dinner (almost all the food served has been transported by the regulated trucking industry), the children are se nl to bed. An hour or so of te levision, broadcast on regulate(1 airwaves, is followed by bedtime. A switch will tum off the electric lights, whose rates are regulated by the Ill inois Commerce Commission and the Federal Ene rgy Regulatory COlnmission.29

Regulation: How It Grew, How It Works r~rolll tile bcginniugs of the American rcpublie Imtil 1887, the fccleral government made almost no regulatory policies; the little regu lation produced W"JS handled by state and local authorities. Opponents disputed even the minimal regulatory powers of stale and local govemmenls. in 1877. the Supreme Court upheld the right of government to regulate the business operationsofa fiml. ' 111e case, Mun/! v. fIli nois, involved the right of the slale of Illinois to regulate the charges and services of a Chicago lVarehouse. During this time, fanners were scethingaboul alleged overcharging by milroads, grain elevator companies, and other busi ness firms. In 1887-a decade after MUllnCongres.~ created the first regulatory agency. the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), :md charged it with regulating the railroads, their prices, and their services to fanners; the ICC thus set the precc<lent for fegtl1a tOry poliCYlllaking.

Th, Evolution of the Federal Bureaucracy


Chapter 13 The Federal Bureaucracy

der gulation

n'~liil\g of r~trkliO"$ 011 bIll; !.5, industry, lind other

pro~ iOr'l~1 activities ror which

gave ment mles h,d beet! established and thai bur l1CflIcies had been creal to admit!ister.

As regu lato rs, bureaucratic agencies typica lly operate with a large grant of power from Congress. which may detail goals 10 be achieved but may also permit the agencies to sketch out the regulatory means. In 1935, fo r example, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to control "unfair labor prac~ tices," but the NLRB had to playa major role in defining "fair" and "unfair." Most agencies ehllrged with regu lation musl first develop a sel of rules, onen ca lled guidelines. The appropriate agency may specify how much food coloring it will permit in a 1'101 dog. how many contami nan~ it will allow an indusby to dump into :I

stream, how much radiation from a nuclear reactor is too much. and so forth. Cuidelines are deveJoped in consultation with-lind sometimes with th e agree~ mcn! of- the people or industries bcing regulated.

Next, the agency must apply and enforce its rules and gu idelines, either in court or through its own administrative procedures. Sometimes it wai ls for complaints to come to it, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does; sometim es it se nds inspectors into the field , as OSHA does; a nd sometimes it requ ires application for a permit or license to demonstrate pe rformance consistent with co ngress iooal goa ls and agen cy rul es, as the FCC does. Often government agencies take violators 10 court, hoping to secure a iudgmen t and fine against an offender (see «You Are th e Poli cymakcr: How Shou ld We Regulate?"). Vlhatever strategy Congress pennits a regulati ng agency to use, all regulation conlains these elements: ( I ) a grant of power and set of directiOIl$ fram Congress, (2) a set of rules and guidelines by the regulatory agency itself, an d (3) some means of enforCing compliance with congressiona l goa ls and Hgency regulations.

Covermnenl regulation of the American economy and society has, of course, grown in recent decades. T he budgets of regulatory agencies, their level of employment, and the num ber of mles they issue are all increasing-and did so even during the conservative Reagan administration. As we have seen, few niches in American socie ty are not affected by regulation. Not surprisi ngly, th is si tuation has led to charges that government is overdoing it.

Toward Deregulation Deregulation -the lifting of government restrictions on business, industry, and professional :Ictivitics- is curren tly a fashionable term .30 The idea behind deregulation is that the number and complexity of regu latory policics have made regu lation 100 compli cated and burdensome. To critics, the probl em lVith regulation is that it ra ises prices. distorts market forces, and -worst of all - does not work. 'nley claim that the regulatory system does fhe follOWing:

• Raises prices. If the producer is faced with expensive regulations, the cost will inevitably be passed on to the consumer in th e fonn of higher prices.

• Hurts America's competitive position abroad. Other nations Illay have fewer regulations on pollution, worker safety, and other business practices than the United States. Thus. American products may cost more in the international marketplace, undermi ning sales in other countries.



HE POLICYMAKER

How Should We Regulate?

Almost every regulatory policy was created to achieve some desirable social goal. When more than 6,000 people are killed annually in industrial accidents, who would disagree with the goal of a safer workplace? Who would dissent from greater highway safety when more than 40,000 die each yea r in au tomobi le accidents? Who would disagree with policies to promote equality in hiril!g when the history of opportunities for women and minorities is one of discrimination? Who would disagree with policies to reduce industrial pollution when pollulion threatens health and lives? However, there may be more than one way to achieve these-and many otherdesirable social goals.

Charles L. Schultze, fonner chair of President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers, is- like Murray L. Weidellooum, who held the same position under President Reagan- a critic of tile current state or fedeml regula tion. Sclmll7.e reviewed the regulatory activi ties of the EPA and OSHA. Neither agency's l>olicies, he concluded, worked very well. He described the existing system as commandand-control policy: The government tells business how to reach certain goals, checks that tllCSC commands are followed, and punishes offenders.

Schultze advocates an incentive system. He argues that instead of telling construction businesses how their ladders must be constructed, measuring tile ladders, and charging a small fine for violators, it would be more efficient and eIfec,.. tive to levy a high tax on fimlS wi th excessive worker injuries. Instead of trying to develop standards for 62,000 pollution sources, as the EPA now does, it would be easier

and more effective to levy a high tax on those who cal se pollution. TIle government could even provide incenti in the fonn of rewards for such socially valuable behavio £' developing technology to reduce pollution. Incentiv , Schul tze. argues, use lIIarketlike strategies to regulate ind try. TIley are, he claims. more effecti~"C and efficient thJ:' n command-and-control regulation.

Not everyone is as keen on tile use of incentives as Schultze. Defenden of the commancJ..and-control sysl m of regulation compa re the present system 10 prevent;\"e medicine-it is designed 10 minimize pollution or woh:place accidents before they become too severe. Defcnd+rs of the system argue, too, tllat penalt ies for excessive pollution or excessive workplace accidents would be imposed only after substantial damage had been done. ' 1ley a(so add that irtaxes on pollution or unsafe workenvironme~ts were merely externalized (that is, passed along to the consu mer as higher prices), they would not be much 0i' deterrent. Moreover, it would lake a large bureaucracy to monitor carefull y the level of pollution discharged, an it wou ld require a complex calculation to determine t le level of tax necessary to encourage businesses not to pollute.

TIle issue or the manner of regulation is a comp x one. What would you do?

Soun:a: Charles L. Schuttze, '1'M PublN: U.o{the Pril'Clle ITlt (Wa$hington, DC: Brookings IflStilution, 1m); Steven Kcl n, What ~ Im:.utiva? Erooomish and th. Environment (Bas n: Auburn House, 1981).

• Does not always work well. Tales of failed regulatory policies are numerous. command-and-contrOl Regulations may be difficult or cumbersome to enforce. Critics charge thai regulations sometimes do not ach ieve th e resul ts that Congress intended and maintain thallhey si mply create massive regulatory bureaucracies.

President Reagan's conservative pol itical philosophy was opposed to much governm ent regulation , but even before the Reagan administration, sentiment favoring deregulation was building in th e Washington community. Even liberals

policy I According to Charles Schulre, the Iypical system of rcgulattn whereby govemmenllell$ bWiness how to I'e;leh certain goals, o11ecks that these commands are ful owed, and punishes offenders.



ince~tive system Acro ing to Charles Schll tZC',

A 1110 effective and efficient

polk than romm~nd-llnd·

ront I; ill the incc:nti~c: system. mark11.likc: strategies uc used to IIl1m. public policy.

so metim es joined lhe 3ntiregu lation chorus; for exa mple, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts pushed for airline dcregu t<llion. The airlin e industry a lso pressed for deregu l<ltion, ~nd in 1978 th e Civil Aeronauti cs Bomd (CAB ) began 10 deregu late airline prices and <lirline roules. III 1984, the CAB formally disbanded; il even brought in a milit ary bugler to play taps at its lasl' meeting.

Not everyon~, however, be lieves deregulation is in the nation's best interest. · 1

For exa mpl c, c ritics point to severe environ menta l da mage resulting from lax enforce ment of environmental protec tion standards during the Reagan ad ministration . Simila rly, many obse rvers attribute at le<lst a substantial portion of the blame for the enormously expensive bailout of the savings and loan industry to deregulation in the 19805. Many people now argue for morc regulation of savings and loan institutions. California ns found that deregulation led to severe power shortages in 2001.

In addition, many regulations have proved beneficial to America ns. As a result of government regulations, we brellthe cleaner air,H we have lower levels ofl ead in our blood, millers arc safer at work, H seacoasts have been preserved, H and children are more likely to survive infuncy,15

Understanding Bureaucracies As both implelllentors and rcgui:ltors, bmeaucnlcies are making public policy, not iust administering someone else's decisions. The fact thai bmeaL1crats, who are not elected, compose most or the govern ment raises fundamental issues about who controls governing and what the bureaucracy's role should be.

Bureaucracy and Democracy Bureaucracies constitute one of America's two unelected pol icymaking institutions (courts are the other). In democratic theory, po pular control of gove rnment depends on elections, but we could not possibly cicCI the more than 4 million federal civi lian and military employees or even the few thollsand top men and women, thOllgh they spend Illore than $2.5 trillion of the American gross domestic product. Furthermore. th e fact that voters do not elect civi l servants does not mea n tha t bureaucracies c::mnot respond to and represe nt th e public's inte rests. Wh en we compare the backgrounds of burea ucmts with those of members of Congress or presidents, we find that bureaucrats are more representative than elected offi ci:tls. Much depends on whethcr bureaucracies arc effectively controlled by the policymakers citizens do elect-the president and Congress.16

Presidents Try to Control the Bureaucracy. Chapter 12 looked at some of the frustrahous presidents endure in tryi ng to control the government they arc elected to nln. Presidents try ha rd -not always with suc~-to impose their policy preferences


Understanding Bureaucracies 449

on age ncies. Following are some presidential methods of cxe rcising control over bureaucracies:

•

•

•

•

Appoint the rigllt people to head the agency. Normal/y. presidents control the appointment;; of agency heads and subheads. Putting thei r people in charge is one good way for presidents to influence agency policy,3? yet even this has it;; problems. President Re(lgan'seiforb to whittle the powers or tI le EPA led to his appointment or controversi'll Anne Gorsuch to head the agency. Gorsuch had previously supported policics contral)' to the go.11s of tIle EPA. When Gorsuch attemptcd to implement her policies, legal squabbles with Congress .mel political controversy ensued, ultimately leading to her resignation. '10 patch lip the damage Gorsuch had done to his reputation, Reagan named a moderate and seasoned administralor. William Ruekelsh<lus, to run the agency. Ironically, Ruckelshaus demanded-'lIld got-more freedom from the White House than Gorsuch had sought. President Clinton had no use fo r FBr Director Louis Freeh, who woul(1 barely talk to the president. Yet Clinton fclt he could not fire him because he feared unleashing denu nciations by those claiming he was purging an enemy. Issue orders. Presidents can issue executive orders to agencies. These orders carry the force of law and are used to implement statules, treaties, and provisiam of the Conslitution. 38 Sometimes presidential aides simply pass the word that the president wants something done. These messages llsllally suffice, although agency heads 3rc reluctant to run afoul of Congress or the press on the basis of 11 brO~ld presidential hint. The presidenl's rhetoric in speeches outside the bureaucracy may also influence the priorities ofbureaucrats. 39

Alter an agency's budget. 111e Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Is Ihe presiden t's own fina l authority on any agency's budget. ''11c OMS's threats to cut here or add there will usually gel an agency's attention. Each agency. howcver, has its constituents with in and outside of Congress, and Congress, nol tlte president, does the appropriating. Reorganize ,Ill agency. Although President Reaga n promised, proposed, and pressured to abolish th e Department of Energy and the Department of Education, he never succeeded-largely beca llse each deparhnent was in the hands of an entrenched bureaucracy backed by clements in Congress and strong constituent groups. Reorganizi ng an agency is hard to do ir it is a large and strong agency, and reorganizing a small and weak agellcy is often not worth tile trouble. A mass ive reorgani za tion occurred in 2002 with the creation or th e Depa rtm ent of Ilomcland Security. It is not clear, however. th al it has improved the implementation of policy.

Congress Tries to Control the Bureaucracy. Congress exhibi ts a parado,;ical relationship wi th the bureaucracies. On the one hand (as we have seen), members of Congress may fi nd a big bureaucracy congenial.40 Big govcT11ment provides servic~ to constihlcnts, who may show their appreci<lt ion at the polls. Moreover, when Congress lacks the answers to policy problems, it hopes the bureaucracies will find them. Unable itself, for exam ple, to resolve the touchy issue of equality in intercolle. giate athletics, Congress passed the ball to the Department of Health, Edueatiolt, and Welfare. Unable to decide how to make workplaces safer. Congress produced

executive orders Rcgubtionl Qfigmaling fror 1 the el1~uti\'e brnnc:h. Execllli , orders ar~ onc mcthod presidenlJ; C-.or'lll5e 10 controt Ihe I hllTe;Jucr.lcy; mort' ofter,. though, prc~iden ls puss ~Iong IIteir wishes through Iheir akiC5.



OSHA. ru you saw in Chapler I I, Congress is increasingly the problem-identifying branch of governm ent, set ling the bureaucratic age nda but letting the agencies decide how to implement the goals it sets.

On the other hand , Congress has found it hard to control the government it helped create. There are scveml measures Congress can take to oversee the bureaucracy:

• Influence the appoin tment of agency heads. Even when the law does not require se natorial approval of a presidential appointment, members of Congress are not shy in offering their opinions about who should and should not be funning the agencies. Wh en congressional approval is required, members are doubly infl uential. Committee hearings on proposed appointments are almost guaranteed to produ ce lively debal'es if some members find the nominee's probable orientations objectionable.

• AJter an agency's budget. With the congressional power of the purse comes a mighty wea pon for controll'ing bureaucratic behavior. At the sonne ti'me, Congress knows that many agencies perform services its constituents demand. Too Oluch budget cutting may make an agency more responsive, allhe price of losing an interest group's support fo r a reelection campaign.

• Hold hearings. COlllmittees and subcommittees can hold periodic hearings as pari of their oversigh t responsibilities. TIley may p..rade flagrant agency abuses of congressional intent in front of the press, but the very committee that crea ted a program usually has responsibility for oversight of it and thus has some stake in showing the agency in a fa vowble light. We also ieOlrned in Chapter 11 that members of Congress have other disincentives for vigorous oversight, including a desire not to emba rrass the chief executive.

• Rewrite the legislation or make it morc detailed. Every statute is filled with instmetions to its administrators. To limit bureaucratic discretion and make its instmctions clearer, Congress can write new or more detailed legislation. Still, even voluminous detail (as in the case ofthe I RS) can never eliminate discretion.

Through th ese !I nd other devices, Congress tries to keep bureaucracies under its control. Never entirely successful , Congress faces a constant battle to limit and channellhe vast powers it delegated to the bureaucracy in the first place.

Sometimes these efforts :lre detrimental to bureaucratic perfonnance. In 2006, at least 60 1·louse aod Senate committees and subcommittees claimed jurisdiction over a portion of homeland security issue., . Officials in th e Department of Homeland Securi ty have to spend :I large percentage of their time testifying to these committees, and the balkani zed jurisdiction has undennined the abili ty of Congress to perfollll comprehensive oversight. Moreover, different committees may send different signals to the same agency. One may press fo r stricter enforcemen t of regulations, for example, while another seeks for more exemptions.

Iron Triangles and Issue Networks. Agencies' strong ties to interest groups on the one hand and to congressional committees and subcommittees on thc oth er fmth er complicate efforts to control the bureaucracy. Chapler 10 illustrated that bureaucracies often enjoy cozy relationships with interest groups and with commit· tees or subcommittees of Congress. \"'ben agencies, groups. and committees all



depend on one another and are in close, frequent contact, they form what are sometimes called iron triangles or subgovemmenls. These triads have advantages on all sides (see Figure 13.4).

T11cre are plenty of examples of subgovemments at work. A subcommittee on aging, senior citizens' interest groups, and the Social Security Administration are likely to <lgree on the need for more Social Security benefits. Richard Rettig has recounted how an all iance slowly jelled around the issue of fighting cancer. It rested

Figuro13.4 Iron Trianglos: Ono Example

iron triangles A mutually dependent relationship between bureauCl"lllic ~gendes, inter' I groups, and congressional committees or Suocolll,nittees. Iron triangle, dOll1inate 50rrle areas of domcstic policyma~ing.

Iron triangles-composed of bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, and congressional committees or subcommittees--have do~inated some areas of domestic policymaking by combining internal consensus with a virtual monopoly on information in their areal The tobacco triangle is one example; there are dozens more. Iron triangles are characterized by mutual dependency in which each element provides key services, information, or policy for the others. The arrows indicate some of these mutually helpful relationship In recent years, a number of well·established iron triangles, including the tobacco triangle, have been broken up.

CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMlmES

Suboommlm!es of the Houw ~nd -~grlcultaral committees

BUREAUCRACY Toboxo _

"' .............. ofA8fkulrure

Campaign contributions ~nd support

Information ~bout the Industry

legislaTion affecting ToNeco fa~ and other members of the Industry

INTEREST GROUPS

Tobacco lobby, Indudlng

both fal"11"\en and manufacturers



You Are the President of MEOICORP

on three pillars: CHncer researchers, agencies within th c Na tional Ilistitutes of Hea.lth, and members of congressional health su bcommittees." l

When these iron triangles shape policics for senior citizens, ca ncer, tobacco, or any other interest, officials make each policy independent ly of the others, sometimes even in contradiction to other policies. For exam ple, for yea rs the government supported tobacco farmers in one way or another while encouraging people not to smoke, Moreover, the iron triangles' decisions lend to bind larger institutions, such as Congress and the White 1·lollse. Congress often defers to the decisions of committees and suhcom mittecs, especially on less visi ble issues. TIle White House llI;!y be too busy wrestJing with global concems to fret over agricu ltural issues or ca ncer. Em boldened by this lad: of involvement , subgovernments nourish and mid a strong decentral izi ng lind fragmenting element to Ihe policym~lking process.

nle system of subgovemments is now overlaid with an amorphous system of issue networks. 'n lere is more widespread participation in bureaucratic policymaking, and many of the participants have tec hnical policy expertise and are drawn to issues bec,lUse of intcllechlal or emotional commitments rather than material interests. ' lllOSC concerued with environmental protection, for exa mple, have challenged formerly closed subgovemments on numerous fronts . This opening of the poticymaking process complicates the calculatiorts and decreases the predictability of those involved in t!testable and relatively lIarrow relationsh ips of stlbgovernments.4z

Although sllbgovenUll cnts are often <l bl e to dominate policymaking for decades, th ey arc not indestructible:-i3 For c.~ampl e, the subgover1llnent picturcd in Figure 13.4 long dominated smoking and tobacco policy, fOCUSing on crop subsidies 10 tobacco fa rmers. Bul increasingly, these policies ca me under fire from health authorities, who were not involved in tobacco policymaking in ea rlier years. Similarly, Congress no longer considers pesti cide policy, once dominated by chemica l companies :md agricultural interests, sepilTately from environmental and hea lth concerns. You ca n read about the evolution of another-and very powerfu l-iron triangle in "A Cenernljon of C hange: Nuclear Powcr Comes Full Ci rcle."

Nevertheless, there is often a cozy relationship between the components of the three sides or a subgovemment. For example, in 2003, Congress added a massive prescription dnlg benefit under Medicare. Representative Bil ly '1311zin shepherded the drug bill through the House as chair of the Energy and Commerce Com1l1ittee. He then retired from Congress to head the Phannaceutical Resea rch and Manufacturers of America, a powerful industry lobby group. for an estimated $2 millio]] a year. ' n lOlllas Scully, the Medicare administrator and lead negotiator for the admfnistration, resigned his position with in weeks after the p<lssagt: ofthe bill to join a lobbying firm that represented several health care industry companies significantly affected by the new law. He also announced he would be working pari lime for an inveshnent finn with interests in scverallllore companies affected by the new law.

Bureaucracy and the Scope of Government To many, the huge American bureaucracy is the prime example of the federal government growing out of control. As this chapter discussed ea rlier, some observers view the bureaucracy as acquisitive, constantly seeking to expand its size, budgets,

Published by Longman. Copyright © 2008 by Pearson Education, Inc.Government in America:People,Politics,and Policy, Brief Ninth Edition, Study Edition, by George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, and Robert L. Lineberry.


Nuclear Power Comes Full

An especially vivid eX:llllple of the death of an iron triangle is the case of Ilucle:n power.' During the I9iOs and 1950s, Americans were convinced that the technology that had euded \,\/orld War II could also serve peaceful purposes. Nuclear scientists spoke enthusiastically about harnessing the atom to achieve all sorts of g0.11s. evclltually making electricity so inexpensivc that it would be "too chcap to meter." Optimism in progress through scicnce was the ntie, and the federal government encouraged the development of nuclear power through a powemll iron triangle.

Congress eslablislled a speda l joint COlllI'nillee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and gave it complete control over questions of nuclear power. It also created a new executive agency, the Atomic Energy COlllmissiOIl (A I£C), and together lI'i th the private COll1P;lI1ics that built the Iluclear power plants and the electrical utilit ies that wanted to operate them, tlley formed a powerful subgO\·emment. America built more nuclear power plants than m.y other country in the world, and American technology was expor1ed overseas to dozens of natiOIlS.

Nuclea r power today-after the acciden ts at Three Mile Island and Cilen iobyl and the vnrious cost overnlllS ;lssociated with the illdustry-bears ~llI1ost no resem['Iallce 10 that of the early 19605 whcli the iron triangle was at ils peak. What happened711le experts lost control. When critics raised questions concerning the safety of the plants and whell opponents were able to get local officials to question the policies publicly, the issue grew into II major political dcb:.te of the late 19605, associated with the growth of envirOllmentalism. Opposition to Iluclear power destroyed two of the most powerful legs of the iron triangle. Congress disbanded the Joint Committee Oil

Atomic Energy; a variety of congressional committees now claim some jurisdiction over nucle:lr power questiolls. Simi larly, Congress replaced thc AEC with two

ncw ngencies: the Nucle~r Regulatory Commission the Department of Ellergy.

'nle lIu('lear )Xlwer industry has been dev.lstated: new nuclear power plants have been started in United States since 1978,and almost all 111,,,,,,, .. d,,,,¥ struction at that time lw\'e been abandoned at financial loss. Nuclear power provides only about cellt of uur total energy production. In sum. the ' environmental concen! that developed in the late swept away one of tlle 1lI0st powerful iron Id'" " I" In recent American history.

-n.is is not the end of the story, however. 'n""",,,o,!HHarily high price of gasoline and heating fuel i;"":,;~~:.~l.~ 2006 and cOllcems over global wamling hHve 1.'1

II reconsideration of nuclear power. 111e Callup Poll found that a majority of tbe public tIle nuclear energy to produce electricity. I

Bush declared on August 8. 2005, "Of all our energy sources. only nuclear l)Qwer plants can goo",,"', massive amounts of dectricity without emitting an 1

of air pollution or greenhouse gases. And thanks to

advances iu science and technology. n,';~~.::,:;:':~'~,:,~~;~; SJ:Jfe r than ever before .... We wi ll start i Ii po""er plants again by tI .e end of this decade."

If the nuclear power industry should revive. there be renewed calls for strict regulation-from both bureaucracy and Congress. Whether an iron I

reemerges from this change will depend on whether pllDlic is attenlil'e to the issue of nuclear power whether it allows e~perts to define safety concerns technical matters appropriate.' only for e~rerts 10

• Fhnl; R. Banmgartller and Bryan D. lones. Agendas

lnstllbility in Ammcllu PolitiCl (Chicago: Unil'el'5ity Press. 19(3).

and authority. Much of the political rhetoric agai nst big government also adopts this Jine of argument, a long with complaints about red tape, senseless regulations, and the like_ It is easy 10 lake potshots at a faceless bureaucracy that usua lly cannot respond.



Comparing Bureaucracies

One should keep in mind, however, that the federal bureaucracy has llotgrown over the past two generations, as Figure 13.1 ill ustrates. If one considers the facl that the population of the country has grown significanUy over this period, then the fed~ eral bureaucracy has actually shrunk in size relahve to the populution it serves.

Originally, thc federal bureaucracy had the mooesl role of promoting the economy, defending the country. managing foreign affairs, providing ;ustice, and delivering the mail. Its role gradually expanded to include provid ing services to farmers, businesses, and workers. The discussion of federalism in Chapter 3 showed that as the economy and the society of the United States changed, a va riety of interests placed additional demands on governmen t. We now expect goveml1lenl-and the bllfcaucracy-to play an active role in dealing with social and economic problems. A good case can be made that the bureaucracy is actually too small for many of the tasks currently assigned to it-tasks ranging from the control of illicit drugs to prolection of Ule environment.

In addition, it is important to remember that when the president and Congress have chosen to deregulate certain areas of the economy or cut taxes, the bureaucracy could not ::md did not prevent them from doing so. The question of what and how much Ule federal government should do-and thus how big the bureaucracy should be-is answered primarily at the polls and in Congress, the White House, and tlle COUrts- ILot by faceless bureaucmts.

Summary Am eri cans rarely congratulate someone for being a good bureaucrat. Unsu ng, taunted by cartoonists, and maligned by columnists, bureaucrats are the scapegoats of American pol ilics. Americans may call presidents great and reelee! melllbers ofCongreS!, bu t almost no one praises bureaucrats. Those who compose the bureaucracy, however, perform most of the vita l services provided by the federal government.

.Bureaucrats sha pe policy as administrators, as implementors, and as regulators. In this chapler we examined who bureaucrats are, how they got Uteir positions, and wha tlhey do. 1bday, most bureaucrats working for the federa l govern ment gel thei r jobs through the civil service system. although the president appoints a few at the very top.

In general , th ere are fOllT types of bureaucracies: the cabinet departments, Ihe independent regulatory commissions, the government corporations, and the independent executive agencies.

As policymakers, bureaucrats play two key roles. First, they are policy implementors, translating legislative policy goals into programs. Policy implementation does not always work well, and when it docs not, bureaucrats usually take the blame, whetller they deserve it or not. Much of administration involves a prescribed routine, but nearly all bureaucrats still have some discretion. Second, bureaucrats are regulators. Congress increasingly delegates large amounts of power to bureaucratic agencies .md expects them to develop rules and regulations. Scarcely a nook or cranny of American society or the American economy escapes the long reach of bureaucratic regulation,


Although bureaucrats are nol elected, bureaucracies are not necessarily undemocralic. Bureaucracies must be controlled by elected decision makers, but presidential or congressional control over bureaucracies is difficult. Burea us have strong support from interest groups-a faclor that contributes to pluralism because interest groups try to forge common links with bureaucracies and congressional committces. 11lcse subgovernments tend to deccntralize policymaking, thereby contr ibu~ing to fragmentation.

Although there are mallY critics of the increasing size of government, the federal bureauc racy has not grown over th e past two generations. Instead, it has shru nk, even as the country has grown and the public has mad e additional demands on government.

Internet Resources www.gpooccess.govlgmanuallindex.hlml u.s. Government Manual that provides information on the organi7.!Ition of tile U.S. government.

www.opm.go"l'lfeddatal Feder .. l employment statistics.

www.opm.go"l'

Gel Connected 455

www.gpooccm.govlfrlindex.html TIle Federal R£gister, which provides information on U.S. laws and regulations.

Office of Personnel Management Web site wi th infoml tion on fe<lenil jobs and personnel issues.

www.whilehouse.go"l'lgovemnlenl!cabi"et.html Information on federal cabinet departments.

www.whitehouse.go"l./goW!mmentlindepelldelll-agencies.html Infonmllion on federa l independent agencies and commissions.

Get Connected

www.go"I.t.Xec.com/ The Web site for Government E.recutiw maglu:ine.

How Bureaucracies Are Organized On January 21, 2003, President George W. Bush signed legislation that created a new departmc.n and the large$t federal bureaucracy since 1917. "H~ new department, called the Department of Homdand Security, was proposed first by Congress in the aftemlath of the September! I, 200 I, terrorist attacks, The department's mission is to better coordinate the nation's homeland defenses. Do you know1how this new burcaucnlcy is organized? Could you conlnct the Dep~rtment of Homeland Security if you needed to? Lei liS look at this departmeni"s Web page to learn more about the agency.

Search the Web Go to .... ww.dhs.go"l'ldhspubliclfaq.jsp and rcview the infonnation on thai page. 111en review Amen (II Risk: A Homeland Security IW/X)rt Card published by the Progressive Policy Insti lu at www.ppiollfine.orgldocumelltsiHomeSecRptCrcC0703.pdf

Questions to Ask • How IlIlluy agencies ha"l'e been combined to create the new Department of Homeland Secu ity? • What are some of the challenges the Progressive Policy Institute identifies for the new

Department of Homeland Security?



Why k Matters The Department of Homeland Security is the most dralnlllic change in tile federal burcaucmcy in half 1I century. It is likely thai, as wilh most otJler agcncies, citizens will come into contact with the new agency oftcn, especially liS they tTowel.

Get Involved Do you hllve a question about tIle Department of HOlllclll1ld Sccurity? If so, go to Wlvw.dhs.goy/dl1spubliclcontactus amI send your quC'stion. Discuss the response you gel .... .jth your class. You also may follow issuC$ related to homeland security hy visiting the Web page of the U.S. I·[ouse of Representatives Select Committee on l'lomel:md Sectlrity,l1ltp:llhsc.hoU1le.govl.

N)r mort'- exercises, go tf) www.longmcmamericalJgovemmlml.rom.

Fo Further Reading Abe hach, loel D., lind ijeli A Rockman. III the Web o{PolitiC8. Wasington, DC: Brookings Institutiotl , 2000. Ex..1milles federal ecutives and the degree 10 whieh tJley are represenlative of counlry and TC$ponsive to elecled officials.

Am lei, Peri E. Making the Manageriul Presidency. 2nd ed. Pri cion, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. A ca ref(ll cx.;Il lination of efforts 10 reorganize the federal bureaucracy.

Ocr Jliek, MiHtha, a nd Paul J. Quirk. The Polit ics of De gulation. Washington, DC: Brooki ngs Ilistilutioll, 1985. Exp ainG why advoc~tes of deregu latioll prevailed over the

al interests tllat benefiled from regulation.

ards. Ceorg~ C" m. Implementing Public Policy. lingtoll. DC: COllgressiol1111 Quarterly Press, 1980.

review of the iSSl lCS involvcd in implemcnl:llion.

sell , Charles T. '/'l1e Cau: (or Burruucracy. 41h ed. Iloglo11, DC; Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004.

A 51 ong case on behalf of lhe effectivcness ofhmea11cmcy.

Co ley, William T., Ir. 1'1Ining the Bureaucrucy. Prillcetoll , NJ: rinceton Ullive1"5ity Press, IQS9. Examines remedics for

oiling bureauer.leics.

Ilcy, William T., Jr., and Steven J. BilUa. Bureal/cracy und ocracy: Accounttlbility aud Per{onua1Jce. Washillglon, OC;

Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003. Discusses the account· ability of unclccted Imreaucrals ill 11 democ111 CY.

I-Ieclo, !-Jugh M. CoveOlmell/ ofStTal1gen;: Executi~ 1'01itiC$ in Washil1gl011. Washingtol1. DC: Brookings Institl1tion, 19n. A study of the top executives of Ille federal goveTilment, who consti tute (says the 111lthor) 3 "govcllltllent of sln1!1gcrs .~

Kerwin , Cornel ius M. HlIlemakillg: How Coveml1ltJl1t AgenCies Write Lnw anci Make Policy. 3rd ed. Wa5hington. DC: COlIgrcssional Quarterly Press, 2003. Explains holl' agencies wri tt: regulations 10 implcmcnt lnws.

Osborne, D~vid , and l ed Caebler. Reil1Yentirlg Cc»"el7ll1lt'111. Reading, MA: Addison.Weley, 1992. Simplistic but important view of making govern ment more cn lreprellel1ri~t and rcsponsive tn cil i7.ells.

S :1 V'd S, E. S. Privatization: Th e Key to Beller Covemmell!. Chatham, NI: Cllatham HOlJse, 1987. A conseTViitive econoll1ist's arg11lnent lhat 11l ~ ny public services performed by bure3ucrilcies wOl1ld he bett e.r hll1ldled by th e private .~ccto r.

Wilson, JamC$ Q. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books, 1989. Presen ts a "holtom·up" approach to u11derstanding how bmcaucrals, managers, ami c)(ecillives decide what to do.

the federal bureaucracymyresource.phoenix.edu/secure/resource/pos110r2/pos110_week6_reading2.pdfthe...

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