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TheFrenchColonizationandJapaneseOccupationofIndochinaduringtheSecondWorldWar:EncountersoftheFrench,Japanese,andVietnamese

ChizuruNamba,KeioUniversityNamba,Chizuru.2019.“TheFrenchColonizationandJapaneseOccupationofIndochinaduringtheSecondWorldWar:EncountersoftheFrench,Japanese,andVietnamese.”Cross-Currents:EastAsianHistoryandCultureReview(e-journal)32:74–96.https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-32/namba.Abstract

Thisarticleseekstoclarifytherelationshipsthat formedamongtheFrench, Japanese,andVietnamesewhen theycoexisted in Indochinaduring theSecondWorldWar.TheFrench and the Japanese jointly ruled Indochina, due to their respective interests inpreserving suzerainty and securing bases for the Pacific War. These two groupsmaintained constantmutual awareness in this complicated and unstable relationshipwhileavoidingconflictandseekingthesupportoftheVietnamesepopulation.However,despite efforts of French and Japanese authorities, the contradiction of mutualcoexistence between France, as the “missionary of civilization,” and Japan, as the“liberator of Asia” from Western colonialism, could not be concealed. Whereas theJapanese government’s policy of “maintaining peace” in Indochina ensured thatinteractions between the Japanese and Vietnamese were limited, the relationshipbetween the French and the Vietnamese shifted during this time, with the effect ofstimulatingthelocalpopulation’sidentityandleadingtoFrancelayingthegroundworkforpostwardecolonization.Byexamining thequotidian facetsof theFranco-Japaneserule of Indochina, this article reveals how mutual encounters among the French,Japanese,andVietnameseunderminedFrenchcolonizationandJapaneseoccupation.

Keywords:Indochina,Japan,Vietnam,Frenchcolonization,Japaneseempire,SecondWorldWar,PacificWar,colonization,decolonization

IntroductionDuring the Second World War, Indochina experienced the unique situation of beingoccupied by Japan while remaining a French colony. For four and a half years, theFrenchsuzerain,whichhadwieldedcolonialpowerformorethansixtyyears,coexistedwith the Japaneseoccupation,which brandished thebanner of “liberatingAsia” fromWesterncolonization.

ThereexistsagreatdealofresearchonIndochinaduringthisperiod,encompassingarangeofperspectives.Murakami’s(1981)pioneeringresearchdetailingtheJapanese

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invasion in its entirety deals with the topic from a largely Japanese perspective.Yoshizawa (1986) focuses on themilitary aspects of the Japanese occupation in 1940and 1941, Tabuchi (1980; 1981) discusses its economic implications, and numerousstudiesbyShiraishiandFuruta (1976),Akagi (1984),andothersdealwith thepoliticalintention behind Japan’s choice of seihitsuhoji), a policy of “preserving peace.” Nitz’s(1983; 1984) interviews with the Japanesemilitary, diplomats, and civilians who hadstayed in Indochinaat thetime, reveals theassociationbetweenthe intentionsof theJapanese and the Vietnamese nationalists. Tachikawa’s (2000a) research emphasizesthepolitical,economic,andmilitary“cooperation”betweenJapanandFrance,whereasarecentworkbyMichelin(2019)offersadetailedtreatmentofJapaneseintentionsandthe negotiation with the French government regarding the process of the JapaneseinvasionsinSeptember1940andJuly1941.ItdiscussestheimplicationsoftheJapaneseoccupationasacrucialcatalysttothesubsequentPacificWar.

L’Indochinefrançaise,1940–1945 (Brocheux and Isoart 1982)was the first editedcollection of articles to describe the Indochina of that era from diverse standpoints.Marr (1995) reveals the importance of this period as a prelude to Vietnameseindependencebymeticulouslydiscussing thedevelopmentof theVietnamesepoliticalmovementunder jointFranco-Japaneserule.Tønnesson(1991)discusses thesituationinIndochinaduringthisperiodfromtheperspectiveofinternationalrelations,andtheworkofTurpin (2005) focuseson the involvementofCharlesdeGaulleanddeGaullesupporters in Indochina. Freud (2014) contributes to the relative paucity of researchthat draws on an economic perspective by elucidating the economic efforts of theIndochina authorities to strive towardan Indochina autarky, as theywere forced intocuttingoffrelationsfromthehomecountryandstrengtheningrelationswithJapan.

ResearchbyJennings(2001;2004)andVerney(2012)discussestheeffectsoftheimplementationoftheanti-RepublicanVichyregimeanditspoliciesonIndochinalocals.Amongthese,asRaffin(2012)explores,theyouthmovementsthatdevelopedundertheauspices of the colonial authorities and their aftereffects continued to be felt afterindependence. Namba (2012) discusses the complex thrust and parry ofFranco-Japaneseculturalpoliciesandpropaganda.

Whilenotanexhaustiveaccount,thisresearchhasillustratedtheenormityoftheramificationsofthe1940–1945Franco-JapaneseoccupationofIndochinafromavarietyof perspectives. This article brings to the fore the quotidian elements of the colonialencountertorevealhowFranco-JapaneseruleintersectedwiththeVietnamesepeople,by focusing on how direct and indirect contact among the French, Japanese, andVietnamesewithinsocietyaffectedtheconsciousnessandbehaviorofeachgroup.Howdideachreactinfrontoftheotherduringmorethanfouryearsofcontact?Howdothesocietalchangesbornefromcontactbetweenpeoplescomebacktoaffectthenatureofoccupationalrule?ByclarifyingtherelationshipsamongthesethreegroupsduringtheperiodofFranco-Japanesecoexistence,thisarticleseeksto illuminatehowFrenchandJapaneseimperialisminhibitedeachcountry’splans.

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HistoricalContextFrance was defeated by Germany in June 1940, and the Vichy government wasestablishedunderMarshalPhilippePétainthefollowingmonth.TheVichygovernmentplanned to govern Indochina domestically through a national revolution,mobilizing arepressiveantirepublicanpoliticalmovement.IntheceasefireagreementwithGermany,France’s possession of its overseas empire was recognized. However, as the warexpanded,Indochinabecameseparatedfromthemetropoleduetotheinsecurityofthe15,000-kilometermaritimeroutesbetweenthetwocountries.Bymid-1943,therestofFrance’s colonies had split off from the Vichy government and followed de Gaulle’sgovernment-in-exile(Thobieetal.1990,311–371).However,Indochina,itsmostdistantcolony,remainedunderVichyauthoritythroughoutthewar.

Taking advantage of the German victory over France, Japan stationed troops innorthernIndochinainSeptember1940tosecureabasefortheresolutionoftheSecondSino-Japanese War (1937–1945). In July 1941, the Japanese Army advanced to thesouthern part of Indochina to procure a vital jumping-off point for the invasion ofSoutheast Asia, and a treaty for mutual defense between France and Japan wasconcludedpriortotheoutbreakofthePacificWarinDecember1941(Yoshizawa1986;Michelin2019).DuetoFrance’soccupationbyGermany,theexpansionofthewar,andweakcolonialforcesinIndochina,FrancewasforcedtoaccedetothestationingoftheJapaneseArmyonitsterritory.ThepriorityforFrancewastomaintainitssuzeraintyinIndochina,anditsgreatestfearwasJapan’scompleteoccupationoftheterritory.

Whereas Western powers were expelled by Japan in other Southeast Asiancountries,FrenchsovereigntywasretainedinIndochina.However,Japan’sretentionofFrenchsuzeraintywhileoccupying Indochinacontradicted itspolicyofa“GreaterEastAsiaCo-ProsperitySphere,”whichwaspremisedon theexpulsionofWesterncolonialpowersfromAsia.JapanchoseseihitsuhojinotjustbecauseoftheVichygovernment’spro-Germanpolicy;makinguseofanexistingcolonialadministrativestructureallowedthemtosecureIndochinaasabaseforthepursuitofthePacificWarwithouttheneedfor total occupation. Some people within the Japanese government, particularly theMinistryofForeignAffairs,pointedout thiscontradiction,but theywereoverruledbythestrongurgesof thearmy,whichprioritized thesuccessfulundertakingof thewar.Moreover, there was an entrenched concern that the Pacific War could assume theformof awhite versus yellow “racewar”(Akagi1984;ShiraishiandFuruta1976). Forthesereasons,JapanandFranceendeduprulingIndochinajointlyuntilthefutsuinshori(coupdeforce)onMarch9,1945,whentheJapaneseArmyabolishedFrenchcontrol. FragileContactbetweentheFrenchandJapanese With the September1940agreement for stationing troops innorthern Indochina, theJapaneseArmywaspermittedtogarrisonuptotwenty-fivethousandtroopsinTonkin;withtheoccupationofsouthernIndochinathefollowingyear,itwasallowedtostation

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unlimited troops throughout Indochina. Thenumberof Japanese troopspositioned inIndochina changed with the preparation, commencement, and continuation of thePacificWar. The sixty thousand Japanese stationed therebefore thewarweredrawndownafter thebreakoutof thePacificWar,butbecause Indochinacontinued tobeastrategically vital stationing area, several unitswere kept for defense. The billets andbarracksfortheJapaneseArmy,establishedfarfromurbanareas,wereprovidedbytheFrench.

There were approximately thirty-nine thousand French in Indochina―about 0.2percentofthetotalpopulation(Jennings2001,136)—andtheywereshockedtolearnoftheJune1940surrendertoGermany.TheFrenchresidentsnotonlyfearedthefateoftheir distant homeland but also had misgivings about the continuation of FrenchcolonialruleinIndochinawheretheyhadmadetheirhome.Theirmemoirsrevealtheseconcerns:“Inaddition to thepain [ofdefeat], therewasoneoverridingconcern.Howwasthistobeexplainedtothelocals?Whatdotheythinkofus,wewhohaveuntilnowexpressedoureffortlesssuperiority?…Inordernottobelosers likeourselves, is itnotnaturalforthemtowishtoseparatefromus?”(Bauchar1946,32).

Notwithstanding this unease, in a relatively well-resourced Indochina largelyunaffectedbythewar,themajorityoftheFrenchwereabletoretainasenseofsecurityandlifestylesimilartothatbeforethewar.ThetranquilityandaffluenceofthecolonysurprisedFrenchcitizensdispatchedfromadefeated,occupiedFrance:

For myself and those who arrived with me, Indochina appears aparadise.WhenweleftMarseillesatthestartofJanuary[1941],FrancehadbeenunderaharshGermanoccupationsincethepreviousJulyandwas experiencing desperate shortages and a particularly severewinter.…Wewerefinallyabletosatisfyourhunger,drinkPernod,buytobacco,rideintaxis,andorderclothes,althoughit’shot.1

However, the Japanese threat was growing in Indochina. As of July 1941, the

Japanese Army was garrisoned throughout the whole territory. The French colonialauthorities and most of the French population sought to somehow remain thelegitimaterulersofIndochinauntiltheendofthewar,buttheyknewtheycouldnotwinagainst the Japanese by force. The Battle of Lạng Sơn in September 1940 made theinferiority of the French military undeniable; while Japan and France were stillnegotiating the stationing of Japanese troops in northern Indochina, a Japanese unitstationedbytheborderinChinadecidedtoenterIndochinaonitsownauthorityand

1 ANOM(ArchivesNationalesd’Outre-Mer:Aix-en-Provence),INF1131.Notedusous-lieutenantLoiselsurlasituationmatérielleetmoraledesfrançaisenIndochine,décembre1942;AN(ArchivesNationales:Pierrefitte-sur-Seine),MI43.Commissioninterministérielled’enquêtesurl’Indochine,procès-verbauxdu13octobre1945.

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decisivelydefeatedtheFrenchbrigade.2 Duetothisincident,theFrenchsawnootheralternativethantoseekcoexistencewithJapan.3

Underthesecircumstances,thecolonialgovernmenttriedtolimitcontactbetweentheFrench,theJapanese,andthelocalpopulationindailylife,fearingthatanyfrictionor minor disagreements between individuals could escalate into larger conflicts andworsen relations. At the same time, the colonial government sought to prevent theJapanese from having any influence over the local population, an intention thatunfolded into a subtle contest between the Japanese and the French. Kept frombreakingoutintoopenconflict,theformerproclaimedtheirownpresencetoappealtolocals and pressured the French, while the latter desperately sought to preserve theexistingsocialstructure.

TheFrenchcolonialauthoritiesrequestedthatthefirstlandingofJapanesetroopsat Haiphong in September 1940 take place in the middle of the night to avoid theattention of the local population. During the stationing of troops in the south thefollowing July, French colonial forces were prevented from leaving their barracks atmanyof the landingsitesuntil all Japanese troopshaddisembarked.4 InMarch1941,the Japanese Army anchored a ship in the Saigon River and dispatched some twohundredsoldierstomarchundertheJapaneseflagwithoutauthorization.Inresponse,theFrenchauthoritiesimmediatelysentFrenchtroopstomarchalongsidethem.5 ThisseemstohavebeenanefforttoamelioratetheimpactthatJapan’sshowofforcewouldhaveonlocals,whileavoidingthetremendousamountoffrictionthatwouldresultfrominterruptingthemarchofJapanesetroops.

JapaneseArmybilletswereestablishedinplacesdistantfromurbanareasandthebasesof French colonial forces.6 However, Japanese troopswerenotprevented fromleaving their barracks to shop, eat, drink, and seek pleasure in town. They wereoccasionally reported as attracting the attention of the Vietnamese population byparading through themain streets and congregating in central squares. Therefore, it

2 ArmedforcesorganizedbytheViệtNamPhụcquốcĐồngminhHội(VietnamNationalRestorationLeague,hereafterthePhụcquốcArmy),aVietnamesenationalistorganizationseekingindependencefromFrance,alsoparticipatedinthismilitaryattackbytheJapaneseArmy.Thefightingendedinjusttwodays,asthemilitaryleadersorderedthemtoceasehostilitiesandwithdrawafterdecidingonthestationingoftroopsinaccordancewiththenewtreatywithFrance.ThePhụcquốcArmywasabandonedbytheJapaneseArmyanddispersed,withsoldierseitherbeingcapturedbytheFrenchorfleeingtoChina(Shiraishi1982). 3 FrancesoughttokeepthisshortconflictexposingthefragilityoftheFrenchArmyasecretthroughoutthewar.However,theFrenchuseditasanimportantpieceofevidenceinthepostwarTokyotrialtomaketheargumentthatJapanhadinvadedIndochinainSeptember1940(Namba2013).4 MAE(MinistèredesAffairesEtrangères:LaCourneuve),Asie-Océanie1944–1955,Indochine327.TélégrammedeDecouxauMinistèredesAffairesEtrangères,19août1941.5 ANOM,INF1198.LasituationpolitiqueduTonkinetdelaCochinchine,8mars1941.6 MAE,Asie-Océanie1944–1955,Indochine327.TélégrammedeDecouxauMinistèredesAffairesEtrangères,19août1941.

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was impossible topreventeverydaycontactbetween Japanese troopsand theFrenchpopulation, and, in fact, minor conflicts often broke out between them.7 The exactnumberofsuchconflicts isunknown,butabout twentywererecorded inCochinchinafor a one-month period fromDecember 1943 to January 1944.8 Many of theseweretrivialinsultsexchangedbetweendrunkensoldiersatnight.However,astheseincidentsthreatenedtobreakthedelicatebalanceoftheFranco-Japanesecoexistence,theyweredealt with harshly by authorities on both sides. Furthermore, when objections wereraisedregardingincidentsinstigatedbytheFrench,theJapanesesidetookadvantageofthe situation and increased its demands concerning the stationing of its troops. Thecolonial government requested that theFrenchpopulation remain calmwhendealingwiththeJapanese,advisingthatitwasbesttoignorethemandavoidcontactasmuchas possible.9 When incidents did occur, the police and members of the MissionFranco-Japonaise,anorganizationofFrenchandJapaneseauthoritiescreatedtohandleissues relating to the stationingof Japanese troops, immediately rushed to the scene,contained the damage, and investigated the case. Perpetrators of incidents wereseverelypunished.Forexample,inDecember1941,whenaFrenchmanthrewastoneata Japanesesoldierduringanargument inaHuebar, the latter immediatelyrequestedthatFrenchauthoritiesinvestigatetheincident,andtheFrenchmanwasheldinjailforthirtydays.10

In another incident in Hanoi in June 1944, some Japanesemen assaulted an AirFrance pilot. The pilot did not hesitate to ask for forgiveness, thus containing theincident. However, a later report by the French authorities displayed considerableirritationthattheJapanesemenattackedaFrenchmaninpublic.Itblamedthepilotfornot resisting the JapaneseandcriticizedotherFrenchpeoplewhowerewith thepilotformerelycalling thepoliceandnotdirectly involving themselves in thealtercation.11Taking such incidents into account, the French and Japanese agreed to attempt topreventtheseconflicts.Forexample,inDalat,therewasaproposaltodividerestaurantsinto those open to the Japanese and those frequented by the French or locals.12 InTourane(Danang),therewerefixeddayswhenJapanesetroopscouldheadintotown.13Japanese and French authorities even decided that soldiers on both sides shouldexchangegreetingswhenpassingoneanother,tofostera“friendlyatmosphere.”14 7 Jennings(2011,214–215)clarifiesfactsabouteverydayconflictsbetweentheFrenchandJapaneseinDalat.8 ANOM,Cabinetmilitaire773.Relationsfranco-japonaises,incidents.9 ANOM,INF1112.NotesurlasituationenIndochine,août1942.10 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire773.Relationsfranco-japonaises,incidents,4janvier1942. 11 ANOM,RSTNF6965.Conflitsnippo-indochinois,1941–1945.12 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire773.Rapportdel’adjoint-chefFaucher,commandantdupostedeDalat,surunincidententremilitairesetmarinsfrançaisetmilitairesjaponais,28septembre1943.13 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire690.Bulletind’informationsurlesactivitésjaponaises,1941.14 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire690.Bulletind’informationsurlesactivitésjaponaises,1941;ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire258.Relevédesincidentsdu30juilletau28octobre1941.

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It seems that suchmeasureswere relatively successful in giving ordinary Frenchcitizenstheimpressionthattheday-to-dayJapanesepresencewas“discreet”(Jennings2011, 212–213). Admittedly, many of the French considered this situation to be “aninvasion of a French colony by Japanese troops”15 and looked upon the Japanese asenemies,buttheytendedtoavoidneedlessfrictionwiththeJapaneseduetothestrictmeasuresofthecolonialgovernmentandtheirdesirestoretaintheirrelativelypeacefulandwealthysituation in Indochina.Therefore, itcanbesaidthattheFrenchrefrainedfrominteractingwiththeJapaneseasmuchaspossible.TheJapanesepainterTakanoriOgisu,whowasinIndochinaduringthewar,testifiedthatFrenchandJapanesewouldfrequentthesamerestaurantsandhotels,buttheywould“sitaroundtheirrespectivetableswithextremedisinterest”ineachother(Oguisu1944,27).

ThestationingofJapanesetroopsnecessitatedthattheJapaneseandFrenchlearneachother’s languages,buttherewerefewFrenchwhoundertooktoteachFrenchtothe Japanese. A former student at the Nanyô gakuin (Academy of South Sea)16 hastestified that the French professors there appeared to be “wanderers”withoutmuchcontactwithFrenchsocietyinIndochina.17 Atthesametime,sincemaritimetradewithEuropebecameunstableduetothewar,manyFrenchspeakers,includingintellectuals,were sent from Japan to Indochina (which representedFrance in theFarEast), and itseemstheyenjoyedinteractingwiththeFrenchthere.18

For the Japanese, too, it was essential to prevent fighting to maintain a securemilitary base. Many Japanese also considered Indochina “another heaven,” rich anduntouched by the war.19 In fact, the material wealth enjoyed by the French andJapanese alike was a result of forceful exploitation. For example, the colonialgovernmentmadeitcompulsoryforVietnamesepeasantstosellricedirectlytothematafixed,cheaper-than-marketprice,resultinginseverepovertyforthepeasants.Itwasin the common interest of both the French and Japanese to share the “wealth” ofIndochina,andsotheyostensiblycametocoexist“sidebyside”(Hara1998,22–23).

Furtheranalysisofnumeroustrivial incidentsthatoccurredovertimerevealsthatmany of these conflicts were tied to the presence of the indigenous population. Forexample,a fightbrokeoutbetween theVietnameseandFrench,anda Japaneseman 15 ANOM,INF1145.LettredeRatinéécriteenmars1941.16 TheNanyôgakuin,atechnicalcollegeunderthejurisdictionoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs,wasestablishedinSaigonin1942forthepurposeoftrainingJapanesehumanresourceswithgoodknowledgeofthesituationinSoutheastAsia(Shiraishi1983).17 TokyôDaigakuKyôyôgakubukokusaikannkeironkenkyûshitsu1980–1981.Inntabyûkiroku:Nihonnonanpôkanyo[Interviewrecords:JapaneseinvolvementintheSouth],C-2.InterviewwithSetsurôTsuchidabyMasayaShiraishi,December23,1979. 18 RepresentativeexamplesincludeKiyoshiKomatsuandKomakiOmi.ThereweremanyotherFrench-speakingresearchersandeducatedpeopledispatchedfromJapanattheJapaneseCulturalInstitutesinHanoiandSaigon.19 MostJapanesetestifiedthatIndochinaatthistimewaspeacefulandrelativelymateriallyaffluentdespitethewar.Forexample,seeTokyôDaigaku1980–1981.Inntabyûkiroku,C-2,11–12.InterviewwithSetsurôTsuchidabyMasayaShiraishi,December23,1979.

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who happened to be nearby intervened. These incidents shook the generallycooperative relationship maintained by the French and Japanese, revealing theunderlying competition between them. Japanesewriter Kiyoshi Komatsu,whowas inIndochinaatthetime,witnessedaquarrelbetweenaFrenchofficerandaVietnamesemanatarestaurant.HerecordedinhisnoteshowthefacesofsurroundingVietnamese“appeared to say that only you Japanesewould be able to extricate the unfortunatelocalfromthesituation”(Komatsu1941,272–273).20

Inanothercase,aVietnameselifewaslostduetoFrenchandJapanesecompetition.When a Vietnamesewoman employed by a Japanese organization suffered a seriousinjury,aFrenchpolicemansoughttotransporthertoaFrenchmedicalfacility,buttheJapanese intervened and forcibly took her to a Japanesemilitary hospital.Ultimately,thewomandiedbecauseof thedelay in treatment.Thedisputecontinuedevenafterherdeath,withtheJapanesedemandingthattheyjointlyconductherautopsy,onlytoberefusedbytheFrench.21 Althoughthisisanextremecase,itindicatestherealityofFranco-Japanesecoexistence: competitionover the rights to rule the localpopulation.ThiswasanissueofwhoheldthelegitimaterighttoprotecttheVietnameseinJapaneseemploymentintheFrenchcolony.FortheJapanese,holdingontotheirrighttoprotectthiswomanwasmoreimportantthanherlife.

In this way, competition between the French and Japanese often negativelyaffectedtheVietnamesepopulation.Forexample,whentroublesoccurredbetweenthetwo foreign groups in an eating establishment, it was common for the colonialauthoritiestoorderitstemporaryclosure.22 Inothercases,tensionbetweenJapaneseandFrenchtroopscouldresult inthesoldiersofbotharmiesbeingforbiddento leavetheirbarracks,ameasurethathadrepercussionsforlocalrestaurantsandbars.23 Somedocuments display the sentiments of the local population caught up in this tensesituation.Asonelocalweeklymagazinedescribed:

It’s a difficult situation for us Vietnamese. If we have social or economicrelations with the Japanese, the French consider us traitors or treat us evenworse. If we maintain our relations with the French, the Japanese will besuspiciousofourhesitation toward themandhold a grudgeagainstus.Whatarewetodo?Canweavoidanycontact?Wewill justbeconsideredcowards.Will we take either side? Either choice is dangerous.Where do our loyaltieslie?24

20 AbouttheactivitiesandpersonalityofKomatsu,seeVinh(2001).21 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire773.Relationsfranco-japonaises,incidents.22 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire773.Notepostaledurésident-mairedeDalataurésidentsupérieurenAnnam,21septembre1943.23 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire773.Rapportdel’adjoint-chefFaucher,commandantdupostedeDalat,surunincidententremilitairesetmarinsfrançaisetmilitairesjaponais,28septembre1943.24 Indochine,hebdomadaireillustré,no.97,9juillet1942.

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On theonehand, the Frenchpolice issued threats to the families ofVietnamesestudentswhoattended schools taught in Japanese,whichwereestablished in variouspartsofVietnam,andpressuredthoseworkingfor Japanese institutionsto leavetheirjobs. 25 On the other hand, Japanese kempeitai (military police) summoned andcriticizedVietnamesepublishersforproducingworksfeaturing“excessiveFrancophilia”or “insufficient zeal toward Japan.”26 The Vietnamese population thus suffered fromthecompetitionbetweentheFrenchandJapanese.

The repercussions of the Franco-Japanese coexistence did not stop there. Theeconomic agreement between Japan and Indochina obliged the latter to regularlyexportricetoJapan.Inturn,theFrenchcolonialauthoritieswantedtostrengthentheircontrol of the rice market, imposing a system of compulsory purchase on theVietnamese.Acropfailurebroughtonbybadweather innorthernIndochinabetweentheharvestoffall1944andsummer1945occurredintandemwiththeAlliedbombing,the severing of transportation between the north and south, the reduction in foodproduction due to themilitary demand for the cultivation of palm oil and fiber, andconfusion stemming from the transfer of political authority to Japan after thefutsuinshori.ThissequenceofeventsledtoaseverefamineinnorthernVietnamin1945,which,accordingtooneestimate,causedasmanyastwomilliondeaths(VănTạoandFuruta1995).TheFranco-Japanesecoexistence,throughthesystemofdualrule,castadarkshadowoverIndochina.

As these numbers suggest, coexistence between the French and Japanesedemonstrated latent instability. To partially camouflage this underlying tension andcompetition, the collaborative relationship between the two was frequentlystrengthened invariousways. ItwasnecessarytopubliclystressthatFranco-Japanesecollaboration was beneficial for Indochina, rather than merely a practical choice, inorder to divert popular attention from the joint rule’s contradictions. In fact, theheadquarters of the Mission Franco-Japonaise in major cities flew flags that read“ServicedeCollaboration,”aswellastheflagsofthetwocountries.27

Fornearly fiveyears, theFrenchand the Japanese sought to coexistby findingabalance between cooperation and competition. Both sides considered their rule overthe local residents to be of utmost importance for the success of their respectiveoccupationandgovernance.Althoughtheynavigatedtheircoexistence,theyeachtriedtoreinforcerelationswiththeindigenouspopulation.

25 DiplomaticArchivesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,“Futsukokunaiseikannkeizassann:Nannnbufutsuinnseijôhôkoku”[MiscellaneousdocumentsrelatingtotheinternalgovernanceofFrenchterritories:ReportsonthepoliticalsituationinsouthernFrenchIndochina],June2,1943.26 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire680.Bulletinderenseignementssurlesactivitésjaponaises,1942.27 ANOM,INF1226.Relationsfranco-japonaises.

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IndecisiveRelationsbetweentheJapaneseandVietnameseTeachingJapanesewasanimportantwayfortheJapanesetomakecontactwithlocals.DespitesomereluctancefromtheFrenchauthorities,theJapanesehadopenedtwelveschoolsinsixcitiesbytheendof1943.Theclassesmadeuseofexistingschools,billets,andtemples,andwereheldlargelyatnighttoaccommodateworkingstudents.Bytheend of 1943, more than two thousand students had completed Japanese courses attheseschools.28 InJuly1944,fivehundredstudentsreceivedtheirdiplomasatagrandgraduation ceremony held at the Hanoi cinema. The ceremony was attended byJapanese military and government officials. It included the screening of films on thestateofeducationinJapanandtheGreaterEastAsiaConferencethathadbeenheldinTokyo the previous year, to which representatives from Indochina had not beeninvited.29

Vietnamese locals attending Japanese schools told their colleagues that theysoughttolearnthelanguagefortheirowncommercialorpracticalreasons,notbecausethey felt close to the Japanese.30 There appear to have been some students wholearnedJapaneseoutofanti-Frenchsentiment,31 butitcanbeassumedthattheywentlargely for the opportunity to learn a language for relatively low prices and to gainaccess tomore jobs.The radioprogramthat Japanbroadcasted in Indochina includedmessageslike“TheEnglishandAmericanswillbechasedoutofSoutheastAsia,andallindustryandcommercewillbeinthehandsoftheJapanese”and“IfyoulearnJapanese,you will be able to communicate throughout Asia.”32 Furthermore, the programemphasizedtheutilityof Japaneseandthecommonalitiesofkanji (Chinesecharacter)culturebetweenJapanandVietnam.

Some studentswere aware that attendance at these schools risked drawing theattentionoftheFrenchcolonialgovernment.TheJapaneseemphasizedthatalloftheseschoolshadbeenauthorizedbytheFrenchauthorities.33 Infact,theFrenchauthoritiesevenprovidedopportunitiestostudyJapanese;GovernorGeneralDecouxthoughtthat“thebestmeansforustolimitJapan’sexperiment[tospreadJapanese]isforustoalsoparticipate,”34 and he personally took the initiative to open classes for the generalpublicinSaigonandHaiphong.

With troops garrisoned in Indochina, the local population was employed astranslators, typists, drivers, and clerks by the Japanese Army, kempeitai, embassy,

28 NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministration(NARA),RG165,Entry77,Tokyo,December27,1943.29 ANOM,RSTNF7080.RemisedediplômesdelanguejaponaiseàHanoi,4juillet1944.30 ANOM,RSTNF7061.Tonkin,Collaborationfranco-japonaise,15septembre1942.31 TokyôDaigaku1980–1981,Inntabyûkiroku,C-6,134.InterviewwithRintarôKiuchibyMasayaShiraishi,February13,1980.32 NARA,RG165,Entry77,Box974,April16,1943.33 ANOM,RSTNF7061.Tonkin,Collaborationfranco-japonaise,15septembre1942.34 MAE,Guerre1939–1945,Vichy,Asie,279.TélégrammedeDecouxdu15octobre1942.

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consulates, companies, and newspapers. Military intelligence, the embassy, andconsulatesmadeuseof “unemployed intellectuals” toacquireall sortsof informationabout Indochina (Nguyễn 1998, 497). However, Japan was unable to employ largenumbersofthelocalpopulationwithoutFrenchpermission.InOctober1942,whentheJapanese Army employed five hundred Vietnameseworkerswithout permission fromthe colonial authorities, the French immediately opposed this at the MissionFranco-Japonaise and demanded that they go through the formalities of submittingdocuments and undergoing physical examinations.35 The French colonial governmentwas sensitive regarding contact between the Japanese and the local population andsoughttomonitortheVietnamesehiredbytheJapanese.

The Japanese Armywas not permitted to employ locals as soldiers, but colonialauthorities permitted their deployment as auxiliary heiho (support troops) withoutweapons under certain conditions. The real aimwas to raise amilitary force to fightalongside the Japanese Army if the Allies ever landed in Indochina. The Japanesemilitaryauthoritiessoughttorecruitasmanyoftheseheihoaspossible.However,theyneverenlistedasmanymenastheyhadhoped;onlyfifteenhundredtotwothousandmenwererecordedpriortothedissolutionoftheFrenchgovernmentinMarch1945.36Theheihoseemtohaverangedfromtroopswithrelativelyhigh levelsofeducationtothosewhosimplyhopedforfoodandhousing,sotheywereassignedtotheirunitsafteraboutthreemonthsofintensiveJapanese-languagetraining.37

Japan’spolicyofseihitsuhojiprioritizeditsstabilityinIndochinawhileappearingtonotactivelyengagewiththe local independencemovement.However,someJapaneseArmy,embassy,andconsularofficialsaswellascivilianswerefrequentlyincontactwithlocals involved in political activities. The army, specifically the kempeitai, approachedVietnameseintellectualsandindependenceactiviststobringinfluentialindividualsovertotheJapaneseside,shieldingthemfromFrenchauthoritiesandhelpingthemgointoexileoverseas (Tachikawa2000b,69–80).Thekempeitai alsoestablished tieswith thepolitical-religious Caodaist group, suppressed by French authorities because of itsanticolonialtendencies. InexchangeforCaodaist informationand labor,thekempeitaisupported Caodaist activities and protected the group from the French colonialgovernment(Tran1996;Takatsu2013;2014).

Bothofficersandsoldiersattemptedtoappealindividuallytothelocalpopulation.To hireworkers, one Japanese officer called out to the headmenof four villages andgave speeches stating that taxes would be lowered the following year when Japan

35 MAE,Asie-Océanie,1944–1955,Indochine,327.RelationsentreleJaponetl’Indochine,1940–1941.36 ANOM,HCI,Conspol226.MémoirespersonnelsécritsenréponseauquestionnairedesautoritésfrançaisesdeHuesurlesévénementssurvenusenIndochineenmars1945,parMasayukiYokoyama.37 TokyôDaigaku1980–1981,Inntabyûkiroku,C-6,87–88.InterviewwithTomomiYamaguchibyMasayaShiraishi,November19–20,1979.

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would take control of all of Indochina.38 On another occasion in front of someVietnameselocalsatahotelinSaigon,aJapanesesoldiercrackedaneggandmixedtheyolkandeggwhite to show that thecombinedmixturewas“yellow” (Franchini1977,121). In such ways, the army frequently intimated Japan’s support for Vietnameseindependenceinordertogainlocalbacking.

Among diplomats, too, there were those who proactively engaged with theVietnamese.SituatedbetweentheJapanesegovernmentalpolicyofseihitsuhojianditsstatedgoalofliberatingAsia,theirmaneuverabilitywasrestricted.Manyofthemwerefluent in French, allowing them to communicate with Vietnamese intellectuals andactivists.OnediplomatattheJapaneseembassy inHanoiexplainedthatwhilehewasnot involved because it contravened official policy, many of his colleagues were infrequent contact with Vietnamese nationalists and were providing them support(Ishikawa1996,47).AttheJapaneseconsulateinHue,farfromthecentersofcolonialgovernance in Saigon andHanoi, the staffwas able to have notable contactwith theVietnamese.Vietnameseseekingtoacquireinformationfromsourcesotherthanofficialpublications and the French colonial government often entered and exited theconsulate.39

As longas thesediplomats’participation in the independencemovementdidnotcauseexcessive frictionwith theFrench, itwasconductedwith theconnivanceof topJapaneseofficials.However,asshownbythetransferofMinisterShigenoriTashiro,whowasdeeplyinvolvedwithmembersofthepro-JapaneseViệtNamPhụcquốcĐồngminhHội (Nitz 1984, 116), their activities were limited by official policy. In general, topdiplomats “did nomore than interact superficiallywith the Vietnamese” (Nasu 1963,45).

SomeciviliansalsoactivelyengagedwiththeVietnamese.MitsuhiroMatsushita,arepresentative of the Japanese company Dainan Koosi, and Mitsuichi Yamane, aJapanese industrialist supervising the Indochina Economic Research Institute, soughtcontact with numerous Vietnamese nationalists and supported their activities. AsMatsushitahadcontactswithCườngĐể,amemberoftheVietnameseroyalfamilylivinginJapan,heusedhisconsiderablefundstosupporttheViệtNamPhụcquốcĐồngminhHội andCaodaism.Moreover, heorderedhis employees to shelter the independenceactivistNgôĐìnhDiệmfrom theFrenchpoliceandassist the flightof thewell-knownintellectualTrầnTrọngKimfromthecountry(Tachikawa2000b,74–76;Takeuchi2017,45–62).Caodaism,whichwasbasedinTâyNinhinthesouth,wasanorganizationwithespecially strong ties to Japan. It faced increasing oppression from French authoritiesafter1940,whenMatsushitaapproachedthereligiousorganization toprovidevariousformsofassistance,aswellasactasago-betweenwithCườngĐể.TheJapaneseArmy,noticing Caodaism’s organizational capability, also made connections with the groupthroughMatsushita.ThearmymobilizedasmanyasthreethousandCaodaiststobuild

38 MAE,Guerre1939–1945,Vichy,Asie,255.TélégrammedeDecouxauMinistredesAffairesEtrangères,12septembre194139 ANOM,HCI,Conspol226.MémoirespersonnelsdeYokoyamaMasayuki.

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woodenshipsattheNichinanDocks,thecompensationforwhichbecameanimportantsourceoffundsforCaodaism(Takatsu2014,53–54).

Kiyoshi Komatsu, who had lived in France for a long time, and the writer ŌmiKomakiwere both proficient in French and had contactwithmanyVietnamese. Bothwereclosetothenationalistsofthepro-JapaneseĐạiViệtQuốcdânđảng(NationalistPartyofGreaterVietnam),andbothwereinvolvedwiththeJapaneseCulturalInstituteatHanoiandmetoftenwithVietnameseintellectualswhovisitedthereonthepretextofculturalexchange.Frenchauthoritieswereonthelookoutforthissortofinteraction.ThedangerplacedonlocalswhoconsortedwiththeJapaneseisshownintherequestofKomatsu’sfriendthattheymeetinplacesnotfrequentedbytheFrench(Komatsu1941,122). Indeed, in Hanoi in the autumn of 1943, an incident took place in whichVietnamese perceived to be pro-Japanese were rounded up by French authorities(Shiraishi 1984, 36). Likewise, most Vietnamese with opportunities to talk with theJapanese were careful about including political subjects in their conversations withthem.40

StirringupunnecessarytroublewiththeFrenchalsoriskedimpedingtheactivitiesofJapanesefirms.Therefore,therewasageneralsenseofhesitationamongJapanesecivilians tobecomeoverly involvedwithVietnameseactivists.At Komaki’s urging, theHanoibureauchiefoftheNichi-NichiShimbunmadethreeVietnamesemembersoftheĐại Việt Quốc dân đảng correspondents for the paper. However, one of them wasarrestedbyFrenchauthorities.Whenthebureauchieflearnedofthis,heremovedtheaccreditation of the other two, fearing that problems would arise with the Frenchauthorities. The Vietnamese were very disappointed and subsequently severed theirconnectionswithKomaki.41

Japan’s joint rule with France inevitably made relations with the locals seemhalf-hearted. Vietnamese dissatisfaction toward the attitudes of the Japanese wasshown ina lettersent to the Japaneseconsulate inSaigon:“If the Japaneseare tobeprotectorsofus,theVietnamese,theymusttakedefinitivestepsinthisdirection.TheymustdefeattheFrenchwhotrytoarrestthosewhowanttoworkfortheJapanesearmyandwillhindertheattendanceofworkersatJapaneseschools.”42

DissatisfactionwiththeJapaneseisalsoevidentinthememoirsofCaoĐài leaderTrầnQuangVinh,whohadbeenprotectedbytheJapanesemilitaryforprovidingmorethan three thousand laborers for Japanese shipyards and cooperating in theconstructionofwoodenvessels:

Seeing the Japanese attitude toward the various pro-Japanesegroupings, in all of them, themajority of people became despondent

40 TokyôDaigaku1980–1981,Inntabyûkiroku,C-2,48–79.InterviewwithTakujiKashiwagibyMasayaShiraishi,July15,1979;C-6,72–73.InterviewwithTomomiYamaguchibyMasayaShiraishi,November19–20,1979.41 MAE,Guerre1939–1945,Vichy,Asie,255.TélégrammedeDecoux,17octobre1941.42 ANOM,GGI,Cabinetmilitaire690.Bulletind’informationsurlesactivitésjaponaises,1941.

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and unwilling to take further action for the Japanese. The Japanesemade many promises to the Vietnamese, but there was noindependenceinsight,andwhenevertheJapanesemadeaconcessionto the French, we would see the arrest of the pro-Japanese patriots,whichtheJapaneseprovedunabletoprevent.(Takatsu2013,109)

VietnameseemployedbythekempeitaialsoquestionedwhytheJapanesewereso

concerned about their relationship with the French (Marr 1995, 86), and thisdissatisfactionoccasionallyboiledover.AVietnamesedoctorrecordedthefollowinginJune1944:

In 1942, many Vietnamese intellectuals had become close to theJapanese. They thought thiswas their duty toprotect the interestsofthecountry.However,theseindividualssoonrealizedthattheJapanesewerefrauds,concealingtheirdesignsforJapaneseimperialismbeneaththepolicyliberatingthepeoplesofEastAsia.43

A letter penned in July 1944 by a Vietnamese employed by the Japanese Army

notedhowthetreatmentofthesupporttroopswasgettingworseasthewarsituationdeteriorated:

TheJapanesewerefriendlytowardusatthebeginning.Theyconstantlytold us that we were working for Greater East Asia and would winindependence for our country…. But the situation changeddramatically….The Japanese failed tosupplyuswithenough foodandbegan to rudelyorderusabout.Besides, the support troopswerenotnumerous;thisshowedthattheJapanesehadalreadylostanyconcernforus.Atthemoment,thenumberofuswhoremainpro-Japaneseisatmostaround20percent.44

Whenthe Japanesebasedtheir troops innorthern Indochina inSeptember1940,

manyVietnamesefoundhopeintheirarrival.AccordingtotheadministrativereportsofChợLớninSaigon,whenthelocalsreceivedinformationregardingthedefeatofFranceinEuropeandthearrivaloftheJapaneseArmy,theymonitoredthesituationwithgreatinterestwhilepreservingoutwardcalm.45 FollowingthedefeatofFrenchcolonialforcesinLạngSơnthatoccurredwhenaJapaneseunitforciblycrossedtheborderfromChina,rumorsspreadthroughasectionofthepopulationandcausedexcitement,eventhough

43 ANOM,HCI,Conspol161.Cochinchine,rapportmensueldu16juinau15juillet1944.44 ANOM,HCI,Conspol161.Cochinchine,rapportmensueldu16juinau15juillet1944.45 TTLT2(TrungtâmLưuTrữQuốcGia2:HoChiMinh),GoucochIIA.Rapportsurl’étatd’espritdelapopulationindigèneécritle27septembre1940parledéléguéadministratifdelarégionSaigon-CholonTranVanThi.

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theFrenchauthoritiesdidnotbroadcastthisincidentandsoughttostrictlycontrolthedissemination of information. There is no doubt that many looked forward to bigchanges with the arrival of the Japanese. However, Japan’s plan for seihitsuhoji andcoexistence with the French continued unaltered until March 1945. With theiravoidanceof frictionwith the French colonial authorities, thewavering relationswiththelocalpopulation,andtheworseninglivingstandardsduringtheperiodofJapaneseoccupation, the locals’distrustof the Japanesegradually increased.At thesametime,Japan loudly publicized its granting of independence to the Philippines and Burma inspecial issuesofthemagazineTânÁ,46 makingthecontradictionbetweentheGreaterEastAsianCo-ProsperitySphereandseihitsuhojievenmoreconspicuous.

Whereas the Japanese attempted to approach the Vietnamese nationalists, theyweresuspiciousoftheVietnamesecommunists,whosoughtindependenceinthenearfutureontheirown.AsJapanandFranceconsideredtheVietMinhacommonenemy,the two powers collaborated to suppress their activities. For example, in September1942, the JapaneseArmyhandedoveraVietMinhactivist toFrenchauthorities,whoexecutedhim.47

Some Japanese were aware that the Japanese attitude toward Vietnamese wasinconsistentandproblematic.HisashiYamakawa,aresearcherattheSouthManchurianRailwayCompany’sEastAsiaticEconomicInvestigationBureau,notedinanAugust1943report that, as a result of Japanese ambiguity toward the Vietnamese population, ofwhichtheFrenchtookadvantagetorestrictJapaneseinfluence,manyoftheindigenouspopulation who had high hopes at the start of the occupation were left bitterlydisappointed(MantetsuTôaKeizaichôsakyoku1943).

SomeVietnamese studentswho attended Japanese schools asked their JapaneseteacherswhentheJapanesegovernmentwouldgrantindependencetotheVietnameseas ithadtotheBurmese.Theteachersonlydodgedthequestion,saying,“GoandaskGovernorDecouxorMarshalPétain.NeithertheJapanesegovernmentnorIcananswerthatquestion.”AJapaneseofficerrespondedtoasimilarquestion,stating,“Thereisanagreement between our emperor and Pétain….We cannot do anything ourselves.”48These people were unable to give a convincing explanation as to why the JapanesepersistedincoexistingwiththeFrench.

NewRelationshipsbetweentheFrenchandVietnameseFacedwithasituationinwhichtheJapanesehadbothpublicandprivatecontactwiththe Vietnamese population, what sort of relationship with the locals did the Frenchseek? Japanhadappealed to theVietnameseas fellowmembersofgreaterEastAsia.While restricting and intervening in such efforts, the French colonial authoritieswere

46 TânÁ,no.19,1943;TânÁ,no.24,1943. 47 AN,MI43,1.AuditionducommandantJouan,commissaireadjointauxrelationsfranco-japonaises,le28mars1946.48 ANOM,RSTNF6963.RapportsurlasituationduTonkin,1943.

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forced to reexamine their approach toward the indigenous population. The colonialgovernment under the Vichy regime had begun to call for “work, family, fatherland”over“liberty,equality,fraternity”inIndochinaaswellasinthemetropole.InVietnam,thisgovernmentemphasizeddoctrinesofVichyFrance—hierarchy,order,authority,anda return to the soil—assuming commonalities with the worldview of traditionalConfucianism,andtherebysought toattract theattentionof thepopulation (Jennings2001; Verney 2012). An article in the journal Indochine,hebdomadaire illustréstated,“Work, family, fatherland. These slogans are not irrelevant to us Vietnamese.On thecontrary, these are similar to the four duties of which Confucius spoke—discipline,economy, governance, and tranquility—which have been ours for many years.”49Articlesmaking statements like these proliferated, reinforcing an effort to strengthenFrenchcontrolbynarrowingthegapbetweenFranceanditscolony,heedingtheviewsofthelocalsratherthanunilaterallyimposingandassertingaFrenchviewofcivilization.

Under the slogan “France and Indochina drawing together,” the colonialgovernmentpromotedaffinitybetween the Frenchand the local populationonmanylevels,includingeverydaylife.ThispromotionwasinresponsetotheJapaneseemphasisonthegapbetweenEastandWest incomparisonto theunityofeasternAsia. In July1942, the Federal Council of Indochina reported that “on the basis of a valuable andaccurate survey conducted recently in Tonkin, it has been confirmed that the mostfrequentcausesforexpressionsofdissatisfactionamongalllevelsofVietnamesesocietyare an absence of consideration, an absence of empathy, or simply an absence ofinterest by Frenchmen in the Indochinese.”50 Relations with the locals were revisedbasedonsuchunderstanding.

Thisrevisionextendedtothetermsusedinofficialdiscourse.Forexample,colonyimplied exploitationor an “unstable and impermanent relationship,” and its use wastherefore avoided in public. 51 Moreover, indigène (indigenous), with its scornfulovertones, was banned from official use, and the term Indochinois (Indochinese)wasusedinstead.Sincetheearly1930sFrenchofficialshadbeenprohibitedfromusingthefamiliarpronoun“you”(tu)whenaddressingsubordinates.Althoughthebanhadbeenlargelyignored,itwasreissuedunderrevision.52

Ruleswereissuednotjustaboutvocabularybutconcerningthegeneralattitudeofthe French. The governor general notified each of the regional administrations that“giventheappallingcustomofspeakingtoIndochineseinanunpleasanttone,”itwas

49 Indochine,hebdomadaireillustré,21novembre1940.50 TTLT1(TrungtâmLưuTrữQuốcGia1:Hanoi),Gougal1307.Conseilfédéralindochinois,sessiondejuillet1942,moyenspropresàfavoriserlerapprochementfranco-indochinois.51 TTLT1,Gougal1304.Organisationlocaledelapropagande.Circulaireduchefduservicedel’IPPauxchefsadministratifslocaux,6septembre1941.52 ANOM,RSTNF6174.DirectiondesAffairesPolitiques.CirculairedugouverneurgénéralaurésidentsupérieurauTonkin,24juillet1942.

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forbiddento“expressangerinyourdailyconductanddutiesoruseabusiveexpressions”inordertoimprovethebehavioroftheFrenchtowardtheindigenouspopulation.53

InMarch1942,thearmyswimmingpool,whichhadbeenopenonlytotheFrench,startedtoadmitlocals.54 ToencourageinteractionbetweentheFrenchandVietnamese,variousorganizationslikesportsteamsandyouthclubswerepaidtoincludetheFrenchaswellaslocalsintheiractivities.AstheBoyScoutsoftheIndochineseUnionhadthreehundred French citizens among its five thousandmembers, and the Catholic studentand youth wing had two hundred and fifty Vietnamese and Frenchmembers (Raffin2005,74), thenumberofcombinedorganizationsappears tohave increasedbetween1940and1945.However,inreality,combinedactivitieswererelativelyrare.AccordingtohistorianPierreBrocheux,whospenthisyouthinIndochinaandwasaBoyScoutinSaigon,histroopwaslargelyFrenchexceptfortwoVietnameseboysandtwochildrenofmixedrace.WhenthetroopwenttoacampinDanang,theymetanothertroopofVietnamese children.Although they shared the same campfire, they sat at a distancefrom each other, and there was little communication between the two groups.AccordingtoBrocheux,therewasasignificant languagebarrier.AlthoughafewoftheVietnamesechildrenspokeFrench,theywerereluctanttospeakwithanaccentinfrontofFrenchchildrentheirownage(Larcher-GoschaandDenis2003,39–42).

ThelimitednatureoftheexperimenttobringtheFrenchandVietnamesetogetheracross a variety of organizations is evident in the case of the LégionFrançaise desCombattants (French Legion of Combatants), the largest political organization inIndochina.ThiswasapoliticalVichyorganizationthatsoughttodeveloptherévolutionnationale(theofficialideologyoftheVichygovernment)andencouragetheidolizationof Pétain. In 1943, it hadmore than seven thousandmembers, but all of themwereFrench. Governor Decoux asked the metropole to clarify whether the Légion in theAfriqueOccidentaleFrançaise (Algeria) should admit the locals asmembers. The replyhe receivedstated thatalthough those twocoloniesdid indeedallow for theentryoflocalsasmembers,thiswasadecisiontobemadebythegovernor.Asaresult,Decouxpreserved the Légion as anorganization admittingonly Frenchmembers. Localswerenotadmittedandcouldonlybedesignated“FriendsoftheLégion”(Jennings2001,149).

NotwithstandingtheslogantobringFranceandIndochinacloser,therewasagapbetweenrhetoricandreality.Throughoutthecolonialperiod,mostFrenchhadenjoyedtheirprivilegedstatusandcouldnoteasilychangethehabitsfosteredbytheircoloniallifestyle. Some essential goods began to be rationed around this time, even for theFrench,whodespisedqueuingwiththelocalpopulation.TheHanoiadministrationthatfielded their complaints expressed concern that “mingling with the indigenous

53 TTLT1,DirectiondesFinances3443.CirculairedeDecouxauxchefsdel’administrationlocale,18avril1942.54 DiplomaticArchivesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,“ReportsonthePoliticalSituationinSouthernFrenchIndochina.”MiscellaneousdocumentsrelatingtotheinternalgovernanceofFrenchterritories,May10,1943.

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populationwas resulting in the French losing their authority”55 and so experimentedwithdistributingcommoditiestotheFrenchandlocalsondifferentdays.56

Despitesuch limitationsoneverydaycontact, thenewmeasures launchedby thecolonial authorities had the effect of stimulating the identity of the Vietnamesepopulation. In particular, the youthmovements that unfoldedon a large scale duringthistimeresultedinoutcomesthattheFrenchhadnotexpected.BackinFrance,youthshadmobilizedin largenumberstoworshipPétainandrealizetherévolutionnationale.Throughphysicalandmentaldiscipline,theywereactivelytrainedtosustainthefutureof the Vichy regime, and this youthmovementwas introduced into Indochina (Raffin2005). In Indochina, French and Vietnamese youths were required to attend sportsmatches,BoyScoutmeets,physicaltraining,andotheractivitiestogethertoovercometheir“ethnicantagonisms.”57 Theideawasthatthisnewactivity,mobilizingboththeirbodiesandtheirspirits,wouldfiretheinterestoftheindigenouspopulationandcauseamicable relations to develop between them and the French (Ducoroy 1949, 39). ByFebruary1944,aroundaboutsixhundredthousandyoungpeoplewereparticipatingintheyouthmovementinIndochina(Raffin2005,5).

Connected to this youth movement was the popularity of sports events. ThecolonialauthoritieswereconcernedabouttheVietnamesecompetingwiththeFrenchbecausetheywereunsureabout thescopeof theirabilities,but theyplannedvariousevents in the hope that it would “keep the Indochinese youth away from Japanesepropaganda”(Ducoroy1949,39).Inlightofthislarge-scaleyouthmovementdevelopedbytheFrench,theJapaneseaskedtheFrenchcolonialauthoritiesforpermissiontoalsocompete in certain athletic events, such as swimming and gymnastics, two sports inwhichtheJapaneseexcelled.However,seekingtomonopolizetheattentionofyouthinIndochina,theFrenchrefusedtherequestobliquely,permittingJapaneseparticipationonly in events like bicycling and pelota, in which they had little experience. Soonthereafter,theFrenchcolonialauthoritiesnotifiedtheirregionaladministratorstoneveraccepttheJapanesedemandtoparticipateinsportingeventswithoutthepermissionofthe central government, signifying the exclusion of Japan from the youthmovement(Ducoroy1949,132–133).SomeJapanesewerepersonallyinvitedtoandparticipatedintheactivitiesofVietnamesestudents,58 buttherewasnoorganizedparticipationpriortothefutsuinshoriinMarch1945.

Allof thesenewactivities for the indigenousyouth—thediscipliningof thebody,the constant group gatherings, the gymnastics and contests, the marching andscouting—encouragedunityanddiscipline,kindlingtheirpoliticalawareness.ThelyricstoasongoftensungatBoyScoutsactivitiesinSaigonwere,“Howdoyouhelpmakethe

55 TTLT1,MairiedeHanoi3612.Rapportsurl’étatd’espritdelapopulation,24janvier1944.56 TTLT1,MairiedeHanoi3612.Rapportsurl’étatd’espritdelapopulation,14février1945.57 MAE,Guerre1939–1945,Vichy,Asie,255.TélégrammedeDecouxauMinistredesColonie,20octobre1942.58 TokyôDaigaku1980–1981,Inntabyûkiroku,C-6,72–73.InterviewwithTomomiYamaguchibyMasayaShiraishi,November19–20,1979.

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country strong? If you can think by yourself, then it’s easy. If you can’t, youwill stayperpetualslaves.Weaknessorstrength, itdependsonyou.Everyone,reflectonthesewords.”59

MauriceDucoroy,chiefadministratorfortheyouthmovement,lateradmittedthathehadrecognizedtheeffectthismovementwouldhaveontheVietnamesebutsawnoother way of keeping the youths on the French side and away from Japaneseinfluence.60 After the end of French rule on March 9, 1945, and the subsequentterminationofJapaneseoccupationwithJapan’sdefeatonAugust15,theVietnameseyouthsactive in thismovementplayedanenormous role indisciplining theVietMinhforcesthatopposedtherestorationofFrenchrule.61

ConclusionThecomplexsituationdiscussedinthisarticleconcludedwiththefutsuinshorionMarch9, 1945. As it became clear in 1943 that the Axis powers were in an unfavorablesituation, the possibility of a futsuinshori began to be discussed in Tokyo that fall.AlthoughtheJapanesemilitaryacknowledgedtheneedforacoup, its implementationwaspostponed to allow for a full focuson thePhilippines campaign.When theAlliesliberatedFrance in the summerof1944,and theVichygovernment fell, the JapanesebecameskepticalabouttheIndochinesecolonialauthorities’“cooperationwithJapan.”Moreover, despite the lack of an Allied plan for landing in Indochina, Japan deemedsucha landingimminent in lightof intensifyingaerialbombinginIndochinaandfinallydecided to eliminate French suzerainty by force in January 1945 (Akagi 1984, 46–48;ShiraishiandFuruta1976,10–19).

WecantracethemeetingbetweenFrance,Vietnam,andJapanbacktotheĐôngDu movement formed by Phan Bội Châu in the early twentieth century. Nearly twohundredVietnameseyouths fromthismovementsawhope in Japanas the firstAsiancountryto“modernize”andstudiedthereforthesakeoffutureindependence.Butthemovement was dissolved in 1909 by the Japanese government, which prioritized itsrelationship with France (Shiraishi 1993). This “imperialist complicity” of France andJapanwithregardtoIndochinatookonaddedcomplexitywhenitcameintoplayagainduringtheSecondWorldWar.

Although the French and the Japanese in Indochina hadminor conflicts at times,they coexisted while minimizing friction as they prioritized their respective interests.TheyalsoexploredwaystointeractwiththeVietnamese,becausebothforeigngroupsperceived that gaining local supportwas a key element determining the fate of their

59 ANOM,HCI,Conspol161.Cochinchine,rapportmensueldu16décembre1932au15janvier1944.60 AN,MI43/1,LaCommissiondu13décembre1945pourentendreDucoroy,Capitainedevaisseau.61 ANOM,Fondsprivés14PA54.Directiongénéraledesétudesetrecherches.Bulletinderenseignements,4octobre1945.

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ruleandoccupation.SomeJapaneseprotectedandsupportedVietnamesenationalists,butsuchinitiativesinevitablyendedupbeinghalf-heartedduetothenationalpolicyofseihitsuhoji.JapanhadexercisedalevelofinfluenceoversomeVietnameseintellectualssince the beginning of the twentieth century, but the ambition to gain total supportfromthelocalpopulationwasconstantlyobstructedbyJapan’sownimperialistpolicies.Bycontrast,theFrenchtriedtoapproachtheVietnamesebasedonVichyideology,andsuch new policies had the effect of stimulating their national identity. Thus, therelationshipsamongFrance, Japan,andVietnamwereconstrainedduetothe intrinsiccontradictionsofFranco-Japanesecoexistence,aswellasnewdevelopments resultingfromthestimulatingeffecttheyhadoneachother.

Meanwhile, the Viet Minh steadily expanded the scope of its activities, takingadvantageoftheturbulentperiodwhenJapanesetroopswerestationed in Indochina,and gained the support of the population,which suffered under theworsening livingconditions caused by Franco-Japanese coexistence. The French systemof controlwasterminatedwiththefutsuinshoriinMarch1945,butJapanhadlittlecapabilitytocollectinformation about Viet Minh activities, which allowed the Viet Minh to decisivelyexpand its influence during this power vacuum. The VietMinh took control after thedefeatofJapanandestablishedtheRepublicofVietnaminSeptember1945.Francehadlostitssuzeraintyand,inendeavoringtoreestablishitsruleinIndochinaafterthewar,itsoughttorestoreaRepublicanFrance.Indoingso,thenewFrenchgovernmentdeniedthepreviousstateofcoexistencebetweenVichyFranceandJapan,emphasizingthattheFrenchhadresistedJapaneseruleduringthosefiveyears(Namba2013).

By April 1946, both the British and Chinese militaries had withdrawn fromIndochina,andFrancestartedafull-scalecomeback,dispatchingmoreandmoretroops.The Viet Minh reacted furiously to the return of France, and as a result, the FirstIndochinese War broke out at the end of 1946. France failed to reestablish stablecontrolofIndochinaandwasforcedtoendtheconflict,withdrawingentirelyin1954.Aswehaveseen,therefore,thebeginningoftheendofFrenchrulecanbetracedbacktothisdecisiveperiodofFranco-JapanesecoexistenceduringtheSecondWorldWar.ReferencesAkagiKanji.1984.“Futsuinnshoriwomegurugaikôtogunji”[Militaryaffairsand

diplomacyindealingwithIndochina].Hôgakukenkyû[Lawstudies]57(9):28–62.Bauchar,René.1946.Rafalessurl’Indochine[GunfireonIndochina].Paris:L.Fournieret

Cie.Brocheux,Pierre,andPaulIsoart,eds.1982.L’Indochinefrançaise,1940–1945[French

Indochina,1940–1945].Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.Ducoroy,Maurice.1949.MatrahisonenIndochine[MybetrayalinIndochina].Paris:

ÉditionsInternationales.Franchini,Phillippe.1977.ContinentalSaigon.Paris:ÉditionsMétailié.

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PacificWar].Tokyo:Aokishoten.AbouttheAuthorChizuruNambaisAssociateProfessorofEconomicsatKeioUniversity.