The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 by Geoffrey WawroReview by: Lawrence D. FreedmanForeign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 159-160Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033920 .

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of a foreign currency as official legal tender, touching on both academic and practical arguments for each. Over time, Cohen believes, the rationale for and management of national currencies will have to contend with increasing competition from foreign currencies and new forms of payment, especially electronic ones.

In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices From Wa/l Street to Washington. BY ROBERT E. RUBIN AND JACOB

WEISBERG. New York: Random House, 2003, 448 pp. $3s.00.

Rubin offers personal reflection on two highly successfuil careers: on Wall Street, where he was co-chair of Goldman Sachs, and in Washington, where he was Treasury secretary in the Clinton ad ministration. The result is a good read for anyone interested in either the inner

workings of one of the world's most suc cessful financial firms or a once-outsider's reaction to policymaking. Rubin candidly discusses his initial ignorance of Wash ington and notes both the exhilaration and the frustration of being at the center of economic policymaking. The book is judicious throughout; although it offers no new information on the major inter national debt crises of the late 1990s, it gives an insider's authoritative treatment of them. On the whole, Rubin expresses his satisfaction with the positions the administration took, which, he says, reflected a reasonable balancing of risks given the information available at the time. Although (or perhaps because) Rubin has extensive experience with financial markets, he does not believe that "the market always knows best," but rather that markets sometimes require corrective action by government.

Inflation Targeting in the World Economy. BY EDWIN M. TRUMAN. Washington:

Institute for International Economics, 2003, 288 pp. $25.00.

A century ago, national currencies were linked to gold or silver. Starting in the 1930s, they were linked to major currencies, a practice formalized in 1944 at Bretton

Woods. That system broke down in 1973, and ever since countries have floundered looking for a new "anchor" for monetary policy. The U.S. answer has been to appoint a committee of experienced individuals to manage the monetary aspects of the national economy. But that solution is not satisfying to some and, in any case, cannot

work in countries with a history of mone tary turbulence or a corrupt political culture. Since 1989, 22 countries have instead focused on targeting the domestic rate of inflation. Truman, a former official of the Federal Reserve, reviews the basic arguments for and against this kind of inflation-targeting and evaluates economic performance under such a system. He offers much usefil discussion of the formulation of monetary policy by various central banks and how inflation influences the process. Truman emerges sympathetic to (but unenthusias tic about) inflation-targeting as a strategy.

Military; Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest ofFrance in 1870-1871. BY GEOFFREY WAWRO. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2003, 344 pp. $35.00.

Michael Howard's account of the Franco

FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2004 [159]

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Prussian War, published in 1961, was so definitive that it seemed to deter others from telling the same story. Wawro has at last taken up the challenge, drawing on a wide range of sources to offer a brisk, readable, and sharp account. The war marks a pivotal point in history, when a united Germany undermined the old European balance of power by taking on a French army whose reputa tion outstripped its capabilities. Wawro conveys the battles particularly well, along with the surprising ineptitude of the French army (exemplified by

Marshal Achille Bazaine's conspicuous failure to seize any opportunity to turn a battle). The Franco-Prussian War is

widely thought to have set in motion the events that led to World War I;

Wawro stresses the boost to German militarism more than he does the French desire to retake the annexed Alsace-Lorraine.

Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. BY

ERHARD RAUS. COMP. AND TRANS.

BY STEVEN H. NEWTON. Cambridge:

Da Capo, 2003, 384 pp. $35.00. Raus was one of the Wehrmacht's most accomplished generals, and his memoirs are a welcome addition to the literature on World War II. Raus entered Russia in June 1941 as a brigade commander in

Germany's sixth Panzer division and quickly led his troops to the outskirts of Leningrad. Even after the German invasion faltered, his career prospered; by the end of 1943, Raus was in com mand of the fourth Panzer army. As Germany's position deteriorated, he moved from one army to another, until his failed effort to defend Pomerania

resulted in his dismissal. (He delivered the bad tiding to Hitler himself, "physically broken-down, embittered and suspicious.") This account was mostly written after the war, and excerpts were later used for U.S. military training. Newton has performed a valuable service by reassem bling and translating the original into a vivid account of operations and an in sightful study of how the German army showed such tactical aptitude even

when saddled with bad strategy.

Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor ofMichaell. Handel. EDITED BY RICHARD K. BETTS AND THOMAS G.

MAHN KEN. Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, 256 pp. $79.95 (paper, $26.95).

Admirers of the late Michael Handel will welcome this short volume of essays, one of three produced as a tribute. It addresses one of Handel's favorite topics: how countries can manage their intefli gence to avoid getting caught by surprise. In addition to his own essay on the subject, there are contributions by a number of top specialists, including Richard Betts' discussion of the politicization of intelli gence and John Ferris' detailed assessment of British military deception in the two world wars. Handel died in June 2001, a few months before that September's catastrophic surprise. As James Wirtz notes, the fact that the United States

might have seen the attack coming would have confirmed Handel's skepticism of the possibility of developing an opera tional theory of surprise. These essays similarly conclude that there are inherent difficulties in trying to guard against surprise, although there are approaches to intelligence collection that can reduce its likelihood.

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