the german campaign in poland 1939 usa 1956

8/6/2019 The German Campaign in Poland 1939 USA 1956

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 2 0 - 2 5 5

THEGERMAN CAMPAIGNIN POLAND( 1 9 3 9 )

BYROBERT M . KENNEDYMAJOR, INFANTRY

UNITED STATES ARMY

HAY 9 1996

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY APRIL 1 9 5 6For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402 - Price $9.20Stock Number 008-020-00555-0


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DEPARTMENT OF TH E ARMYWASHINGTON 25, D. C , 18 April 1956Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-255 is published for the

information and useofall concerned.[AG385 (14Sep55)]

By Order ofWilber M. Brucker, Secretaryof theArmy:

MAXWELL D.TAYLOR,General, United/StatesArmy,Official: Chiefof Staff.

J O H N A.KLEIN, Major General, United States Army,

The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:Active Army:Gen Staff,DA (5) Armies(5)SS,DA (5) Corps(3)TecSvc,DA (5) Div (1)Adm Tec Svc Bd (1) Gen BrSvcSen(5)HqCONARC (25) PMST(1)OSMajComd (10) MilD ist(1)MDW (1)NO:StateAG (1);unitssameasActiveArmy.U8AR: SameasActiveArmy.For explanation ofabbrev iations used,see SR320-50-1.


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D ep artm e nt o f th e A r m y P am phlets Publishedin th eGE RM AN REPORT SERIES

No. Title Publibation date20-201 M ilitary I mprovisations D uring the R ussian Campaign Aug 5120-202 GermanTankM aintenance inW orld W ar I I Ju n 5420-230 Russian Combat Methods in World W ar II Nov. 5020-231 C om bat in R ussia n F o re sts and S wam ps Jul 5120-232 Airborne O perations: A German Appraisal Oct 5120-233 G erm an D efense T ac tic s A ga in st R u ssia n B re ak -T hr ou gh s- Oct 5120-234 O perations of Encircled Forces G erm an E xperience inRussia Jan 5220-236 Night Combat Jun 53 20-240 R ea r A rea S ecurity in R ussia T he Soviet Second F ro ntBehind the German Lines Ju l 5120-242 German Armored Traffic Control During the Russian Cam

paign Ju n 5220-243 G erm an A ntig uerrilla O perations in th e B alkins (19411944) Aug 5420-260 The G erman Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) Nov 5320-261a TheGermanCampaign in RussiaPlanning and Operations(1940-1942) M ar 5520-269 Small Unit Actions D uring the German Campaign inRussia Ju l 5320-290 Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign Ju l 5120-291 Effects of Climate on Combat in European R ussia Feb 5220-292 W arfare in the F ar North Oct 51iii


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FOREWORDTheOffice of the Chief of M ilitary History of the Department oftheArmy iscurrently preparing aseriesof studiesonGerman military operations in W orld W ar I I against forces other than thoseoftheUnited States. Thesemonographs willcoverGerman operationsintheBalkans,inRussia,inF inland, in Norway,and in France andtheLow Countries. The brief Polish-German struggle in late 1939

wasthefirstoftheseoperationsinorderofoccurrence.These campaign studies are being made available to the GeneralStaff andtotheArmyschoolsandcollegesasreferencew orks. Theywillalsoproveofvaluetoallwhoareinterested inm ilitary affairs.


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PREFACETheGermanattackonPolandprecipitatedWorldWarII,makingthe Polish campaign oneof particular significance to the student ofthe1939^5 conflict. ThelessonslearnedbytheGermanArmy initsoperations in Poland wereput tousein the later campaigns againstthewestern Allies,theBalkan states,and the Soviet Union. Polandalsoformedthetestinggroundfornewtheoriesontheuseofarmoredforcesandcloseairsupportofground troops. Thecompletedestruction of the Polish state and theremoval of Poland from the mapofeastern Europe weregrim portents of the fate of the vanquished inthenewconceptoftotalwar.Thepurposeofthiscampaignstudy istoprovidetheUnited StatesArmy with afactual account of German military operations againstPoland,basedonsourcem aterial from captured recordscurrently inthe custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army;monographs prepared by anumberof former German officers for theHistorical Division, United States Army, Eu rope; and such Polishaccountsaswereavailable. Sincenootherpam phlet intheserieswilldiscusstheexpansion of theGerman Armed Forces and the variousdiplomatic eventsth at preceded the outbreak of hostilities, these areincludedinpartoneofthestudy.Twopreliminary drafts of thestudy and aseriesof questionnairesweredistributed toacommitteeof former German general officers forreply and comment ontheir part in planning and operations, and tofillgapsintheofficial records. Theseformer Germ anofficers includedGeneraloberstFranzH aider,Chief oftheArm yGeneralStaff throughtheperiodofthePolish Campaign,Generaloberst HansvonSalmuth,General der Arti llerie Walter Warlimont, General der InfanterieGuentherB lumen tritt, andGeneralder Infanterie K ur t vonTippelskirch. Therepliesandcommentsof thesesurvivingkey participantsarereferred toin the footnotes and areavailableinthe author'sfileinthe Office of the Chief of Military History for study by interestedresearchers.AnenormoussourceofGermanmaterialexistsonthisopeningcampaignofWorldW arI I . Timeandpersonnelconsiderationspresentlymakeimpossibleanydetailed study of such significant features of thePolishCampaignasGermanexperienceswithirregularsandguerrillasin the rear areas,contacts with theRed Army at division and lower

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Vlii PREFACEcommandlevels,andtheestablishment of asecurity forcetopolicetheoccupied area and provide a buffer against a possible Soviet attackfromtherearwhilethemainGermanarmieswereengagedinthe1940campaign in western Europe. This vast store of unexplored documentsanduntranslatedbooks,articles,andotherwritingsstillpresentsachallengetotheseriousresearcherwhodesirestoobtainmorecomprehensive information on the matters which could betouched upononlybrieflyinthescopeofthisstudy.This study was writ ten by Maj. Robert M. Kennedy, under thedirection of the chief of the Special Studies Division, Office of theChief of Milita ry History . Appreciation is expressed to all whoparticipatedinthepreparationofthisstudy.


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CONTENTS

PARTONE.THEBACKGROUND OFTHE CONFLICT "'IChapter 1 . Polish-GermanRelationstoMarch 1939 1General 1The Versailles T reaty and the Rise of Hitler 2The Polish-German Nonaggression Pact 3The Austrian and Czechoslovak Crises 4The Revival of German C laims against Poland 6

2. GermanMilitary DevelopmentstoMarch1939 8The Treaty Restrictions 8The Reichswehr 9The Army 10The Navy 14The Covert Air Force 16The National Socialists in Power 17The W ehrm acht 20The New Army 22Expansion 22The Westwall 25M obilization 26Divisional Organization 28Command Organization 31The New N avy 33The New Air Force 35The G erman M ilitary Situation in M arch 1939 363. EventsLeading uptotheOutbreakof Hostilities 38General 38The Annual Military Directive, 1939-40 39Diplomatic Developments, April-July 41Events, 1-22 August 42The Pact with the Russians 44PART TWO. POLAND'S POSITION A N D GERMANY'S

PREPARATIONS FORTHE ATTACK 47Chapter 4. ThePolishStateandtheArmedForces 47Government 47Population and Economy 48Topography 48The Armed Forces 50General 50The Army 51The Navy 54Defense Plan and Dispositions 55ix


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X CONTENTS

PART TWOContinued pageChapter 5. TheG erm an Planan dPreliminary Movements 58April-May 1939The OKH Operation Order of 15June 1939 60 58The OKW Tim etable 63Logistical Support 64The N avy and Air Force 68The Concentration of Forces 70The Period of Indecision 73PART THREE. OPERATIONS IN PO LAND 78Army Group N orth, 1-3 September 79

Third Army Operations, 2Septem ber 80F ourth Army Operations, 2September 81Army Group South, 1-6 September 83

T he Advance across th e Polish Plain and into

Chapter 6 . A t ta c k and Breakthrough 78The Opening of the Attack 78The Opening B attles 79

The Junction of Third and Fourth Armies 82The Advance to the W arta (W arthe) 83

Galicia 85The Air Force and N avy 887 . The Destruction o f the Polish A rm y 91

General 91Army Group N orth, 4-17 September 92

Army Group South, 7-17 September 100

Operations in W estern Poland 92Operations in Eastern Poland 94Operations a t Brzesc 98The Intervention of the Russians 99Eighth Army 101Tenth Army 103Fourteenth Army 1068. TheEnd of theCampaign 109General 109The Battles for Warsaw and Modlin 109Early Surrender Overtures 109Initial German Attacks 110The Eighth Army Attack 111The C apture of M odlin 113Gdynia and Hela 114The Evacuation of Eastern Poland 116The Army Group N orth Area 117The Army Group South Area 118Results of the Campaign 120

9 . TheInterventionof the Soviet Union 122Diplomatic Negotiations 122The Red Arm y's Intervention Forces 124

10. The Fourth Par tit ion andG ermanO ccupat ion of Poland 126


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CONTENTS X iPART THREEContinued

Chapter 1 1 .Conclusions PageGeneral 130Lessons Learned by the W ehrmacht 131Materiel 131Organization 133Equipment 133TrainingandTactics 134AirSupport 135

Bibliographical No te 136Chronology of Events--- 138Rank Designations of German General a nd FlagOfficers 141

CHARTSNo.1. The Organization of the Reichsheer, 1921 -_ following p. 102. The W ehrm acht a nd the A rmed Services High Commands, 1939 323. ThePolishGroundandAirForce (PeacetimeEstablishment) followingp.504. German Order of Battle , 1September 1939 following p. 74MAPS

1. General Reference Map faces p. 12. Eastern Frontier ChangesFollowing World War I 43. The WehrkreisOrganization, 1939 following p.324. The Po lish Defense P lan and Es tim ate of Germ an S tr ength in theFrontier Area, August 1939 following p . 565. The German C oncept of Ground Operations following p . 586. The Concentration of German Forces following p.707. German Dispositions and Objec tives for the F ir st Day, as of 0445,1 September 1939 inside back cover8. Army Group North, 3September 1939 insideback cover9. Army Group South, 6September 1939 inside back cover10. German Situation, 17September 1939 insideback cover

ILLUSTRATIONS1. Troopsof theReichsheer s 11th I nfa ntry R eg im en t in T rain in g, 1 9 3 4 .. 122. Typical Barracks of the New Wehrmacht 233. M ark I I Tank 29 4. M ark I I I Tank 29 5. M ark IV Tank 29 6. Artist 's Conception of German Pocket Battleship 347. The U-25 34 8. The Messerschmitt 109,Standard German Fighter 349. TheJunkers 87 (Stuka) Dive Bomber 3410. The Batt leship Schleswig-Holstein 8011. Polish Fortif ication Near Mlawa 8012. The Tczew (Dirschau) Bridge Destroyed by the Poles 8013. G erm an 20-ton P on to n B ridge Across th e V istula a t Gniew (M ew e) 8014. German Regimenta l Command Post in Poland 87

15. German Infantry on the March in Poland 87


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xii CONTENTSNo. Page16. Polish L ight Tank D isabled by A ntitank Fire near Warsaw 10617. German Antia ircraf t Gun Suppor ting Advancing Infantry Along theBzura River 10618. German 150mm Howitzer Firing on Warsaw 11119. German 75mm Infantry Gun F iring on Target Near Warsaw 11120. PolishGarrisonof Warsaw MarchingoutofCityAfter theSurrender__ 119Credit.Figure 1Mr. Julius Weber.Figure2QenHub ert Lanz,Gebirgsjaeger(BadNauheim,1954).AHothersarefrom De pa rtm en t ofDefense files.


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GENERAL REFERENCE M A P L I T H U A N I A

E A S T P R U S S I A

ViennaA U S T R I A


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PART ONETHE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Chapte r 1Polish -German Relations to March 1939

GeneralThePolishstatetemporarilyceasedtoexistwhentheterritoriesoftheonce-powerful Kingdom of Poland weredivided among Prussia,Austria , and Russia in three part it ions of 1772, 1793, and 1795.Nationalist aspirations were not extinguished, and determined factionswithinPoland'sformerfrontiersandinexilewagedapersistentstruggle for the restoration of independence in the century and a

quarter that followed.Polish support was sought by both the Allies and the Centra lPowersinW orld W ar I. TheAllies announced asoneof their waraimsthe reestablishment of an independent Polish state. The Germans, occupying the country with the Austrians after driving outtheRussian armies,setup a Polish Government on 5November 1916in an effort to gain the favor of the nationalists. The Allied offerhadagreaterappealtothePoles,andthePolishNationalCommitteein Paris,the strongest exilegroup,under Ignace Paderewski, identified itself withtheAllies.The Polish Republic was proclaimed by nationalist leaders a tWarsaw on 3November 1918,as it became obvious tha t the CentralPowers were about to suffer a military collapse. Executive powerwasassumedbythe Regency Council,the government organized twoyears before by the German occupation authorities . The RegencyCouncilpromptlycalleduponJozef Pilsudski,themilitary leaderwhohad led Polish troops in Austrian service against the Russians, toassume the leadership of the new republic. Pilsudski was investediththepowersofamilitary dictatorandimmediately invited PaderrskiandotherPolish leadersinexiletoreturn. AcoalitiongovernntwasformedunderPaderewskion17January1919.

Jnlessotherwise noted, the material for this chapter wastaken from.William L.Langer,Encyclopedia of World History (Boston, 1952).


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2 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)Thenew Polish statecommenced its existence in themidst of ruinand poverty. Its territory had been the scene of heavy fighting between theCentral Powers and theRussians in theopening stagesofW orld W ar I, and the German and Austrian occupation forces hadsystematicallyexploitedthecountryintheseveralyearsthat followed.The end of the war found Poland's factories destroyed or idle, i ts livestock decimated, and the nation's economy in a state of chaos.Reconstruction and economic recovery in Poland were to take farlongerthanwasthecasewithmostotherWorldWarIparticipants.Poland'snorthwesternandwesternborderswerefixedbytheTreatyof Versaillesbetween Germany and the Allies on 28Ju ne 1919,anditssouthern frontier bytheTreaty of St.Germainbetween theAllies

and Austr ia-Hungary on 10September 1919. The Treaty of Riga(L atv ia) , 18March 1921,ended asuccessful campaign by thenewlyestablished s ta te against Soviet Russia and determined Poland'seasternandnortheastern frontiers.TheVersaillesTreatyandtheRiseofHitler

Theter rito ria lclausesofthetreatybetweenGermanyandtheAlliesprovidedPolandwithalandcorridortotheBalticSeaandthesiteofthefuture port of Gdynia, attheexpenseoftheprewarReich. Thisarrangement isolated the province of East Prussia from Germany,disrupted much of the Reich's economy, and placed thousands ofGermans inthe Corridor within theborders of the new Polish state.Danzig,amajorporta tthemouthoftheVistulaandpopulatedalmostcompletelybyGermans,wasmadeafreecity,withaLeagueofNationscommissioner and itsownelected legislature. Poland waspermittedto control Danzig's customs, to represent the Free City in foreignaffairs, andtokeepasmallmilitary forceintheharbor area. AplebiscitewastobeheldtodeterminethefrontierinpartsofUpperSilesia,butthepolessecuredseveralofthemoredesirableareasbyforceinasudden rising on 18August 1919. Despite heated German protests,theseareaswereincorporated intoPo land. Later plebiscitesdividedotherareasalonglinescorrespondingtothewishesofthelocalpopulation. A Polish-French treaty of alliance on 19February 1921wasdesignedtomaintaintheterritorialarrangementsthathadbeenmadeand toprovide France with aneastern counterweight to future Germanexpansion. [Seemap2.~\

Germany was preoccupied with internal troubles and reduced tothe position of an inferior power in the several years that followed.The Reich wasbeset with inflation until 1923and plagued with unemployment in the general depression after 1929. In 1933 AdolfHitler became chancellor and brought a new revolutionary systemofgovernmenttotheReich.


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3OLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS TO MARCH 1939Hitler'sNationalSocialistregimequicklyassumedcompletecontroloverGermany'snationallife and future. A dictatorship wascreatedand opposition suppressed. An extensive armaments program, expansionofthesmallarmedforcepermittedtheReichunderthetreaty,andpublicconstructionworkbroughtGermanyameasureofeconomicrecovery and improved the country 's military posture . Germanysoonregained asemblanceof the position it had held asa Europeanpowerbeforeitsdefeatin1918.The former Allies presented an obstacle to whatever plans H itletmayhavehadtorecovertheterritories taken from Germany. Theirarmed forces had notbeen modernized or equipped with great numbersof the latest weapons,but these countries collectively controlledan industria l and mili tary base s tronger than Germany's . Br itainhadthepreponderanceofseapowerandcouldrelyuponthepopulationandmaterialresourcesof itsworld-wideempirefor support. Francehadthelargest reservoir of trained manpower in western Europe byreasonof itsconscription program. Moreover, France had madedefensivearrangementswithRomaniaandthepostwarstatesofCzechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in addition to its alliance with Poland.Britain and France were reluctant to engage in an armed conflict

withGermanytocompelcompliancewiththeterritorialchangesmadeat the time of Allied victory which were not absolutely essential totheirownvitalinterests. H itlerestimatedcorrectlythissentimentofthe former Allied nations, and his foreign policy became a gameofbluff. Buttominimizetherisksofanarmedconflictwhileheexecutedhis first designs in Europe,the German dictator felt it necessary toeffectarapproachmentwithPoland.The Polish-German Nonaggression PactOn26January1934thePolishandGermanGovernmentsannouncedthe signing of a pact binding both to the arbitration of differences.The agreement was to be in effect for 10 years, unless renounced 6monthsinadvancebyeitherofthecontractingp arties. In his justification of the agreement to the German people, Hitler claimed thathe had entered into the pact to prevent the crystallization of bad

feelings over the boundaries into a traditional enmity between theGermans and Poles. Relations with Poland had been bad a t thetime the National Socialist government was established, and Hitlerdesired tobetter theserelations inthe interestsof peace.On30Janua ry 1937Hitler reaffirmed theimportanceof the Polish-GermanpacttotheassembledReichstag,declaringitinstrumentalineasingtensionbetweenthe twocountries. However,sincemaking theoriginal agreement, Germany had reintroduced conscription andgreatly expanded itsArmy. An Air Force had been organized,new


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THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)

E A S T E RN F R ON T IE R C H AN G ES FOLLOWING WORLD WAR IAreas ceded byG


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5OLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS TO MARCH 1939Hitler accelerated hiswarof nerves,andin March 1938Dr. Schuschnigg,reluctanttobringonwar,resignedinfavorofSeyss-Inquart,andGerman troops marched into thecountry. The Republic of Austriawasdissolved andits territory incorporated into the Reich.The annexation of Austr ia increased considerably the Germanthreatto Czechoslovakia. Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German Pa rtywithinthecountryclaimedtorepresentCzechoslovakia'sthreemillionethnicGermansandclamoredforautonomyandunionwiththeReich.Hitler's threatening attitude caused the Pragu e government toorderfull mobilization in September 1938. W ar appeared imminent.British and French a ttempts to enlist the support of the SovietUnionwereunavailing. On29September theformer Allies and thepro-German Italians met with Hitler at Munich to hear his claims.Czechoslovakia wasnotrepresented at themeeting,but an agreementAvasreached granting the German leader's demands. The Czechoslovakgovernment,urgedby Brita in and France, acceptedthe stipulationslaid downbyH itler ; the alternativeundoubtedly would havebeenwar, without British or French support. The pact washailedinthewestforattaining"peaceinourtime."Bytheprovisions of the agreement, Czechoslovak forces evacuatedthe Sudeten areas between 1and 10 October. Scheduled plebisciteswerenotheld, andGermany took control of areasw ith atotal populationof3,500,000,ofwhom700,000wereCzechs. Fortifications whichwouldhavemadeaGerman invasion difficult if not impossibleat thetimewereturnedovertotheGermanArmyintact.Poland took advantage of the opportunity to gain the remainderof theTeschen industrial area, seized by Czechoslovakia at the timeCzechoslovakia and Poland were formed. Polish troops moved intotheTeschenregion on2October,tak ingcontrolof400squaremilesofterritoryandapopulationof240,000ofmixedCzechandPolishorigin.On2NovemberHungarytook5,000squaremilesofsouthernSlovakia,an area Hungary had lost toCzechoslovakia in 1919,with a population of 1,000,000. Both Polish and Hungarian acquisitions were condonedbyGermany and Italy .WithinCzechoslovakia itself,therewasanotherdeepencroachmentonthestate'ssovereignty and territorial integrity. A strong separatistmovement in Slovakia forced the government togran t autonomyto the Slovaks, under Joseph Tiso, and the name of the State waschanged toCzecho-Slovakia. Territo rial losses and establishment ofa large autonomous area within a weak federal system combined tomake Czecho-Slovakia a rump state, almost powerless to repel invasion. Tisoand anumberof otherleaderswerequitefrank abouttheirclosetieswithGermany.


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6 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)The Revival of German C laims Aga inst Poland

The Czechoslovak question settled temporarily, Hitler was free toturn hisattention toPoland. On24October 1938Joachim vonRibbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister, made a series of requests thatreopened old Polish-German wounds and precipitated a new crisis.The German proposals involved the return of Danzig to Germany,with Poland assured railway, port , and other economic facilities.Poland wasalsotopermit theconstruction of anextraterritorial roadand railroad across the Corridor. In return for these concessions,Germany would guarantee the Polish-German frontiers and extendthenonaggressionpactaslongas25years.PilsudskihadwarnedhiscountrymenyearsearlierthattheGermanatti tude toward Danzig would be an indication of Germany's trueintentions toward Poland and Polish public opinion would nevercondonethesurrenderofPoland'ssovereigntyinpartoftheCorridor.The diplomatic world wasnot surprised when Poland firmly rejectedtheGermanoffer.In March 1939 a series of significant events in Czecho-Slovakiastrengthened the German position in the controversy with Poland.TheseeventsbeganwiththedismissalofTisofromofficebythePraguegovernment for allegedly scheming to take Slovakia out of thefederal union. Tiso wassupported by Hitler , and President HachawassummonedtoBerlinandinducedtoplaceCzecho-SlovakiaunderGerman protection. Slovakia was granted full independence andCarpatho-Uk rainewasannexedbyHun gary. BohemiaandMoravia,all tha t remained of the truncated Czechoslovak state,wereoccupiedby German troops on 15M arch. A German official was appointedProtector of Bohemia and Moravia, with President Hacha retainedas the nominal Chief of State. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. AdaylaterTisorequestedthatHitleralsoplaceSlovakiaunderGermanprotection, and agreed to grant German troops passage to certainfrontier areas. This arrangement would enable Germany to useSlovak terri tory as a base of operations against Poland from thesouthintheeventofhostilities.

TheestablishmentoftheprotectorateandHitler'sproclamationinPrague that Bohemia and Moravia belonged to the Germanlebensraum ( living space) made obvious to the world the extent of National Socialist ambitions. For the first time Hit ler had gonebeyondhisirredentistclaimsandswallowedupanareawithapredominan tly non-German population . British Prime Minister NevilleChamberlain, hitherto an advocate of appeasement, stated two dayslater that this latest acquisition had raised the question of German


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7OLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS TO MARCH 1939domination of the world. From this point British determination tocontainHitlergainedsupport.On23March 1939Lithuania acceded to German demands for theMemelland,asmallstrip of former Reichterritory along Lithuan ia'ssouthwestern frontier. The following day Germany and RomaniaconcludedaneconomicagreementwherebytheGermanswouldacquirealmost theentire product of Romania's extensiveoil industry, par tially resolving apressingproblem for the conduct of military operationsbytheGermanArmedForces.On 31March Chamberlain addressed the British House of Commons, s ta ting that Britain and France would assist Poland in theevent Poland were attacked. The British and French Governmentshad reached an understanding, and Britain wasto act as spokesmanfor thetwonations. Theissueofpeaceorwar wasleft for GermanyandPolandtodecide.Hitlerwouldnotpermitmuchfurther delayinarrivingatasolutionof theterritorial controversy favorable to Germany. The Poles, fortheir part, were determined to reject all German demands, since itwasapparent tothem that any concession would mean the fate thathadbefallen Czechoslovakia. Thiswasthestateof relationsbetweenGermanyandPolandattheendofMarch1939.


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Chapter 2German Military Developments to March 1939The Treaty Restrictions

The military clauses of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 limited theGerman armed forces establishment to a small organization of long-term volunteers. Conscription and universal tra in ing were prohibited,and major offensive weapons,suchasaircraft, tanks,andsubmarines,werenotpermitted. ThenewGermanm ilitary organizationcould therefore be little more than a police and coastal patrol force,incapable of carrying out any aggressive action outside the Reich.Even asadefensive organization,the postwar armed forceswould require considerable reinforcement toprotect theReich in the eventofwarwithoneormoreofitsstrongerneighbors.The Army wasallowed atotal of 100,000men,including 4,000 officers. Noncommissioned officers and privates wereto beenlisted for12years,and officers were tobe required to serve for a period of25years. A further s tipula tion by the Allies provided tha t no more than 5percent of the officers and enlisted personnel could be releasedyearly by reason of termination of their period of service. Thesevarious requirements and the prohibition against conscription anduniversal train ing effectively prevented the formation of areserveofanysize. Nofield pieceslarger than 105mmweretobeused,withtheexception of a few fixedguns of heaviercaliber in the old fortressofKoenigsberg, in East Prussia. Thedetailed organization and armamentof all units formed had first tobeapproved bytheAllies.The Navy wasauthorized 15,000men,including 1,500 officers. Sixobsolete battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 12 torpedoboatswerepermittedthefleet,with2battleships,2cruisers,4destroyers,and4torpedoboatsinreserve. Thebuilding of shipsdisplacingover 10,000tonswasprohibited. A further restriction limited navalgunstoamaximum of 280mm (approximately 11inches).Arms and munitions industries and factories producing mili taryequipmentwerereducedinnumbertotheminimumessentialtomaintain authorized stocks. Notroops were tobepermitted in ademilitarized zone extending 50kilometers (approximately 31miles) eastof the Rhine. Allied control commissions were to be allowed to in


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9ERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1939spectarmsfactories and theArmy andNavy for compliancewith thetreaty and the Reich defense laws enacted in conformity with its provisions.

The Reichswehr1It devolved upon the German Republic under President Ebert tocreateaseffective anarmed force aspossiblewithin the framework oftherestrictionsimposedbytheAllies. Meanwhile,atemporarymilitary organization existed under a reichstag law of 6 March 1919.EbertcalleduponGeneralleutnantHansvonSeeckttoheadacommission to study the matter and submit recommendations on which theorganizationofthepostwar forcecouldbebased.Seeckt's recommendations were adopted, with some modificationsandchanges,and theneworganization,createdbytheDefenseLawof23M arch 1921,was called the Reichswehr (Reich Defense Force).Itstwoserviceswerethe Reichsheer (Army) and theReichsmarine(Navy). The predominant part played by the land service gavemany the impression that the Reichswehr and Army were identical,andthetinyNavyreceivedlittleattention.ThenominalCommanderinChiefoftheReichswehrwasthePresi

dent. Actual authority, howevier, was normally exercised by theMinister of Defense, acabinet officer and coequal of the MinistersoftheInterior,Justic,ForeignAffairs, andother membersof thePresident'sofficial family.Commanders for theArmy and Navy wereprohibited by the VersaillesTreaty , sothe senior officers of the two servicesheld positionsanalogoustothatofChiefsofStaff,responsibledirectlytotheMinister of Defense. In practice, the Chiefs of Staff directed planning,operations, and training, and the Minister of Defense restricted hisactivities to representing the Reichsivehr before the Reichstag andperforming similarministerial functions.Alargenumberofofficers andnoncommissioned officers withW orld War I experience were available to command and cadre the smallpostwar force at first, but emphasis soon came to be placed on theprocurement of younger men. Forced to make do with what theyhad, the military leaders proceeded to develop an elite force, andnumerous incentives were offered in order to acquire a high typeofpersonnel. Enlisted pay was raised and barracks conditions wereimproved. Strict disciplinegainedthe Reichsioehrtherespectof thecivilian population, and relations with the local inhabitants in garrisonandport areaswereusually excellent. Upon dischargeReichswehr personnel were given priority in obtaining civilian positions

1Unless o therwise noted, the materia l in th is section was taken from Die Reichswehr(Cologne, 1933) ; and H. Franke, Handbuch der Neuzeitlichen Wehrivissenschaften, BandI, II, III, and IV (Berlin and Leipzig,1937).


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1 0 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)withthegovernment,orweregranted financial support up toamaximumofthreeyearswhilereadjusting tocivilianlife. Menwithmorethan 10yearsservice could receivetrainin g for a civilian occupationwhilestillinuniform.Anotherim portantm orale factor for theEeichsheerwasthepolicyof recruitment onalocalbasis. Each unitofb attalian sizeorlargerhad itspermanent stationand recruitedthebulkofitspersonnel fromthatgeneralregion. Personnelassignmentswererelativelystableandindividuals remained in units composed largely of men from theirhomeareas. AsimilararrangementfortheReichsmarinewouldhavebeen impracticable, though personnel were rotated to sea and shoreassignmentsonaregularschedule.

The Reichswehr adopted the traditions of the disbanded unitsoftheoldimperialforces,e.g.the 1stCompany of the9thInfantry tookchargeof thebattleflagsofthe1stPrussian FootG uards. Traditionwascarried to anextreme with the 1stInfantry, which adopted theold 43d In fan try 's traditions the bassdrum in the regimentalbandwascarriedinparadesonacartdrawnbyaSt.Bernarddog,aprivilegthe43d Infantry had wonbycapturing adog-drawn drum from theAu strians atthe Battle of Koeniggratz in 1866. A memorial honoring the paren t unit was installed in each barracks square,and ceremoniesheld before it onofficial holidays. Survivorsof theold unitsand the families of members who had been killed in battle werecontactedandinvitedtothememorialservices. Wherepossible,olderofficers and men stil l in the military service were assigned to theReichswehr unit which wastocarry their old unit 's tradit ion. Another effective means of promoting organization spirit was theassignment of a band to every battalion-sized and larger unit, withfifersanddrummersdowntothecompany.The Army 2

TheChiefofStaff oftheArmywasknownastheChief of theArmyCommand {Chef der Heeresleitung). Themostimportantofthefivesectionsof hisstaff wastheTruppenamt, anall-encompassingorganization with many of the functions of the Imperial General Staff,which had been disbanded in compliance with the Versailles Treaty,though this did not preclude General Staff appointments at lowerechelonsofcommand. Theheadquartersof theArmy CommandwasinBerlin.ThetacticalforcesoftheReichsheercomprisedsevensmallinfantryand three cavalry divisions, the former numbered 1through 7 and

2Unless otherwise noted, the mater ia l on the organizat ion of the Reichsheer was takenfrom Bu rkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer (1933-45), Band I, Das Heer Ms sum Kriegsbeginn (Darmstadt, 1954),pp. 14-20.


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CHARTI-ORGANIZATION OFTHEREICHSHEER.1921ARMY COMMAND (Berlin)

TERRITORIAL(Wehrkreis) TACTICALORGANIZATION FORCES

GPHO I (Berlin) 6PHQ2 Kossel]

I (Koenigsberg)'

II (Stettin)

in (Berlin) XIV (Dresden) X

I(Frankfurt-am-Oder)

2(Bres1ou)

V (Stuttgart)

VI (Moenster)

VII (Munich) 1X13(Weimar


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 1 1the lat ter 1 through 3. The s trength of the infantry division wasapproximately 12,000men,withthreeinfan try regiments,an artilleryregiment of three light battalions, and small reconnaissance, signal,engineer, transportation, and medical battalions. The cavalry divisionhadsixsmallcavalryregimentsandanartillerybattalion,andatotalstrengthof5,300men.Thecommandersoftheinfantry divisionshad adual responsibility,since they were territorial commanders as well; their staffs alsofunctioned intwocapacities. The areacommandsof theReichsheer,known as Wehrkreise,were seven in number, designated by RomannumeralsIthroughVII,andcoveredtheentireterritoryoftheReich.The Wehrkreise were charged with recruiting, logistical support oftacticalunitsw ithin their areas,and general housekeeping functions.The seven infantry divisions were distributed one to each of theseven Wehrkreise,the numbers ineach casebeing identical,e.g. the7th Infantry Division was assigned to Wehrkreise V II , with headquartersin Munich,the capital of Bavaria. The infantry divisions,inaccordancewiththepolicyoflocalrecruitment,weredrawnalmostentirely from the Wehrkreiseinwhich they had their homestations,e. g. the 7th Infantry Division was composed of Bavarians . Thethree cavalry divisions, though their headquarters were situated inone Wehrkreisor the other,were drawn from a wider area,e.g.the3d Cavalry Division, with headquarters at Weimar in Thuringia ,includedonecavalryregimentcomposedofBavarians. [Seechart1.]

The divisions were controlled by two Gruppenkommandos (groupcommands). Gruppenkommando1,inBerlin,controlledthedivisionsin northern and eastern Germany; Gruppenkommando 2,in Kassel,thedivisionsinsouthernandwestern Germany. Thetwogroupcommandswereresponsible tothe Chief of Staff of theReichsheer. TheWehrkreisewerealsoresponsibledirectly tothe Chief of Staff of theReichsheer,maknigthegroupheadquarterspurelytacticalcommands.Thetrainingofthe Reichsheerwasoneof themost important imprin tsleft byGeneral vonSeeckt,whobecamethefirstChief of Staffand remained in that position until 1926. The time spent on theschoolofthesoldierandcloseorderdrillAvasreducedoncedisciplinehad been established. Emphasis was then placed on field training.Seecktbelievedth at them obility lost inthe trench warfare of W orldWarI couldberegainedbytheinfantry-artillery team withtank andairsupport. Trucksweremadeintomocktanksfortraining purposesby the addition of cardboard and wooden supers tructures. Suchpassive air defense measures as camouflage were stressed. Formertank officers were assigned to the supply and transpo rtation services,and180flyingofficersofWorldWarIweredistributedthroughoutthe


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12 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)Army invariousother capacities. A coreof 3,later15air specialistswasassignedtotheheadquartersoftheArmyCommand.Thesmallnumberoftroops,thedispersalofunitsingarrisons fromEast Prussia to Bavar ia , and budgetary considerations restric tedmaneuvers and large-scale exercises. Consequently, to train commanders and staffs from battalion level upwards a type of realisticwargameexercisewasadopted. Commandersandstaffs,allavailablesignaltroops,andaskeletonforceofinfantry,artillery,andengineersparticipated. Troopswerepresentonlyinsufficient numberstoestablishfront lines,buttheheadquartersfunctioned asinatactical situation. ManyofthedeficienciesoftheImperialArm y'scommunicationsystemwerecorrectedinthecourseoftheseexercises,andanumberoffuture army and army group commanders and staffs had the opportunity toexperiment withnew theories andtechniques.

Figure 1. Troops of the Reichsheer's 11th Infantry Regiment in training, 1934General von Seeckt'spolicy required military personnel to refrainfrom engaging in political activities, giving credence to the belief

thattheArmyrepresentedtheGermannationandnottheadministration in office. Nevertheless, during Seeckt's tenure, there was considerable deference by political leaders to the Reichsheer. An icy,aloof individual, Seeckt spoke for the Army as a solid, determinedblock of 100,000 armed men and the ultimate government force.In thefirst several years following itsorganization,the Reichsheerwas committed to securing the internal s tabil ity of the Reich andm aintaining law and order. To supplem ent the efforts of theReichsheer,local militia were frequently organized for short periods


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 1 3oftime. However,thesesoonhadtobedisbanded upontheinsistenceoftheAlliedcontrolcommissions. By 1924thesituation inGermanyhadsettledtotheextentthatthe Reichsheercouldperform itsmissionwithout assistance.Gradually, as time passed, some restrictions on Germany's armedforceswererelaxedorsimplynotenforced,andtheReichsheerorganizedadditional signalandantiaircraft units andimproved someof itsartillery andotherweapons. Seecktand thegovernment leadersalsoadopted the broadest possible interpretation of the restrictions includedinthetreaty,givingGermany variousadvantagesnot intendedbythetreaty writers,e.g.there wasnoprohibition against drawingupplans for improved weapons,soGerman designers preparedblueprintsfor variousnewgunsandother armament.Significant evasionsof the treaty terms involved the establishmentof military installa tions and armaments industries in the SovietUnion. The German government supported these arrangements,financed inlargepar tbysuchindu strialfirmsastheJunk ers AircraftCompany. This evasion of the treaty terms was welcomed by theRussians, desperately in need of foreign engineers and techniciansto build up their own air and tank arms and their chemical warfare service. In exchange for technical advice and the services ofGerman experts, the Russians permitted the German Army to testweaponsandequipmentandtotrain cadresunhamperedbytheAlliedcontrolcommissions.3

By1930theArmy felt secureenoughtoproceed withthe planningwork started by Seeckt and toprepare for anexpansion of its smallforce in the event of war. Should i t be necessary for Germany tomobilize,the7infantrydivisionsofthe Reichsheerwouldbeexpandedto 21. Themillionsof World W ar I veterans could bedrawn upontofillthe21divisions,buttheseveteransweregrowingolderandtheGerman youth were receiving no mili tary training aside from theReichsheerand police forces. Arms and equipment would be availableforapproximatelytwo-thirdsofthisforce,butammunitionwouldbean insurmountable problem. In 1932further studies weremadefor a gradual expansion of arms and munitions plant capacities tomeettheseneeds.Inadditiontoits21infantry divisions,theReichsheeronmobilization would comprise 3or 4 cavalry divisions, 33batteries of heavyartillery, 55antiaircraft batteries, asmall army air force,and atankbattalion. Amediumbattalion wouldbeaddedtothe artillery regiment of the infantry division, and the infantry regiment would beequipped with antitank guns. Theplans for an increase in the size

3Helm Speidel, "Reiehswehr und Rote Armee," Vierteljahrshefte fuer Z eitegeschichte,vol.I (1953),p .18.


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1 4 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)of the German forces in the event of mobilization were interruptedbytheappointmentofHitlerasChancellor.The Navy

The Navy had more difficulty than the Army during this periodin evading the treaty terms that reduced it to little more than acoastalpa trol force.4 Sincethe Versailles Treaty contained noprohibition against replacing old vessels, the Navy began a limitedbuilding program as soon as the internal political situation of theimmediate postwar period had settled. However, new naval construction in German yards had to adhere closely to the limitationsset by the Allies, with representatives of the Allied control commissionsinspectingGermanportareasandthenavalbudget.TheNavalCommand (Marinelietung) found a serious obstacleinthoseprovisions of the Versailles Treaty tha t prohibited submarinesto the G erman naval service; the problem of retain ing highlyspecializedconstructionandmaintenancepersonnelandtrainingcrewsfor the German underseas fleet of a la ter day was not simple ofsolution. Only a few naval engineers and technicians managed tokeepbusyinthesubmarineconstructionfieldoncontractfortheJapaneseGovernmentintheimmediatepostwarperiod.A start wasmadeinreviving submarinebu ilding in 1922when theNavysubsidized aDutchsh ipbuilding firm inThe Hagueand staffedit with German submarineengineers. The purpose of the firm wastobuild U-boats oncontract for foreign governments,thereby keeping German construction personnel employed and giving submarineengineers the oppo rtunity toexperiment with new designs and technical improvements. Similar arrangements were made with shipbuilding companies in Finland and Spain. The building of a German-controlled torpedo factory and testing center in Spain allowedGerman engineers to develop new types of torpedoes, including theelectricallycontrolledtorpedo.The250-tonsubmarinesbu iltand tested inF inlan d weretobecomethe prototypes of the U-l through U-24- , the 750-ton boat built inSpain andeventually sold totheTu rkish GovernmentwastobecometheprototypeoftheU-25andU-26. Intheirexperimentalwork, theGerman submarine engineers strove tosimplify gear and equipment,in order to make easier assembly-line production of craft and thetrainingofcrews.*The information on the Navy's evasion of the t rea ty te rms is taken from a prin tedmemo by a Capt Schuessler , Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles, 1919-1935. Memohas been reprinted as Doc 156-c in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (h ereafter cited as / . M. T.) (Nuernberg , 1947), XXXIV, pp.530-607.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 1 5Thefinancingof theseundertakings wasaccomplished at firstwithnavalfunds diverted for thepurpose. Eventually, with their building success abroad, many of the Navy's enterprises became self-supporting. In 1927ascandal brought anumber of these covert naval

activities to light and made necessary their curtailment. However,theAllied control cor"1missionshad been withdrawn earlier the sameyear,andmanyoftheillegalundertakingsbeingcarriedonin foreigncountriescouldbeshifted backtotheReich. Longbefore theabrogation of theVersailles Trea ty, assembly lines to build 6U-boats at atime were constructed at Kiel, and the component parts for 12submarinesmade and stored. (Thus the firstof the new underseasfleetcould make i ts appearance less than six months after Hitler 's announcementofrearmamentin1935.)In addition to its activities in submarine construction, theReichsmarinealso managed to hold its position in thefieldof fire controlequipment. A trainload of range-finders and technical equipmenthad been shipped into hiding at Venlo, Holland, at the time of theArmistice in 1918,and brought back in small lots. Later the Navypurchased a Dutch firm manufacturing precision instruments in Germany,tocarry out experimental work onfirecontrol and similarequipmentunimpededbytheAlliedCommissions.A new type of armored cruiser, popularly known as the "pocketbattleship,"wasdevelopedduringthereplacementbuildingprogram.This warship displaced 10,000tons and had 11-inch gunsin its mainbatteries,incompliancewiththetreaty limitations. Thekeel for thefirstof thisclasswaslaid down in1929and three in all,theDeutschland (1931), Admiral Scheer (1933), and Graf Spee (not launcheduntil1934)werebuilt.5Sixlightcruiserswerealsoconstructedorbegunduringthisperiod,to replace the treaty cruisers. These were the Emden (1925), theKoenigsberg and Karlsruhe (1927), the Koeln (1928), the Leipzig(1929),andtheNuernburg (not launched unti l 1934). The Emdendisplaced 5,400tons; the remainingfive,6,000 tons. All six cruisershad5.9inchgunsintheirmainarmament.Twonewbattleships,the ScharnhorstandGneisenau,wereplanned.(Somesourcesrefer totheseshipsasbattlecruisers.) Treaty limitationsinthis case were ignored. The two ships of this class were todisplace26,000tonsandmount11-inchguns.By 1933,when Hitler became Chancellor, the Reichmarine had afleet ofthreeoldbattleshipsofthepre-WorldW ar I period,theHannover (1905), Schleisien (1906), and Schleswig-FIolstein (1906).Workwassoontocommenceonthetwonewbattleships. Twoof thearmoredcruisershadbeenlaunched andoneof them,the Deutschland,

5See: Alexander Bredt, Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten (Munich, 1935 and 1940).


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1 6 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939}was almost ready for sea. Five of the new l ight cruisers were already in service, and the sixth was under construction. All of thetreaty cruisers had been removed from the active lis t. Twelve destroyershad beenbuilt during thepreiod 1926-28toreplaceworn-outtreatydestroyers,andanumberoftorpedoboatsandtendershadbeenrebuiltandreconditioned.The Covert Air Force

M ilitary aviation was prohibited completely under the VersaillesTreaty, and the direction of German civil aviation in the immediatepostwaryearswasdelegatedtotheAirOfficeintheMinistryofTransportation. The construction of c ivil a ircraft was prohibited until1922, then limited as to weight, ceiling, speed, and horsepower.Though i t operated under a sharp disadvantage, German aviationmanaged toretain itsproficiency inbuilding andflyinga ircraft during the period of restric tions tha t followed. The interest of theGermanpublicinaviationmatterswasalsokeptaliveinglidingclubsandsimilarair-mindedassociations.In 1924General von Seeckt succeeded in engineering the appointment of h is own candidate , a World War I fly ing officer namedBrandenburg, as head of the Air Office. Cooperation between theh ighly centralized German civil aviation organization and theReichswehr was assured, and from this point on the developmentofGerman civil aviation was controlled and directed to a considerableextentbythemilitary.6Restrictions onflight trainin g for military officers were relaxed astimepassed. Thesmall number of Reichswehr officers permitted totakingflyinginstructionsforobtainingweatherdataorinpreparationfor the possible use of the Reichswehr in support of the civil policewasincreasedfromits'ceilingof5peryearto72in1926.The restrictions on German aircraft construction were also liftedin 1926. That same year several small corporations were amalgamatedtoform theLufthansa, orgovernment-sponsored airline. German aircraf t were already flying on regular schedules to variouscountriesineasternE urope. Aseriesof agreementswithmembersofthe former Allies soon permitted the Lufthansa to establish regularroutes in western Europe. Night and all-weather flying techniqueswereimproved,andGermanaviationreachedahighpointintechnicaldevelopment.Asmallnucleusforthefuture GermanA irForcewasformed withinthe Lufthansa organization shortly after its creation. By 1931the"secret" air force had a total of four fighter, eight observation, andthreebombersquadrons. Flight training wascarried onin the four

WalterGoerlltz,Der deutsche Generalstab (Frankfu rt) , pp.365-66.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 1 7schoolsmaintained bytheLufthansa, but tactical tra inin g wasnecessarilyrestricted.Some progress in German military aviation was also made in theexperimentalinstallationsintheSovietUnionduring thisperiod. ApartyofGermanaviationexpertsmovedtotheSovietUnionin1924,andin1926agroupoffighterandreconnaissancepilotsbegantraininginthevicinityofMoscow. Anotherairinstallationwaslatersetupinthe CaucasusMountains area. In Germany, the Reichsheerstudiedthe-airforcesoftheotherworldpowerandplannedmeasuresfordefense against possibleair attack. Preoccupied with the defense, theReichsheerfelt that any future air force should bepa rt of the army,and assigned missions in support of the ground forces. As aconsequence,theaircraft andtacticsdevelopedintheSovietUnion reflectedthisthinking ,andmostoftheGermanmilitary aireffort oftheperiodwasdevotedtofightersandobservationwork.

Only a small number of pilots in all were trained in the SovietUnion. Some pilots had alsobeen trained or had maintained theirskillbyflyingfor thecivilairlinesinGermany orabroad. However,therewerestill toofew qualified flying personnel available for anewair force at the time Hitler organized his government. The Reichnheerconceptof the air arm asan adjunct totheA rmy and the fewaircrafttypesdevelopedasaresultofthispolicyhelpedlittleinforming a foundation upon which to organize an air force capable ofoperatinginitspropersphere.Germanywasinasomewhatbetter position by1933insofar asproductionfacilitieswereconcerned. Messerschmittwasalreadyproducing light aircraft in quantity. The Focke-Wulf concern wasestablished at Bremen; Junkers was developing one of Europe's largesta ircraft factories a t Dessau; Heinkel had a large plant a t Warnemuende; and Dornier had had several successes in building aircraftfactories aboard. W ith alittle retoolingtheplantsproducing sportsaircraftandcommercialtransportscouldbuildobservationandliaisonplanes, troop carriers, and bombers. A lit tle more work would benecessary to build fighters and attack aircraft. W ith the mili taryinfluence throughout their development, many of the German commercial aircraft could bepu t to immediate military use if necessary.

The Nat ional Socialists in PowerAdolf Hi tle r was appointed Chancellor by the aged PresidentHindenburg on 30January 1933and the Enabling Act of the Reichstagon23MarchgrantedHitler'sNationalSocialistgovernmentdictatorial powers. To raise the Reich to what he considered its right

fulplaceamongthenationsandtoaccomplishhisforeignpolicyaims,


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1 8 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)Hitlerhadtohavealargeandwell-equippedarmedforceandthewarindustry tosupport it. Planning had already been accomplished fora wartime armed force tobeformed bytheexpansion of theReichsicehr. Hitler decided to apply these plansto apeacetime expansioninstead. The Army was to be increased to 21divisions and a totalstrength of 300,000men. At first theyear 1937wasset asthe targetdateforthecompletionofthisprogram.H itler put anendtothemilitary and industrial collaboration withtheSovietUnioninthesummerof 1933.7 On 14Octoberofthesameyear Hitler'sgovernment withdrew from thedisarmament conferencethen inprogressand from theLeagueof Nations. Henceforth, Germany wastofollow amoreindependent pa th inforeign affairs,notallowingitself tobeboundbysuch restrictions astheVersaillesTreaty,which had already been violated repeatedly. Hitler then insistedonmoving the target date for the expansion of the armed forces up totheautumnof1934.Meanwhile,aseriesofconflictshadarisenbetweenthemoreextremeelements of the National Socialist Party 's uniformed Strwnabteilungen(SA),orStormTroops,andthe Reichsheer. ErnstRoehm,leader of the SA , advocated the absorption of th e Reichsheerintohisownuniformed force,toform anarmy morerepresentativeofthe new National Socialist state. Hitler had to resolve the growingrift anddecided infavor ofthe Reichsheer. On30June 1934Roehmand several score others were executed without legal process of anykind asa threat tothesecurity of the state. Needlesstosay, Hitlermade use of this opportunity to rid himself of numerous politicalopponents as wTell as the embarrassing SA leaders.8

Hindenburg asPresidentwasstillthenominalCommanderinChiefof the armed forces. The President's death on 2August 1934wasfollowed immediatelybyamajor changein this organization ofcommand. Hi tle r adopted the title of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor(Der Fuehrer und Reichskanzler), and the office of President wasabolished. The functions of the Presidency were absorbed into thenewoffice,andHitle rbecameChief of Sta te and Commander inChiefofitsarmedforces.Allofficers andmenoftheArm yandNavywererequired toswearapersonaloathof obediencetothenew Chief of State and Commanderin Chief. Thiswasaradicaldeparturefrom thepracticeof swearingallegianceonly to the state,ashad been doneunder the German Republic. AsimilaroathtotheKaiserhad beenthecustom in imperialtimes,butunderthepre-WorldWarIsystemofgovernmenttheKaiserhadpersonified thestateandpeople. H itler 'sassumptionofauthoritywas approved by anational plebiscite on 19August 1934.

7Speidel,op. cit.,p. 41.8 Goerlitz, op.dt., pp. 413 -21.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1939 1 9The tempo of rearmament was increased and the strength of theArmyroseto2*0,000bytheendof theyear. Hitler's heir-apparent,HermannGoering,wasappointedtothenewlycreatedpositionofAirMinister and assumed control of the covert air force, which immedi

ately began a period of rapid expansion. As his deputy, Goeringselected Erhard Milch, director of the Lufhansa. Milch began immediately to increase the production of t ra ining a ircraft. While Goering occupied himself with political matters,_Milch did most ofthe planning work for the new air force. According to Milch'scalculations,aperiodof8to10yearswouldbenecessarytobuildupanadequate nucleus for the new service. Political considerations werelatertorequireanaccelerationofthisprogram. W ithhiswell-knownpassion for uniforms and display,Goering was appointed a GeneralderInfanterie in theground forces pendingthe unveiling of thenewGermanAirForce.

The clauses of the Versailles Treaty that had disarmed Germanywerepublicly denounced by H itler on 16March 1935. The Fuehrertookadvantageoftheoccasiontopromulgateanewdefenselawthatprovided for anincreaseinthe sizeof thepeacetimeArmy to 12corpsand 36 divisions and reinstituted conscription. A subsequent law,of21May 1935,brought theA ir Forceinto the open and establishedit asa separate service. The law of 21May also set the period oftrainingforconscriptsatoneyear.9The restriction of conscript training to one year was necessitatedbyalackof cadrepersonnel. Fifteen monthslater theexpansionofthearmed forces would permit theextension of theperiod of serviceto twoyears. Conscription offices proceeded to register the classof1914(allmenborninthatyear),veteransofWorldWarIstillwithinmilitary agelimits (18to45years,except inE ast Prussia,where themaximumwassetat55ye ars),andthe largemassofmenof theclasses1901to1913andtooyoungtohavehadserviceintheImperialArmy.Thislargegroupofmenbornintheyears1901to1913weretoformaspecialproblem. Fewhadhadanym ilitary training,yetwereintheagegroups from which alargepart of thereservehad tobe drawn.Also,those"borninthefirstfewyearsbetween1901and1913werealready becoming a little old to begin military training. As a result,a large proportion of these classes received two or three months oftrainingandwereassignedtothosenewreservedivisionswhichwouldbeutilizedfor defensiveserviceorinasecurity capacity,orto varioussupportunits.

An adequate population and industrial base existed to support anexpanded armed force. The Reich's population prior totheannexation of Austria and the Sudetenland was almost 70m illion, and inFranke, op. cit., Band I, Wehrpolitik und Kriegfuehrung, Wehrgeaetz B,pp.699-703.


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2 0 THEGERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)creasedbymorethan 10millionwhenthesetwoareasbecamep ar tofGermany. TheReich produced more than 22million tons of steelyearlyandover200milliontons ofcoal. Thecountry washighlydevelopedindustrially,withlargemotorvehicleandtoolplants,andhadexcellenttranspo rtation andcommunications systems. The merchantmarine totalled more than 4 million tons, andport facilities wereextensive.

The WehrmachtThe expansion of Germany's armed forces and thecreationof aseparateAirForcewereaccompaniedby anumberofchangesin thecommand organization. By the newdefense laws, theReichswehrwas renamed the Wehrmacht (armed forces), and theReichsheerbecamethe Heer (A rm y),whiletheReichsmarinebecametheKriegsmarine (Navy ). The AirForce wasdesignated theLuftwaffe, witha distinctive uniform andorganization. TheTruppenamt was reestablishedas theArm y General Staff. H itle r assumed thetitleofSupremeCommanderoftheArmedForces {DerObersteBefehlshdberder Wehrmacht). TheMinister of Defense became theMinisterofWarandCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces{Oberbefehlshaber

der Wehrmacht).10GeneraloberstWernervonBlomberg,Hitler'sMinisterofDefense,becamethe first MinisterofWarandtheCommanderinChiefof theArmed Forces. Thereorganization of theArmy wasaccomplishedlargely by theChief of Staff then in office, General derArtillerieWerner vonFri tsch and the chief of the Truppenamt, Generalleutnant Ludwig Beck. In thereorganization Fritsch becamethecommanderinchiefof theArmy andBeckchiefof thereconstitutedArmy General Staff. Thecommand of theNavy wasretainedbyAdm iral Erich Raeder, former chief of theNaval Command. TheAir Force wasplaced under thecommand of Hermann Goering,inhisnewrank (and uniform) ofGeneralderFlieger.The expanding services soon began tosuffer acute growing pains.The Reichswehr's officers andnoncommissioned officers were far toofewto commandandstaff thelargecitizenforcebeingraised althoughsome relief wasafforded by theincorporation of militarized policeunitsintotheArmywithalargenumberof tra ined officers andnoncommissioned officers. TheArmy was.affected by thelossofmanyofficers to thenewLuftwaffe, and forsometimemuch airstaff workhad to beaccomplished by former ground officers notqualified aspilotsorexperiencedinairoperations.Thehighandrigid standards established bytheReichswehrcouldnot bemaintained during this period of g rowth . Educational re-

w Goerlitz op. cit. pp. 422-23.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 2 1quirements for officers had to be lowered, and several thousand noncommissioned officers of the Reichswehr became junior officers in theWehrmacht, while other thousands of Reichswehr privates (or seamen) became noncommissioned officers in the new force. The 4,000officersoftheE eichsheer,theofficers trained inthe SovietUnion,andthemencommissionedfromtheranksoftheArmystillcouldnotprovideasufficient numberofofficers for thenumerousnewunits formed.Thousandsof W orldW ar I officers had toberecalled to active dutyand bridged the gap to a certain extent, but several years would berequired to provide a sufficient number of trained commanders andstaff officers of the age groups young enough for full field service.A production problem alsoexisted. The manufacture of somanyaircraft, tanks, artillery, and warships at the pace required by therearmamentprogramrequiredmorerawmaterialandalargertrainedlabor force than Germany could immediately muster. Some concessionshadtobemadeattheexpenseofoneortheotherofthethreeservices,and the Navy was forced to curtail an ambitious programofshipbuildingtoallow theArmy andAir Forcetoforge ahead withtanks, artil lery, and combat aircraft. Hitler 's reluctance to antagonizetheBritish alsoplayedapar t inthisdecision. W ork continuedonanumber of keels already laid and construction started on a fewother major units, but most of the naval effort wasdevoted to producing small craft and submarines, which required less constructiontimethancapitalships,andtotrainingaNavythatmorethandoubledinsizewithinayear.A series of events that occurred much later during the period ofexpansion, in January and February 1938,placed Hitler in actualcommand of the three armed services and disposed of Fritsch andthoseotherseniorofficerswhohadadvisedagainsttheFuehrer'smilitarypolicyofbluff andbluster andpreferred instead asteady growthandconsolidation within theservices. These events started with themarriageofBlombergtoawomanof questionablereputation. Blomberg,eventhough hewasnot amongthe activeopponentsof H itler'spolicies,was forced by H itler to resign his position as Minister ofWar and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Scandalouschargeslater proved false wereused asapretext toforce Fritsch outof his position as commander in chief of the Army.11 The post ofMinister of W ar was abolished, and from 4 February 1938 Hitlerexercisedsupremecommandthrough anewheadquarters,formed from

u Thedetails of the intrigues that endedwith thedismissal of Blomberg and Fritsch areto befound in thefollowing:(1) Graf Kielmansegg, Der Fritachprozess 1938 (Hamburg, 1938).(2) Wolfgang Foers ter , Oetueraloierst Ludwig Beck, Sein Ka mpf gegen den Krieg(Munich, 1953).(3). Goerlitz, op. cit.,pp.447-62.


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2 2 THEGERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)Blomberg's staff and called the Oberkormnandoder Wehrmacht( O K W ) , or High Command of the Armed Forces. General derArtillerie Wilhelm Keitel, according to a literal translation of theGerman title, became chief, OKW. K eitel wasactually toholdapositionsimilar tothatof achiefofstaff, butwithlittleoftheactualresponsibility tha t thet itle implied. General derArtillerieWalthervon Brauchitsch, commander of a Heeresgruppenkommamdo, as theold Gruppenkommamdowashenceforth to becalled,becamethe successor toFritsch. These events were followedby theretirementforreasonsofhealthof alargenumberofseniorofficers,and thetransferof other officers to fieldduties. Hitler wasdetermined tobrooknooppositionto hismilitarypolicy andwouldacceptnowordofcaution.

In hisnewpost, Keitel became chief ofHitler'sworkingstaffandassumed theduties of the former Minister of War. HeadquartersOKW wastoexpand itsoperationsandplanning staff intotheWehrmacht fuehrungsamt (Armed Forces Operations Office), underCol.Alfred Jodl from April toNovemberof1938andCol.WalterWarlimonttoAugust1939.Friction, not uncommon under Blomberg, increased considerablyunder this newcommand organization. Noclear dividing line wasestablishedbetweentheresponsibilities ofthejointarmedforcescommandand thecommandsoftheArmy,Navy,and AirForce. GeneralKeitellacked theposition andseniority ofBlombergandalmostanyactivityof theOKWheadquarters,particularly of itsplanning staff,the Wehrmacht uehrungsamt, cametoberegarded asencroachingontheresponsibilitiesofthethreeservicesand metwithresistance. Thecommanders inchiefof theArmy,Navy,and AirForce, freed fromtheir common superior, Blomberg, soon began tocircumventOKWandtoaddressthemselvestoHitlerpersonally,therebystrengtheningtheFuehrer'scontrolofmilitary affairs.12TheNew Army

ExpansionAnextensiveprogram tohousethegrowingactiveArmywasbegunin 1935 and in thecourse of thenext twoyears a large numberofbarracks were built. These barracks were usually designed tohousea battalion or regiment, and were of brick or stone construction.Workshopandindoortrain ingfacilitieswereexcellent. F iring rangesfor small arms, andopenfieldsandwooded areas for limitedfieldexercises were usually situated within a fewmiles of thebarracksproper. Accommodationsat thelarge training areas were improvedand expanded.

Ltr, GenWarlimont toOCMH,15 Apr55. Author 's f ile.


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23ERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1939

Figure 2. Typical barracks for the Xew Wehrm acht.ByOctober1937theactiveArmyhad500,000-600,000menunder

arms, and its tactical force consisted of 4 group commands and 14corps, with 39 active divisions, including 4 motorized infantry and3 Panzer (armored) divisions.13 The cavalry divisions had been deactivated. One cavalry brigade was retained, but most of thecavalry regiments were reassigned as corps troops and some of thepersonnel transferred tothenew Panzer force. Twenty-nine reservedivisions had been organized and could be called into service onJmobilization. Thenumberof reservedivisionswould increaseasmenwerereleased from theactiveArmy upon completion of their periodofcompulsorytraining.Thenumberof Wehrkreise had been increased increased to 13intheprocessofArmyexpansion. Thestatusofthe W ehrkreiswasalsoraised. The relationship between the tactical corps and WehrkreisoftheWehrmachtwassimilartothatwhichhadobtainedthetacticaldivision and Wehrkreis of the Reichswehr. The corps commanderfunctioned in adual capacity as Wehrkreis commander in garrison,butrelinquishedhisterrito rial functions toadeputy whenhetookhiscorpsintothe field. TheXIV Corpshadnocorresponding Wehrkreisorganization, since it was formed to control the motorized divisionsthroughout the Reich and had no te rr itor ia l responsibility . TheWehrkreise were responsible directly to the commander in chief oftheArmy. In thetacticalchain of command,thecorpsheadquarters

13Mueller-Hillebrand,op. cit.,pp.25and61.


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2 4 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)were subordinated to the Heeresgruppenkommandos,which in turnwereresponsibletotheArmy'scommanderinchief.The expansion of the active Army beyond the level of 12 corpsand 36 divisions established by Hitler was ordered in the annualmobilization plan, which directed the creation of additional activeandreserveunitsyearbyyear. Thecreation ofreservedivisionstha tcould bemobilized on short notice increased the combat potential ofthe Army considerably and kept the trained manpower at a fairstateof proficiency byparticipation inannual maneuversand specialtroopexercises.Twogroupcommandsandsevencorpsheadquarterswereactivatedin 1938. Three of thecorps werefrontier commands,with noterritorialresponsibilitiesasidefrom security,i.e.theyhadnocorresponding Wehrkreis organization. All three were assigned to Germany'swesterndefenses. Theseheadquartersborenonumericaldesignations,butwereknown asFron tier CommandsEifel, Saarpfalz, and Oberrhein, for the Ardennes, Saar, and Upper Rhine frontier areas,respectively.14 Of the o ther four corps headquarters, the XV andX V I Corps were formed to control the light and Panzer divisions,andtheXVIIandXVIIICorpsbecamethetacticalcorpsinAustria.Neither the XV nor XV I Corps had a corresponding Wehrkreisorganization or territorial responsibilities. The commanders of theX V II and X V I I I Corps,however, had adual function asareacommanders for the two Wehrkreise in to which Austria was divided.Other active units organized included three infantry divisions, twoPanzer divisions, four light divisions (small motorized infantry divisions,withanorganictankbattalion),andthreemountaindivisions.Provision was also made for the organization of an additional 22reservedivisions.ItwasplannedtoconvertthelightdivisionstoPanzerdivisionsinthe autumn of 1939 as sufficient materiel became available. Themountain division was an adap tation of the in fan try division,equipped and trained for operations in mountainous areas and deepsnow. The increasein thenumber of active divisionsin 1938canbeattributed partially to the annexation of Austria in March, and theabsorption of the Austrian Army into the Wehrmacht. The Aust rian Army was reorganized to form one light, one panzer, twoinfantry, and twoof them ountain divisionsorganized by theW ehrmachtthatyear.The Sudetenland was incorporated into several existing WehrkreiseformilitaryadministrationfollowingitsannexationtoGermanyinOctober1938,andconscriptsatfirstwereabsorbedintounitsbeing

14Ibid.,pp . 25, 46, 76-77, a nd 156.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 2 5formed bythose Wehrkreise. Oneof theinfantry divisions formedin1938wasalsocomposedlargely of Sudetenland inhabitants.Asof March 1939the Army had atotal of 102active and reservedivisionsand1activecavalrybrigade. The51activedivisions,onthewhole, were maintained close to full s trength, and required onlycertain supply,medical,and transportation services to take the field.The total strength of the active Army was approximately 730,000:that of the reserve, about l,100,000.15 The variance in strengthfiguresfor an equal number of active and reserve divisions can beexplainedbythediversionofalargepartofthereservetoformsupport, security, and training units , or to staff administrative headquarters, in the event of mobilization, i. e. a large proportion ofreserve personnel would not be assigned to field divisions. Otherreservepersonnel wouldnot becalled up immediately upon mobilizationbecauseofemploymentincriticalwarindustries. The51reservedivisionswereallinfan try divisions;their organizationwassimilar totha toftheactiveinfan try divisions,though they lackedsomeitemsofequipment, armament in short supply, and certain units.

TheWestwallIt wasfelt that the Reich had need of a ground defensive systemto secure its Avestern flank while its armies mobilized or in theeventitsarmieswerealready engaged elsewhere and theFrench weretoattack. Construction work on the Westwall (sometimes referredto isthe "Siegfried Line") commenced in 1937. The original planenvisaged a 12-year project and the building of a defensive systemthelengthoftheGerman frontier facing France. Ashort time later

Hitler directed an acceleration of thework and the extension of theWestwall to the north , to include the Luxembourg and Belgian frontiers and apart of theDutch frontier intheAachen area.The Director of the Bureau of Roads (Generalinspekteur fuer dasdeutsche Strassenwesen),Dr.Tod t,wasmaderesponsiblefor theconstruction project. Personnel assigned to the work included roadconstruction crewsgrouped under aforce identified after the directorof theproject astheO rganization Todt, alarge force of the GermanLabor Service (youths of premilitary age groups), Army engineers,and other troops. In contrast to the elaborate fortifications of theFrench Maginot Line,the Westwall was a seriesof smaller bunkers,tank traps and obstacles, and defenses distributed in depth. Adjacentbunkerscould support oneanother with protectivefire,andcamouflage was extensive and thorough. The Luftwaffe supplementedthisground defensive system with oneof itsown tosecuretheborderareatoadepthof30milesagainstairpenetrations.

16Ibid., p . 6 6.


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2 6 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)MobilizationTheassemblyof forces atthetimeof theAustrian andCzechcrisesgavetheGermanplannerstheopportunity totestthe irexistingmobilizationplans',whichwerefoundtobedeficientinanumberofrespects.

A special annex to the annual mobilization plan, issued 8December1938,superseded previous instructions andprovided for themobilizationof theactiveand reserveforces of theArmyby "waves." Foursuch waves were planned, and their mobilization could be accomplishedalmostsimultaneously.16 Wave I would involve only higher headquarters, active divisions(numbered in the 1-50 block), and supporting units. The headquarters for 1army group (Army Group C) and 10armies (First ,Second, Th ird, Fo urth , Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Twelfth, andFourteenth) would beformed from the existingHeeresgruppenkommandos and several of the active corps headquarters. Since only6group commands existed and 11higher headquarters wereplanned,5corps headquarters would provide personnel for an equal numberofarmyheadquartersaswellastheirownheadquartersonmobilization.The Wehrkreise would a ttend to the procurement and tra ining ofreplacements for units of the tactical corps and divisions once thetacticalcommandsleftforthefield.Operational headquarters for the Army High Command wouldbesetup within sixhoursof the time mobilization wasordered. ArmyGroup C and the 10army headquarters would be operational by thesecond day of mobilization. The active corps headquarters, thePanzer and light divisions, and the support units of the infantrydivisionswould alsobemobilized bythesecond day. The remainingunits of the activeinfantry divisionswould bemobilized bythe thirdday.Wave I I would include a number of corps headquarters to beorganized from the reserve, with a cadre of active personnel, and 16fully trained reserve divisions (numbered in theblock 51-100),composedlargelyofpersonnelwhohadcompletedtheirperiodofcompulsorytraining. TheWaveI I corpsheadquarters wouldbecomeoperational on the third day of mobilization and the Wave II divisionswould be ready within four days of mobilization to move into thefield withtheactivedivisions.WaveIIIwouldcallintoservice21divisions (numbered intheblock201-250) consisting mostly of reservists with less train ing , includingmany individualsof the 1901-1913classesandW orld W ar I veteranswhohadhad oneormoreshort periodsof refresher training. Thesedivisions were to assemble by the sixth day following mobilization.

Besondere Anlaye 2 zum Mob. Plan Heer, Kriegsgliederungen 8 Dez 1938. H l/ 30 9/2 a.Captured Records Section (CRS),TAG.


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 9 3 9 27TheWaveIIIdivisionswouldfillthevacuumcausedbythedepartureof the active and Wave I I divisions for thefield,they would securerearareas,andcouldbecommittedtocombatoperationsinarestrictedrole.

Wave IV would include 14divisions (numbered in the block251 300) to be formed from training units within Germany; these divisions were tobeformed by the sixth day of mobilization and wouldsupplement the Wave I I I d ivisions. As of the seventh day a newheadquarters,for theReplacement and Train ing Arm y (Ersatzheer),would bemobilized to assume responsibility for the Zone of the Interior,permittingtheArmy HighCommand todevoteitsattention todirectingtheoperationsofitsarmiesinthe field.Personnelaswellasunits weredesignated for mobilization assignments. Certain officers and enlisted men of the active Army weretobeassigned to reserve units as they formed. A number of activeofficers in Wehrkreis and station complement assignments would remain in the various garrison areas until their replacements, usuallyolderreserveandretired officers,werefamiliar with their duties. Theactive officers would then rejoin their commands in thefield.Additional motor vehicles' and horses would be required by theArmy on mobilization. In accordance with standard German practice,thetrucks and other motor vehiclesof government agenciesoutsidethearmed forces,e.g.the extensiveGerman postal organ ization;business corporations; and private owners were registered with thelocal Wehrkrei* for military use. The same procedure applied to horses,tofilltheextensive requirements of the reserve infantry divisions and support units. Both vehicles and horses wTould be requi

sitioned whenreserveunitsweremobilized. The selection of vehiclesand horses, however, could be accomplished only by procurementcommissions.Special reference should bemade at this point to the mobilizationassignment planned for Army Group C and the First , Fifth, andSeventh Armies. In the event of mobilization, Heeresgruppenkommando2 a t Frankfurt-am-Main would become Army Group C, to control the First, Fif th, and Seventh Armies in the defense of theWestwall. First Armywouldbeformed byX I I Corps andtheSaarpfalzF rontierCommand. Fifth ArmywTouldbeformedbyVICorpsand the Eifel Frontier Command. Seventh Army would be formedbyVCorps and theUpper RhineFrontier Command. The frontiercommands would be responsible for security and garrison duties inthe Westwall area pending mobilization. Corps headquarters andactiveandreservedivisionsweredesignated for allocationto.thearmygroup,andwouldpasstothecontrolof thearmy group and itsarmiesupon orders mobilizing Army Group C and directing it to assume


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2 8 THEGERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)responsibilityfor thewestern frontier. Thecodenamefor themilitarymovementsforthiscontingencywasPlanWEST.17

Divisional OrganizationThe5Panzerdivisionsvariedsomewhat intheircomposition. The1st,2d, and 3d had 1tank and 1motorized infantry brigade each;the4thPanzer Divisionhad atankbrigade andonly aregimentofmotorizedinfantry; the 5th had atankbrigadeand 2infantry regiments. In addition, each Panzer divisionhad amotorized artilleryregimentwith2battalionsof105mmhowitzers;areconnaissancebattalion with motorcycle andarmored carcompanies;anantitankbattalion w ith towed 37mm guns; an engineer battal ion; a signal

battalion; andreartrains andservices. Theauthorized strengthofthe panzer division wasapproximately 12,000 officers and men, thevariationsinorganizationaccountingforsomedifferencesinpersonnelstrengthfromonePanzerdivisiontotheother.Each Panzer division hadabout 300tanks, including all 4typesthen inservice. TheMark I vehicle was2-man tankette, weighedapproximately 6tons, andmounted 2machine guns. TheMark I Itank wasa 3-man vehicle,weighed 111/2tons,andmounted a20mmgun;theMarkII and allheaviertanks had1ormoremachinegunsin addition to their main armament. TheMark I I I model had acrew of 5,weighed approximately 2414 tonsand had a37mmgun.Theheaviesttankof theperiod wastheMark IV,whichweighed26tons,carriedacrew of5,andmountedashort-barreled75mmgun. Asplanned,the 1stPanzerDivisionwouldhave56Mark I,78MarkII ,112Mark III, and 56Mark IV tanks. The 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5thPanzerDivisionswouldeachhave124Mark I,138MarkI I ,20MarkI I I ,and24MarkIVtanks. Thisfigureintankstrength,particularlyfor theMark I I I ,couldnot bereached in allcasesby thetimethePanzer divisions tookthefield against Poland.

The4lightdivisionsalsovaried intheir organization,e. g. the 1stLightDivisionhad amotorized infantry brigadeof1regimentandamotorcyclebattalion;the2dand4thLightDivisionshad2motorizedinfantry regiments each;and the 3dLigh t Divisionhad amotorizedinfantryregimentandamotorcyclebattalion. Eachofthelightdivisionshad anorganiclighttankbattalion, and the1stL igh t Divisionhad anorganic tank regiment. The 1stLight Divisionhad areconnaissance battalion, while the 2d, 3d, and 4thLight Divisionshadreconnaissanceregiments. ThedivisionartilleryofthelightdivisionswasthesameasthatofthePanzerdivisions,i.e.2lightbattalionsof

17H eeresgruppenkommando t, la Nr. 160/38 g. Kdos., 20 December 1938. 1922a.CRS,TAG.


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29ERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1939

Figure 3. Mark II Tank.

Figure 4- M ark III Tank.


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30 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)

Figure 5. Mark IV Tank.towed howitzers. Engineer, s ignal, and other normal attachmentswere similar to thoseof the infantry and Panzer divisions; all weremotorized. The s trength of the l ight division was approximately11,000officers and men.The 35 active in fan try divisions had 3 in fantry regiments of3battalions,acannoncompany,andanantitank companyeach. Thebattalions were 4-company organizations, with the fourth, eighth,and 12th companies (companies werenumbered 1through 14in theregiment) filling the role of heavy weapons companies in the comparable United Sta tes Army organization. The line (rifle) companies had atotal of 9light and 2heavy machine guns and 3light(50mm)mortarseach;theheavyweaponscompanies,8heavymachinegunsand six 81mm mortarseach. As amatter of interest, the lightand heavy machine gun were the same air-cooled weapon, modelof1934. W ith thebipod mount the MG 34,asit wasknown, wasconsideredalightmachinegun ;withthetripodm ount,itbecameaheavymachine gun. All t ransportation for the rifle and heavy weaponscom panies was horsedrawn. T he cannon company had 6 light(75mm) and 2 heavy (150mm) infantry howitzers. The antitank


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO MARCH 1 939 3 1company had twelve 37mmtowed gunsand was the only completelymotorizedunitoftheregiment. Thereservedivisionswereorganizedinsimilarfashionbuttheirregimentslackedheavyin fantry howitzersand the third and fourth wave divisions had obsolete machine gunsfromWorldWarI.The artillery element of the active infantry division was amixedregiment of 3light and 1medium battalions, equipped with 105mmand 150mmhowitzers,and anobservation battalion. Noneof thereservedivisionshad anobservation battalion, and mostof their firingbattalions had obsolete artillery pieces from W orld W ar I.Other divisional units for both active and reserve infantry divisions were a reconnaissance battalion; an antitank battalion with37mmgun s;anengineerbattalion ;asignalbattalion ; andrear trainsand services. The to ta l strength authorized the active infantry divisionwas17,875officers andmen. WaveI I and IV divisionsweresmallerby1,000 to2,000menormore,and Wave I I I divisions largerbyapproximately600men.The 4 motorized infantry divisions were smaller than the activestandard infantry divisions by approximately 1,400 men. Each ofthemotorized infantry divisionscomprised 3infantry regimentsandwasorganized much as a standard division except that all elementsofthedivisionweretransportedbymotorvehicle.The 3 mountain divisions resembled the standard infantry divisionsbutwerenotorganized uniformly. The 1stM ountain Divisionhad 3infantry regiments and 4gun battalions in its artillery regiment; the 2d and 3d Mountain Divisions had only 2 regiments ofinfantry and 3batta lions of arti llery apiece. The l ight mountainartillerybattalionswereequippedwith75mmpackguns,whichcouldbedismantled and carried by mules, and the medium artillery battalionswereequipped with 150mmhowitzers of the type usedby theinfantry divisions. Theauthorizedstrengthofthemountaindivisionwasapproximately 17,000officers and men, though the 1st MountainDivisionforatimehadatotalstrengthofover24,000men.

Command OrganizationGeneralvonBrauchitsch wasstill theArm y's commander inchiefinMarch 1939,withGeneral derA rtillerie Franz Haider ashischiefof staff. The headquarters of the Army was known as theOberkommando des Heeres (OK H) , or the High Command of theArmy. [See chart&]For administration and other station complement functions OK Hcontrolled 15 Wehrkreise, numbered I through X I I I , X V I I , andX V III . [Seemap


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32 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

HITLEROKW (Keitel)

OKH Brauchi tsch OKL Goering OKM Raeder

AirForcesGroup Fleet Shore

Commands Commands CommandsAirCorps Wehrkreise Divisions LuftgaueDivisions

Chart 2. The Wehrmacht and theArmed Services H igh Com mands, 1939.GroupCommand 1,controllingthe I, II, II I , andVIII Corps,wasin Berlin . GroupCommand2 (P lan WEST) was at Frankfurt-am-Mainand to itwereattached the V, VI, and XII Corps,and the 3

frontier commands. DresdenwasheadquartersforGroupCommand3,towhichthe IV, VII, andX I I I Corps were responsible. GroupCommand4controlledtheXIVCorps(motorizedinfantrydivisions),THE WEHRKREIS ORGANIZAT ION, 1939j^VDENMARK

V V ^ B A L T I C S fHamburger J NJ ^_^^^^ J > j t / oK oen igs be r g ,

/ Munster "^y Hannover\ \ ^ . II / y I /iV * ' X t ' Berlin \ ^sKossel/M' \ Wiesbaden\l 1J \ IX

> 0 L A N D

\ XtL \ y "XTTT V ~ > ^ - ' ^ \ _7 Prague ( Breslau \\F R A N C E / ^^ Niirnberg s Protectorate

/ Stuttgart X. Bohemia ^^-r>v_ v_/SV (\ Moravia / ^1 AMunich T Vienna( S L 0 V A K 1

SWITZERLAND^ ' ' '\ ^^~\^ ] 'o,1Salzburg V/ V - - f - / ^ ^ ~ - . . ' ' ' " ^N r

xzm V H u N G A R Y1 T A L Y ^ Y U G O S L A V I A l


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GERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO M ARC H 1 9 3 9 33XV Corps (lightdivisions),andX V I Corps (Panzerdivisions),andwasthe forerunner of the Panzer armies of a later date; the headquarters of this group command was in Leipzig. Group Command5 had its headquarters in Vienna, and controlled the X V II andX V II I Corps. Hannover washeadquarters for Group Command 6,towhich wereattached the IX , X, and X I Corps. This peacetimesubordination of corpswould notnecessarilyper tain on mobilization,whenthe group commandsbecamearmies. Asin the United StatesArmy, corps in the German Army could be shifted from control ofonearmytotheother.The N ew N avy

GermanywaspermittedbytermsofanagreementwiththeBritishon 18June 1935to build up to 35percent of the latter's total navaltonnageand 45percentofBritain'ssubmarinetonnage. FollowingasitdidonH itler'sdenunciation of themilitary limitations imposedonthe Reich by the Versailles Treaty, the naval agreement constitutedtacitB ritish consenttoGerman rearmament. The British weretemporarily reassured by theGerman agreement to limit the sizeof theReich'snew navy. However, the French were distressed by the increaseinGermannavalpower,andawedgew rasdrivenintheAlliedfront.By March 1939 the Hannover had been decommissioned and theobsoletebattleships SchlesienandSchleswig-FIolsteinwerebeingusedascadettrainingships. Stillarmed,theoldbattleshipscouldbeusedfor secondary naval missions. The battlefleetproper was composedofthebattleships Scharnhorstand Gneisenau;the3armoredcruisers(pocketbattleships) ;2newheavycruisers,the Bluecherand AdmiralHipper,displacing10,000tonsandmounting8-inchguns;the6lightcruisers' built during the replacement construction program ; 22 destroyersoftheMaassandBoederclasses (1,625and 1,811 tons ), with5-inch guns; and 43 submarines. The U-l through U-24 and theU-56displacedfrom250to300tonsandwererestrictedtothecoastalwatersoftheBaltic and North Seas. The U-25and U-26were712tonboats,andthe U-37through TJ-39 displaced 740tonseach; theselarger submarines were capable of operating as far as mid-Atlanticwithout refueling. The U-27through U-36 displaced 500to ns; theU-45,U-4-6,and TJ-51, 517tonseach. These lastboats werecapableofoperationsintheNorth Seaand thewatersabout theB ritish Isles.Some additional submarines in various'stages of construction wouldalsobeready for operationsby theoutbreak of hostilities.18

18Bredt, op. cit., pp. 6-12.


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34 THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN INPOLAND (1939) H i l *

Figure6. Artist's conception of German Pocket Battleship.

Figure7. The U-25.

Figure8. The Messerschmitt 109, standard German fighte*


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35ERMAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TOMARCH1939

Figure 9. The Junkers 87(Stuka) Dive Bomber.Admiral Raeder's OberJcommando derKriegsraarine ( O K M ) ,orHighCommandof theNavy,controlled thefleet,Luftwaffe unitsattachedtotheNavy,andshorecommands fortheBalticandNorthSeacoastal regions. Thefleetcomprised theheavy surface units,submarinearm,andnaval reconnaissance forces. Theshore commandswereresponsiblefor thetraining