the gettysburg campaign june - july 1863

7/30/2019 The Gettysburg Campaign June - July 1863

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The

June July


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CMH Pub 7510

Cover: Scene from the Gettysburg Cyclorama painting, The Battle of Gettysburg, byPaul Phillippoteaux, depicting Picketts Charge and ghting at the Angle.

Photograph Bill Dowling, Dowling Photography.


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byCarol Reardon

Center of Military HistoryUnited States ArmyWashington, D.C., 2013

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ettysburgCamp gn

June July


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Introduction

Although over one hundred fiy years have passed since thestart of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. e forces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-

tive because of the significant issues involved: the existence ofthe Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation.e war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, withover six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-yearstruggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. e seeds of the conflict were sownin the earliest days of the republics founding, primarily over the

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in thedebates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division of the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed half slaveand half free, and that could not stand.

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personalreasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passionsand emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoringstates rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamicof being convinced that they were worth three of the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. is has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profes-

sion of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but oen stay in thefight because of their comrades and because they do not want toseem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell andmini ball.


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Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy,the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. esecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story ofthose American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature of their cause. e Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. STEWARTChief Historian


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The Gettysburg CampaignJuneJuly 1863

Strategic Setting

After the Confederates victory at Chancellorsville in May1863, General Robert E. Lees Army of Northern Virginia and theArmy of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker,

once again confronted each other across the RappahannockRiver near Fredericksburg, Virginia. The battle, which costHooker nearly 16,000 casualties and Lee some 12,300 losses,had proved indecisive. The two armies maintained an uneasystalemate, occupying virtually the same ground they had heldsince December 1862. Washington, D.C., the U.S. capital, stoodfifty-three miles to the north, while Richmond, Virginia, theConfederate capital, lay fifty-seven miles to the south. The rival

presidents, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, ponderedtheir next moves.Despite the defeat at Chancellorsville and mounting

discontent on the Northern home front, Lincoln could takeheart from recent developments in the west. In April 1863, Maj.Gen. Ulysses S. Grant shifted 20,000 Union troops from the westbank of the Mississippi River to the east bank, about thirty-fivemiles below the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg, Mississippi.

From 1 to 17 May, Grants command defeated Confederate forcesat Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, and the BigBlack River Bridge. By the end of the month, Grant had trappedLt. Gen. John C. Pembertons 30,000 Confederates inside theirfortifications around Vicksburg. After two unsuccessful frontal


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assaults, Grants army settledinto a siege; meanwhile, aConfederate relief force underGeneral Joseph E. Johnsonfailed to rescue Pemberton.

Davis confronted a moredaunting set of problemsthan his Northern counter-part. Amid bad news fromVicksburg and other parts ofthe Confederacy, he summonedLee to Richmond twice in

mid-May to discuss their stra-tegic options. Despite Leesvictory at Chancellorsville, themilitary situation in Virginiaappeared to be deteriorating. Inthe Tidewater region, a Federalgarrison of some 20,000 menheld Suffolk, and their presence

threatened both Norfolk andHampton Roads. Given thesize and location of the Federalforce, Davis and Lee also fearedfor the safety of Richmond.

On 16 February 1863, Leehad ordered the infantry divi-sions of Maj. Gens. John Bell

Hood and Lafayette McLawsto march from the armyswinter camp at Fredericksburgto Richmond and HanoverJunction. Two days later,Lee ordered Lt. Gen. JamesLongstreet to take commandof the Suffolk Expedition, as

he called it. On 21 March, Leeadvised Longstreet to remainalert for an opportunity ofdealing a damaging blow, or ofdriving [the enemy] from any

General Lee (Library of Congress)

General Longstreetby Alfred R.Waud (Library of Congress)


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important positions. Should Longstreet find such an opening, Leeurged him not to be idle, but act promptly.

Bad news on nearly all military frontsabove all, the reportthat Grant had trapped Pembertons army inside Vicksburgsdefensesforced the Davis administration to consider a widerange of options. No single course of action could resolve all thechallenges facing the president. In addition to Vicksburg andSuffolk, Davis also had to consider impending Union offensives inmiddle Tennessee and at Charleston, South Carolina.

Lee had, in fact, already craed a plan for his own army. Inearly April, he advised Confederate Secretary of War James A.Seddon: Should General Hookers army assume the defensive,

the readiest method of relieving pressure on [Vicksburg andCharleston] would be for this army to cross into Maryland. Oneweek later, Lee suggested to Davis:

I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive bythe first of May when we may expect General Hookers army to beweakened by the expiration of the term of service of many of hisregiments. . . . I believe greater relief would in this way be afforded

to the armies in middle Tennessee and on the [South] Carolinacoast than by any other method.

During his mid-May deliberations with Davis and Seddon,Lee continued to advocate an offensive operation against Hookersarmy. He hoped to take the Army of Northern Virginia north of thePotomac once again. Lees reverse at Antietam in September 1862did not deter him from making a second northern expedition.

While in winter camp in February 1863, Lee had directed JedediahHotchkiss (then Lt. Gen. omas J. Stonewall Jacksons chiefengineer) to draw up a map of the valley of Virginia extending toHarrisburg, PA and then on to Philadelphiawishing the prepara-tion to be kept a profound secret.

Not everyone who participated in the strategic conference inRichmond agreed with Lees plan. A number of senior Confederateofficialsincluding Postmaster General John H. Reagan and,

for a time, even Davis himselfadvocated sending all or part ofLees army to Mississippi. In the end, however, Lees views wonout. Davis gave his approval for the Army of Northern Virginiasinvasion of the North. Only one question remained: When shouldthe campaign begin?


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Operations

THEADVANCE INTOPENNSYLVANIALee issued his initial orders for the northern offensive on

3 June, stealthily breaking contact with Hookers Army of thePotomac near Fredericksburg to concentrate around Culpeper.Despite Lees best efforts, Hooker discovered that the Confederateswere marching northward on 5 June. Hooker sent a force of 7,000cavalry and 4,000 infantry and artillery under his new cavalrycommander, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, in pursuit of theConfederates. Early on the morning of 9 June, Pleasonton surprisedMaj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuarts Confederate horsemen at Brandy Station.

In a chaotic fight that proved to be one of the largest mountedclashes of the war, the Union troopers initially scattered Stuartsmen and nearly captured the vaunted cavalry commander himself.In the end, Stuart held his ground, but it had been a near thing.Richmond newspapers sharply criticized him and demanded that

he redeem himself throughheroic action.

e scare at Brandy

Station did not deter Lee inthe least. He forged ahead withambitious plans that wouldtest his armys new organiza-tional structure in active fieldoperations. Aer the death ofGeneral Jackson on 10 May,Lee had reconfigured his army

of two corps under Jacksonand Longstreet into threecorps. Longstreet retainedcommand of the First Corps,while two newly promotedlieutenant generals, RichardS. Ewell and Ambrose PowellHill, led the Second and ird

Corps respectively. e inclu-sion of Stuarts cavalry raisedLees total strength to roughly75,000 officers and enlistedmen. An unbroken string of

General Stuart (Library of Congress)


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victories during Lees thirteen months in commandassumingthat Antietam was a tactical drawinspired high morale amongthe rank and file and great confidence in the commander. As oneGeorgian said while passing the general during the march north,Boys, there are ten thousand men sitting on that one horse.

Lee planned his northward route with care. (See Map 1.) Aerconcentrating at Culpeper, he intended to clear the ShenandoahValley of Union troops and then continue north into Pennsylvaniasrich Cumberland Valley. If he stayed west of the Blue RidgeMountains, the range would shield both his armys supply trainsand, in time, southbound wagons filled with goods taken north ofthe Potomac. On 10 June, Lee ordered Ewell to proceed into the

Shenandoah Valley. Lee chose Ewells Second Corps to lead the

General Ewell (Library of Congress) General Hill (Library of Congress)


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advance into Pennsylvania because that command contained mostof the veterans of Jacksons 1862 Valley Campaignmen whoknew the region they were marching into.

e fight at Brandy Station, meanwhile, convinced Hooker toreconsider his options. When it became apparent that Lees entirearmy was heading north, Hooker recommended marching southand attacking Richmond instead. President Lincoln, however,reminded him that Lees army and not Richmond, is your sureobjective point. On 13 June, Hooker ordered the Army of thePotomac to begin its pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia.Consisting of seven infantrycorps and one cavalry corps, the

Army of the Potomac numberedabout 94,000 effectives. WhileHooker saw no need for thekind of massive reorganizationthat Lee had recently under-taken, he knew that several ofhis corps contained only twodivisions rather than the usual

three and that he had just lostthousands of veteran soldierswho mustered out when theirtwo-year enlistments expired.For those reasons and more,Hooker believed that Leeoutnumbered him, and he oenbadgered the general in chief of

the U.S. Army, Maj. Gen. HenryW. Halleck, either for reinforce-ments or for authority overgarrisons not currently underhis control.

On 14 June, Ewell passedhis first test as corps commanderat Winchester soundly defeating

Union Brig. Gen. Robert H.Milroys garrison. So impetuouswas the charge of our men that ina few minutes they were over thebreastworks, driving the enemy

General Hooker (Library ofCongress)


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out in great haste and confusion, described a Louisiana captain.Ewell captured 23 cannon, 300 wagons, and 4,000 prisoners. He thensent Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins cavalry brigade scouting aheadof the main column. Jenkins horsemen rode into Chambersburg,Pennsylvania, on 20 June, and two days later, Ewells infantry enteredthe Keystone State near Greencastle.

For the next week, Ewells troops scoured south-centralPennsylvania for supplies, advancing as far north as the outskirtsof Harrisburg, the state capital. On 21 June, Lee issued GeneralOrders 72, setting forth proper foraging procedures: quartermaster,commissary, ordnance, and medical officers were to obtain neededgoods at fair market value, and all soldiers must respect private

property. Jenkins cavalry apparently interpreted the order quiteloosely. Some people, with . . . antiquated ideas of business, mightcall it stealing to take goods and pay for them in bogus money,wrote a Chambersburg journalist, but Jenkins calls it business,and for the time being what Jenkins called business, was business.When Ewells infantry arrived, they also enjoyed the bounty ofthe region. Pvt. Gordon Bradwell of the 31st Georgia recalled anissue of two hindquarters of very fine beef, a barrel or two of flour,

some buckets of wine, sugar, clothing, shoes, etc. All this for abouttwenty men.

Reports of such excesses troubled Lee. On 27 June, he issuedGeneral Orders 73 chastising his soldiers for their instances offorgetfulness and reminding them of the duties expected of usby civility and Christianity. Still, even before Lees entire armyhad crossed into Pennsylvania, wagon trains loaded with food-stuffs and other goods began heading south. In addition, reported

the Chambersburg editor, Quite a number of negroes, free andslavemen, women and childrenwere captured by Jenkins andstarted south to be sold into bondage.

Pennsylvanians responded to the arrival of Lees army invarious ways. Many civilians in Lees path simply fled with all theycould carry. Some Pennsylvania Democrats believedwrongly,as it turned outthat their political affiliation would protectthem from depredation. A Harrisburg editor opined that Lees

men enjoyed great success as foragers because the people of theState were not prepared to meet any foe, and least of all, such afoe as marches beneath the black flag of treason. He cited thelegislatures recent failure to improve the states militia systemfor leaving south-central Pennsylvania open to invasion. On 9


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June, the Lincoln administration had established the Departmentof the Susquehanna to organize local defense, and GovernorAndrew G. Curtin had called out the states emergency forces, butall such efforts proved futile. On 26 June, the 26th PennsylvaniaEmergency Regiment deployed against some of Ewells men justwest of Gettysburg; those who did not become prisoners scatteredin panic aer exchanging a few shots with the Confederates.

Even as Ewell neared Harrisburg, he faced only minimal resis-tance; however, the rest of Lees army faced far stiffer oppositionduring its northward advance. Now alerted to Lees movements,Hooker sent his cavalry and some infantry to probe the Blue Ridgegaps, seeking opportunities to intercept the Confederate columns.

Lee had kept Longstreets First Corps and Stuarts cavalry eastof the Blue Ridge to block Hookers advance, resulting in sharpclashes between rival horsemen at Aldie on 17 June, at Middleburgon 19 June, and at Upperville on 21 June. On 23 June, Lee orderedStuart to harass and impede as much as possible the progressof Hookers army if it attempted to cross the Potomac, and,should that occur, to take position on the right of our columnas it advanced. Stuart certainly bothered the Union army and

caused great consternation in Washington, but he chose a north-bound course that placed Hookers hard-marching army squarelybetween him and Lee for one crucial week in late June. Lee thushad to conduct operations without benefit of the excellent intel-ligence that Stuart usually provided him.

Even so, Lee continued to display an aggressiveness thatconfounded Hooker. Still convinced that he faced an enemy in myfront of more than my number, Hooker delivered an ultimatum to

Halleck on 27 Juneeither send reinforcements or relieve him ofcommand. Hookers superiors decided to replace him. In a letter tohis wife, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade noted that he was awakenedbefore dawn on 28 June by an officer from Washington. eofficer, Meade wrote, said that he had come to give me trouble.At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, andpromptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear. . . . He thenhanded me a communication to read; which I found was an order

relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it.Hooker was in such a hurry to leave that he failed to provideMeade with a detailed assessment of the military situation. enew commander therefore knew little about his own armys statusand even less about Lees. With a hostile army on the march ahead


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new commander would enter his duties cautiously, Lee issuedorders on 29 June for the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrateat Cashtown, east of the Blue Ridge and seven miles northwest ofGettysburg. He warned his corps commanders not to give battlewith Meades approaching forces until the whole of the army wasconcentrated to provide ready support. By 30 June, most of Hillsird Corps had already reached Cashtown. Longstreet remainedwest of the Blue Ridge, but was less than a days march away. Ewellmade plans to leave his camps around Carlisle early on 1 July andhead for Cashtown.

On 30 June, Hill sent forward a brigade from Maj. Gen.Henry Heths division to reconnoiter toward Gettysburg. e

brigade commander, Brig. Gen.James J. Pettigrew, reportedthat Union cavalry had enteredthe town from the south.Pettigrew had encounteredthe lead element of the Armyof the PotomacBrig. Gen.John Bufords cavalry division,

which then consisted of twosmall brigades and one six-gunbattery. An outstanding cavalryofficer, Buford had deployed hiscommand to cover Gettysburgsroad network from the HanoverRoad to the east through theYork Pike and the Harrisburg

Road to the northeast, theCarlisle Road to the north,the Mummasburg Road andChambersburg Pike to thenorthwest, and the FairfieldRoad to the southwest (Map 2).Buford remained uncertain ofLees location and intentions, yet

he sensed that the Confederateswho had appeared west of townearlier that day would returnthe next morning in far greaternumbers. He was right.

General Buford (Library ofCongress)


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THEFIRSTDAYOFBATTLE, 1 JULY

As Buford had expected, Hill ordered Heths entire division toadvance on Gettysburg at first light. About 0700, troopers from the8th Illinois Cavalry, posted three miles west of Gettysburg on theChambersburg Pike, spotted shadowy figures nearing the MarshCreek Bridge to their front. According to tradition, Lt. MarcellusJones borrowed a sergeants carbine and fired the first shot of theBattle of Gettysburg. He then fired several more rounds at skir-mishers from Brig. Gen. James J. Archers brigade, the lead elementof Heths division. Jones immediately reported the contact; inshort order, Buford learned not only of the mounting threat alongthe Chambersburg Pike but also of enemy activity along roads

to the west and north of Gettysburg. He immediately sent briefbut informative assessments of the rapidly changing situation toMeade at Army headquarters and to Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds,whose I Corps had encamped the previous night just a few milessouth of Gettysburg. In order to keep the Gettysburg crossroadsunder Union control, Buford would need Reynolds help. WithHeths division in the lead and Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pendersdivision close behind, a force of nearly 14,000 Confederates from

General Hills ird Corps advanced down the ChambersburgPike toward Bufords 2,800 cavalrymen.

Fortune favored Buford that muggy July morning. Withoutcavalry to scout ahead, Heth admitted, I was ignorant what forcewas at or near Gettysburg. is meant that even the slightest resis-tance from Bufords pickets compelled Archers brigade to halt,deploy skirmishers, and proceed cautiously as if the commandfaced a comparable force of infantry. As Capt. Amasa Dana of

the 8th Illinois Cavalry recalled, the firing was rapid from ourcarbines, and . . . induced the belief of four times our number ofmen actually present. For nearly a mile-and-a-half, each timeArchers skirmishers came too close we retired and continuedto take new position, and usually held out as long as we couldwithout imminent risk of capture. Bufords cavalrymen thustraded space for the time required for Reynolds to arrive with hisI Corps. About 1000, Archers brigade halted on Herrs Ridge, two

miles west of Gettysburg, to await the rest of Heths division whileBufords troopers took up their final defensive line on the next riseto the eastMcPhersons Ridgeone mile closer to town.

Reynolds had not yet arrived when Heth launched his stron-gest attack yet. Deploying Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis brigade


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north of the Chambersburg Pike and Archers brigade south ofit, Heth sent his troops across Willoughby Run and up the slopesof McPhersons Ridge against Bufords line. anks to the ease ofreloading their single-shot, breech-loading carbines, the caval-rymen produced a volume of fire entirely disproportionate to theirnumbers, but both sides knew the outnumbered troopers couldnot withstand the Confederate infantry much longer. At roughly1015, however, the rattle of drums signaled the arrival of GeneralReynolds and the lead division of the I Corps.

e fighting on 1 July west of Gettysburg breaks down intofour phases. e advance of Archers Confederate infantry againstBufords Union cavalry that began at 0700 and culminated with

the assault on McPhersons Ridge around 1015 constituted thefirst phase. No officer in either army more senior than a divisioncommander played a major role in this action and casualtiesremained comparatively light. e three remaining phases of the1 July fight featured far more lethal action between large infantryunits, well supported by artillery, with corps commanders and, intime, Lee himself present on the battlefield to make key decisions.

Phase two of the 1 July fight, lasting from about 1030

until 1200, included two largely independent brigade-levelinfantry actions on McPhersons Ridge, one on each side of theChambersburg Pike (Map 3). North of the road, Heth sent Davisback into the fight, this time against Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutlersinfantry brigade rather than Bufords cavalry. Davis turned Cutlersright flank, but the 380-man 147th New York failed to receive theorder to withdraw and remained in position to protect an artillerybattery. e New Yorkers were hard-pressed by enemy troops in

their front, and their right flank was exposed or in the air. Toconfront both threats, the 147th New York refusedor bent backits rightmost companies, giving the battery time to withdraw. Asthe New Yorkers ranks melted away in the crossfire that engulfedthem, Maj. George Harney issued a unique command: In retreat,double time, run. During the short but sharp fight, the 147th NewYork lost almost 80 percent of its troop strength.

At roughly the same time south of the Chambersburg Pike,

Brig. Gen. Solomon Merediths famed Iron Brigadeconsisting ofthe 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, the 19th Indiana, and the 24thMichiganarrived on the field. Reynolds himself pointed out theMidwesterners first objective: the repulse of Archers brigade, thencresting McPhersons Ridge through the Herbst family woodlot.


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Seconds later, Reynolds fell from his saddle, killed instantly by abullet to the back of the head. Unaware of Reynolds death, theIron Brigade drove Archers men out of the woodlot and backacross Willoughby Run. Pvt. Patrick Maloney of the 2d Wisconsincaptured Archer himself, making him the first general officer in theArmy of Northern Virginia to be captured since Lee had assumedcommand thirteen months earlier. e Iron Brigade learnedof Reynolds fall only aer they withdrew to the high ground inHerbsts woods to reorganize.

e Midwesterners position south of the Chambersburg Pikewas not as secure as it seemed. Reynolds death made Maj. Gen.Abner Doubleday the senior Union officer on the field, and he

found his attention quickly drawn north of the turnpike. at wasbecause Davis troops, emboldened by their success against Cutler,continued to push eastward; if le unchecked, the onrushingConfederates could sweep in behind the Union troops fightingsouth of the road. To stop Davis advance, the Iron Brigades 6thWisconsin and two New York regiments charged from south ofthe pike to the lip of an unfinished railroad cut that many of Davistroops were using for cover. e Federals sudden appearance

made prisoners of hundreds of Confederates who found them-selves trapped within the railroad cuts steep earthen walls. Lt. Col.Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin ordered a Mississippi officer,

Death of Reynoldsby Alfred R. Waud (Library of Congress)


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Surrender, or I will fire! According to Dawes, the man repliednot a word but promptly handed me his sword. en, six otherofficers came up and handed me their swords, Dawes recalled. esuccessful charge consequently averted a Union disaster, inspiringDoubleday to hold McPhersons Ridge in the belief that it had beenReynolds intention to defend the place.

e fight at the railroad cut ended about 1200, and an eeriecalm settled over the battlefield. When the third phase beganaround 1400, the battle changed in three important ways. First,both sides received substantial reinforcements. Second, the morn-ings fight west of Gettysburg now extended to the north of town.ird, General Lee arrived on the battlefield and took a significant

measure of tactical control over his armys actions.Phase three began when General Heth renewed the contest

south of the Chambersburg Pike by advancing his two remainingfresh brigades against the Iron Brigade. e Midwesterners linehad been bolstered by two newly arrived I Corps brigades. Fightinggrew in intensity all along McPhersons Ridge, but nowhere didthe carnage exceed that in the Herbst woodlot, where the leflank of General Pettigrews North Carolina brigade assaulted the

Iron Brigades line. Fate had thrown two of the largest regimentson the fieldthe 496-man 24th Michigan and the 800-man 26thNorth Carolinaagainst each other. Col. Henry Morrow of the24th Michigan considered his position to be untenable, but hereceived orders that the line must be held at all hazards. e 26thNorth Carolina advanced with rapid strides, yelling like demons,Morrow reported. Before the fighting ended, at least eleven NorthCarolina color bearersand their 21-year-old colonel, Henry

K. Burgwyn Jr.fell to Iron Brigade bullets. Company F, 26thNorth Carolina, contained three sets of twins in its ranks, andfive of those six men were either killed or mortally wounded. e24th Michigan paid dearly as well, reporting 316 men killed andwounded, along with another 80 listed as missing in action.

In the meantime, a new threat emerged against the rightof the I Corps line, this time from the north and northwest.Earlier that day, General Ewell was heading southwest toward

Cashtown with the Second Corps divisions commanded by Maj.Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal A. Early. en word arrived ofthe fighting at Gettysburg. Ewell immediately changed directionand began marching south toward Gettysburg, bearing in mindthat Lee did not want a general engagement brought on till the


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rest of the army came up. e deployment of Rodes division onOak Hill, an eminence just north of the Mummasburg Road thatoverlooked the mornings battlefield, placed Ewells men in goodposition to strike the right flank of the I Corps line astride theChambersburg Pike. As Rodes wheeled his batteries onto the highground, Doubleday saw the potential for disaster and sent Brig.Gen. Henry Baxters fresh brigade to extend the I Corps line to theMummasburg Road and anchor its flank there. Utilizing the coveroffered by Sheads Woods and the reverse slope of a northwardextension of Seminary Ridge known as Oak Ridge, Baxters menmoved into their assigned position unseen by Rodes.

Wrongly believing that the Union flank rested squarely in

Sheads Woods, Rodes planned to hit the woodlot hard with acoordinated assault launched by three of his five brigades. Becauseof poor execution resulting from incompetence and negligenceon the part of two brigade commanders, Col. Edward A. ONealand Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson Jr., Rodes assault soon fell apart.ONeals Alabamians attacked alone, and Baxters right flankregiments along the Mummasburg Road repulsed them easily.Iversons North Carolinians attacked shortly thereaer, blun-

dering forward without skirmishers to warn them of the enemyspresence. To deal with Iversons assault, Baxters men simply facedle and redeployed behind a stone wall on top of Oak Ridge, firingvolleys into the Tar Heels ranks that literally mowed them down.Virginia artilleryman Henry Robinson Berkeley passed the fielda few days later and noted in his diary: ere were, in a few feetof us, by actual count, seventy-nine (79) North Carolinians layingdead in a straight line . . . all evidently killed by one volley.

Rodes had intended for Brig. Gen. Junius Daniels NorthCarolina brigade to support Iversons assault, but a growing threaton the Tar Heels right flank caused the unit to split in two. Twoof Daniels regiments ultimately supported Iverson, but the restturned south toward the railroad cut and the McPherson farm,where they clashed with Col. Roy Stones small Pennsylvaniabrigade. e Tar Heels and the Pennsylvanians surged back andforth in some of the costliest fighting of the day across the narrow

swath of ground separating the pike and the railroad cut, withneither side gaining an advantage.While Ewells men approached Gettysburg from the north,

Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard brought up the Union XI Corps fromthe south. e unit contained a high percentage of German-born


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soldiers. It had been plagued by misfortune, having borne the bruntof Stonewall Jacksons flank attack at Chancellorsville, aer whichthe XI Corps became known throughout the Army as HowardsCowards or the Flying Dutchmen. By virtue of seniority, Howardsuperseded Doubleday as the Union commander at Gettysburg.He ordered Doubleday to continue to hold McPhersons Ridgewith the I Corps. Recognizing the importance of Cemetery Hill,a key terrain feature just south of town, Howard sent Brig. Gen.Adolph von Steinwehrs division there as a reserve in case the situ-ation north of Gettysburg deteriorated. He sent his other two XICorps divisionsthose of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz and Brig. Gen.Francis C. Barlownorth through the town. As Howards senior

division commander, Schurz became commander of the XI Corpswhen Howard assumed overall command.

Schurz intended to deploy on the right flank of the I Corpsline, but Rodes presence on Oak Hill made that impossible.Worse yet, the acting XI Corpscommander began to receivereports of the advance of Earlysdivision down the Harrisburg

Road from the northeast.Schurz conferred with Barlowand quickly decided to estab-lish a defensive line perpen-dicular to the I Corps line tocounter the threat posed byboth Rodes and Early. Sincethe Carlisle Road bisected his

new front, Schurz deployedwest of it, and he sent Barloweast of it. Barlow dislikedthe position that Schurz hadassigned him. Concerned thatEarly might transform a knobof high ground in his imme-diate front into a commanding

artillery position, Barlowadvanced his entire division,posting one of his two brigadesas a heavy skirmish line astridethe Harrisburg Road at Rock

General Howard (Library ofCongress)


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Creek and extending the other westward to the knoll. During theadvance, Barlow broke contact with Schurzs right flank near theCarlisle Road leaving a large gap in that part of the XI Corps line.To make matters worse, Barlows right flank was also in the air.Both points were vulnerable to a Confederate attack.

Schurz faced problems of his own. e general realized thathe lacked sufficient numbers to do the three things he deemedessential to maintaining his position: establish a line of battle tostop the Confederates advancing down the Carlisle Road, forge alink with the I Corps on Oak Ridge, and retain a reserve force.All he could do was deploy one of his two brigades as a strongskirmish line between the Carlisle Road and the Mummasburg

Road, weighted a bit to the le to provide support to the I Corps ifneeded, and keep Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowskis brigade availableto respond to crises anywhere along the XI Corps front.

When Early finally struck, Barlow bore the brunt of the assault.Brig. Gen. John B. Gordons Georgia brigade advanced directly onBarlows line at the knoll, while Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays Louisianabrigade marched on the east side of the Harrisburg Road in orderto turn Barlows right flank. (See Map 4.) While Barlow focused

his attention on Hays and Gordon, Brig. Gen. George P. DolesGeorgia brigade from Rodes division advanced in force down theCarlisle Road toward Barlows unprotected le flank. A gallantstand along the road by the 157th New York slowed their progress,but the Georgians continued to angle toward Barlows open flank.Schurz ordered Krzyzanowskis brigade forward to Barlowssupport. Pvt. Edwin Southard of the 119th New York recalled thevicious firefight that followed: We moved straight on to the death

that hurtled from the enemys hidden lines. We returned volley forvolley, and the sulpherous air seemed filled with hissing bulletsand bursting shells. Krzyzanowskis men briefly held but sufferedcruelly in doing so.

General Lee, meanwhile, arrived on the battlefield about1400. Informed of Earlys initial success, Lee ordered a generalassault around 1600. us began phase four of the 1 July fight.Overwhelmed by the weight of superior numbers, the entire

Union line unraveled, starting with the right flank of the XI Corpson the Harrisburg Road. During the rout, Barlow fell seriouslywounded, and his division fled through the streets of Gettysburgtoward Cemetery Hill. Schurz soon withdrew his skirmish linewest of the Carlisle Road, his survivors also heading for the high


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ground south of town. From Cemetery Hill, Steinwehr sent Col.Charles R. Costers brigade forward to cover the XI Corps with-drawal. Costers men became embroiled in a nasty firefight withHays Louisianans and Col. Isaac Averys North Carolina brigade.Making a desperate stand at Kuhns brickyard on the northern edgeof town, Costers men soon found themselves all but surrounded.ose who managed to cut their way out joined their fleeingcomrades in the race to Cemetery Hill. Critics point to the largenumber of Union prisoners as evidence of the XI Corps cowardice,but the long list of killed and wounded says otherwise.

As the XI Corps line disintegrated, the I Corps line beganto give waybut only aer six hours of hard fighting. e rout

began on the right of Doubledays line. Brig. Gen. StephenD. Ramseurs fresh North Carolina brigade reinvigorated theremnants of Rodes brigades that had fought near Oak Hill, and theConfederates finally swept the Union forces off Oak Ridge. Duringthe fight, a Confederate bullet struck one of Doubledays brigadecommanders, Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul, in the head and blindedhim for lifemany Northern newspapers reported Paul as killed.Col. Charles W. Tilden of the 16th Maine assumed command of

Pauls brigade and received orders unwelcome to any commander:stand to the last and hold as long as there was a man le. Tildentore the regimental battle flag from its pole and gave a shred toeach soldier in his command. By the end of the day, Tilden and 161of his men were prisonersmany captured while occupying thesame railroad cut that had betrayed so many hapless Confederatesearlier that day. Oddly enough, the Confederates made theirgreatest haul of Union prisoners at the cut.

On the I Corps line south of the Chambersburg Pike, theremnants of three Union brigadesincluding the Iron Brigadefinally abandoned McPhersons Ridge and re-formed behind a fence-rail barricade in front of Schmucker Hall, the main building of theLutheran eological Seminary on Seminary Ridge. Col. Charles S.Wainwright of the I Corps artillery concentrated his batteries alongthe ridge to the right of the infantry and astride the ChambersburgPike. When General Penders fresh division launched its assault

on the high ground, Wainwrights guns took a heavy toll on Brig.Gen. Alfred M. Scales North Carolina brigade, wounding Scalesand putting every one of his regimental commanders out of action.e remaining I Corps troops made Col. Abner M. Perrins SouthCarolinians pay in blood for the ridge before they and Wainwrights


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guns finally gave way and fell back to the Union rallying pointon Cemetery Hill. About 1700, soldiers from Perrins 1st SouthCarolina Infantry raised their regimental flag over the Gettysburgtown square.

In the meantime, chaos reigned on Cemetery Hill. WhileDoubleday and Howard squabbled over possible courses of action,thousands of lost soldiers searched for their units as small groupsof exhausted men gathered around tattered remnants of regi-mental colors. To restore order, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock,the commander of the Army of the Potomacs II Corps, arrivedon the scene as General Meades personal representative, carryingwritten authorization to make decisions in Meades name and

an order to evaluate Gettysburg as a potential battlefield. If youthink the ground and position there a better one to fight a battlethan the Pipe Creek line, Meade instructed, then the commandinggeneral would order all the troops up. Upon his arrival, Hancock

quickly ended all dissen-sion by assuming commandin Meades name. en heordered Howard to keep his XI

Corps on Cemetery Hill, andoverruled Doubledays objec-tion to sending the I Corpsto defend neighboring CulpsHill. In a dispatch to Meade,Hancock assessed the situationat Gettysburg: I think we canretire; if not, we can fight here,

as the ground appears not unfa-vorable with good troops.It was well that Hancock

carried out his orders so effi-ciently. Buoyed by his tacticalsuccess, at 1645, Lee sent Ewellone more order: attack thehigh ground south of town

Cemetery Hillif practicable.Ewell was unaccustomed tosuch discretionary orders. Heperformed a perfunctory recon-naissance of the ground, saw the

General Hancock (Library ofCongress)


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beginnings of a stout defense, and received reports about possibleUnion activity behind his le flank. en, realizing that he couldnot bring artillery to bear on the hill and all the troops . . . werejaded by twelve hours marching and fighting, he decidedagainstthe recommendations of his senior subordinatesnot to order anassault. Ewells controversial decision, still debated today, ended thedays major combat.

About 2100, General Longstreet arrived at Lees headquarterson the Chambersburg Pike near the seminary. Aer offering hiscongratulations on the days success, Longstreet was stunned tolearn that Lee already had decided to renew the fight on 2 July. Ashe later wrote, I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance

with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon beforeleaving Fredericksburg. At the time, the two generals had discusseda strategic offensive into Pennsylvania, in which Lee would shito the tactical defensive on ground of his choosing if compelled tofight. But now Lee said, If the enemy is there to-morrow, we mustattack him. Longstreet replied, If he is there, it will be because he isanxious that we should attack hima good reason, in my judgmentfor not doing so. But Lee had made his decision. As he explained in

his report, It had not been intended to fight a general battle at sucha distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but findingourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it becamea matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with ourlarge trains. . . . A battle thus became in a measure unavoidable.

THE SECOND DAY OFBATTLE, 2 JULYActing on Hancocks advice, Meade ordered the Army of the

Potomac to concentrate at Gettysburg and thus made the prospectof battle there almost a foregone conclusion. Just aer 2400 on 2July, Meade established his headquarters at the small farmhouseof Lydia Leister on the southwestern slope of Cemetery Hill. Heconsulted with Buford, Hancock, and other senior subordinates,and aer a quick reconnaissance, laid out a strong defensiveposition. Meade kept the XI Corps on Cemetery Hill, sent theXII Corps to Culps Hill, and placed the decimated I Corps in

the saddle between the two heights. He also deployed HancocksII Corps on a rise that ran south from Cemetery Hillknown asCemetery Ridgeand planned to extend his line along that eleva-tion as additional corps arrived. Meade intended to anchor hisdefensive position on two hillsknown as the Round Topsat the


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southern end of Cemetery Ridge. When placed on a map, Meadesline resembled a giant fishhook.

As Meade deployed his army, Lee considered how best toattack it. As his conversation with Longstreet indicated, Leeevinced little interest in the other options still open to him. Atfirst light, he sent out Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, an engineeron his staff, to reconnoiter the Union left flank. Johnstondescribed the Union line as extending south from CemeteryHill along the Emmitsburg Road until it ended just south of thedistinctive red Codori farm buildings. When asked if he hadfound Union troops on Little Round Topthe less forested ofthe two hillsJohnston reported that he had ridden to its peak

and found it unoccupied.Present-day students of the battle find Captain Johnstons

report befuddling because the Union le flank bore no resem-blance to Johnstons description. In fact, when the captain madehis reconnaissance, the II Corps linethen the armys le flankextended along Cemetery Ridge well south of the Codori farm.e line also rested at least 250 yards east of the EmmitsburgRoadin reality, Meade had posted no Union troops on the road

itself. Moreover, troops from Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocums XIICorps and later Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles III Corps encamped inthe area of Little Round Top in such numbers that Johnston shouldhave detected their presence. Flawed as Captain Johnstons reportwas, it determined Lees plan of attack for 2 July.

About 0900, Lee explained his plan to Longstreet. As Leelater reported, It was determined to make the principal attackupon the enemys le, and endeavor to gain a position from

which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bearwith effect. He gave Longstreet command of the assault on theUnion le, which he was to drive in. Lee also ordered Ewellto make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemys right,to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. Hedirected Hills ird Corps to threaten the enemys center, inorder to prevent the shiing of reinforcements against Longstreetor Ewell. Longstreet once more raised objections to Lees plan.

When it became clear that Lee would not reverse his decision,Longstreet sought to delay its execution. Only two of his divi-sionsthose commanded by Generals McLaws and Hoodhadarrived. He wanted to wait for Maj. Gen. George E. Pickettsdivision, still half a days march away. Lee determined to press on


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without it, but he did permit Longstreet to await the impendingarrival of Hoods final brigade and even arranged for Maj. Gen.Richard H. Andersons division of Hills ird Corps to coop-erate with Longstreet. Assuming that Longstreet would obey hisorders to advance rapidly against the Union le flank, Lee rodeoff to Ewells headquarters.

When Lee returned around 1100, he was upset to discoverthat Longstreet had not yet moved. Yet again he rejected his subor-dinates objections and ordered him to attack at once. Longstreetscolumns soon began their march to the southeast, but they haltedjust south of the Fairfield Road. e advance had spotted a Unionsignal station on Little Round Top, which no doubt would have

seen them had they continued on their current route. Longstreettherefore ordered his columns to face about and countermarch.eir detour took them between intervening ridges that screenedtheir movement but cost the attackers valuable time.

At 1515, McLaws leadbrigade reached the base ofSeminary Ridge several milessouthwest of Gettysburg where

the Millersville Road crestedthe ridge and then proceededeastward to intersect withthe Emmitsburg Road. TheConfederates revised planof attack was to follow theMillersville Road over thecrest, halt at the Emmitsburg

Road, face left, and advancenorth toward the Union leftflank. At the top of the ridge,however, where McLaws andLongstreet had expected tosee empty fields and quietorchards, they found SicklesIII Corps deployed for battle.

Sickles actions on 2 Julyremain a contentious issue tothis day. Meade had intendedfor the III Corps to occupy thedefensive fishhook along the

General Sickles (Library ofCongress)


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southern portion of Cemetery Ridge and to protect Little RoundTop until the arrival of the V Corps. From the start, however,Sickles disliked his assigned position. If the Confederates placedartillery on the high ground half a mile or so in his front, Sicklesreasoned, his entire line would be at their mercy. e knollthat caused Sickles so much concern was the site of JosephSherfys Peach Orchard; it reminded him of a similar positionat Chancellorsville known as Hazel Grove. Sickles did not wantto repeat what had occurred there: soon aer he obeyed ordersto abandon Hazel Grove, enemy guns occupied the rise andinflicted heavy losses on his men.

erefore, Sickles requested that Meade let him advance

the III Corps from Cemetery Ridge to the high ground near theEmmitsburg Road, but Meade refused. A second plea from Sicklesbrought Meades chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, to makea reconnaissance of the ground in question. While conceding thatthe position held certain advantages, Hunt also informed Sicklesthat he did not have the authority to approve Sickles request.About 1200, Sickles skirmishersconsisting of a hundred-mandetachment of Col. Hiram Berdans U.S. Sharpshootersspotted

some Confederates (though not from Longstreets command)in the woods just beyond the Emmitsburg Road and brieflyexchanged fire with them. e skirmish further convinced Sicklesof the soundness of his plan.

Around 1400, Sickles ordered his command to moveforward with flags flying and drums beatingand while stilllacking permission to do so. The problems he created by seizingthe high ground at the Peach Orchard far outweighed the

advantages gained. First, Sickles placed Brig. Gen. Andrew A.Humphreys division along the Emmitsburg Road, exposing itto interlocking fields of Confederate artillery fire and leaving itwithout enough cannon to mount an effective counterbatteryresponse. Then he ordered Maj. Gen. David B. Birneys divisionto form on Humphreys left and extend the line eastward from thePeach Orchard to the Wheatfield and from there southeastwardall the way to Devils Den. Birney soon discovered that he lacked

the troops to cover his new front. A small gap isolated his leftbrigade at Devils Den from the regiments he had deployedin the Wheatfield near the Rose farm buildings, and an evenlarger gap separated the troops in the Wheatfield from thoseBirney had posted near the Peach Orchard. Worse yet, the


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bend in Sickles line at the Peach Orchard created a vulnerablesalient that the Confederates could attack from both the southand the west. In addition, Sickles decision to abandon hisposition on the southern stretch of Cemetery Ridge uncoveredthe Taneytown Road, an essential line of communication forMeades army.

Sickles movement did succeed in complicating Longstreetsassault, however. Since the Confederates could not execute theirplan to attack up the Emmitsburg Road, Longstreet orderedMcLaws to deploy his men along the crest of Seminary Ridgeparallel torather than perpendicular tothe roadway. Hethen told Hood to extend McLaws line to the south and prepare

to assault Sickles new position. e Round Tops had played norole in the original attack plan, but now they had to be taken intoaccount. Hood sent out scouts, and he reported to Longstreet thatthe way to the Army of the Potomacs le flank and rear east ofthose hills remained clear of enemy troops. He asked permissionto bypass the Round Tops by sweeping around them rather thanattack the hills straight on.

But the clock had advanced to 1600, and Lee had grown impa-

tient. When Longstreet reported that the situation had changeddramatically since the craing of the original attack plan, Leeproved unwilling to reconsider his options. Longstreet betrayedhis frustration with Lee in his comments to Hood. He rejectedHoods repeated appeals to bypass the Round Tops and ordered theattack to start at once. Hoods division would strike first, followedby McLaws and then Anderson, the attack proceeding from southto north. A frustrated Hood lodged a formal protest, the first time

that the hard-fighting general had ever done so. But he continuedhis preparations notwithstanding.As Hood prepared to attack, Sickles inspected his new

line. General Meade and his staff caught up with him nearthe Peach Orchard, and aer a colorful and mostly one-sidedverbal exchangeMeade was notorious for his hot temperSickles offered to pull back to Cemetery Ridge. At that moment,Longstreets artillery opened fire. To prevent the III Corps with-

drawal from becoming a rout should the Confederates attack,Meade ordered Sickles to stay put and await reinforcements.Sickles advocates later tried to turn Meades order into a belatedendorsement of his subordinates initiative, but the commanderclearly meant no such thing.


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Hoods attack plan for his four brigades seemed straightfor-ward enough (Map 5). Brig. Gen. Evander M. Laws Alabamianswould step off first, seize the crest of Round Top and move onLittle Round Top, bypassing the III Corps le flank at Devils Denentirely. e next unit to step off, Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertsonsbrigade, would assault Devils Den. Brig. Gen. Henry L. BenningsGeorgians would follow the Alabama flags, presumably to theRound Tops. Brig. Gen. George T. Tige Andersons Georgianswould support Robertson. Early in the action, Hood fell badlywounded; from that point on, his division lacked effective direc-tion, and the attack soon began to fragment.

Harassed all the way to the Round Tops by Berdans

Sharpshooters in their distinctive green uniforms, Laws brigadesplit in two, with three regiments heading toward the Round Topsas planned, while the remaining two regiments veered off to dealwith a troublesome Union artillery battery at Devils Den. Laws44th and 48th Alabama thus fired the first Confederate volleysthat bloody aernoon amid Devil Dens giant boulders. eenemy were as invisible to us as we were to them, recalled Col.W. F. Perry of the 44th Alabama. As his men emerged onto open

ground, a sheet of flame burst from the rocks less than a hundredyards away. e fire came from the rifle muskets of the 4th Maine,which constituted Birneysand by extension, the Army of thePotomacsle flank just then. e 4th Maine defended the rockygorge at the southern end of Devils Den.

Robertsons brigade also split as it advanced. e 4th and 5thTexas formed on Laws le flank, a move that carried them towardthe Round Tops. e 1st Texas and the 3d Arkansas, meanwhile,

attempted to follow orders directing them to keep their le flank onthe Emmitsburg Road, and were swept into the fight at Devils Den.ey advanced into a triangular field enclosed by stone walls on theDevils Dens steep western slope. Col. A. Van Horn Ellis 124th NewYorknicknamed the Orange Blossoms in honor of their homecountymanned the wall at the far end of the field. Pvt. James O.Bradfield of the 1st Texas described the fight: e enemy stoodtheir ground bravely, until we were close on them, but [they] did not

await the bayonet. ey broke away from the rock fence as we closedin with a rush and a wild rebel yell. e New Yorkers lost heavily ina counterattack down the slope, and the Texans drove them back toa stone wall at the top of the hill. Here occurred one of our wildestfiercest struggles of the war, Bradfield recalled, a struggle such as


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it is given to few men to pass through and live. It was a chaoticfightone in which every man became his own commander.

e confusion quickly worsened. Under Hoods original plan,Bennings Georgians should have followed the Alabamians towardthe Round Tops, but as General Benning later explained, a woodon the right had concealed most of Laws brigade from him.Benning therefore led his men into the fight at Devils Den. Pvt.omas Fluker of the 15th Georgia recalled: We raised a deaf-ening yell and went over the rock fence and up the hill shoutingand yelling like demons. Birney shied troops from other partsof his thin line to reinforce Devils Den, but the combined force ofAlabamians, Arkansans, Georgians, and Texans overwhelmed the

defenders, who grudgingly yielded both the position and severalartillery pieces to the victorious Confederates. In truth, serendipityplayed a greater role in the Confederates success than deliberateexecution. With Hood down, the assault lacked a guiding hand to

separate the entangled brigadesand put them back on track.e absence of capable seniorleadership on the Confederate

right flank stymied Longstreetsefforts on 2 July.

In contrast, the Unioncommanders who directed thedefense of Little Round Topdisplayed remarkable skill andinitiative. On top of the hillwith only a small signal detach-

ment, Brig. Gen. GouverneurK. Warren, Meades chiefengineer, spotted Longstreetsline of battle extending beyondSickles le flank at Devils Denand recognized Little RoundTops vulnerability. Knowingthat Meade intended to anchor

the le of his fishhook on thathill, Warren realized that hehad to act. He saw reinforce-ments from the V Corpsmarching toward Sickles line

General Warren (Library ofCongress)


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and directed one brigade to occupy Little Round Top. Col. StrongVincent turned his column up the hill and deployed on the spurof its southern slope.

ree Alabama regiments of Laws brigade, along withthe 4th and 5th Texas of Robertsons brigade, soon approachedVincents position, where his four regimentsthe 20th Maine, 83dPennsylvania, 44th New York, and 16th Michiganformed in linefrom le to right. e fighting first raged on the right of Vincents linewhere Texans took on Michiganders and New Yorkers. Sgt. ValeriusGiles of the 5th Texas recalled that he and his comrades used everytree, rock and stump that gave any protection from the rain of miniballs. Both Sergeant Giles and Pvt. John Griffith took cover behind

a moss-covered old boulderabout the size of a 500-poundcotton bale. e rough terrainquickly disrupted attack forma-tions, so every fellow was hisown general, Giles continued.Private soldiers gave commandsas loud as the officers. Nobody

paid any attention to either.A few moments later, LawsAlabamians launched an assaulton the 83d Pennsylvania and the20th Maine.

Colonel Vincent had madeclear to Col. Joshua LawrenceChamberlain that his 20th

Maine now held the extremele flank of the entire Unionline. As a consequence, retreatwas not an option. Firing firstbroke out on the regimentsright and soon spread alongChamberlains entire line. Aerrepulsing several attacks, the

Maine soldiers noticed thattroops of Col. William C. Oates15th Alabama were sweepingaround their le flank. Inresponse, Chamberlain bent

Colonel Chamberlain, picturedhere as major general (Library of

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backor refusedhis lemost companies to confront themdirectly. Cpl. eodore Gerrish never forgot how rapidly thecartridges were torn from the boxes and stuffed in the smokingmuzzles of the guns; how the steel rammers clashed and clanged inthe heated barrels; how the mens hands and faces grew grim andblack with burning powder; how our little line, baptized with fire,reeled to and fro as it advanced or was pressed back. He recalledas well a terrible medly of cries, shouts, cheers, groans, prayers,curses, bursting shells, whizzing rifle-bullets, and clanging steel.

When the men of the 20th Maine had exhausted their ammu-nition, Chamberlain ordered them to fix bayonets. Accounts varyabout the impetus for what happened next, but suffice to say that

the 20th Maines refused flank led the charge down Little RoundTops eastern slope, the line of onrushing men swinging out likea giant gate. e effect was surprising, Chamberlain reported,many of the enemys first line threw down their arms and surren-dered. A Confederate officer fired his pistol at Chamberlain whileoffering his sword in token of surrender. e 20th Maine routedthe exhausted Alabamians, but Chamberlain lost 124 of his 386men during the fight, 42 of them killed or mortally wounded.

History has immortalized the 20th Maine for its stand onLittle Round Top, but a similar crisis threatened Vincents rightflank, where the line of the 16th Michigan nearly gave way. etimely arrival of Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weeds V Corps brigade,with Col. Patrick H. ORorkes 140th New York in the lead, madethe difference. Bloody work was ready for us at our very feet,Adjutant Porter Farley recalled. Many New Yorkers had no time toload their rifles or fix bayonets. Down this way, ORorke shouted,

and according to Farley, the 140th rushed down the rocky slopewith all the same moral effect upon the rebels, who saw us coming,as if our bayonets had been fixed and we ready to charge uponthem. Little Round Top remained securely in Union handsbut at a terrible cost. Warren was wounded, and Vincent, Weed,ORorke, and Lt. Charles E. Hazlett, the commander of Battery D,5th U.S. Artillery, all lost their lives defending it.

While the Confederates succeeded in overrunning Devils

Den and the Federals managed to hold on to Little Round Top, theoutcome of the clash in the Rose Wheatfield was not so clear-cut. Atfirst only a handful of III Corps regiments defended the position,but they were soon reinforced by two small V Corps brigades.Aer being crowded out of the fight at Devils Den, General Tige


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Andersons Georgians attacked the Union line in the Wheatfield.e 17th Maine, posted behind a stone wall at the southern edgeof the field, bore the brunt of the Georgians first attack. Accordingto the 17th Maines commander, Lt. Col. Charles B. Merrill, econtest became very severe, the enemy at times being driven backby our line, and then by superior numbers compelling us in turnto give way. e heavily outnumbered Union defenders began tobuckle under the pressure of the Confederate attacks.

At that moment, Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwells divisionfrom Hancocks II Corps arrived to stabilize the position. Eachof Caldwells four brigades launched a separate attack. Brig. Gen.Samuel K. Zooks brigade swept the woods and the western part

of the Wheatfield, while Col. Edward E. Cross brigade attemptedto clear the eastern half. Col. Patrick Kellys Irish Brigade engagedBrig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaws South Caroliniansthe first ofMcLaws brigades to enter the fighton a little knob of groundin the Wheatfields southwestern corner. Relieving Cross men,Col. John R. Brookes brigade surged into the woods south of theWheatfield and reached a high rocky shelf, where they collidedwith the Georgians of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes brigade. e

Confederates counterattacked and drove back the Union brigadeswith heavy losses; in the process, Brooke was severely wounded,and Cross, Zook, and Semmes all fell with mortal wounds.

e intense combat in the Wheatfield seared itself into thesurvivors memories. Pvt. James Houghton of the 4th Michigandescribed one horrific moment: My tent mate James Johnston wasshot. He was but a few feet in front of me when he fell. I heard himsay I am killed. is was the last words that I heard him speak. e

rest was groans. ere was no help for him. He was shot seven times.A terrified Capt. Charles Fuller of the 61st New York, wounded inthe leg and unable to move to safety, had to lie entirely helpless . . .hearing those vicious bullets singing over my head.

Among the steady succession of reinforcements thatMeade fed into the Wheatfield were two small brigades of U.S.Regular infantry from the V Corps; they briefly restored thenumerical balance and prolonged the seesaw fight across the

trampled grain. As sunset neared, however, the Confederatesgained the upper hand. By 1830, Brig. Gen. William T. WoffordsGeorgians had pushed the Regulars out of the Wheatfield andpursued them to the foot of Little Round Top. Lt. John Page ofthe 3d U.S. Infantry remembered seeing artillerymen on the hill


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waving their kepis as a signal to get out of the way. We realizedthat they wished to use canister, Page wrote, so we took up thedouble quick. In addition to Union artillery, a brigade of thePennsylvania Reserves Division, the V Corps last reserve unit,as well as a fresh brigade of VI Corps troops, stopped Woffordsadvance.

e Confederates withdrew to the western edge of theWheatfield, while the Pennsylvania reserves deployed along theeastern tree line, transforming the trampled field into a grislyno-mans-land strewn with dead and wounded men. One of thecasualties, a Pennsylvania soldier named Lt. J. Jackson Purman,lay in sleepless pain, during the long hours of that midsummer

night and worried about being hit by a stray shot from a nervouspicket. Purman had good reason to be concerned. He noted thatsome men were wounded a second timeincluding himselfwhile others were killed outright. Pvt. John Coxe of the 2d SouthCarolina felt sorry for the wounded enemy, but he and hiscomrades could do little for them. Coxe gave a wounded Unionofficer a drink of water and never forgot his profuse thanks for thelittle service I was able to render him.

In contrast to the Wheatfield, there was little doubt aboutthe fate of Sickles vulnerable Peach Orchard salient. Althoughthe Union artillery chief, General Hunt, supplied several reservebatteries to defend that exposed ground, no infantry reinforce-ments from outside the III Corps were forthcoming. As a result,the position finally collapsed under the combined attacks ofKershaws South Carolinians from the south and Brig. Gen.William Barksdales Mississippians from the west. Several III

Corps regiments fought in the Peach Orchard itself, and Brig.Gen. Charles K. Graham, whose brigade was posted just northof it, tried several times to shi his Pennsylvania regiments therebefore he fell wounded and became a prisoner. One of Grahamsmen, William E. Loring of the 141st Pennsylvania, recalledfighting the Confederates at close quarters until the Federalswere compelled to fall back, our ranks . . . rapidly being thinnedwhile the exultant enemy pressed on in pursuit. As his troops

gave way, Sickles realized that his worst fear had become reality:Confederate batteries wheeled into position on the high groundat the Peach Orchard and opened fire on his command. A shellfrom one of those guns nearly severed Sickles right leg, and it wasamputated that night.


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Worse yet for Meades army, the loss of the Peach Orcharduncovered the le flank of Humphreys division posted alongthe Emmitsburg Road. is threat, combined with the advanceof three of General Richard Andersons ird Corps brigades

Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcoxs Alabamians, Col. David LangsFloridians, and Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wrights Georgiansagainst Humphreys front, succeeded in breaking the stubbornresistance of the III Corps and finally forcing it back. e collapseof the Emmitsburg Road line created yet another crisis for theUnion high command. A huge gap remained in the Union linealong lower Cemetery Ridge in the area formerly held by Sicklesmen and Caldwells II Corps division. A determined push by

Barksdale, Wilcox, Lang, or Wright could have severed the Unionsupply line on the Taneytown Road just behind the ridge.General Hancock displayed great initiative in shiing units

from quiet sectors of his II Corps line to stop the attackingConfederates. Col. George L. Willards New York brigade slowed

The Wheateld (Library of Congress)


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Barksdales advance, with both commanders losing their lives inthe desperate fighting. e famous charge of the 1st Minnesotahelped to stop Wilcoxs Alabamians and some of Langs Floridians.e regiment lost 82 percent of the Minnesotans who went intothe charge, but the frightful losses did not deter the survivors fromaccomplishing their mission. According to Sgt. Alfred Carpenter,Bullets whistled past us; shells screeched over us; canister andgrape fell about us; comrade aer comrade dropped from theranks; but on the line went. No one took a second look at his fallencompanion. We had not time to weep.

Wrights Georgians crested Cemetery Ridge and capturedseveral artillery pieces, only to collide with counterattacking II

Corps soldiers. Meade also sent in XII Corps troops from CulpsHill, the battered remnants of several I Corps regiments, andeven rallied some III Corps units to fill gaps in the Union line. Asdaylight faded and Andersons last two brigades failed to supportthe Confederate attacks up Cemetery Ridge, Longstreets assaultfinally foundered. e Union le flank and center had held.

While Longstreets attack unfolded, General Ewell prepared tolaunch his assault on the Confederate le (Map 6). By 1600, Ewell

had deployed most of his artillery on Benners Hill east of townand opened a heavy bombardment on Cemetery Hill and CulpsHill. Although Ewells cannonade did considerable damage, theUnion artillerymen responded with an even heavier counterbat-tery fire that soon silenced the Confederate guns. en, followingLees orders to mount a full-fledged assaultand perhaps regret-ting his inaction of the previous eveningEwell sent his infantryagainst the two heights.

On the evening of 2 July, three brigades of Maj. Gen.Edward Allegheny Johnsons division attacked Culps Hill. Onlythe 1,400 officers and men of Brig. Gen. George S. Greenes NewYork brigade remained to defend the section of the line vacatedby the rest of the XII Corps, which had gone to Sickles aid. Anengineer, Greene had put his men to work building breastworksthat aernoon. e entrenchments proved invaluable to theheavily outnumbered defenders. Near the crest of the hill, the

60th New York repelled Brig. Gen. John M. Jones Virginians,capturing both prisoners and battle flags. According to the 60thNew Yorks historian, e effects of our fire were so terriblethat the [enemys] flags were abandoned, and the prisoners wereafraid to either advance or retreat.


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Greenes men, however, could not repulse Johnsons attacksagainst the lower part of the hill. Brig. Gen. George H. Steuartsswarming North Carolinians, Virginians, and Marylandersthreatened the overextended 137th New York and forced them towithdraw up the hill to an earthen traverse that lay perpendicularto Greenes original line. Together with reinforcements amountingto 750 men from at least three other corps, the 137th New Yorkcontinued to defend Culps Hill from its new position. But it hadbeen a near thing. In the darkness, Johnsons Confederates hadadvanced to within a few hundred yards of the Union supply lineon the Baltimore Pike but failed to press their advantage.

Ewell, meanwhile, ordered Hays Louisiana brigade and

Averys North Carolina brigade from Earlys division to assaultthe eastern slope of Cemetery Hill. Ewell also had intended forPenders and Rodes divisions to participate by attacking on Earlysright. Pender had been severely wounded earlier that day, andcommand of the division devolved on Brig. Gen. James H. Lane.Both Lane and Rodes were slow to deploy their forces, and by thetime they were ready to step off, the fight on Cemetery Hill wasover.

In any event, Hays Louisianans scattered the XI Corpsdefenders at the eastern base of the hill and headed for the NewYork and Pennsylvania batteries on the crest. As one Union batterycommander reported, the Louisianans charged his guns andsucceeded in capturing and spiking my le piece. e cannoneersfought them hand-to-hand with handspikes, ramrods and pistols.Although Colonel Avery, commanding on the Confederate le,fell mortally wounded early in the attack, his Tar Heels managed

to advance across open fields swept by Union artillery and brokethe XI Corps line in their front. As darkness fell, Col. Samuel S.Carrolls brigade from Hancocks II Corps double-quicked throughEvergreen Cemetery, plugging the gap in the XI Corps line andpushing the Confederates off the hill. By then it was so darkthat Carrolls men could distinguish friend from foe only by thelocation of their muzzle flashes. While Ewells assaults on CulpsHill and Cemetery Hill had met with initial success, the attackers

lacked sufficient striking power to exploit it.THETHIRD DAY OFBATTLE, 3 JULY

Around 2400, Meade summoned his senior subordinates tohis headquarters at the Leister house. Although the meeting was


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not a formal council of warMeade did not regard its decisionsas bindingthe commanding generals chief of staff, Maj. Gen.Daniel A. Butterfield, nonetheless kept a record of the votes onthree main questions. First, should the army stay or withdraw? egenerals wanted to stay. Second, should the army attack or awaitLees next move? is question inspired greater discussion, but themajority preferred to remain on the defensive. ird, how longshould the army wait for Lee to move? e generals agreed thatif Lee did nothing over the next twenty-four hours, they shouldreconsider their own options.

As the meeting broke up, Meade spoke to Brig. Gen. JohnGibbon, whose II Corps division held a portion of Cemetery Ridge

close to Army headquarters. If Lee attacks tomorrow, Meadereportedly told Gibbon, it will be in your front. Gibbon assuredMeade that his men would be ready. Aer the generals departed,Meade worked through the night to strengthen weak spots in hisfishhook line. He paid special attention to his le flank on theTaneytown Road behind the Round Tops, the area that Hood hadwanted to attack on 2 July. Had the Confederates tried to turn thatflank on 3 July, they would have found two well-posted infantry

brigades, supported by artillery, waiting for them.General Lee, for his part, did not hold a meeting of his senior

leaders but instead formulated his own plans for 3 July. Becausehe considered the results of both Longstreets and Ewells effortsagainst the Union flanks on 2 July to be partial successes, he deter-mined to renew the attacks on those points. As he later wrote, thegeneral plan was unchanged. He issued orders for early morningassaults against both Union flanks.

Around 0430, cannon fire shattered the predawn stillness.In an effort to reclaim possession of his trenches on lower CulpsHill, the acting XII Corps commander, Brig. Gen. Alpheus S.Williams, ordered his batteries to fire on the Confederate troopsoccupying them. In response, Ewell launched the early morningattack that Lee had ordered. Flashes of musketry soon lit up theslopes of the hill. During the night, Ewell had doubled the size ofhis attacking force. But the entire XII Corps had since returned

to join Greenes brigade in the trenches, and Meade had sent abrigade from the VI Corps as additional reinforcement. Hundredsof Confederate attackers fell before sheets of unrelenting Unionmusketry, as fresh regiments swapped places with frontline unitsthat had emptied their cartridge boxes. A soldier in the 149th


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New York recalled: It was surprising to behold the number ofthe enemys dead, which were scattered on the ground, behindrocks, and even hanging on the limbs of trees. e Union rightflank on Culps Hill remained secure.

Once the firing on the hill had died down, orders came fromXII Corps headquarters for skirmishers to probe the Confederateline at Spanglers Spring. e message became garbled in trans-mission and reached the commander of the 2d Massachusetts, Lt.Col. Charles R. Mudge, as an order for a full-blown attack. It ismurder, but its the order, observed Mudge, who then shouted:Up, men, over the works! e 2d Massachusetts and the 27thIndiana advanced into an open field, only to be mowed down by

Confederates posted behind strong stone walls. Mudge himself fellmortally wounded while leading the futile charge. e two Unionregiments fell back with heavy losses.

On Seminary Ridge, meanwhile, Lee listened to the firefighton Culps Hill with growing concern. Mistaking the artillery fireas Ewells early morning assault, he soon learned that the Unionarmy had taken the initiative. He also listened for the sound ofLongstreets attack on the Union le, but discovered that his senior

subordinate had not yet launched his own assault and showed noinclination to do so. In any case, the duration and intensity of thefighting on Culps Hill convinced Lee that Meade had reinforcedhis right flank overnight and that he had done the same for hisle. Lee thus surmised that the Union line must be weakest in thecenter, and he considered the possibility of attacking CemeteryRidge itself. Longstreet once again offered his frank assessmentand restated his preference for alternative courses of action; he

took seriously his responsibility as Lees senior subordinate toprovide such advice. General, he said, I have been a soldier allmy life. . . . It is my opinion that no fieen thousand men arrangedfor battle can take that position.

After listening to Longstreet state his case, Lee decided onthe attack that came to be known as Picketts Charge. Col.Armistead L. Long of Lees staff later refuted what he consid-ered to be a glaring misconception about the commanding

generals decision: The attack of Picketts division on [3 July]has been more criticized, and is still less understood, than anyother act of the Gettysburg drama. Long noted that it hasbeen characterized as rash and objectless, on the order of TheCharge of the Light Brigade; nevertheless it was not ordered


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without mature consideration, and on grounds that presentedfair prospects of success.

Lee made several important decisions regarding the attackon the Union center. First, he selected the troops. He chose hisonly remaining fresh units, Picketts three Virginia brigades fromLongstreets First Corps. ey seemed primed for action. Accordingto Lt. Col. Rawley Martin of the 53d Virginia, e esprit de corpscould not have been better. But the division numbered only about5,500 officers and men. To add more weight to the attack, Leeturned to Heths division, the unit from Hills ird Corps that hadopened the battle on 1 July. Knowing that the division had sufferedheavy casualtiesincluding the wounded Heth, who was replaced

by PettigrewLee added two brigades from Penders divisionunder the command of Maj. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble and directedhim to support Pettigrew. Lee thus planned to send about 13,000soldiers against the Union center, but the commands of Pickett,Pettigrew, and Trimble came from two different corps, and two ofthe three senior leaders were new to their duties.

Lees second decision called for an artillery bombardment ofthe Union center to precede the infantry assault. e attackers had

to cross undulating, open ground for nearly a mile, and Lee worriedabout the impact of massed artillery on his ranks. He thereforeexploited one of the few advantages his sprawling exterior linesoffered: the ability to concentrate artillery fire on a specific point.His target was a prominent copse of trees near the center of theenemy line on Cemetery Ridge.

ird, Lee decided to place Longstreet in command of theattack. Lees senior subordinate tried to sidestep the assignment by

suggesting that General Hill should be the commander, becauseslightly more than half of the assaulting force came from his irdCorps. A withering look from Lee quickly put that notion torest. Like it or not, Longstreet now had

the gettysburg campaign june - july 1863

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