the global maritime partnership initiative mike mullen
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The Global MaritimePartnership InitiativeImplications for theRoyal Australian Navy
No. 24
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs
Chris Rahman
SEA POWER CENTRE - AUSTRALIA
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The GlobalMariTiMeParTnershiPiniTiaTiveiMPlicaTionsfor The royal
ausTralian navy
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Copyright Commonwealth o Australia 2008
This work is copyright. Apart rom any air dealing or the purpose o study, research,criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, and with standard sourcecredit included, no part may be reproduced without written permission. Inquiries should
be addressed to the Director, Sea Power Centre Australia, Department o Deence,CANBERRA ACT 2600.
National Library o Australian Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Rahman, Chris 1966
The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications or the Royal Australian Navy
ISSN 1327-5658
ISBN 978-0-642-29682-5
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c rm
The GlobalMariTiMeParTnershiPiniTiaTiveiMPlicaTionsfor The royal
ausTralian navy
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Dm
The views expressed are the authors and do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy
or position o the Government o Australia, the Department o Deence and the RoyalAustralian Navy. The Commonwealth o Australia will not be legally responsible in
contract, tort or otherwise or any statement made in this publication.
Sea Power Centre Australia
The Sea Power Centre Australia (SPC-A), was established to undertake activities to
promote the study, discussion and awareness o maritime issues and strategy within the
RAN and the Deence and civil communities at large. The mission o the SPC-A is:
to promoteunderstandingof seapower and itsapplication to thesecurityof
Australias national interests
tomanagethedevelopmentofRANdoctrineandfacilitateitsincorporationinto
ADF joint doctrine
tocontributetoregionalengagement
withinthehigherDefenceorganisation,contributetothedevelopmentofmaritime
strategic concepts and strategic and operational level doctrine, and acilitate
inormed orce structure decisions
topreserve,develop,andpromoteAustraliannavalhistory.
Comment on this publication or any enquiry related to the activities o the Sea Power
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Department o Deence Telephone: +61 2 6127 6512
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Internet: www.navy.gov.au/spc
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Pp at Mtm a
ThePapers in Australian Maritime Aairs series is a vehicle or the distribution o
substantial work by members o the Royal Australian Navy as well as members o theAustralian and international community undertaking original research into regional
maritime issues. The series is designed to oster debate and discussion on maritime
issues o relevance to the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Deence Force, Australia
and the region more generally.
Other volumes in the series are:
No. 1 From Empire Deence to the Long Haul: Post-war Deence Policy and its
Impact on Naval Force Structure Planning 19451955 by Hector Donohue
No. 2 No Easy Answers:The Development o the Navies o India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 19451996 by James Goldrick
No. 3 Coastal Shipping: The Vital Linkby Mary Ganter
No. 4 Australian Carrier Decisions: The Decisions to Procure HMA Ships
Albatross, Sydney and Melbourne by Anthony Wright
No. 5 Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: Papers by Foreign Visiting Military
Fellows with the Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program 1998
edited by David Wilson
No. 6 Australias Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the Australia
Station 18801909 by Nicholas A. Lambert
No. 7 Maritime Aviation: Prospects or the 21st Centuryedited by David Stevens
No. 8 Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective
edited by David Wilson
No. 9 HMASSydney II: The Cruiser and the Controversy in the Archives o the
United Kingdom edited by Captain Peter Hore, RN
No. 10 The Strategic Importance o Seaborne Trade and Shipping: A Common
Interest o Asia Pacic edited by Andrew Forbes
No. 11 Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary Delimitation, Resource Conficts
and Constabulary Responsibilities edited by Barry Snushall and Rachael
Heath
No. 12 Australian Maritime Issues 2004: SPC-A Annualedited by Glenn Kerr
No. 13 Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020, edited by Glenn Kerr and BarrySnushall
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No. 14 Peter Mitchell Essays 2003 edited by Glenn Kerr
No. 15 A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact o the Submarine Threat on Australias
Maritime Deence 19151954 by David Stevens
No. 16 Australian Maritime Issues 2005: SPC-A Annualedited by Gregory P. Gilbert
and Robert J. Davitt
No. 17 Australian Naval Personalities edited by Gregory P. Gilbert
No. 18 ADF Training in Australias Maritime Environmentedited by Chris Rahman
and Robert J. Davitt
No. 19 Australian Maritime Issues 2006: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbes
and Michelle Lovi
No. 20 The Russian Pacifc Fleet: From the Crimean War to Perestroika by Alexey
D. Muraviev
No. 21 Australian Maritime Issues 2007: SPC-A Annualedited by Andrew Forbes
No. 22 Freedom o Navigation in the Indo-Pacic Region by Stuart Kaye
No. 23 Asian Energy Securityedited by Andrew Forbes
No. 24 The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications or the Royal
Australian Navyby Chris Rahman
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ctt
Abbreviations ix
About the Author xiii
Acknowledgements xiv
Introduction 1
The 1000-ship Navy Concept 3
What the Initiative Is, and What It Is Not 7
Sea Lines o Communication Security or the Post-9/11 Era 8
Idealism and the 1000-ship Navy 9The Concept as System Deence 10
Policy and Strategy Foundations 13
Naval and Maritime Security Strategy Post-9/11 14
Sea Power 21 14
The National Strategy or Maritime Security 15
Navy Strategic Plan 18
Naval Operations Concept 20
The New Maritime Strategy 20
Evolution, Not Revolution 21
The 1000-ship Navy in Practice 23
Building Regional Networks 23
Global Fleet Stations 26
Maritime Domain Awareness 27
Inormation Collection 27
Sources o Inormation 30
Surveillance and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 33
Implications for Naval Cooperation 35
Framework or Naval Cooperation 35
Inormation Sharing 36
CENTRIXS 38
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The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
Coalitions Versus Networks 40
The V-RMTC: A Model or Regional Inormation Exchange? 42
The Prospects or a Regional Inormation Exchange Network in Southeast Asia 44
Maritime Enorcement 46
Interoperability 48
Implications for Australia and the Royal Australian Navy 51
Australian Regional Engagement and Cooperation Programs 51
The Implications o Australian Participation 53
Implications or the Royal Australian Navy 54
Conclusion 57
Notes 59
Bibliography 69
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x
at
ABCA Australia, Britain, Canada and America [group]
AIS Automatic Identifcation System
APEC Asia Pacifc Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ATS Automated Targeting System
BPC Border Protection Command
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence
CARAT Cooperation Aoat Readiness and Training
CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Inormation Exchange System
CMFP Cooperative Maritime Forces Pacifc
CNO Chie o Naval Operations
COP Common Operational Picture
COTS commercial-o-the-shel
COWAN Coalition Wide Area Network
CSCAP Council or Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacifc
CTF Combined Task Force
DHS Department o Homeland Security
Equasis Electronic Quality Ship Inormation System
FPDA Five Power Deence Arrangements
GCTF Global Counterterrorism Task Force
GIG Global Inormation Gridgrt gross registered tons
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISPS Code International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated [fshing]
LRIT Long-range Identifcation and Tracking
MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia [coordinated patrols]
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MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MEH Marine Electronic Highway
MIC Multinational Interoperability Council
MIED Maritime Inormation Exchange Directory
MNIS Multinational Inormation Sharing [Program]
MSSIS Maritime Saety and Security Inormation System
NETWARCOM Naval Network Warare Command
NOC Naval Operations Concept
NSMS National Strategy or Maritime Security
NSP Navy Strategic Plan
OPV Oshore Patrol Vessel
PSI Prolieration Security Initiative
QDR Quadrennial Deense Review
RAN Royal Australian Navy
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
ReMIX Regional Maritime Inormation Exchange
RFID Radio Frequency Identifcation
RIMPAC Rim o the Pacifc [exercise]
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative
SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SLOC Sea Lines o Communication
SMIS Strategic Maritime Inormation System
SOLAS Saety o Lie at Sea [Convention]
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warare Systems Command
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TTCP The Technical Cooperation Program
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
USN United States Navy
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xabbreviaTions
USCENTCOM US Central Command
USSOUTHCOM US Southern Command
VMS Vessel Monitoring Systems
VoSIP Voice over Secure Internet Protocol
V-RMTC Virtual Regional Maritime Trafc Centre
VTIS Vessel Trafc Inormation System
WMD Weapons o Mass Destruction
WPNS Western Pacifc Naval Symposium
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at t at
Dr Chris Rahman is a Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre or OceanResources and Security (ANCORS), University o Wollongong, currently researching
China, Australian and Asia-Pacifc maritime security, strategic theory, United States
national security strategy and regional space power and policy. He is the coordinator o
the Centres Maritime Strategy and Security research program, the Centres academic
programs and research and courses developed or the Royal Australian Navy and
Department o Deence.
Chris holds a BA degree in politics and history rom Victoria University o Wellington,
a Master o Arts degree in deence studies rom the University o Waikato and a PhDrom the University o Wollongong on Chinese maritime power.
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x The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
akwdgmt
The author would like to acknowledge the time and insights o several people whohave made this project possible.
Within the Sea Power Centre Australia: its Director, Captain Peter Leavy, RAN, who
has been an enthusiastic and supportive sponsor o the project rom its inception, and
its Deputy Director (Research), Andrew Forbes, has been the projects prime mover
and has assisted greatly with the accessing o documentation and organisation o a
Roundtable held at SPC-A on 30 April 2007, as well as providing useul eedback
and assistance in getting the project to print. The author also thanks all those who
participated in the Roundtable, rom the Royal Australian Navy, Department o Deence,Border Protection Command and Ofce o Transport Security.
The helpul, detailed comments o Dr Lee Willett rom the Royal United Services
Institute or Deence and Security Studies, London were much appreciated.
As always, responsibility or any errors, oversights or omissions rest with the author
alone.
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1inTroDucTion
itdt
Im ater that proverbial 1000 ship Navy - a eet-in-being, i you will
comprised o all reedom-loving nations, standing watch over the seas,standing watch over each other.1
Admiral Mike Mullen, USN
In August 2005 the US Navys then Chie o Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen,
introduced a new concept or international naval and maritime cooperation to an
audience at the US Naval War College: the 1000-ship Navy.2 In November 2006,
the Chie o the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, publicly
confrmed that the RAN would adopt the concept.3
Because the concept remains relatively new and underdeveloped, it is important to
ascertain, in the Australian, regional and global contexts, what the implications o
the 1000-ship Navy might be or maritime security and naval cooperation. An initial
point o resistance rom some quarters was the name, which conjured up visions
o an American-controlled naval eet attempting to dominate the global maritime
domain. To allay such concerns, the US Navy (USN) renamed the concept the Global
Maritime Partnership initiative, whilst the term Global Maritime Network has also
been employed. Despite these modifcations, the 1000-ship Navy label has persisted,
including continued use in USN strategy and policy documents. This paper thus
uses the three terms interchangeably. It is divided into fve chapters to address the
ollowing questions:
I. What is the 1000-ship Navy?
II. How does it ft within the USNs policy and strategy ramework?
III. How might it work in practice?
IV. What are the implications or international naval cooperation?
V. What are the implications or Australia and the Royal Australian Navy?
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2 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
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T 1000-p n cpt
In establishing the initial case or his proverbial 1000-ship Navy, Admiral Mullenexplicated a vision or sea power in the 21st century that would broaden the ocus o the
US Navy (USN) somewhat; rom perorming roles connected primarily to deterrence
and warfghting, to one that also emphasises the protection o shipping and saety o
sea lanes, the maintenance o a stable and lawul maritime domain and prosecution
o the fght against transnational terrorist groups, including in the littoral, and the
ability to inuence events ashore. This vision would require the USN to rebalance its
orce structure to be able to ace the challenges o our age, which he argued comprise
Piracy, drug smuggling, transport o weapons o mass destruction over the high seas,
exploitation o economic rights, organized crime, and terrorism. He summed uphis vision with the motherhood statement that the USN needs tools that are not only
instruments o war, but implements o peace - to become a strong partner or a stable
global community.4
Beyond adaptation by the USN itsel to the new security environment, Mullen
envisaged that the goal o peace and order throughout the worlds maritime domain
would require new levels o naval and maritime cooperation, in part building on
existing concepts such as the Prolieration Security Initiative (PSI) and US Pacifc
Commands Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), and bound together by
new technologies or maritime domain awareness (MDA), command, control and
communications: the 1000-ship Navy.5 These goals essentially aspire to a system
or ensuring the maintenance, or enorcement, o a condition o maritime peace and
stability that Georey Till has described at length as good order at sea.6
Admiral Mullen expanded on his concept or a global maritime network o like-minded
states to secure the global maritime environment at the 17th International Seapower
Symposium in September 2005, which became the initiatives ormal diplomatic launch
pad. In his address Mullen argued that the most serious threat aced by all states
was that o irregular and Unrestricted Warare - warare with no rules, with nothingorbidden. These threats were deemed to be o particular signifcance in certain
regions o the maritime world labelled the ungoverned and under-governed parts o
the maritime domain, denoting both coastal areas and the high seas.7
The threat environment being described is clearly one dominated by the global menace
o the new terrorism, as epitomised by Al Qaeda and its ideological ellow travellers,
and roguish state actors willing to conduct asymmetric and unconventional, and
unrestricted, albeit not necessarily unlimited, orms o warare against the United
States (US) and the US-led world order. The term unrestricted warare is an implicit
reerence to the title o a book written by two senior colonels rom Chinas Peoples
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4 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
Liberation Army, which sets out the asymmetric military and non-military tactics o
a grand strategy with which to combat American dominance, whether in war or in
periods o so-called peace.8
Mullens view o the threat environment thus makes signifcant assumptions aboutthe character o current and uture threats and challenges, and orms o warare,
deemed most likely to be encountered by the USN over the medium term. That threat
environment supposedly will be dominated by non-traditional security actors and
irregular warare, whether conducted by states or non-state oes, rather than the
reputedly more amiliar orms o conventional conict against similarly equipped
states.9
The 1000-ship Navy concept was urther elucidated by two o Admiral Mullens
senior sta in a short article published in November 2005.10 The article identifed
the current salience o transnational threats to international security in a globalisedworld characterised by increasing economic and security interdependence. The
authors argue that a purported growth in maritime lawlessness resulting rom the
cumulative eect o threats to good order at sea posed by criminal activity, terrorism
and weapons prolieration may seriously impact the security and economic well-being
o all states, which increasingly are interconnected by their reliance on a largely sea-
based international trading system. Given the extent o the maritime domain and the
range o challenges to order, as well as the political sensitivities and legal limitations
posed by the reality o national sovereignty and sovereign rights either extant or
claimed at sea, it recognises that the problem is too large and complex or the USNalone to combat. In this view the size and complexity o the problem thus necessitates
the need or enhanced international cooperation, although it may be viewed by some
as a declinist argument: that is, being symptomatic o Americas declining ability to
protect the international system it notionally leads.11
One o the truly innovative aspects o the proposed global maritime security network
outlined in the November 2005 article is its intention to incorporate into the network
not only the assets o navies and other government agencies but also those o the
private sector - the international maritime industry. The 1000-ship Navy network
would be built around inormation rom the sensors o all o those national and private
industry seaborne assets to enhance maritime domain awareness. The concept thus
would pursue two objectives: enhanced maritime domain awareness and improved
response capacity. Finally, the article explained that the network would be able to
export maritime security and security assistance to willing countries and regions
where there exist capacity shortalls to deal with threats to order at sea.
Admiral Mullen urther expounded the developing concept to a Royal United Services
Institute conerence in December 2005, when he made the somewhat startling claim
that not only was good order at sea under increasing threat but that a nexus o piracy,terrorism, and exploitation o the maritime domain or illegal purposes had passed
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5The 1000-shiP navy concePT
a new threshold, or tipping point, which potentially could change the world.12 The
supposed tipping point or Mullen was the unsuccessul November 2005 attack on the
cruise ship Seabourn Spiritby pirates o the southern coast o Somalia using two 25-
oot boats and armed with rocket-propelled grenades and assault ries. That the attack
took place some 100 miles oshore and employed such a signifcant arsenal certainlywas unusual,13 but Mullens assertion that this represented a signifcant discontinuity
in maritime security analogous to the momentous strategic shocks o Pearl Harbor in
1941 and 11 September 2001 (9/11) surely is a gross exaggeration. Indeed, to compare
the Seabourn Spiritincident to 9/11, which resulted in around 3000 civilian deaths,
signifcant economic disruption and the launching o a global war (o sorts) against
militant Islam would seem entirely inappropriate; yet even the attacks o 9/11 and
the consequent, ongoing conict pales into relative insignifcance compared to the
genuinely world-changing consequences o Japans sneak attack on the United States.
Rather, it would seem that the dangers in the waters adjacent to Somalia are more areection o the anarchy reigning within that country itsel than being portentous o
a new tipping point or security in the wider maritime domain.
Mullen explicitly acknowledged the PSI as a preerred model or cooperation, noting
that it was an inormal and voluntary arrangement amongst likeminded states, with
no ormal organisation, sta or support structure. This no doubt also reects the Bush
Administrations preerence or these types o inormal coalitions o the willing rather
than having to deal with the inherent constraints and unwieldy nature o ormal treaty
agreements and international organisations, which oten are incapable o acting in a
timely ashion, i at all. The Administration itsel has spruiked the PSI as a model or
uture security cooperation - or results-oriented partnerships in its currentNational
Security Strategy:
These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not
international bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather
than binding treaties. They are oriented towards action and results
rather than legislation or rule-making.14
Perhaps inuenced by the PSIs Statement o Interdiction Principles, Mullen oeredhis own set o ten First Principles or the Global Maritime Network in his December
2005 speech, set out below.
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6 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
To unction eectively, the 1000-ship Navy will not only require high levels o
international political support to oster the necessary levels o cooperation, but also
will be heavily technology dependent. Mullen stressed this aspect in his address
to the Western Pacifc Naval Symposium (WPNS) in October 2006, stating that
Technology and inormation technology, in particular, may very well be the single
largest contributor to our maritime security in the uture. According to Mullen, the
promise o signifcant technological progress, including web-enabled MDA, is itsel
a compelling reason to cooperate or maritime security.15
M ft Pp
a recognition o the continued primacy o national sovereignty1.
many o the problems that are challenging good order at sea can be solved2.
when States respond cooperatively where they share a common interest
the scope o the network is limited to the maritime domain, rom ports to3.
the high seas
the networks undamental building block will be the extant capabilities4.
o individual states
the network is not limited to navies and will include all relevant national5.
government agencies and maritime orces, and private industry playersstates with the ability to export maritime security or security assistance6.
should be willing to do so
states which require maritime security assistance should be prepared to7.
request it o those willing and able to provide it
states must develop regional networks or maritime security as the key to8.
constructing an eventual Global Maritime Network
to be eective, the network needs to be able to share inormation amongst its9. members, which preerably should be o an unclassifed nature to overcome
security concerns. Such inormation should include commercial ship
characteristics, accurate cargo maniests, merchant ship crew lists, sailing
times, destinations, and current ship locations
the security situation in the global maritime domain requires that eorts10.
are initiated as soon as possible to strengthen national maritime security
capacities, build regional cooperation and link regional arrangements to
build the global network.
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7The 1000-shiP navy concePT
Wt t itt i, d Wt it i nt
Tentatively, then, the Global Maritime Partnership initiative represents both less, and
more, than meets the eye. In some respects, it represents little more than a continuation
o post-Cold War proposals by many policymakers, naval operators and commentatorsor increased naval and maritime security cooperation, albeit on a grander scale. In
this respect, the concept very much represents an evolutionary approach to maritime
security, whilst at the same time reecting the greater sense o urgency o the post-
2001 security environment.
Usually, those earlier proposals were regionally based. The Asia-Pacifc region,
characterised by its maritime geography and beset by maritime sources o international
dispute, has witnessed a high level o activity promoting maritime security cooperation
at the ofcial, inter-governmental level, such as in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
and the Asia Pacifc Economic Cooperation (APEC) orum;16 at the Track II unofcial
level o supporting cooperative activity, such as the Council or Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacifc (CSCAP);17 and in naval orums, such as the multilateral Western Pacifc
Naval Symposium.18 The United States has also been active in the region, promoting
the RMSI and conducting other, more US-centric orms o naval cooperation.19
The USNs 1000-ship Navy concept can be thought o as a continuation o these regional
processes and initiatives, only extrapolated to encompass maritime security on a truly
global basis. Indeed, it is sometimes implied, rightly or wrongly, that the announcement
o the RMSI in 2003 and subsequent pronouncements by US Pacifc Commandspurred Malaysia and Indonesia to take security in the Malacca and Singapore straits
more seriously. In this manner o thinking, the launch o the MALSINDO coordinated
patrols o the straits in July 2004 and the subsequent launch o the Eyes-in-the-Sky
aerial patrols may have been a response to the threat o American intervention in
the area. I that is a view widely shared within the USN, it is possible that the intent
o the 1000-ship Navy is simply to spur other states to improve maritime security
globally. Nonetheless, the act that the concept is being ully integrated into USN
strategy and planning documents suggests a more ambitious scheme which needs to
be taken at ace value.On the other hand, however, beyond the promotion o naval cooperation, there are
aspects to the concept which are potentially groundbreaking. The intent to develop the
MDA picture available to participating states into a unctionally global, comprehensive
system o near-real time data collection, analysis and exchange on merchant ship
movements and related inormation on the maritime domain, is both highly ambitious
and signifcant. O course, MDA has been a eature o other, regional, proposals
or some time. The RMSI unsurprisingly has a heavy emphasis on this actor, and
other proposals or regional cooperation also have oten ocused on the importance
o maritime inormation and its exchange. For example, in the early to mid 1990sthe RAN sponsored the development o an unclassifed database which would have
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8 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
integrated a wide range o inormation on Southeast Asian seas, able to be accessed
by regional states: the Strategic Maritime Inormation System (SMIS).20 Although
SMIS itsel was never completed, the American conception o MDA can be thought
o as an SMIS on steroids, harnessing the great leaps in inormation technology and
communications systems made since the time o SMIS and the vast technological andfnancial resources which the US can bring to bear on the problem, and applied not
just to a single geographical sub-region but the entire global maritime domain.
It has been made sufciently clear what the 1000-ship Navy concept is not intended to
be: a global naval alliance consisting o a nominal eet o 1000 ships under American
leadership. The coining o the term 1000-ship Navy was probably a mistake in this
regard and, despite attempts at relabelling, the moniker has become strongly afxed.
The intent o the term itsel is largely metaphorical,21 and somewhat misleading: as
Admiral Mullens fth First Principle states, the concept is about more than just navies.
Yet by employing navy in its title the initiative gives the impression that it is solely a
military scheme, when in act it is not. That issue o perception will pose problems or
certain states in important maritime regions, such as Southeast Asia, and will likely
mean that such states do not publicly join the initiative, even i they cooperate with
it. That pattern o behaviour has already been evident in the PSI.
s l cmmt st t Pt-9/11 e
In many ways the 1000-ship Navy concept is a reection o the changing conditions or
the security o shipping in a time o a constant terrorist threat. The security o shipping
itsel indeed is the very essence o the idea o securing the sea lines o communication
(SLOCs): the actual sea lanes themselves are ater all just stretches o empty ocean.22 In
times o (conventional) war, and the period o the Cold War, SLOC security was solely
a military task to deend allied shipping against attack rom rival military orces. The
primary responsibility or this task rested with navies.
However, the character o SLOC security has in eect been redefned by the exigencies
o the current circumstances in which not only shipping but the entire maritimetransportation system is at risk rom the spectre o terrorism; and that system also
could be exploited by terrorists to conduct catastrophic attacks against high-value
targets on land. The threat to shipping is now more likely to be posed by, or example,
a small boat attack close to shore or a weapon smuggled in a ships cargo, than a
conventional attack on the open ocean.23 The implication o the changed character
o SLOC protection is that navies, or the time being, have lost their monopoly on
securing the worlds sea lanes. SLOC security must thereore now involve a plethora
o other protective agencies, such as coast guards, marine police orces and other law
enorcement agencies, customs organisations, immigration departments, intelligence
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9The 1000-shiP navy concePT
agencies, port authorities and other commercial players throughout the maritime sector
and international supply chains. The 1000-ship Navy should be viewed in this context
as an attempt to integrate the capabilities o all types o agencies that contribute to the
security o shipping on an international, cooperative basis, as reected in the ollowing
statement by the US Secretary o the Navy:
The responsibility or Global Maritime Security lies with many
departments, agencies, and organizations across the spectrum o
our government, international partners, and industry. Each o these
stakeholders bring a part o the solution, and taking the lead in
establishing a global capability rom those parts is one o the single
most important new steps o the Department o the Navy.24
From this perspective the 1000-ship Navy is just one o a number o dierent strategies
that the US has employed to strengthen the overall security o the international maritime
system in the post-9/11 world - along with a host o new regulatory measures which
have been pursued both on a unilateral basis, and multilaterally through international
groups such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Increasingly, these
dierent strategies in combination are beginning to orm a globally integrated protective
maritime security system.25
idm d t 1000-p nAdmiral Mullens pronouncements on the Global Maritime Partnership initiative reect
a highly idealistic view o states common interests at sea, and invokes the old notion
o collective action noted in the epigraph to this paper, o all reedom-loving nations,
standing watch over the seas, standing watch over each other.26 He has even employed
the term collective security in the context o the initiative.27 However, does the 1000-
ship Navy actually represent a orm o collective security? And is truly collective
security at sea (or even collective security in general) actually attainable?
Perhaps unortunately, undermining both the theory and practice o collectivesecurity are perormance criteria that are all but impossible to meet. That is why the
use o the term collective security has devolved, rom the frst extremely idealistic
pronouncements in the interwar years and the tragic dbcle o the League o Nations,
into something more akin to a populist political slogan, much like the currently
popular, highly misleading - and essentially empty - term international community.
The characteristics that make collective security distinct rom other, more traditional
security systems have been identifed by Richard Betts as universality and automaticity.
Thus, in order to work as advertised, a collective security system must be truly
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10 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
collective, with the universal and automatic participation o its members in response
to aggression - the all or one, and one or all principle.28
Participation in the 1000-ship Navy, however, is to be voluntary. As a type o inormal
coalition o the willing, whereby members would participate in instances comportingwith their own national interests, it notably ails the collective security test. Rather, the
initiative should be viewed more as a orm o cooperative security, itsel a somewhat
amorphous construct characterised by its inclusiveness o membership and both
military and non-military contributions to security, which does not exclude existing
strategic relationships such as alliances rom the system.29 Americas new joint
Maritime Strategy also suers rom this terminological inaccuracy, employing both
terms in aid o its message; stating that sea power must be used to promote collective
security,30 and that the Global Maritime Partnership initiative will serve as a catalyst or
increased international interoperability in support o cooperative maritime security.31
The temptation to appeal to the symbolism o collective security ought to be avoided
though: little kudos is likely to be won by such overselling and mislabelling.
Although the initiative is ramed in such a way as to be inclusive o a wide range o
threats and challenges to security in the maritime domain, it is also evident that it is
driven by an overriding American concern with the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other
extreme Muslim groups. The possibility that those terrorist networks might exploit the
maritime transportation system, to carry our potentially catastrophic attacks on United
States territory or against allies, or contribute to instability in those under-governed
parts o the world is real. However, that threat perception is not universally shared,placing a urther potential obstacle in the path o the initiative. Some Muslim states may
be especially sensitive to that motivating actor. Others will view the scheme simply
as urther evidence o American unilateralism, even though the USN has gone out o
its way to promote the scheme as inclusive, voluntary and non-threatening.
T cpt stm D
In summary, then, the 1000-ship Navy can be thought o as an initiative to enhance
the deence o the US-led international system, including globalisation and the sea-based trading system, by coopting international partners at a time in which the United
States is preoccupied and overcommitted in Iraq and elsewhere around the globe.32
There are historical antecedents or such a proposal, particularly Mahans call or the
establishment o an Anglo-American naval consortium and even wider naval cooperation
around the turn o the 20th century to deend the then British-led international system
o international commerce and Anglo liberalism against new threats to that order.33
However, one abiding question hanging over the entire concept remains its assumption
o global disorderat sea. Apart rom a number o regional hot spots, it is not clear that
that assumption is a reasonable appraisal o the wider maritime security situation at
all. The terrorist threat, though, is real enough: the potential or catastrophic attacks
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11The 1000-shiP navy concePT
involving WMD alone mandates that responsible states give a high priority to improving
SLOC security, as reormulated above or post-2001 circumstances.
A cynic might perhaps suggest also that the 1000-ship Navy concept and the new
Maritime Strategy are ways to make the navy seem more relevant to the war onterrorism, thus saeguarding service unding at a time o great budget stress due to
the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan and maintaining political support or programs such
as the littoral combat ship.34 Yet navies do have important roles to play, and these
need to be understood by policymakers. Indeed, inasmuch as the US-led international
system is by nature a maritime system,35 navies and other maritime orces will always
have a central role to play in saeguarding it. As the player with the greatest degree o
responsibility or system deence - like Britain beore it in a previous era - the United
States has had to adapt to the current threat environment to ensure that the maritime
system itsel continues to unction. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative is a
potentially important element in system deence, both symbolically, as a rhetorical
instrument o international outreach and cooperation, and practically, through its
promotion o an improved understanding o the maritime domain and the dissemination
o such inormation to partner states.
The USNs proposal to deend the international system thus seeks to build, frstly,
new, or enhance existing, regional networks or maritime security cooperation; and,
secondly, to link those regional networks into a global network. Within that ramework,
there are two main components to the initiative, each with its own sub-components:
improving maritime domain awareness1.
increasing the number o sensors
incorporating military, non-military (agency) and private sector assets
networking the inormation
sharing the inormation
enhancing the ability o states to respond to threats to good order at sea and crises2.
in littoral areasbuilding national enorcement and response capacity
building regional enorcement and response capacities through improved
cooperation.
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P d sttg fdt
Existing schemes and new initiatives or naval cooperation do not provide the onlycontext or the development o the 1000-ship Navy idea. It has also taken place within
a ertile post-Cold War naval policy and strategy-making environment, one which has
been built upon in the post-9/11 world by an entire new policy preoccupation with
terrorism and the terrorist threats to maritime security. The ollowing discussion
places the 1000-ship Navy within that uid environment, inclusive o both USN and
national-level strategy development.
In June 2006 Admiral Mullen outlined the bare bones o a new US maritime strategy.36
The strategy itsel was released by his successor, Admiral Roughead, and his MarineCorps and Coast Guard counterparts in October 2007, becoming the frst new US
maritime strategy since the Reagan-era Maritime Strategyormulated under the
leadership o then Secretary o the Navy, John Lehman.37 The 1980s strategy became
almost instantly obsolete with the end o the Cold War and the abrupt and happily
peaceul demise o the Soviet Union. The USN (and US Marine Corps) instead reocused
their operating concepts to the new strategic environment,38 which was characterised
by regional conict, including limited conventional wars such as Operation DESERT
STORM; internal conict, as many parts o the ormer Soviet and Communist worlds
began to disintegrate; and general instability, as the caution-inducing constraints o the
bilateral Cold War strategic ramework were shrugged o to reveal underlying tensions
and longstanding political, ethnic and religious fssures in many parts o the world.
The new post-Cold War operational concepts redirected the ocus o the USN: rom
winning and maintaining sea control in order to then launch oensive operations
against the Soviet homeland, to an assumption o sea control in the absence o a peer
naval competitor, which in turn allowed that naval preponderance to be used to project
power into the worlds littorals and across the shore to directly inuence events on
land with relative impunity. In so doing US maritime orces proved rather more adept
at adapting to the new strategic circumstances than the other Services, especially theresistant US Army, and the maritime orces o many other states, including the NATO
Europeans, whose legacy orce structures proved to be less exible and adaptable
to the demands o littoral operations and power projection than those o the United
States.39
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14 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
n d Mtm st sttg Pt-9/11
The ollowing discussion describes the relationship between the Global Maritime
Partnership initiative and major strategy and doctrinal documents. It demonstrates
that the USN has taken an evolutionary approach to conceptual development andstrategy ormulation since 9/11: the 1000-ship Navy has grown logically rom those
developments and continues to inorm the urther evolution o policy and strategy. In
terms o the documents surveyed, theNational Strategy or Maritime Securityrepresents
higher level policy guidance or maritime security rom a national, whole-o-government
perspective, and is one o a number o national strategies directly linked to theNational
Security Strategy. The current Chie o Naval Operations describes his own overarching
guidance in terms o three documents:
The Maritime Strategy creates a unifed strategy that integrates sea power with
other elements o national power, and those o our riends and allies.
The Navy Strategic Plan translates [the] Strategy into guidance or uture Navy
program development.
The N aval Operations Concept describes how the Navy-Marine-Corps team will
fght.40
And the operational principles o the Sea Power 21 concept continue to inorm USN
thinking, including the Navy Strategic Plan and the Naval Operations Concept. To
establish the evolutionary nature o US thinking the documents are consideredchronologically.
sea Pwer 21
The frst restatement o US naval power or the post-9/11 era took place in October 2002
with the release o the Sea Power 21 concept document.41Sea Power 21 expanded the
USNs regional ocus with a new emphasis upon conducting global operations against
transnational threats. These dual concerns o regional conict and regionally ocusedrogue states, and the threat o globally active terrorist organisations, had become the
new strategic preoccupation or the United States, as set out in theNational Security
Strategywhich preceded Sea Power 21.42 The threat o the new terrorism, as epitomised
by Al Qaeda, the development o weapons o mass destruction (WMD) by regional
rogue states, and the potential or cooperation between such states and terrorists thus
became the driving motivation or US national security policymaking. In particular,
the possibility, however remote, that Al Qaeda or a similar group might successully
develop, procure or be gited by a rogue state some orm o useable WMD especially
a crude nuclear or atomic device - to attack the American homeland understandably
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15Policy anD sTraTeGy founDaTions
ocused minds throughout the US national security community. The consequences o
not preventing such an attack would be horrifc indeed.
Sea Power 21 introduced three new operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield
and Sea Basing. These concepts in turn are connected by FORCENET, which is thearchitectural ramework that intends to exploit advanced inormation technologies to
network command and control systems, sensors, platorms, weapons and people into
an integrated, network-centric orce.43 O particular relevance to the 1000-ship Navy
are aspects o Sea Shield and Sea Basing.
Sea Shield reormulates the concept o naval deence, rom the deence largely o
individual ships, eets or sea lines o communication, to a more expansive concern
with protecting wider national interests with layered global deensive power based
on control o the seas, orward presence, and networked intelligence. It seeks to
project deensive power into the littorals and deep inland and contribute to theprotection o the American homeland. Homeland deence is both a new role and one
especially relevant to the issue at hand, as the 1000-ship Navy concept also is driven
by a preoccupation with terrorism and other, potentially interlinked, threats o a
transnational nature. The intention is that naval homeland deence capabilities will be
integrated with those o other military and civilian agencies with homeland deence
and homeland security responsibilities. In keeping with the idea o layered deence,
the intent oSea Power 21 is that the orward-deployed navy would act to identiy,
track, and intercept threats ar seaward o US territory, long beore they could directly
endanger the homeland. This would include the use o advanced radiation detectionequipment by boarding parties on intercepted vessels, or example.44
The Sea Basing concept envisions that orward deployed naval assets will act as
essentially independent bases or operations in the littoral and on land, complete
with their own integrated logistics and command and control capabilities. These
capabilities also can support coalition or non-coalition multilateral operations in
a littoral environment, as occurred, or example, in the response to the December
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. As will be examined urther, elements o the Sea Basing
concept are being developed specifcally to support the regional, in-theatre, aspects
o the 1000-ship Navy.
T nt sttg Mtm st
In September 2005 the Departments o Deense and Homeland Security released the
National Strategy or Maritime Security(NSMS). The NSMS and its eight supporting
implementation plans represent a whole-o-government planning approach to
maritime security, reecting the strategic priorities o the 2002 National Security
Strategy. Although the NSMS identifes state, terrorist, transnational criminal, piracy,
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16 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
environmental and illegal immigration threats to maritime security, clearly it is
terrorism and the possible interplay between terrorists, rogue states and WMD that
dominates the thinking behind the document.
The counter-terrorism priority is also reected in the National Strategy or MaritimeSecuritys strategic objectives, the frst three o which are concerned with preventing
terrorist attacks and other hostile acts throughout the maritime domain, protecting
coastal population centres and critical inrastructure rom attacks and minimising
damage incurred rom such an attack whilst ensuring successul recovery. The
fnal strategic objective, saeguarding the ocean itsel and its resources rom illegal
exploitation is treated only cursorily in comparison.45
It is in its fve declared strategic actions that the NSMS clearly lays an important
oundation or the 1000-ship Navy:
enhance international cooperation1.
maximise domain awareness2.
embed security into commercial practices3.
deploy layered security4.
assure continuity o the marine transportation system.5. 46
The frst o these actions is largely sel-explanatory, and involves military and inter-
agency cooperation between states, as well as engagement within international andregional organisations and security regimes. So too are the second and fth o these
actions. The integration o private industry, including the commercial maritime sector,
into supply chain security has an analogous component in the 1000-ship Navy, whereby
shipping companies have been invited to contribute as part o the global sensor grid,
eeding inormation rom their ships automatic identifcation systems into the overall
MDA picture.
Layered security, a term previously made amiliar by the USNs Sea Shield concept,
applies across dierent levels o analysis. For example, it can reer to layering security
practices along the entire length o the maritime transportation chain, to all possiblepoints o vulnerability. It also means integration o security practices between the
various levels o government within the US domestic jurisdiction, with the private
sector, between dierent agencies and internationally. The physical protection o ports,
ships and cargoes adds extra layers. Further layers still are provided by interdiction
o suspicious materials and people all along the supply chain, and enorcement action
where necessary. Layered security thereore attempts to establish preventative security
measures through (usually non-military) interdiction and pre-emptive action - such
as pre-screening containers in oreign ports beore being loaded onto ships bound or
the United States - and protection, through deterrence and deence.47
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17Policy anD sTraTeGy founDaTions
Also in common with the Sea Shield concept, layered security seeks to extend the reach
o its maritime security aegis - in this case the physical protection o the American
homeland rom terrorist threats delivered via the maritime transportation system - as
ar rom US national territory as possible. The pursuit o such a strategy should not
be a surprising one or any maritime power o signifcance, or as Norman Friedmanreminds us in the conclusion to his examination o the strategy o sea power:
The issue is always the same. Is the sea a barrier or a highway?
I seapower makes the sea a barrier, then it is a tool to promote
isolationism. The argument against isolation is that some weapons, both
military and economic, can leap any barrier. It is better to use the sea
as a highway, and engage potential threats as close to source as possible.
That is the ultimate character o maritime strategy - or the United States,
and or any other country contemplating such a strategy.48
Although Friedman was reerring primarily to the use o naval means in a more
traditional strategic context, the utility, or maritime powers, o engaging threats as
close to source as possible remains valid in the current security environment, in which
a collaborative, joint and inter-agency approach is being pursued to negate a maritime
security threat o a non-traditional nature. The new US Maritime Strategy is explicit on
this point: Maritime orces will deend the homeland by identiying and neutralizing
threats as ar rom our shores as possible. This requirement is also linked to a standard
doctrinal component o the application o maritime power: orward presence, both to
prevent hostile acts and to build partnerships.49
Whilst identifcation and neutralisation o such threats might be an obvious response
to the new threat environment, it is nevertheless interesting to note how these two
necessities correspond to the substantive elements o the Global Maritime Partnership
initiative: identifcation representing the MDA component, and neutralisation the
preventative enorcement element. I one were to take an entirely US-centric view o
the 1000-ship Navy, by integrating the eorts o other members o the cooperative
scheme, the United States can thus be seen to be adding the capabilities o their
international and commercial sector partners to the layered maritime security o theUS homeland.
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navy strategi Pla
The Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) o May 2006 added to the strategy ramework
underpinning the Global Maritime Partnership initiative. It outlines three CNO ocus
areas:
global war on terror/irregular warare1.
homeland security/homeland deense2.
conventional campaigns.3. 50
These ocus areas are consistent with, and linked to, the Force Planning Construct
outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Deense Review(QDR). The new priorities o deending
the American homeland and prosecuting the so-called long war against violent
extremists who use terrorism as their weapon o choice were clearly elucidatedby the QDR, although it perhaps overstated the signiicance o changes to the
strategic environment when it outlined an apparent necessity to transorm deence
preparations rom 20th to 21st century realities. This supposed discontinuity includes
the downplaying o state-based threats in avour o accentuating non-state enemies
(such as Al Qaeda and other related terrorist groups).51
That same prioritisation o the irregular threat to the homeland is also apparent in the
Navy Strategic Plan. O particular relevance to the 1000-ship Navy, the NSP includes
among the desired eects that the navy can contribute to its CNO ocus areas, global
MDA, theatre security cooperation programs and cooperation with the US Coast Guardand other Department o Homeland Security (DHS) agencies to better prepare or joint
and inter-agency responses to maritime threats to the US homeland.52
In regard to cooperation with the US Coast Guard, the relationship has been enhanced,
at least in theory, with the reinvigoration o the National Fleet policy. Although frst
promulgated in 1998, the National Fleet concept had been largely moribund until the
exigencies o the global campaign against extreme Islamist revolutionaries demanded
closer cooperation. The renewed emphasis on the National Fleet also implicitly
recognises the limitations o a downsized and overstretched USN orce structure, therole and expertise o the US Coast Guard in saeguarding the United States against
threats emanating rom within the global maritime transportation system, and the
utility o employing a non-military orce to engage with countries which may be less
comortable or willing to cooperate with the US military. Thus, the National Fleet
aspires to be
A joint and interoperable maritime orce to establish the numerical
sufciency required or eective global operations and to eectively
oster and leverage regional international partnerships in order to
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19Policy anD sTraTeGy founDaTions
achieve global maritime domain awareness and maritime transportation
security in the era o globalization.53
The Navy-Coast Guard relationship has been urther bolstered by the inclusion o the
latter agency as a ull partner in the new Maritime Strategy. Nevertheless, althoughthe 1000-ship Navy has been a USN initiative and despite an NSP assertion o the
Navys unique position in acilitating its construction, it is somewhat surprising that
the US Coast Guard has not been given a prominent role in developing and promoting
the concept.54 As a ormer Coast Guardsman notes, the US Coast Guard itsel has
many unique attributes that would be useul in operationalising the initiative.55 In
this respect the Coast Guard:
is a law enorcement agency with powers and expertise not held by the Navy
already has considerable responsibility or maritime homeland security andmaritime transportation security, including developing MDA capabilities and
implementation o international regulations such as the International Ship and
Port Facility Security(ISPS) Code
has close operational relationships with other DHS agencies involved with maritime
security, such as Customs and Border Protection
is deeply involved in international cooperation and engagement programs 56
as a primarily civilian rather than military organisation, it is both more closely
attuned to the capability requirements and operational concerns o potential partnernation coast guard (and other civilian) agencies and many o the worlds smaller
navies which unction primarily as coast guards and more politically acceptable
than the USN (or other navies) in some parts o the world.
One o the tangible outcomes o closer Navy-Coast Guard cooperation or the
homeland deence role is the development o a Maritime Domain Awareness Concept
o Operations.57 This is a logical step and, indeed, the USN will undoubtedly need to
leverage the US Coast Guards expertise and access to the entire range o commercial
maritime supply chain data derived rom the inormation collection capacities o various
DHS agencies, i it wishes to play a signifcant role itsel in securing the homeland
rom threats carried via the maritime transportation system.
The NSP summarises the now amiliar case or the need or a Global Maritime Network
o partner nations cooperating to ace down the growing challenges to security in the
global maritime domain. It also adds a fnancial justifcation, stating that the proactive
cost o ensuring day-to-day security in the maritime domain is dramatically more
aordable than the reactive costs o going to war or mounting a large-scale security
operation. This seems to ignore the act that the context o the war on terrorism was
the leading driver o the concept in the frst place.58
Nevertheless, the 1000-ship Navyhas clearly become a signifcant element o USN strategy making.
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20 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
naval operati cept
TheNaval Operations Concept(NOC) o September 2006 urther integrates the 1000-ship Navy into USN operational thinking, which takes pride o place, or example, in
the NOC discussion o maritime security operations or, the apparent need or the
Policing o the maritime commons. The NOC also places importance upon security
cooperation programs and civil-military operations, such as those employed or counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism, and humanitarian and civic assistance. Lastly, the
NOC emphasised building cooperative partnerships the mantra o the 1000-ship
Navy again by building up the capacity o the maritime orces o partner nations.59
The NOC will be revised to take into account the new Maritime Strategy.60
T nw Mtm sttg
In October 2007 the USN, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard released the frst ever
tri-Service Maritime Strategy to describe the role o joint sea power in protecting the US
homeland, national interests and the extant international system:A Cooperative Strategy
or 21st Century Seapower. It sets out the potential sources o disruption that might upset
an ever more tightly connected global system whose economic linkages via trade are
overwhelmingly maritime: rom major power war and regional conict to terrorism,lawlessness and large scale natural disasters. Unsurprisingly, it builds upon the same
set o perceptions and assumptions about the international strategic environment as
earlier pronouncements on the 1000-ship Navy concept: the globalised world does not
come ree o negative consequences, including the spread o the disruptive political
ambitions and extremist ideologies o rogue states and transnational actors, via modern
technologies and employing a hybrid blend o traditional and irregular tactics.61 It
also identifes the potential or the continued rapid growth o the global economy to
increase the competition or natural resources, including marine resources, although it
alls short o Admiral Mullens more dramatic 2006 characterisation that globalisationis driving a competitive race or energy.62
A Cooperative Strategy or 21st Century Seapowerpays due regard to the ability o
US maritime orces to prevent conventional wars through deterrence or fght them
using their sea control and power projection capabilities. However, it is also clear
that, consistent with the 1000-ship Navy concept, there is a growing emphasis upon
conducting maritime security operations to saeguard both the homeland and the
international system - including its major sea lanes and global maritime commons - rom
transnational terrorist and criminal threats, as well as operations in response to natural
disasters and demands or humanitarian assistance. US maritime orces thus contribute
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21Policy anD sTraTeGy founDaTions
to the outer reaches o the layered security o the homeland by the persistence o their
orward presence, particularly in unstable regions o the world.63
As befts its title and consistent with the NSMS and 1000-ship Navy, the Maritime
Strategy places a strong emphasis on cooperation, not only between the three Americansea Services but also with riends, allies and other partners in achieving cooperative
maritime security throughout the global maritime domain, including with international
organisations, the private sector, and other non-state actors.64 The strategy thus places
the Global Maritime Partnership initiative at the heart o its international partnership-
building activities, which are in turn central to the current American conception o the
roles o sea power in the war against transnational Islamist insurgents.
et, nt rtIn summary, thereore, it is clear that the 1000-ship Navy concept has been the
product o an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary departure in maritime
strategy and security policy making since 2001.65 Not only has the concept grown
out o pre-existing policy and strategy thinking, but it has been ully integrated into
new USN concepts o operations and strategy priorities, including a prominent role
in the Maritime Strategy. The underlying assumptions and strategic priorities o this
thinking seem to be well established and unlikely to change in the current international
circumstances, particularly Washingtons preoccupation with the Global War on Terror.Strategic circumstances can change rapidly, however, and it remains to be seen how
resilient the new thinking would be in the event o a more traditional maritime-strategic
challenge, such as a Chinese assault on Taiwan or an Iranian attempt to close or
dominate the Persian Gul region. Those types o scenarios - o state-based challenges
to regional or international order or a break down o the globalising, integrative
international economic order so integral to USN thinking would thus perhaps provide
the real test o the strength o the Global Maritime Partnership initiative.
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T 1000-p n Pt
This chapter takes a two-pronged approach by examining the regional ocus areas othe proposed global maritime security network, and outlining the challenges acing
the construction o a system o global maritime domain awareness.
bdg rg ntwk
The USN has conceptualised the global 1000-ship Navy as being built around existing
regional cooperative ventures to enhance maritime security, where such initiatives
exist, and the creation o new cooperative initiatives in regions where they do not. In
keeping with the network theme, and analogous to the Internet which is constituted
by networked but independently operated computers, these regional schemes, Admiral
Mullen states explicitly, need not be led by the USN or even involve the United States
at all.66
Nevertheless, the USN has pinpointed certain regions as particular areas o concern
to global maritime security due to their strategic locations and/or instability, involving
actors such as the potential disruption o good order at sea, international trade or
energy supplies, and the potential to oster the growth o those irregular Islamistenemies that are the ocus o current US national security eorts.
The NSP identifes three maritime ocus areas that correlate directly to the priority
regions in the global campaign against Islamist extremism: the western Pacifc,
especially Southeast Asia; the Middle East and Southwest Asia; and the Mediterranean.67
These regions also include most, i not all, o the worlds most important, and vulnerable,
maritime choke points.
In Southeast Asia, the NSP takes particular note o the Muslim terrorists and insurgents
who are using violence to orward their goals in an arc stretching rom southernThailand through the Malay peninsula, the Indonesian archipelago and Borneo to the
southern Philippines. The NSP notes the Al Qaeda links o regional organisations such
as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayya Group.68 The importance o archipelagic and
peninsular Southeast Asia barely needs stating: with its straits orming the essential
link between the Indian Ocean and the semi-enclosed seas o the western Pacifc and
the large markets o Northeast Asia, the region straddles an international trade route
vital or regional and, indeed, global, economic - and consequently also political
stability.
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A ocus or American Theater Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia since its
inception in 1995 has been the annual bilateral Cooperation Aoat Readiness and
Training (CARAT) and, since 2002, the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism
(SEACAT), exercises. US maritime orces conduct these bilateral exercises each year
with the navies o Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand,exercising a range o scenarios depending on the requirements o the CARAT partner
nation and on sometimes limiting political actors. Vietnam now also observes CARAT
activities and is likely to become the seventh ull participating partner in coming
years. The exercises ocus on improving interoperability, multinational coordination
and inormation sharing, and include the exercising o humanitarian assistance and
disaster relie and, increasingly, maritime interdiction and maritime counter-terrorism
scenarios. The United States hopes that the CARAT program will eventually evolve into
a multinational exercise, although that will be difcult given the prevailing political
and strategic cultures in the region which continue to indicate a preerence to abjurerom security multilateralism amid prevailing sensitivities, disputes and mutual
suspicion. Despite this difculty, the Commander Logistics Group Western Pacifc/
Commander Task Force 73 (the executive agent or both CARAT and SEACAT), Rear
Admiral William Burke, USN, has gone so ar as to claim that CARAT is the model
exercise or the 1000-ship Navy.69
The Middle East and Southwest Asian areas o primary interest conorm largely to
the maritime parts o the existing US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area o
responsibility: the Persian (Arabian) Gul, Red Sea, Gul o Oman, the Arabian Sea and
parts o the north-western Indian Ocean, including the vital choke points o the Strait
o Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Bab al Mandeb.70 The Mediterranean area has a
strong ocus on the northern Arican littoral as well as the Suez Canal and the Strait
o Gibraltar. In addition, the NSP identifes other maritime areas o interest where
regional instability has the potential to negatively impact maritime security: the Gul
o Guinea and Aricas Swahili Coast, parts o South America and the Black Sea.
Nascent regional networks already exist and, in the American conception, should
orm part o the Global Maritime Network. For example, NATOs Operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean has been carrying out maritime security operationsand protecting that region against possible terrorist activity since October 2001, and
has enlisted the support o Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Albania and
Georgia.71 In the USCENTCOM area o responsibility, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150,
established in the early stages o Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the war against
terrorism, conducts maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea, Gul o Oman,
Gul o Aden, the Red Sea and the adjacent parts o the Indian Ocean. Currently led
by the French navy, it has previously been commanded by Germany, the Netherlands
and Pakistan.72
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25The 1000-shiP navy in PracTice
The United States is leading an eort to establish a maritime security network in the
Gul o Guinea, including engagement with the Maritime Organization or West and
Central Arican States, which is pursuing the establishment o an integrated regional
coast guard network, and through the Arica Sea Power Symposia.73 And US Southern
Command (USSOUTHCOM) holds a series o maritime security exercises in CentralAmerica and the Caribbean, and provides maritime security assistance to the region
under the Enduring Friendship program.74
These peacetime roles to inuence regional security environments involve not only
capacity building activities to improve the protection o important sea lanes, but
also support rendered by maritime orces to wider eorts to provide stability to
erstwhile unstable or at least, vulnerable regions and states. Such operations
include humanitarian and civic assistance missions, such as the response to the
Indian Ocean tsunami and the deployment o the hospital ships USNS Mercyand
USNS Comortto regions such as archipelagic Southeast Asia and Central America,
respectively, where their humanitarian missions can help win the hearts and minds
contest against the disruptive ideologies noted above and destabilising transnational
criminal inuences.
Following the deployment oMercyto Southeast Asia in 2006, the amphibious assault
ship USS Peleliu deployed or our months beginning in June 2007 to Southeast
Asia and the Southwest Pacifc to provide medical and other humanitarian and civic
assistance in a mission entitled Pacifc Partnership 2007. The deployment involved
participation rom humanitarian non-governmental organisations and other regionalstates.75 It seems as though such regular deployments may become a sort o precursor
to a regional US Global Fleet Station (see below), although it is possible that that name
may not be used in Southeast Asia due to overriding local sensitivities.
There can be no doubt that these nation and security-building activities play an
increasingly important role in the American conception o the long war. For example,
Admiral Mullen explicitly linked such enterprises to that overriding strategic priority:
I view relie eorts and any number o other engagement activities as very much
a part o winning the war on terror. And we are at war.76
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26 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
G ft stt
One supporting concept under development is the establishment o Global Fleet
Stations, which will consist o orward-deployed shallow drat ships and support
vessels based in littoral regions: a orm o Sea Basing. Global Fleet Stations couldbecome both a means o exerting the positive inuence desired by Mullen and his
successor and a means by which to build cooperation and local capabilities or maritime
security. They could be staed by specialist Foreign Area Ofcers and orm a hub
where all manner o Joint, Inter-Agency, International Organizations, navies, coast
guards and non-governmental organizations could partner together as a orce or good
in particular regions o interest.77 The Maritime Strategy urther states the need to
develop sufcient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise amongst the three sea
Services to nurture eective interaction with diverse international partners:78 a kind
o neo-imperial enabling orce or the global policing and security-building deemednecessary by the United States to saeguard the maritime domain?79 Like the 1000-ship
Navy itsel, the Global Fleet Station idea is clearly idealistic, and requires the support
o sometimes hesitant coastal nations to be eective.
Global Fleet Stations, urther described by Mullen as a persistent sea base o operations
ocused on shaping (that is, inuence) operations, Theater Security Cooperation and
contributing to maritime domain awareness, are being developed explicitly as regional
support elements or the 1000-ship Navy.80 In April 2007 the initial Global Fleet Station
deployed to Panama and six other Central American and Caribbean states in a six
month pilot mission, consisting o the high speed vessel HSV 2 Switand USN andUS Coast Guard training teams.81
The second Global Fleet Station, named the Arica Partnership Station, began a
seven month deployment to the Gul o Guinea in November 2007. Consisting oSwit
and the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry, the deployment involves
the participation o personnel rom the three US Sea Services, military sta rom
seven NATO European states, sta rom the State Department and the US Agency
or International Development, Department o Homeland Security, Department o
Commerce and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and selectednon-governmental organisations. This is indeed the joint, combined, inter-agency and
still wider maritime collaboration o the type posited by Mullen at the Naval War College
less than 18 months earlier, representing an impressive case o backing words with
actions. According to US Naval Forces Europe-US Sixth Fleet, the Arica Partnership
Station will concentrate on providing tailored education and training to improve
maritime saety and security, including or enorcement, interdiction, search and
rescue and counter-terrorism operations, as well as support or over 20 humanitarian
assistance missions.82
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27The 1000-shiP navy in PracTice
Mtm Dm aw
The United States takes a comprehensive and inclusive view o what constitutes
maritime domain awareness. Its defnition o the maritime domain itsel is also so
broad as to make the MDA task extremely difcult, as laid down in theNational Planto Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.83 The maritime domain:
is all areas and things o, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering
on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime
related activities, inrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other
conveyances.
Maritime domain awareness:
is the eective understanding o anything associated with the maritimedomain that could impact the security, saety, economy, or environment
o the United States.
In the international context o the 1000-ship Navy, one can substitute all participants in
the initiative or perhaps even all statesper se or the United States. This is a highly
ambitious undertaking which will demand not only the application o technology but
also the development o protocols and procedures, political and, at times, possibly legal
arrangements or the accessing and sharing o data. The MDA aspect o the initiative
can be divided into two elements: inormation collection and inormation sharing.
imt ct
The extent o United States ambitions or MDA data collection is probably not entirely
obvious even rom the above defnition. The ultimate intent is to be able to maintain
tracks on the entire global merchant eet o approximately 121,000 ships o 300 gross
registered tons (grt) or larger. In the words o the USNs Director o Naval Intelligence:
As we evolve down the road well get closer to tracking all [merchant ships] that are inthe world on a minute-by-minute basis.84 A common theme in USN pronouncements
is to draw a parallel with the way international civil aviation is tracked using a system
o global identifcation standards or airliners and civilian-based air trafc control
radar.85 It should be noted though, that the analogy is not entirely sound: there is an
underlying saety demand to ensure that large, relatively ast moving airborne people
carriers do not collide and all rom the sky. The system thus represents a practical
necessity to ensure the saety and viability o the civilian aerospace industry. There
is no comparable saety issue, on the other hand, that would require the constant,
global tracking o the worlds eet o merchant ships. Nevertheless, one o the USNsongoing technology development programs involves the construction o an unlimited
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28 The Global MariTiMe ParTnershiP
track database which would merge and display maritime track data rom a number
o separate databases.86
As indicated earlier, Admiral Mullen has placed considerable importance upon the
development and application o technology, and inormation technology, in particular, asthe single largest contributor to uture maritime security. He suggests that, even today,
such technologies can play a leading role in negating the enemys intentions.87
Whilst MDA technologies can indeed play an important role, and they are indispensable
to gaining an understanding o the maritime domain, it is also essential that the
limitations o technology be recognised. This is less a question o the technical limits
o technology, but rather that an understanding is required that technology unctions
only as a tool - a particular means to achieving a specifc objective - and not an end in
and o itsel. In other words, there are signifcant dangers in assuming that the task o
enhancing maritime security can be equated with achieving a certain level o domainawareness: such as mistaking MDA or maritime security. Indeed, the promotion o
technology as a solution to strategic, as opposed to merely technical, problems has
been identifed as a characteristic typical to American military and strategic culture.88
It will thus be important that MDA technologies are treated as enabling tools or
maritime security rather than as a wand to magically solve the challenges o the
current maritime security environment. Americas allies and close coalition partners
may play an important role in this respect by helping the United States to keep a sense
o perspective regarding the role o MDA technologies.
One question worth asking is whether it is really necessary to be able to track the
worlds entire eet o merchant ships persistently. The need to fnd or track specifc
ships when required is understandable, and authorities would need the capability to
be able to do so. But the assertion that the war on terrorism demands that one o the
strategies that we have to ocus on is fnding the needle in the haystack by using
a database o ship tracks, assumes that we know what we are looking or in the frst
place.89 Otherwise we might end up knowing an awul lot about all the haystacks and
not much about the apparent needle, until we are pricked. It remains the case that
MDA inormation in isolation may not be sufcient to prevent major attacks. Rather,
it will be o most utility when matched with actionable intelligence, oten rom non-
maritime sources, on specifc threats. The lack o good intelligence, on the other hand,
has spurred greater eorts to develop better MDA capabilities, including, or example,
NATOs Maritime Saety and Security Inormation System (MSSIS), which supports
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean.90
A number o technologies and strategies are being pursued to attain the necessary
inormation to achieve comprehensive MDA - a kind o peacetime (or quasi-war time,
given contemporary circumstances) equivalent to the US military concept o dominant
battlespace awareness. Piecing together a composite picture or comprehensive MDAis an extremely challenging task, which involves the incorporation o a wide range o
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29The 1000-shiP navy in PracTice
data beyond just tracks o merchant ships. Attaining the data, rom all sources, such
as customs and port state reporting requirements, military and non-military sensors
and ship transmissions, is only the frst step in the process. Such vast quantities
o disparate data need to be used and analysed that specialised computer-based
algorithms are required to process all the inormation and potential risk actors in themaritime trading system identifed. One o the goals o the analysis process is to identiy
anomalous behaviour. For example, anomalies in a ships behaviour might be identifed
by comparing inormation on the ships actual location and bearing with its sailing
schedule and itinerary. This type o process is already being implemented not only by
the United States and in other national systems, but also in some regional systems.
However, as noted by Martin Murphy, systems relying upon inormation rom AIS and
other similar raw data sources can be vulnerable to non-compliance and deception by
merchant ships. Moreover, anomalous behaviour is not necessarily easy to detect. For
example, a supposedly anomalous voyage pattern was one o the actors that inuenced
British authorities to board and search theNisha in British waters in December 2001
on suspicion that it might be carrying WMD-related materials, yet on investigation
that pattern turned out to be normal or that particular ship.91 At the very least, the
computer programs developed
to crunch all the raw data may
need to be ed with historical
inormation on the normal mode
o movement and behaviour
o individual ships in order to
be able to detect anomalies:
a vast undertaking. And even
with such historical data sets,
the MDA picture will probably
still need to be matched with
specifc intelligence inormation
to be truly eective in preventing
terrorist attacks, although
there are obvious benefts rom
enhanced MDA or all manner o
maritime enorcement and border
protection operations.
The US National Plan to Achieve
Maritime Domain Awareness sets
out an essential task l