the greater caspian project 21

CONTENTS

21

EDITORIAL

THE NUCLEAR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EASTSTRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCEGIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

HARD AND SOFT POWER IN THE CASPIANRUSSIAN AND IRANIAN OBJECTIVESTAYLOR MORSE

MILLENNIAL IRANCHANGE OR STATUS QUO?STEPHEN SARTY

THE BLAME GAMEFINDING FAULT IN GREATER CASPIAN HUMAN RIGHTSDR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

TERRORIST THREAT IN CENTRAL ASIAONE PROBLEM, DIFFERENT APPROACHESALESSANDRO LUNDINI

AZERI INTELLIGENCEDEALING WITH HANDCUFFS AND HINDRANCESTIM WOBIG

THE POWER OF SIBERIA PIPELINEMULTIPLE LAYERS OF COMPLEX GEOPOLITICSALEXANDER S. MARTIN

THE TAPI PIPELINETHE POLITICS OF ENERGY BALANCINGANDY DEAHN

XI JINPING’S TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EASTGIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

RUSSIA`S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

petra poseGateJa palkoluisa monteironina laVrenteVaGaBriela pasCholati Do amaralBruCe aDrianCeanatolii Baronintroy BaxterGreGory Brewnasurullah BrohistaCey Cottoneantony ClementanDy DeahnnenaD DrCa sara DysonJareD s. eastonGianCarlo elia ValoriJeffery fishellaura GarriDoorhan Gafarliaaron GooDamy hanlonJeanette "JJ" harper

Jonathan hartnerBrian huGhesanDrii kolpakoVVlaDislaV lermontoValessanDro lunDinipaula malottmeGan munozelena m.alexanDer s. martinnorBerto morales rosataylor morseJohn CoDy mosBeysarah nolDerJoshua pattersonDayna riCeJessiCa reeDGreGory rouDyBushstephen sartyDmitrii seltserrakesh krishnan simhaeVan thomsenDianne a. ValDezChristopher whitetim woBiG

THE grEaTEr CaSPIaN PrOJECTBI-WEEKLY DIgITaL EDITION

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

Dimitris GiannakopoulosModern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief

Dr. matthew CrosstonThe Caspian Project, Director

authors

“The society that

separates its scholars from

its warriors will have its

thinking done by cowards

and its fighting by fools”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

or the most part the world views diplomacyas a positive tool for peace and cooperation.Indeed, in its ideal form this is its proper func-tion. But it is not its sole function, nor does it

operate only within the boundaries of pure politics. Thisissue of the Greater Caspian Project shows how darklyvibrant diplomacy (in this case simply defined as a coun-try’s pursuit of its interests through interaction and ne-gotiation) can be across every spectrum of the humancondition. In fact, I would dare say that diplomacy in the21st century is utilized quantitatively more often for self-interested state motivations and objectives than for pur-suing globally-recognized consensus values. The articlesgiven to the reader herein illustrate this richly.

Everything from pipeline diplomacy (the TAPI and thePower of Siberia) to caviar-flavored diplomacy (humanrights reporting across the region) to African diplomacy(how Russia engages the continent) to spy diplomacy(Azeri intelligence issues at the local level) to hard, soft,smart diplomacy (the Russian and Iranian interpreta-tions) are included in this issue, affording our readers anever-expanding thematic and geographic tapestrythrough which to better understand the home region ofthe Caspian.

Keep in mind that the use of the term‘dark diplomacy’ in the title of the issueis not necessarily meant to be pejora-tive. Rather, it is simply a nod to howpolitics across this great region tend toget played out, not only from the keylittorals and expanded neighbors, buteven by the great powers swooping intemporarily at a distance. Everyonehas an angle. All states have anagenda. No actor is without self-inter-est. This fuels the concept of darkdiplomacy. Even when intentions aregood and long-term objectives pure,an accurate reflection of present-dayreality is only achieved by one’s will-ingness to get down below the surfaceof high-minded values and the in-tegrity of ideals. As it turns out, I thinkour readers will find out the greaterCaspian region has great wealth whenit comes to the currency of dark diplo-macy.

DARK DIPLOMACY

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

F

THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 21

f we look at the latest data, the OPEC countries– or anyway the Middle East countries - arethose which are investing more resources in nu-clear power. Iran, for example, was the first State

to directly place a nuclear reactor into the electricitygrid for civilian uses in 2011. Despite the JCPOA recently signed by Iran with theP5+1 which, however, will certainly not stop the Iran-ian military-civilian research, the Shi’ite country is play-ing on nuclear power, together with the othercountries, for the following reasons: a) nuclear powermakes available crude oil quantities which shift fromthe internal market to foreign sales; b) nuclear powerextends the life cycle of oil wells, most of which arenow aging, since it reduces domestic demand; c) theuse of nuclear power allows a civilian-military “dual use", independent and autonomous from the old regionalalliances, which are now all definitively under crisis.

I

THE NUCLEAR POWER

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Strategic and economic significance

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminentItalian economist and businessman.

He holds prestigious academic distinctions andnational orders.


Hence, in addition to manage the deal with Iran ra-tionally and advisedly, it will be necessary - in a veryshort lapse of time – to reach a series of bilateralagreements on nuclear power with the other Gulfand Middle East countries - an idea which I do notthink is widespread in the current strategic debate.In this particular case, Iran will use nuclear powerfor military purposes when it has it, or rather whenit has a "threshold" threat, which is what really mat-ters, as a strategic substitute for a large conven-tional force which is lacking in Iran.The Shi’ite country has a strategic rationale linkedto asymmetric warfare and proxy wars, like those ofthe Hezbollah in the Lebanon - the structure cre-ated by Iran to hit Israel with a hybrid war that theJewish State cannot oppose with the same tech-niques.Or nuclear power is seen as a "game changer", evenonly as an ultimate and credible threat, for a non-conventional clash in which Israel is present.Or a part of the Sunni world.

Therefore, the rationale of Iran’s nuclear power is toforce the Jewish State into an asymmetric war in theregions opposing it and outside its borders, in acontext of international - but mainly tactical - isola-tion.What matters, however, is not the technicalability to actually produce, have and show a seriesof nuclear devices, but the ability to manage - in theshortest possible time – the transition from an ac-ceptable level for the Non-Proliferation Treaty to thetypical one of the operational nuclear power.Incidentally, the Italian signature of the Non-Prolif-eration Treaty (NPT) in May 1975 marks the start ofthe end of its independent and autonomous for-eign policy.And to think that Italy wanted to walk out of theNon-Proliferation Treaty at the G8 Summit held inBirmingham in 1998.

The NPT is used to clip the wings of the Euro-West-ern and Mediterranean countries, while India andPakistan which, with their nuclear tests threw theBirmingham G8 Summit in turmoil, rightly view theNPT - like the other Arab and Islamic countrieswhich are currently at the nuclear threshold - as oneof the edicts in Manzoni’s novel The Betrothed.Just think of what would have happened in theMediterranean currently under fire if we had had aneffective level of nuclear deterrence, managed ac-cording to the customs, usages and codes agreedupon.Hence Iran remains at the so-called nuclear thresh-old, where India and Pakistan, North Korea and, ofcourse, Israel have been for long time.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

In fact the JCPOA equalizes the level of maximumthreat, namely the nuclear threat, between Israeland Iran. Iran as a threshold power is exactly whatthe Iranian leaders wanted. This causes a revolutionin the Middle East strategic equation and, hence, inthe European and NATO one.

If the Shi’ite Republic has a threshold power and if,meanwhile, the civilian use of nuclear power still al-lows nuclear testing (which is possible on the basisof the JCPOA), the Jewish State is turned into astrategic hostage. I do not know whether Westernsignatories to the agreement with Iran have beenfully aware of this - but I somehow doubt it.The purely economic obsession, typical of Westerndiplomacies, has blinded the minds of Westernleaders.

If Israel is deprived of its supreme threat, it becomestargetable and vulnerable at conventional level,where the Israeli structural limits are evident andunavoidable. It would have been better to sign anagreement with Iran allowing to better control alsothe military sites of the Shi’ite State, in addition toreducing the amount of fissile material for "civilian"production, which is currently too high and guar-antees alone the threshold effect of the Iranian nu-clear power. All we need to do is only shift it. Thedata on the distribution of nuclear plants, globally,is still particularly important.According to the IAEA,in September 2010 - the date of the last survey - nu-clear facilities totaled 441 in 29 countries. The shareof nuclear power in energy production is higher inEurope (27%) while, in 2010, South Asia and theMiddle East were, in fact, at zero.


Today, however, as many as 65 new States show aninterest in nuclear energy, and among them, at leastone fifth is located in the Middle East. The Gulf Co-operation Council’s will to go nuclear dates back to2007, while also peripheral Arab nations and, aboveall, the non-oil countries (such as Jordan) are pavingthe way for widespread nuclearization.

The projects currently under consideration reportthe operation of 90 nuclear reactors to be placed in26 sites in thirteen countries of the region by theend of 2030. Six Middle East countries, namelyBahrain, Egypt, obviously Iran, Jordan, the UnitedArab Emirates and Yemen are planning to build anuclear power plant by the end of 2017. If all goesaccording to the Iranian and Russian wishes, Yemenshould host a nuclear site - not falling within theJCPOA regulation - right in front of the Saudi coast.While, however, we have noted some geopoliticalconditions for the establishment of the Middle EastSunni and Shi’ite countries’ nuclear power, it shouldbe recalled that the shift to nuclear power has alsointernal motivations.

Firstly, there is the demographic and economicgrowth which needs low-cost and abundant elec-tricity. Moreover, in a situation characterized by aslowing down in energy consumption from hydro-carbons in Europe and in the other industrial coun-tries. From 1980 to 2010, the demand for electricitygrew throughout the Middle East by five times, butalso the global demand for electricity is expectedto grow by 61% between 2010 and 2050.In said period, the demand for electricity in the Mid-dle East is expected to rise by 114%. Obviously, withnuclear power, the Middle East countries also wantto present themselves as potential exporters ofelectricity, as well as hydrocarbons, in addition tomeeting their domestic demand.

On the other hand, cheap and abundant energy isinevitable for the very future and survival of thecountries in the region. In Saudi Arabia 50% of elec-tricity consumption is used for air conditioners, forobvious climate reasons. No to mention the seawater desalination plants needed for the local pop-ulation’s life.

If the OPEC countries of the Middle East do not freethemselves from dependence on their own sourcesof energy from hydrocarbons, it is obvious that - ata time of shrinking international oil markets andlower structural prices - it will no longer be possibleto maintain social peace or to afford the same costsfor the survival of the population. In the Emirates,for example, 97% of electricity production dependson natural gas, while in Egypt 70% of the "wonder-ful electric light" - as the Futurists called it - is pro-duced by gas, which is either an unmanageable costor, even worse, an unmanageable bond with thosewho supplies it to poor countries.Even in Iran gas is worth 67% of total energy pro-duction, while currently Iran's regulated nuclearpower accounts for less than 6% of the total energyproduced.

Obviously, as already noted, nuclear energy is usedto support the exports of hydrocarbons: the pro-ceeds from the sale of natural gas and oil, for exam-ple, are worth 85% of revenues in Qatar and SaudiArabia, while Iran - and this is a key factor of itsstrategic autonomy - acquires only 60% of its rev-enue from the sale of hydrocarbons abroad. Themore or less explicit war in the Middle East will bewon by the last country having the ability to sell gasand oil to the West. The country which will lastlonger with its active oil wells, will be the real hege-monic power in the region. The fight has alreadybegun.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

In the OPEC cartel, which is now ever less importantto manage prices, the equivalent of our "wars ofsuccession" has arrived. Oman, which is not a mem-ber of the Vienna cartel, is the largest oil produceroutside the oligopoly dominated by OAPEC, theArab and Sunni sub-cartel established in 1968 witha deal, still relevant today, including Kuwait, Libyaand Saudi Arabia.

But nuclearization is a real bargain even for the Arabor Islamic net energy importers, such as Turkey - or,at the time, Jordan - which want to reduce the costsof gas acquisition from Russia and Iran, countrieswhich are always less in line with President Erdo-gan’s hegemonic designs. Furthermore, if eachcountry has its own nuclear power plants, the dan-ger of violent energy disruptions, due to the ji-hadists or to other reasons, is largely diminished.If each country has its own nuclear system, the"sword jihad" inside the Middle East will soon haveno longer reason to exist.

Moreover, it is also worth taking note of a criticaldate: the time of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Saudiresumption of nuclear energy production coincideswith the one according to which the JCPOA be-tween the P5+1 and Iran will enable the latter to re-sume some research activities - even of a militarynature - in the nuclear sector.

Therefore the strategic equation is clear: the RussianFederation will have an interest in managing the nu-clearization of the Greater Middle East - and its pres-ence in Syria is a sign in this regard - while both theEuropean Union and the United States will remainlinked to the very important oil market.They will also be conditioned by the nuclear powerinternal to oil producers.Nevertheless, in this case, a new variable will appearon the crude oil and natural gas prices: their eco-nomic and strategic connection with the quantityand the cost of production of nuclear energy withinthe crude oil producing countries.


If each country has its own nuclear system, the "sword jihad" inside the Middle East will soon have no longer reason to exist

HARDANDSOFTPOWERIN THE CASPIANRussian and Iranian

Objectives

TAYLOR MORSE

Taylor Morse is currently a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

Russia has already shown its willingness to utilizeeconomic hard power for its foreign policy goals. Inthe ongoing crisis in Ukraine, Russia cut off naturalgas supplies to apply pressure on the new anti-Russian government. When many European statestried to resell the gas that they had received fromRussia to Ukraine, Russia threatened to cut off theirgas supplies unless they abandoned that plan. TheEuropean states complied. Being that Russia sup-plied around 43% of Europe’s natural gas at thatpoint, increasing dependence upon Russian gasfrom an influx of natural gas from the Caspian Seawill only increase European compliance with Russ-ian policy.

Similarly, Iran is preparing a natural gas pipelinethat may include Caspian gas that will go throughPakistan. This will allow Iran to put pressure on itsAmerican adversary through economic hard powerin Pakistan, which has stated that it is not deterredby the threat of US sanctions if it does business withIran. Being that Pakistan is the main logistical hubfor the US effort in Afghanistan it seems that Amer-ica is being foreign policy ‘outflanked’.

The soft power gains made by Russia and Iran ifthey control the Caspian Sea’s natural resources willoccur both unintentionally and intentionally.

wo of the five states that border theCaspian Sea can be considered hege-monic in the region: Russia and Iran. Al-though this is beneficial to these states,

it is a threat to American interests since these statesare also adversarial to the US.

The first reason that Russian and Iranian controlover Caspian Sea resources is a threat to the US isthat it will increase their hard and soft power influ-ence around the world. The second reason is thatRussian and Iranian growth in the Caspian Sea willalso increase their ties with one another, laying thegroundwork for a troublesome alliance against theUS. Hard power utilizes military force and economicmight to attain a desired outcome in internationalrelations. Soft power is the ability to shape the pref-erences of others to your desired outcome. Throughnewfound power from Caspian Sea resources Russiaand Iran will strengthen these hard and soft posi-tions in the world.

Hard power is typically referenced for its capacity towield military might or the threat of it to pursue for-eign policy goals. However it is the economic sideof hard power which will be a tool in Russia andIran’s respective arsenals if they are able to controlthe flow of resources out of the Caspian Sea.

T


Soft power will be gained unintentionally merelythrough the interaction of Russia and Iran with theircustomers. For example, the power of Russian busi-ness to provide natural gas jobs in NATO countrieswould predispose more people within these statesto pro-Russian attitudes that are contradictory toNATO’s traditional anti-Russian stance. There willalso be efforts to intentionally gain soft power in-fluence. Iran already exerts soft power to pursue itsforeign policy through portraying itself and its alliesas ‘the oppressed,’ which will only be furthered bythe new opportunities Caspian resources provide.The major American security guarantee in Europe,NATO, would be compromised if its dependence onRussian Caspian gas was threatened to be cut off.Similarly in Asia, Pakistan’s realist foreign policy al-lows it to absorb and deflect US pressure in favor ofIranian Caspian natural gas.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The threat of Russian and Iranian control of the Caspian Sea extends far beyond economics

Although Russia and Iran are pursuing the CaspianSea’s resources for their own realist self-interests,their respective stakes in the Caspian Sea will growthe military ties between them. This is problematicfor the US since these states are both adversarial tothe US and their shared security priorities will in-crease their respective global capabilities. Thegroundwork for their mutual goals of securityacross the Caspian Sea has already been created.Russia just concluded a sale for delivery of multipleS-300 air defense missile systems to Iran which is

designed to target ad-vanced aircraft (which iswhat the West wouldutilize in any military ac-tion against it). Also the RussianCaspian naval flotilla hasrecently traveled southto conduct joint train-ings with Iran, necessaryfor any joint defense ofthe Caspian Sea. Thisgroundwork will only beexpanded to possiblyinclude contingencyplans for the defense ofthe Caspian Sea, jointcommand structures,and joint covert action,which Iran is already ca-pable of in the Caspianregion.

Deepening their military bond via Caspian Sea re-sources would serve to further ties between Russiaand Iran in general. Iranian ports in the gulf wouldbe open to the Russian navy, easing their force pro-jection across the Middle East and subsequentlyhelp project its hard power there. The Russian mili-tary would have access to Iranian military baseswhich would politically and militarily frustrate anyattempt by the West to enforce any deviation fromthe new Iran nuclear accord. Therefore the threat ofRussian and Iranian control of the Caspian Sea ex-tends far beyond economics and goes into project-ing Russian power into the Middle East andsolidifying Iran’s domestic defense against the West.

The Caspian Sea’s natural resources are ripe fortakeover by its two regional powers, Russia and Iran.If they are able to dominate control of these re-sources, American interests far beyond the greaterCaspian region and across the Middle East would bethreatened. Through the exploitation of both hardand soft power, Russia and Iran will be able to in-crease their capacity to attain foreign policy goalsthat are often contradictory to US policy. Thereforeit is imperative for the United States to start makingcontrol of Caspian Sea resources a far more impor-tant national security agenda than it presently is.Preventing Russia and Iran from totally controllingthe Caspian Sea and its resources may be in theshort-term a maneuver that increases tension in theregion, but from Western perspectives it will facili-tate their own agenda long-term more efficiently.


STEPHEN SARTY

Stephen Sarty is a graduatestudent in the International

Security and IntelligenceStudies program at Bellevue

University in Omaha, NE, USA.He is a former U.S. Marineand has lived and worked

in the Middle East forthe last 23 years.

MILLENNIAL IRANChange or status quo?

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

omestically, nationalism in Iran is high asit has produced some of the greatestartists, physicians, poets, and mathe-maticians that history has ever seen and

Iranians see themselves as still being able to con-tribute to those rich traditions in the future.This nationalism has been at odds, however, withthe “revolutionary” state that emerged out of the Is-lamic Revolution, as Iran began to base many of itsdomestic and foreign policy decisions on Islamicobjectives versus Persian cultural ones. Long a con-tributor, culturally, on the world stage, it has beenIran’s willingness to support and often-times forgevarious radical Islamic Shia movements in its ownimage that ultimately led to its isolation from theworld stage.

Initially, post-revolution, the Islamic Republic Partydominated within all branches of government. Inthe years since, however, this has radically changedand there are now literally hundreds of variousgroups all vying for a piece of the pie. The core issuebetween the various factions more recently hasbeen split along the divide of whether to create astate based on a purity of Islamic principles and tolead the way for Islamic nations against the West orto create an Islamic state that is independent butalso interacts with the larger global communityeconomically and politically on more friendly terms.In the years directly following the revolution, Iranianpolicy was driven mainly via the hardline conserva-tive side of the house. This approach, however, isunder attack, as the recent JCPOA indicates.

The new millenial generation of Iranians, as the rev-olution moves further into the rear-view mirror, ispushing for a return of Iran to its cultural place inthe world and an improvement of the economic sit-uation. The most recent election of PresidentRouhani, who ran on a moderate platform, wouldappear to indicate this generational shift. Rouhani’selection was seen as a direct reflection of the Iranianpublic’s growing impatience with the economichardships brought on by decades of sanctions andpolitical exile from the global community andserved as a warning shot to the hardline conserva-tives. Running counter to this is the Ayatollah’s con-cern for both ensuring that he remains firmly inpower and that he can groom his successor. Giventhe widespread pressure towards reform and thewidening splits in political parties, the appointmentof the next supreme leader will undoubtedly be acontroversial but crucial transition.

Strategically to the outside world Iran occupies animportant geographical space. That it possesses im-mense oil and natural gas reserves and controls ac-cess to the main oil routes out of the Arabian Gulfhas made it a ripe target for foreign intrusion overthe course of history. It is also a major bridge be-tween Asia, Europe and the Middle East, so good re-lations with Iran is essential to a number of thesurrounding states. As a result Iran has often resis-ted attempts at coercion globally, especially whenit came to Western nations, as that was viewed asan attempt to control Iran against its own best in-terests.

D


Because of this much of what fuels its bitter politicalpolicies toward Western powers is based on the per-ceived “meddling” of various foreign entities in itsaffairs pre-revolution. The paranoia against out-siders, like the CIA having a hand interfering inter-nally in Iran, is used by those in power in Tehran tocontrol uprisings and label them as being under thedirection of these outside agents. Additionally, al-though Persian and proud of that distinction, Irani-ans possess many of the same traits found in Arabtribal culture, which can create opportunities for in-ternal dissension and manipulation. This has alwaysstunted the rise of a true opposition force within thecountry.

The need to balance the social and economic needsof the people while keeping intact revolutionaryideology is essential to the Ayatollah retaining hisposition at the top of the pile. As we’ve seen in otherArab states in the region there is tremendous pres-sure from within to “westernize” or at least engagethe global community.

The younger generation in these nations has atremendous will to participate in modern technolo-gies that come directly into conflict with the moreconservative ways of the ruling religious faction. Toprevent internal strife the religious leaders of Iranmust find ways to adapt and accommodate theirpeople. The fear here is that in doing so it creates aradicalization on both ends of the spectrum, whichis evidenced all over the region.

On the religious side factions like ISIS, the Taliban,and al Qaida resisted the influx of western valuesand culture and used the poverty created by yearsof sanctions and war as propaganda against theWest, while those who seek to increase ties to West-ern outsiders simultaneously exert ever greaterstress on the ruling institutions with their demandsand needs. On this opposite side we see manyyoung students, women, and others who have beeneither oppressed or are simply tired of the poor con-ditions openly revolting against leaders who wouldseek to keep them isolated.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

In the years directly following the revolution, Iranian policy was driven mainly via the hardlineconservative side of the house

Leaders on both sides within Iran appear to bewalking a fine line as they work through discussionswith the West. While they must not show weaknessthat would lessen national sovereignty or “honor,”they must also find a way to appease the increasingdomestic pressure to improve economic conditions.

In its quest to continue its role as a regional hege-mon, Iran’s leadership faces many challenges, withnone more important to its survival than those itfaces domestically. With memories of the 1979 Rev-olution fading into the distance and itsleadership keen to remain firmly in controlof the nation, the Ayatollah and Iran’s as-sortment of political players need to lookfor ways to address an increasingly failingeconomy, an unfriendly global environ-ment, and stifling segments of remainingsanctions, as these factors all push todestabilize the country into internal strife.It is not an impossible task, however, andIran can well learn from the successes andfailures of other nations who have faced,or are facing, similar pressures.The learning of WHICH lessons, however,is a matter of the perspective one takesand is of major importance when lookingat Iran. Looking through the lens of theAyatollah, the lessons learned would likelybe drawn from nations where the controlof the country remained firmly in the handof a single dictatorial type leader, wherebysuccess was defined in the ability to retainpower and dominance.

Conversely, if one determines success by what isbest for the state as a whole and its movement to-ward a more open and free society with greaterglobal acceptance and connectivity, then the result-ant path is radically different. This then is the realchallenge facing millennial Iran and its future: willit be within a theocratic framework of managed pol-itics guided by Islamist ideology or will it move toreplace such staunchly traditionalist thinking andmove away from its current theocracy, becoming amuch more progressive and engaged member ofthe global community? This could very well be thekey crucial question facing the entire Middle Eastfor the next generation.


DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program,

and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

wonderfully informative, if also some-what depressing, report has just comeout from The Foreign Policy Centre,based in London, where the effort was

made to understand why there seems to be a lackof transparency and accountability across Parlia-mentarian International Organizations as concernsrecognizing and documenting and challenginghuman rights abuses across the Post-Soviet space,including the Greater Caspian region.


A

More specifically, the investigation capitalized onaccess to data and personnel within the Parliamen-tary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) andthe OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). Thechief purpose was to basically assess the assessors:were the organizations put in charge of supposedlyoverseeing the proper development of humanrights and civil governance across the former SovietUnion actually doing their duties effectively andcompellingly. If not, why? Together with previous studies conducted by fineorganizations like the European Stability Initiativein Germany, the overall conclusions are not inspir-ing. The relatively famous concept of ‘caviar diplo-macy’ (which has been written about at length in aprevious issue of our own Greater Caspian Project),where favors are performed or misdeeds are for-given or dismissed in exchange for personal giftsand benefits, has seemingly been accented by a ver-itable plethora of other complicating factors, all ofwhich serve to undermine the proper promotion ofhuman rights and good governance across thisgreat region.

THE BLAME

GAMEFinding Fault inGreater CaspianHuman Rights

These complicating factors in addition to ‘caviardiplomacy’ break down as follows:

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE: In short, most Parliamen-tarians across Europe put in charge of a particularcountry often have no direct experience or educa-tional training on said country. Perhaps worse, ef-forts to ‘engage and learn’ can often be relegated toextremely short trip visits with highly ‘managed’ ex-cursions organized by country authorities that, ob-viously, have a vested interest in showing theParliamentarian in question the rosiest of picturesand most progressive of achievements. As a result,reports produced by the international organizationstend to be terribly skewed and inaccurate.

BELIEF IN ‘THE POWER OF PERSUASION’THROUGH ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT: This is some-thing akin to a political neo-paternalism, where theEuropean actors in question believe that the onlyway to evolve and progress ‘emerging democracies’is to give them benevolent guidance and engage-ment.

In other words, success depends on the Western Eu-ropeans being able to show the ‘ungovernables’how to govern. Even if done with the best of inten-tions, it is easy to see how quickly this tactic can gooff the rails in terms of respect and responsibility.Even weaker seems to be the belief that there is adirect causal link between ‘dialogues’ and ‘structuralchange.’ So far, at least, that causal link seems decid-edly thin.

CIRCLING THE WAGONS: For Parliamentariansthere seems to be an ‘empathizer’ element for theirfellow Post-Soviet/Greater Caspian legislators, inthat they recognize their learning peers often facefar harsher and more critical political crises, barriers,and obstacles. Consequently, this empathy identifi-cation is incurring a forgiveness quotient on trans-gressions against human rights and civil freedoms,or at least the ability to ‘understand’ how some slipscan occasionally happen. In America, this wouldmost often be categorized under the rubric of ‘notwanting to throw the baby out with the bathwater.’

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

dark diplomacy, unfortunately, seems to be just as prevalentin the overseers as the overseen

PARTIES OF THE WORLD UNITE: Many partiesacross Europe forge international alliances witheach other. As time goes by, some of these partner-ships form deep ties as literal bridges between Eastand West. There is at least compelling anecdotal ev-idence to suggest that some of these bridges haveinduced negative consequences, where membersof the European bodies seem willing to be lessharsh on violations when taken by members of sis-ter organizations and parties. The European Peo-ple’s Party, for example, took a light-handedapproach to human rights violations in Georgiawhen the sister party United National Movementwas in power.

When UNM fell out of power and moved into theopposition role, however, EPP suddenly seemedmore enthusiastic and vociferous about toutinggovernmental transgressions coming out of Tbilisi.This same trend also tends to make very weird al-liances of disparate groups with wildly varyingagendas and interests. In the confusion, local pop-ulations will suffer from bad governance that nevergets called out. The most colorful example of this is how the Euro-pean Democrats group brings together Britain’sConservative Party, Turkey’s ruling Justice and De-velopment Party, Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbai-jan Party, and some of Armenia’s ruling elite parties.This kaleidoscope of political agenda-confusiononly seems to create a lack of coherence and con-sensus on rulings over human rights and good gov-ernance.

POLITICAL ‘REALISM’: In this case realism is justcode for foreign-policy-strategic-business-as-usual.As in, a country in the West, while sincerely beingconcerned about human rights and good gover-nance in all states, is not going to be so concernedabout it as to limit, constrain, or hinder its own pur-suit of national interests and security. So whether itis the prioritization of new economic opportunities,trade, and investment or some country forming astrategic lynchpin in a greater global security planagainst terrorism, it is clear that human rights andgood governance are ‘flexible priorities’ that will riseand fall according to the importance of other states’considerations of their own realpolitik.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM: This is something of a ratherstrange international version of American ‘politicalcorrectness’ in the late 20th century. In this case wehave a strange unity between the radical left andthe radical right, laying claim that any Western na-tion giving lectures or making demands abouthuman rights ‘standards’ is akin to a moral imperial-ism and an ignorance of unique cultural traditions.


MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The implication being that the so-called less-devel-oped political cultures of the former SovietUnion/Greater Caspian region need to be left aloneto develop their human rights standards at theirown pace and in line with their unique cultures.Amazingly, this has some traction with Parliamen-tary bodies across Western Europe.

“ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL”: To utilize a political cyn-icism, this finding indicates that how much a Parlia-mentarian cares, or does not care, about humanrights abuses in any given country is a direct reflec-tion of how big or how small that country’s diasporamay be within his/her own constituency backhome.This obviously creates a wildly diverse slidingscale of empathy and importance, with none of theassessment values based on empirical reality or crit-ical gravity. Rather, it is just about whether or notthe Parliamentarian in question can politically af-ford to pay attention to it or ignore it.

Rather, it is just about whether or not the Parliamen-tarian in question can politically afford to pay atten-tion to it or ignore it. Too often, whichever versionplays best with the home crowd seems to be theoption that carries the day.

“CAVIAR-FLAVORED” DIPLOMACY: Unlike thepreviously mentioned caviar diplomacy, which is asimple and brazenly open system of corruption viabribery, extortion, and/or blackmail, caviar-flavoreddiplomacy is perhaps a level below but still ulti-mately detrimental. In this case it describes politi-cal/economic/diplomatic behavior that is clearlyinappropriate and unethical but is not immediatelytransactional in nature. This usually involves a tit-for-tat quid pro quo, where in exchange for a Parlia-mentarian’s willingness to look the other way or notcriticize too harshly an improvement in personalnetworking contacts will occur or lucrative eco-nomic opportunities will be promised.


There is some evidence that this is becoming fa-vored over straight caviar diplomacy simply be-cause there is at least some element of plausibledeniability for the Parliamentarian, as the payoffcomes later on, thereby making it harder to draw anexplicit link between a particular vote and the ben-efit.

What we can ultimately see from these findings isthat the tendency in the West to shake its diplo-matic head in disgust at the lack of progress on im-portant issues like human rights and goodgovernance across the greater Caspian region is in-sincere, as it is not taking place in a political vac-uum. Many of the structural barriers like corruptionand lack of institutional history are not only beingexacerbated by the very people meant to be re-sponsible for improving the situation, but it is ar-guable that the conditions sometimes becomeworse because of the involvement of the oversee-ing group from the West. We should try to remem-ber this whenever we read the unfortunate reportscoming out of the region on human rights andproper governance: dark diplomacy, unfortunately,seems to be just as prevalent in the overseers as theoverseen.

(*) For the full report, please see: Institutionally blind?International organisations and human rights abusesin the former Soviet Union, edited by Adam Hug, For-eign Policy Centre, London, February 2016.

the European actors in questionbelieve that the only way toevolve andprogress ‘emergingdemocracies’is to give thembenevolent guidance and engagement

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

TERRORIST THREATIN CENTRAL ASIA

One problem, different approaches

errorism and security have newly be-come one of the top priorities in post-Soviet Central Asia. States are discussinghow to face the threat of a strengthen-

ing of the terrorism and, in particular, of the IslamicState. The attention to this phenomenon has beengrowing in relation to the Russian involvement inthe Syrian war and the risk of a “contagion” that,from North Africa and Middle East, could affect Cen-tral Asia.

Both internally and regionally, during 2015 therehave been discussions about anti-terrorist measuresto implement and focused on the security aspects.But, actually, what is the level of the threat thestates are facing?

TALESSANDRO LUNDINI

Alessandro Lundini, IsAG Associate Researcher,“Eurasia” Programme, specialized in Central Asia,

is Co-Editor (with Dario Citati) of “L’Unità nelladiversità. Religioni, etnie e civiltà del Kazakhstan

contemporaneo (Roma 2013)


In the face of concerns expressed by national gov-ernments, sources and analyses point out a moreintricate reality that needs to be examined more indepth. The possibility of a strengthening of the rad-ical groups is concrete and different elements proveit. There are no certain figures, but it is estimatedthat from these countries diverse thousands ofyouths joined ISIS or other Islamic radical groups inSyria and Iraq. Their presence is considered to bearound 1.500-2.000 militants, up to a maximum ofeven 4.000 people. Official numbers, in fact, could also hide govern-ments’ strategy to underestimate or exaggerate thenumber of foreign fighters, in order to purse theirown internal purposes in facing radical groups. Be-yond these figures, what concerns is the possibilityof an “expansion” of the Caliphate in the Eurasian re-gion that could take place also with the adhesion ofindigenous militias to ISIS, its ideology and its strat-egy.

An example of such risk comes from the pledge ofloyalty made by the radical Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan last August. However, it is not only amatter of ISIS, because another factor to be consid-ered is the evolution of the fighting in Afghanistan.Taliban, indeed, could represent a potential elementof instability for bordering countries, like Turk-menistan.

In the face with this situation, the Russian Federa-tion is trying to play its role of leading actor in theregion for security issues through the definition ofa common anti-terrorism policy, involving all otherCentral Asian states. Moscow has direct interest inlimiting the expansion of islamist groups, in stabil-ising bordering countries and in reducing the pro-liferation of radical elements in its territory. Inaddition to Central Asians foreign fighters, whatworries Moscow is the presence of 1.500-3.000Russian citizens in war zones. Moreover, Russia itselfhas become a land of recruitment for jihadist move-ments, which acquire new militants from the emi-grants resident in the large Russian cities, wheretough living conditions pave the way for culturaland social marginalization and the split up betweenyoung Islamic workers from the rest of the society.This evolution has made the Russian, the third lan-guage – after Arab and English – in Islamic State’spropaganda and recruitment activities.

By its own side, Moscow has military bases and thelead of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,the most important regional security structure. Inthe last CSTO’s summits (in Dushanbe and Moscow)it has been underlined the risk for the five CentralAsian states and Russia, but the path to a commonanti-terrorist initiative it’s not easy.

The possibilityof a strength-ening of theradical groupsis concreteand differentelementsprove it

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

CSTO doesn’t include two key states like Turk-menistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, central Asiansare wary over a possible return of Russian influencein the region. This concern is in part emerged withthe constitution of the Eurasian Economic Union,but is much stronger in relation to the possibility ofa Russian-led common defensive policy, because itcould be interpreted as a blow to the sovereigntyof these countries.

So, even if the issue of a coordinated policy is alwayson the agenda, the answers against terrorist threathave assumed different faces. Elaborated on theroot of problems, prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic re-minded us recently in his seminal piece ‘No moreWar on Terror, please’: “But, terror is a tactics, not anideology. How can one conduct and win war on tac-tics? – it is an oxymoron.”

Turkmenistan, for example, has maintained his neu-trality position and repeatedly underlined its will toprotect the integrity of the state from any kind ofintrusion. Even if it is one of those states forced toface the major threat - since reports pointed out in-cidents at its Afghan borders - Turkmenistan is con-trary to any kind of “intrusion” in its sphere ofsovereignty.

Only in recent days, Ashgabat reached an agree-ment with Russia for security cooperation, which in-clude the control of Turkmen-Afghan border, inorder to limit eventual border crossing by Talibanforces. In other cases, instead, the menace might beused as an instrument through which governmentscan crack down opposition groups. Among states“suspected” of these practices there is Tajikistan.


The country suffers hundreds ofyoung in the forces of theCaliphate and recently even oneof the most influential militaryofficials, Colonel Gulmurod Khal-imov, abandoned institutionalranks to join ISIS. Tajik PresidentEmomali Rahmon described theIslamic State “the 21st century plague” and starteda crackdown on Islamic groups highly criticized,starting speculations about the real nature of thegovernmental intentions. Many suspects, in fact,that some measures – like the disbandment of theopposition movement Islamic Renaissance Party ofTajikistan, the ban of veil for women and the stronginvitation for the men to shave their beard – havelittle to do with security issue. In Uzbekistan, wherePresident Karimov is conducting a years-long waragainst terrorism, government decided to imple-ment new anti-terrorist measures.

Kazakhstan, instead, has chosen another path. Re-cently, Astana declared to have allocated more re-sources for security apparatus, but there is more.Contrary to the other Central Asians republics, As-tana has taken up the idea of a regional cooperationto this issue.

Speaking to the 70th UN Gen-eral Assembly last September,President Nursultan Nazarba-yev advanced a proposal (pre-viously presented in SCO sum-mit in Ufa) for the creation of an“anti-terrorist global network”under the aegis of the United

Nations and with the involvement of regional de-fense structures, like CSTO. Kazakh President under-lined that global threats requires global answers,stressing the necessity to re-unite the different al-liances constituted in order to coordinate them. Avision – this – that brings Russia and Kazakhstaneven closer on security issue. Another element tounderline about Kazakh strategy is the role con-ceded in its anti-terrorism law to social and culturalfactors, in order to prevent the spread of religiousradicalism and extremism. Only years to come willsay if this particular approach will give its results.

The necessity of a common answer should start alsoby the consideration that the Eurasian one presentsitself as an increasingly significant key region. Theattention toward Central Asians states is deter-mined by their relevance as raw materials suppliers,

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

their strategic transit routes and importance for thepolitical stability: single States’ instability – due tothe rise of domestic radical groups or to the returnof foreign fighters - can produce an impact on thewhole area and even on Russia and China.

At the same time, is necessary a thought-out lookabout the real entity of the issue. Many reports in-dicate that Central Asians states are lesser in dangerthan other regions’ countries. According to the 2015“Global Terrorism Index” Central Asia is less in dan-ger than Europe. Eurasian states have “good per-formances” not only in respect of the most troublednations, but even of their more influential neigh-bors, Russia and China. The five former Soviet Cen-tral Asian states have been included in the “lowestimpact of terrorism” and “no impact” categories,ranging from 83rd rank (of 162 countries classified)of Kazakhstan to the last position of Turkmenistanand Uzbekistan.

This standing can result exaggerated, especially ina phase in which terrorism is living a rising trend,but it can help to value the relative stability of thesecountries. Moreover, it can help in understandingthat disproportionate reactions can lead to coun-terproductive effects in medium-long term. In somecases, restrictions and repressions seems to respondto necessities of internal politics. The real risk is thatsuch measures might contribute to an increasingexpansion of radicalism and dissatisfaction with theinstitutions. Poverty, social and cultural marginal-ization, ethnic discriminations, lack of efficient pol-itics and the increasing economic difficulties inthese states are among other factors able tostrengthen radical groups beyond the “religious ide-ology”.

The answer can’t include only security aspects, be-cause fundamentalism can grow for economic, so-cial and cultural reasons. In this regard, theaforementioned Kazakh law on anti-terrorism, withits comprehensive attitude toward the issue, couldrepresent a viable approach in the fight against re-ligious extremism and radicalism. Only time, how-ever, can say if this kind of solution can work and ifCentral Asia can prevent the rise of terrorism and in-stability.

Russia is tryingto play its role of leading actorin the region for security issues throughthe definition of a commonanti-terrorismpolicy


zerbaijan has been known to have morenatural resources than most nations.However, it is its geographical locationand history that sometimes has been

more important in understanding its IntelligenceCommunity. Since 1967 the Azeri Ministry of Na-tional Security was headed and influenced by theless than popular Soviet KGB. Until 1967 the securityauthorities of the republic had been headed onlyby non-Azerbaijanis. In the same year General Hey-dar Aliyev was appointed as chairman of the KGB ofAzerbaijan.

TIM WOBIG

Tim Wobig is currently a Master’s Studentat Bellevue University for International Security

and Intelligence Studies.He has been in the military for almost 15 years,

8 of them in the Marine Corps and is nowan Army Captain. Having served in Afghanistan

and as a Team Leader for Weaponsof Mass Destruction, he is now a Company

Commander for a Sustainment Brigadein California.

A

AZERI INTELLIGENCEDealing with Handcuffs and Hindrances

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

In October 1991, after the Republic of Azerbaijangained independence, the Ministry of National Se-curity of the Republic of Azerbaijan was establishedon the material-technical basis and staff of the StateSecurity Committee.

This intelligence agency, which we will refer to fromhere on out as the MNS, has numerous departmentsof communication. The MNS frequently deliberatesand bases its decisions on the methodologieswithin the internal State authority establishedunder the Republic of Azerbaijan, better under-stood as the Milli Majlis, which relatively recentlychanged how long a President could hold office.Now the President can be reelected as many timesas necessary while the country is at war. Before thisamendment, the President could only hold officefor up to three terms, each having a five year period.Understand that each Parliamentarian deputy, all125 of them, are put into position by the President.There are no debates about putting laws into Con-gress or by Congress. Rather, the influence of polit-ical clans takes precedence.

One of the more recent discussions on corruptionwas the firing of Eldar Mahmudov, the Minister ofNational Security. The President, Ilham Aliyev, did not give a reason asto why he was fired nor was he required to. “Azer-baijani President Ilham Aliyev has dismissed hispowerful security minister in an unexpected moveagainst an official who was widely seen as an Aliyevloyalist. Aliyev announced the dismissal of NationalSecurity Minister Eldar Mahmudov in a decree thatwas published on his website. He did not provideany explanation for the decision.

The 59-year-old Mahmudov had served at the postsince 2004. Opposition politicians complained thatAliyev’s failure to explain the reason for Mahmu-dov’s firing showed that there was no transparencyin the country’s political decision- making process.Critics have long accused Aliyev of authoritarianism,corruption, and rights abuses. Aliyev also dismissedhis previous national security minister, Namig Ab-bassov, in July 2004 without providing any reason.”


Two clans, the Nakhichevanis and Yerazi, have dom-inated politics for decades. Heydar Aliyev had hisorigin in both clans, which gave him a strongpowerbase. The Aliyev family stands on the top ofthe pyramid and makes sure that key positions in allspheres of society are taken by the closely relatedand like-minded. This structure has developed intoextensive bureaucracy and corruption. Corruptionin all spheres of society poses the largest threat tothe functioning of the state. Most ministers havebought their jobs and many are directly related tothe president. Moreover, membership of the presi-dent’s party, YAP, is a precondition for state employ-ment.”

Consequently, the Azeri nation is mired in a situa-tion that it really cannot control, nor is it able tovoice its opinion to the authorities for fear of beingincarcerated on charges that are often fabricated.“There are limitations to freedom of expression andassembly and the rights to liberty and fair trial. Theauthorities have arrested dozens of political ac-tivists on bogus charges, imprisoned critical jour-nalists, broke up several peaceful publicdemonstrations, and adopted legislation that fur-ther restricted fundamental freedoms. Torture andill-treatment continue with impunity. The authori-ties did not effectively investigate credible allega-tions of beatings, threats, and other abuses incustody made by several arrested political activists.”

Compounding these events was the fact that theeditor of the most popular newspaper within thecountry reporting on the story was related to thePresident himself. The political clans mentioned ear-lier are extremely important in understanding thepowers of the President, which thereby impact theintelligence-gathering techniques and strategies ofthe MNS.

“The political and economic system in Azerbaijan islargely based on a pyramidal web of patronage.Clans, mainly based on regional origin as well as theruling elite, keep the system intact to secure theirfinancial and power interests.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The political and economicsystem in Azerbaijanis largely basedon a pyramidalweb of patronage

These difficulties and restraints that form the back-ground noise of MNS functioning are producing ill-advised impacts that put the people of Azerbaijanat risk. The MNS thus operates within an area that isconsumed by a history of corruption and severe lim-itations on its impartial independence. The MNSgathers intelligence on its own people and thesesurrounding influential countries: Russia, Turkey,Iran, Israel, and Syria.

Imagine the pressure, if you can just for a moment,being an agent within the Ministry of National Se-curity. With no ability to perform your duties impar-tially or objectively and with your own personallivelihood obviously tied to how well you honor al-legiance to the Presidential clans, the MNS ends upbeing largely just another subjective arm of manip-ulation by the President.

When such corruption and bias is allowed to notjust exist but actually blossom within the intelli-gence community, then it is not just the civil liber-ties of the people or the general level of freedom ofAzerbaijan that becomes compromised: the actualnational security of the country vis-à-vis the globalcommunity becomes undermined. The future ofAzeri national security and perhaps the very legiti-macy of its intelligence community, in the form ofthe MNS, have a long road of revision and reform inits future if Azerbaijan wants to truly play a biggerrole regionally across the greater Caspian with in-tegrity and effective power.


he Power of Siberia pipeline is particu-larly well-suited to exploring the conver-gence of energy resource scarcity andclimate change and that convergence’s

impact on international relations and potential con-flict.Gas production for the pipeline begins in Russia’sIrkutsk region, and will stretch from there throughKharabarovsk to Vladivostok, ultimately for exportsto the Asian-Pacific region (Gazprom, 2014). In 2014,officials from Russia and China signed a 30 year con-tract “to supply pipeline gas from Russia to Chinavia the eastern route,” stipulating that Russia will an-nually supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China(Gazprom, 2014).

TALEXANDER S. MARTIN

Alexander S. Martin is currently pursuinga Master’s Degree in International Intelligenceand Security Studies from Bellevue University.

He earned a Bachelor’s Degree in InternationalIntelligence and Security Studies

also from Bellevue University in 2014.

THEPOWER

OFSIBERIA

PIPELINE

Multiple Layers of ComplexGeopolitics

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

This pipeline, and the deal between Russia andChina, adds additional complexity to the geopoliticsof the Arctic and will contribute to the possibility ofconflict in the Arctic region, which will be influ-enced by climate change.

This article examines the potential conflict over thePower of Siberia pipeline. It is first necessary to putthe pipeline into theoretical, environmental, andgeopolitical contexts. Lee’s theory of Hot and ColdWars provides an excellent theoretical frameworkthrough which to understand this issue. It is alsovital to understand the role that the environmentplays in contributing to future conflict. The two pri-mary environmental factors are shrinking reservesof energy resources and the melting of Arctic ice.These two developments are, in this case, linkedand it is necessary to understand their combined in-fluence. Finally, the geopolitical dynamics of the na-tions involved will be analyzed in order tocharacterize the threat.

LEE’S THEORY OF COLD WARS

James R. Lee (2009) has developed a useful modelfor thinking about how climate change influencesconflict, which he terms Hot and Cold Wars. Thistheory posits two types of zones in which climatechange will contribute to conflict, the EquatorialTension Zone which is comprised of countries alongthe equator, and the Polar Tension Zones, made upof the Arctic and Antarctica as well as nearby coun-tries (Lee, 2009).


The Equatorial Tension Zone will experience HotWars, while the Polar Tension Zones will experienceCold Wars. Cold Wars are conflicts of expansion inwhich rising temperatures cause previously inacces-sible resources to become available, as a result ofwhich relevant states engage in competition overthose resources.

Potential conflict involving the Power of Siberiapipeline will be characterized by the elements of aCold War. It is designed to transport natural gasfrom Russia and “will be filled with gas from Yamal,the gas-rich peninsula in the Russian far north”(Staalesen, 2014). Yamal has a maximum annual gasproduction “comparable to the volume ofGazprom’s current gas supplies to the domesticmarket and exceeds twofold the volume of [ex-ported] gas.” Furthermore, as Arctic ice melts, off-shore development will be possible and is projectedto begin after 2025 (Miller, 2015).

When compared to the criteria for a Cold War, thePower of Siberia pipeline displays each necessaryelement. Having established the Power of Siberiapipeline within a theoretical framework, it is worthexploring its environmental impacts.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

The first and perhaps most pertinent environmentalinfluence on potential conflict involving the Powerof Siberia pipeline is the melting Arctic ice. In 2015,Arctic sea ice was at its lowest recorded winter max-imum (Smith-Spark, 2015). Counterintuitively, re-searchers at NASA have found that the thickestArctic ice sheets are melting faster than the thinnersheets, and these areas are most heavily concen-trated north of Russia (Gran & Vinas, 2012). Accord-ing to Lee’s Cold War theory, as these resourcesbecome available, the nations who begin to exploitthese resources increase their likelihood of cominginto conflict.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

The most recent “Energy Outlook” published by BPassesses that while global energy demand will de-crease by 2035, China will still be a principle driverof demand growth (BP, 2014). The International En-ergy Agency estimates that by 2030 China will havea larger gas market than the European Union, whileits total energy demand by 2040 is nearly doublethe demand of the US (International Energy Agency,2015). This demand places Russia and the Power ofSiberia pipeline in a privileged position vis-a-visChina’s rising energy demand.

The strategic value of energy resources is illustratedin the increasing tendency of states to take nationalcontrol of oil companies, forming what are knownas national oil companies (NOCs). Rising awarenessof and concern for depletion of energy resourceshas led to states taking a mercantilist approach toenergy resources (Klare, 2009). Energy resourcecompetition has already led great powers to inter-vene militarily in weaker states, but the likelihoodof great power conflict is also increasing in indirectways (Klare, 2009). Aside from general trends to-ward conflict, the particular geopolitical tensionsconcerned with the Power of Siberia pipeline havea particular contribution to the likelihood of con-flict.

GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

The agreement that Russia would supply China withnatural gas from the Power of Siberia pipeline wassigned in the wake of widespread, largely Westerninternational condemnation and application ofsanctions against Russia as a result of its military in-terventions in Ukraine. This highlights the interna-tional tensions that characterize the Power ofSiberia Pipeline. The combination of economic con-flict between Russia and the West, and cooperationbetween Russia and China, reflects and amplifiesthe geopolitical tensions that existed before thecreation of the pipeline.


When comparedto the criteria for a Cold War, the Power ofSiberia pipelinedisplays eachnecessary element

A concept common to both is the notion of a mul-tipolar world order (Turner, 2009). Russia has pur-sued this goal in several ways, most recently withthe formation of the Eurasian Economic Union atthe beginning of this year (Michel, 2015). China like-wise has established a number of economic chal-lenges to Western supremacy.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), de-signed to function like the International MonetaryFund, includes “a quarter of the world’s nations, 16of the world’s largest economies, and includescountries in Europe and in Latin America.” (Tiezzi,2015) In the context of Russia’s and China’s revision-ist ambitions, and Russia’s international isolation,the Power of Siberia pipeline offers a chance for thetwo powers to strengthen each other’s strategic po-sitions. This will embolden both nations in theirchallenge to the West. On the other hand, as energyresources become increasingly scarce, Russia’s ac-cess to and control of Arctic resources will increasethe likelihood of conflict over these resources.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the confluence of climate change andgeopolitical tensions are increasing the likelihoodof conflict between Russia and China on one sideand the US and its Western allies on the other. Thetheory of Cold Wars predicts that as warming tem-peratures in the Polar Tension Zone rise, Arctic re-sources will become more available, resulting incompetition and conflict. In the case of the SiberianPower pipeline, the resource involved is natural gas,a critical energy resource. Diminishing energy re-source reserves is already raising tensions betweenmajor powers. Finally, preexisting rivalries betweenthe West and Russia and China will be exacerbatedby climate change and resource scarcity. In the mid-dle of all of this will likely be the Power of Siberiapipeline, something that very few global analystsseem to be focusing on right now.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

“The strong do what they have to doand the weak acceptwhat they haveto accept”

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

THE TAPI PIPELINEThe Politics of Energy Balancing

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

here is a new energy rush among manyGreater Caspian states, one that contin-ues to focus on breaking free of theheavy Russian influence while also diver-

sifying their supply chains.

However, in the continual game of energy politics,many geopolitical and geostrategic foes have beenborn. One such nation, Turkmenistan, is spearhead-ing an energy initiative that will both diversify andexpand its customer base while at the same time re-lease itself from Russian authority.

In addition to being a landlocked country and a for-mer Soviet Republic, the nation is also the richestCaspian state in natural gas and untapped energyresources. Yet the nation has also struggledthroughout the past in diversifying its export trans-portations. This issue stems back into the 1980s and90s when Russia attempted to exert its influencethroughout Central Asia by occupying Afghanistan.


TDuring this time Russian gas giant Gazprom refusedto sign an energy deal with Unocal - a previous pe-troleum explorer and marketer based in California -over a Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, due to U.S. sup-port for the mujahideen, a move it believed wasaimed at undermining Russian influence in the re-gion. Moreover, Gazprom’s chief executive at thetime, Rem Vyakhirev, declared that Russia would notallow Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan to export its oiland gas through non-Russian pipelines. This wasaimed as a move that would eradicate any form ofRussian influence or energy developmentsthroughout Central Asia in the near or far future.

While projects like the aforementioned Trans-Afghan pipeline failed to develop and efforts tobuild the Trans-Caspian pipeline are continuallystalled due to political contestations, on December13, 2015, a deal outlining the details to build theTurkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India(TAPI) pipeline was signed.

ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from BellevueUniversity’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor working as a member of anintelligence analysis team throughout various worldwide locations.

He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. AirForce supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

This ratification hopes to allow the destinationcountries to break free of those political and eco-nomic chains that have restricted Turkmen gas fromdiversifying its transport routes and becoming in-dependent of Russian influence. Nevertheless, thismay come with a price of its own.

The timeline to begin operations is set for the year2019 and will hold a cost of over $10 billion USD,from which Turkmenistan is the leading sponsor.The TAPI pipeline will have the ability to transportan estimated 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.But with all the hype and allure of generating en-ergy independence, diversifying exports, and ex-panding each destination country’s energyinfrastructure, there has also been a lack of foreigninvestments as well as various geopolitical ramifica-tions tied to these attempts at building anotherpipeline.The TAPI pipeline is alive today due to Turkmengaz’s85 percent stake in the project—leaving the re-maining 15 percent stakes split equally among thedestination countries.

Turkmengaz is the national gas company of Turk-menistan and the largest gas company in CentralAsia. Its lead investment depicts Turkmenistan’s pri-oritization to generate energy diversification and in-dependence, which the nation believes arenecessary to keep pace with its domestic produc-tions that are slowly surpassing its current exportcapacities. Before 2011, Russia was Turkmenistan’smain market for imports of natural gas. Howeversince 2011, China has become the recipient of thebulk of Turkmen natural gas exports. This was madepossible by the willingness of China to create thenecessary environment. Since these expansions,two-thirds (45 bcm) of natural gas has been trans-ported annually to China, with the rest being splitbetween Iran (9 bcm), Russia (9 bcm), and Kaza-khstan (0.5 bcm).This new China pivot presents two geopoliticalproblems. First, this shift away from Russia may ag-gravate regional tensions as Moscow may observethis move as one that once again attempts to un-dermine its influence across the Greater Caspianand Central Asian regions.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Russia and Iran may observe the TAPI pipeline as a hindranceto their own economies

Second, even if the TAPI pipeline allows the sponsornations to escape the grip of one of the largestCaspian powers—Russia—they may find them-selves shackled to the dominance of Beijing, a movethat would only replace one great power with an-other. China is already closing its economic grip onthe project, seeking to assist in financing Pakistan’s5 percent stake through its $46 billion USD invest-ment project known as the China-Pakistan Eco-nomic Corridor. Furthermore, Afghanistan, whichalready has limited financial resources and a secu-rity situation that presents multiple dilemmas, mustraise 3 percent of its own financing before the AsianDevelopment Bank will provide the rest.

Undoubtedly, the single most important consider-ation during the development and constructionphase will be to stabilize the security situation inAfghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, territorialconflicts and boundary disputes stemming fromPakistan and India over Kashmir must be quelled inorder to attract more outside investors and improvethe overall security situation.

Russia and Iran may observe the TAPI pipeline as ahindrance to their own economies and may surrep-titiously exacerbate the security issues stemmingheavily from Afghanistan and Pakistan. This maylead the two nations to indirectly economically andpolitically suppress the effort to build what someare calling “The New Silk Road”, perhaps renderingthe TAPI pipeline nothing but a pipe dream.Despite the various historical tensions, conflicts,and uncertain security equation throughout thedestination countries, the success of the TAPIpipeline may be more possible than it seems. Thisis because Turkmenistan’s president GurbangulyBerdimukhammedov, has actively pushed eachcountry’s leader to move the project forward, offer-ing them a direct, unobstructed investment in an-other pipeline project originating at the world’ssecond-largest natural gas field—the Galkynyshnatural gas field in southern Turkmenistan. It wouldbe against any of the destination countries’ besteconomic interests to muddy the waters of an op-portunity this large.

Moreover, the political will of each nation and theeconomic prospects for the region could be bal-anced against the long and still powerful grip ofRussian energy controls. In short, the TAPI pipelineis not just a quick-fix solution to energy independ-ence. Rather, it is a calculated, coherent, and long-term energy focused strategic vision for the GreaterCaspian state of Turkmenistan and the Central Asianstates of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.


istorically, the Silk Road was establishedduring the Han dynasty, between 206B.C and 220 A.D., after the long Chineseexploration of Southern and Western

Asia which had started at least two thousand yearsbefore.As the original myth of Eurasia’s foundation has it,it was in those areas - among nomadic and warringpopulations - that the Son of Heaven became, forthe first time, a shepherd of sheep flocks, and es-caped the wild beasts which wanted to kill him andthen devour the whole Han dinasty.

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa

Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminentItalian economist and businessman.

He holds prestigious academic distinctions andnational orders.

H

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

President Xi Jinping, the new Son of Heaven, em-bodying positive forces both at political and myth-ical levels, followed again the Silk Road and hencereturned to the Middle East, by visiting Iran, SaudiArabia and Egypt. This was meant to rebuild theoriginal strategic projection of China’s First Red Em-pire – hence to make China regain its ancient rolebased on the philosophical principle of "All underHeaven".The visit to the three Middle East countries was paidby the CCP Secretary on January 19-22, 2016, on theoccasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the mutualrecognition between China and the Arab League.Until 2015 Saudi Arabia was the most importantChina’s crude oil supplier - a position currently heldby Russia as primary seller.

The travel to these three Arab and Islamic countriesis the first visit paid by the CCP Secretary in 2016and this makes us understand the special impor-tance that Xi Jinping and his China attaches to thecommercial, political and strategic relationship be-tween China and Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. As iswell-known, Xi Jinping’ strategic project is the newSilk Road, which he called "One Belt One Road".

Xi Jinping’s project was made public in October2013. It is divided into a maritime part and a landpart, which will both connect China with Centraland Western Asia, the Middle East and finally Eu-rope. To put it in a metaphor of the Taoist sages -and Mao Zedong was so – the void (of power) of theUnited States and of the European Union itself,completely devoid of a real foreign policy, will be"filled" by a link with China and Eurasia on the partof the Sunni and Shi’ite Islamic world.

In Asia, where it originates, the new Silk Road willbe connected with the China-Pakistan EconomicCorridor (CPEC) and with the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM). After the globaliza-tion which was an Americanization, the Chinese-style globalization will prevail, which will unite allthe losers of the first globalization by tying them atfirst to Eurasia and later to China itself.Since the diplomatic recognition between Russiaand Saudi Arabia in 1990, trade has increased by230 times, up to 70 billion US dollars in 2014. Cur-rently, in Saudi Arabia, 160 Chinese companies op-erate not only in the oil sector but also in thelogistics, transport and electronics sectors.

XI JINPING’S TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST


China wants to support the Arab world with a stim-ulus to the domestic production differentiation andthe reduction of those economies’ oil dependence.For China, the relationship with Saudi Arabia is thestrategic link with the Sunni country closest to theUnited States which, however, does not want to betied hand and foot to the United States.Saudi Arabia has every interest in dealing withChina so as to avoid having only North America ascounterpart – a relationship and a situation which,devoid of any counterbalance, would obviously beless favourable to Saudi Arabia.

The most important project binding China andSaudi Arabia is the Yarseef refinery which is worth10 billion US dollars, 62.5% of which funded by theChinese Sinopec. President Xi Jinping has definedYanbu - the Red Sea port where the Yarseef refineryis located – as the regional point of arrival of the SilkRoad and, at the same time, the axis of the newSaudi industrialization. Another essential aspect ofXi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia is the idea of estab-lishing, by 2017, a Free Trade Zone together withthe Gulf Cooperation Council, another componentof the "Silk Road" which, in these areas, connects itsmaritime way and its land stretch.

Later, in his visit to Egypt, the CCP Secretary fol-lowed up the themes already developed during thevisit paid by the Egyptian President, Al Sisi, to Bei-jing in December 2014. The idea is to implement a"comprehensive strategic partnership" based on 15major projects, to the tune of 15 billion USdollars.These projects are related to infrastructureand transport, considering that Cairo and theEgyptian coast will be the Mediterranean point ofarrival of the new maritime Silk Road.

Other investments in the "comprehensive strategicpartnership" regard the Egyptian energy sectorwhile, during Xi Jinping’s visit, additional 21 new in-vestment projects were defined with an additionalsoft loan to this country equal to 1.7 billion US dol-lars, managed by some Egyptian banks.A geopolitical level, Xi Jinping’s attention is mainlyfocused on the Egyptian and Shi’ite region, with aprobable mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabiawhich has materialized during the Chinese leader’svisit. This means that China fears the expansionismof the Isis/Daesh "Caliphate" and, above all, the re-turn of hundreds of Uighur foreign fighters living inXingkiang. At diplomatic - and probably at opera-tional - level, China has supported Egypt in its fightagainst the Qaedist jihadist area, at first, and lateragainst the Caliphate jihadist aera in the Sinai. It willcertainly distribute its investments across the Mid-dle East, based on the each country’s ability to fightagainst the jihad.

If Europe and the West will not be able to supportthe new autonomous development of the MiddleEast - and we can currently perceive all their limitsin this regard - this region will become - betweenRussia and China - the Southern and maritime partof Eurasia. This will be the new Sino-Russian Heart-land which will hegemonize the Mediterranean re-gion and much of the "great European plain", as theFrench philosopher Raymond Aron called it.

Another significant geopolitical sign is that Xi Jin-ping urged Al Sisi’s Egypt to participate, as observer,in the next G20 Summit to be held in Beijing nextSeptember. The last Middle East country visited bythe Chinese leader, was the Shi’ite and not Arab na-tion of Iran.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Xi Jinping was the first leader of a world power tovisit Iran after the lifting of sanctions, to which theChinese and Russian activity within the P5+1 con-tributed significantly. It is a very important symbolicfact.Certainly China has never taken the sanctionsagainst Iran into account. In fact, as early as 2014,China has replaced Germany as first business part-ner of the Shi’ite country, with a bilateral turnoverexceeding 70 billion US dollars. Obviously Xi Jimp-ing came to preserve the Chinese position reachedin Iran, but also to support Iran in its strategic differ-entiating from Europe and NATO, as demonstratedby the open support he showed during some inter-views in Iran for the presence of Shi’ite forces inSyria. Unlike many naïve Western experts and theeven more childish leaders of a gutless Europe be-lieve, the Syrian issue is not the fight against a"tyrant" such as Bashar al-Assad so as to restore avery unlikely "democracy". In the Middle Eastdemocracy is imposed to make a country strategi-cally "viable", which means devoid of reactions to

the operations carried out by other players on thefield. Therefore the real Syrian issue is the fightagainst those hegemonizing the Greater MiddleEast in the future. It may be Turkey, which wants toconquer Syria’s vast Sunni area for its mad neo-Ot-toman dream.

Or the Russian Federation along with Iran, whichwill annex the Shi’ite and Alawite Syria to the corri-dor stretching from Ukraine to the coast towardsthe Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean basin.Or finally Saudi Arabia, which wants to manage itsown "Sunni and Wahhabi International" so as todominate the whole Middle East region and its oil,without the constraints of OPEC, which is now aresidual cartel.Xi Jinping, however, proposes to Irana greater Chinese presence in the local banking andfinancial sector, the building of seven fast railwaylines to be connected, in the future, with the net-works already existing in China and, of course, agreater Chinese presence in the Iranian oil and gassector.


Obviously Xi Jimping came to preserve the Chineseposition reached in Iran, but also to support Iranin its strategic differentiatingfrom Europe and NATO

According to Chinese analysts, trade between Chinaand Iran is expected to increase tenfold, up toreaching 700 billions a year by 2017.Hence, considering all the actions undertaken in thethree Middle East countries he visited late January,the core of Xi Jinping’s operation is the creation ofa joint Free Trade Zone between the three countrieswith China's support – a topic we have alreadyraised at the beginning of this article.

This is a move intended to rebalance the free tradeagreement between the United States and other 11Pacific countries, as well as to fill Western Europe’s"void" throughout the Middle East.China has reached the free trade agreement with allthe six Persian Gulf countries, namely Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwaitand Oman.China wants to put enemy countries together so asto mediate in a credible way.The agreement is supposed to be signed by the endof 2016.Hence the "void" of the United States and of an everweaker and inward-lookingWest, obsessed by theidea of "exporting democracy" or by a naïve, self-defeating and self-destructive "geopolitics of val-ues", is “filled” by a China exporting economicsupport, political influence and credible skills andabilities to mediate between all regional players.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

n its end-of-year official report, the RussianForeign Ministry indicated that Russia, as apermanent member of the UN SecurityCouncil, has made a substantial contribu-

tion to resolving conflicts and crises in Mali, So-malia, Sudan and the Central African Republicand many other African countries.Russia alsoprovided targeted humanitarian relief aid toGuinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cameroon. Thereport, however, did not state the total amountthat was spent on humanitarian aid to Africa in2015.

IKESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcherand writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region

and former Soviet republics.

RUSSIA`SACTIVITIES IN AFRICA


In 2015, Russia's financial and material support wasoverwhelming. With regards to health, Russia's con-tribution to the international effort to fight thedeadly Ebola virus in West Africa (mainly in Guinea,Liberia and Sierra Leone) was estimated at around$60 million, according to an international depart-ment head of Russia's health watchdog Rospotreb-nadzor.Russia continues participating in the joint effort tocreate a vaccine against the Ebola virus, which is ex-pected to be ready for mass use in early 2016, thedirector of the Health Ministry's department MarinaShevyreva said. According to the World Health Or-ganization (WHO), the deadly Ebola virus has killedsome 11,300 people in West Africa. Last February,to ease the situation of refugees who have beenstreaming from neighboring states into Cameroon,the Russian government delivered provided foodaid for refugees amounting to US$ 2.5 million (1.3billion CFA francs).

According to statistics issued by the Cameroon gov-ernment and the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees, around 300,000 refugees fromNigeria and the Central African Republic havesought refuge in Cameroon. The Republic of Bu-rundi on May 13 last year saw a coup attempt andas a result threw the country into chaos. Burundi de-scended into violence after President Pierre Nkurun-ziza announced he was running for a third term. Thedecision to run for a third term in office was seen byopponents as a contradiction to the constitution.Coup leader General Niyombare is currently on therun. The failure of their coup bid and re-election ofNkurunziza have not stopped the unrest in thecountry.

Over the past years, Russia has played pivotal rolesin helping resolve many multi-faceted conflicts onthe continent. For instance last September, therewas a three-way consultation, the first time withinthis format, with the participation of Sudanese For-eign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour and South Su-danese Foreign Affairs and InternationalCooperation Minister Benjamin Barnaba, to utilizethe "Moscow platform" to continue the dialogue onthe issues that remain in the relations between thetwo states. The joint meeting made some importantdecisions by the Sudanese and South Sudanese for-eign ministers, above all, regarding the need to im-plement – to the maximum degree and as soon aspossible – all the provisions of the document on theinter-Sudanese settlement that were signed overthe past two or three years.

MODERNDIPLOMACY.EU

Russia has made a substantial contributionto resolving conflicts and crises in many African countries

Russia welcomed the efforts to stabilize the situa-tion in the Republic of South Sudan, where a con-flict has been ongoing since 2013, as well as thesigning of a peace agreement between the SouthSudanese government and the opposition last Au-gust. Russia supported them to continue advocating fora political, diplomatic settlement of all outstandingissues, among other things, by following a corre-sponding approach at the UN Security Council. For-eign Minister Sergei Lavrov, meeting separatelywith the Foreign Affairs and International Coopera-tion Ministers from Rwanda, Congo and Madagas-car last year, stressed Russia's preparedness to boosthumanitarian aid to natural and man-made disas-ters regions as well as continue helping to find last-ing solutions to conflicts in Africa. "We agree thatvarious conflicts in Africa require heightened atten-tion of the world community and the UN, primarilyin order to support the approaches of Africans whoknow better than others how to approach compli-cated issues on their continent," Lavrov told Rwandan Louise Mushikiwabo during ajoint media conference held last October inMoscow. They further shared opinions on theevents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC) and the African Great Lakes Region as awhole, the Horn of Africa, the Central African Re-public and South Sudan.As always, Russia hasagreed on the need to contribute to the subre-gional organizations on the continent and to con-tinue consolidating the peacemaking potential ofthe African Union (AU).

In addition, Russia regularly provides funds for theannual training of about 80 peacemakers fromAfrican countries. "We will help strengthen thepeacekeeping potential of African countries in theform of training peacekeepers from African coun-tries and helping them equip their peacekeepingcontingents," Lavrov said in January last year aftertalks with Burundi Foreign Minister LaurentKavakure. In all discussions and consultations heldthroughout 2015, both African and Russian sideshave had in-depth exchange of opinions on key is-sues on the African agenda with a particular focuson easing crisis situations in Africa. Russian Presi-dent Vladimir Putin stressed at a previous ceremonywhen receiving credentials from ambassadors ofseveral foreign countries, including diplomats ofseveral African states, that Russia has planned togive all necessary humanitarian assistance to con-flict-stricken African countries.


the greater caspian project 21

Documents