The Future of Turkey.

By Donovan Crowley

POS205 -- Nezha Hamid.

Red Rocks Community College – 2011, Spring

Points to be addressed:

Why it is inevitable that Turkey will become a major regional power.

- Economic growth

- Solid power in an area of weak regimes.

- Location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe.

Current Turkish political intentions.

- “No problems with neighbors.”

- Neutral mediator role.

What will force Turkey to take a side.

- Iranian vs. Saudi / Shia vs. Sunni

- Armenia vs. Azerbaijan

- Energy imports from Russia.

Power split religious vs. secular / east vs. west

- How the split developed.

1. Original purpose of the Anatolian region for the 16th century Turks:

buffer region.

2. Prosperous western farming in Sea of Marmara area.

3. 90-year isolation during which time Eastern Turkey was developed,

leading to political integration.

4. AKP and secularists.

Who currently has power and why.

1. Worries about the AKP.

2. Lack of either side to push any hidden agendas.

3. Balanced approach by the AKP which appeals to many secularists as

well.

a. Religious position: tough stance on Israel, and continuing

dominance of Islam through political affairs.

b. Secular position: Active NATO member who say they want to

join the EU. (Mention Libya involvement)

4. Acceptance/Integration of minorities (i.e. Kurds).

How Turkey will progress, and what will it look like.

- Picking a side: The West (EU, US & Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan), Russia &

Armenia, Iran.

- Other players to consider: Israel, Egypt, Iraq.

- Possible expansion plans: Levant

1. Good area to cut their teeth on, because of weak or unpopular

governments in the region.

2. Not very profitable region, however.

3. Why the Levant is a more attractive prospect than the Balkans or

Caucasus.

a. Balkans

b. Caucasus

- Islamic overtures with Western actions.

1. Why Turkey will not side with Russia and Armenia

a. Unwilling to become swallowed by Russian economic and political

dominance.

b. Already looking for energy alternatives which will alienate Russia

and its closer ally Armenia.

2. Why Turkey will not side with Iran

a. Distrustful of Iran’s religious government.

b. Predominantly Sunni .

c. Perceptions by the West and what this would mean for economic

relations.

d. Impossible to assert its own dominance while playing regional

second-fiddle to Iran.

- Summary: Turkey will not side with the West over ideological reasons or

even because the West is a particularly attractive option to Turkey in itself,

but it offers the most options for Turkey to expand its regional influence as

it plays the main counterbalance to Iran in Iraq.

Why is it inevitable Turkey will become a major regional power?

Turkey has been outside of mainstream politics for approximately ninety years,

since the end of World War I. So, it is excusable if many or even most people are

unaware of the role Turkey plays today and the role it will play in the future… for

now. Turkey will become a major regional player in the Middle East once again,

however. This paper will endeavor to explore the current and likely future

political outlook for Turkey. It will also take a closer look at if Turkey will take on

the shape of a Western European-style power, or a Middle Eastern style such as

Saudi Arabia or Iran. Another way of wording this is will Turkey’s political self-

expression be predominantly religious or secular in nature?

In order to understand the role Turkey will play, it is first important to understand

why Turkey will become a major player in the region whether it wants to or not.

1. Economic Assets and Growth:

Prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 & 2009 (GFC08), Turkey has been a

major agricultural and industrial producer. It supplied Europe with a stunning

percentage of goods, including over a million automobiles in 2006, and a total of

over 50% of its television sets, among many other things. Turkey is also ranked as

the 4th leading shipbuilding nation in terms of the number of ships and mega

yachts ordered from them. Turkey is ranked 10th in the world in mineral

production as well, and it is estimated 72% of the world’s boron salts are in

Turkey.

The GFC08 had an impact on Turkey, as it did every other country; however even

during this time the Turkish stock market rose the 2nd most in the world, with

market share prices in Turkey nearly doubling. The international credit rating

agencies Moody’s and Fitch also upgraded Turkey’s rating by a notch, and two

notches respectively.

Furthermore Turkey has the 15the largest global Gross Domestic Product,

Purchasing Power Parity (GDP-PPP) The GDP-PPP is a method of weighing income

against cost of living to arrive at a value of how much you can actually buy.

Just based on these empirical values it is clear to see that Turkey, with its

developed cities and businesses, has a solid basis for sustained economic growth.

This will inevitably leads to growth of power and influence as well.

2. Continental Crossroads:

Turkey lies right at the heart of the crossroads between the East and West, or

more precisely between Asia and Europe. While for the Ottoman and early

Turkish Empires this meant a firm hold over any trade routes going between the

two continents, this is no longer the case. The once essential trade routes through

the Black Sea, while still important, are much less so these days; Deep-sea

navigation has created alternative transit routes.

This area is still of very significant geopolitical importance, though. Turkey sits

between three major power-spheres: Europe, Russia and the Middle East. Any

entity in any of these spheres of influence looking to permanently expand the

reach of their power into another region will have to do it through Turkey. This

also puts Turkey in a unique position to play politics in any of these regions, as

well as Northern Africa, thanks to the Mediterranean Sea.

3. Failing Influences in the Middle East:

Since the US invasion of Iraq, the Sunni-Shi’a power balance has been tipped. Iran

no longer has a Sunni adversary on its Western immediate border to keep its

influence in the Middle East in check. Many Iraqi politicians are in fact Shi’a now,

and show open warmth towards Iranian influence. Iran has attempted to take on

a legitimizing force behind these Shi’a politicians and will push even harder for a

Shi’a-controlled Iraq as the United States withdraws at the end of this year.

With Iraq’s fall as a major regional player, there is a significant Sunni power

vacuum in its place – the way is cleared some for Turkey to take a position of

greater prominence. Turkey is not yet willing to do this, but it will have no choice.

I will expand on this more, later.

Current Turkish Political Intentions:

Intentions of a country operating in a political environment seldom have any real

importance or consequence regarding what the country actually does or is forced

to do. This is especially true of good intentions.

1. “No problems with neighbors.”

Turkey’s would like to operate as they have for the last 90 years: no problems

with their neighbors. They are a NATO member but import most of their energy

from Russia. They let the US military operate out of their bases. They trade with

Iran, Israel and Europe. They advise the Syrians and the Saudis on treating their

peoples fairly, but have often persecuted their own ethnic minorities. For nearly a

century Turkey has been focused on their own country and developing it, with

their only wish for the outside world being that they would leave them in peace.

2. Neutral mediator role.

Turkey would still like to have no problems with their neighbors, but it has taken

on a new dimension. Turkey would like to play the Neutral mediator role for the

region, as Egypt has done in the past. This can be perfectly illustrated as Turkey

offered to negotiate between the Gadhafi regime and Libyan rabbles at the start

of the 2011 Libyan civil-war. On one hand it would seem Turkey is perfectly suited

to the role, due to their location. But Turkey has too much power in itself to

remain completely neutral. And as a powerful entity it must act in its own

interests before its neutrality, if it intends to continue to flourish as a state.

What will force Turkey to take a side:

With a resurgent Russia, squabbling Europe and tumultuous Middle East

surrounding Turkey however, Turkey will eventually be forced to pick a side and

take the enemies that are associated with it. To demonstrate how easy it is to

make enemies: Recently, Turkey is attempting to flex its muscle as a show to

Europe. It is attempting to take the role as lead country in the NATO operations

against Libya.

Firstly, participating in a military operation against Gadhafi indicates its stance as

a neutral party is already wavering. Secondly, as it attempts to take the leading

role away from France, it is very possible it will step on French toes. France is

attempting to assert itself as the leading military force in Europe to Germany, in

response to Germany’s own power plays as the leading economic power in

Europe. Consequently, France will not appreciate Turkey’s attempts to upstage

them.

If Turkey did attempt to take no sides whatsoever, this would become detrimental

to Turkey’s abilities to operate with any of its neighbors. As Russia continues to

meddle in the area, and Iran continues on a collision course with the rest of the

world, countries will begin to take more and more of a “with us or against us”

position. Attempting to take no sides, Turkey would run the very real risk of being

seen as against everyone. This is not an attractive proposition for any country.

1. Irani vs. Saudi / Shi’a vs. Sunni

The most pressing issue, from an American standpoint is maintaining the

Shi’a/Sunni balance in the Middle East. Iraq was a very capable roadblock against

Iran. This is not because Iraq had a more skilled or well-equipped fighting force,

but because they were more than willing engage in a war of attrition with Iran.

This war was fueled by the large numbers on otherwise unemployed Iraqis, and so

they were readily able to replenish their military.

With Iraq no longer acting as a roadblock to the Iranians, that duty has fallen on

the Americans, who occupy positions on either side of Iran. But America is seeing

to disentangle itself from the Middle East, where it has been operating for nearly

a decade now.

The duty of gatekeeper to Iran has now fallen on the Saudis: Next-in-line of the

Sunni countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a rich country with a well-

equipped and well-trained fighting force. What Saudi Arabia lacks, however are

significant numbers of forces to repel (or more importantly to counterattack) an

Iranian or Iranian-backed incursion. The US would, of course intervene on Saudi

Arabia’s behalf, but what the US wants most is to extricate itself from the Middle

East, not get in another conflict. Iran knows this, and would happily use it to their

advantage to put the US in an awkward position.

This is where the US and Saudi Arabia turn to Turkey. With significant border on

both Iraq and Iran, Turkey, together with Saudi Arabia, is more than capable of

countering Iranian influence in the region. This is not to say Turkey intends to

invade Iraq or Iran – this is certainly not the case – but with the proper political

moves showing support for Saudi Arabia it could be assured that they never have

to. Turkey will eventually support Saudi Arabia if it comes to a showdown

between the Saudis and Iranians. I will explain more on why, later.

2. Turkey vs. Armenia vs. Azerbaijan

As mentioned earlier, Turkey has tried to keep all its neighbors appeased. This

includes the nemeses Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey has never fully managed to

achieve the same fruitful relations with Armenia that it has with Azerbaijan,

however. This is understandable, since it was Panturkism (the theory that all

Turks should be united in language and religion) which was responsible for the

genocide committed against the Armenians perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire

in 1915-1917.

Turkey has recently tried to normalize relations with Armenia with mixed success.

However, as Azerbaijan announces a strategic partnership with Turkey, Armenia is

put on the ropes again. Fearing a political and military alliance of its two rivals,

Armenia has set about securing much closer ties to Russia. Clearly the lines of

allies and enemies are already forming, pushing Turkey more and more outside its

“no problems with neighbors” stance.

3. Energy imports from Russia.

Although Turkey is extremely mineral-rich, and has significant agricultural assets,

what it lacks are the energy reserves to be self-sufficient. Though it does possess

some oil and gas reserves, it does not have nearly enough to drive is

manufacturing-heavy economy, or its burgeoning modernized cities.

Consequently it imports most of its energy from Russia.

While this is a masterful play on Russia’s part in securing economic pseudo-fealty

from Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan (on top of Germany and Iran), it leaves the

Turks feeling very insecure. Turkey has no desire to enter into a Russian trade

agreement like many other Former Soviet Union (FSU) states have been forced

into over the past couple years. There is likelihood that Russia will at some point

hold Turkey’s energy need hostage at some point unless they do enter a trade

agreement, however. Unless Turkey can find an alternative supplier of fuel – cue

Saudi Arabia, and add Russia to Turkey’s list of unhappy neighbors.

Power split religious vs. secular / east vs. west

While Turkey starts to worry more and more about things abroad, it has its own

splinterings at home. The secularist Western part of the country strongly supports

the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the embodiment of Atatürk’s reforms from

the 1920s and ‘30s. Meanwhile the more religiously-minded East supports the

Justice and Development Party (AKP).

1. How the split developed.

Before getting into the dynamics of the two parties, it is worth noting how this

very fundamental split developed.

a. Prosperous farming in Sea of Marmara area.

After the Turks conquered Constantinople and brought an end of the Byzantine

Empire, they began to establish a Turkish (aka Ottoman) Empire. Constantinople,

then renamed to Kostantiniyye (or Constantine) would become the capital of a

second great empire.

Constantine (modern day Istanbul) occupies a position on the Strait of

Bosphorous, just north of the Sea of Marmara. The Sea of Marmara is small sea in

the Northwest of Turkey that adjoins the Aegean Sea with the Black Sea.

Because of the costal climate and numerous gently sloping valleys in this part of

Turkey, the fertile areas around the Sea of Marmara were extremely agriculturally

productive. They were also wide open to invasion from practically every direction.

If the Turks wanted to hang onto this prosperous region they were going to have

to expand, defend, conquer and consolidate the surrounding regions.

b. Original purpose of the Anatolian region for the 16 th century Turks: buffer

region.

The Anatolian (Eastern Turkey) was one of the first regions the Turks expanded

into, because there were already a great number of Turkish tribes in this region.

The region was not agriculturally productive, however, with less water and

rougher terrain the further east you headed. The sole purpose of this region was

to act as a buffer from invaders to the East.

Because of this, East Turkey was not treated to the same luxuries as West Turkey.

Furthermore, many communities in East Turkey, despite being part of the Turkish

Empire, remained disjointed. News and administration also moved much more

slowly in this section of the country.

c. 90-year isolation.

After the Turkey was defeated in World War I, and finally lost its Turkish Empire

once and for all, it would go into a 90 year phase of introspection and

development. Thanks to both sides seeing Turkey as too costly to occupy during

WWII, while the rest of the world fought, Turkey’s progress remained

uninterrupted.

World War I had another dramatic effect on Turkey. As Allied troops occupied

Istanbul, Atatürk (an accomplished soldier and head of the Turkish Nationalist

Movement, and later 1st President of the Republic of Turkey) was forced to make

Ankara the capital of Turkey. This very definitively shifted the focus of the

government to the East. Even after reclaiming the prosperous western half of the

country, the country, development occurred at a much more even pace.

d. AKP and CHP.

The CHP is the oldest party in modern-day Turkey. This is the party founded by

Atatürk, and would remain the only party in Turkey until after World War II, when

a multi-party system would replace the single-party system. The AKP is highly

secularized, left-leaning whose primary power base is amongst white collar

business professionals and, unsurprisingly, with government employees

themselves. Despite Atatürk moving the capital to the east and assuring

development of both sides of the country, the CHP’s primary power base is in the

West.

The AKP is a right-leaning party whose power-base is in East Turkey primarily,

though, oddly, it also has majority support in Istanbul. AKP also has the support of

many voting blue-collar Kurdish laborers. The party is considered a reformist

party, but there are accusations the party holds a secret Islamist agenda, primarily

due to the fact many of its core members were formerly members of the banned

Islamist Virtue Party. The AKP holds that it is mainstream conservative party,

however not a religious party in a political guise. The AKP also strongly advocates

membership in the European Union, reinforcing their dedication to the West and

secularist values, even if the European Union in its current financial state would

be detrimental to Turkey’s current economic success.

Who currently has power and why.

The AKP currently has control of the Grand Assembly in Turkey by 3-to-1 over the

CHP. There are many reasons for this, including: the balanced approach by the

AKP, which appeals to many secularists as well as religious supporters, and the

acceptance of Kurds mainstream Turkish society. Conversely, while the AKP has

significant support by secularists as well as Islamists, the CHP has virtually no

supporters within the Islamist base, by comparison. This is indicative of “out of

touch” leadership within the CHP, and it is likely the CHP will continue to lose

support unless they can make their position more balanced and appealing once

more.

Acceptance/Integration of minorities (i.e. Kurds).

The AKP holds tremendous support with many Kurds in Turkey, and last year

offered amnesty to several Kurdish terrorists on the condition that they renounce

violence. AKP has also offered some limited assistance to Kurds in Iraq in the past

couple years.

Worries about the AKP.

CHP supporters in Turkey are not the only ones with concerns about AKP having a

hardline religious doctrine motivating their political moves, however. Israel and

the United Nations both condemned Turkey for their support of the “aid-flotillas”

which set sail to Israel in support of Palestine. While Turkey condemned Israel for

their actions against the flotillas, the international community was equally quick

to blame Turkey for their role as an instigator.

Lack of either side to push any hidden agendas.

Even if the AKP had a hidden agenda to bring Sharia-Law to Turkey, which is a

highly dubious claim, they would be unable to push this agenda due to lack of

support from the general population. While CHP may be losing support of some

secularists there are still millions of secularists and even Islamists in the country

who would not support Sharia.

Similarly, the CHP has tried and failed to have the AKP banned by a constitutional

court for subverting Turkish secularism. As a friend of mine put it: “There is no

better defense against hidden agendas than not being able to affect them.”

Turkey’s Outlook:

Based on what I know and what I have read, here are my predictions for Turkey,

barring any major new developments:

The Turkish economy will continue to grow, but the more it does, the more

Turkey will be faced with the dilemma: give up much of their economic power to

Russia, or fine alternative energy solutions.

Turkey will not join the European Union, but will continue to espouse its intent to

do so. The EU is currently involved in political infighting and has only narrowly

avoided a potential economic calamity in Greece and Italy. Turkey is in a much

better economic position than the EU and wishes to remain there; however in an

attempt to reassure the West and secularists within Turkey of the government’s

commitment to Western values it will talk big about joining the EU.

Turkey will have to pick a side to play with, and accept the enemies and problems

that come with that. Their theoretical options are Russia & Armenia, the West

(EU, US & Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan) or Iran. Other regional players to consider are

Israel, Egypt, Libya and Iraq.

Let’s disentangle this web briefly, so we might predict Turkey’s choice:

Russia:

If Turkey were to maintain relations with Russia (assuming Russia does not

attempt to push an onerous trade agreement on Turkey), Azerbaijan would be

extremely spooked by this. Having both its rival Armenia and its closest ally,

Turkey, in line with Russia (who all parties should know would be more than

happy to gobble their territory up into an expanded Russia) would cause

Azerbaijan to start reaching out for International partners. This partner could be

Iran out of desperation, or Saudi Arabia. Eventually Russia will start leaning on

Turkey (perhaps to put pressure on the US in the Middle East in return for US

concessions elsewhere that would benefit Russia), and Turkey will have to cave,

or risk the health of their entire economy. Turkey’s participation in NATO would

also become a peculiar proposition, much like Germany’s. It should be mentioned

that Turkey is already searching for energy alternatives.

Iran:

Turkey will not side with Iran. Despite the mutual dislike of Israel which most

countries in the Middle East share, there is little else of common interest between

the two countries. Turkey does have economic interests in Iran, and it would like

to preserve these, to be certain. But the negative implications of asserting closer

ties to Iran could also jeopardize economic ties with the West. Iran would be a

viable energy alternative to Russia, but not only would this alienate Russia, it

would also alienate Saudi Arabia. It is much more probable that Turkey would side

with Saudi Arabia, the other large Sunni country in the region, than cross the

fence and side with Iran. Lastly, if Turkey were to ally with Iran, both countries

would still be vying for dominance, since neither is willing to play second-fiddle to

the other.

The West: Turkey may or may not side directly with the United States (it would

certainly prefer not to, since it could jeopardize its current relations with Iran and

Russia), but if major problems started brewing in the region it will certainly side

with Saudi Arabia. Turkey will also continue its NATO participation, since it

provides an excellent way for Turkey to cut its military and political teeth. Turkey

will not side with the West over ideological reasons or even because the West is a

particularly attractive option to Turkey in itself, but it offers the most options for

Turkey to expand its regional influence as it plays the main counterbalance to Iran

in Iraq.

As a last note, it bears some thought as to why Turkey is being so aggressive all of

a sudden in Libya. Could Turkey be doing more than simply flexing its muscle? The

Libyan rebels in Turkey have indicated they will give any powers aiding in the

removal of Gadhafi favorable contracts in a new Libya. As a former Libyan partner

back in the early 1900s, Turkey could be seeking to reassert its ties to Libya in

hopes of striking oil, which it desperately needs.

References: (Special thanks to Google Earth, for wasting hours of my time with

browsing pictures of far-off lands)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism_in_Turkey

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Turkey

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenia%E2%80%93Russia_relations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice_and_Development_Party_%28Turkey%29

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Turkey

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ankara

http://www.euratlas.net/history/europe/1500/index.html

http://www.turkeytravelplanner.com/go/Istanbul/Sights/Bosphorus/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_of_Istanbul

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_empire

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Istanbul

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100311_turkey_refusing_imf_funds

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100217_turkey_battle_over_judiciary

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100826_turkey_emerging_akp_gulenist_split

http://www.stratfor.com/node/167965/analysis/

20100726_geopolitics_turkey_searching_more

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101122_geopolitical_journey_part_5_turkey

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100525_islam_secularism_battle_turkeys_future

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100419_turkey_davutoglus_todo_list

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100615_turkey_escalating_tension_over_flotilla_probe

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20101121_turkey_accedes_missile_defense_plan

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100621_turkey_ruling_partys_challenges_home_and_abroad

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100518_brazil_balancing_iranian_mediation_and_us_ire

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/

20100513_russia_turkey_grand_energy_bargain

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080526115135AAxTwEj

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenia%E2%80%93Turkey_relations

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemalism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Kemal_Atat%C3%BCrk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_Constantinople

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Turkism

http://www.pkkonline.com/en/index.php?sys=article&artID=98