the high court dublin court no. 12 between: helena ... · gwen malone stenography services ltd. 5...

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THE HIGH COURT

DUBLIN

COURT NO. 12

Record No. 2017/344JR

BETWEEN:

HELENA MERRIMAN, MICHAEL REDMOND, ADRIENNE MCDONNELL, PETER COLGAN, ELIZABETH MCDONNELL, TREVOR REDMOND, PATRICIA DEIGHEN, MARGARET THOMAS, NOEL REILLY, HELEN GILLIGAN, JAMES SCULLY, FERGUS RICE, NOEL DEEGAN, VALERIAN SALAGEAN, SIDNEY RYAN, GREG FARRELL, SHEELAGH MORRIS, JIMMY O'CONNELL, SILE HAND, DECLAN MCDONELL, ELIZABETH ROONEY & DESMOND O'CONNOR

and

FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT CLG APPLICANTS

and

FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL RESPONDENT and

DUBLIN AIRPORT AUTHORITY PLC FIRST NOTICE PARTY

and

IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SECOND AND THIRD

NOTICE PARTIESand

RYANAIR DAC FOURTH NOTICE PARTY

ACTION HEARD BY MR. JUSTICE BARRETT

ON FRIDAY, 13TH OCTOBER 2017 - DAY 7

Gwen Malone Stenography Services certify the following to be a verbatim transcript of their stenographic notes in the above-named action.

______________________ GWEN MALONE STENOGRAPHYSERVICES

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPLICANTS: MR. JERRY HEALY SCMR. OISIN COLLINS BL

INSTRUCTED BY: O'CONNELL & CLARKE SOLICITORS

FOR FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT CLG: MR. JOHN KENNY BL

INSTRUCTED BY: FP LOGUE SOLICITORS

FOR FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL: MR. CONLETH BRADLEY SCMR. TIM O'SULLIVAN BL

INSTRUCTED BY: THE LAW AGENTMS. HELEN O'NEILL

FOR DUBLIN AIRPORT AUTHORITY: MR. GARRET SIMONS SC

MR. BRIAN KENNEDY SCMR. FINTAN VALENTINE BL

INSTRUCTED BY: ARTHUR COX SOLICITORS

FOR IRELAND & THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MR. DENIS McDONALD SC

MR. CIARÁN TOLAND SCMR. CHRISTIAN KEELING BLMS. SUZANNE KINGSTON BL

INSTRUCTED BY: CHIEF STATE SOLICITORS OFFICE

FOR RYANAIR DAC: MR. MARTIN HAYDEN SCMR. DAMIEN KEANEY BL

INSTRUCTED BY: PHILIP LEE SOLICITORS

COPYRIGHT: Transcripts are the work of Gwen Malone Stenography Services and they must not be photocopied or reproduced in any manner or supplied or loaned by an appellant to a respondent or to any other party without written permission of Gwen Malone Stenography Service

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Gwen Malone Stenography Services Ltd.

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THE HEARING RESUMED ON FRIDAY,

13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2017 AS FOLLOWS:

REGISTRAR: The matter at hearing.

SUBMISSIONS BY MR. KENNY RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

MR. KENNY: Good morning, Judge. Judge, just before I

embark on the two remaining topics I just want to very

briefly refer back to two matters arising from my

submissions yesterday, and they are: Firstly, I would

ask the Court to just open volume 1 of the pleadings at

page 134. This arises in the context of my submissions

in respect of climate change and the document I have

brought the Court's attention to is the Inspector's

Report from 2007, when permission was originally

granted, and what was being discussed by the Inspector

at the relevant page is a submission being made by

Mr. Ian Lumley from An Taisce in relation to the

climate implications from the construction of the

proposed runway. And Mr. Lumley says, at the large

paragraph on the right-hand side of the page:

"Mr. Lumley, on behalf of An Taisce, presented an

in-depth statement/submission to WBQ on the issue of

emissions and climate change and the impact of the

aviation sector on same. He is of the opinion that the

relevant section of the EIS is entirely deficient in

addressing the issue. He contended that in declaring

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that there would be no adverse impact on climate from

additional aircraft arising from the more than doubling

of the airports current capacity no validation or

reference was provided to substantiate that claim."

He then goes on to consider the implications of Kyoto

protocol and can I just bring the Court's attention to

the last paragraph on that page:

"While I fully acknowledge An Taisce's express view on

this issue and, indeed, accept the premise of Mr.

Lumley's presentation, I consider that the concerns

raised go far beyond the remit of this assessment in

terms of the acceptability or otherwise of a 3,110

metre parallel runway. In my opinion, the issue is of

strategic importance and must be tackled at national

and international level, from which clearly stated

policies and objective to address the concerns would be

formulated."

Then he goes on to say over the page:

"I do not consider that the current proposals can or

should fail on this basis."

The reason I am bringing the Court's attention to that

passage is not the veracity or the correctness of what

the Inspector or Mr Lumley said or otherwise, it is

simply this: That the inspector, and by extension the

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Board, purported to say in 2007: Well look, you have

made a submission on climate change but that's

something that has to be dealt with at an international

or trans-boundary level. In my respectful submission,

the Respondent, in this decision, has adopted a similar

if not the exact same position and I say the Respondent

is not entitled to do that because of the intervention

in the meantime of the 2015 Act.

The second clarification, in case it was less than

clear, Judge, when I was discussing the Pro-Baine

decision at the conclusion of my submissions on EIA, to

make it very clear, in my respectful submission, what

occurred in Pro-Baine was an extension of time with no

intervention in the physical landscape. The court said

if there had been an intervention in the physical

landscape then the obligation to submit an EIA arises.

In my respectful submission, there is both an extension

of time and an intervention in the physical landscape

and, in my respectful submission, the obligation to

submit an EIS and conduct an EIA must arise. In case

that was less than clear.

Judge, if I may move on to the Habitats Directive.

Before I open the law in relation to the Habitats

Directive, I think there is no dispute as between

myself and my Friends but that this runway, or this

proposed runway has never been assessed for the

purposes of the Habitats Directive. It wasn't assessed

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in 2007 and no assessment was conducted by the

Respondent in the course of the decision under

challenge. I am not making the case and I can't make

the case that it must have been subjected to an

assessment for the purposes of the Habitats Directive

in 2007. As the Respondents rightly say, I'm now out

of time to do that. And there is no such argument in

my submissions and there is certainly no such arguments

in Mr. Healy's submissions.

What I am saying is that if there was a failure to

conduct an assessment in 2007, when there should have

been such an assessment, there was an obligation on the

Respondents, in the first instance, and on this

honourable Court, in the second instance, to remedy

that defect. It is not simply a crude argument of

well, it didn't happen in 2007 and, therefore, it has

to happen now. At a subsequent consent stage, in my

respectful submission, the national authority, whether

as a Respondent to this Court, has to address any such

deficiency which it inherits from the earlier consent

procedure.

A useful summary of the applicable principles and the

applicable law is contained in the judgment of

Mr. Justice Finlay Geoghegan in Kelly -v- An Bord

Pleanála which is in, I believe, Book 2. It is at Tab

27, Judge. If I could bring the Court to paragraph 22,

it is on internal page 9 of the decision, where

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Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan -- what was before the

Court in that case was an application by a wind farm

developer to develop a wind farm in Co. Roscommon. The

Board had conducted an Appropriate Assessment and there

was a dispute as between Mr. Kelly and the Board as to

the adequacy of that dispute. What the case really

boiled down to was: Were the reasons provided by the

Board adequate? That, obviously, does not arise in

this case, for the simple reason that there was no

assessment; ergo there was no reasons. But I think the

identification of Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan of the

applicable principles was useful. She starts at

paragraph 22:

"In these appeals, the third statutory requirement

imposed on the Board relates to its obligations and in

particular the carrying out of an appropriate

assessment pursuant to Article 6 of the Habitats

Directive as implemented by Part XAB of the Planning

and Development Act. There is some dispute as to the

extent of the obligations imposed and in particular the

nature of the reasons which must be given by the Board.

Whilst the provisions of Part XAB are more detailed

than Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, it was common

case between the parties at the hearing that they are

intended to and do impose similar obligations on the

Board to those imposed by Article 6(3) of the Habitats

Directive as construed by reference to the case law of

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the Court of Justice.

Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, insofar as

relevant, provides:

"6(2) Member States shall take appropriate steps to

avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the

deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of

species as well as disturbance of the species for which

the areas have been designated, in so far as such

disturbance could be significant in relation to the

objectives of this Directive.

6(3) Any plan or project not directly connected with or

necessary to the management of the site but likely to

have a significant effect thereon, either individually

or in combination with other plans or projects, shall

be subject to appropriate assessment of its

implications for the site in view of the site's

conservation objectives. In the light of the

conclusions of the assessment of the implications for

the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 4,

the competent national authorities shall agree to the

plan or project only after having ascertained that it

will not adversely affect the integrity of the site

concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained

the opinion of the general public."

And then she goes on the describe the overriding --

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that doesn't arise in this case and is not relevant.

Paragraph 25:

"As appears Article 6(3) envisages a two-stage process

which is implemented in greater detail by ss. 177U and

177V of the Planning and Development Act".

And she then goes on to describe screening and the

subsequent Appropriate Assessment. There was a dispute

in that case as to whether the Board was obliged to

first conduct a screening and then, ultimately, a full

Appropriate Assessment. Again, that doesn't arise in

this case. And if I might skip on to where she

discusses that particular element of the -- past that

particular element of dispute to paragraph 33 of the

judgment. Sorry, paragraph 32, Judge.

"Sub-section 177V(1) also expressly requires the

appropriate assessment to be carried out before consent

is given for a proposed development. Further

Sub-section (3) provides that "Notwithstanding any

other provision in this Act", the Board shall give

consent to a proposed development only after having

determined that the...proposed development shall not

adversely affect the integrity of a European site".

Sub-section (4) then "subject to the other provisions

of the Act" permits consent to be given where

modifications or conditions are attached and the Board

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has determined that "the proposed development would not

adversely affect the integrity of the European site if

it is carried out in accordance with the consent and

the modifications".

33. As appears, the respective effects on the decision

making process of the Board of the environmental impact

assessment and the appropriate assessment (where both

have to be carried out by the Board prior to taking its

planning decision) are quite different. In carrying out

an environmental impact assessment, the Board is

required to conduct an examination, analysis and

evaluation of and identify the direct and indirect

effects of the proposed developments on the matters

specified in section 171A(1). However, the outcome of

that examination, analysis, evaluation and

identification informs rather than determines the

planning decision which should or may be made. The

Board has jurisdiction in its discretion to grant

consent regardless of the outcome of the EIA though of

course it impacts on how it should exercise its

discretion.

34. In contrast, the Board, in carrying out an

appropriate assessment under Article 6(3) and s.177V,

is obliged, as part of same, to make a determination as

to whether or not the proposed development would

adversely affect the integrity of the relevant European

site or sites in view of its conservation objectives.

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The determination which the Board makes on that issue

in the appropriate assessment determines its

jurisdiction to take the planning decision. Unless the

appropriate assessment determination is that the

proposed development will not adversely affect the

integrity of any relevant European site, the Board may

not take a decision giving consent for the proposed

development unless it does so pursuant to Article 6(4)

of the Habitats Directive. It is agreed that the

decisions made by the Board herein were not taken

pursuant to Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive.

Hence, for the purposes of these appeals, the Board was

precluded from granting consent for the proposed

developments unless, having conducted an appropriate

assessment in accordance with Article 6(3), as

construed by the Court of Justice of the European

Union, it reached a determination that the proposed

development will not adversely affect the integrity of

the European sites."

So I just pause there, Judge. The Court is comparing

and contrasting the exercises undertaken by consent

authorities for the purposes of EIA and for the

purposes of Appropriate Assessment. She states, and

there is no dispute about this, that EIA is a process

which informs the exercise of a consent authority's

discretion, but that whatever the result of that EIA

the consent authority would retain a jurisdiction to

grant consent for the proposed development.

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On the contrary, under the Habitats Directive there is

no jurisdiction to grant permission for a proposed

development unless the consent authority has excluded

the possibility of significant effects on a European

site. And the content of what that consent authority

has to consider or the threshold which it must vault

was considered by Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan in the

following paragraphs. Could I just bring the Court

briefly to paragraph 35:

"35. The requirements of an appropriate assessment and

of the legal test that the proposed development "will

not adversely affect the integrity of a European site"

have been considered by the Court of Justice Waddenzee

(Case C-127/02) [2004] ECR I-7405, at para. 61 of its

judgment, it stated:

"...under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, an

appropriate assessment of the implications for the site

concerned of the plan or project implies that, prior to

its approval, all the aspects of the plan or project

which can, by themselves or in combination with other

plans or projects, affect the site’s conservation

objectives must be identified in the light of the best

scientific knowledge in the field. The competent

national authorities, taking account of the appropriate

assessment of the implications of mechanical cockle

fishing for the site concerned in the light of the

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site's conservation objectives, are to authorise such

an activity only if they have made certain that it will

not adversely affect the integrity of that site. That

is the case where no reasonable scientific doubt

remains as to the absence of such effects"."

She goes on then to consider other decisions, the

Commission -v- Spain and more recently at paragraph 37:

"....in Sweetman (Case C-258/11), provided further

guidance as to what is required of an appropriate

assessment at para. 44 where it stated:

"44. So far as concerns the assessment carried out

under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, it should

be pointed out that it cannot have lacunae and must

contain complete, precise and definitive findings and

conclusions capable of removing all reasonable

scientific doubt as to the effects of the works

proposed on the protected site concerned..."

And then there is a reference to Commission -v- Spain.

"'It is for the national court to establish whether the

assessment of the implications for the site meets these

requirements'."

So, in short, the Habitats Directive requires consent

authorities to exclude the possibility of significant

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affect on a European site prior to the granting of

planning permission on the basis of the four points

summarised by the Court in Kelly at paragraph 40.

"(i) must identify, in the light of the best scientific

knowledge in the field, all aspects of the development

project which can, by itself or in combination with

other plans or projects, affect the European site in

the light of its conservation objectives. This clearly

requires both examination and analysis."

(ii) Must contain complete, precise and definitive

findings and conclusions and may not have lacunae or

gaps. The requirement for precise and definitive

findings and conclusions appears to require analysis,

evaluation and decisions. Further, the reference to

findings and conclusions in a scientific context

requires both findings following analysis and

conclusions following an evaluation each in the light

of the best scientific knowledge in the field.

(iii) May only include a determination that the

proposed development will not adversely affect the

integrity of any relevant European site where upon the

basis of complete, precise and definitive findings and

conclusions made the Board decides that no reasonable

scientific doubt remains as to the absence of the

identified potential effects."

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So that is the threshold which, in the ordinary course,

applies to both Local Authorities and on appeal to the

Board. I don't there would be any real dispute that

that would be the applicable law if, for example, the

proposed runway had made an application for planning

permission in 2017 and the matter ultimately ended up

before the Board and an appeal was taken. That would

be the applicable law. Which of course raises the

question: How is the law identified by

Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan applicable to a situation

where no application for permission was made and

instead an application under Section 42, which purports

to exclude any assessment or re-evaluation from taking

place?

I say there are a number of elements which the Court

has to consider. I can't make the case that the runway

should have been subjected to Appropriate Assessment in

2007. I can't give evidence to that effect. But what

I can do is ask the Court to consider the following

when the Court comes to ask itself the question: Was

there an oversight in 2007 which falls to be remedied

at this juncture? And I say the following facts are

relevant. there is no dispute but that the runway

project is a project for the purposes of Annex I of the

EIA Directive. My Friends may be able to correct me,

but I know of no Annex I project which has not been

subjected to, at least, screening for Appropriate

Assessment.

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Secondly, the scale of the project. This is a 3,110

metre runway by 75 metres across, which will require an

investment of somewhere in the region of €400 million.

It is a vast project. Thirdly, within 15 kilometres of

the site of the proposed runway there are nine areas of

special areas of conversation and eight special

protection areas, and there are a number, two I

believe, within five kilometres of the site of the

proposed runway. Though I'm open to correction on that

point.

So I say when the Court is asking its the question:

Was there an oversight in 2007? And does that fall to

be remedied at this stage of the consent procedure?

The Court has to have its eyes open as to the scale of

the project which is before it.

In my respectful submission, if I could bring the Court

to Tab 12 of Book 1, Judge, it is the European

Communities (Birds and Natural Habitats) Regulations

2011. Now, I'm bringing the Court to these regulations

not because they directly apply. In fact, obviously, I

have to concede that they don't apply to the decision

under challenge. But where they are relevant, Judge,

is that -- if I could bring the Court to Section 42,

which is on page 332 or internal page 89, where it

states at 42(1):

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"42. (1) A screening for Appropriate Assessment of a

plan or project for which an application for consent is

received, or which a public authority wishes to

undertake or adopt, and which is not directly connected

with or necessary to the management of the site as a

European Site, shall be carried out by the public

authority to assess, in view of best scientific

knowledge and in view of the conservation objectives of

the site, if that plan or project, individually or in

combination with other plans or projects is likely to

have a significant effect on the European site."

So these regulations cover, in essence, all

applications for plans or projects which don't involve

the Planning and Development Act 2000. So if I want to

do anything else other than apply for planning

permission, or, in this case, an extension to a

planning permission, I would fall under the ambit of

these regulations. And why I say they are relevant, if

I can bring the Court back to internal page 8, the

definition of "Consent" for the purposes of Section 42:

""Consent" includes any licence, permission, permit,

derogation, dispensation, approval or other such

authorisation granted by or on behalf of a public

authority, relating to any activity, plan or project

that may affect a European Site, and includes the

process of adoption by a public authority of its own

land use plans or projects."

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If I could then bring the Court on to the definition of

the term "project" which is at internal page 15 or page

258 of the booklet, the bottom right-hand corner of the

page.

""Project", subject to the exclusion, except where the

contrary intention appears, of any project that is a

development requiring development consent within the

meaning of the Planning and Development Acts 2000 to

2011, includes...."

And we can skip on over the page.

"That are to be considered for adoption, execution,

authorisation or approval, including the revision,

review, renewal or extension of the expiry date of

previous approvals, by a public authority and,

notwithstanding the generality of the preceding,

includes any project referred to at subparagraphs (a),

(b) or (c) to which the exercise of statutory power in

favour of that project or any approval sought for that

project under any of the enactments set out in the

Second Schedule of these Regulations applies;"

And, obviously, I put heavy emphasis on the fact that

the definition of "project" for the purposes of these

regulations explicitly includes the renewal or

extension of the expiry date of previous approvals,

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which is exactly the position before this Court. And I

say that is relevant, Judge. There is something very

strange if an application for renewal or an extension

of an expiry date of a previous approval for the

purposes of all of the consents under this Act but not

under the Planning and Development Act. I say the

Court can and should consider the fact that the

legislature has adopted a position whereby extensions

of expiry dates to previous approvals have to be

subject to a fresh Appropriate Assessment, a fresh

screening for Appropriate Assessment at the very least.

So the final authority I wish to bring the Court to in

relation to Appropriate Assessment is that of the

Brussels Airport case which is at Tab 65 of book 3. In

this case the court was concerned with an application

for the extension of an airport in Flanders. The Court

ultimately decided, for reasons which don't concern us,

that it was not a project for the purposes of the

Directive. I should say, Judge, it is the EIA

Directive. I'm making an argument by analogy. And if

I bring the Court to paragraph 37 of the decision:

"If it should prove to be the case that, since the

entry into force of the EIA Directive, works or

physical interventions which are to be regarded as a

project within the meaning of the directive were

carried out on the airport site without any assessment

of their effects on the environment having been carried

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out at an earlier stage in the consent procedure, the

national court would have to take account of the stage

at which the operating permit was granted and ensure

that the directive was effective by satisfying itself

that such an assessment was carried out at the very

least at that stage of the procedure."

In my respectful submission, that is exactly the

position before this honourable Court. In my

respectful submission, the Court is considering a

situation where there was no Appropriate Assessment in

2007, there was no Appropriate Assessment by the

Respondent in 2017. I say that the Court is entitled

to consider whether there should have been such an

Appropriate Assessment by reference to the scale of the

project, by reference to the number of European sites

in close proximity to the project. And if the Court is

of the view that this is a plan or a project which has

at least the potential for a significant effect on a

European site neither the Respondent, in the first

instance, nor this honourable Court, in the second, has

jurisdiction to give its imprimatur to the decision

under challenge. I say that if the Court of Justice

has identified a remedial obligation in respect of the

EIA Directive it follows that that remedial obligation

subsists with equal force in relation to the Habitats

Directive.

Judge, if I might bring the Court to my last

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substantive point, which is that there is and should be

recognised by this honourable Court as a constitutional

right to an environment which is consistent with the

bodily integrity, right to life, water, food, and

dignity of the Applicants' members and the citizens at

large.

I say as a preliminary there is no dispute that the

construction of the runway will lead to an increase in

greenhouse gas emissions. The result of an increase in

greenhouse gas emissions will lead to an increase in

the pace of climate change. I say there is no dispute

but that an increase in the pace of climate change will

directly and irrevocably impinge on each and every one

of those rights I have just mentioned. In relation to

that submission, I rely on the passages opened

yesterday from the IPPC, the IPP special report on

aviation and the report of Professor Bows-Larkin.

I agree with my Friends when they say that the

jurisdiction of the High Court to recognise an

unenumerated right is a jurisdiction to be exercised

cautiously. But even recognising that or even

accepting that, I say it is time for this honourable

Court to engage in such recognition.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Where does that right end? I

mean, if I get into my car this morning I am adding to

greenhouse gases.

MR. KENNY: If you got into your car this morning you

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emitted greenhouse gases. Obviously, like all rights,

it is a right which exists in balance with and in

proportion with all other rights. It is not an

absolute right. There is no, as far as I'm aware, no

constitutional right which is absolute and it will take

its place in the constitutional hierarchy, in balance

with all other rights identified under, inter alia,

Article 40.3. There is no suggestion by my clients

that it would become invaluable, inalienable, or a

right which exists to subvert all other rights around

it.

I am conscious, Judge, that I'm asking the Court to

make a jurisprudential leap. But so too were Mrs. Ryan

and Mrs. McGee in their cases before the Supreme Court.

Neither Mrs. Ryan and Mrs. McGee could point to any

textual support for their submissions that there was a

right to bodily integrity and a right to privacy.

Where I say I differ from both Mrs. McGee and Mrs. Ryan

is that I can and do rely on a scientific consensus in

my favour. Unlike, for example, Mrs. Ryan, who lost

her case essentially because she couldn't prove that

fluoridation of water actually had the harmful effects

which she contended for, there is no scientific doubt

but that the ongoing pace of, for example, climate

change will impinge ultimately on the rights identified

by me earlier.

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I can also rely, Judge, on what I say is an emerging

jurisprudential convention; that it is appropriate for

the superior courts to recognise exactly this type of

right. Albeit the method by which it is recognised

will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

In Europe the following countries have explicitly

recognised this right Albania, Andorra, Armenia

Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech

Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary,

Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands

Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia,

Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and the Ukraine. I

would also add that 177 of 193 members of the United

Nations have similarly recognised the right. So I

respectfully suggest that Ireland is an outlier, along

with North Korea, Zimbabwe and Turkish Northern Cyprus,

in not having recognised the right.

So I say there is both a scientific consensus, I say

there is an emerging jurisprudential consensus and I

say that there is an emerging theological or

philosophical consensus.

I might refer the Court, slightly unusually, to the

Papal encyclical of May 2015, Laudato Si’. I'm going

to give a copy to my Friends.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: They are probably familiar with

it already!

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MR. KENNY: The class of the educated amongst my Friends

quite possibly (Same Handed). It is a very long

version, Judge, it is an 87 page document, I have only

given the Court three pages of it, but if I might bring

the Court to the second page, where Pope Frances states

at paragraph 20:

"Some forms of pollution are part of people’s daily

experience. Exposure to atmospheric pollutants produces

a broad spectrum of health hazards, especially for the

poor, and causes millions of premature deaths. People

take sick, for example, from breathing high levels of

smoke from fuels used in cooking or heating. There is

also pollution that affects everyone, caused by

transport, industrial fumes, substances which

contribute to the acidification of soil and water,

fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and

agrotoxins in general. Technology, which, linked to

business interests, is presented as the only way of

solving these problems, in fact proves incapable of

seeing the mysterious network of relations between

things and so sometimes solves one problem only to

create others.

Account must also be taken of the pollution produced by

residue, including dangerous waste present in different

areas. Each year hundreds of millions of tons of waste

are generated, much of it non-biodegradable, highly

toxic and radioactive, from homes and businesses, from

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construction and demolition sites, from clinical,

electronic and industrial sources. The earth, our home,

is beginning to look more and more like an immense pile

of filth. In many parts of the planet, the elderly

lament that once beautiful landscapes are now covered

with rubbish. Industrial waste and chemical products

utilized in cities and agricultural areas can lead to

bioaccumulation in the organisms of the local

population, even when levels of toxins in those places

are low. Frequently no measures are taken until after

people’s health has been irreversibly affected.

If I could bring the Court on to paragraph 23 overleaf:

"The climate is a common good, belonging to all and

meant for all. At the global level, it is a complex

system linked to many of the essential conditions for

human life. A very solid scientific consensus indicates

that we are presently witnessing a disturbing warming

of the climatic system. In recent decades this warming

has been accompanied by a constant rise in the sea

level and, it would appear, by an increase of extreme

weather events, even if a scientifically determinable

cause cannot be assigned to each particular

phenomenon."

That encyclical was welcomed by that well-known friend

of the Catholic Church, Professor Dawkins, who called

it "bold" and "thoughtful". It is not, in my

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respectful submission, an encyclical which reflects a

particular religious or dogmatic view point. It is, I

would respectfully suggest, an eloquent and thought

provoking encapsulation of an emerging philosophical

consensus that environmental degradation is occurring

at an accelerating pace; that that environmental

degradation is having a profound effect on us all and

on the poor and disadvantaged, in particular, and I

would say that that philosophical consensus should be

considered in tandem with what I have described as the

jurisprudential consensus and the scientific consensus.

Which brings me to how can or should the Court go about

the identification of what I accept would be a new

unenumerated right? And if I could bring the Court to,

and I apologise for handing in the cases loose, the

case of McGee -v- The Attorney General. I will give my

Friends a copy (Same Handed). If I could bring the

Court to the decision of Mr. Justice Walsh. The Court

will be familiar with the facts of McGee. Mrs. McGee

made the argument that she needed to access

contraceptives in order to enjoy conjugal relations

with her husband because if she became pregnant again

it posed a real and present risk to her life. She

argued that the statutory prohibition on the sale of

contraceptives breached her right to privacy and, in

particular, her right to marital privacy as between

herself and her husband. If I could pick up the

decision of Mr. Justice Walsh at internal page 315,

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where the Court goes on to consider the interaction as

between Mrs. McGee's alleged right to marital privacy

and her right to life. And Mr. Justice Walsh says:

"So far I have considered the plaintiff's case only in.

Relation to Article 41 of the Constitution; and I have

done so on the basis that she is a married woman but

without referring to her state of health. I now turn to

the claim, made under Article 40 of the Constitution.

So far as this particular Article is concerned, and the

submissions made thereunder, the state of health of the

plaintiff is relevant. If, for the reasons I have

already given, a prohibition on the availability of

contraceptives for use in marriage generally could be

justified on the grounds of the exigencies of the

common good, the provisions of s.1 of Article 40 (in

particular, the proviso thereto) would justify and

would permit the State to discriminate between some

married persons and others in the sense that, where

conception could more than ordinarily endanger the life

of a particular person or persons or particular classes

of persons within the married state, the law could have

regard to this difference of physical capacity and make

special exemptions in favour of such persons. I think

that such an exemption could also be justified under

the provisions of s. 3 of Article 40 on the grounds

that one of the personal rights of a woman in the

plaintiff's state of health would be a right to be

assisted in her efforts to avoid putting her life in

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jeopardy. I am of opinion also that not only has the

State the right to do so but, by virtue of the terms of

the proviso to s.1 and the terms of s.3 of Article 40,

the State has the positive obligation to ensure by its

laws as far as is possible (and in the use of the word

"possible" I am relying on the Irish text of the

Constitution) that there would be made available to a

married woman in the condition of health of the

plaintiff the means whereby a conception which was

likely to put her life in jeopardy might be avoided

when it is a risk over and above the ordinary risks

inherent in pregnancy. It would, in the nature of

things, be much more difficult to justify a refusal to

do this on the grounds of the common good than in the

case of married couples general."

Judge, I'm relying on that passage because, although,

clearly, Friends of Irish the Environment Ltd. are not

in -- or CLG -- are not in a position like that of

Mrs. McGee, I say that the members of Friends, and by

extension the wider population, are equally at risk, in

terms of their bodily integrity, from the environmental

degradation that is ongoing, that is accelerating and

by which the construction of the runway in these

proceedings forms a part. I say that the evidence

before the Court from the IPPC and Professor

Bows-Larkin can leave no doubt but that climate change

poses a real and immediate risk to, at least, the

bodily integrity of the Applicants' members and the

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citizens at large.

And if I could bring the Court just over the page to

where Mr. Justice Walsh considers under what

circumstances the court can or should recognise a new

unenumerated right. It is page 318, the paragraph

beginning: "In the pluralist society....", the Court

says:

"In a pluralist society such as ours, the Courts cannot

as a matter of constitutional law be asked to choose

between the differing views, where they exist, of

experts on the interpretation by the different

religious denominations of either the nature or extent

of these natural rights as they are to be found in the

natural law. The same considerations apply also to the

question of ascertaining the nature and extent of the

duties which flow from natural law; the Constitution

speaks of one of them when it refers to the inalienable

duty of parents to provide according to their means for

the religious, moral, intellectual, physical and social

education of their children"

And he refers to the Article.

"In this country it falls finally upon the judges to

interpret the Constitution and in doing so to

determine, where necessary, the rights which are

superior or antecedent to positive law or which are

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imprescriptible or inalienable. In the performance of

this difficult duty there are certain guidelines laid

down in the Constitution for the judge. The very

structure and content of the Articles dealing with

fundamental rights clearly indicate that justice is not

subordinate to the law. In particular, the terms of s.

3 of Article 40 expressly subordinate the law to

justice. Both Aristotle and the Christian philosophers

have regarded justice as the highest human virtue. The

virtue of prudence was also esteemed by Aristotle as by

the philosophers of the Christian world. But the great

additional virtue introduced by Christianity was that

of charity, not the charity which consists of giving to

the deserving, for that is justice, but the charity

which is also called mercy. According to the preamble,

the people gave themselves the Constitution to promote

the common good with due observance of prudence,

justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom of

the individual might be assured. The judges must,

therefore, as best they can from their training and

their experience interpret these rights in accordance

with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity. It

is but natural that from time to time the prevailing

ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the

passage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution

is intended to be final for all time."

So, Judge, I say that that last observation by

Mr. Justice Walsh is of particular relevance to the

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submission I am making. If I had been making this

submission, perhaps, 20 years ago I don't think I would

have been able to point to a scientific consensus, I

don't think I would have been able to point to a

jurisprudential consensus, and I don't think I would

have been able to point to a philosophical consensus as

to the importance of the preservation of the

environment and what I say is the appropriateness that

be recognised within, at least, Article 40.3 of the

Constitution. But, in my respectful submission, in

2017, in the midst of the environmental maelstrom

identified by the IPPC, it was high time that this

court consider recognising a new unenumerated right to

an environment consistent with the bodily integrity of

its citizens.

I don't propose to engage in all of the arguments made

against me by, in particular, the State in relation to

this argument but I will just deal briefly with two of

the arguments made.

The first is that as a company -- and it is only a

company before the Court -- I am not entitled to plead

the existence of a personal right because a company

clearly doesn't -- and I accept this -- enjoy a right

to bodily integrity. But I say that that is not the

position. If I could bring the Court to a case which

is relied upon by my Friends which is Digital Rights

Ireland at book 2, Tab 39. It is a decision of

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Mr. Justice McKechnie. If I could bring the Court to

page 267 of that decision. What Digital Rights Ireland

was concerned with was an application made by Digital

Rights Ireland, which was a company, they were

asserting that various actions by the Minister for

Communications had interfered with a number of rights

which were held by the company, who was also a personal

applicant before the court. So the court was called

upon to consider was the company entitled to argue

personal constitutional rights which were also held by

the individual litigants. The discussion, insofar as

is relevant to this case, is not really concerned with

the facts in that case.

If I could bring the Court to paragraph 32 of

Mr. Justice McKechnie's decision. He refers to Cahill

-v- Sutton and Crotty -v- An Taoiseach, which relates

to the "locus standi of natural persons", which don't

concern us in this case.

"Where the plaintiff is a corporate body do different

considerations arise? This question was considered in

S.P.U.C. v. Coogan. Referring to his decision in A.G.

(S.P.U.C.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., Finlay C.J.

quoted at p. 741 from p. 623 of that judgment as

follows:- "If, therefore, the jurisdiction of the

courts is invoked by a party who has a bona fide

concern and interest in the protection of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to life of the

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unborn, the courts, as the judicial organ of government

of the State, would be failing in their duty as far as

practicable to vindicate and defend that right if they

were to refuse relief upon the grounds that no

particular pregnant woman who might be affected by the

making of an order was represented before the courts."

He rejected as misconceived the defendant’s proposition

that this paragraph was qualified by reference to the

special position of the Attorney General, and

reaffirmed at p. 742 that the "broad statement of

principle contained in this paragraph remains

unqualified". The general test with regards to locus

standi at p. 742 should thus be:-

"That of a bona fide concern and interest, interest

being used in the sense of proximity or an objective

interest. To ascertain whether such bona fide concern

and interest exists in a particular case it is of

special importance to consider the nature of the

constitutional right sought to be protected"."

Picking it up again at paragraph 34, Judge.

"Whilst Walsh J. in the same case emphasised the nature

and importance of the right in question (the right to

life of the unborn), his comments in my view have a

broader application, especially when considered in

light of the rights claimed, in the case at hand. He

stated at p. 743:-

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'The question in issue in the present case is not one

of a public right in a classical sense ... but is a

very unique private right and a human right which there

is a public interest in preserving ... What is issue in

the case is the defence of the public interest in the

preservation of that private right has been guaranteed

by the Constitution. It is a right guaranteed

protection by public law as it is part of the

fundamental law of the State by reason of being

incorporated in the Constitution'.

The Judge further noted the exceptional importance of

access to the courts, which was essential to the

vindication of all other rights. Thus at p. 744 with

regards to the standing, 'the essential question is has

the Plaintiff a bona fide interest to invoke the

protection of the courts to vindicate the

constitutional right in question'. In relation to

Cahill -v- Sutton, he was of the opinion at pp. 746 to

747 that:-

'The decision ... is not of such sweeping application

as it is sometimes thought. It can be understood only

in the light of the narrow ground upon which the case

was presented and argued and on the possible injustice

of the Defendant...

It is quite clear ... that even in cases where it is

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sought to invalidate a legislative provision the Court

will, where the circumstances warrant it, permit a

person whose personal interest is not directly or

indirectly present or in the future threatened to

maintain proceedings if the circumstances are such that

a public interest warrants it. In this context the

public interest must be taken in the widest sense.'

Finally, as the Plaintiffs was a company limited by

guarantee, established for the sole object of

protecting human life, a question arose as to its right

to bring the application. Finlay C.J. notes at p. 742

that:-

'I would accept the contention that the Plaintiff could

not acquire a locus standi to seek this injunction

merely by reason of the terms of its articles and

memorandum of association ... However the particular

right which it seeks to protect with its importance to

the whole nature of our society, constitute sufficient

grounds for holding that it is a person with a bona

fide concern and interest and accordingly has the

necessary legal standing to bring the action.'

Whilst SPUC -v- Coogan did not involve a constitutional

challenge to any particular peels of legislation, there

is no, in my view, as to why it would not equally apply

to such a case. Therefore it would thus seem to me

that, in principle, a company should not be prevented

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from taking proceedings to protect the rights of others

where, without otherwise being entitled, it has a bona

fide concern and interest, taking into account the

nature of the right which it seeks to protect or

invoke."

So if I just pause there, Judge. The SPUC decision was

a decision -- it was the Society for the Protection of

the Unborn Child Limited, it was a limited company

which asserted a right to intervene in, ironically

enough given what has happened in recent weeks, the

publication by UCG students of abortion literature.

They said that it imperilled the right to life of

unborn children. It was accepted by all parties that

SPUC itself, or the members of SPUC were not directly

affected by it. And yet, the Court said the rules of

locus standi, where there is a profound public interest

in the matter being litigated, have to be interpreted

in the widest possible sense. I say I fall squarely

within the standing accorded by the Supreme Court to

SPUC.

Mr. Justice McKechnie then goes on to consider a number

of particular rights. He discusses whether the company

was entitled to assert a right to privacy, to

communications, to travel, et cetera. In relation to

some of those rights he said: No, they did not vest in

the company and the company had no entitlement to

assert them. That, I believe, are the passages upon

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which my Friends will rely in due course. But, I say

this is significant at internal page 79 Mr. Justice

McKechnie's -- sorry, my apologies, at paragraph 79.

In a part of the judgment entitled: "Actio popularis"

the Court said, having considered all the individual

rights:

"Despite the foregoing, it may nevertheless be possible

for the Plaintiff to litigate matters which do not, or

cannot, affect it personally and especially in limited

circumstances. The seminal case in this regard is

Crotty -v- An Taoiseach, which is referred to in detail

at paragraph 31 supra. It is sufficient to recap that

the Plaintiff's inability to point to any prejudice

specific to him personally, as distinct from him as a

member of the public, did not deprive him of the

necessary standing.

However, as noted above, different considerations may

apply to limited companies. One of the primary

concerns of rules relating to locus standi is to

prevent those litigations who are meddlesome, frivolous

or vexatious from unduly burdening the Court and those

parties whom are sued. Therefore, cases should be

brought primarily by persons who have a particular

interest in subject matter. In striving to achieve

this outcome, the courts have available the deterrent

to impose cost orders as against the former group,

which may include companies with limited liability.

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However, there can be a concern if such litigants are

in fact merely straw men, or straw companies, behind

which the true litigants hide so as to evade any order

for costs which might ultimately be made against them.

In those circumstances the Court must examine the

nature of the company and its purpose, lifting the veil

if required, together with the surrounding

circumstances of the case and the right which it seeks

to vindicate.

The Supreme Court in SPUC -v- Coogan recognised the

right of the Plaintiff company to litigate to prevent a

breach of the Constitution where it is had a bona fide

concern and interest, with Finlay C.J. noting at p. 742

that:-

'To ascertain whether such a bona fide concern and

interest exists in a particular case it is of special

importance to consider the nature of the constitutional

right sought to be protected'."

And there followed then a discussion in relation to the

right to life which doesn't affect us here.

If I can skip down to paragraph 82:

"Similarly, Walsh J. at p. 744 said:-

'One of the fundamental political rights of the citizen

under the Constitution, indeed one of the most valued

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rights, is that of access to the courts...'

He put it further at pp. 746 and 747:-

'It is quite clear from East Donegal Co-Op and

O'Brien -v- Keogh and other decisions that even in

cases where it is sought to invalidate a legislative

provision the Court will, where the circumstances

warrant it, permit a person whose personal interest is

not directly or indirectly or in the future threatened

to maintain proceedings if the circumstances are such

that the public interest warrants it'."

If I may skip on, Judge, to the Court's conclusions on

locus standi. At paragraph 91 on page 293 of the

judgment, where Mr. Justice McKechnie said the

following considerations were relevant as to whether to

grant, in this case Digital Rights Ireland locus to

argue a particular point.

"In coming to my conclusions, and in light of the case

law considered above, I have taken into account:-

(i) the Plaintiff is a sincere and serious litigant -

it is not a vexatious litigant or a crank;

(ii) this case raises important constitutional

questions;

(iii) the impugned provisions affect almost all of the

population;

(iv) it would be an effective way to bring the action -

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individual owners of mobile phones would be unlikely to

litigate the matter;

(v) the Plaintiff's rights of access to the Court, and

the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution and ensure

that suspect actions are scrutinised; and

(vi) the public good, which is being sought to be

protected."

Just in relation to each of those considerations,

Judge, there's no suggestion that my clients are not

sincere and serious litigants. They have been in being

for 20 years, advocating, sometimes in very difficult

circumstances, for environmental protection. There is

no suggestion by any of my Friends that they are

vexatious, that they are crank's, or that they are

busybodies. In my respectful submission, this element

of my case raises the most profound constitutional

questions. It affects not almost all, but all of the

population. It is an effective way to bring this

action. It is unlikely, it in my respectful

submission, that you would find an individual who will

take upon themselves the grave risk of engaging in High

Court proceedings to assert the existence of an

unenumerated right and if they are unsuccessful in that

application, they will face the consequences of losing

their home in order to satisfy a costs order against

them.

In relation to the last element I say there is a clear

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public good at the heart of the submission I make.

Judge, I said I was going to deal with two elements of

my Friends' objections. I have to confess I've

actually forgotten the second limb which I was going to

rebut given the length of time it took me on Digital

Rights Ireland. I'll obviously deal with whatever wish

points my Friends wish to make.

Judge, that concludes my submission in relation to the

existence of a constitutional right, which leaves me

with just two brief matters to address the Court before

I conclude.

I have adopted Mr. Healy's eloquent submissions in

relation to Dellway. I'm in a slightly different

position in relation to the argument that I have a

right to be heard. I am not, and I don't pretend to

be, in the position of homeowners whose houses are in

close proximity to the airport and who will be directly

affected by jumbo jets roaring over their homes if this

is built. But I say that I, equally, enjoy a right to

be heard on the basis that the proceedings before the

Court, in my respectful submission, represent a

profound interference with environmental protection and

it is that environmental protection which my clients

exist in order to promote and vindicate.

On a less esoteric basis I say that in Dellway itself -

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and I don't need to bring the Court to it, but at

paragraph 442 of Mr. Justice Fennelly's decision I say

he makes it clear that the right to be heard inhered in

both Mr. McKillen and the 14 companies which were

before him. I say at no point did the Court say:

Well, Mr. McKillen enjoys a personal right to be heard

but his companies don't. I also say that my clients

have a sufficient interest in the matters before this

Court for the purposes of Section 50A of Planning and

Development Act. There has been no suggestion by any

of my Friends that I don't have standing to bring these

proceedings. My Friends dispute my ability in relation

to various elements. There's been no suggestion, and

more to the point, no attempt by my Friends to suggest

that I have no standing or to revisit.

MR. BRADLEY: Sorry, Judge, that's not the case. We've

raised it in the decision of Mr. Justice Peart in

Coll -v- Donegal County Council.

MR. KENNY: My Friends disagreed that I have a right to

participate -- to be clear. My Friends are relying on

Coll in order to ground the argument that I don't have

a right, in my understanding, to participate. My

Friend will correct me in due course if I'm wrong in

that understanding. But more to the point, Judge, if I

didn't have a sufficient interest, presumably my

Friends would have brought a motion to undo or to

vacate the grant of leave by me by Mr. Justice Noonan.

And I say it would be odd, indeed, if I enjoyed

standing to bring these proceedings but not also a

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right to participate in the decision before the

Respondent before the decision was taken.

Finally, Judge, if I could bring the Court, I wrongly

said I wasn't going to bring the Court, but if I could

bring the Court to the Dellway decision to paragraph

315, I believe it's in Book 2, Judge, at tab 37. If I

could bring the Court to page 315 where Mr. Justice

Hardiman discusses a number of constitutional texts

between. Paragraphs 315 and paragraphs 324

Mr. Justice Hardiman discusses a number of

constitutional texts and reaches the conclusion, in my

respectful submission, that the right to be heard is

itself a constitutional right and it does not need to

be asserted in the defence of, for example, a property

right that subsists of itself. He quotes at paragraph

318, (internal page 284):

"One consequence of the elevation of the constitutional

right to be heard would plainly be that a statute, or

statutory regulations, requiring decisions to be made

following or unfair procedures would be presumptively

invalid. But such a suggestion is unlikely to occur

since, since it will usually be possible to read an

obligation to follow fair procedures into the relevant

permissions."

The reason why I rely on that passage, Judge, is I'm

not asserting a property right, unlike the Merriman

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objectors. But I say that I have a freestanding

constitutional right to make a submission and that

there is no requirement for me to identify a material

interest of mine which will be directly affected by the

impugned decision in order for that right to be imputed

into the proceedings for the Respondent.

Finally, Judge, if I could bring the Court to the

decision, again opened at some length by my Friend,

Mr. Healy, in Lackagh Quarries, which is at Book 2 at

tab 38. Judge, there's a whole series of decisions

which my Friends have cited as to the sealed nature of

Section 42 which has mandatory consequences and which

exclude both myself and Mr. Healy from that process and

they've all been rehearsed at some length in my

Friend's submissions. Obviously I'll deal with those

points in reply but I would say this, Judge. All of

those decisions, every single one of them, presumes

that Section 42 is congruent with the Constitution and

with Habitats and the EIA Directives. Those issues are

central to this case and I say my Friends cannot rely

on jurisprudence which assumes the correctness of

exactly that which is under challenge in these

proceedings.

But the final point I wish to bring the Court's

attention to is at the end of the decision in Lackagh

Quarries, where at paragraph 122 onwards -- the Court

will recall from Mr. Healy's opening of the case that

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the permission which was granted by An Bord Pleanála

was for ten years and then it was the understanding

that the quarry operator would have to reapply for

planning permission.

The quarry operator sought to, in fact, apply for a

fresh grant of planning permission and it became clear

that the local authority was going to require that a

fresh EIA had to be submitted. And the correspondence

is discussed at paragraphs 124 on to 127. I'll pick it

up at paragraph 128:

"The scoping of opinion..."

This is in relation to the proposed new application for


"The scoping opinion sought from the Planning Authority

was then furnished on 21st September 2009. In that

opinion, the Respondent made it known that an EIS,

which merely updated that which was provided in 1999,

would not be sufficient and that it would be necessary

to fully re-examine the environmental impact of the

continued use of the quarry, given the change in

circumstances that had occurred since the 1999

decision. These were stated to include inter alia the

adjacent area of conservation, the Galway City outer

bypass, the change in environmental legislation,

changes in the Galway City Development Plan 2005-2011,

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the Habitats Directive and the Galway City Heritage

Plan. These appear to be precisely the concerns which

it was intended to protect by the insertion of

Condition No. 2 in the original planning permission and

which considerations clearly the applicant was

determined to avoid in circumstances where it did not

pursue further an application for fresh planning

permission but rather lodged its application under

Section 42. In adopting this approach, the Applicant

has sought to frustrate the objectives of the Board

which granted the planning permission in 1999, which

was to ensure that the consequences of ongoing

quarrying to the amenities of the area could be

reassessed after ten years of quarrying. The Applicant

also sought to renege upon the terms of the agreement

in respect of which he gas been the beneficiary, both

financially and otherwise, for upwards of nine years."

He ultimately refused the quarry operator the relief

sought. I'm not accusing anybody of reneging on

anything but what I am saying, Judge, I'm inviting the

Court to, if it comes to the point where this Court is

considering whether it should exercise its discretion

in favour of the Applicants, having determined that

there was in fact a breach of one or more of the

Directives or having accepted one or more of the points

made by the Applicants, I'm going to invite the Court

to consider whether it was appropriate for the DAA to

commence works, nine working days prior to seeking an

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47

extension of time under Section 42 in circumstances

where it must have known that the commencement of works

would preclude the Respondent from assessing whether

the runway should have been subject to an appropriate

assessment. I put it no higher than that. Subject to

the Court, they are my submissions.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you very much. You know, I

used to enjoy going to the airport!

SUBMISSION BY MR. McDONALD:

MR. McDONALD: Judge, it has been agreed that I would

go next. I think Mr. Bradley may have some difficulty

in going first so I have got the task of responding to

the submissions of the Applicants.

Of course it's not ideal that I go first because I

wasn't a party to any of the things that happened

either in 2007 or indeed in 2017 but I have gleaned, I

suppose, some of the story from the materials which are

before the Court and I will be referring to those in

due course.

Just before I start at all, Judge, I do want to pay

tribute to the submissions that have been made by

Mr. Healy and Mr. Kenny. They were, if I may say so,

submissions made with great clarity; they were

appealing submissions; and they were attractive

submissions. I also want to say that particularly the

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Applicants in the Merriman case have a particular

appeal. They are local landowners and homeowners

immediately to adjacent to the airport. But I do have

to suggest that the operation of the Planning Code may,

from time to time, have very unwelcome consequences for

people. One can imagine, for example, people who are

living beside the route of a new motorway, people

living beside the route of the Luas line if within

earshot of a motorway or a Luas line, very unwelcome

developments for them but those who use the motorway

and those who use the Luas line, or indeed those who

useless the airport these are very, very welcome

facilities from their perspective. And what might be a

nuisance to one person can be a vital facility to

another or indeed a vital facility to the State. Going

back to the times of the construction of fever

hospitals, you know, there can be public utility behind

a particular development. I will be drawing attention

to the fact that in this case, this isn't a development

that is being constructed for private gain, it is a

development that is being constructed in accordance

with the whole series of local plans and regional plans

and county development plans that have been in place

for a long period of time. And it does, I think, in

the context of the constitutional rights which are

asserted, that is of significance in our respectful

submission because, as the Supreme Court has

acknowledged, and Mr. Justice Fennelly in particular in

the Dellway case, planning decisions are of general

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49

effect and they do not always engage -- the fact that

somebody is a property might be affected does not mean

that their property rights are engaged by a planning

decision. I do think it's important and we will

address this in more detail later, I do think it's

important to bear in mind the very significant

distinction the Supreme Court makes in Dellway between

decisions of general application such as planning

decisions and decisions such as that in the Dellway

case itself, which were particular to Mr. McKillen and

his companies.

Now, I suppose I'm getting ahead of myself in relation

to that. I will want to address, in very broad

outline, the constitutional issues. I should say

Mr. Toland will be following me, with the Court's

permission, and he will deal specifically with the

constitutional issues and also with the issues in

relation to the Convention on Human Rights to the

extent that they are being pursued. I will just

outline, in very broad terms, what our case is. But I

am getting ahead of myself because there is one issue

about which I am, I have to say, quite exercised and

it's the issue that was ventilated at the beginning of

Mr. Kenny's submissions yesterday; the submission

there's been a lot lack of candour on the part of the

State. Mr. Kenny, and I'm very grateful to him was

very careful to suggest it wasn't a lack of candour on

the part of counsel and I'm extremely grateful for

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that, but the suggestion that thee's been a lack of

candour on the State's part is something that I must

address at the outset. It's a grave allegation to be

made against the State. And with due respect to

Mr. Kenny, for whom I have much admiration, having

regard to the clarity of his submissions, with due

respect to Mr. Kenny I suggest it is an allegation that

is without foundation.

Can I just, I suppose, say at the outset that the first

time this issue was raised was not in any affidavit or

pleading in the case, it was raised in the submissions

that were delivered on behalf of the Applicants in the

Friends proceedings. It wasn't pleaded. It's nowhere

on affidavit and for that reason it hasn't been

addressed on affidavit by the State Respondents. But I

do say, as I said a few moments ago, it's an unfounded

allegation, it's an inappropriate allegation and there

are a number of reasons for suggesting that. The first

is that the words of the Minister are taken out of

context. All you have before you are three or four

lines from a much longer speech. When seen in context,

it's more likely, I would suggest, although I'm not

asking the Court to make any finding in relation to

this, but it is more likely that they relate to the new

provisions of the 2014 EIA Directive. I'll come to

that. The more fundamental point we make is that it is

impermissible to refer two statements made by the

Minister in seeking to construe, or even understand the

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51

rationale or purpose of a particular piece of

legislation and fourthly there are sound policy reasons

why a court should not consider statements made by a

minister or any member of the House, in the course of

litigation.

The first case I want to refer to is one that was

referred to briefly by Mr. Kenny yesterday in relation

to this issue was the Crilly -v- Farrington decision

and while that was a decision that was solely concerned

with the interpretation of statutes, they do suggest to

the Court that the underlying rationale for the

decision is equally applicable whatever purpose you

want to use, including trying to suggest this is the

reason why this statute was introduced. If I might ask

the Court to look, it's in Book in am 3 and it's in tab

49 of Book number 3. There are just a few pages in the

judgment of the Supreme Court in that case that I think

are relevant.

We also want to refer to, in a moment, to a decision of

this Court that Mr. Simons provided with me, the case

of Hoey but I'll come to that in a moment. We have

copies of these additional authorities. It is a

decision, I should say, I will be suggesting that

something should be done about it but the Hoey case for

some reason hasn't gone into circulation given it is an

approved judgment. It doesn't have an IEHC reference,

or anything of that kind, but Mr. Simons had a copy of

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it.

MR. SIMONS: I have to credit Mr. Kennedy.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I don't remember it.

MR. KENNEDY: I lost it, Judge.

MR. McDONALD: I'm very grateful to both of them. If I

could ask you to look briefly at Crilly -v- Farrington,

it's at tab 9 of Book number 3. It's page 295. It is

under the heading "Role of the courts" and Mr. Kenny,I

think, has correctly observed that this is strictly

obiter but it's not a passing obiter dictum, it is

clearly a considered, well reasoned and, in my

respectful submission, a compelling obiter dictum, one

that I think any High Court Judge would be prepared to

follow and one which, in any event, has been repeated

in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, as this

Court observed in Hoey. Let's just look at what

Mr. Justice Murray said at page 295 under that heading.

He said:

"As has often been said by this court, the courts are

one of the organs of government, the judicial organ of

government, referred to in Article 6 of the

Constitution. Included in their role is the task of

applying Acts of the Oireachtas in justiciable disputes

between citizens or between a citizen and the State and

for that purpose to interpret them. It is frequently

said that in interpreting Acts of the Oireachtas the

court seeks to ascertain the 'intent' of the

legislature or as Blackstone put it at p. 59 of his

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Commentaries 'the will of the legislature'. The phrase

'intent of the legislature' is, on a casual view,

ambiguous because it does not expressly convey whether

it is the subjective intent or the objective intent of

the legislature which is to be ascertained.

Manifestly, however, what the courts in this country

have always sought to ascertain is the objective intent

or will of the legislature. This is evident for

example from the rule of construction according to

which when the meaning of the statute is clear and

definite and open to one interpretation only in the

context of the statute as a whole, that is the

meaning to be attributed to it. There has never been

any question of examining the statute further in the

light of external aids so as to ascertain whether

parliament had an intent which it failed to adequately

express, at variance with that to be clearly found in

the statute."

He then refers to what Lord Nicholls said in the R -v-

Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. Spath and

where Lord Nicholls said:

"Statutory interpretation is an exercise which requires

the court to identify the meaning borne by the words in

question in the particular context. The task of the

court is often said to be to ascertain the intention

of parliament expressed in the language under

consideration. This is correct and may be helpful, so

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long as it is remembered that the 'intention of

Parliament' is an objective concept, not subjective."

I do place something emphasis on that.

"The phrase is a shorthand reference to the intention

which the court reasonably imputes to Parliament in

respect of the language used. It is not the subjective

intention of the minister or other persons who promoted

the legislation."

Of course that's manifestly so. The Minister is only

the person who introduces the piece of legislation. It

then becomes discussed and debated in the House and

it's the House which ultimately votes on and approves

the legislation and of course then it goes to the Sean

add and so on to the President. Sorry I'm

interrupting.

"Nor is it the subjective intention of the draftsman,

or of individual members or even of a majority of

individual members of either House. These individuals

will often have widely varying intentions. Their

understanding of the legislation and the words used may

be impressively complete or woefully inadequate. Thus

when the courts say that such and such a meaning

'cannot be what Parliament intended', they are saying

only that the words under consideration cannot

reasonably be taken as used by Parliament with that

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55

meaning. As Lord Reid said: 'We often say that we are

looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is

not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning

of the words which Parliament used'."

That goes back to the objective principle. That's

taken up by Mr. Justice Murray into the next paragraph.

He says:

"The principle of objective intent at the root of the

role of the courts in interpreting statutes is, as I

have indicated, the same in this country. The intent

of the Oireachtas is imputed to it on the basis of the

text of an Act adopted and promulgated as law in

accordance with the Constitution. Any proposal that

the courts should go behind the constitutionally

expressed will of the Oireachtas so as to rely on the

statement of one member of one house, whatever his or

her status, must be approached with circumspection

and constitutional prudence."

He then goes on to deal with general considerations and

I don't think I need to take the Court through all of

that. If you go to the last paragraph on the opposite

page, page 297, he deals with the particular position

of a minister or promoter of a bill and he says :

"A minister or promoter of a bill may feel constrained

when intervening in the cut and thrust of parliamentary

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debate to choose her or his words carefully for fear of

giving rise to any misunderstanding as to her or his

intent on a subsequent parsing of those words in a

court of law."

This is on the assumption that it might be possible to

look at the words used when the Court comes to look at

the statute.

"On the other hand it has been suggested that a clear

and deliberate statement on the part of the minister or

other promoter of the bill as to the purpose for which

it is been introduced could be a helpful aid to

interpretation. Apart from other considerations which

I will refer to, there is the foreseeable risk that

the promoter of the bill would feel constrained to make

statements calculated specifically for interpretative

purposes, something which has occurred in the United

States. Even if a minister did not feel so

constrained, the fact remains that ministers or other

promoters of bills do routinely inform the House in

question of the general purposes of the bill and the

reasons for its introduction. Statements, calculated

or otherwise, promoting a bill passing through a

politically contentious process would not necessarily

constitute a neutral aid to construction. If the

courts were to go behind an Act and look at the

proceedings in the Houses of the Oireachtas and

statements made by the promoter of a bill for the

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purposes of interpreting the Act adopted, it would

place an onus on other members of the Oireachtas to

examine his or her spoken words for its implications as

to the ultimate effect of a bill when it becomes law.

They would have to do so from a perspective which they

have never had to do and which does not currently

arise."

Then he goes on to talk about the legislative organ of

State is the Oireachtas and it is subject to the

Constitution. It has exclusive responsibility for the

conduct of its proceedings and so on. I don't think

it's necessary to open the rest of that page. But if

you look at page 299, the second paragraph on page 299,

Mr. Justice Murray says:

"The disadvantages concerning complexity and

uncertainty, to which reliance generally on ministerial

statements could give rise would not, to my mind, be

greatly ameliorated by limiting such reliance only to

cases where there is ambiguity in the statute or the

need to avoid a patent absurdity and the ministerial

statement is clear and unequivocal. First of

all, I would recall that there are a wide range of

canons of construction and presumptions available which

are more sophisticated and neutral aids to the

resolution of such interpretative problems. Also

available are methods of interpretation such as the

purposive or teleological approach to statutory

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construction."

That's really all I wanted to draw attention to in the

judgment of Mr. Justice Murray. But I do say the

observations to which he makes there, to which I've

drawn attention, apply equally whether one is looking

at the interpretation of a statute or whether one is

looking for the rationale or purpose behind a

particular statutory provision. We'll see from the

Court's own judgment in Hoey that the Supreme Court has

expressly said that in a later case. But if you look

then, just briefly at what Ms. Justice McGuinness said

at page 302 of the report, the second last paragraph on

page 302 she draws attention to the collective nature

of the process of legislation through the Oireachtas.

She says:

"That process is of legislation by the Oireachtas is

essentially collective. It is the Oireachtas as a

whole which legislates. It would in my view be a

misleading oversimplification of this process to rely,

in interpreting a statute, on ministerial statements

alone. Particularly in the case of more complex

statutes, which pass through a lengthy committee stage,

contributions come from all sides of both Houses of the

Oireachtas. The statute as finally enacted may well

have been extensively amended and may differ crucially

from the bill as introduced by the Minister's initial

introductory statement at the second stage. For the

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courts to rely on ministerial statements in

interpreting statutes would not, therefore, reflect the

will of the Oireachtas as a whole. Yet to search the

entire parliamentary debates for indications as to the

proper interpretation of statutes would be both

complex, time consuming and extremely difficult in

practice. Such a procedure would be open to all the

criticisms voiced by both Murray and Fennelly JJ. in

their judgments."

Of course, again, going back to Mr. Kenny's point that

this was an obiter dictum on the part of Mr. Justice

Murray, you have there, I suppose, an expression of the

collective will of the Supreme Court, Ms. Justice

McGuinness, Mr. Justice Fennelly all to the same effect

and all indicating support for the proposition that

Mr. Justice Murray identifies and support for the

rationale as to why one doesn't have regard to

ministerial statements or indeed any statements made in

the Oireachtas.

If I could then take the Court to the Court's own

judgment in Hoey, which is in a little booklet and I'm

sorry to be handing you yet another booklet but there

is an additional booklet. I think there was one copy

for each of the legal teams. I don't have any more

copies than that at this stage.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I don't mind when it is such a

sterling piece of jurisprudence!

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MR. McDONALD: Well it's at tab 8 of that book. As you

will see it is Hoey -v- The Chief Appeals Officer. The

Court, if I may is a so, very usefully summarises all

of the case law very succinctly and identifies the

relevant principles and I say they are directly

relevant in the present case. It starts at page 19 of

the judgment, paragraph 32 and it says:

"When it comes to the interpretation of the ostensibly

'free-wheeling' discretion afforded the CAO under the

Act of 1996, as referred to in para. 25, the court was

referred by counsel for Ms. Hoey in this regard (and

later by counsel for the respondents in relation to the

constitutionality arguments raised) to a particular

statement made by the Minister for Social Welfare

before Seanad Éireann on 25th March 2007, when what

became s.34 of the Social Welfare Act 1997 was being

debated. (Section 34 inserted a new s. 253A into the

Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1993 that is

materially identical to s. 307 of the Act of 2005). The

court has entirely disregarded the substance of the

comments made by the Minister and, with respect, all

submissions made by the parties as regards those

comments. That the court is better to disregard the

Minister's comments and the related submissions of the

parties is a course of action that the court considers

to be all but required of it by the decisions of the

Supreme Court in Crilly -v- T & J Farrington Ltd.

[2001] 3 I.R. 251., Controller of Patents -v- Ireland

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[2001] 4 I.R. 229, and the more recent decision of the

High Court in O'Sullivan -v- Irish Prison Service

[2010] 4 I.R. 562."

Then at paragraph 33:

"In Controller of Patents, a case in which, inter alia,

discovery was sought of various documentation

concerning the pre-enactment progress of certain

legislation, Keane C.J. affirmed the Supreme Court's

decision in the then recent (and unanimously decided)

case of Crilly -v- T & J Farrington Ltd. '...that it

will not even entertain the citation of passages from

debates in the Oireachtas with a view to ascertaining

what the intention of the Government or the executive

was...'"

That obviously applies in the present case where this

short extract from a speech by the Minister is being

suggested to represent the intention of the Government

or the legislature in introducing the 2016 Act.

Then the Court continues:

"The issue of whether the courts ought properly to have

regard to Oireachtas debates was re-visited

subsequently by McKechnie J. in O'Sullivan, a case

concerned with the constitutionality of a particular

provision of the European Arrest Warrant 2003,

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McKechnie J. stating as follows, at 584:

'In relation to a consideration of Dáil debates in

general, for the purposes of ascertaining the

objectives of the legislation or interpreting

provisions thereof it has long been the case that such

is impermissible. Such consideration would inevitably

blur the lines between the role of the legislature in

enacting laws, and the role of the judiciary in

interpreting them...'"

If I might just pause there. You'll see that in that

passage Mr. Justice McKechnie identifies not just

interpreting a statutory provision but also

ascertaining the objectives of the legislation. That's

precisely the purpose which Mr. Kenny urges on the

Court that one can have regard to that statement of

that minister, or rather that extract from a statement

made by the Minister to Dáil Éireann for the purposes

of ascertaining the objective of the legislation.

Then going on at paragraph 34:

"McKechnie J. then considered, inter alia, Crilly and

Controller of Patents, before stating, again at 584:

'The above situation seems clear; so also is the fact

that the courts can have regard to the legislative

history of any enactment for these purposes.'

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When it comes to 'legislative history', the court

understands McKechnie J. merely to be making the

uncontroversial assertion that if, for example, s. 10

of a particular statute is replaced by a new s. 10, the

court can have a look at both versions of the provision

in a bid to understand the intended effect of the new

s. 10, a point touched upon by Murray C.J. in Crilly,

at 291 et seq. where he distinguishes between

'parliamentary history' and 'legislative history'."

Of course that's the well-established principle under

which you can look at predecessor provisions as an aid

to the construction of a new provision. Mr. Justice

McKechnie then continues:

"In any event as noted above, nothing of relevance

could in fact be found the Dáil debates regarding the

subject amendment. However even if relevant commentary

on the reasons for the amendment could be found in the

debates, I would be extremely reluctant to utilise any

such comments in considering the constitutionality of a

section. Either the section is constitutional or not.

The debates ultimately have no effect upon this by

variety of their indicating the intention of the

Oireachtas and so legislating."

You say then at paragraph 36:

"There is perhaps a certain liberality of sentiment in

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the above-quoted observations of McKechnie J. that does

not seem to all but shut out the admission of

parliamentary material in the maimer that seems

contemplated by the Supreme Court in Crilly and

Controller of Patents though even those cases, strong

and clear as they are in their thrust, do not

unequivocally establish that parliamentary materials

are never ever to be consulted by the courts."

Then you go on to say:

"Other jurisdictions have, as it happens, taken a more

liberal approach as regards the introduction of the

substance of parliamentary debates before their courts.

However, it seems to the court, that there are at least

six reasons why the more (though not absolutely)

restrictive tradition presently pertaining in the Irish

courts is perhaps to be preferred. First, in giving

effect to the intention of the Oireachtas which enacts

statute as a whole body, statute is the uniquely

authoritative statement of what that body intends.

Second, the rule of law requires that citizens should

be able to determine the law by reference to the laws

as enacted by the Oireachtas and as interpreted by the

courts (and by the courts only), not by reference to

what a member of the executive and/or legislative

branches, however esteemed or well-intentioned,

construes the meaning of that legislation whether in

draft form or later. Third, parliamentary privilege

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65

and the natural comity to be shown between the great

organs of state requires that parliamentary debates

should not be subject to judicial parsing or scrutiny.

Fourth, if statute is plain and unambiguous, it is

unnecessary and may engender uncertainty to have regard

to the parliamentary debates that preceded its

enactment; the conventional canons of construction

suffice as an aid to interpretation and themselves

ensure a greater certainty as to the likely meaning of

statute that is as yet uninterpreted by the courts.

Fifth, if statute is unclear and/or ambiguous, it would

be in truth a usurpation by unelected judges of the

role of elected lawmakers for a court to correct

omissions, remedy defects or fill gaps left by the

legislature; the courts must construe legislation as it

has been enacted, not as it might have been enacted.

Sixth, practical concerns also present such as (i)

whose contributions to parliamentary debates are to be

preferred (e.g. a Minister who sponsors legislation,

other ministers, Government supporters, members known

to have a special interest in particular legislation),

and (ii) the increase in confusion for and costs to

members of the public if statutory interpretation were

to become a matter of legal advisors reading the runes

of parliamentary debates instead of having regard

merely to statute and relevant case law in order to

determine statutory meaning."

So I would respectfully suggest that the utility of

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that judgment is that the Court has very helpfully

summarised the preceding case law, the principle to be

applied and the rationale for not looking at

parliamentary debates and what was said in

parliamentary debates. And I, with great respect to

the Court, propose to adopt what the Court there said

as part of my argument in this case.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I certainly seem to have eaten my

Shreddies that day, don't I!

MR. McDONALD: Absolutely. There are two authorities

that Mr. Kenny referred to that I must deal with. The

first was handed up loose yesterday, it's the decision

of the late Mr. Justice Carney in Gorman -v- The

Minister For environment and Local Government. If you

can't find it at the moment -- I don't propose to do

anything other than draw the Court's attention to the

date on which the judgment was delivered, 23rd March

2001, which is four months before the Supreme Court

judgment in Crilly -v- Farrington. So, in my

respectful submission, Gorman is not an appropriate, or

relevant authority in the circumstances.

Then I also need to draw attention to the Corbally

judgment, the judgment of Mr. Justice Hardiman which

undoubtedly postdates the decision in Crilly -v-

Farrington, but with due respect to Mr. Kenny I do

think that Mr. Kenny has actually misconstrued what

happened in that case and the approach which

Mr. Justice Hardiman took. Because although

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Mr. Justice Hardiman described and even quoted from

what the Minister said, what Mr. Justice Hardiman

ultimately did was to say I'm not having regard to that

material and that's the crucial thing.

I just need to find where it is. I thought I had a

note of it. It's in volume 2, tab 25. I want to ask

the Court to look at page 326 of the internal

pagination or page 550 of the book's pagination. That

was a case where the Court was concerned to know what

test to be applied or how they should apply a test in

relation to the approach to be taken by the Medical

Council in relation to professional regulatory matters.

The passage that Mr. Kenny opened yesterday was at page

326, after Mr. Justice Hardiman had referred to certain

things that had been said by the Minister. But if you

look at paragraph 38, Mr. Justice Hardiman says:

"For the purposes of this case I do not believe there

is any significant difference between the word

'serious' and its cognate words on the one hand and the

word 'significant' and its cognate words on the other.

It will be observed that the citation by the Minister

of the judgment in O'Laoire -v- The Medical Council

(Unreported, High Court, Keane J., 27th January, 1995)

is of a passage quoted earlier in this judgment in the

analysis of the Irish case law."

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Can I just pause there and identify the date of that

judgment, it's 27th January 1995, O'Laoire -v- The

Medical Council and that's not a decision of the

Mr. Justice David Keane obviously, but of Mr. Justice

Ronan Keane, as he then was. That's relevant, I think,

when one comes to look at what Mr. Kenny said yesterday

about the next paragraph. You will recall that

Mr. Kenny suggested that the second indent of the next

paragraph, paragraph 40 was actually a quotation from

the judgment of Mr. Justice Keane but in fact it's not

in my respectful submission, it's actually Mr. Justice

Hardiman's own words. You'll see that when you look at

what he says in paragraph 40:

"When the foregoing passages from the record of Dáil

Éireann were opened, counsel on behalf of the Medical

Council stated that his client was not in agreement

with what had been said by the Minister as to the

advice tendered by the Medical Council to her."

Then these are the words undoubtedly, in my respectful

submission, of Mr. Justice Hardiman, as we'll see:

"I do not find it necessary to have regard to the

foregoing discussion as an aid to the interpretation of

the Act of 2007."

The first thing to observe is, Mr. Justice Keane in the

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69

1995 could not have been referring to the Act of 2007.

The next sentence says:

"Therefore I do not find it necessary to consider the

two decisions of this court: The People (Director

of Public Prosecutions) -v- Michael McDonagh [1996] 1

I.R. 565 and Crilly --v T & J Farrington Ltd. [2001] 3

I.R. 251..."

Both of which also postdate the decision of Mr. Justice

Keane in the O'Laoire case in 1995 which considered the

admissibility of the legislative history as an aid to

construction or to resolve any tensions between them.

In fact Mr. Justice Hardiman is applying the classical

approach in Crilly -v- Farrington and is not relying on

the material that was brought to the Court's attention

during the course of that hearing.

There are just one or two other things I need to say

about this aspect of the case before I get on to the

meat of the case but I see it's just coming up to

1:00 o'clock and this might be an appropriate time to

pause.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: All right. Shall we come back at

2:00 o'clock then? Thank you very much.

THE HEARING ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH

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THE HEARING CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH AS FOLLOWS:

MR. McDONALD: Just to finish off the point that I was

dealing with before lunch, and I stress this is for

illustration purposes only, I'm not asking the Court to

make any finding in relation to this because I think to

ask the Court to make a fining would be to go against

the submission that I made, but I would ask the Court

to look at the booklet that we handed in just before

lunch, the smaller booklet. We should really have, in

retrospect, used a different colour to distinguish it

from all the other books before the Court, but it is a

black book also. At Tab 9 of that is a full copy of

the Dáil debate, for the debate in question on 13th

July 2017, it is a Thursday, and if you turn to page 92

of the internal pagination, it is the third page of the

photocopy, under the heading "5 o'clock" on that page

you will see the paragraph that is quoted in

Mr. Kenny's written submissions and it says:

"Specifically, section 28 of the 2016 Act provides:

Under section 28(1), a permanent change to section 42

of the 2000 Act, providing that extensions of duration

would no longer apply where environmental impact

assessment, EIA, or appropriate assessment, AA, was

required in respect of the original planning

permission."

And then the next sentence is what so much reliance is

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placed on:

"That is to bring the planning code fully into line

with EU law requirements."

If I just pause there. That's obviously a very

succinct statement. It doesn't identify in any detail

what the EU law requirements are. It doesn't set out

the advice the Minister may have had in relation to why

he was making that statement. It is an extremely

succinct statement and one that, even taken on its own

terms, I would suggest, is one that would be treated

with caution even if it was permissible to have regard

to parliamentary debates. But it is in the next

paragraph, if you read on -- this paragraph is not

quoted in the Friends of the Irish Environment

submission -- but you will see in the next paragraph

there is a reference to "new EU law requirements". The

Minister continues:

"Under section 28(2), a temporary change is being made

to section 42 of the 2000 Act, providing that a second

extension of duration of planning permission could be

approved for a development of 20 or more homes in

certain circumstances and where development had

substantially commenced within the original permission

period. It was always intended to commence these

provisions separately, as the first was drafted in

response to EU requirements, and as is the norm with

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72

such new legislative requirements, there needs to be a

transitional period for practical arrangements to be

made to meet them."

And it is next sentence to which I wish to draw

attention:

"Developers need time to consider and comply with the

new EU law requirements, and, as the case may be, apply

for an extension of duration or a new planning

permission. That is the reason I am not commencing this

provision immediately but expect to do so by the end of

this year."

Now, there are other references to "new EU law

requirements" elsewhere in the debate, I don't propose

to take the Court through those, I simply draw

attention to this by way of illustration: How does

anyone know which Directive the Minister was referring

to when one sees language of that kind? Is he

referring to the 2011 Directive, which is the one that

is relevant for present purposes, or the new Directive,

the 2014 Directive? Which I will be coming to later in

my submissions because, curiously enough, it does

introduce a new provision that allows Member States, it

is not mandatory but it allows Member States to put a

duration on an Environmental Impact Assessment, a

limited duration on it. Express provision to that

effect. But I will be coming back to that at a later

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73

stage.

I simply draw attention to that, that it is unclear

which, at minimum it is unclear, I would say it is more

likely that he was referring to the new Directive but

I'm not asking, as I say, the Court to place any

reliance on it, I'm simply doing this by way of

illustration as to why it would be unreliable in any

event to seek to rely upon a particular sentence in a

particular speech by a Minister on a particular

occasion.

Just to round off the point, there is at Tab No. 10 of

the same book an extract from the Dáil debates in

relation to the 2016 Act, when it was actually being

promoted, and you will see at page 9 the Minister

simply puts forward the amendment to Section 42; there

is no explanation whatsoever in relation to it. And

again I think that just illustrates the point that I

have been trying to make; that one shouldn't try to

place so much reliance, as these Applicants do, the

Friends of the Irish Environment, on one sentence and

then to extrapolate from that a principle, and then to

go further than just extrapolating that principle but

to actually suggest that the State lacks candour. And

for all of those reasons I would respectfully suggest

to the Court that the observation I made before lunch,

that that submission or allegation is -- it is an

allegation really -- is not just inappropriate but is

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74

without foundation in the circumstances. And that's

really all I wanted to say about that issue. It is one

that I felt I had to deal with at the outset because it

was of such gravity in terms of the State's position,

in particular its position with the Court.

But while I'm just dealing with things which I think

are taken out of context can I just deal with something

else as well. It is the extract from the argument of

the State in Commission -v- Ireland, which is referred

to at paragraph 39 of the written submissions of the

Applicants in the Friends case. Mr. Kenny drew

attention to this late yesterday afternoon. It is on

page 17. Sorry, it starts on page 16 and goes over to

page 17. It is paragraphs 39 and 40 of Mr. Kenny's

submissions. He underlines a passage, the European

Court of Justice, its summary of the State's argument

and he says that -- at least he refers, or Mr. Kenny

refers to the argument the State made in that case:

"... that the use of the word "proceed"...

In the '85 Directive.

"....is significant, that term not being confined to

the commencement of works but also applying to the

continuation of a development project."

And the observation is then made in paragraph 40:

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75

"In other words, the State does not believe that the

EIA Directive is confined to a decision at the

commencement of works and also apply to continuations

of development projects."

Now, if I could just say Commission -v- Ireland was the

case about retention permissions, where the State had a

system at that time that allowed someone to apply for a

retention permission even after they had commenced

significant works on a project, and the EIA could be

done at the time the retention permission was sought.

And that was struck down by the European Court as being

contrary to the scheme of the Directive and contrary to

European law.

But the crucial thing, from my perspective, is that the

argument that was made by the State in that case was

not accepted by the Court of Justice. The very fact

that the court found against the State demonstrates

very clearly that the argument was not accepted by the

Court of Justice. And that, of course, distinguishes

the matter entirely. I'd be in a completely different

position if I had made an argument that had been

accepted by a Court and the Court had made a finding on

that basis. Impliedly or implicitly the Court rejected

that argument by Ireland and, in those circumstances,

the fact that an argument may have been made -- indeed

I think it was by Mr. Simons in that case -- the fact

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that an argument may have been made by whoever it might

have been on behalf of the State is neither here nor

there. That's really all I wanted to say, I don't

intend to spend any time on it at all. But it is a,

for want of a better word, it is a slightly cheap shot

that was made in paragraph 40 of the submissions.

Again just a very minor point, but to get it out of the

way before I go any further and look at the relief

which is sought against the State in both sets of

proceedings, to the extent that it is sought against

the State, it just might be convenient while we have

been looking at the interpretations of statutes, and

the Court has already seen in the Court's own judgment

in the in Hoey case that of course one can adopt the

teleological approach and one can look at the

legislative history of the statute, but there is an

opposite side of that coin which says that you can't

look at a new provision of statute in order to

interpret a pre-existing provision. It is the opposite

of the teleological approach. I just want to draw

attention to the relevant authorities for that

proposition. I'm afraid they are in two different --

no, actually they are not, they are in the same book.

They are in book 3 of the books of authorities before

the Court and I will deal with them very briefly.

The first is at Tab 54 of book 3 and it is Cronin

(Inspector of Taxes) -v- Cork and County Property Ltd.

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and this goes to Mr. Healy's argument -- because

Mr. Healy, unlike Mr. Kenny, wasn't really relying on

what the Minister said, he was saying well you can look

at the new provision and then you can see what the old

provision really meant or intended. I just want to

draw the Court's attention, this was a provision of the

Taxes Acts, I think it was to do with Capital Gains

Tax. I may be wrong about that. But certainly it was

a provision of the Taxes Acts. There is just one small

passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Griffin in the

Supreme Court at the bottom of page 571. Oh sorry, it

is at the next page. I'm terribly sorry, it is on the

next page, it is page 572 and this is directly in point

with reference to Mr. Healy's submission to the Court a

few days ago.

"With regard to the submission of Council for the

company that the amendment of the section 18 by Section

29 of the Finance Act, 1981, was an implied acceptance

of by Oireachtas of the construction of section 18 for

which they contended...."

Which is precisely what Mr. Healy is arguing.

"...the court cannot in my view consider a statute in

the light of amendments that may thereafter have been

made it to. An amendment to a statute can, at best,

only be neutral - it may have been made for any one of

a variety of reasons."

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And of course that's consistent with Crilly -v-

Farrington.

"It is however for the courts to say what the true

construction of what a statute is, and that

construction cannot be influenced by what the

Oireachtas may subsequently have believed it to be."

And again that's consistent with the view this Court

took in Hoey, it is just the other side of the coin. I

think it is worth just looking at the headnote in that

case because the headnote, the reporter in this case

took that comment or observation of Mr. Justice Griffin

to be sufficiently important to list it as a "per

curiam". And you will see that at the top of 560. It

is in the same terms as the sentence I have just read

but it "per curiam" and I think that does tell its own

story.

There is also in the same book the decision of the

Supreme Court in Clinton which is at Tab 41 of the

book, where in one sentence Ms. Justice Denham, as she

then was, makes the same point, albeit she doesn't go

into any detail at all about it. But if you turn to

Tab 41 you will see at page 283 of the report the

judgment of Ms. Justice Denham. It is paragraph 24 but

it is last three lines of paragraph 24. Having quoted

the new provision of the 2006 Act that was in issue in

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that case, she says, very pithily, in an observation

that I adopt for the purposes of these proceedings:

"However, the section does not apply to this case".

Likewise, the section on which Mr. Healy relies does

not apply in this case .

"Nor would I construe s. 50 of the Planning and

Development Act 2000 by reference to this new section."

Again, very short and very pithy, but entirely

consistent with the earlier decision of the Supreme

Court in Cronin -v- Cork and County Properties.

I just thought it was a convenient moment to deal with

that issue, while we were looking at the issue raised

by Mr. Kenny in the Dáil debates.

Can I now then turn to the relief which is sought

against the State. Just before I do that, I suppose

from a housekeeping perspective there are two things

which I need to just ask the Court to bear in mind

because I don't think it has been mentioned to the

Court previously. But there is a slight difference

between the way in which the Merriman proceedings and

the way in which the Friends proceedings come before

the Court because in the Merriman proceedings the Court

did not give leave to bring judicial review; what the

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Court gave leave to do was to bring an application on

notice to the Respondents and the Notice Parties to

seek judicial review. So technically the test to be

applied then in that case, this being a telescoped

hearing -- and we have all agreed that this would be a

telescoped hearing -- technically the test to be

applied is are there substantial grounds? And if so,

is judicial review to be granted in respect of any of

those grounds? It is a double test in the case of

Merriman.

That doesn't apply in relation to the Friends case.

They have been given leave to bring judicial review

proceedings and the Court is, therefore, only concerned

with whether or not judicial review should be granted.

You don't have to consider the preliminary or threshold

question as to whether there are substantial grounds.

But, for reasons which I will deal with a little later

this afternoon, that does have consequences in relation

to the case which is made by Friends in these

proceedings. But I will return to that later this

afternoon.

Can I ask the Court now to look at the Statement of

Grounds, the Amended Statement of Grounds in Merriman

just to identify the relief that is claimed against the

State Respondent. And correctly the State has been

named as a Respondent in those proceedings. It is at

Tab No. 6 of book 1 of the Merriman pleadings. I'm

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going to deal with these in slightly reverse order.

But if I deal with the constitutional issue first. You

will see if you turn to page 138 of the book paragraph

13 of the Statement of Grounds is the relief that is

sought:

"Section 42(1)(a) is invalid having regard to the

provisions of the Constitution because it fails to

provide any mechanism to allow persons in the position

of the Applicants to vindicate their constitutional

property rights under Article 40.3, 45 and 43 of the

Constitution."

Now, that provision I think -- or at least that relief,

I think, has to be looked at in conjunction with some

of the relief which is sought against the other

Respondents. And can I ask the Court to turn to page

136 of the book and to the various declarations that

are sought at paragraphs 3 to 6. At paragraphs 3 and 4

the Applicants are saying that Section 42 essentially

should be interpreted or given effect to in a

particular way which vindicates their constitutional

rights. Essentially what they are saying in those

paragraphs is -- I'm not sure there is a huge amount of

difference between paragraphs 3 and 4 -- but

essentially what they are saying is that because they

have these property rights they were entitled to make

submissions in relation to the Section 42 application

made by the Dublin Airport Authority.

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Now, I suppose if you then look at paragraph 5 of the

declarations that are sought, paragraph 5 seeks a

declaration that:

"Fingal errored in law and acted contrary to fair

procedures and to natural constitutional justice in

failing and/or refusing to accept the Applicants'

submissions."

So that is again an issue, a Dellway issue, that they

should have been given an opportunity, not by reference

to their property rights but simply by reference to

fair procedures and natural constitutional justice,

they should have been given an opportunity to make

submissions. And then paragraph 6 is really an amalgam

of what is sought at paragraphs 3 and 4 because in

paragraph 6 they say, both by reference to their

constitutional rights and by reference to the natural

-- the requirement of fair procedures, I should say --

Fingal ought to have considered the submissions which

they made or sought to make.

In relation to the relief which is sought against the

State at paragraph 13, I drew attention to those

paragraphs because you may not get to the relief at

paragraph 13 against the State if, for example, as we

will be submitting, and Mr. Toland will be submitting

this in due course, if you come to the conclusion that

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the property rights or the right to fair procedures are

not in fact engaged, on the facts of this case, under

Section 42. If you come to the conclusion that they

are engaged then the issue arises, under Dellway,

whether, notwithstanding that there is no express

statutory right to make submissions, that should be

implied, in any event, as a matter of constitutional

justice and fair procedures. But then if the Court

come to that conclusion you don't come to consider the

provisions of -- or at least the reliefs sought at

paragraph 13 of the Statement of Grounds.

It is only if you come to the conclusion that these

rights were engaged -- Section 42 can't be interpreted

in that way -- that one comes to paragraph 13 and the

relief which is sought.

Now, as I said a few moments ago, I will want to come

back and look further at the relief in relation to the

other heads of relief that are sought, but I do want

to, I suppose, make a few observations, as I said, Mr.

Toland will be dealing with this in detail but just at

headline level I do want to make a few observations,

particularly in relation to the reliance that is placed

by the Applicants in the Merriman proceedings on

Dellway. And we say Dellway, as I sought to suggest

this morning, is quite a different case. It is a case

where Mr. McKillen and his companies never had an

opportunity to make any submissions. In contrast in

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the present case, the matters of concern to these

Applicants, as I will hope to demonstrate to the Court

when one looks at all of the material which is before

the Court, in contrast in the present case these

Applicants had an opportunity to make submissions in

relation to the matters of concern to them, such as the

voluntary purchase scheme, such as the impact of noise

generated by the second runway, and, also, the flood

risk. That's something that's specifically addressed

and I want to come back to that because that's

something that's also relied upon. And in addition to

that we say insofar as their claim based on property

rights is concerned, and their concern that this

decision adversely effects the value of their property

rights, we will be relying on the observations of

Mr. Justice Fennelly in the Dellway case and on certain

other authorities in support of the proposition that

the mere -- sorry, I shouldn't use the word "mere"

because it is easy for me to say mere -- but the fact

that property values might be devalued does not give

rise to a right to make submissions to the audi alteram

partem principle per se.

And that is, I think, very clear. I won't ask the

Court to look at it now because it will be addressed by

Mr. Toland in due course, it is very clear from the

judgment of Mr. Justice Fennelly in Dellway the

difference between planning decisions, on the one hand,

and decisions which directly effect me, as in

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Mr. McKillen's case, on the other. Planning decisions

are regarded as being of general application.

Mr. Justice Fennelly makes the point that, for example,

zoning decisions can have very serious consequences for

values of property. Sometimes they can increase the

value of their property, but sometimes they can have

the opposite effect. And certainly in terms of

residential amenity, zoning can have very serious

consequences if, for example, the lands adjoining your

home are suddenly designated for port related activity,

marine industry or something of that kind, depending on

where you are situated. And I do draw attention, in

particular, to the sentence of Mr. Justice Fennelly's

judgment in Dellway where he said at paragraph 454, and

I won't ask the Court to open it because it is so

difficult to get all these authorities out, he said:

"I do not think that mere adverse effects on property

values flowing from a public law decision can on its

own trigger the right."

And I did draw attention this morning to the difference

between planning decisions and other kinds of

decisions. But even within the planning context we

would submit that there are distinctions to be made.

Because there are, of course, planning decisions which

are made in favour of a developer, purely in

the interests of that developer. Sorry, from the

developers perspective, it is a decision which will

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86

endure to that developers financial gain.

That's not the kind of decision that was made in this

case. This was a decision which was clearly

underscored by public considerations, considerations of

general public interest. And I think that's very

clear, it is desperately clear from a document, the

actual planning decision itself, which is in the same

book as the Statement of Grounds and it is at tab

number -- sorry, it is tab 3 and then behind tab 3

there is a tab 2 and a tab -- yes, a tab 2 behind tab

3. And you will see that's the decision of An Bord

Pleanála. I just want to draw attention to the opening

words of the decision because, in my submission, it

goes to the very issue that Mr. Justice Fennelly

identifies in the Dellway case and underscores the

distinction between the Dellway case and the present

case. You will see at the opening words: "Matter

considered" -- this is at page 26 of the book's

pagination:

"In making its decision the Board had regard to those

matters which by virtue of the Planning and Development

Acts and Regulations made there under it was required

to have regard. Such matters included any submissions

and observations..."

And I will be coming back to those. But look at the

reasons and considerations, and these are the first

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87

reasons and considerations that are relied on.

"Having regard to national policy, as set out in the

National Development Plan, the National Spatial

Strategy, and Transport 21, which provide for expansion

of infrastructural capacity and enhancement of the

level of service at Dublin Airport because of its

international gateway status and which provide for

investment priority for an upgraded public transport

system and an improved road network to serve Dublin

Airport, and also having regard to the following: The

Regional Planning Guidelines; the Dublin Transportation

Office Strategy; and also Fingal County Development

Plan and previous County Development Plans where it has

been an objective since 1972 to provide an East-West

runway in at this location."

And that's, in my respectful submission, is an

important element of the kind of decision that we are

dealing with here and it has to borne in mind, in my

respectful submission, when one comes to consider the

very attractive arguments made by Mr. Healy, that his

clients deserved to be consulted, and it also has to be

borne in mind when one looks at the distinction

Mr. Justice Fennelly makes between decisions of general

application and decisions which are more directed at a

particular person. Then it refers to the Dublin

Airport Local Area Plan. Then look at what they say at

the top of the next page:

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"It is considered that the proposed development is

necessary to meet the foreseeable need for aviation

travel at Dublin Airport and to provide for the safe

expansion of air traffic of the airport. It is further

considered that subject to the mitigation measures

proposed and the conditions set out below the proposed

development won't be acceptable..."

And so on.

"....in terms of traffic safety and convenience, would

not present an acceptable risk of water or air

pollution, would not be prejudicial to the public

health due to the noise impacts or otherwise, and would

be in accordance with the proper planning and

sustainable development of the area."

But I do draw attention to that finding by An Bord

Pleanála that the development is necessary to meet the

foreseeable need for aviation travel at Dublin Airport,

clearly consistent with observations of Mr. Justice

Fennelly as to the status that some particular

decisions have, being of general application and, also,

clearly, here being, certainly according to the Board's

view, in the public interest, and being consistent with

a long body of policy considerations both at national,

regional and local level, as identified in the

preceding page.

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While this decision is open before you, Judge, I wonder

could I just refer, it is not directly in point to the

submission that I'm making at the moment but it is

something that I think it is no harm to read while the

decision is open before us, and it is relevant to other

submissions that I need to make in the course of

afternoon. You will see that he goes on, or at least

the Board go on to identify that they don't accept the

Inspector's recommendation to refuse permission.

That's something that Mr. Healy drew attention to

previously.

"The Board considered that sufficient information had

been submitted in the Environmental Impact Statement

and further information submitted both to the planning

authority and the Board and at the oral hearing to

enable it to make an assessment of the significant

impacts of the proposed development on the environment

and its acceptability in terms of proper planning and

sustainable development. The Board considered that in

overall terms the inconsistencies of deficiencies in

information referred to by the Inspector were not so

significant as to warrant a refusal of permission and

could be addressed by way of condition. In particular,

the Board was satisfied on the basis of the information

submitted and conditions attached and having regard to

the fact that there are no planning restrictions in the

current operation of the airport runways that: 1."

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And you will see here there are three considerations

identified which clearly go to the concerns which the

Applicants have ventilated in the present proceedings.

"1. There would be no significant deterioration in

noise conditions at night-time in the vicinity of the

airport due to the proposed option 7b operating mode

for the runways, none use of new runway and of

cross-runway at night, and the restriction on nighttime

aircraft movements by way of condition;

2. In relation to daytime, there would be some

improvements relative to current or future noise

impacts with the existing runway system to be offset

against disimprovements in other areas respects and the

net effects would not be significant in terms of public

health and safety such as to warrant a refusal of

permission;

3. In relation to schools affected (including

pre-school facilities) the mitigation measures

proposed, reenforced by conditions and monitoring,

would ensure that a suitable noise environment can be

maintained within classrooms and school buildings

generally."

And then it says:

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"In coming to the above decision, the Board noted that

in addition to planning controls Dublin Airport would

in the future be subject to the new noise control

regime introduced under the EU Environmental Noise

Directive, 2002, and the Environmental Noise

Regulations 2006."

And we know, of course, that even those provisions have

now been updated with a new noise regulation that will

have general effect throughout the European Union in

relation to airports of the size of Dublin Airport.

But if I just draw attention to one or two of the

conditions because I think they are also relevant to

submissions that I propose to make later this

afternoon. Firstly, if you turn to page 29, and it is

page 5 of the internal pagination, this is Condition 6,

which deals with the position of voluntary noise

insulation for school. Condition 7 deals with the

scheme for voluntary noise insulation of dwellings

which are within a range, the 63 decibel LAeq 16-hour

range, and that has to be done within 12 months of the

planned operation of the runway for use. Then you have

Condition 8:

"The runway permitted shall not be brought into use

until noise insulation approved under Conditions No. 6

and No. 7 above has been installed in all cases where a

voluntary offer has been accepted within the time

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92

limits of the scheme."

Again showing the care which An Bord Pleanála was

taking in relation to the concerns about noise. And we

will see how the Board inspector dealt with those

concerns and the very full examination that was carried

out as part of the EIA in this case in relation to all

the concerns about noise.

And then just, I suppose, to ensure that there is no

misunderstanding I do need to draw attention to the

provisions of Condition 9 because it isn't quite to the

effect as I understood Mr. Healy to suggest and that's

why I just think it is important to actually look at

its terms. It says:

"Prior to commencement of development, a scheme for the

voluntary purchase of dwellings shall be submitted to

and agreed in writing by the Planning Authority. The

scheme shall include all dwellings predicted to fall

within the contour of 69 decibels within 12 months of

the planned opening of the runway for use. But prior

to the commencement of operation of the runway an offer

of purchase in accordance with the agreed scheme shall

have been made to all dwellings coming within the scope

of the scheme and such offer shall remain open..."

And this is the bit that I just want to draw attention

to:

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"....for a period of 12 months from the commencement of

use of the runway."

It is not that there is some very restrictive period of

12 months in advance. But the residents have the

option under this particular provision to actually

remain in their homes for a period of 12 months, see

how they fair and if they prefer to participate in the

scheme or live adjacent to the airport they have that

choice. So it is not a restrictive 12 months, it is

actually a very facilitative -- sorry, I am not

pronouncing that correctly but I think the Court

understand where I'm coming from -- provision that

allows them to see how they fair before they make a

decision of the kind in issue.

There are just one or two other conditions that I want

to draw attention to very briefly. With reference to

the flood risk, and I will be coming back to this, if

you turn to page 9 there are two specific provisions in

relation to that. They don't use the word "flood risk"

but as we will see from the reason given, this is to do

with flooding. Paragraph 20 says:

"Surface water from the proposed development shall be

drained in accordance with the proposals outlined in

the planning application and the environmental impact

statement. Full details of the design, construction,

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94

operation and monitoring of the surface water

attenuation treatment and disposal system shall be

agreed in writing with Planning Authority in

consultation with the Eastern Regional Fisheries Board

prior to commencement of the development."

And the reason given is:

"In the interests of public health, the prevention of

flooding and limiting the risk of pollution of

receiving water."

And then it provides for a monitoring regime for the

monitoring of surface water discharged to streams and

that being agreed with the Local Authority. So, again,

the Board was quite careful to deal and to properly

condition the position in relation to surface water

drainage in order to prevent flooding. And I will be

coming back to that.

If you turn then to the next page, page 34, Condition

23 deals with, for example, the position of birds and

fauna, including badgers and bats. And there are

further provisions in relation to badgers and bats.

But condition 23 says:

"Commitments in relation to archaeology, ecology and

landscape in the EIS shall be carried out in full..."

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That's an enforceable commitment. An enforceable

condition I should say, one that is enforceable under

section 160. "Archaeological site investigation" is

not immediately relevant.

"(b) Measures to be taken to mitigate impacts on fauna,

including fauna protected by loss (such as badgers and

bats).

(c) Measures to be taken to mitigate impacts on birds.

(d) the provision of a compensatory 8 hectare woodland,

together with the provision of 3 hectares of amenity

lands on lands zoned for such use."

Now, I need to just pause there, I suppose, because we

know from more recent authority from the European

Court, in the context of the Habitats Directive, that

you can't under the Habitats Directive have

compensatory measures used as mitigation. But this

isn't what this is dealing with at all. It is not at

though there is any loss of protected habitat in this

case; any of the relevant SACs or special protection

areas are located some distance from the airport. This

is simply dealing with the fact that because the

construction of the runway will lead to the loss of

hedgerows this is being put in place -- this is

ordinary hedgerows, not protected hedgerows -- this

measure is being put in place.

And then there is the provision of funding for a

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96

hedgerow survey and the provision of funding for the

restoration of the historic formal gardens in the Ward

River Valley Regional Park. You will see that was a

concern of some of the objectors to the scheme.

Again, Condition 24 also deals with the requirement of

the developer to comply in full with the proposal

submitted for ecological compensation habitats. That

refers back to what we just saw in Condition 23.

Condition 25 says that:

"A pre-construction..."

This is dealing with badgers.

"A pre-construction survey of badgers on the site shall

be submitted to the Planning Authority and the

National Parks and Wildlife Service prior to

commencement of development. The timing of all

necessary measures in relation to badgers since the

removal of sets will be agreed in writing with the

NPWS."

Then Condition 26 deals with bats.

"The Planning Authority shall be notified in writing of

the name of the bat specialist prior to commencement of

development. The bat specialist shall be present when

any buildings are being fully/partially demolished or

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97

when trees are being removed. To ensure that all

necessary measures are taken in relation to bats in the

event of bats being found located in buildings or

trees, the NPWS and the Heritage Officer shall be

immediately notified."

So that requirement to notify the NPWS, which is the

relevant body, as the Court will be aware, to project

any protected species, provides a very significant

measure of protection to ensure that steps are not

taken which will endanger or expose a protected species

such as bats to loss; the NPWS can step in and deal

with the position at that stage.

I'm sorry to have spent a little bit of time on that

just now but it is relevant to certain of the other

submissions that I propose make. I need now, I

suppose, to go back to Tab 6 of the same book, the

Statement of Grounds, to identify the other relief

which is sought against the State Respondents. The

next relief, that I want to look at very briefly, is at

paragraph 14, which is not something which is featured

in the oral argument before the Court. Paragraph 14 of

the relief that is sought, that's at page 138. You

will see there is a declaration sought against the

State Respondents there that:

"Section 42 as amended is incompatible with the State's

obligations under the European Convention on Human

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Rights and the protocol thereto."

And, again, Mr. Toland will be dealing with this, but

just in headline terms. We say that the decisions of

the European Court -- there is one in fact dealing with

an airport, an airport at Deauville -- the decisions of

the European Court of Human Rights involve a balancing

of interests. The right of a particular local resident

has to be balanced against the importance and

legitimate aim of the construction there. Again, it

was an extension of the runway at Deauville Airport.

The Applicants were locals, they contended that the

extension of the runway breached their Article 8 rights

and that their views had not been sufficiently taken

into account. Very similar to the case which is made

by the Applicants here. They said the market value of

their property would decline and they would have to

bear additional installation costs. But the Court of

Human Rights had regard to the legitimate aim, the

regions economic well-being, for which the development

of the airport was important. And we say there is an

obvious parallel here and in the affidavit of

Mr. O'Duffy, sworn on behalf of the State Respondents,

he has drawn attention to the strategic importance of

the need for a second runway to ensure maximum

connectivity for citizens of the State with the rest of

the world, and he emphasises that this is particularly

important now in the context of BREXIT.

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99

So that's, I suppose, just in headline terms what we

propose to say in relation to that relief which is

sought.

If you then can turn to the European law issues. When

I say European law I mean the EU law issues. The

relief which is sought relates to two Directives, as

the Court has seen, the EIA Directive and the Habitats

Directive. The relief sought in relation to the EIA

Directive, dealing with that first, is at paragraphs 8

and 16. You will see at paragraph 8 on page 137 of the

claim for relief a declaration is sought that:

"...the Second-Named Respondent (the State) has failed

to correctly transpose the requirements of the EIA

Directive."

And you will see at paragraph 15 there is a

declaration -- sorry, it is paragraph 16. I'm terribly

sorry. At paragraph 16 there is a declaration that

Section 42 is incompatible with the EIA Directive. I

will be dealing in more detail later this afternoon

with our response to that. But again just by way of

headline response, the fundamental point that we make

in response to this allegation, or this relief is that

the duration of a planning permission is not regulated

at EU level. There is a distinction made in the Treaty

between environmental considerations, on the one hand,

and town and country planning consideration, on the

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100

other, and the European Union has not to date sought to

regulate the duration of a planning consent. And that

is, we say, of particular significance.

In the little booklet that we handed in this morning we

have included Articles 191 and 192. I'm not sure what

tab they are at in the Court's book. Tab 2. Article

191 deals with the environment and the Union policy on

the environment; preserving, protecting and improving

the quality of the environment, and so on. But then if

you look at article 192 there is a very significant

distinction made between how the European Union

proposes to regulate, or rather legislate for the

environment, on the one hand, and town and country

planning on the other. You see at Article 192,

paragraph 1:

"1. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in

accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and

after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and

the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action

is to be taken by the Union in order to achieve the

objectives referred to in Article 191."

Which is the one that deals with the environment. But

then look at what is said in the next paragraph,

paragraph 2:

"By way of derogation from the decision-making

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101

procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and without

prejudice to Article 114, the Council...."

Not the Parliament and the Council, but the Council.

"....acting unanimously in accordance with a special

legislative procedure and after consulting the European

Parliament..."

That's all it has to do. The parliament itself has no

legislative role.

"....the Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:

(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;

(b) measures affecting:

- town and country planning..."

So it has the same status as tax provisions. Which, of

course, are something that are very much in the news at

the moment and the pressure that's being put on the

State to agree to a different arrangement in relation

the taxation. But town and country planning is given

the very same status.

And we also say, of course, that when you come to

examine the EIA Directive and the relevant case-law of

the European Court -- and I will be dealing with this a

little bit later on -- we say that the case-law of the

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European Court, contrary to everything that you have

heard so far, shows very clearly that an extension of

planning permission does not of itself amount to a

development consent. There are two circumstances where

it can do so. One is, as in Wells, where there is a

change in the conditions. And the Court will recall

that in Wells at the second stage of the two stage

process that the UK operated at that time, at the

second stage 22 new conditions were imposed. Section

42 is utterly different to that; the relevant planning

authority has no ability, no power, no right to impose

new conditions at all, except in relation to the

completion of the development, security for completion

of the development, that's all it has.

The second area, and this is, I think, clear from the

Pro-Baine case, I think when one looks at the language

that is used and when one looks at the position in the

present case we respectfully suggest that what

Mr. Kenny has said about it is actually wrong. But the

second case, where an extension of permission might

give rise to a consequence that it would be treated as

a development consent, is where the extension

permission would permit additional works to be

undertaken which were not within the framework of the

original condition. Obviously, that would be a new

project, a different project to what had been agreed

previously. And we will be making submissions when one

looks at Pro-Baine that that's clearly what the

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103

European Court had in mind.

So we say that absent a change of conditions, which

can't arise under section 42, absent a change in the

project, which doesn't arise under Section 42, can't

arise under Section 42, there is no development consent

in any decision under Section 42; that a decision under

Section 42 cannot be equated with development consent.

And I will be dealing with that in more detail. We

will also be referring to the decision of the Supreme

Court in Dunne -v- The Minister for the Environment,

which is referred to in the Dublin Airport Authority's

submissions, where again I think the Supreme Court made

it very clear that the kind of decision that was made,

it wasn't under the 2000 Act but the kind of decision

that's made under Section 42 should not be regarded as

a development consent. So I will be coming back later

just to deal with the detail of that, but just to give

that in headline terms.

The next relief which is sought against the State is in

relation to the Habitats Directive and that is at page

138 of the book, also at Tab 6. There is a declaration

sought there that:

"Section 42 as amended is incompatible with the

Habitats Directive."

And if you turn back to the preceding page there is an

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104

allegation -- or a relief sought, I should say, at

paragraph 9, there is a declaration that the State has

failed to directly transpose the requirements of the

Habitats Directive. We say, dealing with the legal

points that are made there, we say that if we are right

that the Section 42 decision is not a development

consent then the Habitats Directive is not engaged at

the Section 42 stage. That is, I suppose, the legal

point that we make and I will be dealing with that in

more detail later.

But there are, I suppose, two significant issues that

arise in relation to the relief that is claimed in

relation to the Habitats Directive and that is,

firstly, you don't actually have any evidence before

you at all to show that the relevant SAC's or the SPA's

will be impacted by the development. You have had an

assertion made in the course of submissions that that's

so; you have an assertion made in the Statement of

Grounds in both cases that an Appropriate Assessment is

required, but the basic evidence that the Court

requires in any judicial review proceedings, basic

evidence to substantiate that point is not before the

Court.

If the argument is or if the case being made is that in

some way the SAC's or the SPA's are at risk of being

impacted it would be a very simple straightforward

matter for an expert to come forward and provide a view

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105

in relation to that. The Friends of the Irish

Environment, one would have thought, must have experts

available to them, given the nature of the

organisation, given their objects and so on. And we

would respectfully ask the Court to bear in mind when

it comes to looking at the relief which is sought in

relation to the Habitats Directive that there is a

very, very important and, I think, fairly fundamental

failure of proof here, failure of evidence. That is

something that I will want to develop in a little bit

more detail.

But in addition to that, insofar as the Habitats

Directive is concerned, there is also the issue of

collateral attack. Something that this Court has

considered in some detail in the Harrington case. Just

in relation to that, there is, I think, the suggestion

made by both of my Friends, and I will come to the

Friends of the Irish Environment case in a moment, but

when one comes to the Merriman case there is a

suggestion made: Well, we are not actually in any way

impugning the validity of the 2007 permission, all we

are doing is looking at the section 42 decision. But,

with respect, I don't believe that is correct. And if

one looks again at Tab 6 of the book and the Statement

of Grounds that is put forward by the Merriman

Applicants you will see, for example, and this is just

by way of example, page 155, paragraph 23 under the

very first paragraph under the heading "Habitats

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106

Directive" it says:

"The development, the subject of Planning Permission

Register reference...."

And it gives the Register reference. That's the An

Bord Pleanála reference .

"....is subject to the requirements of the Habitats

Directive and requires that both the Stage 1

Appropriate Assessment screening and/or Stage 2

Appropriate Assessment be carried out and the

requirements of the Directive in this regard were not

complied with."

And there are also similar paragraphs in the Friends

proceedings. And I will be coming to those in a

moment. And we will be suggesting to the Court that,

clearly, in order to make the case which they are

making the Applicants in both sets of proceedings are

in fact calling into question the validity of the

decision made in 2007 by An Bord Pleanála, which is now

immune from attack having regard to the time limits set

out in the 2000 Act, time limits which neither of the

Applicants have sought to extend. Although there is a

power to extend those time limits in the Act. Subject,

of course, to satisfying the necessary statutory test.

And one can only assume that neither Applicant is in a

position to satisfy that test.

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107

But can I just ask the Court to look at the Court's own

decision in the Harrington case, which is at Tab 29 of

book 2, because I think in one paragraph in that

judgment the Court, again very succinctly, if I may say

so, identifies the breath of what is involved in the

collateral attack. I'm just trying to find my book 2,

my apologies, Judge.

That, as the Court will probably recall, was a

challenge to a decision of the EPA under the Water

Services Act 2007.

If you turn to page 294 of the report, there's a

heading: "Collateral attack on the 2007 IPPC licence",

it's not necessary for me to open anything other than

to observe the Court quotes later on in that paragraph

--

MR. HEALY: Could I just ask my Friend what page?

MR. McDONALD: Page 294. The Court quotes from

Section 107 of the Water Services Act 2007 which is, I

understand and believe, in virtually identical terms to

Section 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000.

Then the Court says in paragraph at paragraph 26:

"The clear purpose and effect of s. 87(10) is to give

certainty to those who are affected by decisions of the

EPA. Thus it provides that such decisions must be

challenged within a very short period of time with the

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obvious intention that, thereafter, persons affected by

such decisions ought to be free to rely upon such

decisions, safe in the knowledge that they are beyond

challenge. This policy objective is of particular

importance where considerable sums are to be expended

in reliance on decisions or acts of the EPA, as Shell

has done here. Section 87(10) precludes not just

direct challenges to the validity of decisions of the

EPA but also..."

And I underline these words.

"...the making of any challenge or argument that would

have the effect of impugning the validity of the

decision of the EPA or involving a collateral attack

upon it."

In my respectful submission the argument that is made

in these proceedings has that effect of impugning the

validity of the decision of An Bord Pleanála in this

case and does amount to a collateral attack upon it.

You go on to say:

"That this is so is clear from the wording of s. 87(10)

and also from decisions such as those of the High Court

in Goonery v. Meath County Council (Unreported, High

Court, Kelly J., 15th July, 1999) and Mahon -v- An Bord

Pleanála [2010] IEHC 495, the latter of which was made

in the context of the Planning and Development Act

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109

2000, under which a similar procedural exclusivity to

that which obtains under s. 87(10) in the environmental

law context subsists, so that the challenging or

questioning of acts or decisions of a planning

authority/An Bord Pleanála is done by way of timely

judicial review proceedings and not in other types of

proceedings. In the present case any collateral attack

on the 2007 IPPC licence is now clearly out of time,

having regard to the outside limit set in this regard

by s. 87(10)."

We will be submitting to the Court that that decision

of this Court in Harrington -v- The EPA is consistent

what has been described by the Supreme Court in the

TD case as a fundamental principle of EU law, the

principle of legal certainty. I will be coming back to

that principle at a little later point in my

submissions.

Can I turn then to the relief which is claimed in the

Friends proceedings. I need to just get the relevant

folder. Apologies. It's at tab 1 of the first tab in

that book. I just want to draw the Court's attention

in the first instance to the title of the proceedings.

The Court may think that I'm adopting a very formal, a

very technical approach in relation to this but I do

want to draw the Court's attention to the special, I

suppose, position of judicial review proceedings and

how different they are in the way the courts approach

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110

them to plenary proceedings or proceedings between

private parties. The courts make a very, very distinct

difference between the two and the power of the Court

to amend or the power of the Court to extend time is

very heavily circumscribed in relation to judicial

review proceedings, unlike in the case of plenary

proceedings or other kinds of proceedings. But I draw

attention, in the first instance, to the title of the

proceedings, the only Respondent which is named is

Fingal County Council. The State is simply named as a

Notice Party to the proceedings. And the relief which

is sought is sought solely against Fingal.

Now, I fully appreciate the Court may think that I'm

being very formal and very technical but I think it

does raise a significant issue of principle in the

context of judicial review proceedings.

The relief sought is an order of certiorari of the

Respondent's decision at paragraph 1.

Paragraph 2:

"...the Respondent was not entitled to grant the

permission in the absence of an assessment...

3. A declaration that the Respondent acted in breach

of its obligation under the 2015 Act.

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111


of the rights of the Applicant and its members under

the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

Union.


of the Applicant's rights under the Aarhus Convention.


of the constitutional and natural rights of the

Applicant...

7. A declaration that the decision of the Respondent

was unreasonable, irrational, erred in law and fact, or

was ultra vires...

8. An order providing for the costs of the

application..."

There is, in fact, no relief sought of the kind that

you saw in the Merriman proceedings where the Applicant

very carefully and properly sought declarations in

relation to the failure to transpose and in relation to

alleged invalidity of Section 42, having regard to the

provisions of the Directives and having regard to the

provisions of the Constitution.

There is, for completeness I should draw attention to

it, there is at paragraph 12 on page 6, under the

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112

heading "ground 3", there is a paragraph that says:

"Insofar as the Respondent and/or the Notice Parties

argue that the terms of Section 42 and in particular

the mandatory requirement to grant permission where

four requirements are satisfied same constitutes a

transposition error as between the Directive and the

Planning and Development Act 2000."

I, of course, am going to deal with that argument but I

do draw attention in the first instance to the fact

that no relief is sought that there's been a failure on

the part of the State to transpose. I'll be opening a

decision of the Supreme Court that is relevant in this

context in a moment.

If you then look at page 10, paragraph 26:

"Insofar as the Respondent and/or the Notice Parties

argue that the terms of Section 42 and in particular

the mandatory requirement to grant permission shall,

where four requirements are satisfied precludes or

offers a defence ... same would constitute a

transposition error as between the Habitats Directive

and the Planning and Development Act 2000."

Again, no relief was sought seeking a declaration that

there's been a failure to transpose.

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113

If you look at the opposite page, paragraph 27 you'll

see in the -- I suppose I should open paragraph 27 in

full. It says:

"This raises the final ground of the Applicant's case.

Independently of the constitutional argument raised

above in respect of climate be change, Section 42 of

the Planning and Development 2000 is repugnant to the

Constitution. In excluding interested third parties

entirely, in failing to provide for any opportunities

for participation by objectors or interested

individuals, in failing to provide for fair procedures,

in elevating the interests of developers to the

absolute exclusion of those opposed to a particular

development, in failing to give a local authority any

discretion in deciding whether to grant extension

permission or not to a developer once minimal

conditions are satisfied Section 42 is repugnant to the

constitutional guarantees of fair procedure, equality,

non-discrimination and the protections bestowed by

Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution...."

So there is that allegation made there that there is no

corresponding relief sought in relation to that as

against the State. That does, I have to submit to the

Court, it does carry with it a consequence and there

are just two authorities that I want to draw attention

to in this context. The first is the decision of the

Supreme Court in AP -v- DPP which is in book 2 at tab

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36.

Just to draw attention first to the headnote. I don't

think I need to take the Court through the headnote.

In that case the Applicant was seeking an order of

prohibition restraining a criminal trial from

proceeding. He said that it was an abuse of process,

as you will see in the second paragraph of the

headnote.

It was an abuse of process that he was being subjected

to a fourth trial in relation to the same charges where

the trial had not proceeded on three separate occasions

previously because a witness had not turned up for the

trial.

But in the course of the Supreme Court appeal the

Applicant also sought to rely on delay and the Supreme

Court refused to allow the Applicant to rely on delay

because it wasn't part of the case in respect of which

he'd obtained leave to seek judicial review.

What the decision does, I suppose, is to emphasise the

importance of the order giving leave to bring judicial

review proceedings and how an applicant is very

circumscribed and limited to the case which he has made

in the Statement of Grounds. Just a few observations

of the Supreme Court in relation to that. The first is

at page 731 from the judgment of Chief Justice hurry.

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The last paragraph on that page, Chief Justice hurry

says:

"Because there has been a not insignificant number of

appeals in which there was a lack of clarity and even

confusion as to the precise issues that were before the

High Court, I propose to make a number of

observations in that regard.

Judicial review constitutes a significant proportion of

the cases that come before the High Court and before

this court on appeal. A party seeking relief by way of

judicial review is required to apply to the High

Court for leave to bring those proceedings and can only

be granted such leave on specified grounds when certain

criteria, required by law, are met. In most cases the

applicant must demonstrate that he or she has an

arguable case in respect of any particular ground for

relief and there are also statutory provisions setting

a somewhat higher threshold for certain specified

classes of cases.

In the interests of the good administration of

justice..."

Very similar, I think, to the principle of legal

certainty.

"...it is essential that a party applying for relief by

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way of judicial review sets out clearly and precisely

each and every ground upon which such relief is

sought."

And then he says and I rely on this:

"The same applies to the various reliefs which are

sought."

For completeness I should draw the Court's attention to

what he says on the bottom paragraph of that page. He

says:

"The court of trial of course may, in the particular

circumstances of the case, permit these matters to be

argued, especially if the respondents consent, but in

those circumstances the applicant should seek an order

permitting any extended or new ground to be argued."

In that case he was addressing the grounds but as you

will see from paragraph 5 he says the same applies to

the various reliefs which are sought.

"This would avoid ambiguity if not confusion in an

appeal as to the grounds that were before the High

Court. The respondents, if they object to any matter

being argued at such a hearing because it goes beyond

the scope of the grounds on which leave was granted,

should raise the matter and make their objection clear.

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Although it did not arise in this particular case, it

is also unsatisfactory for objections of this nature to

be raised by the respondents at the appeal stage when

no objection had been expressly raised at the trial or

there is controversy as to whether this was the case."

I draw attention to that for completeness but I do draw

attention also to the underlying principle which is

repeated in each of the judgments of the other Judges

of the Supreme Court. If you turn to page 74, for

example, Ms. Justice Denham makes a similar observation

she says at paragraph 7, page 734:

"When an applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial

review he does so on specific grounds stated in the

statement required. On the ex parte application for

leave the High Court Judge may grant leave on all, or

some, of the grounds sought or may refuse to grant

leave. The order of the High Court determines the

parameters of the grounds upon which the application

proceeds. The process requires the applicant to set

out precisely the grounds upon which the application is

to be advanced. On any such application the High Court

has jurisdiction to allow an amendment of the statement

of grounds, if it thinks fit. Once an application for

leave to appeal has been granted the basis for the

review by the court is established."

Again, I draw attention to those observations.

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If you then turn to page 739 you'll see the observation

of Mr. Justice Hardiman at paragraph 43. He says:

"In too many judicial review cases, it will be found

that little attention has been paid to the absolute

necessity..."

Again I draw attention to that.

"...for a precise defining of the grounds on which

relief is sought until the case is actually before the

court. In my view, this case furnishes an extreme

example of this unfortunate tendency. The delay in the

case and the consequent anxiety to the defendant are an

obvious feature but they are not relied upon at all in

the grounds and are only developed in the solicitor's

replying affidavit. There is no attempt to define the

precise level of anxiety and the effect, if any, on

other family members, as was done in D.S. -v- Judges of

the Cork Circuit Court [2008] IESC 37, [2008] 4 I.R.

379."

Finally, there's the observation of Mr. Justice

Fennelly at pages 744 to 745. At paragraphs 65 and 65

Mr. Justice Fennelly says:

"The first matter to be determined is the scope of the

appeal. The statement of grounds, as quoted above, is

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based only on the allegation of abuse of the process

and infringement of the applicant's right to a fair

trial arising from the fact that the applicant is to be

put on trial for a fourth time. The grounding

affidavit recounts the history of the applicant's

charging and the three previous trials. It proceeds to

state that the applicant 'has secured three jury

discharges on the basis of the infirmities in the

prosecution evidence adduced by the prosecution' and

adds that the applicant 'was in no way culpable for the

said discharges'. The solicitor says that the

applicant 'has suffered severe distress and anxiety in

having to undergo three criminal trials' and that it

would be unfair if there were to be a fourth trial.

The solicitor then claims that there is some risk of

'adjustment of evidence' if the matter is be tried for

a fourth time.

The application for judicial review is thus very

narrowly based. It claims in essence that it is

inherently unfair to put the applicant on trial on

a fourth occasion. It is notable that neither the

original grounding affidavit nor the statement of

grounds makes any mention of delay or of the letter

demanding money of November, 2002. I am satisfied that

the applicant should not be allowed to argue either of

these matters on the present appeal. No leave was

granted to rely upon them. Delay is, in many cases, a

legitimate element of background. For example, where

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there is prosecutorial delay, it is well established

that the fact of pre-existing long delay in making a

complaint may be a relevant factor. However, there is

no complaint of prosecutorial delay in the present

case. Insofar as long delay may, in itself, be a

ground for restraining a prosecution, it will be

necessary to establish that the delay itself has led to

the existence of a real and serious risk to the

fairness of the trial."

Even though the delay allegation in that case was

obvious, the Supreme Court wouldn't allow it to be

argued because no leave had been granted in relation to

it.

While it may seem harsh that, in my respectful

submission, is the relevant principle having regard to

the Supreme Court decision in that case. You can see

that principle, though AP -v- DPP is not expressly

relied upon or referred to, you can see that principle

being applied by Ms. Justice Costello in a case called

Alen-Buckley, which is at tab 18 of Book 1 and I just

need to get that out. Tab 18 Book 1. It is a judgment

of Ms. Justice Costello delivered 12th May this year.

That was on application to have the State Respondents

in that case discharged from the proceedings. I

haven't brought any such application, therefore I will

deal with all aspects of this case. But I am entitled,

obviously, to rely on the fact that the relief which is

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claimed in these proceedings is now claimed in terms

against me and I say, having regard to the Supreme

Court decision, and the, I suppose the strictures laid

down by the members of the Supreme Court in this case,

that that is an approach which should be taken by this

Court.

If you look at - I'm not going to spend time on this

but if you look at pages 3 and 4 of the judgment,

Ms. Justice Costello sets out the relief that was

claimed in these proceedings. It is, again, all

claimed against the Respondent in that case, An Bord

Pleanála; it wasn't claimed against the State

Respondents. She then sets out, on pages 6 and 7, she

sets out the grounds that were relied on. Unlike the

present case, there were grounds that raised the issue

but the issue wasn't claimed against the State in the

relief that was sought. You'll see on the top of page

7, for example, paragraph (xxvii):

"The determination of planning application 14/600109 An

Bord Pleanála Reference PL93.2440006 if made in a

manner consistent with the Planning & Development Act

and Planning & Development Regulations 2001 (as

amended) made thereunder, renders the statutory scheme

inconsistent with and incompatible to Council Directive

2011/92/EU and the Second Named Respondent failed to

appropriately transpose the requirements of the

Directive."

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You'll see, then, if you look at the -- I don't think I

need to take the Court through the various submissions

that were made, if you go all the way to page 17,

paragraph 41 she says:

"It is noteworthy that the applicants advanced no

explanation as to why they did not seek any relief

expressly against the state defendants."

I say I am in the same position here.

"It was open to them, had they so wished, to have

sought declaratory relief to the effect that the

Directive had not been properly transposed into Irish

law, if that was the case which they wished to advance.

Of course, such a case would have to be properly

pleaded in accordance with the requirements of O. 84,

r. 20 (3). In addition, it would have to be pleaded

when the leave application was moved and to have been

within the time limited for bringing judicial review

proceedings. No explanation was provided to the court

as to why the applicants did not seek to identify any

provisions of either the Directive or Irish statute law

or regulations upon which they wish to advance their

case that Irish law had failed properly to transpose

the Directive."

Then if you go down to the end of that page, paragraph

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44:

"In my opinion, the proceedings in fact seek no relief

whatsoever against the State defendants,

notwithstanding the attempt of the applicants to argue

to the contrary. Therefore, the continued maintenance

of these proceedings against these respondents is

vexatious and amounts to an abuse of process."

She strikes out a claim against. As I say, I haven't

brought such an application in the present case but I

am, of course, entitled to draw attention to that in

the course of my defence, my plenary defence, so to

speak, it's not plenary but my full defence to the

claim in the present proceedings. But I do suggest

that in the case of the Friends proceedings there is no

relief sought against me and those two authorities

provide ample authority for the proposition that in

those circumstances the relief, the grounds which I

should say are set out in the Statement of Grounds can

not be relied upon as against me to seek the relief

which is sought, for example, in the Merriman

proceedings. That relief simply isn't sought in these

proceedings.

So that's really all I wanted to say in opening - and

I'm sorry I've taken this long in opening - about the

various reliefs which are sought against the State.

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I now want to, I suppose, before I address the legal

issues which arise in relation to the European law and

the other issues other than the Constitution and the

European Convention, I do want to look at some of the

underlying facts. As I said at the outset I wasn't a

party to either process but there is a lot of material

before the Court which identifies the extent of the

exercise that was carried out before An Bord Pleanála

in 2007. The reason why I'm drawing attention to this

is twofold. One is to distinguish the facts of this

case from McKillen, Dellway, the other is that I think

it's clear when one looks at this material that the

complaints that are made in relation to the EIA and so

on, now, were all fully ventilated and dealt with by An

Bord Pleanála and by the Merriman Applicants

themselves. The Friends of the Irish Environment did

not participate in the proceedings, even though other,

I suppose, experts in relation to environmental impact

assessment and in relation to the Habitats Directive

did participate, among them being An Taisce, Mr. Ian

Lumley appeared on behalf of An Taisce and

Mr. Sweetman, the Applicant or the Plaintiff in the

proceedings which led the European Court in several

decisions called Sweetman to vary its findings both in

relation to the EIA Directive and in relation to the

Habitats Directive, he also participated in relation to

one of the objectors. So you had -- there was also

counsel, very distinguished counsel, Peter Bland

appeared for St. Margaret's in those proceedings, again

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someone with expertise in this area. You had, I think,

Nap Keeling for one of the other objectors, again a

barrister, now a solicitor I understand, with expertise

in this area. And you had, unusually, a triumvirate of

inspectors hearing the oral hearing, including a

leading light in relation to noise, Mr. Thornely, I

have forgotten his, name it's a double-barrelled name

in any event. It was, if I may say so, a very, very

full consideration of all of the issues. I think it is

important, I will try not to spend too long on it but I

think it is important, just to identify, even in

headline terms, the extent of the participation that

was involved and the extent of the ventilation of the

issues and, also, the extent to which it may not have

been called a flood risk assessment under the 2009

Flood Risk Guidelines, but an exercise of precisely the

same kind was carried out in the course of proceedings

before An Bord Pleanála, and reached precisely the same

conclusion as the RPS report that was presented to

Fingal in the Section 442 application by reference to

the 2009 Guidelines. The facts and the conclusions are

identical. There's nothing new in the RPS report that

wasn't addressed in the very full consideration that

was given by An Bord Pleanála. If I may say so, I

think it shows the procedures of An Bord Pleanála in

very good light. It demonstrates the extensive public

participation which is inherent in the process in

Ireland, particularly the process before An Bord

Pleanála. You'll find that in book --

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MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: What is the point Mr. Healy

raises about they were shut out from making submissions

whatsoever, or would have been shut out had they made

submissions as to the extension at the end?

MR. McDONALD: Well he says they were shut out from

making that, but there's no evidence they were shut out

from making that at all. They could, of course, have

said, because they did want clarity as we'll see, they

wanted clarity in relation to the length of the

planning permission. They wanted to clarify that it

was ten years because the Fingal permission didn't

actually state the duration but it granted the

permission based on the application and the application

had looked for a ten-year permission. Fingal didn't

thing it was necessary to say it should be ten years

but the residents wanted to clarify for ten years, but

of course they could have made the submission look,

this might be stated to be for ten years but this is

capable of being extended under Section 42 and we were

really concerned about that. There's absolutely no

evidence to suggest that that couldn't have been

addressed in the course of the EIA. Mr. Healy makes --

it goes back to the point I made earlier in relation to

the Habitats Directive, that's simply a hypothetical

that's put before the Court but there's no evidence at

all to suggest that that was a concern of the

residents, or that the residents were prevented from

raising any issue in relation to it. I do think it is

significant, I suppose, in the first instance before I

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look at Book 2 of the Pleadings in the Merriman case,

it is significant, I think, to draw attention to two

paragraphs of the affidavit sworn on behalf of Fingal,

which is in Book 1 of the papers before the Court.

It's at tab number 11, I think, if I have.

MR. HEALY: Of Book?

MR. McDONALD: It's in Book 1 of the Merriman

proceedings. Sorry, it's tab 12. Mr. Byrne's

affidavit. It's just really paragraphs 15 and 16 of

Mr. Byrne's affidavit. It appears at page 6 of the

internal pagination. Mr. Healy said we accept all of

this and he didn't actually read it all out in those

circumstances. But actually we will be submitting

that, whether it's accepted or not it's desperately

important that the Court should see the extent of the

EIA that was carried out at the time and the

opportunity that existed for public participation and

for dealing with the issues of concern to these

Applicants. Mr. Byrne says at paragraph 15 in the

second sentence:

"The Applicants did, however, invoke the permissions

provided for the participation in the appeal process

before An Bord Pleanála which led to its decision to

grant the said planning permission with 31 conditions

on 29th August 2007."

He goes on then to quote from the Applicant's

affidavit. I don't think that's relevant but in the

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next sentence he says:

"Also, the Applicants comprise the St. Margaret's

Concerned Residents Group."

He says:

"St. Margaret's Concerned Residents Group was one of

the parties that lodged an appeal to An Bord Pleanála

prior to its decision on 29th August 2008. This group

made submissions on a range of matters including, but

not limited to, the impact of the development on the

community, the DAA's proposed voluntary residential

buy-out scheme, noise, traffic, health, cultural

heritage, visual impacts, the construction process and

fauna. It made an appeal submission, a submission

following the EIS public notice dated 25th May 2006 and

participated in and made submissions at the oral

hearing which took 12 days and was held on 26th and

27th September and from 29th September to 12th

October."

Our court hearing days may be long, I think in this

court in particular the hearing days may be very long,

but I think the hearing days in these oral hearings are

particularly long. I think they certainly would match

the 9:00 o'clock days that this Court sometimes has.

But if you go to paragraph 16:

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"The Inspector's report of the said oral hearing

records that Ms. Helena Merriman, Ms. Sheila Morris,

Mr. Noel Reilly, Mr. Jim Scully and Ms. Helen Gilligan

all attended the oral hearing. I say and believe that

these names refer to five of the Applicants herein.

The Inspector's report also records that Mr. Reilly,

Mr. Scully, Ms. Gillespie, Ms. Colgan, Ms. Morris and

MS. Merriman made submissions on behalf of

St. Margaret's Concerned Residents Group on the impact

of the proposal on their lives and properties and that

further submissions by P & M Deighan, S Hand and

J Scully were presented on their behalf. I say and

believe these names also refer to a number of the

Applicants herein being Noel Reilly ..."

He lists them. I don't think I need to go through

that.

"I say and believe that Deirdre Colgan is identified as

a member of the St. Margaret's Concerned Residents

Group and the submissions subject to these proceedings

is not one of the Applicants.

Subsequent to the oral hearing, the group also made a

submission in the revised public notices under the

Section 42 response."

He then exhibits An Bord Pleanála's Inspector's report.

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130

I just want to look very quickly through that report.

I'm not proposing to read out large parts of it but

just to identify, I suppose, the extent of the

participation.

It's a very lengthy document taking up the whole of

that tab, I haven't counted the number of pages but

it's more than 200 pages, I think. This, I think, is

only the tip of the iceberg in terms of what was

actually before An Bord Pleanála, because you'll see

when you go through this document that he refers to

tapes, he refers to disks, he refers to underlying

documents which are not before the Court. But clearly

the kind of material that was dealt with in the course

of this EIA was very extensive. But I'm going to pass

over the report itself for the moment, it's at the

beginning of the book. I'll come back to that. If you

look -- sorry, just to identify the name of the expert.

It's at page 419, Rupert Thornely-Taylor. He is

somebody who has given evidence in several cases here

in relation to noise.

If you turn then to page 450. I should start at page

449 there is the heading: "Appeal submissions". It

identifies at page 450 each of the third party appeals.

You'll see that St. Margaret's is number 7. You'll see

that Mr. Trevor Sargent, who was then a TD, I think,

was also one of the appellants. An Taisce was an

appellant at item 13. And another community

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131

association, Portmarnock Community Association was also

an appellant.

He then goes through - and this is very much in

headline terms - the issues that were identified. If

you go page 452 you'll see he summarises St. Margaret's

Concerned Residents Group's position and you'll see

that it was accompanied by supporting documentation.

You don't have that before you but obviously they had

their opportunity to put in supporting documentation at

that time. You'll see the concerns that they

identified.

"The proposal will result in the end of St. Margaret's

and the erosion of the strong community. The

mitigation measures proposed, which are not discussed

or finalised with the group, will serve to destroy

rather than provide an acceptable solution."

Of course that's one of the complaints or one of the

things that is mentioned by Ms. Merriman in her

affidavit that they weren't consulted in relation to

the Voluntary Purchase Scheme. They didn't have an

opportunity to participate in it. I suppose, just

while I think of it, it is of some significance, I

think, that the Applicants, firstly didn't seek to

contest the legality of An Bord Pleanála's decision at

the time, even though Condition 9 doesn't provide for

any right of the Applicants to participate, or indeed

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132

any of the other affected residents, because I think it

would be wrong just to focus on the St. Margaret's

residents. There were other residents that were

potentially affected. There was no challenge to the

An Bord Pleanála decision at the time and nor was there

any challenge to the scheme. Obviously this was a

scheme that was entered into by two public bodies;

Fingal and An Bord Pleanála and would be amenable to

judicial review and yet there was no challenge in

relation to it.

If you then go back to the page, you'll just the bullet

points here:

"In terms of the buy-out scheme, the community has no

intention or desire to sell their properties and are

therefore being forced into an untenable position."

Exactly the case which is, it's almost word for, it's

not word-for-word but it's the same sentiment as

Mr. Healy had in opening the case or voiced, I should

say, in opening the case.

"Currently the community enjoys a rural setting with

all the amenities of urban life and an active

community. The proposed installation scheme is

piecemeal and will not provide a satisfactory solution.

The Dublin Airport Authority will not operate on any

curfew."

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The Court will recall that in fact the planning

permission ultimately granted deals with that concern

and makes sure there won't be nighttime movements.

Then it talks about lighting; it talks about road

improvements; it talks about changes to road

realignments; the construction process will have a

negative. The community should be advised and

consulted.

"The assessment of mitigation measures for noise every

two years is not acceptable..." and so on. There is

references to historical buildings, hedgerows, fauna

and wild life to be protected. There's a reference to

halting sites.

"Engine testing

The exactly location of the engine testing area should

be provided."

I didn't open this condition but one of the conditions

of the planning permission is that the engine testing

area would be moved.

"The location of the proposed viewing area should be

identified.

Due consideration should be given to boundary

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treatment.

Construction hours should not be allowed beyond the

time stipulated in Condition 3.

Clarification is required about the equipment

enclosure.

Clarification is required about services."

Then there's a reference and this is the flood risk:

"Clarification is required as to whether the water

supply and drainage rain would affect the surrounding

lands and residents."

Then the duration of the permission for ten years needs

to be clarified. That's the point I referred to

earlier.

You then have reference to all the other, again in

summary bullet point fashion you have reference to all

the other concerns of other appellants. But just

briefly if you look at page 458 you'll see there's a

very detailed summary of the concerns made, voiced by

An Taisce, including concerns about the EIS that had

been delivered. Again, of course, An Taisce, somebody

peculiarly qualified to offer views in relation to the

reliability and extent of an EIS in relation to issues

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in relation to the Habitats Directive. These are

matters that ordinary bread and butter issues, I think

that's the wrong expression but relatively common

issues of concern to bodies such as An Taisce.

You then have Portmarnock Community Association at page

459. I don't think we need to spend time on that.

If you turn to page 468 you'll see the Applicants'

response to the third party grounds of appeal. I don't

think I need to take you through the detail of that,

other than to note that there was obviously a very

significant amount of detail provided, because this is

only a summary but if you turn to page 472, one of the

things that was dealt with is water is the heading, but

what they're really dealing with, they're dealing with

run-off water and surface water, drainage and so on.

That's going to the issue of flood risk. The Court

will be aware, of course, that under the EIA Directive

the EIA Directive would require consideration of

impacts but, in addition, there's a specific

requirement that EIA should address accidents, risks of

that kind. So flood risk something that where you have

an EIA you really have to address it. That's what

happened in this case, as we'll see.

If you then move on you'll see at page 476 they deal

with ecology and they deal with birds and so on. Just

in relation to that. There was a suggestion made by

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Mr. Kenny yesterday that the Bird Surveys that were

utilised for the purpose of this EIA dated back to

2002. Now, I could be completely wrong about this but

I couldn't find, I went looking for that reference in

the papers before the Court and I could find nothing

about it. Obviously, having regard to all we've seen

in the AP -v- DPP case and the other case, the position

of Ms. Justice Costello, that's something about which

the Court should have evidence if that's being relied

on and there's a singular, certainly as far as I can

see a singular lack of evidence in relation to that.

You'll see, then, that in addition to that at page 479

there were people who were weren't appellants but they

were observers, including two local councillors. I

don't think I need to take you through that. If you

turn to page 482 there are, just to identify it at page

481, they identify that "what follows in the next

section are submissions received following the EIS

public notice published on 25th May 2006."

You'll see at the bottom of the next page, page 482,

again this is just a summary, you'll see St. Margaret's

again participated at this stage and raised further

issues. The Inspector says, at the top of the page,

he's not repeating the points they made previously

because he has already summarised those before, but

he's identifying additional points that they make.

You'll see the second bullet point under the heading is

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that there is no reference as to how the buy-out

procedure would be operated. So this was something

that they were ventilating and voicing at the time the

planning permission was under consideration.

Then it talks about installation. If turn to the next

page there is reference to:

"Detailed proposals are required as to how contaminated

water is to be stored to prevent contamination of

watercourses.

Overall plans for the airport and surrounding

infrastructure should be lodged simultaneously."

More reference to traffic chaos and details of the

effects of emissions from radio navigation is another

issue that was raised.

If you then turn to page 486 you'll see there's the

Applicants' response to the Section 132 notice. I

don't need to spend time on that. You'll just see

again it is another stage. You then have the responses

to the Section 132 notice and the revised public

notices starting at page 488. You'll see, if you turn

to page 491 that the responses were received from a

number of bodies, including the Portmarnock Community

Association, on the top of the next page,

St. Margaret's Concerned Residents Group at page 492.

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And you'll see that the Portmarnock Community

Association go through a very long list of things,

including very significant detail about noise at page

493. Raising very similar issues, I think, to the

issues that were raised by St. Margaret's. If you then

go forward you'll come to page 498 and you'll see that

that noise in particular was dealt with accompanied by

a report from an engineer, Searson & Associates by

St. Margaret's at this point. I don't think I need to

take you through the detail of that but just to

identify that not only did the residents association

make submissions but they retained, very properly and

prudently, they retained an engineer to assist them in

making their submissions in relation to what was

undoubtedly a technical issue, the issue of noise.

There's then, at page 500, I don't think I need to

spend time on that, but the Inspector identifies the

national policy documents. You've seen some reference

to those in the planning permission. Page 508, the

Inspector deals with the regional policy documents.

Again, I don't think we need to spend time on that

because we've seen the reference to them in the

decision of the Board.

Then if you turn to page 529 you'll see the summary of

the oral hearing proceedings.

If you it turn to page -- well it's the next page, it's

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not actually paginated in the book I just see. But

you'll see the list of attendees and you'll see that

Ms. Theresa Kavanagh, not only did she represent

herself but Mr. Sweetman represented her, an expert in

the EIA and the Habitats Directive issues.

You'll see, if you go down the page, the St. Margaret's

Concerned Residents Group, all the different

participants who took part, including Peter Bland who's

wrongly described as a solicitor. I suppose he was in

civies on that day but he was obviously a member of the

Library and a very well respected and knowledgeable

person in relation to this area. Similarly, on the

next page there's a reference to Mr. Matthew Harley who

represented himself and also in Nap Keeling represented

him. You have Mr. Trevor Sargent who represented

himself and you have An Taisce represented by Ian

Lumley. And then you have a whole series of people,

including various experts on behalf of Portmarnock

Community Council. You'll see there is a reference to

Mr. Kelly Robert of R. Kelly & Associates Consultants,

a reference to Dr. Anthony Staines,

Professor Stansfield, Acoustic Associates Ireland

Limited and so on. Then there are the Planning

Authority well -- that's not -- which identifies who

was there. I don't think those are immediately

relevant in terms of the ability of people like

St. Margaret's to participate in the process.

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Then if you look at page 531 you'll see the identity of

the Inspectors. It is actually a lady, Ms. Pauline

Fitzpatrick who was the presiding Inspector. There is

then Mr. Gerry Barnes and Mr. Rupert Thornely-Taylor

who is the noise expert that I identified earlier.

The Inspector then goes through the various issues that

were addressed during the course of the oral hearing.

I don't think it is necessary to take the Court through

the detail of that, other than to note it. You will

note that at various pages there's reference to disk 1

and so on. That's obviously a recording of the

hearing.

If you then turn to page, or the best way to find it is

to turn to page 541. At the bottom of the right-hand

side you'll see under the heading: "Surface water

drainage" a number of pages all dealing with that issue

which is obviously the flood issue. You'll see, for

example, at the bottom of page 24 of the internal

pagination, Mr. McElligott making a submission in

relation to how the water would be adequately

accommodated and there would be no increase in flood

risk downstream and no deterioration in water quality.

That goes on for, I think, three pages. Again that's

only a summary. The Inspectors refer to the disk.

If it you then turn to page 542 you have a summary of

the issues that were debated in relation to

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archaeology, cultural heritage and visual impact.

You'll see at page 28 of the internal pagination they

address the existing habitat. They address the bat

activity. They address bird strike at the top of page

543. They address habitat mountain at the top of page

543. On the next page there's obviously quite a lot of

questions and answers in relation to the issue of

whether bats are present on site and so on and there

were experts there to address that issue.

You then have at page 544, dealing with public health

and safety and air quality. I don't think we need to

spend time on that. But if you turn to page 548 you

have the section that starts on the opposite page

dealing with noise and by my very unreliable

calculation that goes on for 12 pages. So clearly the

whole issue of noise was ventilated at very significant

length.

I don't think you need to look at the detail of that,

at page 554 you have other issues including legal

issues and there are submissions made by Mr. Lumley in

relation to the adequacy of the EIS.

You'll see at page 52 of the internal pagination,

Mr. Sweetman raising issues. You'll see that among the

issues that he raises is bats and he specifically

references in the fourth last line of the paragraph

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142

beginning "Mr. Sweetman", he specifically references

the Habitats Directive. Then he goes on in the next

paragraph to raise issues about the adequacy of the EIS

and so on.

Then you have, if you go to page 557 you'll see two

pages dealing with closing submissions. Again have you

Mr. Bland then making a closing submission on behalf

the St. Margaret's Concerned Residents Group. Again I

don't think I need to take you to the detail of that.

It's obviously a very short summary. The Inspectors

clearly have disk 2 available to them with the actual

full text of what was said.

You then have, if you turn to the next two pages, page

557 and 558 and the page opposite page 558 you have an

identification of the various things that happened on

each day of the oral hearing. You'll see that

St. Margaret's were heard on a number of days. They

were heard on Wednesday, 27th September; they were

heard again on 4th October; they were heard again quite

significantly, for quite a significant period of

Friday, 6th October; they were heard again on 9th

October when Mr. Searson gave evidence; Ms. Sheila

Morris also gave evidence; and there was whole series

of other residents who gave evidence without their

names being identified, although Mr. Deighan's name and

Mr. Scully's name were identified. And then you also

obviously had other noise experts who gave evidence on

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143

that day.

So you had, I think, when you look at that - and I have

only taken you through on a very headline basis, I

think it just identifies the sheer extent of the EIA

that took place in this case, the opportunity that was

given for public participation, not just once but at

every layer of the process that took place before An

Bord Pleanála, and every opportunity with given to the

residents to make their case and no indication being

given at that they're shut out from making a case.

Now I did say that I wanted to address flood risk and I

think if you look - and I'll try to deal with this as

quickly as I can. I'm sure I will get it done before

4:00 o'clock. If you go back to the Inspector's

report, which is at the beginning of that tab, page 390

of the book, it's under the heading "Site Drainage".

You'll see, if you go down to the second sentence in

that paragraph:

"Concern was expressed as to the potential of whether

the proposal to exacerbate what is considered to be an

already intolerable situation arising from the impact

of development of the airports on lands downstream in

terms of drainage and flooding. Concern was also

expressed as to the potential impact on Baldoyle Bay

which is an SAC and on Kinsealy Lake."

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Again, looking at impacts. You'll see on the next

paragraph:

"I note that the issue of site drainage constituted a

material consideration of the further information

request to the Applicant. Of particular concern was

the sensitivity of the Ward River catchment as it is

salmonid a watercourse..." and so on.

You'll see then in the next paragraph:

"The proposed surface water drainage system is to

record the principles of sustainable urban drainage

systems..."

And they're still in operation today.

"...and it is to involve a sealed pipe drainage system

to intercept all surface water runoff from the

impervious areas to be served by one outfall to Forest

Little Stream sub-catchment so that no paved area

runoff enters the Ward River catchment. Runoff from

grassed areas will continue to drain to existing

catchments, therefore the Ward River will only receive

drainage from grassed areas within the western area of

the development. Attenuation tanks will also be

provided to control discharges for grassed areas."

It then goes on to deal with other steps that were

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145

being taken to offset potential flooding issues. I'm

not sure I really need to take you through all of the

detail of that.

If you look at the conclusion which the Inspector

reaches, in my submission it's exactly the conclusion

which is reached in 2017 by RPS, even though RPS were

approaching this by reference to the framework that's

now in place under the 2009 Flood Risk Guidelines

issued by the Minister.

If you look at the bottom of page 391 of the book or

page 91 of the internal pagination, the conclusion of

the Inspector:

"In conclusion, while I note the concerns raised

relating to current surface water drainage regime at

other parts of the airport and on other airport lands,

including car parking areas, these are not before the

Board for adjudication."

That's the existing regime.

He says:

"Certainly..."

Again, this is entirely consistent with the EIA

requirement that you look at cumulative effects.

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"Certainly, the cumulative effect is of relevance and

on the balance of evidence I am satisfied that the

Applicant has supplied sufficient detail at this

juncture to support its view that the proposed works

will not exacerbate the situation as currently

prevailing. In this regard I see no reason to object

to the Applicants' claim that as the proposed runway

will replace a certain extent of paved areas that

currently discharge unattenuated into the Forest Little

Stream, the proposal is likely to reduce any existing

flood risk."

Then he goes on to deal with contamination and I don't

think contamination is really the issue that is raised

by the Merriman Applicants in these proceedings. But

if you compare that conclusion and the things that he

considered, such as the sealed pipe drainage system to

intercept all surface water and the attenuation tanks

that will be provided, when you compare that when the

flood risk assessment that's done in 2017 by RPS, in my

respectful submission the facts relied on and the

conclusion reached are precisely the same. There's

nothing new here because whether you're doing an EIA to

identify potential impacts of a development, or you're

carrying out a flood risk assessment under the 2009

Guidelines, you're looking at the same thing: What is

the risk of flooding here? Is it being managed

appropriately? And is there a risk of an increase in

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147

flooding as a consequence of this development? That's

exactly the process that this Inspector undertook back

in 2007 and it's the same process which RPS undertook

in 2017.

Can I just ask the Court, very briefly, to look at the

RPS document that's exhibited by the Merriman

Applicants in Book 1 of their pleadings? It's tab 3

behind tab 3. I'm sorry about the pagination but

that's the way it's done. It starts at page 70. It is

headed:

"Flood risk assessment for North Runway."

Just, I suppose, to put this in context - I'll be

desperately quick about this. The 2009 Guidelines on

flood risk assessment, they apply to any development in

an area that potentially has potential flood risk. So

they apply whether you're building a house that has

nothing to do with the EIA or whether you're building

an EIA development. But, as I said to you earlier, EIA

is really when you're looking at impacts, particularly

risks and Annex IV specifically identifies the risk of

accidents and accidents would include flooding because

they're clearly not intentional. You're actually

carrying out the same process. What the 2009

Guidelines do is simply to set out a framework by which

the flood risk assessment is to be carried out and in

particular if you look at page 109 of the Book you'll

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148

see that it sets out a justification test that applies.

I don't think I need to take you through the detail of

that but if you look at page 1110 there are different

criteria in the justification test. The first is the

zoning of the lands and these lands have been zoned for

development. Zoning was already dealt with, as you've

seen, from the An Bord Pleanála decision itself. The

next issue that's dealt with at paragraph 732:

"The flood risk assessment must demonstrate that the

development proposed will not increase flood risk

elsewhere and, if practicable, will the overall reduce

flood risk."

That's precisely the exercise that the Inspector

undertook as we've just seen. The next criteria down

is:

"The development proposal includes measures to minimise

flood risk to people, property, the economy and the

environment so far as reasonably upon."

Again, you have seen the measures that were posed back

in 2007 and are still the same measures. The

culverting or piping of the stream, the building of the

attenuation tank and so on. So the process that is

undertaken under the 2009 Guidelines is not, in

substance, in my submission, any different at all to

the process that was undertaken by the Inspector in

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149

this case.

Just to draw finally at page 112 to the final paragraph

of the report under the heading "Summary and

Conclusions", the very bottom of that page, it says:

"Following completion of the justification test in

accordance with the Planning System and Flood Risk

Management Guidelines for Planning Authorities, it was

shown through the report..."

That's their own report.

"...that all elements can be satisfied and there is no

flood risk to the operational functionality of the

North Runway or to properties and land downstream from

the airport from airport discharges."

That's precisely the same conclusion the Inspector

reaches in his report and, therefore, there is no

difference, in substance, between what was done in 2007

and what was done in 2017.

I see it's just 4:00 o'clock, Judge.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Very good. Just in terms of next

week we have Tuesday and Wednesday. Should we put in

longer days to get it done?

MR. McDONALD: I think it might be, subject to my

Friends, it might be wise to do that, if the Court is

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150

prepared to do that?

MR. SIMONS: Yes.

MR. McDONALD: I mean I'm very conscious this Court

seems to sit unusually long hours and I'm sorry that

the Court is finding itself in that position but if the

Court is prepared to do it I think it would be

immensely.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Sure, well I'll just abandon my

kids to their mother! You name the time on Tuesday and

we'll start at that time.

MR. McDONALD: Would 10:00 o'clock be okay?

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Sure, no problem.

MR. BRADLEY: Judge, could I just indicate, I'm obliged

to Mr. McDonald, I have a slight difficulty on Tuesday

morning but I anticipate that I'll probably be starting

around about lunchtime on Tuesday in any event, just as

a matter of courtesy.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you very much. See you

then.

THE HEARING WAS THEN ADJOURNED TO TUESDAY, 17TH OCTOBER

2017 AT 10:00 A.M.

'

'...that [1] -

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'85 [1] - 74:23

'adjustment [1] -

119:16

'cannot [1] -

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'free [1] - 60:10

'free-wheeling'

[1] - 60:10

'has [2] - 119:7,

119:12

'In [1] - 62:3

'intent [1] - 53:2

'intent' [1] -

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'intention [1] -

54:1

'it [2] - 13:24,

39:4

'legislative [2] -

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'one [1] - 38:28

'parliamentary

[1] - 63:9

'serious' [1] -

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'significant' [1] -

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'the [5] - 34:2,

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53:1, 62:26

'to [1] - 38:17

'was [1] - 119:10

'We [1] - 55:1

1

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127:7, 140:11,

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10:00 [2] -

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1110 [1] - 148:3

112 [1] - 149:3

114 [1] - 101:2

12 [12] - 1:3,

16:20, 91:22,

92:21, 93:2, 93:6,

93:8, 93:11,

111:29, 127:8,

128:19, 141:17

122 [1] - 44:28

124 [1] - 45:10

127 [1] - 45:10

128 [1] - 45:11

12th [2] -

120:24, 128:20

13 [6] - 81:4,

82:25, 82:27,

83:11, 83:15,

130:29

132 [2] - 137:21,

137:24

134 [1] - 3:13

136 [1] - 81:18

137 [1] - 99:11

138 [3] - 81:3,

97:24, 103:23

13th [1] - 70:14

13TH [2] - 1:25,

3:2

14 [3] - 42:4,

97:22, 97:23

14/600109 [1] -

121:21

15 [5] - 16:5,

18:3, 99:18,

127:9, 127:19

155 [1] - 105:28

15th [1] - 108:27

16 [6] - 74:14,

99:11, 99:19,

99:20, 127:9,

128:28

16-hour [1] -

91:21

160 [1] - 95:3

17 [3] - 74:14,

74:15, 122:4

171A(1) [1] -

10:15

177 [1] - 23:14

177U [1] - 9:6

177V [1] - 9:7

177V(1 [1] - 9:19

17TH [1] -

150:21

18 [4] - 77:18,

77:20, 120:22,

120:23

19 [1] - 60:6

191 [3] - 100:6,

100:8, 100:23

192 [3] - 100:6,

100:11, 100:15

193 [1] - 23:14

1972 [1] - 87:15

1981 [1] - 77:19

1993 [1] - 60:19

1995 [4] - 67:27,

68:3, 69:1, 69:12

1996 [2] - 60:11,

69:7

1997 [1] - 60:17

1999 [4] - 45:21,

45:25, 46:11,

108:27

1:00 [1] - 69:24

2

2 [18] - 6:27,

31:29, 43:7,

44:10, 46:4, 67:7,

86:11, 90:13,

100:7, 100:27,

106:11, 107:4,

107:7, 110:22,

113:29, 127:1,

142:12

20 [6] - 24:6,

31:2, 40:12,

71:24, 93:24,

122:19

200 [1] - 130:8

2000 [12] -

17:15, 18:10,

70:23, 71:22,

79:10, 103:15,

106:24, 107:23,

109:1, 112:8,

112:25, 113:8

2001 [5] - 60:29,

61:1, 66:18, 69:8,

121:24

2002 [3] - 91:5,

119:25, 136:3

2003 [1] - 61:29

2004 [1] - 12:16

2005) [1] - 60:20

2005-2011 [1] -

45:29

2006 [4] - 78:29,

91:6, 128:17,

136:20

2007 [25] - 3:16,

5:1, 6:1, 6:6,

6:12, 6:17, 15:19,

15:22, 16:14,

20:12, 47:19,

60:16, 68:27,

69:1, 105:22,

106:22, 107:12,

107:15, 107:21,

109:8, 124:9,

127:26, 147:3,

148:24, 149:21

2008 [3] -

118:21, 128:10

2009 [8] - 45:19,

125:15, 125:21,

145:9, 146:26,

147:16, 147:26,

148:27

2010 [2] - 61:3,

108:28

2011 [3] - 16:22,

18:11, 72:21

2011/92/EU [1] -

121:27

2014 [2] - 50:26,

72:23

2015 [3] - 5:8,

23:26, 110:28

2016 [3] - 61:21,

70:21, 73:15

2017 [12] - 1:25,

3:2, 15:6, 20:13,

31:11, 47:19,

70:15, 145:7,

146:21, 147:4,

149:22, 150:22

2017/344JR [1] -

1:5

21 [1] - 87:5

21st [1] - 45:19

22 [3] - 6:28,

7:13, 102:9

229 [1] - 61:1

23 [5] - 25:13,

94:22, 94:25,

96:9, 105:28

23rd [1] - 66:17

24 [4] - 78:27,

78:28, 96:6,

140:20

25 [4] - 9:3,

60:11, 67:7,

96:10

251 [1] - 60:29

251.. [1] - 69:9

253A [1] - 60:18

258 [1] - 18:4

25th [3] - 60:16,

128:17, 136:20

26 [4] - 86:19,

96:24, 107:24,

112:17

267 [1] - 32:2

26th [1] - 128:19

27 [3] - 6:28,

113:1, 113:2

27th [4] - 67:27,

68:3, 128:20,

142:20

28 [2] - 70:21,

141:3

28(1 [1] - 70:22

28(2 [1] - 71:21

283 [1] - 78:26

284 [1] - 43:17

29 [3] - 77:19,

91:16, 107:3

291 [1] - 63:8

293 [1] - 39:14

294 [2] - 107:14,

107:20

295 [2] - 52:7,

52:17

297 [1] - 55:25

299 [2] - 57:14

29th [3] -

127:26, 128:10,

128:20

2:00 [1] - 69:27

3

3 [26] - 9:22,

19:15, 27:26,

30:7, 51:16,

51:17, 52:7,

60:29, 69:8,

76:25, 76:28,

81:19, 81:25,

82:17, 86:10,

86:12, 90:21,

95:11, 110:27,

112:1, 121:9,

134:4, 147:8,

147:9

3) [1] - 122:19

3,110 [2] - 4:14,

16:2

302 [2] - 58:13,

58:14

307 [1] - 60:20

31 [2] - 37:13,

127:25

315 [4] - 26:29,

43:7, 43:8, 43:10

318 [2] - 29:6,

43:17

32 [3] - 9:17,

32:15, 60:7

324 [1] - 43:10

326 [2] - 67:8,

67:16

33 [3] - 9:16,

10:6, 61:5


1

332 [1] - 16:27

34 [5] - 10:24,

33:22, 60:18,

62:22, 94:21

35 [2] - 12:10,

12:12

36 [2] - 63:27,

114:1

37 [4] - 13:8,

19:22, 43:7,

118:21

379 [1] - 118:22

38 [2] - 44:11,

67:18

39 [3] - 31:29,

74:11, 74:15

390 [1] - 143:17

391 [1] - 145:12

4

4 [10] - 8:22,

9:27, 61:1, 61:3,

81:19, 81:25,

82:17, 111:1,

118:21, 121:9

40 [11] - 14:3,

27:9, 27:16,

27:26, 28:3, 30:7,

68:10, 68:14,

74:15, 74:29,

76:6

40.3 [3] - 22:8,

31:9, 81:11

40.3.2 [1] -

113:21

41 [4] - 27:6,

78:22, 78:26,

122:5

419 [1] - 130:19

42 [35] - 15:12,

16:26, 17:1,

17:21, 44:13,

44:19, 46:9, 47:1,

70:22, 71:22,

73:17, 81:20,

81:28, 83:3,

83:14, 97:28,

99:21, 102:10,

103:4, 103:5,

103:6, 103:7,

103:8, 103:16,

103:26, 104:6,

104:8, 105:23,

111:24, 112:4,

112:20, 113:7,

113:18, 126:19,

129:26

42(1 [1] - 16:28

42(1)(a [1] - 81:7

43 [2] - 81:11,

118:3

44 [3] - 13:12,

13:14, 123:1

442 [2] - 42:2,

125:20

449 [1] - 130:24

45 [1] - 81:11

450 [2] - 130:23,

130:25

452 [1] - 131:6

454 [1] - 85:14

458 [1] - 134:24

459 [1] - 135:7

468 [1] - 135:9

472 [1] - 135:14

476 [1] - 135:27

479 [1] - 136:13

481 [1] - 136:18

482 [2] - 136:17,

136:22

486 [1] - 137:20

488 [1] - 137:25

49 [1] - 51:17

491 [1] - 137:26

492 [1] - 137:29

493 [1] - 138:4

495 [1] - 108:28

498 [1] - 138:6

4:00 [2] -

143:16, 149:24

4th [1] - 142:21

5

5 [6] - 70:17,

82:2, 82:3, 91:17,

111:6, 116:21

50 [2] - 79:9,

107:23

500 [1] - 138:17

508 [1] - 138:20

50A [1] - 42:9

52 [1] - 141:26

529 [1] - 138:26

531 [1] - 140:1

54 [1] - 76:28

541 [1] - 140:16

542 [1] - 140:28

543 [2] - 141:6,

141:7

544 [1] - 141:12

548 [1] - 141:14

550 [1] - 67:9

554 [1] - 141:22

557 [2] - 142:6,

142:16

558 [2] - 142:16

560 [1] - 78:16

562 [1] - 61:3

565 [1] - 69:8

571 [1] - 77:11

572 [1] - 77:13

584 [2] - 62:1,

62:25

59 [1] - 52:29

6

6 [17] - 7:18,

7:25, 8:3, 52:22,

80:29, 81:19,

82:16, 82:18,

91:17, 91:27,

97:18, 103:23,

105:25, 111:9,

111:29, 121:14,

127:10

6(2 [1] - 8:6

6(3 [7] - 7:28,

8:14, 9:5, 10:25,

11:15, 12:19,

13:15

6(4 [2] - 11:8,

11:11

61 [1] - 12:16

623 [1] - 32:25

63 [1] - 91:21

65 [3] - 19:15,

118:25

69 [1] - 92:21

6th [1] - 142:23

7

7 [8] - 1:25,

91:19, 91:28,

111:13, 117:12,

121:14, 121:19,

130:26

70 [1] - 147:10

731 [1] - 114:29

732 [1] - 148:8

734 [1] - 117:12

739 [1] - 118:2

74 [1] - 117:10

741 [1] - 32:25

742 [4] - 33:10,

33:13, 35:12,

38:14

743 [1] - 33:29

744 [3] - 34:15,

38:27, 118:25

745 [1] - 118:25

746 [2] - 34:20,

39:3

747 [2] - 34:21,

39:3

75 [1] - 16:3

79 [2] - 37:2,

37:3

7b [1] - 90:8

8

8 [8] - 17:20,

60:1, 91:24,

95:10, 98:13,

99:10, 99:11,

111:17

82 [1] - 38:25

84 [1] - 122:18

87 [1] - 24:3

87(10 [4] -

107:26, 108:7,

108:24, 109:2

87(10) [1] -

109:10

89 [1] - 16:27

9

9 [8] - 6:29, 52:7,

70:13, 73:16,

92:12, 93:21,

104:2, 131:28

91 [2] - 39:14,

145:13

92 [1] - 70:15

9:00 [1] - 128:27

9th [1] - 142:23

A

A.G [1] - 32:23

A.M [1] - 150:22

AA [1] - 70:25

Aarhus [1] -

111:7

abandon [1] -

150:8

ability [3] -

42:12, 102:11,

139:27

able [5] - 15:26,

31:3, 31:4, 31:6,

64:23

abortion [1] -

36:12

above-named

[1] - 1:29

above-quoted

[1] - 64:1

absence [3] -

13:5, 14:27,

110:25

absent [2] -

103:3, 103:4

absolute [4] -

22:4, 22:5,

113:14, 118:6

absolutely [3] -

64:16, 66:10,

126:20

absurdity [1] -

57:22

abuse [4] -

114:7, 114:11,

119:1, 123:8

accelerating [2]

- 26:6, 28:23

accept [7] -

4:11, 26:14,

31:25, 35:15,

82:8, 89:9,

127:11

acceptability [2]

- 4:14, 89:20

acceptable [2] -

88:13, 131:18

acceptable.. [2]

- 88:8, 133:13

acceptance [1] -

77:19

accepted [7] -

36:14, 46:26,

75:19, 75:21,

75:25, 91:29,

127:14

accepting [1] -

21:24

access [4] -

26:21, 34:14,

39:1, 40:3

accidents [3] -

135:22, 147:24

accommodate

d [1] - 140:23

accompanied

[3] - 25:21, 131:8,

138:7

accordance [12]

- 10:3, 11:15,

30:21, 48:21,

55:15, 88:16,

92:24, 93:27,

100:19, 101:6,

122:18, 149:8

accorded [1] -

36:20

according [3] -

29:20, 53:9,

88:25

According [1] -

30:15

accordingly [1] -

35:22

Account [1] -

24:25

account [5] -

12:27, 20:2, 36:3,

39:21, 98:15

accurate [1] -

55:3

accusing [1] -

46:20

achieve [2] -

37:26, 100:22

acidification [1]

- 24:16

acknowledge

[1] - 4:10

acknowledged

[1] - 48:28

Acoustic [1] -

139:23

acquire [1] -

35:16

Act [36] - 5:8,

7:20, 9:23, 9:28,

17:15, 19:5, 19:6,

42:10, 55:14,

56:27, 57:1,

60:11, 60:17,

60:19, 60:20,

61:21, 68:27,

69:1, 70:21,

70:23, 71:22,

73:15, 77:19,

78:29, 79:10,

103:15, 106:24,

106:26, 107:12,

107:21, 107:23,

108:29, 110:28,

112:8, 112:25,

121:23

Act" [1] - 9:7

acted [5] - 82:6,

110:27, 111:1,

111:6, 111:9

acting [2] -

100:18, 101:6

Actio [1] - 37:4

ACTION [1] -

1:24

action [6] - 1:29,

35:23, 39:29,

40:20, 60:26,

100:21

actions [2] -

32:5, 40:5

active [1] -

132:25

activity [4] -


2

13:2, 17:26,

85:10, 141:5

acts [2] - 108:6,

109:4

Acts [6] - 18:10,

52:24, 52:27,

77:7, 77:9, 86:24

actual [2] - 86:8,

142:12

add [2] - 23:14,

54:17

adding [1] -

21:27

addition [6] -

84:11, 91:2,

105:13, 122:19,

135:21, 136:13

additional [7] -

4:2, 30:12, 51:24,

59:25, 98:18,

102:24, 136:28

address [15] -

4:18, 6:20, 41:12,

49:5, 49:14, 50:3,

124:1, 135:22,

135:24, 141:4,

141:5, 141:6,

141:10, 143:13

addressed [7] -

50:16, 84:9,

84:25, 89:25,

125:23, 126:22,

140:8

addressing [2] -

3:29, 116:20

adds [1] -

119:10

adduced [1] -

119:9

adequacy [3] -

7:6, 141:24,

142:3

adequate [1] -

7:8

adequately [2] -

53:16, 140:22

adjacent [3] -

45:27, 48:3,

93:10

adjoining [1] -

85:9

ADJOURNED

[2] - 69:29, 150:21

adjudication [1]

- 145:20

administration

[1] - 115:23

admiration [1] -

50:5

admissibility [1]

- 69:13

admission [1] -

64:2

adopt [5] - 17:4,

66:6, 76:15, 79:2,

101:14

adopted [5] -

5:5, 19:8, 41:15,

55:14, 57:1

adopting [2] -

46:9, 109:25

adoption [2] -

17:28, 18:15

ADRIENNE [1] -

1:7

advance [3] -

93:6, 122:16,

122:25

advanced [2] -

117:23, 122:7

adverse [2] -

4:1, 85:18

adversely [10] -

8:25, 9:26, 10:2,

10:28, 11:5,

11:18, 12:14,

13:3, 14:23,

84:14

advice [2] -

68:20, 71:9

advised [1] -

133:9

advisors [1] -

65:24

advocating [1] -

40:12

affect [17] - 8:25,

9:26, 10:2, 10:28,

11:5, 11:18,

12:14, 12:24,

13:3, 14:1, 14:8,

14:23, 17:27,

37:10, 38:23,

39:27, 134:14

affected [11] -

25:11, 33:5,

36:16, 41:21,

44:4, 49:2, 90:21,

107:27, 108:1,

132:1, 132:4

affecting [1] -

101:16

affects [2] -

24:14, 40:18

affidavit [12] -

50:11, 50:15,

50:16, 98:22,

118:18, 119:5,

119:23, 127:3,

127:9, 127:10,

127:29, 131:22

affirmed [1] -

61:10

afforded [1] -

60:10

afraid [1] - 76:23

AFTER [1] - 70:1

afternoon [6] -

74:13, 80:19,

80:22, 89:8,

91:16, 99:22

AGENT [1] -

2:15

ago [4] - 31:2,

50:17, 77:15,

83:18

agree [3] - 8:23,

21:20, 101:22

agreed [9] -

11:9, 47:12, 80:5,

92:19, 92:24,

94:3, 94:15,

96:21, 102:27

agreement [2] -

46:15, 68:18

agricultural [1] -

25:7

agrotoxins [1] -

24:18

ahead [2] -

49:13, 49:22

aid [6] - 56:13,

56:26, 63:12,

65:8, 68:26,

69:13

aids [2] - 53:15,

57:26

aim [2] - 98:10,

98:19

air [3] - 88:5,

88:13, 141:13

aircraft [2] - 4:2,

90:11

Airport [12] -

19:15, 81:29,

87:7, 87:11,

87:28, 88:4,

88:21, 91:2,

91:11, 98:11,

103:12, 132:28

AIRPORT [2] -

1:17, 2:17

airport [19] -

19:17, 19:28,

41:20, 47:8, 48:3,

48:12, 88:5,

89:29, 90:8,

93:10, 95:22,

98:6, 98:21,

137:13, 145:18,

149:17

airports [3] -

4:3, 91:11,

143:25

Albania [1] -

23:8

albeit [2] - 23:4,

78:24

Alen [1] - 120:22

Alen-Buckley

[1] - 120:22

alia [4] - 22:7,

45:26, 61:7,

62:24

allegation [11] -

50:3, 50:7, 50:18,

73:28, 73:29,

99:25, 104:1,

113:23, 119:1,

120:11

alleged [2] -

27:2, 111:24

allow [4] - 81:9,

114:19, 117:24,

120:12

allowed [3] -

75:9, 119:26,

134:3

allows [3] -

72:25, 72:26,

93:15

almost [3] -

39:27, 40:18,

132:19

alone [1] - 58:23

also.. [1] - 108:9

alteram [1] -

84:21

amalgam [1] -

82:16

ambiguity [2] -

57:21, 116:24

ambiguous [2] -

53:3, 65:11

ambit [1] - 17:18

ameliorated [1] -

57:20

amenable [1] -

132:8

amend [1] -

110:4

amended [4] -

58:27, 97:28,

103:26, 121:25

Amended [1] -

80:25

amendment [6] -

63:18, 63:19,

73:17, 77:18,

77:27, 117:24

amendments [1]

- 77:26

amenities [2] -

46:13, 132:25

amenity [2] -

85:8, 95:11

amount [4] -

81:24, 102:3,

108:21, 135:13

amounts [1] -

123:8

ample [1] -

123:18

analogy [1] -

19:21

analysis [6] -

10:12, 10:16,

14:10, 14:15,

14:18, 67:29

AND [2] - 1:19,

1:20

Andorra [1] -

23:8

Annex [3] -

15:25, 15:27,

147:23

answers [1] -

141:8

antecedent [1] -

29:29

Anthony [1] -

139:22

anticipate [1] -

150:15

anxiety [3] -

118:15, 118:19,

119:12

AP [3] - 113:29,

120:19, 136:7

Apart [1] - 56:14

apologies [3] -

37:3, 107:8,

109:22

apologise [1] -

26:16

appeal [15] -

15:2, 15:7, 48:2,

114:17, 115:12,

116:25, 117:3,

117:26, 118:29,

119:27, 127:23,

128:9, 128:16,

130:24, 135:10

appealing [1] -

47:28

Appeals [1] -

60:2

appeals [4] -

7:15, 11:12,

115:5, 130:25

appear [2] -

25:22, 46:2

APPEARANCE

S [1] - 2:2

appeared [2] -

124:21, 124:29

appellant [3] -

2:32, 130:29,

131:2

appellants [3] -

130:28, 134:23,

136:14

applicable [7] -

6:24, 6:25, 7:12,

15:4, 15:8, 15:10,

51:13

applicant [13] -

32:8, 46:5,

114:25, 115:17,

116:17, 117:14,

117:21, 119:3,

119:7, 119:10,

119:12, 119:21,

119:26

Applicant [11] -

46:9, 46:14,

106:28, 111:2,

111:21, 114:5,

114:18, 114:19,

124:22, 144:6,

146:4

applicant's [2] -

119:2, 119:5

Applicant's [3] -

111:7, 113:5,

127:28

Applicant.. [1] -

111:11

APPLICANTS

[2] - 1:12, 2:4

Applicants [29] -

46:24, 46:27,

47:15, 48:1,

50:13, 73:21,

74:12, 81:10,

81:20, 83:25,

84:2, 84:5, 90:4,

98:12, 98:16,

105:27, 106:20,

106:25, 124:15,

127:19, 127:22,

128:3, 129:5,

129:14, 129:22,

131:26, 131:29,

146:16, 147:8

applicants [3] -

122:7, 122:23,

123:5

Applicants' [6] -

21:5, 28:29, 82:8,


3

135:9, 137:21,

146:8

application [36]

- 7:2, 15:5, 15:11,

15:12, 17:2, 19:3,

19:16, 32:3,

33:27, 34:23,

35:12, 40:25,

45:15, 46:7, 46:8,

49:8, 80:1, 81:28,

85:2, 87:26,

88:24, 93:28,

117:16, 117:20,

117:22, 117:23,

117:25, 119:19,

120:25, 120:27,

121:21, 122:20,

123:11, 125:20,

126:13

application.. [1]

- 111:18

applications [1]

- 17:14

applied [5] -

66:3, 67:11, 80:4,

80:7, 120:21

applies [6] -

15:2, 18:24,

61:18, 116:7,

116:21, 148:1

apply [20] -

16:23, 16:24,

17:16, 29:16,

35:27, 37:20,

45:6, 58:6, 67:11,

70:24, 72:9, 75:4,

75:9, 79:4, 79:7,

80:12, 115:13,

117:14, 147:17,

147:19

applying [4] -

52:24, 69:16,

74:26, 115:29

appreciate [1] -

110:14

approach [11] -

46:9, 57:29,

64:13, 66:28,

67:12, 69:17,

76:16, 76:21,

109:26, 109:29,

121:5

approached [1]

- 55:19

approaching [1]

- 145:8

Appropriate [16]

- 7:4, 9:10, 9:13,

11:24, 15:18,

15:28, 17:1,

19:10, 19:11,

19:14, 20:11,

20:12, 20:15,

104:20, 106:11,

106:12

appropriate [20]

- 7:17, 8:6, 8:18,

8:26, 9:20, 10:8,

10:25, 11:2, 11:4,

11:14, 12:12,

12:20, 12:27,

13:11, 23:2,

46:28, 47:4,

66:20, 69:24,

70:25

appropriately

[2] - 121:28,

146:29

appropriatenes

s [1] - 31:8

approval [5] -

12:22, 17:24,

18:16, 18:22,

19:4

approvals [3] -

18:18, 18:29,

19:9

approved [3] -

51:28, 71:24,

91:27

approves [1] -

54:15

archaeological

[1] - 95:3

archaeology [2]

- 94:27, 141:1

area [13] - 45:27,

46:13, 88:17,

102:16, 125:1,

125:4, 133:19,

133:24, 133:26,

139:13, 144:21,

144:25, 147:18

Area [1] - 87:28

areas [15] - 8:7,

8:10, 16:6, 16:7,

16:8, 24:27, 25:7,

90:16, 95:22,

144:20, 144:23,

144:25, 144:27,

145:19, 146:9

arguable [1] -

115:18

argue [6] - 32:9,

39:18, 112:4,

112:20, 119:26,

123:5

argued [6] -

26:25, 34:26,

116:16, 116:18,

116:27, 120:13

arguing [1] -

77:23

argument [24] -

6:7, 6:16, 19:21,

26:21, 31:19,

41:17, 42:21,

66:7, 74:9, 74:17,

74:19, 75:18,

75:21, 75:24,

75:27, 75:28,

76:1, 77:1, 97:23,

104:26, 108:13,

108:18, 112:10,

113:6

arguments [5] -

6:8, 31:17, 31:20,

60:14, 87:22

arise [12] - 5:21,

7:8, 9:1, 9:13,

32:22, 57:7,

103:4, 103:5,

103:6, 104:13,

117:1, 124:2

arises [3] - 3:13,

5:17, 83:4

arising [4] -

3:10, 4:2, 119:3,

143:24

Aristotle [2] -

30:8, 30:10

Armenia [1] -

23:8

arose [1] - 35:11

arrangement [1]

- 101:22

arrangements

[1] - 72:2

Arrest [1] -

61:29

ARTHUR [1] -

2:20

Article [29] -

7:18, 7:25, 7:28,

8:3, 9:5, 10:25,

11:8, 11:11,

11:15, 12:19,

13:15, 22:8, 27:6,

27:9, 27:10,

27:16, 27:26,

28:3, 29:24, 30:7,

31:9, 52:22,

81:11, 98:13,

100:7, 100:15,

100:23, 101:2,

113:21

article [1] -

100:11

Articles [2] -

30:4, 100:6

articles [1] -

35:17

AS [3] - 3:2, 3:6,

70:1

ascertain [6] -

33:17, 38:17,

52:28, 53:7,

53:15, 53:27

ascertained [2] -

8:24, 53:5

ascertaining [5]

- 29:17, 61:14,

62:4, 62:15,

62:20

aspect [1] -

69:22

aspects [3] -

12:22, 14:6,

120:28

assert [3] -

36:25, 36:29,

40:23

asserted [3] -

36:10, 43:15,

48:26

asserting [2] -

32:5, 43:29

assertion [3] -

63:3, 104:18,

104:19

assess [1] - 17:7

assessed [2] -

5:28, 5:29

assessing [1] -

47:3

assessment [39]

- 4:13, 6:1, 6:5,

6:12, 6:13, 7:10,

7:18, 8:18, 8:21,

9:20, 10:8, 10:11,

10:25, 11:2, 11:4,

11:15, 12:12,

12:20, 12:28,

13:12, 13:14,

13:25, 15:13,

19:28, 20:5, 47:5,

70:25, 89:18,

124:19, 125:15,

133:12, 146:21,

146:26, 147:13,

147:17, 147:28,

148:10

Assessment

[17] - 7:4, 9:10,

9:13, 11:24,

15:18, 15:29,

17:1, 19:10,

19:11, 19:14,

20:11, 20:12,

20:15, 72:27,

104:20, 106:11,

106:12

assessment..

[1] - 110:25

assigned [1] -

25:24

assist [1] -

138:13

assisted [1] -

27:29

Associates [3] -

138:8, 139:21,

139:23

Association [4] -

131:1, 135:6,

137:28, 138:2

association [3] -

35:18, 131:1,

138:11

assume [1] -

106:28

assumes [1] -

44:22

assumption [1] -

56:6

assured [1] -

30:19

AT [1] - 150:22

atmospheric [1]

- 24:9

attached [2] -

9:29, 89:27

attack [7] -

105:15, 106:23,

107:7, 107:15,

108:15, 108:21,

109:7

attempt [3] -

42:14, 118:18,

123:5

attended [1] -

129:4

attendees [1] -

139:2

attention [44] -

3:15, 4:7, 4:26,

44:27, 48:18,

58:3, 58:6, 58:14,

66:16, 66:23,

69:18, 72:6,

72:18, 73:3,

74:13, 76:22,

77:6, 82:25,

85:12, 85:22,

86:13, 88:19,

89:11, 91:13,

92:11, 92:28,

93:19, 98:24,

109:23, 109:27,

110:8, 111:28,

112:11, 113:27,

114:3, 116:10,

117:7, 117:8,

117:29, 118:6,

118:9, 123:12,

124:9, 127:2

attenuation [4] -

94:2, 144:26,

146:19, 148:26

ATTORNEY [2] -

1:19, 2:22

Attorney [2] -

26:17, 33:9

attractive [2] -

47:28, 87:22

attributed [1] -

53:13

audi [1] - 84:21

August [2] -

127:26, 128:10

authorisation

[2] - 17:25, 18:16

authorise [1] -

13:1

authoritative [1]

- 64:21

authorities [12] -

8:23, 11:23,

12:27, 13:29,

51:24, 66:10,

76:22, 76:25,

84:17, 85:16,

113:27, 123:17

Authorities [2] -

15:2, 149:9

Authority [9] -

45:18, 81:29,

92:19, 94:3,

94:15, 96:17,

96:26, 132:28,

139:25

AUTHORITY [2]

- 1:17, 2:18

authority [17] -

6:19, 11:28, 12:4,

12:6, 17:3, 17:7,

17:26, 17:28,

18:18, 19:13,

45:8, 66:21,

89:17, 95:15,

102:11, 113:15,

123:18

Authority's [1] -

103:12

authority's [1] -

11:26

authority/An [1]

- 109:5

availability [1] -

27:13


4

available [6] -

28:7, 37:27,

57:25, 57:28,

105:3, 142:12

aviation [4] -

3:27, 21:18, 88:3,

88:21

avoid [5] - 8:7,

27:29, 46:6,

57:22, 116:24

avoided [1] -

28:10

aware [3] - 22:4,

97:8, 135:19

B

background [1]

- 119:29

badgers [6] -

94:23, 94:24,

95:7, 96:14,

96:16, 96:20

Baine [4] - 5:11,

5:14, 102:17,

102:29

balance [3] -

22:2, 22:6, 146:3

balanced [1] -

98:9

balancing [1] -

98:7

Baldoyle [1] -

143:27

Barnes [1] -

140:4

barrelled [1] -

125:7

BARRETT [13] -

1:24, 21:26,

23:28, 47:7, 52:3,

59:28, 66:8,

69:26, 126:1,

149:25, 150:8,

150:12, 150:18

barrister [1] -

125:3

based [4] -

84:12, 119:1,

119:20, 126:13

basic [2] -

104:21, 104:22

basis [12] - 4:24,

14:2, 14:25, 27:7,

41:23, 41:29,

55:13, 75:26,

89:26, 117:26,

119:8, 143:4

bat [3] - 96:27,

96:28, 141:4

bats [8] - 94:23,

94:24, 96:24,

97:2, 97:3, 97:12,

141:9, 141:28

bats) [1] - 95:8

Bay [1] - 143:27

bear [4] - 49:6,

79:23, 98:18,

105:5

beautiful [1] -

25:5

became [3] -

26:23, 45:7,

60:17

become [2] -

22:9, 65:24

becomes [2] -

54:14, 57:4

beginning [6] -

25:3, 29:7, 49:24,

130:17, 142:1,

143:17

behalf [12] -

3:24, 17:25,

50:13, 68:17,

76:2, 98:23,

124:21, 127:3,

129:8, 129:12,

139:19, 142:8

behind [8] -

38:2, 48:17,

55:16, 56:27,

58:8, 86:10,

86:11, 147:9

Belarus [1] -

23:9

Belgium [1] -

23:9

belonging [1] -

25:15

below [1] - 88:7

beneficiary [1] -

46:16

beside [2] -

48:7, 48:8

best [7] - 12:25,

14:5, 14:20, 17:7,

30:20, 77:27,

140:15

bestowed [1] -

113:20

better [2] -

60:24, 76:5

between [31] -

1:6, 5:26, 7:5,

7:26, 24:21,

26:27, 27:2,

27:18, 29:12,

43:10, 49:7,

52:25, 62:8, 63:8,

65:1, 67:21,

69:14, 79:26,

81:25, 84:28,

85:23, 86:17,

87:25, 99:28,

100:12, 110:1,

110:3, 112:7,

112:24, 149:21

beyond [4] -

4:13, 108:3,

116:27, 134:3

bid [1] - 63:6

bill [9] - 55:26,

55:28, 56:12,

56:16, 56:22,

56:24, 56:29,

57:4, 58:28

bills [1] - 56:21

bioaccumulati

on [1] - 25:8

biodegradable

[1] - 24:28

Bird [1] - 136:1

bird [1] - 141:5

Birds [1] - 16:21

birds [3] - 94:22,

95:9, 135:28

bit [4] - 92:28,

97:15, 101:29,

105:10

BL [7] - 2:5, 2:8,

2:13, 2:19, 2:23,

2:24, 2:27

black [1] - 70:13

Blackstone [1] -

52:29

bland [1] - 142:8

Bland [2] -

124:28, 139:9

blur [1] - 62:8

Board [35] - 5:1,

7:4, 7:5, 7:8,

7:16, 7:22, 7:28,

9:11, 9:23, 9:29,

10:7, 10:9, 10:11,

10:19, 10:24,

11:1, 11:6, 11:10,

11:12, 14:26,

15:3, 15:7, 46:10,

86:22, 89:9,

89:14, 89:17,

89:21, 89:26,

91:1, 92:5, 94:4,

94:16, 138:24,

145:20

Board's [1] -

88:25

bodies [3] -

132:7, 135:4,

137:27

bodily [6] - 21:4,

22:18, 28:22,

28:29, 31:14,

31:26

body [5] - 32:21,

64:20, 64:21,

88:27, 97:8

boiled [1] - 7:7

bold [1] - 25:29

bona [8] - 32:27,

33:15, 33:17,

34:17, 35:21,

36:2, 38:13,

38:17

book [27] -

19:15, 31:29,

60:1, 70:13,

73:14, 76:24,

76:25, 76:28,

78:21, 78:23,

80:29, 81:3,

81:18, 86:9,

97:18, 100:7,

103:23, 105:25,

107:4, 107:7,

109:23, 113:29,

125:29, 130:17,

139:1, 143:18,

145:12

Book [15] - 6:27,

16:20, 43:7,

44:10, 51:16,

51:17, 52:7,

120:22, 120:23,

127:1, 127:4,

127:6, 127:7,

147:8, 147:29

book's [2] -

67:9, 86:19

booklet [7] -

18:4, 59:23,

59:24, 59:25,

70:9, 70:10,

100:5

books [2] -

70:12, 76:25

Bord [27] - 6:26,

45:1, 86:12,

88:19, 92:3,

106:7, 106:22,

108:20, 108:27,

109:5, 121:12,

121:22, 124:8,

124:15, 125:18,

125:24, 125:25,

125:28, 127:24,

128:9, 129:28,

130:10, 131:27,

132:5, 132:8,

143:9, 148:7

borne [3] -

53:25, 87:20,

87:24

bottom [8] -

18:4, 77:11,

116:11, 136:22,

140:16, 140:20,

145:12, 149:5

boundary [2] -

5:4, 133:29

Bows [2] -

21:18, 28:27

Bows-Larkin [2]

- 21:18, 28:27

Bradley [1] -

47:13

BRADLEY [3] -

2:13, 42:16,

150:13

branches [1] -

64:27

breach [6] -

38:13, 46:25,

110:27, 111:1,

111:6, 111:9

breached [2] -

26:26, 98:13

bread [1] - 135:2

breath [1] -

107:6

breathing [1] -

24:12

BREXIT [1] -

98:28

BRIAN [1] - 2:18

brief [1] - 41:12

briefly [11] -

3:10, 12:10,

31:19, 51:8, 52:6,

58:12, 76:26,

93:19, 97:21,

134:24, 147:6

bring [37] - 4:7,

6:28, 12:9, 16:19,

16:26, 17:20,

18:2, 19:13,

19:22, 20:29,

24:4, 25:13,

26:15, 26:18,

29:3, 31:27, 32:1,

32:15, 35:12,

35:23, 39:29,

40:19, 42:1,

42:11, 42:29,

43:4, 43:5, 43:6,

43:8, 44:8, 44:26,

71:3, 79:29, 80:1,

80:13, 114:24,

115:14

bringing [3] -

4:26, 16:22,

122:21

brings [1] -

26:13

broad [4] -

24:10, 33:10,

49:14, 49:21

broader [1] -

33:27

brought [7] -

3:15, 37:25,

42:26, 69:18,

91:26, 120:27,

123:11

Brussels [1] -

19:15

Buckley [1] -

120:22

building [3] -

147:19, 147:20,

148:25

buildings [4] -

90:25, 96:29,

97:3, 133:14

built [1] - 41:22

Bulgaria [1] -

23:9

bullet [3] -

132:12, 134:22,

136:29

burdening [1] -

37:23

business [1] -

24:19

businesses [1] -

24:29

busybodies [1] -

40:16

butter [1] - 135:2

buy [3] - 128:14,

132:15, 137:1

buy-out [3] -

128:14, 132:15,

137:1

BY [9] - 1:24,

2:6, 2:10, 2:15,

2:20, 2:25, 2:29,

3:6, 47:10

bypass [1] -

45:28

Byrne [1] -

127:19

Byrne's [2] -

127:8, 127:10

C

C-127/02 [1] -


5

12:16

C-258/11 [1] -

13:10

C.J [5] - 32:24,

35:12, 38:14,

61:10, 63:7

Cahill [2] -

32:16, 34:20

calculated [2] -

56:17, 56:23

calculation [1] -

141:17

candour [4] -

49:26, 49:28,

50:2, 73:25

cannot [9] -

13:16, 25:24,

29:10, 37:10,

44:21, 54:28,

77:25, 78:7,

103:8

canons [2] -

57:25, 65:7

CAO [1] - 60:10

capable [2] -

13:18, 126:19

capacity [3] -

4:3, 27:23, 87:6

Capital [1] - 77:7

car [3] - 21:27,

21:29, 145:19

care [1] - 92:3

careful [2] -

49:28, 94:16

carefully [2] -

56:1, 111:22

Carney [1] -

66:13

carried [15] -

9:20, 10:3, 10:9,

13:14, 17:6,

19:28, 19:29,

20:5, 92:6, 94:28,

106:12, 124:8,

125:17, 127:16,

147:28

carry [1] -

113:26

carrying [5] -

7:17, 10:10,

10:24, 146:26,

147:26

Case [2] - 12:16,

13:10

case [154] - 5:10,

5:21, 6:3, 6:4,

7:2, 7:6, 7:9,

7:26, 7:29, 9:1,

9:11, 9:14, 13:4,

15:17, 17:17,

19:15, 19:16,

19:24, 22:23,

26:17, 27:5,

28:15, 31:27,

32:12, 32:13,

32:19, 33:18,

33:24, 33:28,

34:2, 34:6, 34:25,

35:28, 37:11,

38:8, 38:18,

39:17, 39:20,

39:25, 40:17,

42:16, 44:21,

44:29, 48:1,

48:19, 48:29,

49:10, 49:21,

50:12, 51:7,

51:18, 51:22,

51:26, 58:11,

58:23, 60:4, 60:6,

61:7, 61:12,

61:18, 61:27,

62:6, 65:26, 66:2,

66:7, 66:28,

67:10, 67:20,

67:29, 69:12,

69:22, 69:23,

72:9, 74:12,

74:19, 75:8,

75:18, 75:29,

76:15, 78:13,

79:1, 79:7, 80:4,

80:9, 80:12,

80:20, 83:2,

83:27, 84:1, 84:4,

84:16, 85:1, 86:4,

86:16, 86:17,

86:18, 92:7,

95:21, 98:15,

101:27, 101:29,

102:17, 102:19,

102:21, 104:26,

105:16, 105:19,

105:20, 106:19,

107:3, 108:21,

109:7, 109:15,

110:6, 113:5,

114:5, 114:20,

114:26, 115:18,

116:15, 116:20,

117:1, 117:5,

118:12, 118:13,

118:15, 120:5,

120:11, 120:18,

120:21, 120:26,

120:28, 121:4,

121:12, 121:16,

122:16, 122:17,

122:26, 123:11,

123:16, 124:11,

127:1, 132:19,

132:21, 132:22,

135:25, 136:7,

143:6, 143:10,

143:11, 149:1

case" [1] - 79:4

case-law [2] -

101:27, 101:29

cases [15] -

22:15, 26:16,

34:29, 37:24,

39:6, 57:21, 64:5,

91:28, 104:20,

115:11, 115:16,

115:21, 118:5,

119:28, 130:20

casual [1] - 53:2

catchment [3] -

144:7, 144:21,

144:22

catchments [1] -

144:24

Catholic [1] -

25:28

caused [1] -

24:14

causes [1] -

24:11

caution [1] -

71:13

cautiously [1] -

21:23

central [1] -

44:21

certain [11] -

13:2, 30:2, 61:9,

63:29, 67:16,

71:25, 84:16,

97:16, 115:15,

115:20, 146:9

certainly [8] -

6:8, 66:8, 77:8,

85:7, 88:25,

128:26, 136:10,

146:2

certainly.. [1] -

145:26

certainty [4] -

65:9, 107:27,

109:16, 115:27

certify [1] - 1:27

certiorari [1] -

110:19

cetera [1] -

36:26

challenge [11] -

6:3, 16:25, 20:23,

35:26, 44:23,

107:11, 108:4,

108:13, 132:4,

132:6, 132:9

challenged [1] -

107:29

challenges [1] -

108:8

challenging [1] -

109:3

change [15] -

3:14, 3:26, 5:2,

21:12, 21:13,

22:27, 28:27,

45:24, 45:28,

70:22, 71:21,

102:6, 103:3,

103:4, 113:7

changes [2] -

45:29, 133:7

chaos [1] -

137:16

charges [1] -

114:12

charging [1] -

119:6

charity [5] -

30:13, 30:14,

30:18, 30:22

Charter [1] -

111:3

cheap [1] - 76:5

chemical [1] -

25:6

Chief [3] - 60:2,

114:29, 115:1

CHIEF [1] - 2:25

Child [1] - 36:9

children [2] -

29:22, 36:14

choice [1] -

93:11

choose [2] -

29:11, 56:1

CHRISTIAN [1] -

2:23

Christian [2] -

30:8, 30:11

Christianity [1] -

30:12

Church [1] -

25:28

CIARáN [1] -

2:23

Circuit [1] -

118:21

circulation [1] -

51:27

circumscribed

[2] - 110:5, 114:26

circumspectio

n [1] - 55:19

circumstances

[21] - 29:5, 35:2,

35:5, 37:11, 38:5,

38:8, 39:7, 39:10,

40:13, 45:25,

46:6, 47:1, 66:21,

71:25, 74:1,

75:27, 102:4,

116:15, 116:17,

123:19, 127:13

citation [2] -

61:13, 67:25

cited [1] - 44:12

cities [1] - 25:7

citizen [2] -

38:28, 52:25

citizens [6] -

21:5, 29:1, 31:15,

52:25, 64:22,

98:26

City [3] - 45:27,

45:29, 46:1

civies [1] -

139:11

claim [7] - 4:4,

27:9, 84:12,

99:12, 123:10,

123:15, 146:8

claimed [10] -

33:28, 80:26,

104:13, 109:20,

121:1, 121:11,

121:12, 121:13,

121:17

claims [2] -

119:15, 119:20

clarification [4] -

5:10, 134:6,

134:9, 134:13

clarified [1] -

134:18

clarify [2] -

126:10, 126:16

clarity [5] -

47:27, 50:6,

115:5, 126:8,

126:9

CLARKE [1] -

2:6

class [1] - 24:1

classes [2] -

27:21, 115:21

classical [2] -

34:3, 69:16

classrooms [1] -

90:25

clear [24] - 5:11,

5:13, 5:22, 34:29,

39:4, 40:29, 42:3,

42:20, 45:7,

53:10, 56:10,

57:23, 62:26,

64:6, 84:24,

84:26, 86:7,

102:16, 103:14,

107:26, 108:24,

116:29, 124:12

clearly [22] -

4:17, 14:9, 28:18,

30:5, 31:25, 46:5,

52:11, 53:17,

75:21, 86:4,

88:22, 88:25,

90:3, 102:2,

102:29, 106:19,

109:8, 116:1,

130:13, 141:17,

142:12, 147:25

CLG [3] - 1:12,

2:8, 28:19

client [1] - 68:18

clients [5] -

22:8, 40:10,

41:26, 42:7,

87:23

climate [11] -

3:14, 3:20, 3:26,

4:1, 5:2, 21:12,

21:13, 22:26,

25:15, 28:27,

113:7

climatic [1] -

25:20

clinical [1] - 25:1

Clinton [1] -

78:22

close [2] - 20:17,

41:20

closing [2] -

142:7, 142:8

Co [2] - 7:3, 39:4

Co-Op [1] - 39:4

cockle [1] -

12:28

Code [1] - 48:4

code [1] - 71:3

cognate [2] -

67:22, 67:23

coin [2] - 76:18,

78:11

Colgan [2] -

129:7, 129:19

COLGAN [1] -

1:7

Coll [2] - 42:18,

42:21

collateral [6] -

105:15, 107:7,

107:15, 108:15,

108:21, 109:7

collective [3] -

58:14, 58:19,


6

59:14

COLLINS [1] -

2:5

colour [1] -

70:11

combination [4]

- 8:17, 12:23,

14:7, 17:10

coming [13] -

39:20, 69:23,

72:23, 72:29,

86:28, 91:1,

92:25, 93:14,

93:20, 94:19,

103:17, 106:17,

109:16

comity [1] - 65:1

commence [2] -

46:29, 71:27

commenced [2]

- 71:26, 75:10

commenceme

nt [9] - 47:2,

74:26, 75:4,

92:17, 92:23,

93:2, 94:5, 96:19,

96:27

commencing [1]

- 72:11

comment [1] -

78:14

Commentaries

[1] - 53:1

commentary [1]

- 63:18

comments [5] -

33:26, 60:22,

60:24, 60:25,

63:21

Commission [4]

- 13:8, 13:22,

74:10, 75:7

commitment [1]

- 95:1

Commitments

[1] - 94:27

Committee [4] -

100:20, 100:21,

101:13, 101:14

committee [1] -

58:24

common [6] -

7:25, 25:15,

27:16, 28:14,

30:17, 135:3

Communicatio

ns [1] - 32:6

communicatio

ns [1] - 36:26

Communities

[1] - 16:21

community [7] -

128:13, 130:29,

131:15, 132:15,

132:24, 132:26,

133:9

Community [5] -

131:1, 135:6,

137:27, 138:1,

139:20

companies [7] -

37:20, 37:29,

38:2, 42:4, 42:7,

49:11, 83:28

company [15] -

31:22, 31:23,

31:24, 32:4, 32:7,

32:9, 35:9, 35:29,

36:9, 36:24,

36:28, 38:6,

38:12, 77:18

compare [2] -

146:17, 146:20

comparing [1] -

11:21

compelling [1] -

52:12

compensation

[1] - 96:8

compensatory

[2] - 95:10, 95:18

competent [2] -

8:23, 12:26

complaint [2] -

120:3, 120:4

complaints [2] -

124:13, 131:20

complete [4] -

13:17, 14:12,

14:25, 54:25

completely [2] -

75:23, 136:3

completeness

[3] - 111:28,

116:10, 117:7

completion [3] -

102:13, 149:7

complex [3] -

25:16, 58:23,

59:6

complexity [1] -

57:17

complied [1] -

106:14

comply [2] -

72:8, 96:7

comprise [1] -

128:3

concede [1] -

16:24

concept [1] -

54:2

conception [2] -

27:20, 28:9

concern [21] -

19:18, 32:19,

32:28, 33:15,

33:17, 35:22,

36:3, 38:1, 38:14,

38:17, 84:1, 84:6,

84:13, 96:4,

126:26, 127:18,

133:3, 135:4,

143:22, 143:26,

144:6

Concerned [8] -

128:4, 128:8,

129:9, 129:20,

131:7, 137:29,

139:8, 142:9

concerned [14] -

8:26, 12:21,

12:29, 19:16,

27:10, 32:3,

32:12, 51:10,

61:28, 67:10,

80:14, 84:13,

105:14, 126:20

concerned.. [1] -

13:20

concerning [2] -

57:17, 61:9

concerns [15] -

4:12, 4:18, 13:14,

37:21, 46:2,

65:17, 90:3, 92:4,

92:6, 92:8,

131:11, 134:23,

134:25, 134:26,

145:16

conclude [1] -

41:13

concludes [1] -

41:10

conclusion [14]

- 5:12, 43:12,

82:29, 83:3, 83:9,

83:13, 125:19,

145:5, 145:6,

145:13, 145:16,

146:17, 146:23,

149:19

conclusions

[10] - 8:21, 13:18,

14:13, 14:15,

14:17, 14:19,

14:26, 39:13,

39:20, 125:21

Conclusions [1]

- 149:5

condition [9] -

28:8, 89:25,

90:11, 91:19,

94:17, 94:25,

95:2, 102:26,

133:22

Condition [11] -

46:4, 91:17,

91:24, 92:12,

94:21, 96:6, 96:9,

96:10, 96:24,

131:28, 134:4

conditioned [1]

- 30:24

Conditions [1] -

91:27

conditions [15] -

9:29, 25:17, 88:7,

89:27, 90:7,

90:23, 91:14,

93:18, 102:6,

102:9, 102:12,

103:3, 113:18,

127:25, 133:22

conduct [5] -

5:21, 6:12, 9:12,

10:12, 57:12

conducted [3] -

6:1, 7:4, 11:14

confess [1] -

41:4

confined [2] -

74:25, 75:3

confusion [3] -

65:22, 115:6,

116:24

congruent [1] -

44:19

conjugal [1] -

26:22

conjunction [1]

- 81:15

CONLETH [1] -

2:13

connected [2] -

8:14, 17:4

connectivity [1]

- 98:26

conscious [2] -

22:13, 150:3

consensus [12]

- 22:21, 23:20,

23:21, 23:23,

25:18, 26:5, 26:9,

26:11, 31:3, 31:5,

31:6

consent [29] -

6:18, 6:21, 9:20,

9:24, 9:28, 10:3,

10:20, 11:7,

11:13, 11:22,

11:26, 11:28,

11:29, 12:4, 12:6,

13:28, 16:15,

17:2, 17:23, 18:9,

20:1, 100:2,

102:4, 102:23,

103:6, 103:8,

103:17, 104:7,

116:16

Consent [1] -

17:21

consents [1] -

19:5

consequence

[4] - 43:19,

102:22, 113:26,

147:1

consequences

[7] - 40:25, 44:13,

46:12, 48:5,

80:19, 85:4, 85:9

consequent [1] -

118:15

conservation [8]

- 8:7, 8:20, 10:29,

12:24, 13:1, 14:9,

17:8, 45:27

consider [23] -

4:6, 4:12, 4:23,

12:7, 13:7, 15:17,

15:20, 19:7,

20:14, 27:1,

31:13, 32:9,

33:19, 36:23,

38:19, 46:28,

51:3, 69:5, 72:8,

77:25, 80:16,

83:9, 87:21

considerable [1]

- 108:5

consideration

[11] - 53:29,

54:28, 62:3, 62:7,

99:29, 125:9,

125:23, 133:29,

135:20, 137:4,

144:5

considerations

[15] - 29:16,

32:22, 37:19,

39:16, 40:9, 46:5,

55:22, 56:14,

86:5, 86:29, 87:1,

88:27, 90:2,

99:28

considered [21]

- 12:8, 12:15,

18:15, 26:10,

27:5, 32:22,

33:27, 37:5,

39:21, 52:11,

62:24, 69:12,

82:21, 86:19,

88:2, 88:6, 89:14,

89:21, 105:16,

143:23, 146:18

considering [3]

- 20:10, 46:23,

63:21

considers [2] -

29:4, 60:26

consistent [10] -

21:3, 31:14, 78:2,

78:10, 79:13,

88:22, 88:26,

109:13, 121:23,

145:28

consists [1] -

30:13

Consolidation

[1] - 60:19

constant [1] -

25:21

constitute [3] -

35:20, 56:26,

112:23

constituted [1] -

144:4

constitutes [2] -

112:6, 115:10

Constitution

[22] - 27:6, 27:9,

28:7, 29:18,

29:27, 30:3,

30:16, 30:25,

31:10, 34:8,

38:13, 38:29,

40:4, 44:19,

52:23, 55:15,

57:11, 81:8,

81:12, 111:26,

113:9, 124:3

Constitution' [1]

- 34:11

Constitution...

[1] - 113:21

constitutional

[32] - 21:2, 22:5,

22:6, 29:11,

32:10, 33:20,

34:19, 35:25,

38:19, 39:25,

40:17, 41:11,

43:9, 43:12,

43:14, 43:19,

44:2, 48:25,

49:15, 49:18,

55:20, 63:22,

81:2, 81:10,


7

81:22, 82:7,

82:14, 82:19,

83:7, 111:10,

113:6, 113:19

constitutionalit

y [3] - 60:14,

61:28, 63:21

constitutionall

y [2] - 32:29,

55:16

constrained [3]

- 55:28, 56:16,

56:20

constructed [2]

- 48:20, 48:21

construction

[22] - 3:20, 21:9,

25:1, 28:24,

48:16, 53:9,

56:26, 57:25,

58:1, 63:13, 65:7,

69:14, 77:20,

78:6, 78:7, 93:29,

95:24, 96:16,

98:10, 128:15,

133:8, 134:3

construction..

[1] - 96:12

construe [3] -

50:29, 65:15,

79:9

construed [2] -

7:29, 11:16

construes [1] -

64:28

Consultants [1]

- 139:21

consultation [1]

- 94:4

consulted [4] -

64:8, 87:23,

131:22, 133:10

consulting [2] -

100:20, 101:7

consuming [1] -

59:6

contain [2] -

13:17, 14:12

contained [2] -

6:25, 33:11

contaminated

[1] - 137:9

contamination

[3] - 137:10,

146:14, 146:15

contemplated

[1] - 64:4

contended [3] -

3:29, 22:25,

98:12

contended... [1]

- 77:21

content [2] -

12:6, 30:4

contention [1] -

35:15

contentious [1]

- 56:25

contest [1] -

131:27

context [18] -

3:13, 14:17, 35:6,

48:25, 50:21,

50:22, 53:12,

53:26, 74:8,

85:24, 95:16,

98:28, 108:29,

109:3, 110:17,

112:15, 113:28,

147:15

continuation [1]

- 74:27

continuations

[1] - 75:4

continue [1] -

144:23

continued [2] -

45:24, 123:6

CONTINUED [1]

- 70:1

continues [3] -

61:23, 63:14,

71:19

contour [1] -

92:21

contraceptives

[3] - 26:22, 26:26,

27:14

contrary [7] -

12:2, 18:8, 75:14,

82:6, 102:1,

123:6

contrast [3] -

10:24, 83:29,

84:4

contrasting [1] -

11:22

contribute [1] -

24:16

contributions

[2] - 58:25, 65:18

control [2] -

91:3, 144:27

Controller [4] -

60:29, 61:7,

62:25, 64:5

controls [1] -

91:2

controversy [1]

- 117:5

convenience [1]

- 88:12

convenient [2] -

76:12, 79:16

Convention [4] -

49:19, 97:29,

111:7, 124:4

convention [1] -

23:2

conventional [1]

- 65:7

conversation [1]

- 16:7

convey [1] -

53:3

Coogan [3] -

32:23, 35:25,

38:11

cooking [1] -

24:13

copies [2] -

51:24, 59:27

copy [5] - 23:27,

26:18, 51:29,

59:25, 70:13

COPYRIGHT [1]

- 2:30

Corbally [1] -

66:23

Cork [3] - 76:29,

79:14, 118:21

corner [1] - 18:4

corporate [1] -

32:21

correct [5] -

15:26, 42:23,

53:29, 65:13,

105:24

correction [1] -

16:10

correctly [4] -

52:9, 80:27,

93:13, 99:15

correctness [2]

- 4:27, 44:22

correspondenc

e [1] - 45:9

corresponding

[1] - 113:24

cost [1] - 37:28

Costello [4] -

120:21, 120:24,

121:10, 136:8

costs [5] - 38:4,

40:26, 65:22,

98:18, 111:17

COUNCIL [2] -

1:15, 2:13

Council [14] -

42:18, 67:13,

67:26, 68:4,

68:18, 68:20,

77:17, 100:18,

101:4, 108:26,

110:10, 121:26,

139:20

Council... [1] -

101:2

councillors [1] -

136:15

counsel [6] -

49:29, 60:12,

60:13, 68:17,

124:28

Counselling [1]

- 32:24

counted [1] -

130:7

countries [1] -

23:7

country [7] -

29:26, 53:6,

55:12, 99:29,

100:14, 101:17,

101:23

COUNTY [2] -

1:15, 2:13

County [7] -

42:18, 76:29,

79:14, 87:13,

87:14, 108:26,

110:10

county [1] -

48:23

couples [1] -

28:15

course [42] -

6:2, 10:21, 15:1,

15:8, 37:1, 42:23,

47:17, 47:22,

51:4, 54:12,

54:16, 59:11,

60:26, 63:11,

69:19, 75:22,

76:15, 78:2,

82:29, 84:26,

85:26, 89:7, 91:8,

101:20, 101:26,

104:18, 106:27,

112:10, 114:17,

116:14, 122:17,

123:12, 123:13,

125:17, 126:7,

126:17, 126:22,

130:14, 131:20,

134:27, 135:19,

140:8

Court [216] -

3:12, 6:15, 6:20,

6:28, 7:2, 8:1,

11:16, 11:21,

12:9, 12:15, 14:3,

15:16, 15:20,

15:21, 16:13,

16:16, 16:19,

16:22, 16:26,

17:20, 18:2, 19:1,

19:7, 19:13,

19:17, 19:22,

20:9, 20:10,

20:13, 20:17,

20:21, 20:23,

20:29, 21:2,

21:21, 21:25,

22:13, 22:15,

23:25, 24:4, 24:5,

25:13, 26:13,

26:15, 26:19,

27:1, 28:26, 29:3,

29:7, 31:23,

31:27, 32:1,

32:15, 35:1,

36:16, 36:20,

37:5, 37:23, 38:5,

38:11, 39:7, 40:3,

40:23, 41:12,

41:24, 42:1, 42:5,

42:9, 43:4, 43:5,

43:6, 43:8, 44:8,

44:28, 46:22,

46:27, 47:6,

47:21, 48:27,

49:7, 50:24,

51:12, 51:16,

51:18, 51:22,

52:13, 52:15,

52:16, 55:23,

56:7, 58:10,

59:14, 59:22,

60:3, 60:28, 61:2,

61:23, 62:17,

64:4, 66:1, 66:6,

66:18, 67:8,

67:10, 67:27,

70:5, 70:7, 70:8,

70:12, 72:17,

73:6, 73:27, 74:5,

74:17, 75:13,

75:19, 75:22,

75:25, 75:26,

76:14, 76:26,

77:11, 77:14,

78:10, 78:22,

79:14, 79:23,

79:25, 79:28,

80:1, 80:14,

80:24, 81:17,

83:8, 84:2, 84:4,

84:25, 85:15,

93:13, 95:16,

97:8, 97:23, 98:5,

98:7, 98:18, 99:8,

101:28, 102:1,

102:6, 103:1,

103:11, 103:13,

104:21, 104:24,

105:5, 105:15,

106:18, 107:2,

107:5, 107:10,

107:17, 107:20,

107:24, 108:25,

108:27, 109:12,

109:13, 109:14,

109:25, 110:3,

110:4, 110:14,

112:14, 113:26,

113:29, 114:4,

114:17, 114:19,

114:28, 115:7,

115:11, 115:14,

116:26, 117:10,

117:17, 117:19,

117:23, 118:21,

120:12, 120:18,

121:3, 121:4,

121:6, 122:3,

124:7, 124:23,

126:25, 127:4,

127:15, 128:27,

130:13, 133:2,

135:18, 136:5,

136:9, 140:9,

147:6, 149:29,

150:3, 150:5,

150:6

COURT [2] - 1:1,

1:3

court [33] - 5:15,

13:24, 19:16,

20:2, 29:5, 31:13,

32:8, 51:3, 52:20,

52:28, 53:25,

53:27, 54:7, 56:4,

60:11, 60:21,

60:24, 60:26,

63:1, 63:5, 64:15,

65:13, 69:6,

75:20, 77:25,

115:12, 116:14,

117:27, 118:13,

122:22, 128:23,

128:24

Court's [19] -

3:15, 4:7, 4:26,

39:13, 40:4,

44:26, 49:16,

58:10, 59:22,

61:10, 66:16,

69:18, 76:14,

77:6, 100:7,

107:2, 109:23,

109:27, 116:10


8

courtesy [1] -

150:17

courts [27] -

23:3, 32:27, 33:1,

33:6, 34:14,

34:18, 37:27,

52:8, 52:20, 53:6,

54:26, 55:11,

55:16, 56:27,

59:1, 61:25,

62:27, 64:8,

64:14, 64:18,

64:25, 65:10,

65:15, 78:5,

109:29, 110:2

Courts [1] -

29:10

courts.. [1] -

39:1

cover [1] - 17:13

covered [1] -

25:5

COX [1] - 2:20

crank [1] - 39:24

crank's [1] -

40:15

create [1] -

24:23

credit [1] - 52:2

Crilly [12] - 51:9,

52:6, 60:28,

61:12, 62:24,

63:7, 64:4, 66:19,

66:25, 69:8,

69:17, 78:2

criminal [2] -

114:6, 119:13

criteria [3] -

115:16, 148:4,

148:16

criticisms [1] -

59:8

Croatia [1] -

23:9

Cronin [2] -

76:28, 79:14

cross [1] - 90:10

cross-runway

[1] - 90:10

Crotty [2] -

32:17, 37:12

crucial [2] -

67:4, 75:17

crucially [1] -

58:27

crude [1] - 6:16

culpable [1] -

119:10

cultural [2] -

128:14, 141:1

culverting [1] -

148:25

cumulative [2] -

145:29, 146:2

curfew [1] -

132:29

curiam [1] -

78:18

curiam" [1] -

78:16

curiously [1] -

72:24

current [5] - 4:3,

4:23, 89:29,

90:14, 145:17

cut [1] - 55:29

Cyprus [1] -

23:17

Czech [1] - 23:9

D

D.S [1] - 118:20

DAA [1] - 46:28

DAA's [1] -

128:13

DAC [2] - 1:22,

2:27

daily [1] - 24:8

DAMIEN [1] -

2:27

dangerous [1] -

24:26

date [6] - 18:17,

18:29, 19:4,

66:17, 68:2,

100:1

dated [2] -

128:17, 136:2

dates [1] - 19:9

David [1] - 68:5

Dawkins [1] -

25:28

DAY [2] - 1:25,

3:2

days [9] - 46:29,

77:15, 128:19,

128:23, 128:24,

128:25, 128:27,

142:19, 149:27

daytime [1] -

90:13

deal [24] - 31:19,

41:3, 41:7, 44:16,

49:17, 55:22,

66:11, 74:3, 74:8,

76:26, 79:16,

80:18, 81:1, 81:2,

94:16, 97:12,

103:18, 112:10,

120:28, 135:27,

135:28, 143:14,

144:29, 146:14

dealing [23] -

30:4, 70:4, 74:7,

83:22, 87:20,

95:19, 95:23,

96:14, 98:3, 98:5,

99:10, 99:22,

101:28, 103:9,

104:4, 104:9,

127:18, 135:16,

140:18, 141:12,

141:16, 142:7

deals [10] -

55:25, 91:18,

91:19, 94:22,

96:6, 96:24,

100:8, 100:25,

133:3, 138:21

dealt [8] - 5:3,

92:5, 124:14,

130:14, 135:15,

138:7, 148:6,

148:8

deaths [1] -

24:11

Deauville [2] -

98:6, 98:11

debate [4] -

56:1, 70:14,

72:16

debated [3] -

54:14, 60:18,

140:29

debates [17] -

59:4, 61:14,

61:26, 62:3,

63:17, 63:20,

63:23, 64:14,

65:2, 65:6, 65:18,

65:25, 66:4, 66:5,

71:14, 73:14,

79:18

decades [1] -

25:20

decibel [1] -

91:21

decibels [1] -

92:21

decide [1] -

100:21

decided [2] -

19:18, 61:11

decides [1] -

14:26

deciding [1] -

113:16

decision [86] -

5:5, 5:12, 6:2,

6:29, 10:6, 10:10,

10:18, 11:3, 11:7,

16:24, 19:22,

20:22, 26:19,

26:29, 31:29,

32:2, 32:16,

32:23, 34:23,

36:7, 36:8, 42:2,

42:17, 43:1, 43:2,

43:6, 44:5, 44:9,

44:27, 45:26,

49:4, 51:9, 51:10,

51:13, 51:21,

51:25, 61:1,

61:11, 66:12,

66:25, 68:4,

69:11, 75:3,

78:21, 79:13,

84:14, 85:19,

85:29, 86:3, 86:4,

86:8, 86:12,

86:14, 86:22,

87:19, 89:2, 89:6,

91:1, 93:16,

100:29, 103:7,

103:10, 103:14,

103:15, 104:6,

105:23, 106:22,

107:3, 107:11,

108:15, 108:20,

109:12, 110:20,

111:13, 112:14,

113:28, 114:23,

120:18, 121:3,

127:24, 128:10,

131:27, 132:5,

138:24, 148:7

decision-

making [1] -

100:29

decisions [35] -

11:10, 13:7,

14:16, 39:5,

43:21, 44:11,

44:18, 48:29,

49:8, 49:9, 52:15,

60:27, 69:6,

84:28, 84:29,

85:1, 85:4, 85:23,

85:24, 85:26,

87:25, 87:26,

88:24, 98:4, 98:6,

107:27, 107:28,

108:2, 108:3,

108:6, 108:8,

108:25, 109:4,

124:24

DECLAN [1] -

1:9

declaration [13]

- 82:4, 97:25,

99:12, 99:19,

99:20, 103:23,

104:2, 110:27,

111:1, 111:6,

111:9, 111:13,

112:27

declarations [3]

- 81:18, 82:3,

111:22

declaratory [1] -

122:14

declaring [1] -

3:29

decline [1] -

98:17

DEEGAN [1] -

1:8

defect [1] - 6:16

defects [1] -

65:14

defence [6] -

34:6, 43:15,

112:23, 123:13,

123:14

defend [1] - 33:3

defendant [1] -

118:15

Defendant.. [1] -

34:27

defendants [2] -

122:9, 123:4

defendant’s [1] -

33:7

deficiencies [1]

- 89:22

deficiency [1] -

6:21

deficient [1] -

3:28

define [1] -

118:18

defining [1] -

118:11

definite [1] -

53:11

definition [3] -

17:21, 18:2,

18:27

definitive [4] -

13:17, 14:12,

14:14, 14:25

degradation [3]

- 26:5, 26:7,

28:23

Deighan [1] -

129:11

Deighan's [1] -

142:27

DEIGHEN [1] -

1:8

Deirdre [1] -

129:19

delay [10] -

114:18, 114:19,

118:14, 119:24,

120:1, 120:2,

120:4, 120:5,

120:7, 120:11

Delay [1] -

119:28

deliberate [1] -

56:11

delivered [4] -

50:13, 66:17,

120:24, 134:27

Dellway [16] -

41:16, 41:29,

43:6, 48:29, 49:7,

49:9, 82:11, 83:4,

83:26, 84:16,

84:27, 85:14,

86:16, 86:17,

124:11

demanding [1] -

119:25

demolished [1] -

96:29

demolition [1] -

25:1

demonstrate [3]

- 84:2, 115:17,

148:10

demonstrates

[2] - 75:20, 125:26

Denham [3] -

78:23, 78:27,

117:11

DENIS [1] - 2:22

denominations

[1] - 29:14

deprive [1] -

37:16

depth [1] - 3:25

derogation [2] -

17:24, 100:29

describe [2] -

8:29, 9:9

described [4] -

26:10, 67:1,

109:14, 139:10

deserved [1] -

87:23

deserving [1] -

30:14

design [1] -

93:29

designated [2] -

8:10, 85:10


9

desire [1] -

132:16

DESMOND [1] -

1:10

desperately [3] -

86:7, 127:14,

147:16

despite [1] -

37:8

destroy [1] -

131:17

detail [22] - 9:6,

37:12, 49:5, 71:7,

78:25, 83:22,

99:22, 103:9,

103:18, 104:10,

105:11, 105:16,

135:11, 135:13,

138:3, 138:10,

140:10, 141:21,

142:10, 145:3,

146:4, 148:2

detailed [3] -

7:24, 134:25,

137:9

details [2] -

93:29, 137:16

deterioration [3]

- 8:8, 90:6,

140:24

determinable [1]

- 25:23

determination

[6] - 10:26, 11:1,

11:4, 11:17,

14:22, 121:21

determine [3] -

29:28, 64:23,

65:27

determined [5] -

9:25, 10:1, 46:6,

46:24, 118:28

determines [3] -

10:17, 11:2,

117:19

deterrent [1] -

37:27

devalued [1] -

84:20

develop [2] -

7:3, 105:10

developed [1] -

118:17

developer [5] -

7:3, 85:27, 85:28,

96:7, 113:17

developers [3] -

85:29, 86:1,

113:13

Developers [1] -

72:8

Development

[19] - 7:20, 9:7,

17:15, 18:10,

19:6, 42:10,

45:29, 79:10,

86:23, 87:4,

87:13, 87:14,

107:23, 108:29,

112:8, 112:25,

113:8, 121:23,

121:24

development

[56] - 9:21, 9:24,

9:25, 10:1, 10:27,

11:5, 11:8, 11:18,

11:29, 12:4,

12:13, 14:6,

14:23, 18:9,

48:18, 48:19,

48:21, 48:23,

71:24, 71:25,

74:27, 75:5, 88:2,

88:8, 88:17,

88:20, 89:19,

89:21, 92:17,

93:26, 94:5,

96:19, 96:28,

98:20, 102:4,

102:13, 102:14,

102:23, 103:6,

103:8, 103:17,

104:6, 104:17,

106:3, 113:15,

128:12, 143:25,

144:26, 146:25,

147:1, 147:17,

147:21, 148:6,

148:11, 148:19

developments

[3] - 10:14, 11:14,

48:10

dictum [3] -

52:10, 52:12,

59:12

differ [2] - 22:20,

58:27

difference [8] -

27:23, 67:21,

79:25, 81:25,

84:28, 85:22,

110:3, 149:21

different [17] -

10:10, 24:26,

29:13, 32:21,

37:19, 41:16,

70:11, 75:23,

76:23, 83:27,

101:22, 102:10,

102:27, 109:29,

139:8, 148:3,

148:28

differing [1] -

29:12

difficult [5] -

28:13, 30:2,

40:12, 59:6,

85:16

difficulty [2] -

47:13, 150:14

Digital [5] -

31:28, 32:2, 32:3,

39:17, 41:6

dignity [2] -

21:5, 30:18

direct [2] -

10:13, 108:8

directed [1] -

87:26

directive [2] -

19:27, 20:4

Directive [66] -

5:24, 5:26, 5:29,

6:5, 7:19, 7:25,

7:29, 8:3, 8:12,

11:9, 11:11, 12:2,

12:19, 13:15,

13:28, 15:26,

19:20, 19:21,

19:25, 20:25,

20:27, 46:1,

50:26, 72:19,

72:21, 72:22,

72:23, 73:5,

74:23, 75:3,

75:14, 91:5,

95:16, 95:17,

99:8, 99:9, 99:10,

99:16, 99:21,

101:27, 103:22,

103:27, 104:4,

104:7, 104:14,

105:7, 105:14,

106:1, 106:10,

106:13, 112:7,

112:24, 121:26,

121:29, 122:15,

122:24, 122:27,

124:19, 124:25,

124:26, 126:24,

135:1, 135:19,

135:20, 139:5,

142:2

Directives [4] -

44:20, 46:26,

99:7, 111:25

directly [14] -

8:14, 16:23, 17:4,

21:14, 35:3,

36:15, 39:9,

41:20, 44:4, 60:5,

77:13, 84:29,

89:3, 104:3

Director [1] -

69:6

disadvantaged

[1] - 26:8

disadvantages

[1] - 57:17

disagreed [1] -

42:19

discharge [1] -

146:10

discharged [2] -

94:14, 120:26

discharges [3] -

119:8, 144:27,

149:17

discharges' [1] -

119:11

discovery [1] -

61:8

discretion [6] -

10:19, 10:22,

11:27, 46:23,

60:10, 113:16

discriminate [1]

- 27:18

discrimination

[1] - 113:20

discussed [4] -

3:17, 45:10,

54:14, 131:16

discusses [4] -

9:15, 36:24, 43:9,

43:11

discussing [1] -

5:11

discussion [3] -

32:11, 38:22,

68:26

disimproveme

nts [1] - 90:16

disk [3] - 140:11,

140:26, 142:12

disks [1] -

130:12

dispensation [1]

- 17:24

disposal [1] -

94:2

dispute [12] -

5:26, 7:5, 7:6,

7:20, 9:10, 9:16,

11:25, 15:3,

15:24, 21:8,

21:12, 42:12

disputes [1] -

52:24

disregard [1] -

60:24

disregarded [1]

- 60:21

distance [1] -

95:22

distinct [2] -

37:15, 110:2

distinction [5] -

49:7, 86:17,

87:24, 99:27,

100:12

distinctions [1] -

85:25

distinguish [2] -

70:11, 124:10

distinguished

[1] - 124:28

distinguishes

[2] - 63:8, 75:22

distress [1] -

119:12

disturbance [2]

- 8:9, 8:11

disturbing [1] -

25:19

document [6] -

3:14, 24:3, 86:7,

130:6, 130:11,

147:7

documentation

[3] - 61:8, 131:8,

131:10

documents [3] -

130:13, 138:19,

138:21

dogmatic [1] -

26:2

done [13] - 27:7,

51:26, 75:12,

91:22, 108:7,

109:5, 118:20,

143:15, 146:21,

147:10, 149:21,

149:22, 149:27

Donegal [2] -

39:4, 42:18

Door [1] - 32:24

double [2] -

80:9, 125:7

double-

barrelled [1] -

125:7

doubling [1] -

4:2

doubt [5] - 13:4,

13:19, 14:27,

22:25, 28:27

down [9] - 7:7,

30:3, 38:25,

75:13, 121:4,

122:29, 139:7,

143:19, 148:16

downstream [3]

- 140:24, 143:25,

149:16

DPP [3] -

113:29, 120:19,

136:7

Dr [1] - 139:22

draft [1] - 64:29

drafted [1] -

71:28

draftsman [1] -

54:20

drain [1] -

144:23

drainage [12] -

94:18, 134:14,

135:17, 140:18,

143:26, 144:4,

144:12, 144:13,

144:18, 144:25,

145:17, 146:18

Drainage" [1] -

143:18

drained [1] -

93:27

draw [31] - 58:3,

66:16, 66:23,

72:5, 72:17, 73:3,

76:21, 77:6,

85:12, 85:22,

86:13, 88:19,

91:13, 92:11,

92:28, 93:19,

109:23, 109:27,

110:7, 111:28,

112:11, 113:27,

114:3, 116:10,

117:7, 117:29,

118:9, 123:12,

127:2, 149:3

drawing [2] -

48:18, 124:9

drawn [2] - 58:6,

98:24

draws [1] -

58:14

drew [3] - 74:12,

82:25, 89:11

DUBLIN [3] -

1:2, 1:17, 2:17

Dublin [11] -

81:29, 87:7,

87:10, 87:12,

87:27, 88:4,

88:21, 91:2,

91:11, 103:12,

132:28

due [12] - 30:17,


10

37:1, 42:23,

47:22, 50:4, 50:6,

66:26, 82:29,

84:26, 88:15,

90:8, 133:29

Dunne [1] -

103:11

duration [9] -

70:23, 71:23,

72:10, 72:27,

72:28, 99:26,

100:2, 126:12,

134:17

during [2] -

69:19, 140:8

duties [1] -

29:18

duty [4] - 29:20,

30:2, 33:2, 40:4

dwellings [4] -

91:20, 92:18,

92:20, 92:25

Dáil [7] - 62:3,

62:19, 63:17,

68:16, 70:14,

73:14, 79:18

E

e.g [1] - 65:19

earshot [1] -

48:9

earth [1] - 25:2

East [2] - 39:4,

87:15

East-West [1] -

87:15

Eastern [1] -

94:4

easy [1] - 84:19

eaten [1] - 66:8

ecological [1] -

96:8

ecology [2] -

94:27, 135:28

economic [1] -

98:20

Economic [2] -

100:20, 101:13

economy [1] -

148:20

ECR [1] - 12:16

educated [1] -

24:1

education [1] -

29:22

effect [23] - 8:16,

15:19, 17:11,

20:19, 26:7, 49:1,

57:4, 59:15, 63:6,

63:23, 64:19,

72:29, 81:21,

84:29, 85:7,

91:10, 92:13,

107:26, 108:14,

108:19, 118:19,

122:14, 146:2

effective [3] -

20:4, 39:29,

40:19

effects [12] -

10:6, 10:14, 12:5,

13:19, 14:28,

19:29, 22:24,

84:14, 85:18,

90:17, 137:17,

145:29

effects" [1] -

13:5

efforts [1] -

27:29

EIA [40] - 5:12,

5:17, 5:21, 10:20,

11:23, 11:25,

11:27, 15:26,

19:20, 19:25,

20:25, 44:20,

45:9, 50:26,

70:25, 75:3,

75:11, 92:7, 99:8,

99:9, 99:15,

99:21, 101:27,

124:13, 124:25,

126:22, 127:16,

130:15, 135:19,

135:20, 135:22,

135:24, 136:2,

139:5, 143:5,

145:28, 146:24,

147:20, 147:21

eight [1] - 16:7

EIS [10] - 3:28,

5:21, 45:20,

94:28, 128:17,

134:26, 134:29,

136:19, 141:24,

142:3

either [8] - 8:16,

29:14, 47:19,

54:22, 63:22,

119:26, 122:24,

124:6

elderly [1] - 25:4

elected [1] -

65:13

electronic [1] -

25:2

element [6] -

9:15, 9:16, 40:16,

40:29, 87:19,

119:29

elements [4] -

15:16, 41:3,

42:13, 149:14

elevating [1] -

113:13

elevation [1] -

43:19

ELIZABETH [2] -

1:7, 1:9

eloquent [2] -

26:3, 41:15

elsewhere [2] -

72:16, 148:12

embark [1] - 3:9

emerging [4] -

23:1, 23:21,

23:22, 26:4

emissions [4] -

3:26, 21:10,

21:11, 137:17

emitted [1] -

22:1

emphasis [2] -

18:26, 54:4

emphasise [1] -

114:23

emphasised [1]

- 33:24

emphasises [1]

- 98:27

enable [1] -

89:18

enacted [4] -

58:26, 64:24,

65:16

enacting [1] -

62:9

enactment [3] -

61:9, 62:28, 65:7

enactments [1] -

18:23

enacts [1] -

64:19

encapsulation

[1] - 26:4

enclosure [1] -

134:7

encyclical [3] -

23:26, 25:27,

26:1

end [6] - 21:26,

44:27, 72:12,

122:29, 126:4,

131:14

endanger [2] -

27:20, 97:11

ended [1] - 15:6

endure [1] - 86:1

enforceable [3] -

95:1, 95:2

engage [3] -

21:25, 31:17,

49:1

engaged [5] -

49:3, 83:2, 83:4,

83:14, 104:7

engaging [1] -

40:22

engender [1] -

65:5

engine [3] -

133:18, 133:19,

133:23

engineer [2] -

138:8, 138:13

enhancement

[1] - 87:6

enjoy [4] -

26:22, 31:25,

41:22, 47:8

enjoyed [1] -

42:28

enjoys [2] -

42:6, 132:24

ensure [10] -

20:3, 28:4, 40:4,

46:12, 65:9,

90:24, 92:10,

97:1, 97:10,

98:25

entered [1] -

132:7

enters [1] -

144:22

entertain [1] -

61:13

entire [1] - 59:4

entirely [6] -

3:28, 60:21,

75:23, 79:12,

113:10, 145:28

entitled [11] -

5:7, 20:13, 31:23,

32:9, 36:2, 36:25,

37:4, 81:27,

110:24, 120:28,

123:12

entitlement [1] -

36:28

entry [1] - 19:25

ENVIRONMEN

T [2] - 1:12, 2:8

environment

[13] - 19:29, 21:3,

31:8, 31:14,

66:14, 89:19,

90:24, 100:8,

100:9, 100:10,

100:14, 100:25,

148:21

Environment [8]

- 28:18, 53:21,

71:16, 73:22,

103:11, 105:2,

105:19, 124:16

Environmental

[4] - 72:27, 89:15,

91:4, 91:5

environmental

[16] - 10:7, 10:11,

26:5, 26:6, 28:22,

31:11, 40:13,

41:25, 41:26,

45:23, 45:28,

70:24, 93:28,

99:28, 109:2,

124:18

envisages [1] -

9:5

EPA [6] -

107:11, 107:28,

108:6, 108:9,

108:15, 109:13

equal [1] - 20:26

equality [1] -

113:19

equally [5] -

28:21, 35:27,

41:22, 51:13,

58:6

equated [1] -

103:8

equipment [1] -

134:6

ergo [1] - 7:10

erosion [1] -

131:15

erred [1] -

111:14

error [2] - 112:7,

112:24

errored [1] -

82:6

esoteric [1] -

41:29

especially [4] -

24:10, 33:27,

37:10, 116:16

essence [2] -

17:13, 119:20

essential [4] -

25:17, 34:14,

34:16, 115:29

essentially [5] -

22:23, 58:19,

81:20, 81:23,

81:26

establish [3] -

13:24, 64:7,

120:7

established [4] -

35:10, 63:11,

117:27, 120:1

esteemed [2] -

30:10, 64:27

et [2] - 36:26,

63:8

EU [10] - 71:4,

71:8, 71:18,

71:29, 72:9,

72:15, 91:4, 99:6,

99:27, 109:15

Europe [1] -

23:7

European [39] -

9:26, 10:2, 10:28,

11:6, 11:16,

11:19, 12:5,

12:14, 14:1, 14:8,

14:24, 16:20,

17:6, 17:11,

17:27, 20:16,

20:20, 61:29,

74:16, 75:13,

75:15, 91:10,

95:15, 97:29,

98:5, 98:7, 99:5,

99:6, 100:1,

100:12, 100:18,

101:7, 101:28,

102:1, 103:1,

111:3, 124:2,

124:4, 124:23

evade [1] - 38:3

evaluation [5] -

10:13, 10:16,

14:16, 14:19,

15:13

event [7] -

52:14, 63:16,

73:9, 83:7, 97:3,

125:8, 150:16

events [1] -

25:23

evidence [18] -

15:19, 28:25,

104:15, 104:21,

104:23, 105:9,

119:9, 126:6,

126:21, 126:25,

130:20, 136:9,

136:11, 142:24,

142:25, 142:26,

142:29, 146:3

evidence' [1] -

119:16

evident [1] -

53:8


11

ex [2] - 53:21,

117:16

exacerbate [2] -

143:23, 146:6

exact [1] - 5:6

exactly [8] -

19:1, 20:8, 23:3,

44:23, 132:19,

133:19, 145:6,

147:2

examination [4]

- 10:12, 10:16,

14:10, 92:6

examine [4] -

38:5, 45:23, 57:3,

101:27

examining [1] -

53:14

example [20] -

15:4, 22:22,

22:26, 24:12,

43:15, 48:6, 53:9,

63:3, 82:27, 85:3,

85:9, 94:22,

105:27, 105:28,

117:11, 118:14,

119:29, 121:19,

123:22, 140:20

except [2] -

18:7, 102:12

exceptional [1] -

34:13

exclude [3] -

13:29, 15:13,

44:14

excluded [1] -

12:4

excluding [1] -

113:9

exclusion [2] -

18:7, 113:14

exclusive [1] -

57:11

exclusivity [1] -

109:1

execution [1] -

18:15

executive [2] -

61:15, 64:26

exemption [1] -

27:25

exemptions [1] -

27:24

exercise [8] -

10:21, 11:26,

18:21, 46:23,

53:24, 124:8,

125:16, 148:15

exercised [2] -

21:22, 49:23

exercises [1] -

11:22

exhibited [1] -

147:7

exhibits [1] -

129:28

exigencies [1] -

27:15

exist [2] - 29:12,

41:27

existed [1] -

127:17

existence [4] -

31:24, 40:23,

41:11, 120:8

existing [7] -

76:20, 90:15,

120:2, 141:4,

144:23, 145:22,

146:11

exists [4] - 22:2,

22:10, 33:18,

38:18

expansion [2] -

87:5, 88:5

expect [1] -

72:12

expended [1] -

108:5

experience [2] -

24:9, 30:21

expert [4] -

104:29, 130:18,

139:4, 140:5

expertise [2] -

125:1, 125:3

experts [6] -

29:13, 105:2,

124:18, 139:19,

141:10, 142:29

expiry [4] -

18:17, 18:29,

19:4, 19:9

explanation [3] -

73:18, 122:8,

122:22

explicitly [2] -

18:28, 23:7

expose [1] -

97:11

Exposure [1] -

24:9

express [4] -

4:10, 53:17,

72:28, 83:5

expressed [4] -

53:28, 55:17,

143:22, 143:27

expression [2] -

59:13, 135:3

expressly [7] -

9:19, 30:7, 53:3,

58:11, 117:4,

120:19, 122:9

extend [3] -

106:25, 106:26,

110:4

extended [2] -

116:18, 126:19

extension [19] -

4:29, 5:14, 5:18,

17:17, 18:17,

18:29, 19:3,

19:17, 28:21,

47:1, 71:23,

72:10, 98:11,

98:13, 102:2,

102:21, 102:23,

113:16, 126:4

extensions [2] -

19:8, 70:23

extensive [2] -

125:26, 130:15

extensively [1] -

58:27

extent [14] -

7:21, 29:14,

29:17, 49:20,

76:11, 124:7,

125:12, 125:13,

125:14, 127:15,

130:3, 134:29,

143:5, 146:9

external [1] -

53:15

extract [4] -

61:19, 62:18,

73:14, 74:9

extrapolate [1] -

73:23

extrapolating

[1] - 73:24

extreme [2] -

25:22, 118:13

extremely [4] -

49:29, 59:6,

63:20, 71:10

eyes [1] - 16:16

F

face [1] - 40:25

facilitative [1] -

93:12

facilities [2] -

48:13, 90:22

facility [2] -

48:14, 48:15

fact [31] - 16:23,

18:26, 19:7,

24:20, 38:2, 45:6,

46:25, 48:19,

49:1, 56:20,

62:26, 63:17,

68:11, 69:16,

75:19, 75:28,

75:29, 83:2,

84:19, 89:28,

95:23, 98:5,

106:21, 111:14,

111:20, 112:11,

119:3, 120:2,

120:29, 123:3,

133:2

factor [1] - 120:3

facts [8] - 15:23,

26:20, 32:13,

83:2, 124:5,

124:10, 125:21,

146:22

fail [1] - 4:24

failed [5] -

53:16, 99:14,

104:3, 121:27,

122:26

failing [5] - 33:2,

82:8, 113:10,

113:12, 113:15

fails [1] - 81:8

failure [6] - 6:11,

105:9, 111:23,

112:12, 112:28

fair [11] - 43:25,

82:6, 82:14,

82:20, 83:1, 83:8,

93:9, 93:15,

113:12, 113:19,

119:2

fairly [1] - 105:8

fairness [1] -

120:9

fall [4] - 16:14,

17:18, 36:19,

92:20

falls [2] - 15:22,

29:26

familiar [2] -

23:28, 26:20

family [1] -

118:20

far [11] - 4:13,

8:10, 13:14, 22:4,

27:5, 27:10, 28:5,

33:2, 102:2,

136:10, 148:21

farm [2] - 7:2,

7:3

FARRELL [1] -

1:9

Farrington [9] -

51:9, 52:6, 60:28,

61:12, 66:19,

66:26, 69:8,

69:17, 78:3

fashion [1] -

134:22

fauna [5] -

94:23, 95:6, 95:7,

128:16, 133:14

favour [5] -

18:22, 22:22,

27:24, 46:24,

85:27

fear [1] - 56:1

feature [1] -

118:16

featured [1] -

97:22

felt [1] - 74:3

Fennelly [11] -

48:28, 59:8,

59:15, 84:16,

84:27, 85:3,

86:15, 87:25,

88:23, 118:25,

118:26

Fennelly's [2] -

42:2, 85:13

FERGUS [1] -

1:8

fertilizers [1] -

24:17

fever [1] - 48:16

few [7] - 50:17,

51:17, 77:15,

83:18, 83:21,

83:23, 114:27

fide [8] - 32:27,

33:15, 33:17,

34:17, 35:22,

36:3, 38:13,

38:17

field [3] - 12:26,

14:6, 14:20

Fifth [1] - 65:11

fill [1] - 65:14

filth [1] - 25:4

final [5] - 19:13,

30:26, 44:26,

113:5, 149:3

finalised [1] -

131:17

finally [7] -

29:26, 35:9, 43:4,

44:8, 58:26,

118:24, 149:3

Finance [1] -

77:19

financial [1] -

86:1

financially [1] -

46:17

findings [7] -

13:17, 14:13,

14:15, 14:17,

14:18, 14:25,

124:24

FINGAL [2] -

1:15, 2:13

Fingal [10] -

82:6, 82:21,

87:13, 110:10,

110:12, 125:20,

126:11, 126:14,

127:3, 132:8

fining [1] - 70:7

finish [1] - 70:3

Finland [1] -

23:10

Finlay [8] - 6:26,

7:1, 7:11, 12:8,

15:10, 32:24,

35:12, 38:14

FINTAN [1] -

2:19

First [2] - 57:23,

64:18

first [27] - 6:14,

9:12, 20:20,

31:22, 47:14,

47:17, 50:10,

50:19, 51:7,

66:12, 68:29,

71:28, 76:28,

81:2, 86:29,

99:10, 105:29,

109:22, 109:24,

110:8, 112:11,

113:28, 114:3,

114:28, 118:28,

126:29, 148:4

FIRST [1] - 1:17

firstly [4] - 3:11,

91:16, 104:15,

131:26

fiscal [1] -

101:15

Fisheries [1] -

94:4

fishing [1] -

12:29

fit [1] - 117:25

Fitzpatrick [1] -

140:3

five [2] - 16:9,

129:5

Flanders [1] -

19:17

flood [22] - 84:8,


12

93:20, 93:22,

125:15, 134:11,

135:18, 135:23,

140:19, 140:23,

143:13, 146:12,

146:21, 146:26,

147:13, 147:17,

147:18, 147:28,

148:10, 148:11,

148:13, 148:20,

149:15

Flood [3] -

125:16, 145:9,

149:8

flooding [8] -

93:24, 94:10,

94:18, 143:26,

145:1, 146:28,

147:1, 147:24

flow [1] - 29:18

flowing [1] -

85:19

fluoridation [1] -

22:24

focus [1] - 132:2

folder [1] -

109:22

follow [2] -

43:25, 52:14

followed [1] -

38:22

following [14] -

1:28, 12:9, 14:18,

14:19, 15:20,

15:23, 23:7,

39:16, 43:22,

49:16, 87:11,

128:17, 136:19,

149:7

FOLLOWS [3] -

3:2, 3:6, 70:1

follows [4] -

20:25, 32:26,

62:1, 136:18

food [1] - 21:4

FOR [7] - 2:4,

2:8, 2:13, 2:17,

2:22, 2:27, 69:29

force [2] - 19:25,

20:26

forced [1] -

132:17

foregoing [3] -

37:8, 68:16,

68:26

foreseeable [3] -

56:15, 88:3,

88:21

Forest [2] -

144:20, 146:10

forgotten [2] -

41:5, 125:7

form [1] - 64:29

formal [3] - 96:2,

109:25, 110:15

former [1] -

37:28

forms [2] - 24:8,

28:25

formulated [1] -

4:19

forward [4] -

73:17, 104:29,

105:26, 138:6

foundation [2] -

50:8, 74:1

four [5] - 14:2,

50:21, 66:18,

112:6, 112:22

Fourth [1] - 65:4

FOURTH [1] -

1:22

fourth [6] -

114:12, 119:4,

119:14, 119:17,

119:22, 141:29

fourthly [1] -

51:2

FP [1] - 2:10

framework [3] -

102:25, 145:8,

147:27

France [1] -

23:10

Frances [1] -

24:5

free [1] - 108:2

freedom [1] -

30:18

freestanding [1]

- 44:1

Frequently [1] -

25:10

frequently [1] -

52:26

fresh [5] - 19:10,

45:7, 45:9, 46:7

FRIDAY [2] -

1:25, 3:1

Friday [1] -

142:23

Friend [3] -

42:23, 44:9,

107:19

friend [1] - 25:27

Friend's [1] -

44:16

FRIENDS [2] -

1:12, 2:8

Friends [35] -

5:27, 15:26,

21:20, 23:27,

24:1, 26:18,

28:18, 28:20,

31:28, 37:1,

40:14, 41:8,

42:11, 42:12,

42:14, 42:19,

42:20, 42:26,

44:12, 44:21,

50:14, 71:16,

73:22, 74:12,

79:27, 80:12,

80:20, 105:1,

105:18, 105:19,

106:16, 109:21,

123:16, 124:16,

149:29

Friends' [1] -

41:4

frivolous [1] -

37:22

frustrate [1] -

46:10

fuels [1] - 24:13

full [10] - 9:12,

70:13, 92:6,

93:29, 96:7,

113:3, 123:14,

125:9, 125:23,

142:13

full.. [1] - 94:28

fully [5] - 4:10,

45:23, 71:3,

110:14, 124:14

fully/partially [1]

- 96:29

fumes [1] -

24:15

functionality [1]

- 149:15

fundamental [7]

- 30:5, 34:10,

38:28, 50:27,

99:24, 105:8,

109:15

Fundamental [1]

- 111:3

funding [2] -

95:29, 96:1

fungicides [1] -

24:17

furnished [1] -

45:19

furnishes [1] -

118:13

future [4] - 35:4,

39:9, 90:14, 91:3

G

gain [2] - 48:20,

86:1

Gains [1] - 77:7

Galway [3] -

45:27, 45:29,

46:1

gaps [2] - 14:14,

65:14

gardens [1] -

96:2

GARRET [1] -

2:18

gas [3] - 21:10,

21:11, 46:16

gases [2] -

21:28, 22:1

gateway [1] -

87:8

GENERAL [2] -

1:19, 2:22

general [14] -

8:27, 24:18,

28:15, 33:12,

48:29, 49:8,

55:22, 56:22,

62:4, 85:2, 86:6,

87:25, 88:24,

91:10

General [2] -

26:17, 33:9

generality [1] -

18:19

generally [3] -

27:14, 57:18,

90:26

generated [2] -

24:28, 84:8

Geoghegan [5] -

6:26, 7:1, 7:11,

12:8, 15:10

Georgia [1] -

23:10

Gerry [1] - 140:4

Gillespie [1] -

129:7

GILLIGAN [1] -

1:8

Gilligan [1] -

129:3

given [24] - 7:22,

9:21, 9:28, 24:4,

27:13, 36:11,

41:6, 45:24,

51:27, 80:13,

81:21, 82:12,

82:15, 93:23,

94:7, 101:23,

105:3, 105:4,

125:24, 130:20,

133:29, 143:7,

143:9, 143:11

gleaned [1] -

47:19

global [1] -

25:16

Goonery [1] -

108:26

Gorman [2] -

66:13, 66:20

Government [4]

- 61:15, 61:20,

65:20, 66:14

government [3]

- 33:1, 52:21,

52:22

grant [13] -

10:19, 11:29,

12:3, 39:17,

42:27, 45:7,

110:24, 112:5,

112:21, 113:16,

117:17, 117:18,

127:25

granted [14] -

3:17, 17:25, 20:3,

45:1, 46:11, 80:8,

80:15, 115:15,

116:28, 117:26,

119:28, 120:13,

126:12, 133:3

granting [2] -

11:13, 14:1

grassed [3] -

144:23, 144:25,

144:27

grateful [3] -

49:27, 49:29,

52:5

grave [2] -

40:22, 50:3

gravity [1] - 74:4

great [4] - 30:11,

47:27, 65:1, 66:5

greater [2] - 9:6,

65:9

greatly [1] -

57:20

Greece [1] -

23:10

greenhouse [4]

- 21:10, 21:11,

21:28, 22:1

GREG [1] - 1:9

Griffin [2] -

77:10, 78:14

ground [8] -

34:25, 42:21,

112:1, 113:5,

115:18, 116:2,

116:18, 120:6

grounding [2] -

119:4, 119:23

grounds [25] -

27:15, 27:26,

28:14, 33:4,

35:21, 80:7, 80:9,

80:17, 115:15,

116:20, 116:25,

116:28, 117:15,

117:18, 117:20,

117:22, 117:25,

118:11, 118:17,

118:29, 119:24,

121:15, 121:16,

123:19, 135:10

Grounds [10] -

80:25, 81:4,

83:11, 86:9,

97:19, 104:20,

105:26, 114:27,

123:20

Group [7] -

128:4, 128:8,

129:9, 129:21,

137:29, 139:8,

142:9

group [4] -

37:28, 128:10,

129:24, 131:17

Group's [1] -

131:7

guarantee [1] -

35:10

guaranteed [3] -

32:29, 34:7, 34:8

guarantees [1] -

113:19

guidance [1] -

13:11

Guidelines [9] -

87:12, 125:16,

125:21, 145:9,

146:27, 147:16,

147:27, 148:27,

149:9

guidelines [1] -

30:2

GWEN [1] - 1:31

H

habitat [3] -

95:20, 141:4,

141:6

Habitats [37] -

5:24, 5:25, 5:29,

6:5, 7:18, 7:25,


13

7:28, 8:3, 11:9,

11:11, 12:2,

12:19, 13:15,

13:28, 16:21,

20:26, 44:20,

46:1, 95:16,

95:17, 99:8,

103:22, 103:27,

104:4, 104:7,

104:14, 105:7,

105:13, 105:29,

106:9, 112:24,

124:19, 124:26,

126:24, 135:1,

139:5, 142:2

habitats [3] -

8:8, 96:8

halting [1] -

133:16

HAND [1] - 1:9

Hand [1] -

129:11

hand [9] - 3:22,

18:4, 33:28,

56:10, 67:22,

84:28, 99:28,

100:14, 140:16

handed [3] -

66:12, 70:9,

100:5

Handed) [2] -

24:2, 26:18

handing [2] -

26:16, 59:24

Hardiman [11] -

43:9, 43:11,

66:24, 66:29,

67:1, 67:2, 67:16,

67:18, 68:23,

69:16, 118:3

Hardiman's [1] -

68:13

Harley [1] -

139:14

harm [1] - 89:5

harmful [1] -

22:24

Harrington [3] -

105:16, 107:3,

109:13

harsh [1] -

120:16

HAYDEN [1] -

2:27

hazards [1] -

24:10

headed [1] -

147:11

heading [12] -

52:8, 52:17,

70:17, 105:29,

107:15, 112:1,

130:24, 135:15,

136:29, 140:17,

143:18, 149:4

headline [8] -

83:23, 98:4, 99:1,

99:24, 103:19,

125:12, 131:5,

143:4

headnote [5] -

78:12, 78:13,

114:3, 114:4,

114:9

heads [1] -

83:20

health [11] -

24:10, 25:11,

27:8, 27:11,

27:28, 28:8,

88:15, 90:18,

94:9, 128:14,

141:12

HEALY [3] - 2:4,

107:19, 127:6

Healy [13] -

44:10, 44:14,

47:26, 77:2,

77:23, 79:6,

87:22, 89:11,

92:13, 126:1,

126:22, 127:11,

132:21

Healy's [5] - 6:9,

41:15, 44:29,

77:1, 77:14

heard [12] -

41:18, 41:23,

42:3, 42:6, 43:13,

43:20, 102:2,

142:19, 142:20,

142:21, 142:23

HEARD [1] -

1:24

HEARING [4] -

3:1, 69:29, 70:1,

150:21

hearing [20] -

3:4, 7:26, 69:19,

80:5, 80:6, 89:17,

116:27, 125:5,

128:19, 128:23,

128:24, 128:25,

129:1, 129:4,

129:24, 138:27,

140:8, 140:13,

142:18

hearings [1] -

128:25

heart [1] - 41:1

heating [1] -

24:13

heavily [1] -

110:5

heavy [1] - 18:26

hectare [1] -

95:10

hectares [1] -

95:11

hedgerow [1] -

96:1

hedgerows [4] -

95:25, 95:26,

133:14

held [3] - 32:7,

32:10, 128:19

HELEN [2] - 1:8,

2:15

Helen [1] - 129:3

HELENA [1] -

1:7

Helena [1] -

129:2

helpful [2] -

53:29, 56:13

helpfully [1] -

66:1

Hence [1] -

11:12

herbicides [1] -

24:17

herein [3] -

11:10, 129:5,

129:14

Heritage [2] -

46:1, 97:4

heritage [2] -

128:15, 141:1

herself [2] -

26:28, 139:4

hide [1] - 38:3

hierarchy [1] -

22:6

HIGH [1] - 1:1

high [2] - 24:12,

31:12

High [14] -

21:21, 40:22,

52:13, 61:2,

67:27, 108:25,

108:26, 115:7,

115:11, 115:13,

116:25, 117:17,

117:19, 117:23

higher [2] - 47:5,

115:20

highest [1] -

30:9

highly [1] -

24:28

himself [2] -

139:15, 139:17

historic [1] -

96:2

historical [1] -

133:14

history [4] -

62:28, 69:13,

76:17, 119:5

history' [3] -

63:1, 63:9

Hoey [9] - 51:23,

51:26, 52:16,

58:10, 59:23,

60:2, 60:12,

76:15, 78:11

holding [1] -

35:21

home [3] - 25:2,

40:26, 85:10

homeowners [2]

- 41:19, 48:2

homes [4] -

24:29, 41:21,

71:24, 93:8

honourable [5] -

6:15, 20:9, 20:21,

21:2, 21:24

hope [1] - 84:2

hospitals [1] -

48:17

hours [2] -

134:3, 150:4

house [2] -

55:18, 147:19

House [5] - 51:4,

54:14, 54:15,

54:22, 56:21

housekeeping

[1] - 79:22

houses [1] -

41:19

Houses [2] -

56:28, 58:25

huge [1] - 81:24

Human [4] -

49:19, 97:29,

98:7, 98:19

human [4] -

25:18, 30:9, 34:4,

35:11

hundreds [1] -

24:27

Hungary [1] -

23:10

hurry [2] -

114:29, 115:1

husband [2] -

26:23, 26:28

hypothetical [1]

- 126:24

I

I-7405 [1] -

12:16

I.R [6] - 60:29,

61:1, 61:3, 69:8,

69:9, 118:21

Ian [3] - 3:19,

124:20, 139:17

iceberg [1] -

130:9

ideal [1] - 47:17

ideas [2] - 30:22,

30:24

identical [3] -

60:20, 107:22,

125:22

identification [4]

- 7:11, 10:17,

26:14, 142:17

identified [16] -

12:25, 14:28,

15:9, 20:24, 22:7,

22:27, 31:12,

88:28, 90:3,

129:19, 131:5,

131:12, 133:27,

140:5, 142:27,

142:28

identifies [11] -

59:17, 60:4,

62:13, 86:16,

107:6, 124:7,

130:25, 138:18,

139:25, 143:5,

147:23

identify [17] -

10:13, 14:5, 44:3,

53:25, 68:2, 71:7,

80:26, 89:9,

97:19, 122:23,

125:11, 130:3,

130:18, 136:17,

136:18, 138:11,

146:25

identifying [1] -

136:28

identity [1] -

140:1

IEHC [2] - 51:28,

108:28

IESC [1] -

118:21

ii [3] - 14:12,

39:25, 65:22

iii [2] - 14:22,

39:27

illustrates [1] -

73:19

illustration [3] -

70:5, 72:18, 73:8

imagine [1] -

48:6

immediate [1] -

28:28

immediately [5]

- 48:3, 72:12,

95:4, 97:5,

139:26

immense [1] -

25:3

immensely [1] -

150:7

immune [1] -

106:23

impact [14] -

3:26, 4:1, 10:7,

10:11, 45:23,

70:24, 84:7,

93:28, 124:18,

128:12, 129:9,

141:1, 143:24,

143:27

Impact [2] -

72:27, 89:15

impacted [2] -

104:17, 104:28

impacts [11] -

10:21, 88:15,

89:19, 90:15,

95:6, 95:9,

128:15, 135:21,

144:1, 146:25,

147:22

imperilled [1] -

36:13

impermissible

[2] - 50:28, 62:7

impervious [1] -

144:20

impinge [2] -

21:14, 22:27

implemented [2]

- 7:19, 9:6

implications [8]

- 3:20, 4:6, 8:19,

8:21, 12:20,

12:28, 13:25,

57:3

implicitly [1] -

75:26

implied [2] -

77:19, 83:7

impliedly [1] -

75:26

implies [1] -

12:21


14

importance [11]

- 4:16, 31:7,

33:19, 33:25,

34:13, 35:19,

38:19, 98:9,

98:24, 108:5,

114:24

important [12] -

39:25, 49:4, 49:6,

78:15, 87:19,

92:14, 98:21,

98:28, 105:8,

125:10, 125:11,

127:15

impose [3] -

7:27, 37:28,

102:11

imposed [4] -

7:16, 7:21, 7:28,

102:9

imprescriptible

[1] - 30:1

impressively [1]

- 54:25

imprimatur [1] -

20:22

improved [1] -

87:10

improvements

[2] - 90:14, 133:7

improving [1] -

100:9

impugned [2] -

39:27, 44:5

impugning [3] -

105:22, 108:14,

108:19

imputed [2] -

44:5, 55:13

imputes [1] -

54:7

in-depth [1] -

3:25

inability [1] -

37:14

inadequate [1] -

54:25

inalienable [3] -

22:9, 29:19, 30:1

inappropriate

[2] - 50:18, 73:29

incapable [1] -

24:20

include [5] -

14:22, 37:29,

45:26, 92:20,

147:24

included [2] -

86:25, 100:6

Included [1] -

52:23

includes [5] -

17:23, 17:27,

18:20, 18:28,

148:19

includes... [1] -

18:11

including [16] -

18:16, 24:26,

51:14, 90:21,

94:23, 95:7,

125:5, 128:11,

134:26, 136:15,

137:27, 138:3,

139:9, 139:19,

141:22, 145:19

incompatible [4]

- 97:28, 99:21,

103:26, 121:26

inconsistencie

s [1] - 89:22

inconsistent [1]

- 121:26

incorporated [1]

- 34:11

increase [10] -

21:9, 21:10,

21:11, 21:13,

25:22, 65:22,

85:5, 140:23,

146:29, 148:11

indeed [9] -

4:11, 38:29,

42:28, 47:19,

48:11, 48:15,

59:19, 75:28,

131:29

indent [1] - 68:9

independently

[1] - 113:6

indicate [2] -

30:5, 150:13

indicated [1] -

55:12

indicates [1] -

25:18

indicating [2] -

59:16, 63:24

indication [1] -

143:10

indications [1] -

59:4

indirect [1] -

10:13

indirectly [2] -

35:4, 39:9

individual [7] -

30:19, 32:11,

37:5, 40:1, 40:21,

54:21, 54:22

individually [2] -

8:16, 17:9

individuals [2] -

54:22, 113:12

industrial [2] -

24:15, 25:2

Industrial [1] -

25:6

industry [1] -

85:11

inevitably [1] -

62:7

infirmities [1] -

119:8

influenced [1] -

78:7

inform [1] -

56:21

information [5] -

89:14, 89:16,

89:23, 89:26,

144:5

informs [2] -

10:17, 11:26

infrastructural

[1] - 87:6

infrastructure

[1] - 137:14

infringement [1]

- 119:2

inhered [1] -

42:3

inherent [2] -

28:12, 125:27

inherently [1] -

119:21

inherits [1] -

6:21

initial [1] - 58:28

injunction [1] -

35:16

injustice [1] -

34:26

insecticides [1]

- 24:17

inserted [1] -

60:18

insertion [1] -

46:3

insignificant [1]

- 115:4

Insofar [1] -

120:5

insofar [6] - 8:3,

32:11, 84:12,

105:13, 112:3,

112:19

inspector [2] -

4:29, 92:5

Inspector [15] -

3:17, 4:28, 76:29,

89:23, 136:25,

138:18, 138:21,

140:3, 140:7,

145:5, 145:14,

147:2, 148:15,

148:29, 149:19

Inspector's [6] -

3:15, 89:10,

129:1, 129:6,

129:28, 143:16

inspectors [1] -

125:5

Inspectors [3] -

140:2, 140:26,

142:11

installation [3] -

98:18, 132:26,

137:6

installed [1] -

91:28

instance [7] -

6:14, 6:15, 20:21,

109:24, 110:8,

112:11, 126:29

instead [2] -

15:12, 65:25

INSTRUCTED

[6] - 2:6, 2:10,

2:15, 2:20, 2:25,

2:29

insulation [3] -

91:19, 91:20,

91:27

integrity [15] -

8:25, 9:26, 10:2,

10:28, 11:6,

11:18, 12:14,

13:3, 14:24, 21:4,

22:18, 28:22,

28:29, 31:14,

31:26

intellectual [1] -

29:21

intend [1] - 76:4

intended [6] -

7:27, 30:26, 46:3,

63:6, 71:27, 77:5

intended' [1] -

54:27

intends [1] -

64:21

intent [7] - 53:4,

53:7, 53:16,

55:10, 55:12,

56:3

intention [12] -

18:8, 53:27, 54:6,

54:9, 54:20, 55:2,

61:15, 61:20,

63:24, 64:19,

108:1, 132:16

intentional [1] -

147:25

intentioned [1] -

64:27

intentions [1] -

54:23

inter [4] - 22:7,

45:26, 61:7,

62:24

interaction [1] -

27:1

intercept [2] -

144:19, 146:19

interest [25] -

32:28, 33:15,

33:17, 33:18,

34:5, 34:6, 34:17,

35:3, 35:6, 35:7,

35:22, 36:3,

36:17, 37:26,

38:14, 38:18,

39:8, 39:11, 42:8,

42:25, 44:4,

65:21, 86:6,

88:26

interested [2] -

113:9, 113:11

interests [6] -

24:19, 85:28,

94:9, 98:8,

113:13, 115:23

interfered [1] -

32:6

interference [1]

- 41:25

internal [15] -

6:29, 16:27,

17:20, 18:3,

26:29, 37:2,

43:17, 67:8,

70:16, 91:17,

127:11, 140:20,

141:3, 141:26,

145:13

international [3]

- 4:17, 5:3, 87:8

interpret [4] -

29:27, 30:21,

52:26, 76:20

interpretation

[13] - 29:13,

30:25, 51:11,

53:11, 53:24,

56:14, 57:28,

58:7, 59:5, 60:9,

65:8, 65:23,

68:26

interpretations

[1] - 76:13

interpretative

[2] - 56:17, 57:27

interpreted [4] -

36:18, 64:24,

81:21, 83:14

interpreting [8] -

52:27, 55:11,

57:1, 58:22, 59:2,

62:5, 62:10,

62:14

interrupting [1] -

54:18

intervene [1] -

36:10

intervening [1] -

55:29

intervention [4]

- 5:7, 5:15, 5:16,

5:19

interventions

[1] - 19:26

intolerable [1] -

143:24

introduce [1] -

72:25

introduced [5] -

30:12, 51:15,

56:13, 58:28,

91:4

introduces [1] -

54:13

introducing [1] -

61:21

introduction [2]

- 56:23, 64:13

introductory [1]

- 58:29

invalid [2] -

43:23, 81:7

invalidate [2] -

35:1, 39:6

invalidity [1] -

111:24

invaluable [1] -

22:9

investigation [1]

- 95:3

investment [2] -

16:4, 87:9

invite [1] - 46:27

inviting [1] -

46:21

invoke [3] -

34:17, 36:5,

127:22

invoked [1] -

32:27

involve [4] -

17:14, 35:25,


15

98:7, 144:18

involved [2] -

107:6, 125:13

involving [1] -

108:15

IPP [1] - 21:17

IPPC [5] - 21:17,

28:26, 31:12,

107:15, 109:8

Ireland [12] -

23:16, 31:29,

32:2, 32:4, 39:17,

41:7, 60:29,

74:10, 75:7,

75:27, 125:28,

139:23

IRELAND [2] -

1:19, 2:22

Irish [13] - 28:6,

28:18, 61:2,

64:17, 67:29,

71:16, 73:22,

105:1, 105:19,

122:15, 122:24,

122:26, 124:16

IRISH [2] - 1:12,

2:8

ironically [1] -

36:10

irrational [1] -

111:14

irreversibly [1] -

25:11

irrevocably [1] -

21:14

issue [39] - 3:25,

3:29, 4:11, 4:15,

11:1, 34:2, 34:5,

49:22, 49:24,

50:11, 51:9,

61:25, 74:2,

78:29, 79:17,

81:2, 82:11, 83:4,

86:15, 93:16,

105:14, 110:16,

121:16, 121:17,

126:28, 135:18,

137:18, 138:15,

140:18, 140:19,

141:8, 141:10,

141:18, 144:4,

146:15, 148:8

issued [1] -

145:10

issues [29] -

44:20, 49:15,

49:18, 99:5, 99:6,

104:12, 115:6,

124:2, 124:3,

125:9, 125:14,

127:18, 131:5,

134:29, 135:2,

135:4, 136:25,

138:4, 138:5,

139:5, 140:7,

140:29, 141:22,

141:23, 141:27,

141:28, 142:3,

145:1

it' [1] - 39:11

item [1] - 130:29

itself [16] - 14:7,

15:21, 20:4,

36:15, 41:29,

43:14, 43:16,

49:10, 86:8,

101:10, 102:3,

120:5, 120:7,

130:16, 148:7,

150:5

iv [1] - 39:29

IV [1] - 147:23

J

JAMES [1] - 1:8

January [2] -

67:27, 68:3

jeopardy [2] -

28:1, 28:10

JERRY [1] - 2:4

jets [1] - 41:21

Jim [1] - 129:3

JIMMY [1] - 1:9

JJ [1] - 59:8

JOHN [1] - 2:8

Judge [41] - 3:8,

5:11, 5:24, 6:28,

9:17, 11:21,

16:20, 16:25,

19:2, 19:20,

20:29, 22:13,

23:1, 24:3, 28:17,

30:28, 33:22,

34:13, 36:7,

39:13, 40:10,

41:3, 41:10,

42:16, 42:24,

43:4, 43:7, 43:28,

44:8, 44:11,

44:17, 46:21,

47:12, 47:24,

52:4, 52:13, 89:2,

107:8, 117:17,

149:24, 150:13

judge [2] - 3:8,

30:3

Judges [2] -

117:9, 118:20

judges [3] -

29:26, 30:19,

65:12

judgment [30] -

6:25, 9:17, 12:17,

32:25, 37:4,

39:15, 51:18,

51:28, 58:4,

58:10, 59:23,

60:7, 66:1, 66:17,

66:19, 66:24,

67:26, 67:28,

68:3, 68:11,

76:14, 77:10,

78:27, 84:27,

85:14, 107:5,

114:29, 120:23,

121:9

judgments [2] -

59:9, 117:9

judicial [22] -

33:1, 52:21, 65:3,

79:29, 80:3, 80:8,

80:13, 80:15,

104:22, 109:6,

109:28, 110:5,

110:17, 114:21,

114:24, 115:13,

116:1, 117:14,

118:5, 119:19,

122:21, 132:9

Judicial [1] -

115:10

judiciary [1] -

62:9

July [2] - 70:15,

108:27

jumbo [1] -

41:21

juncture [2] -

15:23, 146:5

jurisdiction [11]

- 10:19, 11:3,

11:28, 12:3,

20:22, 21:21,

21:22, 23:5,

32:26, 117:24

jurisdictions [1]

- 64:12

jurisprudence

[2] - 44:22, 59:29

jurisprudential

[5] - 22:14, 23:2,

23:21, 26:11,

31:5

jury [1] - 119:7

JUSTICE [13] -

1:24, 21:26,

23:28, 47:7, 52:3,

59:28, 66:8,

69:26, 126:1,

149:25, 150:8,

150:12, 150:18

justice [62] -

6:26, 7:1, 7:11,

12:8, 15:10,

26:19, 26:29,

27:3, 29:4, 30:5,

30:8, 30:9, 30:14,

30:18, 30:22,

30:29, 32:1,

32:16, 36:23,

37:2, 42:2, 42:17,

42:27, 48:28,

52:17, 55:7,

57:15, 58:4,

58:12, 59:12,

59:14, 59:15,

59:17, 62:13,

63:13, 66:13,

68:5, 68:11,

68:29, 69:11,

69:16, 77:10,

78:14, 78:23,

82:7, 82:14, 83:8,

84:16, 84:27,

85:3, 85:13,

86:15, 87:25,

88:22, 117:11,

118:24, 118:26,

120:21, 120:24,

121:10, 136:8

Justice [22] -

8:1, 11:16, 12:15,

20:23, 39:15,

43:8, 43:11,

66:24, 66:29,

67:1, 67:2, 67:16,

67:18, 68:12,

68:23, 74:17,

75:19, 75:22,

78:27, 114:29,

115:1, 118:3

justice.. [1] -

115:24

justiciable [1] -

52:24

justification [3] -

148:1, 148:4,

149:7

justified [2] -

27:15, 27:25

justify [2] -

27:17, 28:13

K

Kavanagh [1] -

139:3

Keane [7] -

61:10, 67:27,

68:5, 68:6, 68:11,

68:29, 69:12

KEANEY [1] -

2:27

Keeling [2] -

125:2, 139:15

KEELING [1] -

2:23

Kelly [6] - 6:26,

7:5, 14:3, 108:27,

139:21

Kennedy [1] -

52:2

KENNEDY [2] -

2:18, 52:4

Kenny [18] -

47:26, 49:27,

50:5, 50:7, 51:8,

62:16, 66:11,

66:26, 66:27,

67:15, 68:7, 68:9,

74:12, 74:18,

77:2, 79:18,

102:20, 136:1

KENNY [6] - 2:8,

3:6, 3:8, 21:29,

24:1, 42:19

Kenny's [4] -

49:25, 59:11,

70:19, 74:15

Kenny,I [1] -

52:8

Keogh [1] - 39:5

kids [1] - 150:9

kilometres [2] -

16:5, 16:9

kind [12] - 51:29,

72:20, 85:11,

86:3, 87:19,

93:16, 103:14,

103:15, 111:20,

125:17, 130:14,

135:23

kinds [2] -

85:23, 110:7

KINGSTON [1] -

2:24

Kinsealy [1] -

143:28

knowledge [5] -

12:26, 14:6,

14:20, 17:8,

108:3

knowledgeable

[1] - 139:12

known [4] -

25:27, 45:20,

47:2, 65:20

Korea [1] -

23:17

Kyoto [1] - 4:6

L

lack [5] - 49:26,

49:28, 50:1,

115:5, 136:11

Lackagh [2] -

44:10, 44:27

lacks [1] - 73:25

lacunae [2] -

13:16, 14:13

lady [1] - 140:2

LAeq [1] - 91:21

laid [2] - 30:2,

121:3

Lake [1] -

143:28

lament [1] - 25:5

land [2] - 17:29,

149:16

landowners [1] -

48:2

lands [8] - 85:9,

95:12, 134:15,

143:25, 145:18,

148:5

landscape [4] -

5:15, 5:17, 5:19,

94:28

landscapes [1] -

25:5

language [4] -

53:28, 54:8,

72:20, 102:17

large [4] - 3:21,

21:6, 29:1, 130:2

Larkin [2] -

21:18, 28:27

last [9] - 4:8,

20:29, 30:28,

40:29, 55:24,

58:13, 78:28,

115:1, 141:29

late [2] - 66:13,

74:13

latter [1] -

108:28

Latvia [1] -

23:11

Laudato [1] -

23:26

LAW [1] - 2:15

law [46] - 5:25,

6:25, 7:29, 15:4,

15:8, 15:9, 27:22,

29:11, 29:16,

29:18, 29:29,


16

30:6, 30:7, 34:9,

34:10, 39:21,

55:14, 56:4, 57:4,

60:4, 64:22,

64:23, 65:26,

66:2, 67:29, 71:4,

71:8, 71:18, 72:9,

72:15, 75:15,

82:6, 85:19, 99:5,

99:6, 101:27,

101:29, 109:3,

109:15, 111:14,

115:16, 122:16,

122:24, 122:26,

124:2

lawmakers [1] -

65:13

laws [3] - 28:5,

62:9, 64:23

layer [1] - 143:8

lead [4] - 21:9,

21:11, 25:7,

95:24

leading [1] -

125:6

leap [1] - 22:14

least [11] -

15:28, 19:11,

20:6, 20:19,

28:28, 31:9,

64:15, 74:18,

81:14, 83:10,

89:8

leave [18] -

28:27, 42:27,

79:29, 80:1,

80:13, 114:21,

114:24, 115:14,

115:15, 116:28,

117:14, 117:17,

117:19, 117:26,

119:27, 120:13,

122:20

leaves [1] -

41:11

led [3] - 120:7,

124:23, 127:24

LEE [1] - 2:29

left [1] - 65:14

legal [10] -

12:13, 35:23,

59:26, 65:24,

104:4, 104:8,

109:16, 115:26,

124:1, 141:22

legality [1] -

131:27

legislate [1] -

100:13

legislates [1] -

58:20

legislating [1] -

63:25

legislation [17] -

35:26, 45:28,

51:2, 54:10,

54:13, 54:16,

54:24, 58:15,

58:18, 61:10,

62:5, 62:15,

62:20, 64:28,

65:15, 65:19,

65:21

legislative [11] -

35:1, 39:6, 57:9,

62:27, 64:26,

69:13, 72:1,

76:17, 100:19,

101:7, 101:11

legislature [7] -

19:8, 52:29, 53:5,

53:8, 61:21, 62:8,

65:15

legislature' [2] -

53:1, 53:2

legitimate [3] -

98:10, 98:19,

119:29

length [5] - 41:6,

44:9, 44:15,

126:9, 141:19

lengthy [2] -

58:24, 130:6

less [3] - 5:10,

5:22, 41:29

letter [1] -

119:24

level [9] - 4:17,

5:4, 25:16, 25:22,

83:23, 87:7,

88:28, 99:27,

118:19

levels [2] -

24:12, 25:9

liability [1] -

37:29

liberal [1] -

64:13

liberality [1] -

63:29

Library [1] -

139:12

licence [3] -

17:23, 107:15,

109:8

life [14] - 21:4,

25:18, 26:24,

27:3, 27:20,

27:29, 28:10,

32:29, 33:26,

35:11, 36:13,

38:23, 132:25,

133:15

lifting [1] - 38:6

light [13] - 8:20,

12:25, 12:29,

14:5, 14:9, 14:19,

33:28, 34:25,

39:20, 53:15,

77:26, 125:6,

125:26

lighting [1] -

133:6

likely [8] - 8:15,

17:10, 28:10,

50:23, 50:25,

65:9, 73:5,

146:11

likewise [1] -

79:6

limb [1] - 41:5

limit [1] - 109:9

Limited [2] -

36:9, 139:24

limited [9] -

35:9, 36:9, 37:10,

37:20, 37:29,

72:28, 114:26,

122:21, 128:12

limiting [2] -

57:20, 94:10

limits [4] - 92:1,

106:23, 106:24,

106:26

line [5] - 48:8,

48:9, 48:11, 71:3,

141:29

lines [3] - 50:22,

62:8, 78:28

linked [2] -

24:18, 25:17

list [3] - 78:15,

138:2, 139:2

lists [1] - 129:16

literature [1] -

36:12

litigant [2] -

39:23, 39:24

litigants [4] -

32:11, 38:1, 38:3,

40:11

litigate [3] -

37:9, 38:12, 40:2

litigated [1] -

36:18

litigation [1] -

51:5

litigations [1] -

37:22

live [1] - 93:10

lives [1] - 129:10

living [2] - 48:7,

48:8

loaned [1] - 2:31

local [8] - 25:8,

45:8, 48:2, 48:22,

88:28, 98:8,

113:15, 136:15

Local [4] - 15:2,

66:14, 87:28,

94:15

locals [1] - 98:12

located [2] -

95:22, 97:3

location [3] -

87:16, 133:19,

133:26

locus [7] -

32:18, 33:12,

35:16, 36:17,

37:21, 39:14,

39:17

lodged [3] -

46:8, 128:9,

137:14

LOGUE [1] -

2:10

look [53] - 5:1,

25:3, 51:16, 52:6,

52:16, 56:7,

56:27, 57:14,

58:11, 63:5,

63:12, 67:8,

67:18, 68:7,

68:13, 70:9, 76:9,

76:16, 76:19,

77:3, 80:24, 82:2,

83:19, 84:25,

86:28, 87:28,

92:14, 97:21,

100:11, 100:26,

107:2, 112:17,

113:1, 121:8,

121:9, 122:2,

124:4, 126:17,

127:1, 130:1,

130:18, 134:24,

140:1, 141:21,

143:3, 143:14,

145:5, 145:12,

145:29, 147:6,

147:29, 148:3

looked [2] -

81:15, 126:14

looking [13] -

55:2, 58:6, 58:8,

66:3, 76:13,

78:12, 79:17,

105:6, 105:23,

136:4, 144:1,

146:27, 147:22

looks [7] - 84:3,

87:24, 102:17,

102:18, 102:29,

105:25, 124:12

loose [2] -

26:16, 66:12

Lord [3] - 53:20,

53:22, 55:1

losing [1] -

40:25

loss [4] - 95:7,

95:20, 95:24,

97:12

lost [2] - 22:22,

52:4

low [1] - 25:10

Ltd [6] - 28:18,

32:24, 60:28,

61:12, 69:8,

76:29

Luas [3] - 48:8,

48:9, 48:11

Lumley [7] -

3:19, 3:21, 3:24,

4:28, 124:21,

139:18, 141:23

Lumley's [1] -

4:12

LUNCH [2] -

69:29, 70:1

lunch [3] - 70:4,

70:10, 73:27

lunchtime [1] -

150:16

M

Macedonia [1] -

23:11

maelstrom [1] -

31:11

Mahon [1] -

108:27

maimer [1] -

64:3

maintain [2] -

35:5, 39:10

maintained [1] -

90:25

maintenance [1]

- 123:6

majority [1] -

54:21

Malone [3] -

1:27, 2:30, 2:32

MALONE [1] -

1:31

managed [1] -

146:28

management [2]

- 8:15, 17:5

Management [1]

- 149:9

mandatory [4] -

44:13, 72:26,

112:5, 112:21

Manifestly [1] -

53:6

manifestly [1] -

54:12

manner [2] -

2:31, 121:23

March [2] -

60:16, 66:17

MARGARET [1]

- 1:8

Margaret's [17] -

124:29, 128:3,

128:8, 129:9,

129:20, 130:26,

131:6, 131:14,

132:2, 136:23,

137:29, 138:5,

138:9, 139:7,

139:28, 142:9,

142:19

marine [1] -

85:11

marital [2] -

26:27, 27:2

market [1] -

98:16

marriage [1] -

27:14

married [5] -

27:7, 27:19,

27:22, 28:8,

28:15

MARTIN [1] -

2:27

match [1] -

128:26

material [9] -

44:3, 64:3, 67:4,

69:18, 84:3,

124:6, 124:12,

130:14, 144:5

materially [1] -

60:20

materials [2] -

47:20, 64:7

matter [16] - 3:4,

15:6, 29:11,

36:18, 37:26,

40:2, 65:24,

75:23, 83:7,

86:18, 104:29,

116:26, 116:29,


17

118:28, 119:16,

150:17

matters [14] -

3:10, 10:14, 37:9,

41:12, 42:8,

67:13, 84:1, 84:6,

86:23, 86:25,

116:15, 119:27,

128:11, 135:2

Matthew [1] -

139:14

maximum [1] -

98:25

McDonagh [1] -

69:7

McDonald [14] -

2:22, 47:10,

47:12, 52:5, 60:1,

66:10, 70:3,

107:20, 126:5,

127:7, 149:28,

150:3, 150:11,

150:14

MCDONELL [1]

- 1:9

MCDONNELL

[2] - 1:7, 1:7

McElligott [1] -

140:21

McGee [7] -

22:15, 22:16,

22:20, 26:17,

26:20, 28:20

McGee's [1] -

27:2

McGuinness [2]

- 58:12, 59:15

McKechnie [10]

- 32:1, 36:23,

39:15, 61:27,

62:1, 62:13,

62:24, 63:2,

63:14, 64:1

McKechnie's [2]

- 32:16, 37:3

McKillen [5] -

42:4, 42:6, 49:10,

83:28, 124:11

McKillen's [1] -

85:1

mean [4] -

21:27, 49:2, 99:6,

150:3

meaning [11] -

18:10, 19:27,

53:10, 53:13,

53:25, 54:26,

55:1, 55:3, 64:28,

65:9, 65:27

means [2] -

28:9, 29:20

meant [2] -

25:16, 77:5

meantime [1] -

5:8

measure [2] -

95:27, 97:10

measures [12] -

25:10, 88:6,

90:22, 95:18,

96:20, 97:2,

101:16, 131:16,

133:12, 148:19,

148:23, 148:24

Measures [2] -

95:6, 95:9

meat [1] - 69:23

Meath [1] -

108:26

mechanical [1] -

12:28

mechanism [1] -

81:9

meddlesome [1]

- 37:22

Medical [5] -

67:12, 67:26,

68:4, 68:17,

68:20

meet [3] - 72:3,

88:3, 88:20

meets [1] -

13:25

Member [3] -

8:6, 72:25, 72:26

member [6] -

37:16, 51:4,

55:18, 64:26,

129:20, 139:11

members [13] -

21:5, 23:14,

28:20, 28:29,

36:15, 54:21,

54:22, 57:2,

65:20, 65:23,

111:2, 118:20,

121:4

memorandum

[1] - 35:18

men [1] - 38:2

mention [1] -

119:24

mentioned [3] -

21:15, 79:24,

131:21

mercy [1] -

30:15

mere [4] - 84:18,

84:19, 85:18

merely [5] -

35:17, 38:2,

45:21, 63:2,

65:26

Merriman [20] -

43:29, 48:1,

79:26, 79:28,

80:10, 80:25,

80:29, 83:25,

105:20, 105:26,

111:21, 123:22,

124:15, 127:1,

127:7, 129:2,

129:8, 131:21,

146:16, 147:7

MERRIMAN [1] -

1:7

met [1] - 115:16

method [1] -

23:4

methods [1] -

57:28

metre [2] - 4:15,

16:3

metres [1] - 16:3

Michael [1] -

69:7

MICHAEL [1] -

1:7

midst [1] - 31:11

might [22] -

9:14, 20:29,

23:25, 24:4,

28:10, 30:19,

33:5, 38:4, 48:13,

49:2, 51:15, 56:6,

62:12, 65:16,

69:24, 76:1,

76:12, 84:20,

102:21, 126:18,

149:28, 149:29

million [1] - 16:4

millions [2] -

24:11, 24:27

mind [8] - 49:6,

57:19, 59:28,

79:23, 87:20,

87:24, 103:1,

105:5

mine [1] - 44:4

minimal [1] -

113:17

minimise [1] -

148:19

minimum [1] -

73:4

Minister [22] -

32:5, 50:20,

50:29, 54:12,

60:15, 60:22,

61:19, 62:19,

65:19, 66:14,

67:2, 67:17,

67:25, 68:19,

71:9, 71:19,

72:19, 73:10,

73:16, 77:3,

103:11, 145:10

minister [7] -

51:4, 54:9, 55:26,

55:28, 56:11,

56:19, 62:18

Minister's [2] -

58:28, 60:25

ministerial [5] -

57:18, 57:22,

58:22, 59:1,

59:19

ministers [2] -

56:20, 65:20

minor [1] - 76:8

misconceived

[1] - 33:7

misconstrued

[1] - 66:27

misleading [1] -

58:21

misunderstand

ing [2] - 56:2,

92:11

mitigate [2] -

95:6, 95:9

mitigation [5] -

88:6, 90:22,

95:18, 131:16,

133:12

mobile [1] - 40:1

mode [1] - 90:8

modifications

[1] - 9:29

modifications"

[1] - 10:4

Moldova [1] -

23:11

moment [10] -

51:21, 51:23,

66:15, 79:16,

89:4, 101:21,

105:19, 106:18,

112:15, 130:16

moments [2] -

50:17, 83:18

money [1] -

119:25

monitoring [4] -

90:23, 94:1,

94:13, 94:14

Montenegro [1]

- 23:11

months [7] -

66:18, 91:22,

92:21, 93:2, 93:6,

93:8, 93:11

moral [1] - 29:21

morning [7] -

3:8, 21:27, 21:29,

83:27, 85:22,

100:5, 150:15

Morris [3] -

129:2, 129:7,

142:25

MORRIS [1] -

1:9

most [3] - 38:29,

40:17, 115:16

mother [1] -

150:9

motion [1] -

42:26

motorway [3] -

48:7, 48:9, 48:10

mountain [1] -

141:6

move [2] - 5:24,

135:27

moved [2] -

122:20, 133:24

movements [2] -

90:11, 133:4

MR [49] - 1:24,

2:4, 2:5, 2:8,

2:13, 2:13, 2:18,

2:18, 2:19, 2:22,

2:23, 2:23, 2:27,

2:27, 3:6, 3:8,

21:26, 21:29,

23:28, 24:1,

42:16, 42:19,

47:7, 47:10,

47:12, 52:3, 52:4,

52:5, 59:28, 60:1,

66:8, 66:10,

69:26, 70:3,

107:19, 107:20,

126:1, 126:5,

127:6, 127:7,

149:25, 149:28,

150:2, 150:3,

150:8, 150:11,

150:12, 150:13,

150:18

MS [3] - 2:15,

2:24, 129:8

Murray [8] -

52:17, 55:7,

57:15, 58:4, 59:8,

59:13, 59:17,

63:7

Must [1] - 14:12

must [22] - 2:31,

4:16, 5:21, 6:4,

7:22, 12:7, 12:25,

13:16, 14:5,

24:25, 30:19,

35:7, 38:5, 47:2,

50:2, 55:19,

65:15, 66:11,

105:2, 107:28,

115:17, 148:10

mysterious [1] -

24:21

N

name [7] -

96:27, 125:7,

130:18, 142:27,

142:28, 150:9

named [4] -

1:29, 80:28,

110:9, 110:10

Named [2] -

99:14, 121:27

names [3] -

129:5, 129:13,

142:27

Nap [2] - 125:2,

139:15

narrow [1] -

34:25

narrowly [1] -

119:20

National [3] -

87:4, 96:18

national [9] -

4:16, 6:19, 8:23,

12:27, 13:24,

20:2, 87:3, 88:27,

138:19

Nations [1] -

23:15

natural [11] -

8:8, 29:15, 29:16,

29:18, 30:23,

32:18, 65:1, 82:7,

82:14, 82:19,

111:10

Natural [1] -

16:21

nature [15] -

7:22, 28:12,

29:14, 29:17,

33:19, 33:24,

35:20, 36:4, 38:6,

38:19, 44:12,

58:14, 101:15,

105:3, 117:2

navigation [1] -

137:17

necessarily [1] -

56:25


18

necessary [18] -

8:15, 17:5, 29:28,

35:23, 37:17,

45:22, 57:13,

68:25, 69:5, 88:3,

88:20, 96:20,

97:2, 106:27,

107:16, 120:7,

126:15, 140:9

necessity.. [1] -

118:7

need [33] - 42:1,

43:14, 55:23,

57:22, 66:23,

67:6, 69:21, 72:8,

79:23, 88:3,

88:21, 89:7,

92:11, 95:14,

97:17, 98:25,

109:21, 114:4,

120:23, 122:3,

129:16, 135:7,

135:11, 136:16,

137:22, 138:9,

138:17, 138:22,

141:13, 141:21,

142:10, 145:2,

148:2

needed [1] -

26:21

needs [2] - 72:1,

134:17

negative [1] -

133:9

net [1] - 90:17

Netherlands [1]

- 23:11

network [2] -

24:21, 87:10

neutral [3] -

56:26, 57:26,

77:28

never [5] - 5:28,

53:13, 57:6, 64:8,

83:28

nevertheless [1]

- 37:8

new [31] - 26:14,

29:5, 31:13,

45:15, 48:7,

50:25, 60:18,

63:4, 63:6, 63:13,

71:18, 72:1, 72:9,

72:10, 72:15,

72:22, 72:25,

73:5, 76:19, 77:4,

78:29, 79:10,

90:9, 91:3, 91:9,

102:9, 102:12,

102:26, 116:18,

125:22, 146:24

news [1] -

101:20

next [31] - 47:13,

55:7, 68:8, 68:9,

69:3, 70:29,

71:14, 71:17,

72:5, 77:12,

77:13, 87:29,

94:21, 97:21,

100:26, 103:21,

128:1, 136:18,

136:22, 137:6,

137:28, 138:29,

139:14, 141:7,

142:2, 142:15,

144:1, 144:10,

148:8, 148:16,

149:25

Nicholls [2] -

53:20, 53:22

night [2] - 90:7,

90:10

night-time [1] -

90:7

nighttime [2] -

90:10, 133:4

nine [3] - 16:6,

46:17, 46:29

NO [1] - 1:3

Noel [2] - 129:3,

129:14

NOEL [2] - 1:8,

1:8

Noise [2] - 91:4,

91:5

noise [23] - 84:7,

88:15, 90:7,

90:14, 90:24,

91:3, 91:9, 91:18,

91:20, 91:27,

92:4, 92:8, 125:6,

128:14, 130:21,

133:12, 138:3,

138:7, 138:15,

140:5, 141:16,

141:18, 142:29

non [2] - 24:28,

113:20

non-

biodegradable [1]

- 24:28

non-

discrimination [1]

- 113:20

none [1] - 90:9

Noonan [1] -

42:27

norm [1] - 71:29

North [3] -

23:17, 147:13,

149:16

Northern [1] -

23:17

Norway [1] -

23:12

notable [1] -

119:22

note [6] - 67:7,

135:12, 140:10,

140:11, 144:4,

145:16

noted [4] -

34:13, 37:19,

63:16, 91:1

notes [2] - 1:29,

35:12

noteworthy [1] -

122:7

nothing [5] -

63:16, 125:22,

136:5, 146:24,

147:20

NOTICE [3] -

1:17, 1:20, 1:22

notice [5] - 80:2,

128:17, 136:20,

137:21, 137:24

Notice [4] - 80:2,

110:11, 112:3,

112:19

notices [2] -

129:25, 137:25

notified [2] -

96:26, 97:5

notify [1] - 97:7

noting [1] -

38:14

Notwithstandin

g [1] - 9:22

notwithstandin

g [3] - 18:19, 83:5,

123:5

November [1] -

119:25

nowhere [1] -

50:14

NPWS [4] -

96:22, 97:4, 97:7,

97:12

nuisance [1] -

48:14

number [20] -

15:16, 16:8,

20:16, 32:6,

36:23, 43:9,

43:11, 50:19,

51:17, 52:7,

86:10, 115:4,

115:7, 127:5,

129:13, 130:7,

130:26, 137:27,

140:18, 142:19

O

O'Brien [1] -

39:5

o'clock [7] -

69:24, 69:27,

70:17, 128:27,

143:16, 149:24,

150:11

O'CONNELL [2]

- 1:9, 2:6

O'CONNOR [1] -

1:10

O'Duffy [1] -

98:23

O'Laoire [3] -

67:26, 68:3,

69:12

O'NEILL [1] -

2:15

O'Sullivan [2] -

61:2, 61:27

O'SULLIVAN [1]

- 2:13

obiter [4] -

52:10, 52:12,

59:12

object [3] -

35:10, 116:26,

146:7

objection [2] -

116:29, 117:4

objections [2] -

41:4, 117:2

objective [10] -

4:18, 33:16, 53:4,

53:7, 54:2, 55:6,

55:10, 62:20,

87:15, 108:4

objectives [11] -

8:12, 8:20, 10:29,

12:25, 13:1, 14:9,

17:8, 46:10, 62:5,

62:15, 100:23

objectors [5] -

44:1, 96:4,

113:11, 124:27,

125:2

objects [1] -

105:4

obligation [8] -

5:17, 5:20, 6:13,

20:24, 20:25,

28:4, 43:25,

110:28

obligations [4] -

7:16, 7:21, 7:27,

97:29

obliged [3] -

9:11, 10:26,

150:13

observance [1] -

30:17

observation [8]

- 30:28, 73:27,

74:29, 78:14,

79:1, 117:11,

118:2, 118:24

observations [9]

- 58:5, 64:1,

83:21, 83:23,

84:15, 88:22,

114:27, 115:8,

117:29

observations..

[1] - 86:26

observe [2] -

68:29, 107:17

observed [3] -

52:9, 52:16,

67:25

observers [1] -

136:15

obtained [2] -

8:26, 114:21

obtains [1] -

109:2

obvious [4] -

98:22, 108:1,

118:16, 120:12

obviously [21] -

7:8, 16:23, 18:26,

22:1, 41:7, 44:16,

61:18, 68:5, 71:6,

102:26, 120:29,

131:9, 132:6,

135:12, 136:6,

139:11, 140:12,

140:19, 141:7,

142:11, 142:29

occasion [2] -

73:11, 119:22

occasions [1] -

114:13

occur [1] - 43:23

occurred [3] -

5:14, 45:25,

56:18

occurring [1] -

26:5

OCTOBER [3] -

1:25, 3:2, 150:21

October [4] -

128:21, 142:21,

142:23, 142:24

odd [1] - 42:28

OF [3] - 1:12,

2:8, 3:2

offer [4] - 91:29,

92:23, 92:26,

134:28

offers [1] -

112:23

Office [1] - 87:13

OFFICE [1] -

2:25

Officer [2] -

60:2, 97:4

offset [2] -

90:15, 145:1

often [4] - 52:20,

53:27, 54:23,

55:1

Oireachtas [20] -

52:24, 52:27,

55:13, 55:17,

56:28, 57:2,

57:10, 58:15,

58:18, 58:19,

58:26, 59:3,

59:20, 61:14,

61:26, 63:25,

64:19, 64:24,

77:20, 78:8

OISIN [1] - 2:5

old [1] - 77:4

omissions [1] -

65:14

ON [2] - 1:25,

3:1

Once [1] -

117:25

once [3] - 25:5,

113:17, 143:7

one [74] - 21:14,

24:22, 27:27,

29:19, 34:2,

37:20, 38:29,

43:19, 44:18,

46:25, 46:26,

48:6, 48:14,

49:22, 51:7,

52:12, 52:14,

52:21, 53:11,

55:18, 58:6, 58:7,

59:18, 59:25,

62:17, 67:22,

68:7, 69:21,

71:11, 71:12,

72:20, 72:21,

73:20, 73:22,

74:2, 76:15,

76:16, 77:9,

77:28, 78:23,

83:15, 84:3,


19

84:28, 87:21,

87:24, 91:13,

93:18, 95:2, 98:5,

99:28, 100:14,

100:25, 102:5,

102:17, 102:18,

102:28, 105:2,

105:20, 105:25,

106:28, 107:4,

124:10, 124:12,

124:27, 125:2,

128:8, 129:22,

130:28, 131:20,

133:22, 135:14,

144:20

ongoing [3] -

22:26, 28:23,

46:12

onus [1] - 57:2

onwards [1] -

44:28

Op [1] - 39:4

Open [1] - 32:24

open [14] - 3:12,

5:25, 16:10,

16:16, 53:11,

57:13, 59:7,

85:15, 89:2, 89:6,

107:16, 113:2,

122:13, 133:22

open.. [1] -

92:26

opened [4] -

21:16, 44:9,

67:15, 68:17

opening [9] -

44:29, 86:13,

86:18, 92:22,

112:13, 123:26,

123:27, 132:21,

132:22

operate [1] -

132:28

operated [2] -

102:8, 137:2

operating [2] -

20:3, 90:8

operation [6] -

48:4, 89:29,

91:23, 92:23,

94:1, 144:16

operational [1] -

149:15

operator [3] -

45:3, 45:6, 46:19

opinion [8] -

3:27, 4:15, 8:27,

28:1, 34:20,

45:18, 45:20,

123:3

opinion.. [1] -

45:13

opportunities

[1] - 113:10

opportunity [9] -

82:12, 82:15,

83:29, 84:5,

127:17, 131:10,

131:24, 143:6,

143:9

opposed [1] -

113:14

opposite [7] -

55:24, 76:18,

76:20, 85:7,

113:1, 141:15,

142:16

option [2] - 90:8,

93:7

oral [11] - 89:17,

97:23, 125:5,

128:18, 128:25,

129:1, 129:4,

129:24, 138:27,

140:8, 142:18

order [20] -

26:22, 33:6, 38:3,

40:26, 41:27,

42:21, 44:5,

65:26, 76:19,

81:1, 94:18,

100:22, 106:19,

110:19, 111:17,

114:5, 114:24,

116:17, 117:19

orders [1] -

37:28

ordinarily [1] -

27:20

ordinary [5] -

15:1, 28:11,

95:26, 100:19,

135:2

organ [3] - 33:1,

52:21, 57:9

organisation [1]

- 105:4

organisms [1] -

25:8

organs [2] -

52:21, 65:2

original [5] -

46:4, 70:26,

71:26, 102:26,

119:23

originally [1] -

3:16

ostensibly [1] -

60:9

otherwise [6] -

4:14, 4:28, 36:2,

46:17, 56:24,

88:15

ought [3] -

61:25, 82:21,

108:2

outcome [3] -

10:15, 10:20,

37:27

outer [1] - 45:27

outfall [1] -

144:20

outlier [1] -

23:16

outline [2] -

49:15, 49:21

outlined [1] -

93:27

outset [4] - 50:3,

50:10, 74:3,

124:5

outside [1] -

109:9

overall [3] -

89:22, 137:13,

148:12

overleaf [1] -

25:13

overriding [1] -

8:29

oversight [2] -

15:22, 16:14

oversimplificat

ion [1] - 58:21

own [10] - 17:28,

58:10, 59:22,

68:13, 71:11,

76:14, 78:18,

85:20, 107:2,

149:12

owners [1] -

40:1

P

pace [4] - 21:12,

21:13, 22:26,

26:6

page [137] -

3:13, 3:18, 3:22,

4:8, 4:21, 6:29,

16:27, 17:20,

18:3, 18:5, 18:13,

24:3, 24:5, 26:29,

29:3, 29:6, 32:2,

37:2, 39:14, 43:8,

43:17, 52:7,

52:17, 55:25,

57:13, 57:14,

58:13, 58:14,

60:6, 67:8, 67:9,

67:15, 70:15,

70:16, 70:17,

73:16, 74:14,

74:15, 77:11,

77:12, 77:13,

78:26, 81:3,

81:17, 86:19,

87:29, 88:29,

91:16, 91:17,

93:21, 94:21,

97:24, 99:11,

103:22, 103:29,

105:28, 107:14,

107:19, 107:20,

111:29, 112:17,

113:1, 114:29,

115:1, 116:11,

117:10, 117:12,

118:2, 121:18,

122:4, 122:29,

127:10, 130:19,

130:23, 130:25,

131:6, 132:12,

134:24, 135:6,

135:9, 135:14,

135:27, 136:13,

136:17, 136:22,

136:25, 137:7,

137:20, 137:25,

137:26, 137:28,

137:29, 138:3,

138:6, 138:17,

138:20, 138:26,

138:29, 139:7,

139:14, 140:1,

140:15, 140:16,

140:20, 140:28,

141:3, 141:5,

141:6, 141:7,

141:12, 141:14,

141:15, 141:22,

141:26, 142:6,

142:15, 142:16,

143:17, 145:12,

145:13, 147:10,

147:29, 148:3,

149:3, 149:5

pages [13] -

24:4, 51:17,

118:25, 121:9,

121:14, 130:7,

130:8, 140:11,

140:18, 140:25,

141:17, 142:7,

142:15

paginated [1] -

139:1

pagination [11] -

67:9, 70:16,

86:20, 91:17,

127:11, 140:21,

141:3, 141:26,

145:13, 147:9

paid [1] - 118:6

Papal [1] - 23:26

papers [2] -

127:4, 136:5

para [3] - 12:16,

13:12, 60:11

paragraph [103]

- 3:22, 4:8, 6:28,

7:13, 8:22, 9:3,

9:16, 9:17, 12:10,

13:8, 14:3, 19:22,

24:6, 25:13, 29:6,

32:15, 33:8,

33:11, 33:22,

37:3, 37:13,

38:25, 39:14,

42:2, 43:6, 43:16,

44:28, 45:11,

55:7, 55:24,

57:14, 58:13,

60:7, 61:5, 62:22,

63:27, 67:18,

68:8, 68:10,

68:14, 70:18,

71:15, 71:17,

74:11, 74:29,

76:6, 78:27,

78:28, 81:3, 82:2,

82:3, 82:16,

82:18, 82:25,

82:27, 83:11,

83:15, 85:14,

93:24, 97:22,

97:23, 99:11,

99:18, 99:19,

99:20, 100:16,

100:26, 100:27,

101:1, 104:2,

105:28, 105:29,

107:4, 107:17,

107:24, 110:20,

110:22, 111:29,

112:1, 112:17,

113:1, 113:2,

114:8, 115:1,

116:11, 116:21,

117:12, 118:3,

121:19, 122:5,

122:29, 127:19,

128:28, 141:29,

142:3, 143:20,

144:2, 144:10,

148:8, 149:3

paragraphs [16]

- 12:9, 43:10,

45:10, 74:15,

81:19, 81:24,

81:25, 82:17,

82:26, 99:10,

106:16, 118:25,

127:3, 127:9

parallel [2] -

4:15, 98:22

parameters [1] -

117:20

parents [1] -

29:20

Park [1] - 96:3

parking [1] -

145:19

Parks [1] - 96:18

parliament [3] -

53:16, 53:28,

101:10

Parliament [7] -

54:7, 54:27,

54:29, 55:2, 55:4,

100:18, 101:4

Parliament' [1] -

54:2

Parliament.. [1]

- 101:8

parliamentary

[13] - 55:29, 59:4,

64:3, 64:7, 64:14,

64:29, 65:2, 65:6,

65:18, 65:25,

66:4, 66:5, 71:14

parsing [2] -

56:3, 65:3

part [15] - 10:26,

24:8, 28:25, 34:9,

37:4, 49:26,

49:29, 50:2,

56:11, 59:12,

66:7, 92:7,

112:13, 114:20,

139:9

Part [2] - 7:19,

7:24

parte [1] -

117:16

partem [1] -

84:22

participants [1]

- 139:9

participate [9] -

42:20, 42:22,

43:1, 93:9,

124:17, 124:20,

131:24, 131:29,

139:28

participated [3]

- 124:26, 128:18,

136:24

participation [7]


20

- 113:11, 125:12,

125:27, 127:17,

127:23, 130:4,

143:7

particular [58] -

7:17, 7:21, 9:15,

9:16, 25:24, 26:2,

26:8, 26:27,

27:10, 27:17,

27:21, 30:6,

30:29, 31:18,

33:5, 33:18,

35:18, 35:26,

36:24, 37:25,

38:18, 39:18,

48:1, 48:18,

48:28, 49:10,

51:1, 53:26,

55:25, 58:9,

60:14, 61:28,

63:4, 65:21, 73:9,

73:10, 74:5,

81:22, 85:13,

87:27, 88:23,

89:25, 93:7, 98:8,

100:3, 108:4,

112:4, 112:20,

113:14, 115:18,

116:14, 117:1,

128:24, 138:7,

144:6, 147:29

particularly [6] -

47:29, 83:24,

98:27, 125:28,

128:26, 147:22

Particularly [1] -

58:23

PARTIES [1] -

1:20

parties [8] -

7:26, 36:14,

37:24, 60:23,

60:26, 110:2,

113:9, 128:9

Parties [3] -

80:2, 112:3,

112:19

parts [3] - 25:4,

130:2, 145:18

PARTY [2] -

1:17, 1:22

Party [1] -

110:11

party [8] - 2:32,

32:27, 47:18,

115:12, 115:29,

124:6, 130:25,

135:10

pass [2] - 58:24,

130:15

passage [9] -

4:27, 28:17,

30:25, 43:28,

62:13, 67:15,

67:28, 74:16,

77:10

passages [4] -

21:16, 36:29,

61:13, 68:16

passing [2] -

52:10, 56:24

past [1] - 9:15

patent [1] -

57:22

Patents [4] -

60:29, 61:7,

62:25, 64:5

PATRICIA [1] -

1:8

Pauline [1] -

140:2

pause [7] -

11:21, 36:7,

62:12, 68:2,

69:25, 71:6,

95:14

paved [2] -

144:21, 146:9

pay [1] - 47:24

Peart [1] - 42:17

peculiarly [1] -

134:28

peels [1] - 35:26

people [8] -

30:16, 48:6, 48:7,

136:14, 139:18,

139:27, 148:20

People [2] -

24:11, 69:6

people’s [2] -

24:8, 25:11

per [3] - 78:15,

78:18, 84:22

performance [1]

- 30:1

perhaps [3] -

31:2, 63:29,

64:18

period [8] -

48:24, 71:27,

72:2, 93:2, 93:5,

93:8, 107:29,

142:22

permanent [1] -

70:22

permissible [1] -

71:13

permission [45]

- 2:32, 3:16, 12:3,

14:2, 15:6, 15:11,

17:17, 17:18,

17:23, 45:1, 45:4,

45:7, 45:16, 46:4,

46:8, 46:11,

49:17, 70:27,

71:23, 71:26,

72:11, 75:10,

75:12, 89:10,

89:24, 90:19,

99:26, 102:3,

102:21, 102:24,

105:22, 110:25,

112:5, 112:21,

113:17, 126:10,

126:11, 126:13,

126:14, 127:25,

133:3, 133:23,

134:17, 137:4,

138:20

Permission [1] -

106:3

permissions [3]

- 43:26, 75:8,

127:22

permit [7] -

17:23, 20:3,

27:18, 35:2, 39:8,

102:24, 116:15

permits [1] -

9:28

permitted [1] -

91:26

permitting [1] -

116:18

person [8] -

27:21, 35:3,

35:21, 39:8,

48:14, 54:13,

87:27, 139:13

personal [7] -

27:27, 31:24,

32:7, 32:10, 35:3,

39:8, 42:6

personally [2] -

37:10, 37:15

persons [9] -

27:19, 27:21,

27:22, 27:24,

32:18, 37:25,

54:9, 81:9, 108:1

perspective [5] -

48:13, 57:5,

75:17, 79:22,

85:29

pertaining [1] -

64:17

Peter [2] -

124:28, 139:9

PETER [1] - 1:7

phenomenon

[1] - 25:25

PHILIP [1] - 2:29

philosophers

[2] - 30:8, 30:11

philosophical

[4] - 23:23, 26:4,

26:9, 31:6

phones [1] -

40:1

photocopied [1]

- 2:31

photocopy [1] -

70:17

phrase [2] -

53:1, 54:6

physical [6] -

5:15, 5:16, 5:19,

19:26, 27:23,

29:21

pick [2] - 26:28,

45:10

Picking [1] -

33:22

piece [3] - 51:1,

54:13, 59:29

piecemeal [1] -

132:27

pile [1] - 25:3

pipe [2] -

144:18, 146:18

piping [1] -

148:25

pithily [1] - 79:1

pithy [1] - 79:12

PL93.2440006

[1] - 121:22

place [12] -

15:14, 22:6,

48:23, 54:4, 57:2,

73:6, 73:21,

95:25, 95:27,

143:6, 143:8,

145:9

placed [2] -

71:1, 83:24

places [1] - 25:9

plain [1] - 65:4

plainly [1] -

43:20

Plaintiff [6] -

34:17, 35:15,

37:9, 38:12,

39:23, 124:22

plaintiff [3] -

27:12, 28:9,

32:21

Plaintiff's [2] -

37:14, 40:3

plaintiff's [2] -

27:5, 27:28

Plaintiffs [1] -

35:9

plan [8] - 8:14,

8:24, 12:21,

12:22, 17:2, 17:9,

17:26, 20:18

Plan [5] - 45:29,

46:2, 87:4, 87:14,

87:28

planet [1] - 25:4

planned [2] -

91:23, 92:22

planning [47] -

10:10, 10:18,

11:3, 14:2, 15:5,

17:16, 17:18,

45:4, 45:7, 45:16,

46:4, 46:7, 46:11,

48:29, 49:3, 49:8,

70:26, 71:3,

71:23, 72:10,

84:28, 85:1,

85:23, 85:24,

85:26, 86:8,

88:16, 89:16,

89:20, 89:28,

91:2, 93:28,

99:26, 99:29,

100:2, 100:15,

101:23, 102:3,

102:10, 109:4,

121:21, 126:10,

127:25, 133:2,

133:23, 137:4,

138:20

Planning [26] -

7:19, 9:7, 17:15,

18:10, 19:6, 42:9,

45:18, 48:4, 79:9,

86:23, 87:12,

92:19, 94:3,

96:17, 96:26,

106:3, 107:23,

108:29, 112:8,

112:25, 113:8,

121:23, 121:24,

139:24, 149:8,

149:9

planning.. [1] -

101:17

Plans [1] - 87:14

plans [10] - 8:17,

12:24, 14:8,

17:10, 17:14,

17:29, 48:22,

48:23, 137:13

PLC [1] - 1:17

plead [1] - 31:23

pleaded [3] -

50:14, 122:18,

122:19

pleading [1] -

50:12

pleadings [3] -

3:12, 80:29,

147:8

Pleadings [1] -

127:1

Pleanála [25] -

6:27, 45:1, 86:13,

88:20, 92:3,

106:7, 106:22,

108:20, 108:28,

109:5, 121:13,

121:22, 124:8,

124:15, 125:18,

125:24, 125:25,

125:29, 127:24,

128:9, 130:10,

132:5, 132:8,

143:9, 148:7

Pleanála's [2] -

129:28, 131:27

plenary [4] -

110:1, 110:6,

123:13, 123:14

pluralist [2] -

29:7, 29:10

point [35] -

16:11, 21:1,

22:16, 26:2, 31:3,

31:4, 31:6, 37:14,

39:18, 42:5,

42:14, 42:24,

44:26, 46:22,

50:27, 59:11,

63:7, 70:3, 73:13,

73:19, 76:8,

77:13, 78:24,

85:3, 89:3, 99:24,

104:9, 104:23,

109:17, 126:1,

126:23, 134:18,

134:22, 136:29,

138:9

pointed [1] -

13:16

points [8] - 14:2,

41:8, 44:17,

46:26, 104:5,

132:13, 136:26,

136:28

Poland [1] -

23:12

policies [1] -

4:18

policy [7] - 51:2,

87:3, 88:27,

100:8, 108:4,

138:19, 138:21


21

political [1] -

38:28

politically [1] -

56:25

pollutants [1] -

24:9

pollution [5] -

24:8, 24:14,

24:25, 88:14,

94:10

poor [2] - 24:11,

26:8

Pope [1] - 24:5

popularis [1] -

37:4

population [4] -

25:9, 28:21,

39:28, 40:19

port [1] - 85:10

Portmarnock [5]

- 131:1, 135:6,

137:27, 138:1,

139:19

Portugal [1] -

23:12

posed [2] -

26:24, 148:23

poses [1] -

28:28

position [26] -

5:6, 19:1, 19:8,

20:9, 28:19,

31:27, 33:9,

41:17, 41:19,

55:25, 74:4, 74:5,

75:24, 81:9,

91:18, 94:17,

94:22, 97:13,

102:18, 106:29,

109:28, 122:11,

131:7, 132:17,

136:7, 150:5

positive [2] -

28:4, 29:29

possibility [2] -

12:5, 13:29

possible [7] -

28:5, 28:6, 34:26,

36:19, 37:8,

43:24, 56:6

possibly [1] -

24:2

postdate [1] -

69:11

postdates [1] -

66:25

potential [7] -

14:28, 20:19,

143:22, 143:27,

145:1, 146:25,

147:18

potentially [2] -

132:4, 147:18

power [5] -

18:21, 102:11,

106:26, 110:3,

110:4

pp [2] - 34:20,

39:3

practicable [2] -

33:3, 148:12

practical [2] -

65:17, 72:2

practice [1] -

59:7

pre [6] - 61:9,

76:20, 90:22,

96:12, 96:16,

120:2

pre-

construction [1] -

96:16

pre-

construction.. [1]

- 96:12

pre-enactment

[1] - 61:9

pre-existing [2]

- 76:20, 120:2

pre-school [1] -

90:22

preamble [1] -

30:15

preceded [1] -

65:6

preceding [4] -

18:19, 66:2,

88:29, 103:29

precise [7] -

13:17, 14:12,

14:14, 14:25,

115:6, 118:11,

118:19

precisely [10] -

46:2, 62:16,

77:23, 116:1,

117:22, 125:16,

125:18, 146:23,

148:15, 149:19

preclude [1] -

47:3

precluded [1] -

11:13

precludes [2] -

108:7, 112:22

predecessor [1]

- 63:12

predicted [1] -

92:20

prefer [1] - 93:9

preferred [2] -

64:18, 65:19

pregnancy [1] -

28:12

pregnant [2] -

26:23, 33:5

prejudice [2] -

37:14, 101:2

prejudicial [1] -

88:14

preliminary [2] -

21:8, 80:16

premature [1] -

24:11

premise [1] -

4:11

prepared [3] -

52:13, 150:1,

150:6

present [22] -

24:26, 26:24,

34:2, 35:4, 60:6,

61:18, 65:17,

72:22, 84:1, 84:4,

86:17, 88:13,

90:4, 96:28,

102:19, 109:7,

119:27, 120:4,

121:16, 123:11,

123:15, 141:9

presentation [1]

- 4:12

presented [5] -

3:24, 24:19,

34:26, 125:19,

129:12

presently [2] -

25:19, 64:17

preservation [2]

- 31:7, 34:7

preserving [2] -

34:5, 100:9

President [1] -

54:17

presiding [1] -

140:3

pressure [1] -

101:21

presumably [1] -

42:25

presumes [1] -

44:18

presumptions

[1] - 57:25

presumptively

[1] - 43:22

pretend [1] -

41:18

prevailing [2] -

30:23, 146:7

prevent [4] -

37:22, 38:12,

94:18, 137:10

prevented [2] -

35:29, 126:27

prevention [1] -

94:9

previous [6] -

18:18, 18:29,

19:4, 19:9, 87:14,

119:6

previously [5] -

79:25, 89:12,

102:28, 114:14,

136:26

primarily [2] -

37:25, 101:15

primary [1] -

37:20

principle [18] -

33:11, 35:29,

55:6, 55:10,

63:11, 66:2,

73:23, 73:24,

84:22, 109:15,

109:16, 109:17,

110:16, 115:26,

117:8, 120:17,

120:19, 120:20

principles [4] -

6:24, 7:12, 60:5,

144:13

priority [1] -

87:9

Prison [1] - 61:2

privacy [5] -

22:18, 26:26,

26:27, 27:2,

36:25

private [4] -

34:4, 34:7, 48:20,

110:2

privilege [1] -

64:29

Pro [4] - 5:11,

5:14, 102:17,

102:29

Pro-Baine [4] -

5:11, 5:14,

102:17, 102:29

problem [2] -

24:22, 150:12

problems [2] -

24:20, 57:27

procedural [1] -

109:1

procedure [10] -

6:22, 16:15, 20:1,

20:6, 59:7,

100:19, 101:1,

101:7, 113:19,

137:2

procedures [9] -

43:22, 43:25,

82:7, 82:14,

82:20, 83:1, 83:8,

113:12, 125:25

proceed".. [1] -

74:21

proceeded [1] -

114:13

proceeding [1] -

114:7

proceedings

[61] - 28:25, 35:5,

36:1, 39:10,

40:23, 41:23,

42:12, 42:29,

44:6, 44:24,

50:14, 56:28,

57:12, 76:11,

79:2, 79:26,

79:27, 79:28,

80:14, 80:21,

80:28, 83:25,

90:4, 104:22,

106:17, 106:20,

108:19, 109:6,

109:7, 109:21,

109:24, 109:28,

110:1, 110:6,

110:7, 110:9,

110:11, 110:17,

111:21, 114:25,

115:14, 120:26,

121:1, 121:11,

122:22, 123:3,

123:7, 123:15,

123:16, 123:23,

123:24, 124:17,

124:23, 124:29,

125:17, 127:8,

129:21, 138:27,

146:16

proceeds [2] -

117:21, 119:6

process [28] -

9:5, 10:7, 11:25,

17:28, 44:14,

56:25, 58:15,

58:18, 58:21,

102:8, 114:7,

114:11, 117:21,

119:1, 123:8,

124:6, 125:27,

125:28, 127:23,

128:15, 133:8,

139:28, 143:8,

147:2, 147:3,

147:26, 148:26,

148:29

produced [1] -

24:25

produces [1] -

24:9

products [1] -

25:6

professional [1]

- 67:13

Professor [4] -

21:18, 25:28,

28:26, 139:23

profound [4] -

26:7, 36:17,

40:17, 41:25

progress [1] -

61:9

prohibition [3] -

26:25, 27:13,

114:6

project [32] -

8:14, 8:24, 12:21,

12:22, 14:7,

15:25, 15:27,

16:2, 16:5, 16:17,

17:2, 17:9, 17:26,

18:3, 18:7, 18:8,

18:20, 18:22,

18:23, 18:27,

19:19, 19:27,

20:16, 20:17,

20:18, 74:27,

75:11, 97:8,

102:27, 103:5

projects [7] -

8:17, 12:24, 14:8,

17:10, 17:14,

17:29, 75:5

promote [2] -

30:16, 41:27

promoted [2] -

54:9, 73:16

promoter [5] -

55:26, 55:28,

56:12, 56:16,

56:29

promoters [1] -

56:21

promoting [1] -

56:24

promulgated [1]

- 55:14

pronouncing [1]

- 93:13

proof [1] - 105:9

proper [3] -

59:5, 88:16,

89:20

properly [7] -

61:25, 94:16,


22

111:22, 122:15,

122:17, 122:26,

138:12

Properties [1] -

79:14

properties [3] -

129:10, 132:16,

149:16

property [16] -

43:15, 43:29,

49:2, 49:3, 81:11,

81:27, 82:13,

83:1, 84:12,

84:14, 84:20,

85:5, 85:6, 85:18,

98:17, 148:20

Property [1] -

76:29

proportion [2] -

22:3, 115:10

proposal [7] -

55:15, 96:7,

129:10, 131:14,

143:23, 146:11,

148:19

proposals [3] -

4:23, 93:27,

137:9

propose [8] -

31:17, 66:6,

66:15, 72:16,

91:15, 97:17,

99:2, 115:7

proposed [35] -

3:21, 5:28, 9:21,

9:24, 10:1, 10:14,

10:27, 11:5, 11:7,

11:13, 11:17,

11:29, 12:3,

12:13, 13:20,

14:23, 15:5, 16:6,

16:10, 45:15,

88:2, 88:7, 89:19,

90:8, 90:23,

93:26, 128:13,

131:16, 132:26,

133:26, 144:12,

146:5, 146:8,

148:11

proposes [1] -

100:13

proposing [1] -

130:2

proposition [5] -

33:7, 59:16,

76:23, 84:17,

123:18

prosecution [2]

- 119:9, 120:6

prosecution' [1]

- 119:9

Prosecutions

[1] - 69:7

prosecutorial

[2] - 120:1, 120:4

protect [4] -

35:19, 36:1, 36:4,

46:3

protected [8] -

13:20, 40:7, 95:7,

95:20, 95:26,

97:9, 97:11,

133:15

protected" [1] -

33:20

protected' [1] -

38:20

protecting [2] -

35:11, 100:9

protection [9] -

16:8, 32:28, 34:9,

34:18, 40:13,

41:25, 41:26,

95:21, 97:10

Protection [1] -

36:8

protections [1] -

113:20

protocol [2] -

4:7, 98:1

prove [2] -

19:24, 22:23

proves [1] -

24:20

provide [13] -

29:20, 81:9, 87:5,

87:8, 87:15, 88:4,

104:29, 113:10,

113:12, 123:18,

131:18, 131:28,

132:27

provided [12] -

4:4, 7:7, 13:10,

45:21, 51:22,

101:1, 122:22,

127:23, 133:20,

135:13, 144:27,

146:20

provides [6] -

8:4, 9:22, 70:21,

94:13, 97:9,

107:28

providing [3] -

70:23, 71:22,

111:17

provision [25] -

9:23, 35:1, 39:7,

58:9, 61:29,

62:14, 63:5,

63:13, 72:12,

72:25, 72:28,

76:19, 76:20,

77:4, 77:5, 77:6,

77:9, 78:29,

81:14, 93:7,

93:14, 95:10,

95:11, 95:29,

96:1

provisions [22] -

7:24, 8:22, 9:27,

27:16, 27:26,

39:27, 50:26,

62:6, 63:12,

71:28, 81:8,

83:10, 91:8,

92:12, 93:21,

94:24, 101:15,

101:19, 111:25,

111:26, 115:19,

122:24

proviso [2] -

27:17, 28:3

provoking [1] -

26:4

proximity [3] -

20:17, 33:16,

41:20

prudence [4] -

30:10, 30:17,

30:22, 55:20

prudently [1] -

138:13

public [36] -

8:27, 17:3, 17:6,

17:25, 17:28,

18:18, 34:3, 34:5,

34:6, 34:9, 35:6,

35:7, 36:17,

37:16, 39:11,

40:6, 41:1, 48:17,

65:23, 85:19,

86:5, 86:6, 87:9,

88:14, 88:26,

90:17, 94:9,

125:26, 127:17,

128:17, 129:25,

132:7, 136:20,

137:24, 141:12,

143:7

Public [1] - 69:7

publication [1] -

36:12

published [1] -

136:20

purchase [3] -

84:7, 92:18,

92:24

Purchase [1] -

131:23

purely [1] -

85:27

purported [1] -

5:1

purports [1] -

15:12

purpose [9] -

38:6, 51:1, 51:13,

52:26, 56:12,

58:8, 62:16,

107:26, 136:2

purposes [21] -

5:29, 6:5, 11:12,

11:23, 11:24,

15:25, 17:21,

18:27, 19:5,

19:19, 42:9,

56:18, 56:22,

57:1, 62:4, 62:19,

62:28, 67:20,

70:5, 72:22, 79:2

purposive [1] -

57:29

pursuant [3] -

7:18, 11:8, 11:11

pursue [1] - 46:7

pursued [1] -

49:20

put [16] - 18:26,

28:10, 39:3, 47:5,

52:29, 72:26,

95:25, 95:27,

101:21, 105:26,

119:4, 119:21,

126:25, 131:10,

147:15, 149:26

puts [1] - 73:17

putting [1] -

27:29

Q

qualified [2] -

33:8, 134:28

quality [3] -

100:10, 140:24,

141:13

Quarries [2] -

44:10, 44:28

quarry [4] - 45:3,

45:6, 45:24,

46:19

quarrying [2] -

46:13, 46:14

question' [1] -

34:19

questioning [1]

- 109:4

questions [3] -

39:26, 40:18,

141:8

quick [1] -

147:16

quickly [2] -

130:1, 143:15

quite [12] -

10:10, 24:2,

34:29, 39:4,

49:23, 55:3,

83:27, 92:12,

94:16, 141:7,

142:21, 142:22

quotation [1] -

68:10

quote [1] -

127:28

quoted [8] -

32:25, 64:1, 67:1,

67:28, 70:18,

71:16, 78:28,

118:29

quotes [3] -

43:16, 107:17,

107:20

R

radio [1] -

137:17

radioactive [1] -

24:29

rain [1] - 134:14

raise [3] -

110:16, 116:29,

142:3

raised [15] -

4:13, 42:17,

50:11, 50:12,

60:14, 79:17,

113:6, 117:3,

117:4, 121:16,

136:24, 137:18,

138:5, 145:16,

146:15

raises [6] - 15:8,

39:25, 40:17,

113:5, 126:2,

141:28

raising [3] -

126:28, 138:4,

141:27

range [4] -

57:24, 91:21,

91:22, 128:11

rather [5] -

10:17, 46:8,

62:18, 100:13,

131:18

rationale [5] -

51:1, 51:12, 58:8,

59:18, 66:3

re [3] - 15:13,

45:23, 61:26

re-evaluation [1]

- 15:13

re-examine [1] -

45:23

re-visited [1] -

61:26

reached [4] -

11:17, 125:18,

145:7, 146:23

reaches [3] -

43:12, 145:6,

149:20

read [6] - 43:24,

71:15, 78:17,

89:5, 127:12,

130:2

reading [1] -

65:24

reaffirmed [1] -

33:10

real [4] - 15:3,

26:24, 28:28,

120:8

realignments [1]

- 133:8

really [18] - 7:6,

32:12, 58:3,

70:10, 73:29,

74:2, 76:3, 77:2,

77:5, 82:16,

123:26, 126:20,

127:9, 135:16,

135:24, 145:2,

146:15, 147:22

reapply [1] -

45:3

reason [13] -

4:26, 7:9, 34:10,

35:17, 43:28,

50:15, 51:15,

51:27, 72:11,

93:23, 94:7,

124:9, 146:7

reasonable [3] -

13:4, 13:18,

14:26

reasonably [3] -

54:7, 54:29,

148:21

reasoned [1] -

52:11

reasons [15] -

7:7, 7:10, 7:22,

19:18, 27:12,

50:19, 51:2,

56:23, 63:19,


23

64:16, 73:26,

77:29, 80:18,

86:29, 87:1

reassessed [1] -

46:14

rebut [1] - 41:6

recap [1] - 37:13

receive [1] -

144:24

received [3] -

17:3, 136:19,

137:26

receiving [1] -

94:11

recent [5] -

25:20, 36:11,

61:1, 61:11,

95:15

recently [1] -

13:8

recognise [3] -

21:21, 23:3, 29:5

recognised [7] -

21:2, 23:4, 23:8,

23:15, 23:18,

31:9, 38:11

recognising [2]

- 21:23, 31:13

recognition [1] -

21:25

recommendati

on [1] - 89:10

Record [1] - 1:5

record [2] -

68:16, 144:13

recording [1] -

140:12

records [2] -

129:2, 129:6

recounts [1] -

119:5

REDMOND [2] -

1:7, 1:7

reduce [2] -

146:11, 148:12

reenforced [1] -

90:23

refer [10] - 3:10,

23:25, 50:28,

51:7, 51:21,

56:15, 89:3,

129:5, 129:13,

140:26

Reference [1] -

121:22

reference [37] -

4:4, 7:29, 13:22,

14:16, 20:15,

20:16, 33:8,

51:28, 54:6,

64:23, 64:25,

71:18, 77:14,

79:10, 82:12,

82:13, 82:18,

82:19, 93:19,

106:6, 106:7,

125:20, 133:15,

134:11, 134:21,

134:22, 136:4,

137:1, 137:7,

137:16, 138:19,

138:23, 139:14,

139:20, 139:22,

140:11, 145:8

reference... [1] -

106:4

references [4] -

72:15, 133:14,

141:29, 142:1

referred [14] -

18:20, 37:12,

51:8, 52:22,

60:11, 60:12,

66:11, 67:16,

74:10, 89:23,

100:23, 103:12,

120:20, 134:18

referring [7] -

27:8, 47:21, 69:1,

72:19, 72:21,

73:5, 103:10

Referring [1] -

32:23

refers [11] -

29:19, 29:24,

32:16, 53:20,

74:18, 74:19,

87:27, 96:9,

130:11, 130:12

reflect [1] - 59:2

reflects [1] -

26:1

refusal [3] -

28:13, 89:24,

90:18

refuse [3] - 33:4,

89:10, 117:18

refused [2] -

46:19, 114:19

refusing [1] -

82:8

regard [32] -

27:23, 37:11,

50:6, 59:18,

60:12, 61:26,

62:17, 62:27,

65:5, 65:25, 67:3,

68:25, 71:13,

77:17, 81:7,

86:22, 86:25,

87:3, 87:11,

89:27, 98:19,

106:13, 106:23,

109:9, 111:24,

111:25, 115:8,

120:17, 121:2,

136:6, 146:7

regarded [4] -

19:26, 30:9, 85:2,

103:16

regarding [1] -

63:17

regardless [1] -

10:20

regards [4] -

33:12, 34:16,

60:23, 64:13

regime [4] -

91:4, 94:13,

145:17, 145:22

region [1] - 16:4

regional [3] -

48:22, 88:28,

138:21

Regional [3] -

87:12, 94:4, 96:3

regions [1] -

98:20

Regions [2] -

100:21, 101:14

Register [2] -

106:4, 106:6

REGISTRAR [1]

- 3:4

regulate [2] -

100:2, 100:13

regulated [1] -

99:26

regulation [1] -

91:9

Regulations [5]

- 16:21, 18:24,

86:24, 91:6,

121:24

regulations [6] -

16:22, 17:13,

17:19, 18:28,

43:21, 122:25

regulatory [1] -

67:13

rehearsed [1] -

44:15

Reid [1] - 55:1

REILLY [1] - 1:8

Reilly [3] -

129:3, 129:6,

129:14

rejected [2] -

33:7, 75:26

relate [1] - 50:25

related [2] -

60:25, 85:10

relates [3] -

7:16, 32:17, 99:7

relating [3] -

17:26, 37:21,

145:17

relation [91] -

3:19, 5:25, 8:11,

19:14, 20:26,

21:15, 27:6,

31:18, 34:19,

36:26, 38:22,

40:9, 40:29,

41:10, 41:16,

41:17, 42:12,

45:15, 49:13,

49:19, 50:24,

51:8, 60:13, 62:3,

67:12, 67:13,

70:6, 71:9, 73:15,

73:18, 80:12,

80:19, 81:28,

82:24, 83:19,

83:24, 84:6,

90:13, 90:21,

91:11, 92:4, 92:7,

93:22, 94:17,

94:24, 94:27,

96:20, 97:2, 99:2,

99:9, 101:22,

102:12, 103:22,

104:13, 104:14,

105:1, 105:7,

105:17, 109:26,

110:5, 111:23,

113:24, 114:12,

114:28, 120:13,

124:2, 124:13,

124:18, 124:19,

124:25, 124:26,

125:6, 126:9,

126:23, 126:28,

130:21, 131:22,

132:10, 134:28,

134:29, 135:1,

135:29, 136:11,

138:14, 139:13,

140:22, 140:29,

141:8, 141:24

relations [2] -

24:21, 26:22

relative [1] -

90:14

relatively [1] -

135:3

relevance [3] -

30:29, 63:16,

146:2

relevant [39] -

3:18, 3:28, 8:4,

9:1, 10:28, 11:6,

14:24, 15:24,

16:25, 17:19,

19:2, 27:12,

32:12, 39:16,

43:25, 51:19,

60:5, 60:6, 63:18,

65:26, 66:21,

68:6, 72:22,

76:22, 89:6,

91:14, 95:4,

95:21, 97:8,

97:16, 101:27,

102:10, 104:16,

109:21, 112:14,

120:3, 120:17,

127:29, 139:27

reliability [1] -

134:29

reliance [7] -

57:18, 57:20,

70:29, 73:7,

73:21, 83:24,

108:6

relied [9] -

31:28, 84:11,

87:1, 118:16,

120:20, 121:15,

123:21, 136:9,

146:22

relief [47] - 33:4,

46:19, 76:9,

79:20, 80:26,

81:4, 81:14,

81:16, 82:24,

82:26, 83:16,

83:19, 83:20,

97:19, 97:21,

97:24, 99:2, 99:7,

99:9, 99:12,

99:25, 103:21,

104:1, 104:13,

105:6, 109:20,

110:11, 110:19,

111:20, 112:12,

112:27, 113:24,

115:12, 115:19,

115:29, 116:2,

118:12, 120:29,

121:10, 121:18,

122:8, 122:14,

123:3, 123:17,

123:19, 123:21,

123:23

reliefs [4] -

83:10, 116:7,

116:22, 123:28

relies [1] - 79:6

religious [3] -

26:2, 29:14,

29:21

reluctant [1] -

63:20

rely [16] - 21:16,

22:21, 23:1, 37:1,

43:28, 44:21,

55:17, 58:21,

59:1, 73:9, 108:2,

114:18, 114:19,

116:5, 119:28,

120:29

relying [6] -

28:6, 28:17,

42:20, 69:17,

77:2, 84:15

remain [2] -

92:26, 93:8

remaining [1] -

3:9

remains [4] -

13:5, 14:27,

33:11, 56:20

remedial [2] -

20:24, 20:25

remedied [2] -

15:22, 16:15

remedy [2] -

6:15, 65:14

remember [1] -

52:3

remembered [1]

- 54:1

remit [1] - 4:13

removal [1] -

96:21

removed [1] -

97:1

removing [1] -

13:18

renders [1] -

121:25

renege [1] -

46:15

reneging [1] -

46:20

renewal [3] -

18:17, 18:28,

19:3

repeated [2] -

52:14, 117:9

repeating [1] -

136:26

replace [1] -

146:9

replaced [1] -

63:4

reply [1] - 44:17

replying [1] -

118:18


24

report [17] -

21:17, 21:18,

58:13, 78:26,

107:14, 125:19,

125:22, 129:1,

129:6, 129:28,

130:1, 130:16,

138:8, 143:17,

149:4, 149:12,

149:20

Report [1] - 3:16

report.. [1] -

149:10

reporter [1] -

78:13

represent [3] -

41:24, 61:20,

139:3

represented [6]

- 33:6, 139:4,

139:15, 139:16,

139:17

reproduced [1] -

2:31

Republic [2] -

23:10, 23:13

repugnant [2] -

113:8, 113:18

request [1] -

144:6

require [4] -

14:15, 16:3, 45:8,

135:20

required [14] -

10:12, 13:11,

38:7, 60:27,

70:26, 86:24,

104:21, 115:13,

115:16, 117:16,

134:6, 134:9,

134:13, 137:9

requirement [10]

- 7:15, 14:14,

44:3, 82:20, 96:6,

97:7, 112:5,

112:21, 135:22,

145:29

requirements

[15] - 12:12, 71:4,

71:8, 71:29, 72:1,

72:9, 72:16,

99:15, 104:3,

106:9, 106:13,

112:6, 112:22,

121:28, 122:18

requirements"

[1] - 71:18

requirements'

[1] - 13:26

requires [10] -

9:19, 13:28,

14:10, 14:18,

53:24, 64:22,

65:2, 104:22,

106:10, 117:21

requiring [2] -

18:9, 43:21

resident [1] -

98:8

residential [2] -

85:8, 128:13

residents [11] -

93:6, 126:16,

126:27, 132:1,

132:3, 134:15,

138:11, 142:26,

143:10

Residents [8] -

128:4, 128:8,

129:9, 129:20,

131:7, 137:29,

139:8, 142:9

residue [1] -

24:26

resolution [1] -

57:27

resolve [1] -

69:14

respect [15] -

3:14, 20:24,

46:16, 50:4, 50:7,

54:8, 60:22, 66:5,

66:26, 70:26,

80:8, 105:24,

113:7, 114:20,

115:18

respected [1] -

139:12

respectful [24] -

5:4, 5:13, 5:18,

5:20, 6:19, 16:19,

20:8, 20:10, 26:1,

31:10, 40:16,

40:20, 41:24,

43:13, 48:26,

52:12, 66:20,

68:12, 68:22,

87:18, 87:21,

108:18, 120:16,

146:22

respectfully [6] -

23:16, 26:3,

65:29, 73:26,

102:19, 105:5

respective [1] -

10:6

respects [1] -

90:16

respondent [1] -

2:32

Respondent [24]

- 5:5, 5:6, 6:2,

6:20, 20:13,

20:20, 43:2, 44:6,

45:20, 47:3,

80:27, 80:28,

99:14, 110:9,

110:24, 110:27,

111:1, 111:6,

111:9, 111:13,

112:3, 112:19,

121:12, 121:27

RESPONDENT

[1] - 1:15

Respondent's

[1] - 110:20

respondents [5]

- 60:13, 116:16,

116:26, 117:3,

123:7

Respondents

[10] - 6:6, 6:14,

50:16, 80:2,

81:17, 97:20,

97:26, 98:23,

120:25, 121:14

responding [1] -

47:14

response [7] -

71:29, 99:23,

99:24, 99:25,

129:26, 135:10,

137:21

responses [2] -

137:23, 137:26

responsibility

[1] - 57:11

rest [2] - 57:13,

98:26

restoration [1] -

96:2

restraining [2] -

114:6, 120:6

restriction [1] -

90:10

restrictions [1] -

89:28

restrictive [3] -

64:17, 93:5,

93:11

result [3] -

11:27, 21:10,

131:14

RESUMED [2] -

3:1, 3:6

retain [1] - 11:28

retained [2] -

138:12, 138:13

retention [3] -

75:8, 75:10,

75:12

retrospect [1] -

70:11

return [1] -

80:21

reverse [1] -

81:1

review [22] -

18:17, 79:29,

80:3, 80:8, 80:13,

80:15, 104:22,

109:6, 109:28,

110:6, 110:17,

114:21, 114:25,

115:10, 115:13,

116:1, 117:15,

117:27, 118:5,

119:19, 122:21,

132:9

revised [2] -

129:25, 137:24

revision [1] -

18:16

revisit [1] -

42:15

RICE [1] - 1:8

right-hand [3] -

3:22, 18:4,

140:16

rightly [1] - 6:6

Rights [10] -

31:28, 32:2, 32:4,

39:17, 41:7,

49:19, 98:1, 98:7,

98:19, 111:3

rights [37] -

21:15, 22:1, 22:3,

22:7, 22:10,

22:27, 27:27,

29:15, 29:28,

30:5, 30:21, 32:6,

32:10, 33:28,

34:15, 36:1,

36:24, 36:27,

37:6, 38:28, 39:1,

40:3, 48:25, 49:3,

81:11, 81:23,

81:27, 82:13,

82:19, 83:1,

83:14, 84:13,

84:15, 98:13,

111:2, 111:7,

111:10

rise [5] - 25:21,

56:2, 57:19,

84:21, 102:22

Risk [3] -

125:16, 145:9,

149:8

risk [35] - 26:24,

28:11, 28:21,

28:28, 40:22,

56:15, 84:9,

88:13, 93:20,

93:22, 94:10,

104:27, 119:15,

120:8, 125:15,

134:11, 135:18,

135:23, 140:24,

143:13, 146:12,

146:21, 146:26,

146:28, 146:29,

147:13, 147:17,

147:18, 147:23,

147:28, 148:10,

148:11, 148:13,

148:20, 149:15

risks [3] - 28:11,

135:22, 147:23

River [4] - 96:3,

144:7, 144:22,

144:24

road [3] - 87:10,

133:6, 133:7

roaring [1] -

41:21

Robert [1] -

139:21

Role [1] - 52:8

role [6] - 52:23,

55:11, 62:8, 62:9,

65:13, 101:11

Romania [1] -

23:12

Ronan [1] - 68:6

ROONEY [1] -

1:10

root [1] - 55:10

Roscommon [1]

- 7:3

round [1] - 73:13

route [2] - 48:7,

48:8

routinely [1] -

56:21

RPS [7] -

125:19, 125:22,

145:7, 146:21,

147:3, 147:7

rubbish [1] -

25:6

rule [2] - 53:9,

64:22

rules [2] - 36:16,

37:21

run [1] - 135:17

run-off [1] -

135:17

runes [1] - 65:24

runoff [3] -

144:19, 144:22

runway [28] -

3:21, 4:15, 5:27,

5:28, 15:5, 15:17,

15:24, 16:3, 16:6,

16:10, 21:9,

28:24, 47:4, 84:8,

87:16, 90:9,

90:10, 90:15,

91:23, 91:26,

92:22, 92:23,

93:3, 95:24,

98:11, 98:13,

98:25, 146:8

Runway [2] -

147:13, 149:16

runways [2] -

89:29, 90:9

Rupert [2] -

130:19, 140:4

rural [1] - 132:24

Russia [1] -

23:12

RYAN [1] - 1:9

Ryan [4] - 22:14,

22:16, 22:20,

22:22

RYANAIR [2] -

1:22, 2:27

S

s.1 [2] - 27:16,

28:3

s.177V [1] -

10:25

s.3 [1] - 28:3

s.34 [1] - 60:17

S.P.U.C [2] -

32:23, 32:24

SAC [1] - 143:28

SAC's [2] -

104:16, 104:27

SACs [1] - 95:21

safe [2] - 88:4,

108:3

safety [3] -

88:12, 90:18,

141:13

SALAGEAN [1] -

1:9

sale [1] - 26:25

salmonid [1] -

144:8

Sargent [2] -

130:27, 139:16

satisfactory [1] -

132:27

satisfied [7] -


25

89:26, 112:6,

112:22, 113:18,

119:25, 146:3,

149:14

satisfy [2] -

40:26, 106:29

satisfying [2] -

20:4, 106:27

saw [2] - 96:9,

111:21

SC [7] - 2:4,

2:13, 2:18, 2:18,

2:22, 2:23, 2:27

scale [3] - 16:2,

16:16, 20:15

Schedule [1] -

18:24

scheme [16] -

75:14, 84:7,

91:20, 92:1,

92:17, 92:20,

92:24, 92:26,

93:10, 96:4,

121:25, 128:14,

132:6, 132:7,

132:15, 132:26

Scheme [1] -

131:23

school [3] -

90:22, 90:25,

91:19

schools [1] -

90:21

scientific [14] -

12:26, 13:4,

13:19, 14:5,

14:17, 14:20,

14:27, 17:7,

22:21, 22:25,

23:20, 25:18,

26:11, 31:3

scientifically [1]

- 25:23

scope [3] -

92:25, 116:28,

118:28

scoping [2] -

45:13, 45:18

screening [6] -

9:9, 9:12, 15:28,

17:1, 19:11,

106:11

scrutinised [1] -

40:5

scrutiny [1] -

65:3

SCULLY [1] -

1:8

Scully [3] -

129:3, 129:7,

129:12

Scully's [1] -

142:28

se [1] - 84:22

sea [1] - 25:21

sealed [3] -

44:12, 144:18,

146:18

Sean [1] - 54:16

Seanad [1] -

60:16

search [1] - 59:3

Searson [2] -

138:8, 142:24

second [20] -

5:10, 6:15, 20:21,

24:5, 41:5, 57:14,

58:13, 58:29,

68:9, 71:22, 84:8,

98:25, 102:7,

102:9, 102:16,

102:21, 114:8,

127:20, 136:29,

143:19

SECOND [1] -

1:20

Second [4] -

18:24, 64:22,

99:14, 121:27

Second-

Named [1] - 99:14

secondly [1] -

16:2

Secretary [1] -

53:21

Section [40] -

15:12, 16:26,

17:21, 42:9,

44:13, 44:19,

46:9, 47:1, 60:18,

73:17, 77:18,

81:7, 81:20,

81:28, 83:3,

83:14, 97:28,

99:21, 102:9,

103:5, 103:6,

103:7, 103:8,

103:16, 103:26,

104:6, 104:8,

107:21, 107:23,

108:7, 111:24,

112:4, 112:20,

113:7, 113:18,

125:20, 126:19,

129:26, 137:21,

137:24

section [22] -

3:28, 9:19, 9:22,

9:27, 10:15,

63:22, 70:21,

70:22, 71:21,

71:22, 77:18,

77:20, 79:4, 79:6,

79:10, 95:3,

103:4, 105:23,

136:19, 141:15

sector [1] - 3:27

secured [1] -

119:7

security [1] -

102:13

see [78] - 58:9,

60:2, 62:12,

68:13, 68:23,

69:23, 70:18,

71:17, 73:16,

77:4, 78:16,

78:26, 81:3,

86:12, 86:18,

89:8, 90:2, 92:5,

93:8, 93:15,

93:23, 96:3,

97:25, 99:11,

99:18, 100:15,

105:27, 113:2,

114:8, 116:21,

118:2, 120:18,

120:20, 121:18,

122:2, 126:8,

127:15, 130:10,

130:26, 131:6,

131:7, 131:11,

134:24, 135:9,

135:25, 135:27,

136:11, 136:13,

136:22, 136:23,

136:29, 137:20,

137:22, 137:25,

138:1, 138:6,

138:26, 139:1,

139:2, 139:7,

139:20, 140:1,

140:17, 140:19,

141:3, 141:26,

141:27, 142:6,

142:18, 143:19,

144:1, 144:10,

146:7, 148:1,

149:24, 150:18

seeing [1] -

24:21

seek [10] -

35:16, 73:9, 80:3,

114:21, 116:17,

122:8, 122:23,

123:3, 123:21,

131:26

seeking [6] -

46:29, 50:29,

55:3, 112:27,

114:5, 115:12

seeks [6] -

35:19, 36:4, 38:8,

52:28, 82:3,

117:14

seem [4] -

35:28, 64:2, 66:8,

120:16

sees [1] - 72:20

sell [1] - 132:16

seminal [1] -

37:11

sense [5] -

27:19, 33:16,

34:3, 35:7, 36:19

sensitivity [1] -

144:7

sentence [11] -

69:3, 70:29, 72:5,

73:9, 73:22,

78:17, 78:23,

85:13, 127:20,

128:1, 143:19

sentiment [2] -

63:29, 132:20

separate [1] -

114:13

separately [1] -

71:28

September [4] -

45:19, 128:20,

142:20

seq [1] - 63:8

Serbia [1] -

23:12

series [4] -

44:11, 48:22,

139:18, 142:25

serious [5] -

39:23, 40:11,

85:4, 85:8, 120:8

serve [2] -

87:10, 131:17

served [1] -

144:20

Service [3] -

2:32, 61:2, 96:18

service [1] -

87:7

Services [4] -

1:27, 2:31,

107:12, 107:21

services [1] -

134:9

SERVICES [1] -

1:32

set [9] - 18:23,

71:8, 87:3, 88:7,

106:23, 109:9,

117:21, 123:20,

147:27

sets [8] - 76:10,

96:21, 106:20,

116:1, 121:10,

121:14, 121:15,

148:1

setting [2] -

115:19, 132:24

several [2] -

124:23, 130:20

severe [1] -

119:12

shall [22] - 8:6,

8:17, 8:23, 9:23,

9:25, 17:6, 69:26,

91:26, 92:18,

92:20, 92:24,

92:26, 93:26,

94:2, 94:28,

96:16, 96:26,

96:28, 97:4,

100:21, 101:14,

112:21

SHEELAGH [1] -

1:9

sheer [1] - 143:5

Sheila [2] -

129:2, 142:24

Shell [1] - 108:6

short [5] - 13:28,

61:19, 79:12,

107:29, 142:11

shorthand [1] -

54:6

shot [1] - 76:5

show [1] -

104:16

showing [1] -

92:3

shown [2] -

65:1, 149:10

shows [2] -

102:2, 125:25

Shreddies [1] -

66:9

shut [6] - 64:2,

126:2, 126:3,

126:5, 126:6,

143:11

sick [1] - 24:12

side [4] - 3:22,

76:18, 78:11,

140:17

sides [1] - 58:25

SIDNEY [1] - 1:9

significance [3]

- 48:26, 100:3,

131:25

significant [26] -

8:11, 8:16, 12:5,

13:29, 17:11,

20:19, 37:2, 49:6,

67:21, 74:25,

75:11, 89:18,

89:24, 90:6,

90:17, 97:9,

100:11, 104:12,

110:16, 115:10,

126:29, 127:2,

135:13, 138:3,

141:18, 142:22

significantly [1]

- 142:22

SILE [1] - 1:9

similar [8] - 5:5,

7:27, 98:15,

106:16, 109:1,

115:26, 117:11,

138:4

similarly [3] -

23:15, 38:27,

139:13

SIMONS [3] -

2:18, 52:2, 150:2

Simons [3] -

51:22, 51:29,

75:29

simple [2] - 7:9,

104:28

simply [12] -

4:29, 6:16, 72:17,

73:3, 73:7, 73:17,

82:13, 95:23,

110:10, 123:23,

126:24, 147:27

simultaneously

[1] - 137:14

sincere [2] -

39:23, 40:11

single [1] -

44:18

singular [2] -

136:10, 136:11

sit [1] - 150:4

site [28] - 8:15,

8:19, 8:22, 8:25,

10:2, 10:29, 11:6,

12:6, 12:14,

12:20, 12:29,

13:3, 13:20,

13:25, 14:1, 14:8,

14:24, 16:6, 16:9,

17:5, 17:9, 17:11,

19:28, 20:20,

95:3, 96:16,

141:9, 144:4

Site [3] - 17:6,

17:27, 143:18

site" [1] - 9:26

site's [2] - 8:19,


26

13:1

sites [5] - 10:29,

11:19, 20:16,

25:1, 133:16

site’s [1] - 12:24

situated [1] -

85:12

situation [5] -

15:10, 20:11,

62:26, 143:24,

146:6

six [1] - 64:16

Sixth [1] - 65:17

size [1] - 91:11

Si’ [1] - 23:26

skip [4] - 9:14,

18:13, 38:25,

39:13

slight [2] -

79:25, 150:14

slightly [4] -

23:25, 41:16,

76:5, 81:1

Slovak [1] -

23:13

Slovenia [1] -

23:13

small [1] - 77:9

smaller [1] -

70:10

smoke [1] -

24:13

social [1] - 29:21

Social [5] -

60:15, 60:17,

60:19, 100:20,

101:13

society [2] -

29:10, 35:20

Society [1] -

36:8

society... [1] -

29:7

soil [1] - 24:16

sole [1] - 35:10

solely [2] -

51:10, 110:12

solicitor [4] -

119:11, 119:15,

125:3, 139:10

solicitor's [1] -

118:17

SOLICITORS [5]

- 2:6, 2:10, 2:20,

2:25, 2:29

solid [1] - 25:18

solution [2] -

131:18, 132:27

solves [1] -

24:22

solving [1] -

24:20

someone [2] -

75:9, 125:1

sometimes [6] -

24:22, 34:24,

40:12, 85:5, 85:6,

128:27

somewhat [1] -

115:20

somewhere [1] -

16:4

sophisticated

[1] - 57:26

sorry [20] - 9:17,

37:3, 42:16,

54:17, 59:24,

74:14, 77:11,

77:12, 84:18,

85:28, 86:10,

93:12, 97:15,

99:19, 99:20,

123:27, 127:8,

130:18, 147:9,

150:4

sought [61] -

18:22, 33:20,

35:1, 38:20, 39:6,

40:6, 45:6, 45:18,

46:10, 46:15,

46:20, 53:7, 61:8,

75:12, 76:10,

76:11, 79:20,

81:5, 81:16,

81:19, 82:3,

82:17, 82:22,

82:24, 83:10,

83:16, 83:20,

83:26, 97:20,

97:24, 97:25,

99:3, 99:7, 99:9,

99:12, 100:1,

103:21, 103:24,

104:1, 105:6,

106:25, 110:12,

110:19, 111:20,

111:22, 112:12,

112:27, 113:24,

114:18, 116:3,

116:8, 116:22,

117:18, 118:12,

121:18, 122:14,

123:17, 123:22,

123:23, 123:28

sound [1] - 51:2

sources [1] -

25:2

SPA's [2] -

104:16, 104:27

Spain [3] - 13:8,

13:22, 23:13

Spath [1] - 53:21

Spatial [1] - 87:4

speaks [1] -

29:19

special [12] -

8:7, 16:7, 21:17,

27:24, 33:9,

33:19, 38:18,

65:21, 95:21,

101:6, 109:27

specialist [2] -

96:27, 96:28

species [4] - 8:9,

97:9, 97:11

specific [4] -

37:15, 93:21,

117:15, 135:21

Specifically [1] -

70:21

specifically [6] -

49:17, 56:17,

84:9, 141:28,

142:1, 147:23

specified [3] -

10:15, 115:15,

115:20

spectrum [1] -

24:10

speech [3] -

50:22, 61:19,

73:10

spend [8] - 76:4,

121:8, 125:10,

135:7, 137:22,

138:18, 138:22,

141:14

spent [1] - 97:15

spoken [1] -

57:3

sponsors [1] -

65:19

SPUC [6] -

35:25, 36:7,

36:15, 36:21,

38:11

squarely [1] -

36:19

ss [1] - 9:6

St [17] - 124:29,

128:3, 128:8,

129:9, 129:20,

130:26, 131:6,

131:14, 132:2,

136:23, 137:29,

138:5, 138:9,

139:7, 139:28,

142:9, 142:19

stage [18] - 6:18,

9:5, 16:15, 20:1,

20:2, 20:6, 58:24,

58:29, 59:27,

73:1, 97:13,

102:7, 102:9,

104:8, 117:3,

136:24, 137:23

Stage [2] -

106:10, 106:11

Staines [1] -

139:22

standi [6] -

32:18, 33:13,

35:16, 36:17,

37:21, 39:14

standing [7] -

34:16, 35:23,

36:20, 37:17,

42:11, 42:15,

42:29

Stansfield [1] -

139:23

start [3] - 47:24,

130:23, 150:10

starting [2] -

137:25, 150:15

starts [5] - 7:12,

60:6, 74:14,

141:15, 147:10

STATE [1] - 2:25

state [8] - 27:8,

27:11, 27:22,

27:28, 65:2,

119:7, 122:9,

126:12

State [44] -

27:18, 28:2, 28:4,

31:18, 33:2,

34:10, 48:15,

49:27, 50:4,

50:16, 52:25,

53:21, 57:10,

73:25, 74:10,

74:19, 75:2, 75:8,

75:18, 75:20,

76:2, 76:10,

76:12, 79:21,

80:27, 82:25,

82:27, 97:20,

97:26, 98:23,

98:26, 99:14,

101:22, 103:21,

104:2, 110:10,

112:13, 113:25,

120:25, 121:13,

121:17, 123:4,

123:28

State's [4] -

50:2, 74:4, 74:17,

97:28

Statement [11] -

80:24, 80:25,

81:4, 83:11, 86:9,

89:15, 97:19,

104:19, 105:25,

114:27, 123:20

statement [17] -

33:10, 55:18,

56:11, 57:23,

58:29, 60:15,

62:17, 62:18,

64:21, 71:7,

71:10, 71:11,

93:29, 117:16,

117:24, 118:29,

119:23

statement/

submission [1] -

3:25

Statements [1] -

56:23

statements [9] -

50:28, 51:3,

56:17, 56:29,

57:19, 58:22,

59:1, 59:19

states [3] -

11:24, 16:28,

24:5

States [4] - 8:6,

56:19, 72:25,

72:26

stating [2] -

62:1, 62:25

status [5] -

55:19, 87:8,

88:23, 101:19,

101:24

statute [24] -

43:20, 51:15,

53:10, 53:12,

53:14, 53:18,

56:8, 57:21, 58:7,

58:22, 58:26,

63:4, 64:20, 65:4,

65:10, 65:11,

65:26, 76:17,

76:19, 77:25,

77:27, 78:6,

122:24

statutes [6] -

51:11, 55:11,

58:24, 59:2, 59:5,

76:13

Statutory [1] -

53:24

statutory [13] -

7:15, 18:21,

26:25, 43:21,

57:29, 58:9,

62:14, 65:23,

65:27, 83:6,

106:27, 115:19,

121:25

stenographic

[1] - 1:29

Stenography [3]

- 1:27, 2:31, 2:32

STENOGRAPH

Y [1] - 1:31

step [1] - 97:12

steps [3] - 8:6,

97:10, 144:29

sterling [1] -

59:29

still [2] - 144:16,

148:24

stipulated [1] -

134:4

stored [1] -

137:10

story [2] - 47:20,

78:19

straightforwar

d [1] - 104:28

strange [1] -

19:3

strategic [2] -

4:16, 98:24

Strategy [2] -

87:5, 87:13

straw [2] - 38:2

stream [1] -

148:25

Stream [2] -

144:21, 146:11

streams [1] -

94:14

stress [1] - 70:4

strictly [1] - 52:9

strictures [1] -

121:3

strike [1] - 141:5

strikes [1] -

123:10

striving [1] -

37:26

strong [2] - 64:5,

131:15

struck [1] -

75:13

structure [1] -

30:4

students [1] -

36:12

sub [1] - 144:21

Sub [3] - 9:19,

9:22, 9:27

sub-catchment

[1] - 144:21

Sub-section [3]


27

- 9:19, 9:22, 9:27

subject [18] -

8:18, 8:22, 9:27,

18:7, 19:10,

37:26, 47:4, 47:5,

57:10, 63:18,

65:3, 88:6, 91:3,

106:3, 106:9,

106:26, 129:21,

149:28

subjected [4] -

6:4, 15:18, 15:28,

114:11

subjective [4] -

53:4, 54:2, 54:8,

54:20

submission [48]

- 3:18, 5:2, 5:4,

5:13, 5:18, 5:20,

6:19, 16:19, 20:8,

20:10, 21:16,

26:1, 31:1, 31:2,

31:10, 40:16,

40:21, 41:1,

41:10, 41:24,

43:13, 44:2,

48:27, 49:25,

52:12, 66:20,

68:12, 68:23,

70:8, 71:17,

73:28, 77:14,

77:17, 86:14,

87:18, 87:21,

89:4, 108:18,

120:17, 126:17,

128:16, 129:25,

140:21, 142:8,

145:6, 146:22,

148:28

SUBMISSION

[1] - 47:10

SUBMISSIONS

[1] - 3:6

submissions

[54] - 3:11, 3:13,

5:12, 6:8, 6:9,

22:17, 27:11,

41:15, 44:16,

47:6, 47:15,

47:25, 47:27,

47:28, 47:29,

49:25, 50:6,

50:12, 60:23,

60:25, 70:19,

72:24, 74:11,

74:16, 76:6,

81:28, 82:9,

82:16, 82:21,

83:6, 83:29, 84:5,

84:21, 86:25,

89:7, 91:15,

97:17, 102:28,

103:13, 104:18,

109:18, 122:3,

126:2, 126:4,

128:11, 128:18,

129:8, 129:11,

129:21, 136:19,

138:12, 138:14,

141:23, 142:7

submissions"

[1] - 130:24

submit [4] -

5:17, 5:21, 85:25,

113:25

submitted [7] -

45:9, 89:15,

89:16, 89:27,

92:18, 96:8,

96:17

submitting [4] -

82:28, 109:12,

127:13

subordinate [2]

- 30:6, 30:7

subparagraphs

[1] - 18:20

subsequent [5] -

6:18, 9:10, 52:15,

56:3, 129:24

subsequently

[2] - 61:27, 78:8

subsists [3] -

20:26, 43:16,

109:3

substance [4] -

60:21, 64:14,

148:28, 149:21

substances [1] -

24:15

substantial [2] -

80:7, 80:17

substantially [1]

- 71:26

substantiate [2]

- 4:4, 104:23

substantive [1] -

21:1

subvert [1] -

22:10

succinct [2] -

71:7, 71:11

succinctly [2] -

60:4, 107:5

suddenly [1] -

85:10

sued [1] - 37:24

suffered [1] -

119:12

suffice [1] - 65:8

sufficient [7] -

35:20, 37:13,

42:8, 42:25,

45:22, 89:14,

146:4

sufficiently [2] -

78:15, 98:14

suggest [19] -

23:16, 26:3,

42:14, 48:4,

49:28, 50:7,

50:23, 51:11,

51:14, 65:29,

71:12, 73:25,

73:26, 83:26,

92:13, 102:19,

123:15, 126:21,

126:26

suggested [3] -

56:10, 61:20,

68:9

suggesting [3] -

50:19, 51:25,

106:18

suggestion [10]

- 22:8, 40:10,

40:14, 42:10,

42:13, 43:23,

50:1, 105:17,

105:21, 135:29

suitable [1] -

90:24

summarised [3]

- 14:3, 66:2,

136:27

summarises [2]

- 60:3, 131:6

summary [10] -

6:24, 74:17,

134:22, 134:25,

135:14, 136:23,

138:26, 140:26,

140:28, 142:11

Summary [1] -

149:4

sums [1] - 108:5

superior [2] -

23:3, 29:29

supplied [2] -

2:31, 146:4

supply [1] -

134:14

support [5] -

22:17, 59:16,

59:17, 84:17,

146:5

supporters [1] -

65:20

supporting [2] -

131:8, 131:10

suppose [24] -

47:20, 49:13,

50:10, 59:13,

79:21, 82:2,

83:21, 92:10,

95:14, 97:18,

99:1, 104:8,

104:12, 109:28,

113:2, 114:23,

121:3, 124:1,

124:18, 126:29,

130:3, 131:24,

139:10, 147:15

supra [1] - 37:13

Supreme [29] -

22:15, 36:20,

38:11, 48:27,

49:7, 51:18,

52:15, 58:10,

59:14, 60:28,

61:10, 64:4,

66:18, 77:11,

78:22, 79:13,

103:10, 103:13,

109:14, 112:14,

113:29, 114:17,

114:18, 114:28,

117:10, 120:12,

120:18, 121:2,

121:4

surface [10] -

93:26, 94:1,

94:14, 94:17,

135:17, 140:17,

144:12, 144:19,

145:17, 146:19

surrounding [3]

- 38:7, 134:14,

137:13

survey [2] -

96:1, 96:16

Surveys [1] -

136:1

suspect [1] -

40:5

sustainable [3] -

88:17, 89:21,

144:13

Sutton [2] -

32:17, 34:20

SUZANNE [1] -

2:24

sweeping [1] -

34:23

Sweetman [6] -

13:10, 124:22,

124:24, 139:4,

141:27, 142:1

sworn [2] -

98:23, 127:3

system [9] -

25:17, 25:20,

75:9, 87:10,

90:15, 94:2,

144:12, 144:18,

146:18

System [1] -

149:8

systems.. [1] -

144:14

T

Tab [15] - 6:27,

16:20, 19:15,

31:29, 70:13,

73:13, 76:28,

78:22, 78:26,

80:29, 97:18,

100:7, 103:23,

105:25, 107:3

tab [25] - 43:7,

44:11, 51:16,

52:7, 60:1, 67:7,

86:9, 86:10,

86:11, 100:7,

109:22, 113:29,

120:22, 120:23,

127:5, 127:8,

130:7, 143:17,

147:8, 147:9

tackled [1] -

4:16

Taisce [9] - 3:19,

3:24, 124:20,

124:21, 130:28,

134:26, 134:27,

135:4, 139:17

Taisce's [1] -

4:10

talks [4] - 133:6,

133:7, 137:6

tandem [1] -

26:10

tank [1] - 148:26

tanks [2] -

144:26, 146:19

Taoiseach [2] -

32:17, 37:12

tapes [1] -

130:12

task [3] - 47:14,

52:23, 53:26

tax [1] - 101:19

Tax [1] - 77:8

taxation [1] -

101:23

Taxes [3] -

76:29, 77:7, 77:9

Taylor [2] -

130:19, 140:4

TD [2] - 109:15,

130:27

teams [1] -

59:26

technical [3] -

109:26, 110:15,

138:15

technically [2] -

80:3, 80:6

Technology [1] -

24:18

teleological [3] -

57:29, 76:16,

76:21

telescoped [2] -

80:4, 80:6

temporary [1] -

71:21

ten [8] - 45:2,

46:14, 126:11,

126:14, 126:15,

126:16, 126:18,

134:17

ten-year [1] -

126:14

tendency [1] -

118:14

tendered [1] -

68:20

tensions [1] -

69:14

term [2] - 18:3,

74:25

terms [31] -

4:14, 28:2, 28:3,

28:22, 30:6,

35:17, 46:15,

49:21, 71:12,

74:4, 78:17, 85:7,

88:12, 89:20,

89:22, 90:17,

92:15, 98:4, 99:1,

103:19, 107:22,

112:4, 112:20,

121:1, 125:12,

130:9, 131:5,

132:15, 139:27,

143:26, 149:25

terribly [2] -

77:12, 99:19

test [12] - 12:13,

33:12, 67:11,

80:3, 80:6, 80:9,

106:27, 106:29,

148:1, 148:4,

149:7

testing [3] -

133:18, 133:19,


28

133:23

text [3] - 28:6,

55:14, 142:13

texts [2] - 43:9,

43:12

textual [1] -

22:17

THE [11] - 1:1,

1:12, 1:19, 2:4,

2:8, 2:15, 2:22,

3:1, 69:29, 70:1,

150:21

the...proposed

[1] - 9:25

thee's [1] - 50:1

them.. [1] -

62:10

themselves [5] -

12:23, 30:16,

40:22, 65:8,

124:16

THEN [1] -

150:21

theological [1] -

23:22

thereafter [2] -

77:26, 108:1

therefore [12] -

6:17, 30:20,

32:26, 35:28,

37:24, 59:2, 69:5,

80:14, 120:27,

132:17, 144:24,

149:20

Therefore [1] -

123:6

thereof [1] - 62:6

thereon [1] -

8:16

Theresa [1] -

139:3

thereto [2] -

27:17, 98:1

thereunder [2] -

27:11, 121:25

they've [1] -

44:15

thinks [1] -

117:25

THIRD [1] - 1:20

third [5] - 7:15,

70:16, 113:9,

130:25, 135:10

Third [1] - 64:29

thirdly [1] - 16:5

THOMAS [1] -

1:8

Thornely [3] -

125:6, 130:19,

140:4

Thornely-

Taylor [2] -

130:19, 140:4

thoughtful" [1] -

25:29

threatened [2] -

35:4, 39:9

three [9] - 24:4,

50:21, 78:28,

90:2, 114:13,

119:6, 119:7,

119:13, 140:25

threshold [4] -

12:7, 15:1, 80:16,

115:20

throughout [1] -

91:10

thrust [2] -

55:29, 64:6

Thursday [1] -

70:15

TIM [1] - 2:13

timely [1] -

109:5

timing [1] -

96:19

tip [1] - 130:9

title [2] - 109:24,

110:8

TO [1] - 150:21

today [1] -

144:16

together [2] -

38:7, 95:11

TOLAND [1] -

2:23

Toland [5] -

49:16, 82:28,

83:22, 84:26,

98:3

tons [1] - 24:27

took [8] - 41:6,

66:29, 78:11,

78:14, 128:19,

139:9, 143:6,

143:8

top [7] - 78:16,

87:29, 121:18,

136:25, 137:28,

141:5, 141:6

topics [1] - 3:9

touched [1] -

63:7

town [4] - 99:29,

100:14, 101:17,

101:23

toxic [1] - 24:29

toxins [1] - 25:9

tradition [1] -

64:17

traffic [4] - 88:5,

88:12, 128:14,

137:16

training [1] -

30:20

trans [1] - 5:4

trans-

boundary [1] - 5:4

transcript [1] -

1:28

Transcripts [1] -

2:30

transitional [1] -

72:2

Transport [1] -

87:5

transport [2] -

24:15, 87:9

Transportation

[1] - 87:12

transpose [7] -

99:15, 104:3,

111:23, 112:13,

112:28, 121:28,

122:26

transposed [1] -

122:15

transposition

[2] - 112:7, 112:24

travel [3] -

36:26, 88:4,

88:21

treated [2] -

71:12, 102:22

treatment [2] -

94:2, 134:1

Treaty [1] -

99:27

trees [2] - 97:1,

97:4

Trevor [2] -

130:27, 139:16

TREVOR [1] -

1:7

trial [11] - 114:6,

114:12, 114:13,

114:15, 116:14,

117:4, 119:3,

119:4, 119:14,

119:21, 120:9

trials [1] - 119:6

trials' [1] -

119:13

tribute [1] -

47:25

tried [1] - 119:16

trigger [1] -

85:20

triumvirate [1] -

125:4

true [2] - 38:3,

78:5

truth [1] - 65:12

try [3] - 73:20,

125:10, 143:14

trying [3] -

51:14, 73:20,

107:7

Tuesday [4] -

149:26, 150:9,

150:14, 150:16

TUESDAY [1] -

150:21

Turkish [1] -

23:17

turn [29] - 27:8,

70:15, 78:25,

79:20, 81:3,

81:17, 91:16,

93:21, 94:21,

99:5, 103:29,

107:14, 109:20,

117:10, 118:2,

130:23, 135:9,

135:14, 136:17,

137:6, 137:20,

137:25, 138:26,

138:29, 140:15,

140:16, 140:28,

141:14, 142:15

turned [1] -

114:14

two [29] - 3:9,

3:10, 9:5, 16:8,

31:19, 41:3,

41:12, 50:28,

66:10, 69:6,

69:21, 76:23,

79:22, 91:13,

93:18, 93:21,

99:7, 102:4,

102:7, 104:12,

110:3, 113:27,

123:17, 127:2,

132:7, 133:13,

136:15, 142:6,

142:15

two-stage [1] -

9:5

twofold [1] -

124:10

type [1] - 23:3

types [1] - 109:6

U

UCG [1] - 36:12

UK [1] - 102:8

Ukraine [1] -

23:13

ultimate [1] -

57:4

ultimately [10] -

9:12, 15:6, 19:18,

22:27, 38:4,

46:19, 54:15,

63:23, 67:3,

133:3

ultra [1] - 111:15

unambiguous

[1] - 65:4

unanimously [2]

- 61:11, 101:6

unattenuated

[1] - 146:10

Unborn [1] -

36:9

unborn [3] -

33:1, 33:26,

36:14

uncertainty [2] -

57:18, 65:5

unclear [3] -

65:11, 73:3, 73:4

uncontroversia

l [1] - 63:3

Under [1] -

71:21

under [66] - 6:2,

10:25, 12:2,

12:19, 13:15,

15:12, 16:25,

17:18, 18:23,

19:5, 19:6, 20:23,

22:7, 27:9, 27:25,

29:4, 38:29,

44:23, 46:8, 47:1,

52:8, 52:17,

53:28, 54:28,

60:10, 63:11,

70:17, 70:22,

81:11, 83:2, 83:4,

86:24, 91:4,

91:27, 93:7, 95:2,

95:17, 97:29,

103:4, 103:5,

103:6, 103:7,

103:15, 103:16,

105:28, 105:29,

107:11, 109:1,

109:2, 110:28,

111:2, 111:7,

111:29, 125:15,

126:19, 129:25,

135:19, 136:29,

137:4, 140:17,

143:18, 145:9,

146:26, 148:27,

149:4

undergo [1] -

119:13

underline [1] -

108:11

underlines [1] -

74:16

underlying [4] -

51:12, 117:8,

124:5, 130:12

underscored [1]

- 86:5

underscores [1]

- 86:16

understood [2] -

34:24, 92:13

undertake [1] -

17:4

undertaken [4] -

11:22, 102:25,

148:27, 148:29

undertook [3] -

147:2, 147:3,

148:16

undo [1] - 42:26

undoubtedly [3]

- 66:25, 68:22,

138:15

unduly [1] -

37:23

unelected [1] -

65:12

unenumerated

[5] - 21:22, 26:15,

29:6, 31:13,

40:24

unequivocal [1]

- 57:23

unequivocally

[1] - 64:7

unfair [3] -

43:22, 119:14,

119:21

unfortunate [1] -

118:14

unfounded [1] -

50:17

uninterpreted

[1] - 65:10

Union [7] -

11:17, 91:10,

100:1, 100:8,

100:12, 100:22,

111:4

unique [1] - 34:4

uniquely [1] -

64:20

United [2] -

23:14, 56:18

Unless [1] - 11:3

unless [3] -


29

11:8, 11:14, 12:4

unlike [5] -

22:22, 43:29,

77:2, 110:6,

121:15

unlikely [3] -

40:1, 40:20,

43:23

unnecessary [1]

- 65:5

unqualified" [1]

- 33:12

unreasonable

[1] - 111:14

unreliable [2] -

73:8, 141:16

Unreported [2] -

67:27, 108:26

unsatisfactory

[1] - 117:2

unsuccessful

[1] - 40:24

untenable [1] -

132:17

unusually [3] -

23:25, 125:4,

150:4

unwelcome [2] -

48:5, 48:9

up [9] - 15:6,

26:28, 33:22,

45:11, 55:7,

66:12, 69:23,

114:14, 130:6

updated [2] -

45:21, 91:9

upgraded [1] -

87:9

uphold [1] - 40:4

upwards [1] -

46:17

urban [2] -

132:25, 144:13

urges [1] - 62:16

used' [1] - 55:4

useful [2] - 6:24,

7:12

usefully [1] -

60:3

useless [1] -

48:12

usurpation [1] -

65:12

utilise [1] -

63:20

utilised [1] -

136:2

utility [2] -

48:17, 65:29

utilized [1] -

25:7

utterly [1] -

102:10

V

vacate [1] -

42:27

VALENTINE [1] -

2:19

VALERIAN [1] -

1:8

validation [1] -

4:3

validity [5] -

105:22, 106:21,

108:8, 108:14,

108:20

Valley [1] - 96:3

value [3] - 84:14,

85:6, 98:16

valued [1] -

38:29

values [3] -

84:20, 85:5,

85:19

variance [1] -

53:17

variety [2] -

63:24, 77:29

various [12] -

32:5, 42:13, 61:8,

81:18, 116:7,

116:22, 122:3,

123:28, 139:19,

140:7, 140:11,

142:17

vary [2] - 23:5,

124:24

varying [1] -

54:23

vast [1] - 16:5

vault [1] - 12:7

veil [1] - 38:6

ventilated [4] -

49:24, 90:4,

124:14, 141:18

ventilating [1] -

137:3

ventilation [1] -

125:13

veracity [1] -

4:27

verbatim [1] -

1:28

version [1] -

24:3

versions [1] -

63:5

vest [1] - 36:27

vexatious [4] -

37:23, 39:24,

40:15, 123:8

vi [1] - 40:6

vicinity [1] -

90:7

view [18] - 4:10,

8:19, 10:29, 17:7,

17:8, 20:18, 26:2,

33:26, 35:27,

53:2, 58:20,

61:14, 77:25,

78:10, 88:26,

104:29, 118:13,

146:5

viewing [1] -

133:26

views [3] -

29:12, 98:14,

134:28

vindicate [5] -

33:3, 34:18, 38:9,

41:27, 81:10

vindicates [1] -

81:22

vindication [1] -

34:15

vires.. [1] -

111:15

virtually [1] -

107:22

virtue [5] - 28:2,

30:9, 30:10,

30:12, 86:23

virtues [1] -

30:24

visited [1] -

61:26

visual [2] -

128:15, 141:1

vital [2] - 48:14,

48:15

voiced [3] -

59:8, 132:21,

134:25

voicing [1] -

137:3

volume [2] -

3:12, 67:7

voluntary [6] -

84:7, 91:18,

91:20, 91:29,

92:18, 128:13

Voluntary [1] -

131:23

votes [1] - 54:15

W

Waddenzee [1] -

12:15

Walsh [7] -

26:19, 26:29,

27:3, 29:4, 30:29,

33:24, 38:27

Ward [4] - 96:2,

144:7, 144:22,

144:24

warming [2] -

25:19, 25:20

warrant [4] -

35:2, 39:8, 89:24,

90:18

Warrant [1] -

61:29

warrants [2] -

35:6, 39:11

WAS [1] -

150:21

was.. [1] - 61:16

waste [3] -

24:26, 24:27,

25:6

water [21] - 21:4,

22:24, 24:16,

88:13, 93:26,

94:1, 94:11,

94:14, 94:17,

134:13, 135:15,

135:17, 137:10,

140:17, 140:22,

140:24, 144:12,

144:19, 145:17,

146:19

Water [2] -

107:11, 107:21

watercourse..

[1] - 144:8

watercourses

[1] - 137:11

WBQ [1] - 3:25

weather [1] -

25:23

Wednesday [2] -

142:20, 149:26

week [1] -

149:26

weeks [1] -

36:11

welcome [1] -

48:12

welcomed [1] -

25:27

Welfare [3] -

60:15, 60:17,

60:19

well-being [1] -

98:20

well-

established [1] -

63:11

well-

intentioned [1] -

64:27

well-known [1] -

25:27

Wells [2] -

102:5, 102:7

West [1] - 87:15

western [1] -

144:25

whatsoever [3] -

73:18, 123:4,

126:3

wheeling' [1] -

60:10

whereby [2] -

19:8, 28:9

Whilst [1] - 7:24

whilst [2] -

33:24, 35:25

whole [11] -

35:20, 44:11,

48:22, 53:12,

58:20, 59:3,

64:20, 130:6,

139:18, 141:18,

142:25

wide [1] - 57:24

widely [1] -

54:23

wider [1] - 28:21

widest [2] -

35:7, 36:19

wild [1] - 133:15

Wildlife [1] -

96:18

wind [2] - 7:2,

7:3

wise [1] - 149:29

wish [6] - 19:13,

41:7, 41:8, 44:26,

72:5, 122:25

wished [2] -

122:13, 122:16

wishes [1] - 17:3

witness [1] -

114:14

witnessing [1] -

25:19

woefully [1] -

54:25

woman [4] -

27:7, 27:27, 28:8,

33:5

wonder [1] -

89:2

woodland [1] -

95:10

word [10] - 28:5,

67:21, 67:23,

74:21, 76:5,

84:18, 93:22,

132:19, 132:20

word-for-word

[1] - 132:20

wording [1] -

108:24

words [17] -

50:20, 53:25,

54:24, 54:28,

55:4, 56:1, 56:3,

56:7, 57:3, 67:22,

67:23, 68:13,

68:22, 75:2,

86:14, 86:18,

108:11

works [9] -

13:19, 19:25,

46:29, 47:2,

74:26, 75:4,

75:11, 102:24,

146:5

world [2] -

30:11, 98:27

worth [1] - 78:12

writing [4] -

92:19, 94:3,

96:21, 96:26

written [3] -

2:32, 70:19,

74:11

wrongly [2] -

43:4, 139:10

X

XAB [2] - 7:19,

7:24

xxvii [1] - 121:19

Y

year [4] - 24:27,

72:13, 120:24,

126:14

years [11] - 31:2,

40:12, 45:2,

46:14, 46:17,

126:11, 126:15,

126:16, 126:18,

133:13, 134:17

yesterday [9] -

3:11, 21:17,

49:25, 51:8,


30

66:12, 67:15,

68:7, 74:13,

136:1

Z

Zimbabwe [1] -

23:17

zoned [2] -

95:12, 148:5

zoning [4] -

85:4, 85:8, 148:5,

148:6

€

€400 [1] - 16:4

É

Éireann [3] -

60:16, 62:19,

68:17

8

THE HIGH COURT

DUBLIN

COURT NO. 12

Record No. 2017/344JR

BETWEEN:

HELENA MERRIMAN, MICHAEL REDMOND, ADRIENNE MCDONNELL, PETER COLGAN, ELIZABETH MCDONNELL, TREVOR REDMOND, PATRICIA DEIGHEN, MARGARET THOMAS, NOEL REILLY, HELEN GILLIGAN, JAMES SCULLY, FERGUS RICE, NOEL DEEGAN, VALERIAN SALAGEAN, SIDNEY RYAN, GREG FARRELL, SHEELAGH MORRIS, JIMMY O'CONNELL, SILE HAND, DECLAN MCDONELL, ELIZABETH ROONEY & DESMOND O'CONNOR

and

FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT CLG APPLICANTS

and

FINGAL COUNTY Council RESPONDENT and

DUBLIN AIRPORT AUTHORITY PLC FIRST NOTICE PARTY

and

IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SECOND AND THIRD

NOTICE PARTIESand

RYANAIR DAC FOURTH NOTICE PARTY

ACTION HEARD BY MR. JUSTICE BARRETT

ON TUESDAY, 17TH OCTOBER 2017 - DAY 8

Gwen Malone Stenography Services certify the following to be a verbatim transcript of their stenographic notes in the above-named action.

______________________ GWEN MALONE STENOGRAPHYSERVICES

APPEARANCES

FOR THE APPLICANTS: MR. JERRY HEALY SCMR. OISIN COLLINS BL

INSTRUCTED BY: O'CONNELL & CLARKE SOLICITORS

FOR FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENVIRONMENT CLG: MR. JOHN KENNY BL

INSTRUCTED BY: FP LOGUE SOLICITORS

FOR FINGAL COUNTY Council: MR. CONLETH BRADLEY SCMR. TIM O'SULLIVAN BL

INSTRUCTED BY: THE LAW AGENTMS. HELEN O'NEILL

FOR DUBLIN AIRPORT AUTHORITY: MR. GARRET SIMONS SC

MR. BRIAN KENNEDY SCMR. FINTAN VALENTINE BL

INSTRUCTED BY: ARTHUR COX SOLICITORS

FOR IRELAND & THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MR. DENIS McDONALD SC

MR. CIARÁN TOLAND SCMR. CHRISTIAN KEELING BLMS. SUZANNE KINGSTON BL

INSTRUCTED BY: CHIEF STATE SOLICITORS OFFICE

FOR RYANAIR DAC: MR. MARTIN HAYDEN SCMR. DAMIEN KEANEY BL

INSTRUCTED BY: PHILIP LEE SOLICITORS

COPYRIGHT: Transcripts are the work of Gwen Malone Stenography Services and they must not be photocopied or reproduced in any manner or supplied or loaned by an appellant to a respondent or to any other party without written permission of Gwen Malone Stenography Service

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THE HEARING COMMENCED ON TUESDAY,

17TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2017 AS FOLLOWS:

REGISTRAR: Resume at hearing, as I understand it,

Friends of the Irish Environment CLG -v- Fingal County

Council.

SUBMISSIONS BY MR. McDONALD RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

MR. McDONALD: May it please the Court. On Friday,

Judge, I had been looking at the actual EIA that had

been carried out at the An Bord Pleanála level and

there were just two other observations I wished to make

about that process. The first relates to Mr. Healy's

suggestion that An Bord Pleanála were approaching this

on the basis of a 10 year perspective and I would be

respectfully disagreeing with that suggestion on the

part of Mr. Healy; I don't believe that the An Bord

Pleanála materials that I addressed on Friday bear this

out at all.

There was certainly a 10 year period to allow the

runway to be constructed, but when one looks at the

main concerns that were addressed during the course of

that process it wasn't really in relation to

construction. There were certainly some concerns

expressed in relation to construction and the

consequences that it would have in terms of access and

so on, but the principle concerns related to the

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operation of the runway. And, of course, the operation

of the runway was intended to be for a significant

period into the future. So I don't think it is correct

to suggest that the perspective of the EIA in that case

is limited to a ten year period. And it also, I think,

is borne out, I don't think it is necessary to look at

this now but it is borne out if you were to look at

Annex IV to the Directive which sets out the kind of

things you must look at in the context of EIA, a very

significant part of those considerations relate to the

operation of the project, not just the construction.

So I think it would be wrong to regard the 10 year

period as relevant in those circumstances. Clearly,

what An Bord Pleanála was required to do was to look

into the future and see what would the consequences or

impacts be once this runway was up and running. And

that's, indeed, what the main concerns of both sets of

Applicants here today relate to; the operation of the

runway, not to the construction of the runway.

Insofar as construction is concerned, I think it is

clear from the Inspector's Report -- again I don't

think it is necessary to look at this now -- I think it

is clear from the Inspector's Report that delays in the

project were always envisaged as a possibility. I will

just give the Court the reference for this. In Book 2

of the Merriman pleadings at Tab 14 at page 38, or page

364 if you are looking at the -- well, it is actually

the page opposite page 364 if you are looking at the

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books pagination, but it is page 38 of the internal

pagination of the Inspector's Report, what the

inspector said, and I can briefly read this out, under

the heading "Duration of permission sought" the

inspector says:

"A ten year permission is being sought in this

instance. As per details provided by Mr. Hamilton and

Mr. O'Donnell, on behalf of the Airport Authority, a

ten year permission is considered justified given the

size of the project and the potential for delays from

external factors where statutory responsibilities and

procedural matters will have to be satisfied in

addition to procurement procedures and compliance with

European requirements."

The inspector then observes in the next paragraph, he

says:

"That is reasonable in view of the size of the project,

the estimated three year construction period and the

potential for delay from external sources."

So clearly at the time this EIA was being carried out

there was an awareness on behalf of all parties in that

process that there was the, at least, the possibility

of delay in the project, having regard to external

sources. And that's really all I wanted to say about

the evidence before the Court.

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I now want to turn to whether a Section 42 decision can

be considered to be development consent for the

purposes of the EIA Directive. And before looking at

the cases, and I don't propose to look at very many of

the cases because I think the case-law establishes a

very clear authority for the proposition that Section

42 is not a development consent, but before I look at

that case-law I do want to look at Section 42 itself

very briefly. What we will be saying, before I open

its term, what we will be saying is that it is crucial

that Section 42 does not allow the Planning Authority

to interfere with the conditions of the planning

permission or to extend the scope or extent of what is

to be constructed under the planning permission. The

terms of the planning permission remain the same, the

work authorised remains the same, and if any

enforcement action subsequently has to be taken in

relation to the planning permission it is the original

permission that will be referred to for that purpose,

not the Section 42 decision.

But you will find the relevant section of Section 42 in

the form in which it was at the time the decision was

made at Tab 4 of book 1 of the Books of Authorities. I

appreciate this has been opened substantially by

Mr. Healy already but I do want to draw attention to

some features of it, if I may.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Just so I'm sure, I have section

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28 at Tab 4 but I have Section 42 --

MR. McDONALD: Yes, yes, actually section 28 is section

28 of the 2010 Act, which inserts what was then,

certainly in 2017, the current form of Section 42.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Very good, okay.

MR. McDONALD: And it is in somewhat different terms to

the provision that was looked at by Mr. Justice Gannon

back in the McCoy -v- Dun Laoghaire County Council

case, which is at Tab 55 of Book 3 I think. But,

firstly, if I just ask the Court to look briefly at

subsection (1) before we come to paragraph (a).

Subsection (1) simply says

"On application to it in that behalf a Planning

Authority shall...."

And I draw attention to that word "shall".

"....as regards a particular permission, extend the

appropriate period by such additional period not

exceeding 5 years as the authority considers requisite

to enable the development to which the permission

relates to be completed provided that each of the

following requirements is complied with:"

So I draw attention just for the moment to the word

"shall". Clearly, the Planning Authority, therefore, is

required to extend the period where the relevant

requirements which are set out in the section are

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8

complied with. But you will note that the language now

is "provided that each of the following requirements is

complied with", it has lost the language that Mr. Healy

drew attention to when looking at the McCoy case, the

"if, and only if". So that to extent the observations

of Mr. Justice Gannon in McCoy must be treated with

some degree of caution. Although the underlying

principle I think is still extant.

If we then look at paragraph (a), that's the paragraph

that deals with circumstances where the development has

started and has been substantially completed before the

expiration. That's not immediately relevant for

present purposes and I will pass over it. Sorry,

that's (i) I should have said of paragraph (a). If you

then go down to (ii) of paragraph (a), that's the

provision which is inserted now in Section 42 by this

amendment made in 2010. And, of course, I draw

attention to the fact that it is an amendment made in

2010 and I think when one thinks back to all this

country has experienced over the last decade one can

understand why this provision was enacted at that time,

and you will see that very clearly when you look at the

first of the four subparagraphs that follow, and that

is:

"(I) that there were considerations of a commercial,

economic or technical nature beyond the control of the

applicant which substantially militated against either

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9

the commencement of development or the carrying out of

substantial works pursuant to the planning permission."

And that obviously, I would submit it is obvious, in

any event, but that follows from the economic shock

that the country suffered in the period after

2007/2008. It is understandable why the legislature

should wish to introduce such provision, indeed were

still feeling the effects of the stasis that struck the

construction industry at that time. We have a shortage

of housing, for example, because housing schemes

weren't proceeded with.

But what I do draw attention to is the language that's

used there because much of the criticism of Fingal's

decision by Mr. Healy seemed to suggest that Fingal

weren't themselves sufficiently expert to look at the

material that was put before them by the airport

authority and that in some way Fingal had a duty to

essentially find or make a specific finding that the

airport authority was definitely unable to proceed

because of these economic circumstances. But that's

not what the paragraph says at all, in our submission.

What it says is, simply, that there were

"considerations of a commercial, economic or technical

nature beyond the control of the Applicant which

substantially militated against...". That's a

relatively low standard, I would respectfully suggest.

It doesn't mean that the applicant for permission has

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to prove beyond doubt or even prove as a matter of

probability that it wasn't able to proceed with the

development. It simply "substantially militates

against the commencement of the works or the carrying

out of the works pursuant to the planning permission."

I would also respectfully suggest that you don't need

to have an economics degree in order to form a view as

to whether there were considerations of that kind which

substantially militated against the commencement of

development or the carrying out of works. I would

respectfully suggesting that a Planning Authority, who

is used to considering a wide range of sometimes

difficult and significantly more complex than this

considerations, is well capable of forming a view as to

whether there were such considerations -- and that's

all that has to be established -- which "substantially

militated against the commencement of the carrying

out".

If you then look at the next paragraph II:

"(II) that there have been no significant changes in

the development objectives in the development plan or

in regional development objectives in the regional

planning guidelines for the area of the planning

authority since the date of the permission such that

the development would no longer be consistent with the

proper planning and sustainable development of the

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area."

I suggest that's an important safeguard. It is one

which the Planning Authority is in a unique position to

see because the Planning Authority will be familiar

with all of the relevant provisions of the Development

Plan and the developed objective guidelines at a

regional level and so on. And, of course, the

consequence is that -- and this I think is relevant to

the EU law aspect that I will be coming to in a

moment -- the consequence is that if there has been a

significant change which does mean that the development

would no longer be consistent with the proper planning

and sustainable development of the area then the

Planning Authority cannot make the order under Section

42. I think that is of significance when one comes to

look at the European case-law.

And the same issue really arises in relation to III,

that's dealing with changes that have occurred as a

consequence of any guidelines issued by the Minister

such as to make the development inconsistent with the


area. Again, that's obviously an issue which the

Planning Authority is well capable of forming a view

on, and it is also an issue which is of, obviously,

general application because it is an issue as to what

would be appropriate for the area. And the same

applies, I think, to the preceding paragraph.

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You then have IV in capitals and it says:

"Where the development has not commenced, that an

environmental impact assessment, or an appropriate

assessment, or both of those assessments, if required,

was or were carried out before the permission was

granted."

And some significant criticism has been made of that

provision. But again I would suggest that it is a

perfectly understandable provision in the

circumstances. I would suggest that the legislature

may well have had in mind the kind of considerations

which this Court considered in the Harrington case;

that, obviously, if there has been a development

consent given the period or duration of that

development consent is about to expire. If it is about

to expire then, obviously, any ability to challenge

them under the two month period in section 50 has also

expired. And, therefore, I think it would be perfectly

understandable why the legislature, in those

circumstances, should take the view that it is entitled

to include a provision of that kind, and also entitled

to make a distinction between circumstances where a

development has commenced, where somebody has acted on

the principle of legal certainty, acted on the planning

permission which was previously granted and

circumstances where no one has acted on foot of the

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permission, where no works have in fact been commenced.

I think there is a significant distinction between

those two circumstances which the legislature was

entitled to differentiate or make a distinction between

and it is understandable why, certainly in my

submission it is understandable why the legislature

would have proceeded in the way that it did and to make

a provision in those terms.

If you then just go on to consider the remaining

provisions of Section 42. I don't think paragraphs

(b), (c) or (d) of subsection (1) are hugely relevant,

they are all matters of what I would suggest are good

administration.

If you then go down to subsection (2) you have what I

would submit is a very important provision in the

context of European issues which this Court has to

decide because it makes clear that the Planning

Authority may only change the conditions in one respect

only, and that's in relation to "security for the

satisfactory completion" of the development. Obviously

a provision which is consistent with the desire to see

a development for which planning permission has already

been granted, a development being brought to completion

and not being left uncompleted. It would defeat the

object of the section if one could have a situation

where developments could be left uncompleted

notwithstanding an extension of time having been

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granted. But sorry, I should look at the text of

subsection (2). It says:

"(2) In extending the appropriate period under

subsection (1) a planning authority may attach

conditions requiring the giving of adequate security

for the satisfactory completion of the proposed

development, and/or may add to or vary any conditions

to which the permission is already subject...."

And then what follows is desperately important:

"....under section 34(4)(g)."

And section 34(4)(g), I don't think it is in the

book but that's the section that empowers Planning

Authorities when granting permission to impose

conditions requiring security to be given for the

adequate completion of the development.

So what is absolutely key, I think, in the context of

European law, is that there is no ability on the part

of the Council to change any of the other conditions,

and, indeed, there is no ability on the part of the

Council under this provision to extend the scope or

extent of the works to be carried out pursuant to a


If you then go down to subsection (3). It, I think,

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identifies very clearly that the legislature did not

have in mind that there would be public participation

in this phase, did not have in mind that there would be

submissions made at this stage. And I think when one

looks at the provisions of sub-section (3) one can see

this very clearly because it imposes very strict time

limits on the Planning Authority to make a decision as

expeditiously as possible. Subparagraph (a) says:

" Where an application is duly made under this section

to a planning authority and any requirements of, or

made under, regulations under section 43 are complied

with as regards the application, the planning authority

shall make its decision on the application as

expeditiously as possible."

Imposing a positive duty on the planning authority to

make its decision as expeditiously as possible. Then

go down to subparagraph (b):

"(b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph

(a), it shall be the objective of the planning

authority to ensure that it shall give notice of its

decision on an application under this section within

the period of 8 weeks..."

And then it stays "beginning on" and I don't think the

"beginning on" is hugely relevant. But, clearly, you

have two provisions here; a requirement that it would

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be the objective of the Planning Authority to give its

decision within eight weeks, and secondly, a positive

duty imposed on the Planning Authority to make its

decision as expeditiously as possible. Both, I would

suggest, inconsistent with the idea that there would be

public participation at this stage, and inconsistent

with the suggestion that there would be an opportunity

to make submissions by third parties.

If you then look at subsection (4). I think it is

important to look as subsection (4) because I was a

little bit concerned during the course of the

submissions made by the Applicants that they were

putting before the Court an appalling vista where

somebody could get endless extensions and re-extensions

of time. Subsection 4 makes it quite clear that one

can't have that. It says:

"A decision to extend an appropriate period shall be

made once and once only..."

Very firm words.

"....under the section and a planning authority shall

not further extend the appropriate period."

Again a very sensible provision, one which ties in with

subsection (2) and clearly says this is the limit to

which an extension can be granted.

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Subsection (5) is of marginal importance but it simply

provides that any decision must be entered on the

register. That's, obviously, a public register so the

public become aware of any decision in that way and the

public can challenge the decision by judicial review,

just as the present Applicants have done.

Then subsection (6) says:

"Where a decision to extend is made under this section,

section 40 shall, in relation to the permission to

which the decision relates, be construed and have

effect, subject to, and in accordance with, the terms

of the decision."

And that has to be read in conjunction with section 40.

And section 40 isn't in the books that were presented

to you previously but it is in the book that we handed

in last Friday, which, unfortunately, I have in a

slightly different form to the Court's book and I'm not

sure what number it is at in that book. Oh, Mr. Hayden

has it. I will tell you what number it is at now. It

is actually Tab 1 of that book.

For completeness, it is no harm to have regard to

section 40 because it is the provision which deals with

the duration of a planning permission. You will see

the marginal note says "limit of duration of

permission" in section 40, subsection (1) says:

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"Subject to subsection (2), a permission granted under

this Part, shall on the expiration of the appropriate

period (but without prejudice to the validity of

anything done pursuant thereto prior to the expiration

of that period) cease to have effect as regards -

a) in case the development to which the permission

relates is not commenced during that period, the entire

development, and

(b) in case the development is commenced during that

period, so much of the development as is not completed

within that period."

The "appropriate period" is actually defined in

subsection (3) and it says:

"In this section and in section 42 , "the appropriate

period" means -

(a) in case in relation to the permission a period is

specified pursuant to section 41 , that period, and

(b) in any other case, the period of five years

beginning on the date of the grant of permission."

So section 40 is simply setting out the limit of

duration of the permission and when one looks back at

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Sub-section (6) of Section 42, what subsection (6) of

Section 42 and read in conjunction with section 40 is

saying is that the planning permission previously

granted will not cease to have effect until the end of

the extended period. That's really all it does. So I

think it is just of some relevance just to consider

those two provisions together. And, obviously, I think

they are consistent and they identify that what the

Council is dealing with here is simply the limit of

duration of the planning permission, it is not dealing

with anything else.

Now, subsection (7) I just draw attention to for

completeness, it is not in issue in this case, it only

applies, as you will see:

"....where a decision to extend an appropriate period

has been made by a planning authority prior to the

coming into operation of this section..."

And in the case of those particular class of case there

can be further extensions of time granted. So that's

obviously not relevant to the present case because the

present case is governed by subsection (4) and in the

present case the extension that has been granted in

this case is not capable of extension in the future.

So I just thought it was important just to draw

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attention to some features of Section 42 before I ask

the Court to look at the European case-law. Again I

emphasise the fact that the Planning Authority is not

able to interfere with the conditions of the planning

permission, and secondly, it is not able to extend the

scope or extent of what is to be constructed under the

planning permission, and the terms of the planning

permission remain the same, and the works authorised by

the planning permission remain the same.

Again just before I turn to the European authorities I

do think it is worth looking at two further authorities

on Section 42 that the Court has not had opened to it

yet and they are both in Book 3 of the Book of

Authorities, the Coll case and the McDowell case.

Coll is at Tab 44 of the book No. 3 and that's a

decision of Mr. Justice Peart, as the Court will see,

of July 2005. I don't think it is necessary to go

through the entire of the judgment, I just want to pick

out one or two passages in it. But you will see from

the first sentence of the judgment on page 1 that in

that case the Notice Party, Liam Gillespie, had applied

for planning permission for the erection of a shopping

centre and filling station with a sewerage treatment

plant at Bunbeg, Co. Donegal, in December 1998 and that

was subsequently extended under the equivalent of

Section 42 of the 2000 Act and the applicant, who was a

local resident, objected to the Section 42 decision.

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She also objected to another decision in relation a

public road, which isn't immediately relevant. But the

passage I want to draw the Court's attention to is at

page 16 of the judgment and it is just a short passage.

It is the second paragraph on page 16. Mr. Justice

Peart said:

"The second decision which the applicant seeks to have

quashed is that by which the respondent extended the

duration of the notice party's planning permission

until the 28th October 2005. The applicant has

submitted that the requirements of section 42 of the

Planning and Development Act, 2000 have not been

complied with in as much as the respondent could not

have been able to form the view as required by section

42(1)(c)(iii) that "the development will be completed

within a reasonable time"."

And they were obviously relying on the old provisions

of Section 42, the one that I skipped over in opening

the Section 42 to the Court a moment ago. But it is

the next paragraph that I want to draw particular

attention to. Mr. Justice Peart says:

"In my view, firstly, the applicant enjoys no locus

standi to seek the relief she seeks under this heading.

Firstly, she did not participate in the planning

process at all..."

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And obviously that is not the case here insofar as the

Merriman Applicants are concerned. But you will see

that it is the next part of the sentence that is

relevant for present purposes because Mr. Justice Peart

says:

".... but secondly and critically, the power of the

planning authority to exercise a discretion to extend

the duration of a planning permission is one which may

be exercised appropriately without consultation with

the public. It is not necessary under the statutory

scheme to publish any notice of intention to apply for

an extension, and neither is it necessary to erect any

notice at the site of the development indicating an

intention to apply for an extension. Under that scheme,

as provided by section 42 of the 2000 Act, a planning

authority shall on application being made to it, extend

the appropriate period for such additional period as it

considers requisite to enable the development to be

completed provided certain requirements are complied

with, one of which is that referred to already, namely

that the planning authority is satisfied that the

development will be completed within a reasonable time.

The applicant has no entitlement to be consulted in the

making of that decision and therefore in my view cannot

be heard to raise objections to the decision made. It

is a matter within the discretion of the planning

authority, and provided that the discretion is

exercised in a judicial manner it is a decision which

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then planning authority may make in its discretion."

And then he goes on to consider the Applicant's

particular submissions in relation to development. I

don't think it is necessary to open those. But you

will see that is consistent, I think, with what we saw

in the terms of section 42; the fact that the Planning

Authority has a very limited time to make its decision

and so on.

There is also then at the next tab the McDowell case.

That was a case where Roscommon County Council had

refused to make an order under section 42 in relation

to a construction of a house in Co. Roscommon, being

constructed by the Applicants. They then challenged

the decision of the County Council by way of judicial

review. The issue in the case was whether the Council

was entitled to refuse under section 42 in

circumstances where the development, it was argued

certainly by the Council, was not being constructed in

accordance with the conditions of the planning

permission. This I think is relevant to one of the

arguments that Mr. Healy made, I think last Thursday,

where he was suggesting that if the development here

was commenced in breach of a condition of the planning

permission then the section 42 decision could not be

made.

A different view was taken by Mr. Justice Finnegan in

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this case and you will see that if you turn to page 12

of the judgment. He identifies on page 12 the McCoy

case. He then refers to a judgment of Ms. Justice

Laffoy to same effect in Littondale -v- Wicklow County

Council. At page 13 he refers to the decision of the

Supreme Court in Garden Village Construction -v-

Wicklow County Council. He then identifies the issue

for determination and it is really that page and page

14 that I want to draw attention to what he says. He

says:

"The Planning Authority having concluded (the

correctness of that conclusion not being a matter for

my consideration) that the development being undertaken

was not in compliance with the particular planning

permission were they entitled to have regard to that

conclusion and on the basis of the same refuse to

extend the duration of the planning permission? The

Respondents argument is that they have notwithstanding

the wording of section 42 of the Act of 2000 and the

decisions to which I have referred a residual

discretion which they were entitled to exercise and

refuse the extension. They argue that it would be

illogical for them to extend the duration in the light

of their conclusion as a development when completed

would not be in compliance with the planning

permission. There are a number of factors which

militate against my accepting this view."

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It is really the first of them that I think is

relevant. He says:

"1. The wording of section 42 is clear. It provides

that if the Planning Authority are satisfied on certain

matters the Planning Authority must grant an extension.

It is clear on the authorities that to take into

account any other matter, fact or circumstance is ultra

vires."

And that is consistent, obviously, with the views

expressed by the Supreme Court in Garden Village and

consistent, also, with the views expressed by

Ms. Justice Laffoy in the Littondale case and by

Mr. Justice Gannon in the McCoy case. And we

respectfully submit that there is a significant body of

case-law now as to the interpretation of Section 42.

There are decisions not just of the High Court but of

the Supreme Court in relation to section 42, and in

those circumstances we would respectfully suggest that

those are decisions which this Court should follow and

accept as representing the law on section 42. We have

in the additional book that was circulated on Friday,

or handed in on Friday, we have included the Worldport

decision, which says that even if all one had before

one was a series -- I don't think it is necessary to

look at the decision -- that even if all that one had

before you was a succession of High Court decisions,

the High Court Judge should be, at minimum, very slow

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to depart from the decision of a colleague. That's

simply the principle, I don't think it is necessary to

open the authorities, or to open Worldport.

Can I then address the European law having looked at

section 42, having looked at the way in which section

42 has been treated in the Irish case-law. All of the

authorities that I want to look, bar one, in relation

to this are in book 3 of the Book of Authorities. But

before I look at book 3 can I ask the Court to look

again at book 1 of the Book of Authorities and at the

EIA Directive, which is at Tab 13 of the book No. 1.

Can I ask you to turn -- there are two sets of

pagination on the EIA Directive, there is pagination on

the top right-hand corner and I'm looking at page 24 if

you are looking at that pagination, or page 118, if you

are looking at the books pagination. It is Tab 13. I

don't know whether the Court has that?

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: My Directive only goes to page

21.

MR. McDONALD: Oh! It should certainly go up to page

24. It is page 118 of the books pagination. It is

Annex II.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: It is not there I'm afraid.

MR. McDONALD: Oh! Well, we will have to hand one up

then. I'm terribly sorry about that, Judge. My

apologies.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Not at all. Sorry, hang on a

second. I beg your pardon. Annex II?

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MR. McDONALD: Annex II, yes.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: That's at page 11 in my

Directive.

MR. McDONALD: Page 24 certainly on mine.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: This is Directive 2011/92/EU?

MR. McDONALD: It is, yes, absolutely. It may simply

be a different print out of the Directive.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: No, because it is the official

journal reference and it says L26 11.

MR. McDONALD: I certainly have -- well, I have 2011

L0092 and that's also the official journal. So I'm not

sure what has happened there, Judge.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Well as long as we are looking at

the right annex. "Projects referred to in Article

4(2)", is that it?

MR. McDONALD: Yes, exactly. But just before I come to

point 13 of Annex II. Annex II deals with "Projects

referred to in Article 4(2)" and those are projects

which do not automatically require EIA but which Member

States can subject to EIA, depending on the

circumstances. I want to ask the Court to look at

point No. 13, which is the very last paragraph of Annex

II, and I'm asking the Court to do that for two

reasons, first because it features, I would suggest,

significantly in the Pro-Baine case, which I'm about to

open, and secondly, it is also relevant to an argument

Mr. Kenny made on Friday, or possibly it was on

Thursday, but it certainly is an argument that

Mr. Kenny made. You will see that point 13 says that

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Member States can require EIA in this particular

circumstance.

"(a) Any change or extension of projects listed in

Annex I or this Annex, already authorised, executed or

in the process of being executed, which may have

significant adverse effects on the environment (change

or extension not included in Annex I)."

I want to just look at the language which is used

there. Mr. Kenny suggested in the course of his

submissions that the reference to an extension of a

project would extend to the extension of the duration

of a development consent. In my respectful submission,

both when one looks at the language which is used here

and when one looks at the Pro-Baine decision, which I'm

going to look at in a moment, that is, with respect to

Mr. Kenny, I would say incorrect. But just let's look

at the language first of all.

"Any change or extension of projects...."

One has to look at what is meant by "project" in that

context and I want to look at that in a moment. But

"Any change or extension of projects listed in Annex

I". Just pausing there. A runway of more than 2.1

kilometres is an Annex I project. So any change or

extension of a project, including a runway project of

the kind that we are talking about here, may require

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EIA. But it is:

"Any change of extension of projects listed in an Annex

I already authorised, executed or in the process of

being executed."

So it covers three situations: One where the project

has previously been authorised; one where the project

has previously been authorised and has been executed;

and one where the project has been previously

authorised and is in the course of execution. But all

three of those eventualities are covered and I think

that's important when one comes to look at the

Pro-Baine decision. But in addition to that, going

back to the meaning of the word "projects", its only

changes are extension of projects which is fall within

this particular provision. You need to go back, and

unfortunately I don't have the pagination of the

version of the Directive that the Court has, but one

needs to go back to Article 1 to look at what "project"

means because it is not development consent. You will

see it in Article 1 paragraph (2) subsection (a):

""Project" means the execution of construction works or

of other installations or schemes, or other

interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape

including those involving the extraction of mineral

resources."

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Having looked at that definition of "project" if you

then go back to look at point 13(a) and the language

which is used in point 13(a) and you substitute for the

word "projects" the language of Article 1(2)(a) I think

it is quite clear that it is only a "change or

extension of construction works or other installations

or a change or extension of interventions in the

natural surroundings" is caught by point No. 13. And I

think that's manifestly clear and reenforced by the

decision of the Court in the Pro-Baine case.

In order to come within point 13 there must be a change

or extension of a project, as defined, whether that

project was already authorised and no construction work

has been carried out, whether it is a project that has

been previously authorised and executed, or whether it

is a project that has previously been authorised and is

still in the process of being executed. It is only any

change to the physical works or to the ground over and

above what has already been authorised is what

paragraph 13 or point 13 captures.

So just having looked at that book I now want to turn

to book No. 3, if I may, and to the Pro-Baine decision,

which is at Tab 69 of that book. The Court will recall

that decision, it was opened by Mr. Kenny on Friday, or

on Thursday, and that was a case of an existing

landfill site already in operation in Belgium. I think

it was Belgium. Yes, it was Belgium. New legislation

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was introduced, the new legislation required all

existing operators of landfill projects to submit a

conditioning plan to an authority in Belgium and that

authority then had to decide whether to allow the

operation to continue and question was whether the

decision by that authority to allow a development to

continue constituted development consent. Can I ask

the Court to look at what the European Court or the

Court of Justice said at paragraph 26 and following

paragraphs of the judgment because you will see that

the court in its decision is influenced by what was

said in point 13 of Annex II, that we have just looked

at. But let's look at paragraph 26:

"It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether that

decision constitutes a ‘consent’ within the meaning of

Article 1(2) of Directive 85/337."

The decision in question being the decision of the

competent authority in that case to allow the landfill

project to continue. And then it says:

"In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the

concept of ‘consent’ is defined in Article 1(2) of

Directive 85/337...."

That was the previous Directive.

"....as being 'the decision of the competent authority

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or authorities which entitles the developer to proceed

with the project'. Accordingly, there can only be

'consent', within the meaning of that Directive, where

a 'project' is to be carried out.

The definition of the concept of a 'project' set out in

Article 1(2) of Directive 85/337 does not specify

whether changes to or extensions of existing projects

may themselves be considered 'projects'."

And then it says:

"However, inter alia, the installations and sites

listed in Annex II to Directive 85/337, to which

reference is made in Article 4(2) thereof, are

'projects' within the meaning of that Directive.

They then deal with point 11 which is not relevant for

the present purposes. But going down to the next

sentence:

"Point 13 of that Annex includes in the list of

projects referred to 'any change or extension of

projects listed in Annex I or Annex II, already

authorised, executed or in the process of being

executed, which may have significant adverse effects on

the environment...'.

And having quoted from point 13 they go on to say:

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"It follows from those provisions that any change to or

extension of a landfill site, such as the one at issue

in the main proceedings, may constitute a 'project'

within the meaning of Directive 85/337 where it may

have significant adverse effects on the environment.

As has been established by the Court, the term

'project' refers to works or interventions involving

alterations to the physical aspect of the site..."

And then they say, and this, in my submission, is a

critical paragraph:

"Thus, the mere renewal of an existing permit to

operate a landfill site cannot, in the absence of any

works or interventions involving alterations to the

physical aspect of the site, be classified as a

'project' within the meaning of Article 1(2) of

Directive 85/337."

So the Court made a very clear distinction in that case

to the extension of duration of a development consent

and the extension of the scope of a project. The

former, the extension of duration, is not a development

consent, but the latter is. And in my respectful

submission, that is a complete answer to the

submissions which have been made on behalf of the

Applicants in this case. All that section 42 does is

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to permit the duration of the existing permit to

continue. It is the exact parallel between the

Pro-Baine case and the present case. That's all

section 42 does. It doesn't authorise, it cannot

authorise the carrying out of any additional works

beyond what was previously authorised by the decision

granted by An Bord Pleanála. It would only be in

circumstances where it did authorise the execution of

new works that it would be a new project within the

meaning of the Directive and within the meaning of

point 13 of Annex II.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I just have noted there when

Mr. Healy was speaking: "So the question posed by

Pro-Baine is: Will the decision of the Respondent

under challenge lead to physical change in North

County Dublin?" And the answer to that question is of

course.

MR. McDONALD: It will lead to physical change, not the

section 42 decision but the original planning

permission will lead to change. What this is talking

about is going beyond what was permitted by the

original permission. And where you go beyond what was

permitted by the original permission point 13 of Annex

II is engaged. You have a new project at that stage, a

project which requires a new authorisation. That's the

critical distinction, in my respectful submission.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Well I think the point he's

making isn't. It is that but for the decision to

extend nothing would happen.

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MR. McDONALD: Well I don't think that's the way the

court here is dealing with it at all. I mean, when one

looks at the language of that paragraph, "mere renewal

of an existing permit to operate a landfill site

cannot, in the absence of any works or interventions

involving alterations to the physical aspect of the

site, be classified as a 'project'." Here you have an

existing -- going back to the language of point 13 of

Annex II -- you have an existing project which is

already authorised. Okay, no works have been executed

yet, no -- sorry, other than the small works that were

executed just before the period expired. But it is one

which is already authorised, it is in the course, it is

in the process of being executed. But nothing else has

happened in relation to the project, the project hasn't

been extended. All that has happened is that the

duration of the development consent has been extended.

And that I think is absolutely crucial when one looks

at the language of point 13 of Annex II, when one looks

at the language of paragraph 32 of the judgment. You

are not in fact here extending in any way beyond what

was previously authorised, what was "already

authorised", to use the language of point 13. There

is, therefore, no new project. And that's the critical

thing.

There would be a new project if section 42 had

authorised the Council and the Council had granted

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Dublin Airport Authority, for example, an extension of

the runway beyond the three point whatever kilometres

it was given permission for in 2007 or, or if they had

allowed the airport authority to undertake some new

ancillary facility ancillary to that runway. But

nothing like that happened, nor is anything like that

permissible under section 42. There is nothing in the

language of section 42 to permit that to happen. And

therefore I go back to the language of paragraph 32 of

the judgment, the "mere renewal of an existing permit

cannot in the absence of works or interventions

involving alterations". There are no alterations

whatsoever to what has been already authorised, to use

the language of point 13.

So, in my respectful submission, paragraph 32 of the

judgment provides a clear and complete answer and what

the Applicants have done in this case is to both

misconstrue point 13 of Annex II and to misconstrue the

judgment of the European Court, which I would

respectfully suggest is very clear in its term.

And that's really all I wanted to say about the

Pro-Baine case. The next authority to which I wish to

refer is the decision of the Court in the Wells case,

which identifies another circumstance in which a later

event or decision might give rise to a new development

consent. The Wells case, firstly I want to look very

briefly at Tab 60 of the book, which is the opinion of

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the Advocate General. As you will see, I think there

are two important paragraphs, paragraphs 15 and 17, in

order to understand the facts of that case. If you

look at page 730 of the pagination, paragraph 15

explains that:

". In 1947 permission to work Conygar Quarry was

granted under an IDO. In 1991 quarrying works, which

had stopped many years earlier, resumed for a short

period. The resumption resulted in blasting operations,

movements of heavy goods vehicles on the lane running

past Mrs Wells' house and crushing operations. Those

workings caused cracking to Mrs Wells' house and forced

her to keep her windows shut."

Then if you look at paragraph 17:

"The operators exercised their right of appeal to the

Secretary of State. On 25 June 1997 he issued his

decision letter in which he imposed..."

And this I think is the passage I would underline:

"...54 Conditions on the planning permission."

And that is something that the Court then characterises

as a fundamental change in the permission. And of

course a fundamental change in a permission must - and

one doesn't need any decision of the European Court to

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tell you that - constitute a new development consent.

It is a perfectly obvious proposition that if you could

simply substitute a whole rake of new conditions that

would be a new development consent. You would then be

looking to that decision in terms of enforcement,

rather than the original permission. Whereas in this

case, if anyone needs to enforce the planning

permission granted in the future as against the airport

authority what document will they hand up to the Judge?

They will hand up the decision of An Bord Pleanála,

which sets out all of the conditions which must be

observed as a matter of law by the Dublin Airport

Authority.

But if you look at page -- sorry, Judge, the judgment

is at the next tab, Tab 61, and I want to just look

really at one paragraph of the judgment. Well, two

paragraphs in the judgment and they are paragraphs 46

and 47. Actually I should start at paragraph 44. I'm

terribly sorry. At para. 44 the court said:

"In the main proceedings, the owners of Conygar Quarry

were obliged under the Planning and Compensation Act

1991, if they wished to resume working of the quarry,

to have the old mining permission registered and to

seek decisions determining new planning conditions and

approving matters reserved by those conditions. Had

they not done so, the permission would have ceased to

have effect."

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45. Without new decisions such as those referred to in

the previous paragraph, there would no longer have been

'consent', within the meaning of Article 2(1) of

Directive 85/337, to work the quarry.

46. It would undermine the effectiveness of that

directive...."

That's the EIA Directive.

"....to regard as mere modification of an existing

'consent' the adoption of decisions which, in

circumstances such as those of the main proceedings,

replace not only the terms but the very substance of a

prior consent, such as the old mining permission."

Then at 47:

"Accordingly, decisions such as the decision

determining new conditions and the decision approving

matters reserved by the new conditions for the working

of Conygar Quarry must be considered to constitute, as

a whole, a new 'consent'...."

And you contrast that with the present case where under

section 42 Fingal has no ability to impose new

conditions, certainly no ability to impose new

conditions which would replace the very substance of a

prior consent. And just looking at paragraph 46, which

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I think is the key paragraph there:

"It would undermine the effectiveness of that directive

to regard as mere modification of an existing 'consent'

the adoption of decisions which....replace not only the

terms but the very substance of a prior consent..."

I suppose two things can be drawn from that. It

appears to be clear that the court would not have had

difficulty with what they describe as a "mere

modification of an existing consent", and secondly,

they do have a problem, obviously, where there is in

substance a new consent. Which is not the case here.

But what you have here in this case is, when one looks

at all of the law in section 42 in this jurisdiction,

simply an extension of the duration of an existing

planning permission. And that is something, which I

indicated on Friday, is something which is within the

competence of national authorities to determine, the

length of a planning permission, and there is nothing

in European law which in any way interferes with or

prescribes any minimum period, or rather, maximum

period for a development consent.

I do want to look after Krizan in a moment because I

think Krizan has been mischaracterised by the

Applicants. But before I do that there are two Irish

decisions, the first of them in book 3, that are, I

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think, of some assistance to the Court and the first is

a decision of the Supreme Court in Dunne -v- The

Minister for the Environment which is at Tab 43 of the

same book. You will see in this case the Supreme Court

following the Wells decision and drawing attention, in

particular, to the paragraph on which we rely,

paragraph 46 of the judgment, and distinguishing the

decision in issue in this case from the observations of

the European Court in Wells. And if I could just look

at the headnote, I appreciate it is not a section 42

case but there is a parallel between the arguments made

by the Applicants in the present proceedings before the

Court and the arguments made by the applicants in Dunne

-v- Minister for the Environment, and that was a case,

it was quite a controversial case at the time, the

Carrickmines Castle case. You will see if you look the

headnote that Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council had

"....commenced road building works at a site which was

of archaeological significance, following authorisation

pursuant to consents and approvals issued by the first

defendant under the Roads Act 1993. There was, in fact,

no distinct consent for the purposes of the EIA

Directive, rather, the requirements of the Directive

had been implemented through the Roads Act 1993. During

the course of development works, it became apparent

that the nature and extent of the archaeological

features at the site were greater than had been

anticipated at the time of the initial environmental

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impact statement. Works were then halted for some time

following various applications for injunctive and other

relief by persons concerned about the interference with

a national monument caused by the works. The approval

of the first defendant under the National Monuments

Acts for interference with the national monument for

the purpose of continuing the road building works was

subsequently struck down as being ultra vires.

Modifications to the road building plan were then made

by the various State parties so as to preserve some of

the archaeological features."

This is the bit where the parallel arises.

"In the meantime, the National Monuments (Amendment)

Act 2004 amended the National Monuments Act 1930 and

introduced a special provision, at section 8, which

provided, inter alia, that the consent of the first

defendant was not required in relation to the carrying

out of any works by Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County

Council affecting any national monument in connection

with the completion of the roadway but that any such

works should be carried out on the directions of the

Minister. In considering whether to issue such

directions, under section 8 the Minister was not

concerned if such works would interfere with national

monuments if they were in the public interest. Works

recommenced pursuant to the directions issued by the

first defendant."

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Then you will see:

"The plaintiff sought, inter alia, declarations that

section 8 of the Act of 2004 was invalid as being in

contravention of the Constitution..."

But crucially for our purposes:

"...that the directions of the first defendant pursuant

to section 8 were invalid by reason of the failure to

comply with the EIA Directive....and it was submitted

that the works....constituted a project within the

meaning ascribed by the Directive and that the

directions issued by the Minister constituted a

development consent...."

So that's the parallel argument that was made in that

case. And you will see if you turn to page 216 the

Chief Justice delivering the --

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I wonder could we just pause

there.

MR. McDONALD: Of course, absolutely

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Now this might take about ten

minutes so if you want to take a break or whatever and

I will just deal with these matters.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

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THE HEARING ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

MR. McDONALD: I was looking at the decision of the

Supreme Court in Dunne -v- The Minister for the

Environment, it was at Tab 43 of book 3 and I was just

going to ask the Court to turn to page 216 of the

judgment of the court delivered by Chief Justice Murray

and you will see at paragraph 43 on page 216 the Chief

Justice says that:

"The concept of "development consent" has been

considered in a number of cases, including Wells -v-

Secretary of State..."

If you then look at page 217 of the report, at

paragraph 46 Chief Justice Murray actually quotes from

the paragraph that I just opened to the Court a few

moments ago, paragraph 46 of the judgment in Wells, the

one that talks about the conditions being replaced and

the very substance -- sorry, I should open it again .

""It would undermine the effectiveness of that

directive to regard as mere modification of an existing

consent the adoption of decisions which, in

circumstances such as those of the main proceedings,

replace not only the terms but the very substance of a

prior consent, such as the old mining permission".

And you will see that the Chief Justice has emphasised

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those words "the very substance". If you then go down

to the end of that page, at paragraph 48 the Chief

Justice continues:

"In the present case, it seems clear to the court that

the principal development consent is that of October,

1998. The court is of the view that the plaintiff is

mistaken in suggesting that the decisions of 1998 and

the directions given in August, 2004, are, in some

manner, different stages in the same decision making

process. In our view, the decisions of 1998 are stand

alone decisions which allow the road development to

proceed whereas the directions involve merely the

regulation of activities for which the principal

consent, raising the substantial environmental issues,

has already been given."

Again there is a parallel between that case and the

present case, where all of the concerns about the

environment were addressed at the EIA stage at the time

the original decision of An Bord Pleanála was given.

And then the Court continued at paragraph 49:

"The court is satisfied for the following reasons that

the ministerial directions under section 8 of the Act

of 2004 do not fulfil any of the requirements necessary

to constitute a "development consent":-

(a) firstly, the first defendant does not have power

under section 8 of the Act of 2004 to embark upon a

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46

reconsideration of the environmental issues arising for

the road development..."

And obviously the same issue arises here.

"And, more importantly, does not have power to modify

the road development."

And again here under section 42 there is no power to

modify the development.

"All that is left for the first defendant is a power to

regulate the manner in which the works which are

necessary to allow the road to proceed are carried out;

(b) secondly, the project is prescribed for the

purposes of Council Directive 85/337/E.E.C., as

amended, as the road development, the subject matter of

the consent of 1998. Excavation works of the type the

subject matter of the ministerial directions under

section 8 of the Act of 2004 are not a prescribed

project."

But it is really paragraph (a) there which I think is

of some relevance to the issues which this Court has to

decide.

Now, there is one other authority, Irish authority

which I want to draw the Court's attention to, it has

been opened in part by Mr. Healy, and that's in another

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book, unfortunately, it is book 2 and Tab 38 of book 2

and that's the Lackagh Quarries case. It is at Tab 38.

I'm not going to go through the facts again but that

was a case where Galway City Council had refused an

application under what I think was then section 4 of

the 1982 Act to extend the permission in that case and

it had done so on environmental grounds. Ms. Justice

Irvine in that case came to the conclusion that the EIA

Directive did not have direct effect as between the

parties before her. That issue obviously doesn't arise

in this case because the State is a party and,

therefore, any question of direct effect can obviously

be invoked as against the State. And I absolutely

accept that. So what Ms. Justice Irvine said is

strictly obiter in those circumstances.

But I would ask the Court to look at what she says at

page 30 of the judgment, paragraph 70, because although

this judgment was delivered, I think, two years before

the Pro-Baine decision it is, in my respectful

submission, entirely consistent with Pro-Baine and the

approach which the European Court itself took in

Pro-Baine. And if you look at what Ms. Justice Irvine

said. She said:

"The respondent has failed to convince me that there is

any regulation or statutory provision in this

jurisdiction from whence it can be maintained that the

section 42 application was a project which required

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48

development consent within the meaning of the EIA

Directive, or was one requiring appropriate assessment

under the Habitat’s Directive."

This is the obiter statement on which I rely:

"Even if the Directives had direct effect, which they

do not, there are strong grounds to argue that

development consent was given following the assessment

of the likely environmental impact of the proposed

project at the time of the application for planning

permission. An Environmental Impact Statement was

submitted and considered subsequent to which the

project received approval. A similarly strong argument

can be made to the effect that a section 42 application

should not be considered to amount to a change or

extension to the project as referred to in Annex II of

the EIA Directive, such as to require further

development consent."

And that obviously echoes the approach which the

European Court itself took two years later in

Pro-Baine:

"The development as planned and approved of from an

environmental prospective remained the same as did the

scale of the project."

And again those observations apply equally to the case

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49

before this Court.

"It was only the addition of time to complete the

previously approved project that had changed. However,

as already stated, the Directives do not have direct

effect."

I fully accept that's an obiter observation by

Ms. Justice Irvine but I would say that it is entirely

consistent with Pro-Baine and provides added support

for the proposition which we suggest the Court should

adopt; which is that absent any additional works being

undertaken pursuant to a section 42 decision, absent

any new conditions which changed the substance of the

pre-existing condition there is no development consent

under section 42.

Now, I said I would come back to the Krizan case and

I'm sorry, that's back in book 3. I'm really sorry

about this, Judge. It is at Tab 67 and 68 of Book 2.

If I could ask the Court to look first at the court's

decision at Tab 68 before looking at the Advocate

General's opinion. Before I open the relevant

paragraph I suppose I should just identify what was in

issue in that case. That was a landfill case as well

and there was a significant gap of several years

between the EIA which had previously been carried out

and the subsequent development concern.

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50

Now, we are just a little concerned that the Applicants

have sought to characterise this case as being about

development consent. In our submission, it is not

about development consent. What it is concerned with

is the existence of a time gap between a pre-existing

EIA and a subsequent development consent.

Obviously what happened in Krizan is not something that

will happen under our system, because under our system

the relevant Planning Authority's decision will be made

only after the EIA has been completed and there will

not be a significant gap between the carrying out of

that EIA by the relevant Planning Authority and the

issue of the planning permission or development

consent.

Can I ask you to look at the judgment, first. The

reason why I do that is because there is a significant

point of fact in this case, which I think has to be

borne in mind when one looks at the observations of the

Advocate General in her opinion. If you look at

paragraph 20 of the judgment, the Court there

identifies what was the relevant Slovak law. You'll

see it was a very curious law. They say :

"Paragraph 37 of the Slovak law provides: 'The period

of validity of the final opinion concerning an activity

is three years from its issue'."

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That's the final opinion dealing with environmental

impacts. So unlike in the present case, where, for the

reasons which I identified this morning, An Bord

Pleanála was looking into the future in relation to the

operation of this runway well into the future, the

noise that would be generated as the number of planes

increased landing on the runway, and so on, or using

the runways and so on, here you had national system,

which only looked three years ahead. I don't know how

that worked. I really don't know how that worked but

that's the system which they had. They specifically

had a system that only looked three years ahead. But

that isn't the only oddity about it because you'll see

in the next sentence it says:

"The final opinion shall maintain its validity if,

during that period, a location procedure, or a

procedure for a permit for the activity is initiated

under the specific legislation."

So you had this disconnect, very strange disconnect

between the period of validity of the EIA and then this

location procedure. It appears from what we see there

that you could actually have an EIA carried out before

the location was chosen. Now how anyone could carry

out an EIA in those circumstances I just don't know but

that seems to have been the position under Slovak law.

Then you'll see that there was this provision in

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paragraph 7:

"The validity of the final opinion concerning an

activity..."

Again that was the EIA opinion.

"...may be extended by a renewable period of two years

at the request of the Applicant if he adduces written

evidence that the planned activity and the conditions

of the land use have not undergone substantial changes

or that no new circumstance connected with the material

content of the assessment has arisen and that new

technologies used to proceed with the planned activity

have not been developed."

Then I think that's really all I wanted to refer to

there. But it was a very curious position under

national law.

Then, just for completeness, if you turn to paragraph

104 of the judgment you'll see that the Court came to

the conclusion that the relevant facts weren't caught

by the Directive because of the fact of the date when

Slovakia exceeded to the European Union. You'll see at

paragraph 104 they say:

"Consequently, the obligations arising from that

Directive do not apply to the project and therefore it

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53

is not necessary to answer the relevant question."

If you then go back to tab 67, the preceding tab in the

Book, you'll see the opinion of the Advocate General

and again I'm conscious this has been opened to the

Court previously. If you look at paragraph 39 under

the heading "Environmental Impact Assessment" you'll

see:

"On the application of the company as of 16 December

1998, the Ministry of the Environment conducted an

environmental impact assessment of the landfill project

and issued a final opinion on the environmental impact

on 26 July 1999."

Then they say:

"In parallel with the procedure to determine the

location..."

Just going back to what we saw in the judgment. It

appears that the procedure to determine the location is

something that took place subsequent to the EIA.

Again, impossible to understand how anyone could carry

out an EIA in relation to a left-hand fill project

without knowing where the landfill was going to be,

without knowing what the particular impacts of that

landfill was and all of the things that have to be

considered in the particular context, air, water. So

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unless you knew what the water courses were, you know,

what was the impact of the landfill on the water

courses, I just don't know how the procedure here was

envisaged by the Slovakia. We just don't have any

information about that.

Just looking again at paragraph 40:

"In parallel with the procedure to determine the

location, upon the request of the relevant company by

its decision of 27 March the Ministry of the

Environment prolonged the validity of the

aforementioned opinion on the environmental impact

until 1 February 2008."

Then you'll see, if you go down to paragraph 43 that it

was just a few days before 1st February that the

relevant consent was issued, because it says:

"On 22 January 2008, the Environment Inspectorate

issued the integrated permit for the construction and

operation of the landfill site."

So you had this very, very strange situation where the

EIA was carried out in July 1999; it was extended in

2006 at the time the location procedure was being in

being; and then subsequent to that, in January 2008,

the relevant development consent was issued. We are

the entire opposite of that. In this case we have a

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situation where the EIA took place immediately before

the decision of An Bord Pleanála. There is no

significant gap in time but here you have a very

significant gap in time between the EIA that was

carried out in 1999 and the development consent granted

ten years later.

I think everything that the Advocate General has to say

must be seen against that background.

If you then look at paragraph 124 of the opinion, this

is a passage that was opened by Mr. Healy but there are

just some aspects of it that I wish to draw attention

to. It has the heading:

"b) The criteria for planning the validity of the

decision on environmental impact.

124. If it were to become apparent that the EIA

Directive is applicable to the permit for the landfill

project or that national law requires a corresponding

application of the requirements of that Directive, the

question arises whether it was compatible with the

Directive to prolong the validity of a decision on

environmental impact issued in 1999 in 2006.

In this respect, the national court would have to

review, first of all, whether the assessment issued in

1999 already satisfied all the requirements of the EIA

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Directive: even in the event of its validity being

prolonged..."

An observation that I think is fairly understandable in

light of what we've just seen.

"...an inadequate assessment cannot be a substitute for

an assessment within the meaning of the Directive."

Then at 126:

"The EIA Directive does not expressly govern the

request whether the validity of an assessment which is

adequate in terms of its content can be prolonged."

That's dealing with, not with the prolongation of

development consent but with the prolongation of an EIA

assessment. That's what it's dealing with. Utterly

different to the present circumstances. If we are

correct in suggesting that a section 42 decision is not

a development consent, everything that Advocate General

Kokott says here is entirely irrelevant and beside the

point. But going on with what she says:

"Nevertheless, the objective of the environmental

impact assessment which is laid down in Article 2(1) of

the EIA Directive must be determinative. Pursuant to

that provision, projects likely to have significant

effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of

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their nature, size or location are made subject to an

environmental assessment. Such an assessment cannot be

restricted to the effects which would have been caused

if the project had been proceeded with at some time in

the past. On the contrary, it must include all the

effects which may actually be likely at the time of the

consent."

I draw attention to those words "at the time of the

consent". She is clearly looking at this in accordance

with the structure of the EIA Directive which envisages

that at the time of the development consent, an EIA

should be carried out. That's what she has in mind.

She anchors everything she says by reference to those

words "at the time of the consent" and there's no

suggestion that once consent has been given there's any

obligation thereafter to carry out any new or fresh

EIA, no suggestion of that kind is made anywhere in

this opinion.

Then at paragraph 127 she says:

"This is also apparent from Annex II, point 13, of the

EIA Directive, which covers changes to projects, for

the purpose of which the concept of changes must be

understood in a broad sense."

Of course that's what we just looked at in the context

of Pro-Baine. Then at 128:

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"If, in the meantime, environmental conditions or the

project have changed so that other significant effects

on the environment are possible, the procedure for the

environmental impact assessment must be supplemented or

even be carried out completely again in a repeat EIA

procedure."

Again that's dealing with circumstances where there's a

gap between a pre-existing EIA and a subsequent

decision as to whether or not to grant development

consent. Utterly different, we would say, to the

present circumstances. But look at what she says in

the next sentence because again she anchors what she

says by reference to those words "at the time of the

consent" and those words "at the time of the consent"

also appear, I'm not going to open now, in the

Nomarchiaki opinion at tab 66 of the book, paragraph

138. Again, she anchors her observations there by

reference to those words "at the time of the consent".

But going back to paragraph 128:

"Consequently, it may become necessary to examine

whether the environmental impact assessment still

correctly represents the possible significant effects

of the project on the environment at the time of

consent; therefore, in other words, an updating

assessment must be carried out with the objective of

determining whether a supplementary environmental

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impact assessment is necessary."

Then she draws attention to a number of significant

factors that arose in that case, which she says could

be of significance in the context of an updating

assessment.

She identifies in paragraph 130 that:

"...the environmental impact assessment must already

taken into consideration the specific form of the

project as apparent from the integrated permit.

It would not be surprising if the effects of the

project on the environment had changed as compared with

the environmental impact assessment. The Landfill

Directive adopted only in the year of the decision on

the environmental impact, but the requirements of that

Directive had to be complied with for the purposes of

the integrated permit." And so on.

At the next paragraph she identifies another issue

which had arisen since the EIA had been carried out.

She says:

"Furthermore, since the environmental impact assessment

the town of Pezinok has changed its development plans.

Consequently, the possibility cannot, in particular, be

ruled out that the environmental effects of the

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landfill project need to be reevaluated with regard to

changes to the use of neighbouring areas which have not

yet been taken into account. Such uses could be more

sensitive ass regards the effect of a landfill or could

intensify the cumulative effects compared to the

original assessment."

Perfectly understandable in circumstances where the

development consent had yet to be issued in that case.

Then at 132:

"However, intensified cumulative effects might also

result from the fact that the existing Pezinok landfill

site was not closed in 2001, as had been assumed in

environmental impact assessment, but had continued in

use until 31 October 2007, possibly even for longer.

As a consequence of this, the previous impact upon the

area could have increased."

Again perfectly understandable on the facts of that

case; the facts being utterly different to the present

case.

She then goes on to deal with a separate issue, which

is public participation in the decision whether an

older environmental impact assessment is still

sufficient. Again, that arose in the context of the

facts before her where what was in issue was a

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significant gap in time which doesn't exist in the

present case, between the carrying out of an EIA and

the issue of a development consent. But even in this

context it is, I think, of some significance that the

Advocate General took the view that there is no

mandatory requirement for public participation although

obviously the competent authority could decide for

itself as to whether it should invite public

participation.

She identifies a number of, I suppose, significant

concerns that have to be borne in mind in considering

whether public participation should be required. In

paragraph 134 she says:

"In that regard, it must be noted that the updating

assessment should determine whether repeat public

participation is necessary."

She identifies "the interests in effective and

administrative proceedings must be balanced against the

rights of the public. Public participation would make

the procedure more cumbersome, especially since in the

course of a permit procedure it would possibly be

necessary to examine, on more than one occasion,

whether the environmental impact assessment is

sufficiently up-to-date following changes in

circumstances which have occurred in the meantime."

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Then she says, she identifies at the next paragraph

that even if there is no public participation, the

public is not left without rights. Obviously there is

the right, as there is in this case, to challenge the

decision by judicial review.

She says at paragraph 136:

"These principles must apply to an updating assessment,

since it is also aimed at identifying significant

effects on the environment which have not yet been

sufficiently assessed. Subject to that proviso, it

should be left to the Member States to determine

whether and, where appropriate, to what extent they

involve the public in the updating decision."

That is obviously of significance in the context of

some of the arguments which the Applicant seeks to put

before you, although, as I said, our main submission in

relation to that case is that it isn't relevant in

circumstances where, on the facts it's quite clear that

there was an EIA, a very significant gap between the

EIA being carried out and the relevant development

consent. It doesn't deal, at all, with the issue that

was dealt with in Pro-Baine about the duration of the

development consent. Pro-Baine is, in fact, a

subsequent decision to that and in my respectful

submission Pro-Baine and Wells are the relevant

decisions that the Court has to bear in mind in the

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context of development consent as opposed to the

particular circumstances which arose in Krizan.

Just for completeness, I'm not sure a whole lot turns

on it but in the booklet we handed up last Friday we

included the new 2014 Directive and, I suppose, going

back to the observations of the Advocate General in the

Krizan case where she said that there is no

provision -- what was the language that she used? She

says at paragraph 126:

"The EIA Directive does not expressly govern whether

the validity of an assessment which is adequate in

terms of its content can be prolonged."

You now have, at page 11 of the new Directive, you have

a new provision, Article 8A and -- sorry, a new version

of Article 8A, there was Article 8A in the 2011

Directive as well. But it contains a new provision in

paragraph 6 as you will see. If you look at paragraph

6, which is at page 12, it says:

"The competent authority shall be satisfied that the

recent conclusion referred to in

Article 1(2)(g)(iv)..."

That's the EIA conclusion.

"...or any of the decisions referred to in paragraph 3

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of this article, is still up-to-date when taking a

decision to grant development consent."

So the legislature in Europe obviously thought there

was a gap, there may well have been, this was

introduced after the opinion of the Advocate General

has been issued in Krizan. But if you look at the next

sentence you'll see that the legislature has decided to

leave it up to the Member States as to whether they

should set a timeframe for an EIA. You will see:

"To that effect, Member States may set timeframes for

the validity or the recent conclusion referred to in

Article 1(2)(g)(iv) were any of the decisions referred

to in paragraph 3 of this article."

So the legislature didn't think it was incumbent on

Member States, or that it should be made compulsory for

Member States to introduce a timeframe or limited

timeframe for the duration of an EIA which I think is

certainly informative for present purposes. I don't

think I need to put it any higher than that.

I want to turn in a moment to deal with the Habitats

Directive very briefly, but just before I do that,

there is an issue which I think I should address for

completeness. I don't believe it arises in this case.

It's put forward very much as a subsidiary position on

the part of the State but I think it's something that

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the Court needs to be aware of. It is something I'm

sure the Court is already aware of, which is what it is

sometimes referred to as a duty of consistent

interpretation or conforming interpretation. It's a

bit like the in the European context a bit like the

East Donegal principle that one can interpret a statute

in a particular way to give effect to constitutional

rights. If the Court is against the State on all of

the arguments we have sought to make it in relation to

the EIA Directive and indeed the same will apply to the

Habitats Directive, we would draw attention to the duty

of consistent interpretation and suggest that, just as

in East Donegal, one can take the approach that one can

interpret provisions of national law in a way that will

allow them to be consistent with European law.

I emphasise again I mention this solely for completion,

completeness, because I don't believe that it arises

but I do think I have an obligation to bring that to

the Court's attention when dealing with the law.

Obviously it doesn't apply where the ability to

interpret the section in accordance with European law

would be utterly inconsistent with the provisions of

the section and I think a similar principle applies in

the constitutional context. But that's solely for the

sake of completeness.

Can I then just turn to the Habitats Directive. I

won't spend long on this. I've already dealt with the

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collateral attack issue and I'm not going to say

anything further about that. I rely on the

observations of this Court in Harrington and what this

Court said about that. As in the case of the EIA we

say that no issue arises in relation to the section 42

of the Habitats Directive because section 42 does not,

in any way, alter the project in issue. What

Article 6(3) requires is that before development

consent is given for a project, that the project must

be subject to an AA in those cases where an adverse

impact on a protected site or a protected species

cannot be ruled out. But there's no separate

requirement to carry out an AA where all that is done

is to extend the duration of the planning permission.

We make the same arguments in relation to that as I

have sought to do in relation to the EIA issue. But

leaving all that aside, in our submission the issue of

appropriate assessment simply doesn't arise on the

facts of this case because all you have before you are

assertions - very bald assertions if one looks at the

pleadings or the affidavits - that there will be an

impact on protected sites some kilometres away from the

runway. But in our submission mere assertion of that

kind is not sufficient. One must put evidence before

the Court to engage or to suggest that Article 6 is in

fact engaged.

I want to draw your attention, if I may, to a decision

that Mr. Valentine has drawn to our attention, a

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decision of An Taisce -v- An Bord Pleanála. It's a

decision which I'm going to hand in now. (SAME HANDED)

I'm sorry to hand it in loose but we have punched it so

it can be slotted into a book. I just want to ensure

that we all have copies of it. It's a decision which

you'll see, which like the present proceedings, were

two sets of proceedings which were heard together by

Mr. Justice White. They were proceedings brought by

An Taisce on the one hand and by Friends of the Irish

Environment on the other and they both related to a

decision by An Bord Pleanála to allow a development in

the nature of a power plant, a peat and biomass power

plant to proceed in County Offaly, presumably somewhere

on the Bog of Allen. Just to identify the relief that

was sought by, it's really the Friends because like in

the present case you'll see the relief that is sought

by the Friends at page 3 of the judgment, you'll see

that Mr. Justice White there at paragraph 3 identifies

that they sought, as one would expect, an order of

certiorari but you'll see then at (ii):

"A declaration by way of application for judicial

review that the effects of extracting the peat fuel

source for the thermal power plant were not properly

assessed for the purposes of the Habitats Directive;

and

(iii) A declaration that the First and Second

Respondents have failed to fulfil their obligations

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pursuant to Article 6 of the Habitats Directive to

establish necessary conversation measures and to avoid

deterioration of natural habitats and disturbance of

species in Natura 2000 sites.

(iv) A declaration by way of application for judicial

review that the First Named Respondent is obliged to

conduct an appropriate assessment pursuant to Article 6

of Habitats Directive in respect of the peat extraction

works that will occur directly or indirectly as a

result of the proposed development."

So the relief that was being sought in those

proceedings very similar to the relief that is being

assault in the present proceedings.

If you then turn to page 10 you'll see

Mr. Justice White drawing attention at paragraph 17 to

an issue which I dealt with on Friday, this is at

paragraph 17:

"This Court is bound by the parameters of the orders of

Mr. Justice Peart granting leave to bring the judicial

review proceedings. This Court has no jurisdiction to

impugn the IPPC licences granted in respect of the peat

extraction from the relevant bogs, nor is a collateral

attack on the legality of these licences permitted.

It does not have jurisdiction to determine if the peat

extraction is exempted development, because that issue

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69

is outside the parameters of the leave orders."

If you then turn to the next page, page 11, paragraph

24 Mr. Justice White says:

"The evidential burden on the Second Applicant is

different. The Applicant is relying on the provisions

of a separate Directive..."

That's the Habitats Directive. This Applicant is the

Friends he's talking about now.

"...on the conservation of natural habitats of wildlife

and flora in special areas of conservation. It submits

that the extraction of peat on the bogs supplying the

power plant is likely to have significant effects on

the River Barrow and River Nore, special area of

conservation and the River Boyne special area of

conservation."

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Did the Supreme Court just say

in, is it one of the wind farm cases that went before

them, I think it was a lay litigant, and leave was

granted on a particular basis and the lay litigant

wanted to raise other points, did the Supreme Court not

just say: 'Well, that's all right you can go a little

bit beyond what the leave says'?

MR. McDONALD: I am not personally familiar with the

judgment but it may be that other people in court are

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familiar with it and will be able to address that. I'm

conscious that my Friends have yet to speak. I've gone

first, but I'm not naturally the first person to go

first.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I think it is very recent and

you'll be pleased to hear in the middle of the storm

yesterday I was flicking through courts.ie.

MR. McDONALD: I'm glad you had an internet connection

yesterday, I think quite a lot of the country had the

internet down.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: True.

MR. McDONALD: In any event, no, I'm personally not

familiar with it and I should be familiar with it, of

course, Judge, I'm really sorry that I'm not.

Hopefully it can be addressed by one of my Friends in

the course of their observations. I suppose there may

be a difference between a lay litigant on the one hand

and a legally represented litigant on another. Courts

have traditionally provided a degree of leeway to lay

litigants for understandable reasons. Of course I

don't know the underlying facts of the case but, in any

event, I'm sure it will be addressed by one of my

Friends and my apologies that I'm not personally

familiar with it.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: No, no, not at all. Thank you

very much.

MR. McDONALD: If I can ask the Court to turn to page

12 because this is the more relevant issue, the

evidential burden on the Friends and I've already

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opened, I think, paragraph 24 where they were making an

assertion which is very similar to the assertion in the

present case, that there will be an adverse or there

may be an adverse impact on the particular special

areas of conservation. If you look at the top of page

12, paragraph 25:

"The Second Applicant relies on the affidavit of David

Healey, an environmental consultant sworn on 22nd

January 2014, which exhibits the Respondent's

inspector's report, a written submission of Friends of

the Irish Environment of 12th August 2013, to the

Respondent, a site synopsis of the River Barrow and

River Nore, special area of conservation, a site

synopsis of the River Boyne and Blackwater SAC, and the

National Parks and Wildlife Service Conservation

Objects, River Barrow and River Nore SAC."

Something which hasn't been done by any of the parties

in the present proceedings.

"26. There is also a reference to the Inspector's

report to the Long Derries special area of

conservation.

27. The Respondent's inspector's report refers to the

River Barrow and River Nore SAC and notes, that it is

located circa 14km to the south of the power plant and

that the Long Derries special area of conservation is

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72

located circa 5.2km to the north east of the power

plant."

We've had similar observations made in the present case

about the proximity by a number of kilometres of the

runway to certain special areas of conservation.

Then at 28:

"The Respondent supported by the First and Second

Notice Parties has argued that the Applicant has failed

to adduce any evidence to support its contention and

relies.." on the judgment of Mr. Justice O'Neill in

Harrington -v- An Bord Pleanála."

If you then turn to page 29 of the judgment you'll see

how Mr. Justice White deals with that issue. In my

respectful submission the observations he makes in

relation to the failure of the Applicants in the

present case to discharge the evidential burden on them

in relation to the Habitats Directive apply equally

here. You'll see at paragraph 75 of the judgment at

page 29:

"The Court has serious concerns about the application

of the Second Applicant."

Which was the Friends.

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"Order 84, rule 20(3) of the Rules of the Superior

Courts requires an applicant for judicial review to

state his or her grounds..."

He quotes that provision. Then he quotes Harrington.

You will see what Mr. Justice O'Neill in Harrington

said. Mr. Justice O'Neill said:

"There is no doubt that the procedure in this judicial

review is undoubtedly adversarial, and the onus of

proof resting upon the Applicant in these proceedings

is well-settled. The foregoing dicta from the cases of

O'Keeffe -v- An Bord Pleanála, Westin -v- An Bord

Pleanála and Lancefort Ltd. -v- An Bord Pleanála

clearly establishes that the Applicant carries the

burden of proof of establishing the grounds in respect

of which leave for judicial review was granted.

46. ...the Applicant failed to adduce any evidence

whatsoever to support her contention that the site in

question was a priority habitat, warranting, on the

basis of the 'precautionary principle', the elimination

of 'scientific doubt' by the carrying out of an

independent ecological assessment. Thus, on these

judicial review proceedings, I am quite satisfied that

the Applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proof

resting on her to establish that the Respondent failed

in its legal duty, as she contends, in that regard.'

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I have already differentiated between the nature of the

application of the First Applicant and Second Applicant

and referred to the documents relied on by the Second

Applicant in advancing the reliefs for judicial review.

I am not satisfied with the assertion if the affidavit

of David Healey at paragraph 9 of his affidavit sworn

on 22nd January, 2014. This assertion is relied on in

the written legal submissions of the Second

Applicant...

I have already emphasised that the submissions made by

the Second Applicant relate to further downstream

consequences of the extraction of peat on the

designated peat bogs. The only documents generated by

the Second Applicant, other than the inspector's report

and the National Parks and Wildlife Service

Conservation objectives are the submission to An Bord

Pleanála ... the two site synopsis documents which I

presume have been prepared by Mr. Healey but that is

not clear.

The first Respondent has objected to the application

based on the dicta of Mr. Justice O'Neill, the Second

Respondent has relied on the provisions of the Rules of

the Superior Courts and that no case has been made

out..."

Then at 81:

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"The Second Applicant falls substantially short of the

standard I would expect to sustain its argument. I

accept that it may not be well resourced financially

but that does not excuse its failure to put before the

Court cogent material by way of expert analysis on

affidavit of the case it is making about the Habitats

Directive.

I am not satisfied to grant the relief sought."

I do suggest, Judge, that there is a similar lack of

not just cogent evidence but any evidence in the

present case to support the bald assertions which have

been are made that there's a risk to the protected

sites or to any protected species. And in my

respectful submission, in those circumstances, the

issue in relation to the Habitats Directive should fall

away.

Just two very brief --

MR. HEALY: Just before my Friend leaves that point,

because he may wish to say something further about it,

there is one feature of the case which I think is

relevant in this context and that is that whereas I

would hope to be able to rely upon the evidence such as

it is in the affidavits, in the High Court I did seek

to adduce additional evidence relating to environmental

matters and that was ruled out and I contemplated

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76

appealing it but my clients decided that they wanted

this thing brought to an end and there's a limit to

their resources. But what is significant is that the

State, in the High, Court submitted that the evidence I

wished to adduce was irrelevant, whereas now the State

contends that the evidence I wish to adduce is vital.

MR. McDONALD: With respect, I never made that

argument. Absolutely never made that argument. What I

will suggested to Mr. Justice McGovern was that it was

unacceptable that an applicant, in proceedings of this

kind in the Commercial Court, should seek to adduce

further evidence after the date for filing of evidence

by all parties had passed because the effect of that

would be that all of the parties would have to deal

with that evidence and the date for hearing of these

proceedings, which was, as the Court knows, at the very

beginning of term, could not have proceeded. That was

the argument that I made.

MR. HEALY: In fairness to my Friend, Judge,

Mr. Collins tells me that it was Mr. Justice McGovern

ruled it out as irrelevant and that my Friend's

submission is as he has just put it.

MR. McDONALD: Yes, absolutely. That is the submission

that I made. But even if that affidavit was before

you, all it does, as in the case that Mr. Justice White

dealt with, is to draw attention to the existence of

the SACs. It doesn't, in fact, provide any evidence,

at all, to suggest that there is a risk to those SACs.

So you are in precisely the same, even if that

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77

affidavit was before you, you would be in precisely the

same position as Mr. Justice White. What I was

observing was that on the basis of the evidence before

the Court they don't even go that far, whereas they

didn't even, on the basis of the evidence which this

Court has before it, they didn't even exhibit any of

the relevant NPWS objectives in relation to any special

area of conservation, even though all of this is

available on the internet. One doesn't need to be an

expert to find this out.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: If only I had known yesterday!

MR. McDONALD: Yes. Well, I think you could spend

hours trawling through, because there's so many special

areas of conservation and special protection areas.

Each one of them has conservation objectives so you

look at those conservation objectives, you look at the

activity that's proposed and you provide evidence to

the Court as to why that activity is going to interfere

with those objectives, not a very difficult task.

Something which the Applicants here, even on the basis

of the affidavit that has been excluded, did not do.

There were just two further issues then that I wanted

to deal with very briefly. One was the 2011

Regulations which are at tab 12 of Book 1 - I don't

think I need to open to them now - that Mr. Kenny

referred to on Friday and of course the first point I

would make is that, as Mr. Kenny very properly

acknowledged, those regulations are not applicable in

this case in any event so the point that Mr. Kenny

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78

made, in my submission, is simply not relevant. There

is just one other observation I'd make in relation to

them.

The 2011 Regulations are regulations that apply in

relation to activities, even of public bodies. If a

public body like Coillte, for example, wants to carry

out an activity on its land that may join or indeed

even be part of a special area of conservation, it has

a duty under these regulations to carry out a screening

test and an appropriate assessment, where required.

It's understandable, I think, in circumstances where

Coillte, in those circumstances, it doesn't go to

An Bord Pleanála, it doesn't go to a planning

authority, it doesn't have its activity or its

screening activity reviewed by anybody else it just

does it, it's a self-assessment form of screening test.

It is perfectly understandable why the legislature, in

those circumstances, should impose a different

requirement in relation to those kind of public bodies

than it does in circumstances where you have an EIA

being carried out by a planning authority such as

An Bord Pleanála, or a screening assessment being

carried out by An Bord Pleanála, or An Bord Pleanála

deciding whether it has to carried out a screening

assessment at all. Utterly different where you have a

whole ability to have public participation and so on in

those kind of decisions. Utterly different to what

arises under the Regulations. Even if the Regulations

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79

could be said to be relevant, I would submit that there

is a basis as to why the legislature should have taken

a slightly different approach to those regulations than

it does in relation to development consent.

Development consent, of course, is solely governed by

the Planning Acts and the Planning Acts are a separate

and distinct code. So I would distinguish the 2011

Regulations on that basis.

Now the last issue I want to touch on very briefly is

the suggestion which hasn't actually been articulated

in any detail, and I'd have to suggest in the first

instance that if it was to be pursued it should be

articulated and dealt with very carefully and

comprehensively, something which hasn't happened in

this case and that's the question of a possible

reference to the Court of Justice. As I said, if that

was to arise it should have been articulated in some

detail to the Court as to what was the issue of doubt.

In my submission when there is no doubt you look, you

don't have to look beyond, you can look at as many

European Court cases you like, but you don't ultimately

have to look beyond Pro-Baine or Wells. One can see

very clearly from those decisions that what has

happened here is not a development consent because it

doesn't involve either new conditions or new works

beyond what was already approved, to use the language

of Point 13 of Annex II of the Directive.

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So we say this is irrelevant. No need to make a

reference in those circumstances and that one shouldn't

be seduced by the notion of making a reference to the

Court of Justice. There is, I think, in the James

Elliott case, the James Elliott -v- Irish Asphalt, an

observation by Mr. Justice O'Donnell in the course of

his judgment, which judgment I acknowledge ultimately

did make a reference to Europe where he said, you know,

there's almost a desire on the part of parties before a

court to cloud what is otherwise clear law in the hope

that the Court will be persuaded to make a reference.

There's a temptation on the part of parties before a

court to try to cloud what is the law and to try to

suggest there is a doubt when there is in fact no

doubt.

For the reasons which I have sought to identify, I

would respectfully suggest there is no doubt in this

case and that in those circumstances no issue of a

reference should arise, even if it had been

articulated, which of course it has not.

With the Court's permission Mr. Toland is going to deal

with the remaining issues in the case. Those are my

submissions.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.

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SUBMISSION BY MR. TOLAND:

MR. TOLAND: Judge, Mr. McDonald has dealt with the

facts of the case; he's also dealt with the case law on

section 42; he's dealt with the law concerning

environmental impact assessments and appropriate

assessments; and obviously the consequential EU rights

for public participation. So I'll do my best not to

repeat Mr. McDonald's submissions, nor to reopen

authorities which have been canvassed by various

parties.

I'll be dealing solely with the claims under the

Constitution. As the Applicants did not appear to

substantially advance the EU, the Convention and the

Charter claims, nor have they relied on any authorities

to that effect, I propose, with the Court's permission,

to rely on our written submissions in that respect.

Mr. McDonald summarised our submissions on the

Applicants' constitutional claims. With regard to the

claims under the Constitution, as they have been

refined and articulated at oral hearing they appear to

be as follows. Firstly, the constitutional claim

brought on behalf of the Merriman Applicants that they

enjoy a constitutional right to fair procedures such

that they were entitled to make a submission to Fingal

County Council on the DAA's application for an

extension. My principal submissions on this can be

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summarised as follows: First, no right to fair

procedures was engaged. The Applicants' interest in an

Extension Decision is not of a sufficiently substantial

nature to engage the right to fair procedures. In

particular, even if it's the case that the Applicants

enjoy a class of interest by reason that they fall

within a particular condition, Condition 9 of the

planning permission - and that's a matter the State is

a stranger to - it is not a material giving a

potentially adverse affect, having regard to the

opportunity for prior participation by the Applicants

in the planning permission process, and the limited

discretion to be exercised by Fingal County Council.

We say that there is no aspect of Fingal County

Council's discretion under section 42, which concerns

the Merriman Applicants' particular interests.

Second, even if third parties in the position of the

Merriman Applicants do enjoy a right to fair

procedures, we say that the Oireachtas proportionately

limited that right for the same reasons we say the

right wasn't engaged.

Thirdly, as Mr. McDonald has just adverted to the

principle of East Donegal, even if this Court considers

the Constitution required the Merriman Applicants to be

afforded such a right, the well-established doctrine of

consistent interpretation would mean section 42 is not

unconstitutional.

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83

The second constitutional claim is that of Friends of

the Environment and their claim effectively to a right

to public participation under the Irish Constitution.

Quite simply in respect of that I'd say that neither in

their written nor their oral submissions have they

advanced any argument, or any authority for the

proposition of a freestanding constitutional right to

make a submission. Insofar as it is said to derive

from the constitutional right to fair procedures I say

it runs against all authority to say that the

constitutional right to fair procedures would be

afforded to third parties with no material interest

whatsoever. The right of public participation is one

granted by statute, not the Constitution.

The third constitutional claim is that of Friends of

the Irish Environment. That an unenumerated right to

the environment is a personal right, enjoyed by its or

its members, under the Constitution and that the

Extension Decision infringes that right by reason of

the possible omissions.

I say, firstly, that the Applicants' rights or claimed

right is not specific. It doesn't lead to a remedy and

so is not capable of adjudication; secondly, no

evidence has been adduced save in the most general

terms; third, the case law is clear that a very high

threshold must be reached before judicial discernment

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84

of further unenumerated rights; fourth, Friends of the

Irish Environment have advanced no recognised method of

constitutional interpretation suitable to discern this

particular right; and fifth, policy, with respect to

the environment, properly falls to the legislature. In

respect of the standing of the Friends of the Irish

Environment, which was discussed with my Friend, we

rely on our written submissions.

So turning firstly to the Merriman claim, or the claim

to public participation. Mr. McDonald has taken you

through contents of section 42 and I don't propose to

do that again in any detail. But I would first like to

go over it slightly again.

The Applicants have presented the section 42 decision

as effectively a standalone decision as if it exists

bereft of the rest of the elements of the Planning and

Development Act. Rather, the planning process and the

decision made by the Oireachtas must be considered in

its entirety when considering whether or not the

Applicants' right to fair procedures has been engaged

or infringed.

First, Mr. McDonald has taken you through the overall

purpose of section 42 and has brought you through the

pre-existing case law on section 42.

Second, a section 42 application takes place in

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85

circumstances where works have been commenced. A

process is in being. A development has started. There

is an engaged right of the developer. He has expended

monies at that point. There is a very limited role

under section 42 for discretion of the Planning

Authority. I'll come on to that in more detail.

Third, the Extension Decision takes place in the

context of the prior planning process, including public

participation with the point of development plans, the

planning application, the appeal to An Bord Pleanála.

This isn't just a theoretical or statutory right which

they do enjoy, it is one these Applicants have availed

of, as Mr. McDonald took you through. They fully

participated in the planning process, providing

extensive written submissions, oral submissions,

supported by additional documentation, videos and

PowerPoint presentations. There were Council present

during these representations. So on that there has

been very extensive public participation afforded by

the Act itself.

Fourth, there were many opportunities to judicially

review that permission and its conditions.

What we have here, at the point of section 42 and at

the point of extension of that decision is not a review

of any of those conditions, and that's admitted by my

Friends. It is simply an application to extend based

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86

on certain specified criteria in section 42.

We say that the decision-maker had either no discretion

whatsoever or very limited discretion on the conditions

under the planning permission. He is confined to the

matters specified in section 42, as the Court found in

the McDowell case which my Friend opened. He cannot go

beyond section 42 and trespass upon the original


So what is that discretion under section 42 if it

exists? Firstly, under the first condition it is an

assessment of whether or not there are considerations

of a commercial, economic or technical nature beyond

the control of the Applicants which substantially

militated against either the commencement or

development of the carrying out of substantial works

pursuant to the permission. We say that's quite

clearly a matter wholly within the knowledge of the

Applicants' developer and wholly a matter for the

review and decision by the Planning Authority in

question. It is not something that can be aided by

debate and discussion amongst third parties, or at

least it is appropriate that the Oireachtas adjudicated

that that was not necessary.

Secondly, that there are no significant changes in the

development objectives in the development plans,

regional development objectives, and the regional and

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87

spatial economic strategy for the area of the Planning

Authority since the date of the permission such that

the development would no longer be consistent with the


area. We say that all this is is an essential check

that the development objectives have remained

unchanged. As my Friend, Mr. McDonald, took you to on

Friday, there have been objectives in relation to a

North Runway for some considerable period of time.

This statutory check is limited and wholly within the

competence of the Planning Authority. My Friends have

adduced no evidence to suggest that the development

objectives were in any way changed. That's something

I'll return to.

In respect of planning, again, the third condition is

that the development would not be inconsistent with the

proper planning and sustainable development of the area

having regard to any guidelines issued by the Minister,

notwithstanding that they were so issued after the date

of granted permission in relation to which an

application is made. And it was under this that the

flood risk assessment was produced by the Dublin

Airport Authority. This, however, again is a rather

narrow provision. It is not a provision that asks the

Planning Authority to look in toto at the proper

planning and development and sustainable development of

the area. It is simply to check whether or not,

essentially subsequent Ministerial Guidelines, but on

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88

the face of it, all Ministerial Guidelines are such

that the development would not be inconsistent with the

proper planning and development having regard to them.

That's simply because given an elapse of time, there

may be subsequent guidelines that pertain. But that is

a check, it is not a reopening of all matters to do

with the proper planning and sustainable development.

As Mr. McDonald pointed out to you, with respect to the

only Ministerial Guideline that exists that is relevant

on flood risk assessment, the substance was previously

considered in the planning permission and it took

essentially a very different form but the content was,

notwithstanding, the same.

Leaving aside the particular decision which is made,

looking at the statute and the statutory discretion, it

is very limited for the Planning Authority and one

which is wholly within the competence of that Planning

Authority.

Fourthly, where the development has not commenced, that

an environmental impact assessment or an appropriate

assessment or both of those assessments, if required,

also were carried out before the permission was

granted. That's very much a matter of fact. Was the

development commenced? And after that was the EIA or

AA conducted? Those are very simple matters of fact

upon which no submissions are required. In fact - and

Mr. McDonald has opened the case law applicable

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primarily case law which resulted from consideration of

the original section 42, Section 42(1) which considers

substantial works being carried out. That is surely

far more of a discretionary consideration than the

simple fact of whether or not they have been commenced

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: When do you say the development

was commenced?

MR. TOLAND: As Ireland we are strangers to the

particular facts but we understand that from the

pleadings that it was commenced, I think my Friend put

it, some nine days working days prior to the

application being made. The application for extension.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, as Ireland would you

consider the removal of 327kg of asbestos to be

substantial works?

MR. TOLAND: We would consider the decision by the

Planning Authority as to whether or not works had been

commenced to be wholly a matter for that authority and

if this was a challenge to the decision, substantively

as to whether or not works would commence, that would

be an entirely different matter, but quite simply this

is a matter as to whether or not section 42 provides

the Planning Authority to make a decision on whether or

not works have been commenced and whether or not it is

for third parties to make submissions on that fact.

But if the third parties in question rather chose to

judicially review the decision on the basis that the

works had not in fact been commenced, that would be an

entirely different matter and they are not making that

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case. That is something which I will come back to

because in circumstances where they're not making that

case, but simply saying that they would like an

opportunity to have made submissions on that fact, we

say that's not enough at this stage. I will come back

to that, Judge.

A further point with regard to the fourth point and it

actually ties into what you were saying, is that in

their original submission, the submission that Fingal

County Council are considered not to have accepted,

they simply said, we understand some works have taken

place to date, although they cannot be considered as

substantial works. They don't challenge commencement

of the works. And then their sole submissions are:

"It is our submission that no environmental impact

assessment, no screening for appropriate assessment and

no appropriate assessment accompanied this extension

application and this is contrary to the old EIA

Directive. This development in question will have

impacts upon the surrounding community and there has

been no assessment of the potential issues which arise

since the initial permission was granted nearly ten

years ago, which is contrary to EU law."

Now, insofar as that submission referred to any aspect

of these considerations under section 42, I say that it

is primarily about our submission that no EIA or AA,

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screening for AA or AA has been conducted. It is

therefore about the second part of the fourth section.

It is not a challenge to commencement. If you wish to

construe the words that they cannot be considered as

substantial works, is a challenge to commencement,

that's certainly possible but that is not the form that

submission took. So the language that it used.

But fundamentally we would say that the reason why,

under section 42, third parties are not entitled to

make submissions on this point is that that

adjudication is solely a matter for the Planning

Authority upon the application of the developer. It's

up to the developer to prove that the commencement has

taken place and it's up to the Planning Authority to

decided whether or not that has taken place. It is not

something which is within the material interests of

third parties as to whether or not the commencement has

in fact taken place.

One point which Mr. Healy made was that the Applicants

contend they don't challenge the planning permission

that this is not the collateral attack which, in our

submissions, we had said. Instead, they wished merely

an opportunity to make a submission.

If that were the case, the sole infringement of the

rights that they claim is not the infringement caused

by the development in question, but rather of the

extension of time for its building. However, the time

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afforded doesn't form any part of the statutory

criteria for assessment. Subsection (1) provides that:

"The Planning Authority shall extend the period by any

such additional period, not exceeding five years, as

the authority considering requisite to enable the

development to which the permission relates to be

completed."

It is that element of discretion is the limit. The

statutory discretion is solely about whether the

development can be completed in that time. It is not a

discretion which takes into account any external factor

such as impact on residents, et cetera. That is not

the decision before the Planning Authority. So,

therefore, the Oireachtas exclude third parties from

that consideration.

Judge, I won't be opening many authorities to you but I

will be reopening Dellway. I hope not to reopen many

of the passages which my Friend, Mr. Healy, has taken

us through but I will be focusing on one passage in

particular. So if you could turn, Judge, to Book 2,

tab 37 you'll be quite familiar with Dellway at this

point. I think if we just stay at the headnote for the

time being. But before turning to any legal analysis

I'd just like to set the Court's considerations in

Dellway in some context. The context arising from the

facts of Dellway. Section 84 of the NAMA Act, and it

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is set out here on page 2 of the headnote:

"NAMA may acquire an eligible bank asset of a

participating institution if NAMA considers it

necessarily for desirable to do so having regard to the

purposes of this Act and in particular the resources

available to the Minister.

NAMA is not obliged to acquire any particular, or any,

eligible bank asset of such an institution on any

grounds."

The second subsection is:

"For the avoidance of doubt, NAMA may acquire, from a

participating institution, performing or non-performing

eligible bank assets..."

The fourth subsection:

"Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1),

NAMA may, in deciding whether to acquire a particular

bank asset take, into account..."

Then there are a large number of factors here which

NAMA may take into account. Then you go down to (n):

"Any other matter that NAMA considers relevant."

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"Section 87 of the Act provides that when NAMA has

identified an eligible bank asset that it proposes to

acquire, NAMA shall serve on the institution a schedule

(referred to as an 'acquisition schedule')."

Then the following paragraph in the headnote:

"A participating institution may object to the proposed

acquisition of a bank asset if it is of the opinion

that a bank asset is not an eligible bank asset. There

is no express provision for objection by a borrower

whose loan was deemed an eligible bank asset."

So in looking at Section 84, it permitted NAMA to

selectively acquire the loan book of Mr. McKillen and

his associated companies. Considerable discretion was

given to NAMA as to whether or not it chose to acquire

that eligible bank asset if NAMA considers it necessary

or desirable, and considerable discretion is given on

the criteria such that they are non-exhaustive. They

indeed even are prefaced by saying that NAMA may take

them into account.

Banks can object only if they are of the opinion that

the bank asset was not an eligible bank asset. Now,

they are given a say but additionally, they're not

given much of a say. But no objection by the borrowers

was permitted.

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95

The consequence of that was that with the various

statutory powers afforded to NAMA, it could control the

operation of and sell Mr. McKillen's businesses and

property.

If you go to number 7 in the Supreme Court headnote at

page 15:

"That NAMA had statutory powers a bank did not have.

It was a work-out vehicle with an expected lifespan of

seven to ten years and a core commercial objective of

recovering for the taxpayer whatever it had paid for

the loans. There was an expectation that a commercial

bank would renew an expired credit facility whereas

NAMA would be likely to rely on their legal expiry to

call in loans."

So a fundamental difference here between the contract

Mr. McKillen had entered into with the banks and the

regime to which he would now be subject. Obviously

that regime operated for important reasons of national

stability.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I would like to see what my bank

would say if I walked in with that expectation!

MR. TOLAND: I dread to think what mine would! I'm not

proposing to open it but I will read out what Chief

Justice Murray said on that:

"In short the Applicants would be deprived of the

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96

right..."

This is at paragraphs 47 and 48 of his judgment at page

207.

"In short the Applicants would be deprived of the right

to deal with their property portfolio and associated

loan contracts as they judge fit in the ordinary way on

the commercial market, even if subject to any

vicissitudes of current market conditions. Again as

Finnegan J. pointed out there is a risk that properties

could be sold by NAMA in circumstances disadvantageous

to the Applicants in a way which could not be done by a

mortgagor exercising a power of sale.

48. It is in that sense that I consider that there is

a real risk that the property rights and interests may

be directed affected by any decision of NAMA pursuant

to Section 84 of the Act and for that reason they

should have the right to make representations to NAMA."

That is the salient point in this judgment "directly

affected by any decision of NAMA such that their

property rights and interests may be directly

affected." A real risk.

Leaving aside the legal consideration of whether or not

the Plaintiffs in that case enjoyed a legal right in

the bank's interests in their loans, this was, in

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97

reality, as strong an attack on the property rights and

right to earn a livelihood of Mr. McKillen and his

associated companies, as one could possibly imagine,

short of direct expropriation of the property itself.

This attack is the one upon which Mr. McKillen did not

enjoy a right to make submissions and it is in that

context that the Court's considerations in Dellway must

viewed.

I say that the position of Ms. Merriman and her fellow

Applicants is quite different. First, the discretion

to be exercised is different under Section 84, as I

just said, NAMA had a substantive choice to make about

the selection of assets. As Mr. McDonald and I have

outlined, the discretion left to the Planning Authority

on the Extension Decision is very limited indeed.

Second, unlike the situation in NAMA, there has been

extensive opportunity for public participation in the

planning permission and subsequent appeal. The fact

that the statute does not provide in section 42 for a

right of participation is because the statutory scheme

is provided for elsewhere. Third, the interests of

Mr. McKillen and his companies were adversely or

materially adversely affected by the decision. And his

proposed submissions would clearly be directly related

to this adverse affect on his rights.

Here, however, even if one takes the high point of the

Applicants' submissions, not only is the material

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98

affect significantly lower, there is no aspect of the

discretionary element of the decision which the

Applicants have a direct material interest in

commenting upon.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: So you're saying they can't

comment on the elements even though they're affected by

the outcome?

MR. TOLAND: Yes, Judge. That those elements are not

elements which concern them. I also say that in terms

of being affected by the outcome, the parties may

differ on that point, fundamentally this all goes back

to the planning permission and it creates the affects

but the point I'm making now is about the element of

discretion and how an applicant has no right to comment

on issues which it cannot effect. It's not sufficient

merely that the Applicants have a material interest in

the submission at large and that that itself triggers

submissions in respect of other aspects such as the

commercial interests of the Dublin Airport Authority,

or matters distinctly separate in the assessment of

planning and proper planning and sustainable

development of the area. As Mr. Healy noted, it's

because of Condition 9 that he finds his client's

interest, for his part, a condition he acknowledges the

statute precludes the Planning Authority from varying

in the Extension Decision. Condition 9 remains.

Fourth, as I previously opened, the Applicants sought

only to make submissions in respect of an EIA/AA, that

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99

fourth condition. They didn't seek to make

submissions, nor do they seek now to challenge, as I

was saying earlier, the Planning Authority's

application of the statutory criteria such as the flood

risk assessment or the economic rationale for the

airport. Even if the Applicants did enjoy a right to

fair procedures they have not established that one is

engaged in this case.

I can take the Court, if you permit me about ten

minutes to go through the judgment of Mr. Justice

Fennelly in Dellway. Each member of the Supreme Court

delivered their own judgment. It's hard to discern an

absolutely clear reason for the decision. Each judge

differed. But I think what's quite helpful in terms of

assessing the overall decision of the Supreme Court is

the headnote itself.

If you turn to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Supreme Court

headnote at page 12 of the headnote. This is the

Supreme Court's decision in respect of fair procedures

point.

"Held by the Supreme Court in granting a declaration

that the Applicants were entitled to be informed by

NAMA of any intention to consider the making of a

decision to acquire any eligible bank assets related to

their credit facilities with the participating banks so

as to afford them an opportunity of making appropriate

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100

submissions to NAMA concerning such a proposed

decision, 1, that the criteria for assessing whether

fair procedures required a person to be heard before a

decision was made included the nature of the decision,

the nature of the statutory scheme, the importance of

the decision to the person invoking the right and the

choice of the procedure adopted by the decision-maker.

There might be other relevant criteria such as

legitimate expectation. The test was whether or not a

person's rights were affected by the proposed

decision."

This language, you'll recall, was that of Ms. Justice

Macken, as Mr. Healy read into the record on Thursday.

The second provision here:

"That a person, whose interests were capable of being

directly affected in a material way by a decision,

should be allowed to put forward reasons as to why the

decision should not be made or that the decision not

take a particular form, even if that decision was

justifiable in the interests of the common good.

However, the mere diminution of property values would

not normally suffice to establish the right to be

heard. The right to be heard before a contemplated

decision was made was not dependent on establishing

interference with a specific and identifiable right.

No distinction should be made between an effect which

modified the legal content of rights and a substantial

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101

effect on the exercise or enjoyment of rights. The

Courts had never laid down rigid rules for determining

when the need to observe fair procedures applied: it

depended on the circumstances and the subject matter.

The fundamental underlying principle was fairness."

This paragraph is a synthesis of the core judgments,

particularly those of Chief Justice Murray, Mr. Justice

Fennelly and Ms. Justice Macken.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: What I'm just struggling with a

little is, you're saying they're not materially

affected but if the planning permission hadn't been

extended the runway wouldn't be built. So how can it

be that their interests are not materially affected? A

runway is now being built?

MR. TOLAND: Yes. The question isn't, however, whether

or not the runway -- whether the Planning Authority had

the ability to decide whether or not the runway ought

to be built. It is fundamentally a matter for planning

permission. What I am saying is that the discretion

afforded to the Planning Authority under section 42 is

extraordinarily limited. You're correct, Judge, that

if the Planning Authority had decided that the Dublin

Airport Authority had not fulfilled the statutory

criteria then they could have refused permission. But

I say it is in the interest of large third parties that

affords them a right to participate in a statutory

procedure. It is, as is summarised by this, about what

the nature of the statutory scheme and the nature of

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102

the decision being made. And, therefore, one has to

look to the type of discretionary matters which are

being decided upon and whether or not the Applicants

had an interest, a material interest such as it would

be adversely affected by a negative decision in those.

Merely because the Extension Decision exists does not

invoke the same rights as pertained in the original

planning permission for participation.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.

MR. TOLAND: If I could take the Court to the decision

of Mr. Justice Fennelly at page 321. Paragraph 433:

"As I have explained, I have decided to consider as a

separate matter whether the Applicants have shown that

their rights or interests are in fact capable of being

affected by a NAMA acquisition decision. I am posing

as a first question, whether NAMA and the State are

correct in their submission that consideration of the

borrower's interest is excluded. I do so, therefore,

the on the hypothesis that Mr. McKillen's interests are

affected.

When the questions is expressed thus, there can only be

one answer. A person whose interests are capable of

being affected by a decision of a public body

exercising its statutory powers is ordinarily entitled

to have notice of the intention to consider the making

of the decision and to have his representations heard

by the decision-maker with regard to those effects."

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103

That is, of course, the general principle. What we are

here concerning is at what point is that right engaged?

Turning then to page 323 to paragraph 442 of

Mr. Justice Fennelly's decision. It is entitled:

"Would a decision to acquire the Applicants' loans have

the potential to affect their interests so as to

entitle them to be heard by NAMA?

I have set out earlier in this judgment the respects in

which the applicants claim that their constitutional

rights are liable to be affected by a NAMA decision to

acquire their loans. The Applicants have analysed

these effects under four principal headings, which I

now repeat:-

1. Effects their underlying properties, i.e. their

constitutionally protected property rights;

2. Effects on the right to income stream from their

properties, i.e. their constitutionally protected right

to earn a livelihood;

3. Effects on their bundle of contractual rights;

4. Effects on their reputation."

These have all previously been considered. I don't

propose to go into it in too much detail. But I do

want to take the Court, after Mr. Justice Fennelly

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104

considers the decision of - I'm never any good with

Irish - MacPharthalain -v- Commissioners of Public

Works. If I take you to paragraph 451 on page 325.

The judgment of the High Court and the Supreme Court

in:

"The judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court

in MacPharthalain -v- Commissioners of Public Works

1992] 1 I.R. 111; [1994] 3 I.R. 353 held that the

decision 'affected the rights' of the Applicants. Does

that mean..."

This is it's question Mr. Justice Fennelly posed:

"Does that mean that the rights themselves have to be

infringed in their legal quality or does it include

cases where the exercise of the rights is rendered more

difficult, less valuable or merely less attractive?

A distinction has to made between decisions addressed

to or closely connected with named or identifiable

individual persons or bodies and decisions made in the

general public interest. The High Court cited the

following passage from the judgment of Costello J. in

Hempenstall -v - Minister of the Environment [1994] 2

I.R. 20 at pp. 28 and 29:-

'...a change in law which has the effect of reducing

property values cannot in itself amount to an

infringement of constitutionally protected property

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105

rights. There are many instances in which legal

changes may adversely affect property values (for

example, new zoning regulations in the planning code

and new legislation relating to the issue of

intoxicating liquor licences) and such changes cannot

be impugned as being constitutionally invalid unless

some invalidity can be shown to exist apart from the

resulting property value diminution.'

We are not here, of course concerned with a legislative

matter. Nonetheless, government and other public

bodies may adopt decisions having general application

which, while they have effects on individuals, do not

impose an obligation on the decision-maker to accord a

hearing to affected persons. Planning authorities

adopt development plans and designate or 'zone' large

areas of land for specified types of use. Such

decisions are more relevant to this case than zoning

regulations, mentioned by Costello J. The legislation

provides its own mechanism for publication and

objection. Decisions may be challenged on judicial

review for want of vires or on other grounds. They do

not, however, require observance of the rule of audi

alteram partem.

I would add that I do not consider that the mere fact

of diminution of property rights would normally suffice

to establish an individual right to be heard. The

decision of a public body to embark on the construction

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106

of a bridge, an airport, sewerage works, a new motorway

or the like may affect many people, in particular by

adversely impacting on property values, but public

consultation rather than individual judicial review is

the preferred and appropriate means of balancing public

and private interests. At any rate, I do not think

that mere adverse effects on property values flowing

from a public law decision can, on its own, trigger the

right. I am prompted to recall the analogy with the

rules of compensation for a compulsory acquisition of

property. The rules make a distinction between

injurious affection caused by what is done on land

taken from the claimant and on land no so taken. In

other words, the claimant has to put up with the

effects of the compulsory purchase order, insofar as

they emerge from land not taken from him."

There's a comment on Ross O'Carroll-Kelly.

"The central, and the most difficult, question in the

appeal concerns whether the right to be afforded fair

procedures in accordance with natural and

constitutional justice depends on the contemplated

decision amounting to an interference with rights, in

the sense of legal rights only, guaranteed by the

Constitution."

Before I pass on to that particular question I would

underline what Mr. Justice Fennelly has said in respect

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107

of the fact, the mere that fact the diminution of

property values is not sufficient.

There is a comment also that pertains to the Planning

Acts which he acknowledges require public participation

at various stages. Whilst this is an individual

decision and an individual decision affecting primarily

the Dublin Airport Authority, so might then be seen as

different from a zoning which would affect a much wider

number of people, the central point that is being made

here is that in not all cases is a right to hearing to

be afforded. It is a matter of degree and it is a

matter of context.

At paragraphs 456 to 458 he considers previously case

law in which notices ought to have been given where

there is in Haughey, a rather direct affect on an

individual. Then at 460 on page 328 he says:

"It does not appear to me that it has been established

that the right to be heard before a contemplated

decision is made depends on establishing interference

with a specific and identifiable legal right. It is

difficult to discern a principled basis for restricting

a right in that way. The courts have never laid down

rigid rules for determining when the need to observe

fair procedures applies. Everything depends on the

circumstances and the subject matter. The fundamental

underlying principle is fairness. If a decision made

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108

concerning me or my property is liable to affect my

interests in a material way, it is fair and reasonable

that I should be allowed to put forward reasons why it

should not be made or should take a particular form.

It would be unjust to exclude me from being heard. For

the purposes of the right to be heard, I would not draw

a sharp line, what is sometimes called a 'bright line',

of distinction between an effect which modifies the

legal content of rights and a substantial effect on the

exercise or enjoyment of rights. I would fully endorse

the first part of the statement of the High Court,

quoted above as follows:-

'The Court is not satisfied any mere possibility that

there might be an indirect consequence for a party's

rights affords the party concerned a right to fair

procedures. There must be a real risk that parties'

rights will be interfered with in the event that there

is an adverse decision.'

The problem is with the interpretation of the following

statement that 'the adverse decision must be such as

would directly interfere with those rights, or at least

any interference must be so closely connected with any

adverse decision so as to warrant that the party

concerned be entitled to invoke a right to fair

procedures'."


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109

"If the requirement is that there be direct

interference with the legal substance of the rights,

the statement is too narrow. It should be capable of

including material practical effects on the exercise

and enjoyment of the rights. Subject to this

qualification, which was crucial to the outcome of the

case in the High Court, I would approve the passage at

paragraph 116..."

If he approves the passage at 116 quoted at paragraph

445 above, taking the Court to paragraph 445, that

passage ends with the statement the approved passage

ends with the statement:

"Obviously, the precise application of that general

principle requires an analysis of the right which it is

said might be interfered with and the manner in which

it is said that an adverse decision would interfere

with that right."

So, Judge, in short, we say that - I appreciate it is

1:00 o'clock but if you don't mind - there must be a

real risk of an adverse interference with a party's

rights, including adverse practical effects to the

parties' exercise and enjoyment of those rights, other

than that of the right to fair procedures itself. This

entails an analysis of the right which it is said must

be interfered. The Applicants rest their right on

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110

Condition 9, which will not change and/or the potential

diminution of the property rights and enjoyment of

their property. The State considers first that the

mere diminution of the property rights is not itself

significant to trigger a right to be heard, as we've

seen in the judgment of Mr. Justice Fennelly and of the

Court itself. And secondly, that Condition 9 is not a

condition which is amenable to change. The interests

to don't attribute. Then it is required under the

approved test there to analyse how an adverse decision

might interfere with that right and this takes into

account, as you saw in the first paragraph of the

headnote effectively quoting Ms. Justice Macken, the

nature of the decision, the nature of the statutory

scheme and the importance of the decision to the

Applicants. And the State says in its submissions

here, that the nature of the decision is such that it

changes nothing as to the property rights or enjoyment

of the Applicants' property, nor have the Applicants

evidenced anything in their submissions that could be

made to influence same. The nature of the statutory

scheme is one involving minimal discretion and one in

which the Applicant has been heard and has had the

opportunity to be heard and to litigate on many

occasions. Insofar as those narrow statutory criteria

are concerned, the importance of the decision is

limited.

I'll take up two further points in respect of Dellway

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111

and its consequences for the Applicants after lunch.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Very good. Sure we'll come back

at 2:00 o'clock. Does that suit?

THE HEARING ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH

THE HEARING CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH AS FOLLOWS:

REGISTRAR: Resumed at hearing in T -v- Fingal County

Council.

MR. TOLAND: Judge, just before lunch I concluded on

the substantive parts of the Dellway judgment,

summarising, in effect, that there must be a real risk

of an adverse interference with the party's rights and

I went on to say what the State's position was with

regard to the nature of the decision changing not just

property rights. But I just wanted to turn you to

discreet issues within this.

Firstly, that we say that there is no evidence advanced

showing an infringement of the Applicants' interest and

if I turn to -- Judge, well you have Dellway open in

front of you. After the principled consideration up to

paragraph 460, which Mr. Justice Fennelly considered,

he then turned to look at the actual effects on the

rights alleged by the Applicants at paragraph 461, as

to:

"Should the court itself assess its strength or weigh

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112

its value? Should the court arrive at a conclusion as

to the likely effects on the applicants’ business of

the NAMA business plan? I do not think it is necessary

for the court to go so far. It suffices, in my view,

that there is an apparently credible body of evidence

that the applicants’ business is likely to be

significantly affected."

"An apparently credible body of evidence that the

applicants’ business is likely to be significantly

affected.".

You might of course link that it was apparent that it

would have been.

"It is not for the court to decide on the weight to be

attached to that evidence or whether it should be

accepted at all. That would be to beg the question

which arises, which is what NAMA should be required to

take it into account when considering in its discretion

to make an acquisition decision."

Again here you see tied together questions of the

evidence required and the discretion to be made, the

discretion to be exercised.

If you turn to paragraph 463, he assesses the business

plan showing that NAMA is a work-out vehicle. And this

is something I referred to earlier just in terms of the

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difference between this case, Dellway, and the instant

case.

"There was a reasonable expectation that existing

expired facilities would be routinely renewed as an

administrative matter..."

That is in normal business lending.

"....whereas NAMA will be able to and is likely to rely

on the legal fact of expiry. In a normal profitable and

performing banking relationship, a lending bank would

not, in practice, rely on breach of loan-to-value

covenants to call in loans. NAMA has a core commercial

objective of recovering for the taxpayer whatever it

has paid for the loans in addition to whatever it has

invested to enhance property assets underlying those

loans. It is expected to have a lifespan of seven to

ten years. This objective is incompatible with Mr.

McKillen's business model, which is to invest long term

and to enhance his portfolio."

And this again underlines the impairment of the

business of Mr. McKillen, the direct adverse affect

that is being considered here. And at paragraph 466


"Finnegan J. has analysed in his judgment today the

foregoing and a number of other provisions of the Act

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114

conferring specific powers on NAMA. He has demonstrated

that, at the very least, NAMA has powers which were not

available to the financial institutions. Their precise

effects cannot be judged in the abstract or apart from

the context of a particular dispute. It is not possible

to pass judgment definitively on these provisions. I

believe, however, that, when considered in their

entirety they show that the transfer of loans to NAMA

has the potential to affect borrowers, at least to a

sufficient extent to require NAMA to accord a hearing

to the applicants prior to making an acquisition

decision."

Then at paragraph 467:

"The central point is, in my view, that the transfer to

NAMA puts the applicants and Mr. McKillen in a

fundamentally different situation. NAMA, a statutory

body, with statutory powers and objectives replaces his

banks with which he has had, up to now, a commercial

relationship. His long term business model is not

compatible with NAMA's statutory remit, which is

essentially short term. Where NAMA is in a position to

rely on default by any of the applicants under their

loan agreements, it is not only likely to but obliged

to take action in pursuance of its statutory

objectives, where a bank either would, or at least

might, not do so. The consequence of an acquisition

decision...."

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115

Mr. Justice Fennelly is underlining this effectively.

"....is to make a substantial change in the way in

which the applicants are in a position to exercise

their property rights. Their ability to manage their

properties independently is reduced."

That fundamentally, as I was saying at the beginning,

is the crux of the NAMA decision -- or the crux of the

Dellway decision; that fundamentally Dellway is, as I

said, about as far as you could go with a direct

expropriation of property. This is a very substantial

interference and it is for that reason that

Mr. McKillen and his proper businesses were afforded an

opportunity by the Supreme Court to make submissions.

And I say that that is a very different position to the

position that the Merriman Applicants find themselves

in, in the context of a decision to extend in the

context of very limited statutory discretion.

And as I was saying, I was coming to the point where

there is no evidence of the infringement of decision

and at paragraph 471 of Mr. Justice Fennelly's

judgment:

"I have come to the conclusion that the applicants have

the right to be heard by NAMA before it makes any

acquisition decision in respect of their loans."

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116

And, of course, that's in the foregoing context.

"That right relates, as I have already emphasised, only

to representations with regard to the effects any

acquisition decision is likely to have on their

particular interests. It does not extend to making

representations concerning the considerations, other

than effects on the applicants, to which NAMA will have

regard when considering whether to make a decision."

And then he goes into substance of the right and then

at paragraph 472 whether an oral hearing is required.

But that aspect is important. The right to make

submissions must relate to an aspect of the decision

which the interests of the Applicants' concerns. It is

not all aspects, it must be an aspect that they are

directly interested in, adversely affected by. And we

say in respect of the discretionary elements of the

section 42 test, such as they are, that there are no

impacts on the Applicants, or at least they are not of

substantial gravity; they have a material interest in

any potential adverse effect.

And second, and I can hand up the authority of Wexele,

the Applicants must prove that they have something to

say. I have it here, an unbound but punched authority

Wexele -v- An Bord Pleanála. I may be mispronouncing

it there. It is being handed out to my Friends.

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117

(same handed)

I don't propose the rely on the -- I don't propose to

open the entire case. It is a case in which the

Applicant had been refused planning permission by a

Respondent to build a retail and residential complex on

the ground, inter alia, that the loss of parking spaces

created would result in under provision of car parking

spaces for the area, therefore adding to traffic

congestion and have sought to have that decision

quashed on grounds that issues as to parking and

traffic congestion were outside the scope of what the

Respondents could have regard to and, thus, irrelevant

and immaterial to the application. This is the point

where I am using it. If you look at paragraph 20:

"It was also argued that the Respondent had acted in

breach of the fair procedures in failing to notify it

of further observations made by a third party to the

planning appeal."

And paragraph 19 at page 15:

"To a limited extent, the principles of natural justice

have an influence on the interpretation of this

section. The Board is not obliged to bring every fresh

submission to the attention of a party to the appeal

and to ask for further observations. The first

principal applicable is that of utility. The scheme

under the Act is not to be replaced with a mechanical

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118

application of the notion derived from civil law that

everything before the decision maker must also be

before the parties and that everything which is

submitted must be known to all sides and that they must

be given a reasonable opportunity to counter to with

submissions of their own. That is clearly outside the

scheme of the Planning and Development Act, 2000."

And then the point upon which I actually wish to reply:

"Fundamentally, if a complaint is made that an

applicant was shut out of making a submission, that

party must show that they have something to say. What

they have to say must not be something that has already

been said. Nor can it be a reiteration in different

language of an earlier submission. If a party is to

meet the onus of alleging unfairness by the Board in

cutting them out for making a submission they must

reveal what has been denied them, what they have to say

and then discharge the burden of showing that it had

been unjust for the Board to cut them out of saying

it."

So I'm saying that even if it is the case that their

rights were engaged they must discharge the onus of

showing that it has been unjust that they were not

permitted to do so. They haven't done so. At no point

have they said that the Board is incorrect in some way.

As I said before, this is not a challenge to that. But

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119

at no point have they actually said the Board was

incorrect in any of the material assessments that we

considered. Rather, they have simply said they wanted

an opportunity to make a submission. And the extent to

which they say anything which they originally said is

in respect of the Environmental Impact Assessment and

the Appropriate Assessment, which they say should have

occurred. And that is, of course, what they made a

submission on originally.

But of course under the statutory test Fingal County

Council says -- Fingal County Council's first duty to

that, before the rest applies, is whether or not it was

commenced. Not whether or not substantial works have

been done but, rather, whether or not, simply, it had

been commenced. So you don't get to that point. And

so I say that they have not discharged the burden of

showing it had been unjust to cut them out, in the

words of the court in this case.

And I also want to refer, because I have referred in

respect of the engagement of the right, to whether or

not the -- that the role of prior participation is an

important consideration as to whether or not the right

requires to be engaged, and that that is part of the

nature of the statutory scheme which is before you, not

merely section 42 itself but the overall statutory

scheme which permits them, which they have availed of.

So I just want to open briefly a case called Klohn -v-

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120

An Bord Pleanála.

MR. KENNY: Judge, not to be difficult but before

Mr. Toland opens that. I have just been handed an

index with an additional 15 authorities by the State.

The rules of this Court require the parties to confine

themselves to 10 authorities. Obviously, there is a

latitude within that. I handed in two additional

authorities which took me to 11. There comes a point

when, in my respectful submission, there can be no

allowance for the State, in effect, to double the

amount of authorities it wishes to refer to, without

any explanation for how that may have arise. I would

ask the Court to at least consider excluding some of

the additional authorities to which my Friend purports

to rely on.

MR. HEALY: Judge, I have no objection to additional

authorities, save to the extent that I may need time to

look at them. It is hard to read them as Mr. Toland is

opening them because he has the advantage of having had

an opportunity. But I, apart from what general

appreciation I may have them, I am certainly not

against any additional authorities. But there may be a

time element.

MR. TOLAND: I understand Mr. Kenny had also put

forward additional authorities on Friday. There should

be no difficulty in additional authorities being before

the Court, given the parties will have extra time this

evening to consider them and to address the Court in

conclusion in the reply. There is in unfairness in

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121

that.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I don't think there is. I mean,

if there is latitude required you will get the latitude

when you get to stand up the next time.

MR. KENNY: Very good, Judge.

MR. TOLAND: Obliged Judge. Has the court been given a

copy of Klohn?

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I have, yes. Thank you very

much. Oh sorry, I haven't been given a copy of the

case, no.

MR. TOLAND: Oh, sorry.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: If nothing else, at the end of

the day it will be lots of drawing paper for my kids!

MR. TOLAND: Sorry, Judge, I am just trying to confirm

the copy is the same. Yes. The particular issue in

this case that I wish to draw the Court's attention to

is an appeal under section 127 of the Act of 2000 and

whether or not there was permissible exclusion of the

right to make further representations or further

submissions. I will take you to paragraph 55 at page

78 under "Breach of fair procedures". We are not

dealing with Article 4.3 here.

"The applicant makes the case that the Respondent acted

unlawfully in failing to allow the appropriate persons

to make comments in respect of the submissions of the

Second notice party -- He makes the point that the

respondent, in this decision, admits that the original

application has been "amended" by the submissions dated

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122

the 16th February, 2004 and the 25th March, 2004 and,

as such, could not have been covered by the original

Impact Assessment.

The submission of the 16th February, 2004, was the

response by the Achonry Development Group to the

Developer’s appeal. The submission of the 25th March,

2004 was the second notice party's response to the

observations of the applicant. The applicant states

that these ought to have been circulated to the

applicant for his further comment. Specifically, the

applicant alleges that the respondent's action in this

matter was invalid for two reasons."

The first is in respect of Article 113, which I don't

propose to go into, and then the second:

"Second, he argues that as a matter of fair procedures

both he and the Achonry Development Group ought to have

been furnished with these submissions and given the

opportunity to make further submissions. Both of these

arguments will be discussed in turn."

And if I could take the Court to the consideration at

paragraph 62, page 82, in respect of the second

argument. Here, Judge, I will say that this case is

not directly on point. This concerns within an appeal

process a procedure in which further submissions were

not permitted. Rather than a procedure, such as

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123

section 42, in which no submissions are permitted.

However, the factors which Mr. Justice McMahon

considered here I say are of relevance in considering

the very limited discretion the Oireachtas has granted

the decision maker in extension decisions, and the

reason why the Oireachtas has limited submissions,

which is the extent of public participation prior to

that. So if you just open paragraph 62:

"62. The second argument advanced by the applicant in

this context, is that his right to fair procedures was

denied and, in particular, that he was denied further

opportunity to comment on the submissions made on the

16th February, 2004 and the 25th March, 2004, in breach

of fair procedures and, in particular, in breach of the

audi alteram partem rule.

63. In assessing this argument it should be remembered

that, in the present case, the applicant and the

Achonry Development Group, of which he was a member,

participated fully and actively in the whole process

from the very beginning. Both had made submissions in

response to the appeal lodged by the second notice

party. The Group, itself an appellant, had been

supplied with all relevant submissions and observations

and the applicant, as an observer and a member of the

Group, was fully aware of the submissions. A brief look

at the chronology of the events in the initial

application and the appeal discloses how thorough the

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124

process was and, in these circumstances, it is

difficult to conclude that the applicant or the Group

lost any significant opportunity to be fully heard. The

consultation process is not interminable: If the

applicant was afforded the opportunity to further

respond, would the respondent then have to provide the

developer with an additional right of reply? There must

be an end to the consultative process at some stage

and, in view of the fact that the respondent considered

that there was nothing new in the submissions of the

16th February or the 25th March, it was entitled to put

a halt to the submission and observation phase of the

process. It was entitled to move to the deliberation

and the decision phase. In contentious planning

applications it is, on occasion, understandable that

local feelings will run high and, while it is important

that objectors and others be given their say, it is

inevitable that a point will come when the decision

maker must bring an end to the consultation process and

proceed to make his decision. In reviewing this

decision in the light of fair procedures requirements

one must be mindful of striking a fair balance between

the competing interests. One is dealing here with

principles which should be applied in a sensible and

robust fashion. In entertaining an argument from an

objector who says that he was short-changed in the

participation, one is entitled to stand back and look

at the overall picture bearing in mind, at all times,

the discretion given to the decision maker. Before one

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125

would conclude that the applicant has not been given a

fair hearing, one would need to conclude that justice

has been seriously offended. Given the level of

participation and the level of information available to

the applicant in this case, I do not believe that there

has been any breach of fair procedures."

Now, Judge, obviously on the ratio this case is

different in that it concerns vindication of the right

to fair procedures in an appeal at an earlier point,

and the denial of further submissions at a later point.

But I say the factors which are being considered here

and urged, considered here by Mr. Justice McMahon,

which include the level of discretion which the

decision maker enjoys and the opportunity for past

participation, are factors which the Oireachtas

properly has considered in how it has framed section 42

and in the context of very limited discretion available

to the decision maker, the Fingal County Council or

other Planning Authorities, that the exhaustive prior

participation in complete planning processes, planning

application and appeal, mean firstly, in our

submission, that no right to fair procedures is

engaged. Or even if the Court is to take the view that

a right to fair procedures is engaged, that on the

basis set out by Mr. Justice McMahon it can be

circumscribed. And has been legitimately.

And that brings me, Judge, finally, to a general point,

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126

and I don't need to open anything in respect of it,

which is that the Oireachtas must be presumed to have

operated and enacted section 42 in a constitutional

manner. Either it is correct to say that third party's

rights are not engaged. Full stop. Or that they are

not engaged because they are not materially interested

in an adverse effective decision because of the very

limited discretion afforded. Or it is the case that

the right has been engaged and infringed but

proportionately so because of the right -- because of

the limited nature of the discretion and the prior

public participation inherent in the Planning and

Development Acts. And so for that reason we say that

section 42 in not providing for the right to make

submissions is entirely compatible with the provisions

of the Constitution.

That concludes my submissions in respect of public

participation and the Merriman Applicants' right to

fair procedures. Unless the Court has any further

questions.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: No.

MR. TOLAND: I now turn to two final matters which were

raised by Friends of the Irish Environment. The first

which I will deal with is the alleged constitutional

right to an environment, and the second I will turn to

the consideration by Fingal County Council of section

15, the factors outlined in section 15 of the Climate

Action and Low Carbon Development Act, 2015.

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In respect of the right to the environment, Friends of

the Irish Environment assert that natural and

constitutional rights to bodily integrity are

predicated and derived from -- they are dependent upon

a right to the environment. They submit that's

inherent in various articles, Article 40 of the

Constitution, and they claim that that right is --

42(a) of the Constitution -- and they claim the right

is not absolute; it must be balanced with other

competing rights.

They claim that the north runway will lead to an

increase in greenhouse gas emissions, which will in

turn lead to an increase in the pace of climate change

and, ultimately, directly and irrevocably impinge on

citizen's or resident's unenumerated right to an

environment.

My Friend stated that Friends of the Irish Environment

and the wider population are equally at risk in terms

of their bodily integrity from environmental

degradation which would occur if the north runway was

built and in the support of that he referred to two

reports, from the IPPC and Professor Bows-Larkin. I

don't propose to go into those in any detail but simply

to say this: that Friends of the Irish Environment,

firstly, have not specified the scope of the right to

the environment, either generally or in this particular

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case. They have stated it almost as a principle but

not as an enforceable right. I will come back to that

briefly.

Secondly, the Applicants have established no

infringement of the purported right. First of all,

they must define its contours and they must say what

specifically is being breached. They have not done

that, in my view. But secondly, they have not

established a particular infringement. And unlike in

any of the cases in which an unenumerated right has

been established -- and you might recall, Judge, that

in Ryan -v- The Attorney General there is some 65 days

of evidence and submissions in the High Court and in

McGee medical evidence was advanced as to the health of

the Plaintiff. There is a dearth of evidence in this

case. Friends of the Irish Environment have advanced

no evidence to establish that the north runway will

cause an increase in the pace of climate change. The

only evidence adduced is a report concerning Heathrow

Airport and an IPPC report which contains generalised

remarks concerning correlation between expansion of

aviation and production of increased greenhouse gases.

This is not sufficiently precise for a breach of any

alleged right to be established consequential upon the

north runway. And I don't think it is necessary for me

to open those reports in order to say that.

There is no precise statement with regard to the impact

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that Dublin Airport itself will have upon greenhouse

gas emissions. There is no link between that and

greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. And so

there can be no -- even if that link -- even if once

you establish climate change there is a direct link

that can be assumed between that and personal rights,

and you don't need to evidence that, they haven't

reached the point of saying that Dublin Airport is

going to be directly impacting negatively upon climate

change.

The unenumerated rights doctrine also needs to be

considered because, of course, Judge, that is what this

Court is being asked to do; to specify a new

unenumerated right. And with apologies to my Friend,

I'm going to produce another authority. The judgment

of the Supreme Court in O'T -v- B (Same Handed). This

case concerned a finding, after an initial Circuit

Court hearing, a finding by the Supreme Court that a

natural child was entitled to know the identity of his

or her natural parent and that was an unenumerated

right guaranteed by the Constitution. If I could just

take the Court to the third page of the headnote at

point 6 and:

"That in view of the caution to be exercised with

regard to the duty of ascertaining and declaring what

were the personal rights of a citizen, other than those

specified in the Constitution, it was incumbent on a

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court declaring such a right to do so in clear and

explicit terms."

I say that hasn't been done in this case to enable the

Court to do so. I will just take the Court briefly to

page 369 which is the decision of Mr. Justice Keane.

Whilst this is essentially obiter I think it informs

the decision of courts in the future ascertainment of

unenumerated rights. Down at the bottom of page 369,

and he is commenting on and interpreting, firstly, Ryan

and then McGee. He says:

"There is no discussion in that judgment of the

question as whether, given that the unenumerated rights

clearly existed in the contemplation of the framers of

the Constitution, it was intended by them that the duty

of declaring what those rights were should be the

function of the judiciary rather than the Oireachtas,

although that fundamental issue is referred to in the

judgment of Kenny J.. Nor was there any explicit

endorsement of Kenny J.'s proposed criterion that they

might flow from the Christian and democratic nature of

the State. This might have been because the right

under discussion was conceded, on behalf of the

Attorney, to be such an unenumerated right, although

not in the precise form of the right to bodily

integrity.

It would unduly prolong this judgment to consider in

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detail the problems that have subsequently been

encountered in developing a coherent principle

jurisprudence in this area. It is sufficient to say

that, save where such an unenumerated right has been

unequivocally established by precedent, as, for

example, in the case of the right to travel and the

right to privacy, some degree of judicial restraint is

called for in identifying new rights of this nature."

And he goes on. I think that is the single most

important element of his judgment, the necessity for

judicial restraint.

My Friend referred to philosophical approaches. There

is a discussion of that on page 372 but I don't think I

need to open it, save to say that there is no known

method of constitutional interpretation or enumeration

of a right which has been advanced by Mr. Kenny or his

clients to claim the environmental right they rely on,

scientific consensus and an emerging, in the words of

Mr. Kenny, jurisprudential consensus, predominantly

international, and an emerging theological and

philosophical consensus, in sole support of which they

cite a recent papal encyclical.

There are, of course, various approaches to

interpretation of the Constitution. We could spend

days on it. It is unnecessary. The Applicants haven't

grounded their right to an environment on any of the

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standard approaches: Literal; historical; harmonious;

purposive. They have not looked to the text of the

Constitution itself. Instead they have looked beyond

it. And in looking beyond it the Applicants have

advanced no authority to demonstrate that international

consensus can be relied on as an interpretive advice

for the finding of unenumerated rights in the

Constitution.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I fear you have just opened the

gateway there to yet another judgment being handed up!

MR. TOLAND: I apologise, Judge, I didn't hear you.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I fear you have just opened the

gateway there to yet another judgment being handed up!

MR. TOLAND: I may have. And I seek the right of

rejoinder. Whilst it is a case, of course, that the

case-law of the ECHR and the EU are persuasive and, of

course, other jurisdictions are persuasive, the English

system being, perhaps, one most familiar to us, in none

of those systems is the right to environment a legally

enforceable right. My Friends in their written

submissions mention Article 37 of the EU Charter on

Fundamental Rights and that, of course, is not a right,

but merely a principle applicable to Union

institutions, not an enforceable right open to

citizens. So within the orders with which we are most

familiar there is no international consensus.

And third, even if an international consensus could be

placed before this Court, or should be recognised in

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divining a right to the environment, there has been no

evidence placed before this Court of such foreign law.

It is not simply a matter in submissions of asserting

that a certain number of other countries, some of which

are named, have a right to the environment. There are

any number of ways in which a right to the environment

can exist. Firstly, there is its scope. It may have

various different scopes. Secondly, it may exist at

various different legal orders. Thirdly, it exists

within different legal systems, some of which -- or

most of which are unlike ours because ours actually

permit legislation and administrative acts to be struck

down on the basis of them. Fourthly, you need to in

advancing foreign law produce that on evidence, you

need to show how it sits within those legal orders and

explain to the Court. And so it is not simply a matter

of saying that a right to the environment exists as a

concept without actually explaining its contours and

how it does within those international systems.

Finally, and not to treat this in any further --

because this issue has come up on many occasions before

the Courts, but even if it were the case that - and

leaving aside any question of an international

consensus - the Court were to entertain the

establishment of a right to the environment within our

Constitution I say that that very firmly is a

socio-economic right and one which these courts have on

a number of occasions set a line firmly against.

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I regret to say I have another authority for you,

Judge, T.D. -v- The Minister for Education. No, sorry,

that's in the books. You will be pleased to know that,

Judge. Book 3, Tab 50. Just without opening the case

largely you will remember this, concerning the question

about whether or not there is a right to education or

what is called a general right for a citizen to receive

or an obligation on the state to provide medical or

social services as a constitutional obligation. If the

Court opens to the judgment of Mr. Justice Murphy at

page 316 of the internal pagination.

"With the exception of Article 42 of the Constitution,

under the heading "Education", there are no express

provisions therein cognisable by the courts which

impose an express obligation on the State to provide

accommodation, medical treatment, welfare or any other

form of socio-economic benefit for any of its citizens,

however needy or deserving. It is true that the

exploration of unenumerated constitutional

rights....has established the existence of a

constitutional right of "bodily integrity". The

examination of that right in later cases certainly

establishes that the State has an obligation in respect

of the health of persons detained in prisons. However,

these authorities do not suggest the existence of any

general right in the citizen to receive, or an

obligation on the State to provide medical and social

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services as a constitutional obligation.

In G. V. An Bord Uchtála [1980] I.R. 32, Henchy J.

Identified the right to bodily integrity at pp. 90 to

91 in the essentially negative terms following:

"As to a constitutional right to bodily integrity, such

a right arises for judicial recognition or enforcement

only in circumstances which require that, in order to

assure the dignity and freedom of the individual within

the constitutional framework, he or she should be held

immune from a particular actual or threatened bodily

injury or intrusion".

With the exception of the provisions dealing with

education, the personal rights identified in the

Constitution all lie in the civil and political rather

than the economic sphere. These are indeed important

rights which were won for citizens in different

societies over a period of centuries often in the face

of bitter opposition."

Moving down:

"The absence of any express reference to accommodation,

medical treatment or social welfare of any description

as a constitutional right in the Constitution as

enacted, is a matter of significance. The failure to

correct that omission in any of the 24 referenda which

have taken place since then would suggest a conscious

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decision to withhold from rights, which are now widely

conferred by appropriate legislation, the status of

constitutionality in the sense of being rights

conferred or recognised by the Constitution."

He goes on to talk about the right to elevate social

welfare. He does refer to the direct principles of

social policy in the Indian Constitution, which some

commentators have said comes from ours, but then moves

to:

"The status of socio-economic rights in our

Constitution and the detailed provisions in relation to

education were explained by Professor Gerard Quinn:-

"De Valera cleverly genuflected before socio-economic

rights but made sure to insert them into a part of the

Constitution that is unenforceable by the courts. One

socio-economic right escaped into the hard text:

Article 42 on the right to education. Its presence in

the text has more to do with history than with logic."

And moving on:

"There are, as I would see it, serious arguments

against inferring the existence of positive

socio-economic rights (apart from the anomalous rights

relating to education) but there are impressive

authorities to the contrary."

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MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: And when you have no less a man

that Pope Frances saying we live in an immense pile of

filth you don't think that impinges on the right to

bodily integrity, no?

MR. TOLAND: As a Presbyterian, I -- nevertheless I

give him his due. Important philosophical

commentators, important theologians are certainly those

whom any State should take as part of the mix. But the

question in ascertaining a socio-economic right, such

as the right to the environment, is which body and

which arm of the State should derive that right and

should mark its contours. And what I was saying is

that yes, absolutely you might be in favour personally

of a right to the environment being enforced as it is

in our current legislation, but that is separate

entirely from whether this Court should recognise it as

an enforceable right, one whose contours have not been

defined in this case and one which would involve an

adjudication by courts in future cases as to matters

fundamentally about natural resources, both above and

under the ground, and, therefore, substantially

interfering with the balance of powers between our

branchs of government. And that trespasses directly

upon distributed justice, which these courts have quite

definitely set their minds against.

And finally, and without going further at all legally

into the right to the environment, even if it is the

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case that the runway would cause an increase in the

pace of climate change, which, as I have said, has not

been established, and even if there is a constitutional

right to the environment it is the planning permission

and not the extension decision which is the cause of

that increase. Section 42 does not trigger it. That

concludes my submissions on the right to the

environment.

If I could take the Court to book 1, Tab 8 of the

authorities, that's to the climate change Act itself.

The long title provides:

"It is an Act to provide for the approval of plans for

the Government in relation to climate change for the

purpose of pursuing the transition to a low carbon

climate resilient and environmentally sustainable

economy; to establish a body to be known in Irish..."

I won't go there.

"....as the Climate Change Advisory Council and to

provide for matters connected therein."

I only pause to note the long title as its primary

purpose is to provide an obligation upon the government

to pursue a transition of an economy.

What my Friends have effectively said is that

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insufficient regard was had in the decision of Fingal

County Council to the objectives which are set out at

section 15 of the climate change Act and so I just want

to take the Court to section 15:

"Duties of certain bodies

15. (1) A relevant body shall, in the performance of

its functions, have regard to -

(a) the most recent approved national mitigation plan,

(b) the most recent approved national adaptation

framework and approved sectoral adaptation plans,

(c) the furtherance of the national transition

objective, and

(d) the objective of mitigating greenhouse gas

emissions and adapting to the effects of climate change

in the State."

Subsection (3) then provides for directions given by

the relevant Minister about compliance by relevant

bodies with subsection (1).

In section 1 of the Act "approved national adaptation

framework" means...a framework approved by the

Government under section 5"

An "Approved national mitigation plan" means a national

mitigation plan approved by the Government under

section 4..."

"An "approved sectoral adaptation plan" means a

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sectoral adaptation plan approved by the Government

under section 6..."

""Mitigation" means any human intervention aimed at

reducing harmful influences on the earth's climate

system, including action aimed at reducing emissions

and creating or enhancing sinks;"

""national transition objective" has the meaning

assigned to it by section 3(1)."

And if you turn to section 3(1) under "low carbon

transition":

"For the purpose of enabling the State to pursue, and

achieve, the transition to a low carbon, climate

resilient and environmentally sustainable economy by

the end of the year 2050 (in this Act referred to as

the "national transition objective") the Minister shall

make and submit to the Government for approval -

(a) a national mitigation plan, and

(b) a national adaptation framework.

So in this section 3(1) tells us that the "national

transition objective" is the transition by 2050 to "a

low carbon climate resilient and environmentally

sustainable economy".

So the obligations on Fingal County Council are to have

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regard to four separate provisions of section 15. If I

ask the Court to open the Merriman trial book 1 at Tab

3 I will just take the Court through the considerations

of Fingal County Council. So trial book 1, Tab 3

internal pagination -- sorry, book pagination 123.

Okay, thank you, Judge. And so towards the bottom of

the page under the heading "Climate Action and Low

Carbon Development Act 2015".

"The Planning Authority notes section 15 of the Act and

the requirements in that section for public authorities

generally to have regard to the matters referenced in

section 15 in the performance of their functions."

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I think I must have the wrong

book. Merriman, the pleadings book 1, is it?

MR. TOLAND: It was actually FIE book 1. Apologies to

the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Not at all.

MR. TOLAND: There is a lot of paper in this case,

Judge.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: It is all interesting though!

MR. TOLAND: So under the heading "Climate Change and

Low Carbon Development Act 2015", as I said, the

paragraph begins:

"The Planning Authority notes section 15 of the Act and

the requirement in that section for public authorities

generally to have regard to the matters referenced in

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section 15 in the performance of their functions. The

planning authority notes the progress made to date in

relation to the making of the first statutory approved

national mitigation plan on climate change, the first

statutory approved national adaptation framework, the

statutory approved sectoral adaptation plans. It is

also noted that these plans have not been finalised."

And the essential point there is that they have not

been, or weren't at the time. And so further

consideration of them was not appropriate within the

context of the decision. But more importantly, all

that suffices is that they actually have regard to them

and they are noting them here as having done so.

The more substantive elements of section 15, that's (c)

and (d), the furtherance of the national transition

objective and the objective of mitigating greenhouse

gas emissions and adopting to the effects of climate

change on the State, are set out in somewhat greater

detail and they say there:

"In relation to the objective mentioned in section 15

of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and in relation

to the national transition objection, the planning

authority is conscious that a reduction in aviation

emissions will help to make a contribution towards the

overall greenhouse gas mitigation and towards the

national transition objective. The planning authority

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is conscious that a reduction in aviation emissions

will help make a transition towards greenhouse gas

mitigation and towards the national transition

objective, especially in the timeframe within which the

national transition objective is intended to be

achieved as defined within the Act as by the end of the

year 2050."

They couldn't have more express regard to the two

objectives.

"In circumstances where it is recognised that the

control of international aviation emissions requires a

collaborative industry based and multilateral approach,

the UN climate regime, for example, has historically

recognised the International Civil Aviation

Organisation as the appropriate forum through which in

the first instance to seek to achieve reductions in

international aviation emissions. The Planning

Authority notes the dialogue and efforts that have been

taking place in different international forra (e.g. in

the airline industry, the EU and the ICAO) to try to

achieve aviation emission reductions in different ways

(including various market based and technology

approaches to reduction).

The Planning Authority notes the recent agreement

reached within the ICAO in October 2016 for the

establishment of a market based mechanism (MBM) for the

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proposed capping of emissions from international

aviation at 2020 levels, with the off-setting of any

increases beyond that period.

The Planning Authority notes the likelihood that in

2017 and 2018 the EU will consider its first future

approach to the control of aviation emissions with

inter-EU emissions as well as emissions from flights in

and out of the EEA, including whether to accept and

adopt the ICAO's MBM approach, or whether as one

alternative to resume the application of the EU ETS..."

That's the emissions trading scheme.

"....to emissions from all flights into and out of the

EEA.

The Planning Authority notes that as an EU Member State

Ireland will be involved in the EU's continuing policy

responses to aviation emissions control, and as regards

the ICAO initiative it notes Irelands long-standing

membership of the ICAO and it notes that prior to its

adoption in October 2016 the ICAO initiative was the

subject of a consultation process in Ireland, conducted

in early 2016, for the aviation services."

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I gave judgment earlier this year

in a case involving McDonald's out in Greystones and

there you had to have regard to the Healthy Eating

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Guidelines and they did have regard to the Healthy

Eating Guidelines and I said "having regard to" means

having regard to. But I did wonder when writing that

judgment does "having regard to" also mean inadequate

or dismissive regard to. Because what you have read

out to me sounds like load of palaver, to be honest.

So I just wonder is that "having regard to"?

MR. TOLAND: "Having regard to" simply means that they

must consider the issues which are required for them to

be considered. Section 15 does not in any way change

the substance of section 42. The decision to be

adopted by the authority doesn't require to be changed.

So it is not a ground to refuse under section 42. So

the standard principles of judicial review of that

decision would normally apply in terms of the relevant

amount of reasoning that would be required within the

section 42 decision per se.

This is very different to that. Those are not

decisions that Fingal County Council must meet or must

make. They are, rather, considerations it must take

into account in the performance of its functions. It

would be impermissible for them to refuse the

permission or the extension decision on the basis of

any reasoning here and section 15 is solely there to

remind authorities, in the context of all their work --

and remember most of their work wasn't merely the

issuing of decisions but in the context of their own

business plans, et cetera -- that they should consider

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146

these objectives and how they go about their normal

functions. And so I say that the requirement is simply

that of having regard.

I don't demur from the case which my Friend mentioned,

which, if it is found that there are reasons to depart

from -- if it is found that on a "have regard to" test

that one has to depart from the objectives that you

must provide those reasons I don't demur from that at

all. But I say that this decision isn't saying that,

doesn't consider that there is a departure. Nor have

my Friends made out there is, as I have said before.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I think what they said is there

is a failure to engage, that basically what it is, is a

news bulletin telling us what the State is doing. But

it doesn't engage with the issues that they were asked

to engage with.

MR. TOLAND: Section 15 requires that certain matters

be considered.

Section 15 requires that certain things be considered

and it has regard to them. Two of those are the plans

which are referred to; the third is a National

Transition Objective; and the fourth is about

mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. There is very

clear engagement, Judge, on page 124, it expressly

considers those objectives. It, firstly, is conscious

of what those objectives are and sets them out clearly

in a way that is not incompatible with the Act and in a

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147

way, in my submission, which is directly on point with

the Act. It then, in its more detailed consideration,

it engages with the aviation sector and what is

happening within the aviation sector and the moves that

are afoot both at the international body which controls

the aviation sector and within the European Union to

address emissions. The Climate Change Act took place

in a wider context of EU legislation and of EU action,

policy action and international action to combat

climate change and it requires consideration. And this

type of consideration which actually refers to those

measures which are going to be put in place to deal

with emissions effectively, which are completely beyond

the competence of Fingal County Council to put into

place, but at least those elements, it is acknowledging

exist as part of the framework which will exist to deal

with greenhouse gas emissions, which will be part of

our National Transition Objective on mitigating

greenhouse gas emissions. It is these features, Judge,

and this is not being contested by my Friend, it is

these features which form part of our national strategy

to address greenhouse gas emissions. So I'll have to

respectfully say, I take issue with the use of the word

"press statement" or "palaver". This is as great a

consideration that the Fingal County Council was

required to have and, in my respectful submission, went

beyond their statutory obligations in considering it in

this detail.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: So if I was to have regard to the

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148

implications of Brexit, you're saying it would suffice

for me to say there's a meeting of the European Council

next Thursday and they'll do whatever they're going to

do and that I will therefore have had regard to?

MR. TOLAND: The 'have regard to' test isn't in

dispute, Judge. A 'have regard to' test, within

Section 42 itself and under Section 28 of the Act there

is an obligation to have regard to Ministerial

Guidelines. Now that is a context where the Planning

Authority must actually consider those Ministerial

Guidelines and essentially, as I have said to you,

check that the proper planning and sustainable

development is not changed. Within other legislation -

that is not coming to mind - the 'have regard to' test

would be a statutory factor to consider in the course

of making a decision on the person adversely affected

by that decision. But here a 'have regard to' test, in

the performance of the functions of a public authority

is a test that is simply for that authority, in the

course of its ordinary decision-making and in the

course of its normal business functions, that it

actually must put its mind to certain factors which are

set out by statute. And it doesn't require that in

each and every decision at that it makes, each and

every administrative decision nor each and every

business decision that it makes that it has to engage

in some high level analysis in the commissioning of

reports, et cetera. This is something which is quite

simple and at this level of reasoning is sufficient

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(inaudible) the day.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: You assume lawmakers want you to

do something for a purpose though; so what is the

purpose of the Council having regard to something if

there's nothing you can do about it?

MR. TOLAND: Because not every decision will be a

decision which doesn't impact, upon which greenhouse

gas emissions, for example, don't impact on it. Having

regard to in the performance of its functions,will, for

example, mean that when Fingal County Council's County

Manager chooses to develop the expenses policy for his

staff that he may have regard to the emissions targets

in his corporate plan, therefore, because he has had

regard to it he would refer to and say: 'Maybe having

regard to it I will make sure they used unleaded.' But

it isn't that I (inaudible) in saying that it's an

obligation of action; it's an obligation of

consideration and it is relevant in circumstances -- it

will be more relevant in certain spheres than it is in

others and it is certainly, in my respectful

submission, not directly relevant to the making of

decisions on Section 42. It is something they're

obliged by statute to have regard to so that it is

present in their minds. And it is part of our national

policy that we keep public authorities abreast of and

they maintain, as part of their daily considerations,

this alive in their minds. That is the only way in

which we will improve as a State, public adherence to a

national economic target so that the measures are not

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150

merely ones that are taken by direct government action,

but are part of a culture of change and that that is

the purpose of Section 15. But it is not the purpose

of Section 15 to alter existing statutory tests such

that there could be other methods of judicial review in

respect of those decisions.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: And in this case, if there was no

runway there'd be no emissions; if there is a runway

there'll be lots of emissions. But that's not a case

in which there should be more engagement that's a case

in which fairly limited engagement suffices, is it?

MR. TOLAND: Judge, firstly, as I said on a number of

occasions, that has not been established in evidence.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, no, but I think one can

take judicial notice of the fact that one extra

aeroplane will yield one extra aeroplane's worth

emissions.

MR. TOLAND: Well that's the point that is being made

in this consideration, Judge, and I think my Friends

from Ryanair might make, that there are alternative

methods of reducing emissions over time and that upon

the building of the runway more efficient aircraft with

the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, will on the whole,

reduce emissions. There cannot be an assumption as a

result of the creation of a runway that there will be

more emissions, nor can there be an assumption that

that would increase the pace of climate change because

these things take part in a broader context, Judge.

Firstly, that's the evidential side.

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151

Secondly, that is not what Section 42 is about.

Climate change forms no part of Section 42. It is an

Extension Decision based on the prescribed defined

statutory criteria.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: I understood you to say that -

and correct me if I am wrong, I may be wrong - I

understood you to say that there was something of a

scale involved and that the level of engagement would

depend on the scale of the environmental problem that

was perceived to present. So here you could have a

fairly general level because there's nothing really the

Dublin Airport Authority can do about international

problems.

MR. TOLAND: Yes. What I said was that it's for the

decision-maker under the Act to consider and have

regard to those targets. Yes, what this decision-maker

has done is said that the control of those

international aviation emissions are for the relevant

international bodies to consider. Obviously the

control of them doesn't exist within Section 42. It

is, rather, something which exists at an international

and then subsequently national level. So there is

really nothing further the decision could have done in

having regard to those objectives than recite those

actions which are possible and those policy

deliberations which are occurring at an international

and European stage.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Just so I'm clear in my own mind

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152

and I don't want to put you on the spot, in what case

would 'having regard to' require you to go into great

detail as opposed to what you see here? And I don't

want to put you on the spot.

MR. TOLAND: You mean in the context of Section 15 or

in the context generally of 'having regard to'?

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: In the context generally of

'having regard to'.

MR. TOLAND: As I said, Judge, that very much depends

on the statutory context. A statutory context which

requires a decision to be taken with a number of

criteria and that you must have regard to, as it is in

Section 42, Ministerial Guidelines does require you to

have reasons in respect of those statutory guidelines.

And within this decision you find that there's

consideration of the Ministerial Guidelines and the

DAA's fulfilment of that in the flood risk assessment.

But here, the statutory context here is that they must

take note of in the performance of the functions. They

must consider. There is no obligation on them to do

anything, nor is there an obligation -- this is the

critical thing, there's no obligation on them to make

adverse decisions to individuals where those decisions

are before them for other statutory reasons. And

there's no obligation on them, within their reasoning,

to adopt any level of decision-making. But I do take

my Friends' point, as I said to you, that if there is a

departure they must reason that. But I would say to

you, even if it is the case in your view that there is

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153

a departure, which I say there isn't, the consideration

that has taken place here is as complete a

consideration as is required.

Judge, that concludes my submissions on the Climate

Change Act, unless the Court has any further questions.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Not at all. Having had the

benefit of your erudition I'm no longer sure whether it

is palaver or genius.

MR. TOLAND: I think I'm obliged, Judge. There, for

the various reasons, outlined by myself and

Mr. McDonald, the State rests.

SUBMISSION BY MR. BRADLEY:

MR. BRADLEY: Having listened to the exchange, Judge, I

don't know whether to start out with Brexit or the

Papal Encyclical!

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Wherever you like.

MR. BRADLEY: Judge, Mr. Healy has a lot to say about

the Papal Encyclical I think.

Judge, I'd like to take you back to the beginning.

It's my decision. I'd like to take you back and

discuss the process that is engaged under Section 42

and the nature of the decision that's made under

Section 42. What I propose to do, Judge, is in the

first hour today, is to go back and look at the process

under Section 42 and look at some of the key decisions.

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154

Mr. Healy and Mr. McDonald opened some of them but I

want to look at them in a bit more detail because it is

a terribly important factor in terms of the decision

that was made by Fingal County Council to look at the

context and the statutory context in which that was

made.

I then want to turn, Judge, and look at Section 42

itself, and Section 42 is more than

Section 42(1)(a)(ii) (I) to (IV) it includes 42(1)(b),

(c) and (d). They're important, Judge, from our case

because they look at the regulatory framework in which

Section 42 has been set out. Again, that's important

when dealing with Mr. Healy's point of Dellway and the

prism of Dellway.

I then want to spend some time, Judge, on

Section 42(1)(a)(ii)(IV) and that really engages,

again, the nature of the decision, the issue that

Mr. Healy has asked Your Lordship to look at, which is

the engagement, notwithstanding Section 42 that he says

rests on the Council. Also, matters of EU law - and I

don't intend to trespass over the matters that

Mr. McDonald and Mr. Toland have raised and which

Mr. Simons and Mr. Kennedy have set out in their

submissions, Judge, but I'll look at that as well.

That also engages, as I said, the prism of Dellway.

Lastly, Judge, the matter in which the Court has

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155

engaged with Mr. Toland on which is uniquely to

Mr. Kenny's case which is the Climate Change Act and

what does 'have regard to' mean and what does it not

mean. In my respectful submission that issue has been

addressed by the Supreme Court authority in Glencar but

I will take Your Lordship to that as well. In fact

Glencar, in that case, had regard to Section 7(1) of

the then Local Government Act which has been repeated

and reenacted in Section 68, I think, of the Local

Government 2001 Act, which we'll look at.

If I could start, Judge, again, just to give the Court

more paper as if it hadn't enough. I'm going to hand

up a Book of Authorities to the Court, but they're not

new authorities, Mr. Kenny will be glad to hear, they

are effectively to assist the Court from jumping from

one to the other. (SAME HANDED) There are some new

authorities at the end of the it, Judge, but they're

just a reaffirmation of the McDowell case and I can

speak to those very, very quickly.

One matter I will be coming back to, Judge, is the 2010

Act and the 2010 (Amendment) Act which was brought into

force, I think, on 19th August 2007 and that date is

important, Judge, because we'll come to look at what

Ms. Justice Irvine had to say in Lackagh Quarries,

erroneously referred to in our submissions as Lackagh

Rock. That's a different case, Judge, but Lackagh

Quarries is the decision of Ms. Justice Irvine. She

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156

refers to Section 42 and it was Section 42 that was in

place in at that case, Judge, not Section 4(1) of the

1982 Act but I'll come to that in due course although

it's an obiter statement.

You'll see the first statutory provision we refer to is

the Planning and Development (Amendment) Act and there

are two provisions that I will be coming back to when I

look at what this Court has to do in terms of statutory

interpretation. If I could just ask the Court to note

them. Section 28 inserted a new Section 42. That's a

section that deals with 42(1)(a)(ii)(I) to (IV) but it

also inserted another provision, Judge, which is

important when the Court looks at some of the arguments

that Mr. Healy has sought to make. It also inserted a

new Part XA in Section 57 dealing with substituted

consent. You can see the Oireachtas dealt with a

number of matters on 19th August 2007 in the suite of

measures brought in in terms of environmental impact

assessment, remedial environmental impact assessment,

AA appropriate assessment and remedial appropriate

assessment. I'll come to that when I look at the

statute of interpretation.

The first authority, Judge, if I could just speak to

these authorities, first of all, for a few moments

before I come back to them.

The State (McCoy) -v- Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown

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157

Corporation is a case that is cited in all of the

jurisprudence dealing with Section 42. One theme that

I would ask the Court to look at in all of these cases

is what was the purpose of Section 4 of the 1982 Act

and Section 42? In our respectful submission the

purpose has been continuous and that's to enable

development to be completed. That was the purpose of

Section 4 and that's the purpose of Section 42 in its

first iteration, in its latest iteration and in the

last iteration that Mr. Kenny referred to, to enable

development, the subject of the permission, to be

completed. And that's referred to throughout in the

case law.

Secondly, Judge, when you look at The State

(McCoy) -v- Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown Corporation (or Dun

Laoghaire Corporation as it then was), when you look at

the suite of measures that were referred to in

Section 4(1) initially and amended in Section 42 and

then amended twice in Section 42 they are primarily

factual matters. Again, that's an important

consideration because that goes to the nature of the

"discretion". It's not a box-ticking exercise but it's

a prescribed discretion. The factors are set out and

the Planning Authority have to engage with those and

those are questions of fact. It becomes very apparent,

when one looks at what Mr. Healy had to say about

Section 42(1)(a)(ii)(IV). I'll come to that, Judge, a

little bit later. But what Mr. Healy effectively

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158

criticised was the nature of the expert view taken by

the Planning Authority. Now in my respectful

submission questions of fact, questions of assessment

are uniquely given to the Planning Authority and

expressly given to the Planning Authority in this but

also in a number of matters, Judge. When you come to

look at the provisions that took over from the

Development Plan levies, the nature of contribution

schemes, they involved complex, financial and economic

assessments that have to be engaged by the Planning

Authority and when one looks it at the grounds upon

which the Applicants have sought to impugn, there's

actually no challenge to the first ground in (1) and

there's no effectively challenge to (2) and back (3).

There is a challenge to (4) and what Mr. Healy says -

and I'll come to that - he says that if - and I'm not

taking this as a concession but this is what he said -

if, as a matter of fact, the Planning Authority find

that development has commenced then you don't look at

the rest of it. And that's effectively what happened

here. So when you look at the factors that have to be

engaged in and assessed by the Planning Authority,

they're questions of fact, they're heavily prescribed

and while it's not a box-ticking exercise, the

assessment is a limited assessment in terms of the

discretion that has to be exercised. Of course that's

important, Judge, when you look at Dellway and what is

said about Dellway and the nature of the discretion

that was exercised under Section 69, primarily

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159

Section 84 and Section 87 of the NAMA Act. So if you

look at the list of authorities, there, Judge, The

State (McCoy), Garden Village, culminating in McDowell

and Coll, I say that the matters that the Planning

Authority have to engage in are essentially factual

matters and the discretion is limited, Judge. I want

to look at, in particular, the McDowell case, the Coll

case and the Lackagh Quarries case because that engages

some of the EU arguments that were made as well, albeit

obiter.

So if I could ask the Court first of all to look at The

State (McCoy) -v- Dun Laoghaire. It's been opened to

the Court. It's behind tab 2. My observations in

relation to this case, Judge, are as I've just set out.

It emphasises that the statutory purpose of the then

Section 4(1) of 1982 Act has been repeated in

Section 42, initially in 2000 and in the amendments

that followed. The statutory purpose is in relation to

a particular permission, extended period for which

permission is given to enable the development to be

completed. That is the statutory purpose of

Section 42.

When one looks at -- I think Your Lordship might have a

couple of copies of this at this stage but if I could

ask the Court to look at internal page 8 and 9 of the

judgment in that book, Judge. Could I ask the Court to

begin with "Section 11", does Your Lordship see, that:

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160

"Section 11 of the 1982 Act empowers the Minister to

make regulations providing for any matter of procedure

in relation applications under Section 4 of the Act..."

Can I come back to that, Judge, and say that also

applies in this case, and when we look at the

Regulations that were made one will see that there is

no prescription for public participation or

participation in the manner urged by Mr. Healy.

"...also enumerates particular aspects of such

applications for which special requirements may be made

by such regulations. It follows that in relation to

compliance with conditions indicated at subparagraphs

(a) and (b) of Section 4(1) of the 1982 Act the onus is

on the Applicant to clear the negative aspect and make

way for the positive aspect of the decision imposed as

mandatory on the Planning Authority. Compliance with

the terms of subparagraph (c) of Section 4(1) requires

that the Planning Authority 'be satisfied' on all of

the matters under three sub-headings in relation to the

particular permission. These are factual matters in

relation to the performance of works of development

within the control of the developer upon which the

Planning Authority is required to make an assessment or

evaluation."

That's repeated, Judge, when we come to see the

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161

McDowell case as well. So primarily the matters that

the Planning Authority have to be satisfied and the

phrase is "the Planning Authority will be satisfied"

are matters of fact. It is simply not good enough, in

my respectful submission, for Mr. Healy to say: 'Well,

I will disagree with that expertise or that expertise

isn't sufficient enough.' That's not the test, Judge,

and when we see what Ms. Justice Laffoy had to say in

Littonvale, I mean that doesn't pass muster even on an

O'Keeffe test or a The State (Keegan) test or an

O'Keeffe test revised in light of Meadows. That's not,

in my respectful submission, a correct assessment in

terms of what the Planning Authority has to do. They

simply have to be satisfied with those matters as a

matter of fact and in terms of how they address them.

At the next paragraph, Judge, on page 9 --

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: And when does Council say the

works commenced?

MR. BRADLEY: The Council say the works commenced,

Judge, in light of the application that was made. If

the Court goes to the report, the report that

Mr. Toland referred you to.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Yes.

MR. BRADLEY: At page 15 - and it is dealt with in

Mr. Byrne's affidavit as well. I will take you through

that. If you go to the report, the planning report.

Judge, can I say, when I come to the McDowell decision,

the engagement that Your Lordship had with Mr. Toland

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162

in terms of asbestos and other issues is important

because the McDowell decision quite clearly sets out

that a planning authority dealing with a Section 42

application has no role to play in terms of enforcement

or compliance. It would be erroneous for the Planning

Authority to take such matters into consideration but

I'll come to that when we look at the McDowell case.

What happened here, Judge, at the bottom of the report

on page 15 is that reference was made to

Section 42(1)(a)(ii)(IV) and it's quoted:

"Where the development has not commenced that an

environmental impact assessment or an appropriate

assessment or both of those assessments, if required,

was or were carried out before the permission was

granted. The DAA state that construction works

commenced on Friday, 16th December 2016 on the North

Runway Construction Package (NCRP1)."

That's set out in Appendix E, Judge. You'll see over

the page:

"The works comprised in the North Runway Construction

Package No. 1 (NRCP1) are listed in Appendix E. A map

illustrating the locations where works have commenced

is also included in Appendix E.

The DAA confirms that the following works have

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163

commenced:

1. Establishment of the contractors' compound;

2. Hedgerow removal and tree felling works (including

along Barberstown Lane);

3. Site security fencing to the site perimeter;

4. Demolition of the former airport fire service

training ground buildings and training structures,

including the house, aircraft simulator, smoke training

buildings and fuel management system;

5. Demolition of the existing high mast lighting and

associated cabling at the former airport fire service

training ground and removal of the existing hard

standings;

6. Demolition of the existing farm outbuildings

adjoining the former airport fire service training

ground all associated permitted works.

The site was inspected on 2nd February 2017 by a Senior

Planner..."

You'll see in Mr. Byrne's affidavit, Judge, that he

says he's the person who carried out the inspection and

the reference to the Senior Planner is a reference to

him in his affidavit:

"...and the Senior Executive Planner and the site

inspection confirmed that development has commenced as

stated."

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That's the reference above.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: So it's taking the view, when it

says "as stated" that as of 15th December the works

commenced, is that right?

MR. BRADLEY: Works commenced, Judge, as of 16th

December.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: There's a dispute over that

because in the extension application form they had the

15th and the 16th.

MR. BRADLEY: Judge, it's very important from the

Planning Authority's perspective dealing with

Section 42, it deals with the application made to it

under Section 42 and assesses it. Mr. Byrne set this

out in his affidavit. He's also set out how he dealt

with compliance in relation to 12(h), but we'll come to

that in due course.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: When he says "as stated" does he

mean I accept that it commenced on 15th - well you're

saying 16th - December?

MR. BRADLEY: Yes, but, Judge, the important thing is,

he's dealing with it from the perspective of

Section 42(1)(a)(ii)(IV) and that's why the McDowell

decision is very important in relation to this matter

because what it says is that all a planning authority

has to address is the precise questions that are raised

in the context of the application made under

Section 42. Because the mistake that was made in that

case - and I know something about it, Judge, because I

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mate the arguments on behalf of the Roscommon County

Council - but the mistakes that were made in that case

were precisely what Mr. Healy's urging on the Court in

relation to this case. The Planning Authority took the

view that there was non-compliance because of the

height of the building sitting on a slope with the

planning permission. Took the view that because there

was non-compliance there could be no application for an

extension, because there was non-compliance and deemed

to be unauthorised. Precisely the argument that was

made and in fact if one steps back from the nature of

it being unauthorised and simply deal with

non-compliance, and President Finnegan held that that

was a totally erroneous approach to adopt. What had to

be adopted in terms of Section 42 was whether or not

the strict terms of Section 42 were complied with.

Here it deals with the commencement of development. So

there's no question, Judge, that as of 7th March, or

6th March that development had commenced. And the

nature of that development, as a matter of fact, has

not been seriously challenged in this case in terms of

Section 42. That's a very, very important, matter,

Judge, and in fact when we come to look at the McDowell

case, which I might do in the next short while, Judge,

well I'll finish out this. If I could ask the Court to

look at the paragraph below the paragraph I just opened

on page 9.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: The Council is aware, though, it

has been suggested to me in the other proceedings, that

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166

the works actually commenced on 2nd December but it has

no view about that.

MR. BRADLEY: But, Judge, with respect, that has

absolutely no relevance to the question that's before

this Court on Section 42. Section 42 deals with an

assessment when a development commenced prior to its

decision on 7th March and development had commenced.

That's accepted by everybody in these proceedings.

What Mr. Healy has sought to do, Judge, what he has

sought to do is a couple of things. He hasn't really

sought - and in fact when we come to see what he has in

fact said, he accepts that if development has commenced

then the rest of Section 4 doesn't apply. And that's

precisely what happened. It's as simple and as

straightforward as that, Judge, in terms of the issue

under Section 42.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Not quite so simple though in the

previous case.

MR. BRADLEY: Well it is, with respect, Judge. I'm

obviously not a party to the enforcement action so I'm

going to say very little about that, Judge. But it has

absolutely no relevance, absolutely no relevance, in

fact the President of the High Court and this decision

has been endorsed by subsequent High Court decisions

and was not appealed, is that it would be wrong for the

Council, in dealing with the application for extension,

to entertain those matters. It would be entirely

wrong. It's exactly the opposite of what Mr. Healy is

pressing on the Court. That's what the President said,

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167

Mr. Justice Finnegan and, as I say, Judge, that matter

has been endorsed by Ms. Justice Irvine, but in other

cases dealing with the nature of a jurisdiction

exercise by planning authorities. We would have -- if

that decision had come in to me, Judge, and I would

have been asked what Mr. Healy has put forward I would

have to say I have to discount all of that, I can only

deal with the application that's made for the purposes

of this section. They would be falling into the error

that the President refers to in referring to some of

the Law Society cases, Judge, of bringing in an

improper purpose. You can only deal with Section 42.

And that's why, Judge, in many ways this case is a very

straightforward case in terms of the factors at play.

There has been attempt by my Friend to embellish it

both as of a matter of EU law and as national law, but

in my respectful submission, when one comes to look at

Section 42, and it's not just 42(1)(a) and all the

sub-roman numerals, it's 42(1)(b), (c) and (d). They

Planning Authority had no discretion in terms of the

matters that have been urged on the Court. They had to

deal with it in a way in which they dealt with it. In

my respectful submission they dealt with it

appropriately in that regard. In fact, it would have

been entirely wrong, had they had done what Mr. Healy

has asked the Court, or suggesting to the Court, they

would have acted erroneously, Judge.

This paragraph, Judge, and I'll close out this judgment

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just with this short quote:

"The particularity of the provisions of Section 4(1) of

the 1982 Act and the fact that they are included in a

section imposing a mandatory function precludes

consideration of any other matters. The subsection is

explicit on what it requires, and consequently the

exercise of the power to extend the appropriate period

as regards a particular permission or to not extend

that period must comply in all respects with the terms

of Section 4(1) and may not be exercised in any other

manner or upon any other considerations. A decision,

therefore, of the Planning Authority as to whether or

not to extend the appropriate period as regards a

particular permission which is arrived at without

considering all the matters set out in sub-paragraphs

(a), (b), (c), (i), (ii) and (iii) or upon

consideration of other matters not coming within these

sub-paragraphs would be ultra vires."

Now, Judge, could I just speak to Garden Village and

tell the Court that Garden Village and Littonvale are

referred to by the President in McDowell. You'll find

McDowell -v- Brennan case behind tab 5.

Now, Judge just a little bit background to it. The

Court will be familiar at that the Applicants bought a

plot in Rooskey, Roscommon, with planning permission on

it. The planning permission was near its end. They

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169

engaged their own advisers to give effect to the

planning permission. You get a nice summary of the

issue, Judge, on internal page 4 where they say that:

"On 21st June 2004 the architects wrote to the

Respondent as follows:-

'I am writing to you in regard to the proposed house

with the above planning reference. A contour survey

was taken of the site and it indicates that the site is

steeper than what was shown on the planning drawings.

Therefore, we have taken the finished floor level

(which is 8.4 metres above the adjoining road level) to

correspond to the ground floor rather than the basement

floor. This results in the house being more cut into

the slope and requiring less fill than was originally

indicated on the planning cross section C-C. We hope

that this is to your satisfaction and please do not

hesitate to contact this office if you have any

queries'."

Then the President picks it up and says:

"The approach suggested by the architects is consistent

with the information given in the application for

planning permission but not with the section C-C in the

cross section lodged on 21st April 1999. There was no

reply to this letter. The Applicants continued with

the development in accordance with the letter - that is

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170

level 3 (the middle floor of the three levels) was

constructed at a level 8.4 metres above the adjoining

road level."

They effectively lost a level, Judge, when they gave

effect to the permission.

Then under the subtitle "The Application For an

Extension of the Permission", again, Judge, the facts

were important in light of the questions you've asked.

"On 12th August 2004 the Applicants sought an extension

of the planning permission. At that date ground works

had been completed and the basement slab and retaining

walls had been constructed. The dwelling itself is of

timber frame construction and at the time of the

application all preproduction and design tasks had been

completed, all materials procured and manufacture had

commenced. The prescribed form was duly completed.

The period of extension sought was three months from

30th August 2004. The application was assigned to

Frank Flanagan, Assistant Senior Planner, for attention

on 17th August 2004 with the request that he deal with

the matter prior to 1st October 2004. Mr. Flanagan

inspected the site on 18th August and thereafter he

requested that further information be obtained and a

letter dated 25th August 2004 was addressed to the

architects in the following terms..."

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That letter is set out.

At the bottom of the page, Judge:

"This letter was replied to on 27th August 2004: a copy

of the revised site layout plan was furnished with the

letter: the name of a contact in Griffner Coillte was

furnished. Having been furnished with the site layout

plan as requested the Respondent did not communicate to

the architects that it had a concern about compliance

with the planning permission or afford the Applicants

the opportunity to deal with those concerns and the

materiality of any non-compliance. By this time the

Applicants letter of 21st June 2004 was on the planning

file. By memorandum of 4th October 2004 Mr. Flanagan

reported as follows:-

'The developers in this instance are, by their own

admission, constructing a dwelling that is

significantly different than that for which permission

was granted."

You see the 2.2 metres lower, Judge.

"The question of extension to the duration of the

permission, therefore does not arise, as the dwelling

under construction does not have the benefit of


The matter was then passed to Mr. John Coughlan to whom

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172

it fell to make a decision on the application for an

extension. In his affidavit he avers that considered

the following..."

He sets out the matters that he considered. Over the

page, Judge:

"He considered the dwelling as constructed to be

non-compliant with the planning permission having

formed the view that it was 2.6 metres lower than that

for which planning permission had been granted it being

set into the ground. In his affidavit he sets out the

basis of his decision."

Then he quotes the decision, Judge, as follows:

"I considered, that as the development was materially

different from that for which the permission was

granted, that the development under construction was

not the development to which the permission related,

and therefore an extension of time could not be

granted.'

On 5th October the Respondent communicated the refusal

of the extension sought and in a letter set out the

grounds of refusal as follows:-

'I enclose herewith decision to refuse permission for

extension to this permission as the development under

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construction is significantly different from that for

which planning permission reference PD/98/1221 refers.

The question of an extension to the duration of the

permission therefore does not arise as the dwelling

under construction does not have the benefit of

planning permission."

Then you have the notification with the letter giving

the reason.

"The dwelling under construction is significantly

different from that for which planning permission was

granted."

Then the President says, Judge:

"From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the reason

for the refusal was the perception by the

Respondent..."

That's the Planning Authority.

"...be that correct or incorrect, that the dwelling in

course of construction was not in compliance with the

planning permission the level 3 (the first floor level)

being at the level for which level 1 (the basement

floor level) ought to have been constructed."

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That's a very good synopsis, Judge, not just of the

legal issues but of the facts that were at issue in

McDowell -v- Brennan. It's striking, Judge, that it's

familiar because it's similar to the argument that

Mr. Healy is making here and of course he didn't refer

to the McDowell case in making that argument.

The statutory framework is important, Judge, because

you'll see in the statutory framework a continuum in

relation to the statutory purpose, both in Section 4 of

the 1982 Act, Section 42 (as it applies here), and the

more recent iteration of Section 42. Look at what the

President said about the statutory provision under

Section 42:

"On application a planning order shall, as regards a

particular permission, extend the appropriate period by

such additional period as the authority considers

requisite to enable the development to which the

permission relates to be completed..."

And that's the statutory purpose, Judge, in all of

these provisions. Then he sets out what the various

sections are, Judge.

Over the page on page 11, after the reference to the

legislation he says:

"The Planning and Development Regulations 2001 in

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Part 4 Chapter 3 in Regulations 40 to 47 inclusive deal

with the extension of duration of planning permission.

Regulation 42 sets out the particulars to be given on

an application for an extension. Regulation 46

requires the Planning Authority in the case of a

decision to refuse to extend to give the reasons for

such refusal. Both the application and the

notification of the decision to refuse in this case

comply with the Regulations."

That's something I'll be coming back to, Judge, because

again, here, the Minister has had the opportunity to

promulgate regulations and none of those regulations

provide for third party involvement or involvement in

the manner suggested by Mr. Healy.

Then there's a terribly important passage, Judge,

dealing with the construction of Section 42. I do want

to take the Court through this. The President begins:

"In the course of submissions I was referred to three

decisions on the Local Government (Planning and

Development) Act 1982 Section 4 which are of assistance

in construing the 2000 Act Section 42. Considering the

same, however, I have had regard to the differences

between the two sections which appear to me as

follows..."

As Mr. McDonald said this morning, Judge, the words

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"and only if" disappear and it's "provided" the other

sections are complied with. Then 42(1)(d) sets out an

additional matter.

Over the page, Judge:

"The first relevant case is The State (McCoy) -v- Dun

Laoghaire Corporation. In relation to section 4(1) of

the 1982 Act Mr. Justice Gannon said:

'Section 4(1) of 1982 Act is expressed in mandatory

terms bearing both positive and negative aspects. It

confers on the Planning Authority not merely the power

but rather the obligation to extend the duration of a

planning permission in relation to uncompleted

development upon which a developer has embarked."

Can I just pause there, Judge. It's not a discretion,

an open-ended discretion that one can do X, Y and Z.

Once the facts have been submitted and approved it's an

obligation on the Planning Authority. And that speaks

to other matters, Judge, in terms of the nature of a

planning permission and the rights that are referred to

in relation to those matters in a general way. But

then the quote continues, Judge:

"This is equally true of Section 42. Again, in the

course of his judgment, Mr. Justice Gannon refers to

the mean of 'the particular permission': the effect of

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the phrase is that the Planning Authority must have

regard to the permission in question and not other

permissions whether relating to the same development or

other developments. In dealing with Section 4(1)(c) of

the 1982 Act he points out that there are set out

therein factual matters upon which the Planning

Authority is required to make an assessment or

evaluation and in relation to (iii) the Planning

Authority must be satisfied as to the probability that

the development will be completed within a reasonable

time. Section 4 of the 1982 Act precludes

consideration of any other matters and the power to

extend the permission or not may not be exercised in

any other manner or upon any other considerations. I

am satisfied that these considerations apply equally

where the application is made pursuant to Section 42 of

the Act of 2000."

Then reference is made to Littonvale, Judge.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: You are saying there ended the

judgments, basically.

MR. BRADLEY: Absolutely. But not only that, the

jurisprudence endorses this approach because when we

come to see what the President says about that and what

Ms. Justice Irvine says about it, it supports that

particular position, Judge. The President refers to it

in a number of places, Judge, in fact if you just look

over the page on the third paragraph he says it in

terms. First of all, I just speak to the Littonvale

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178

reference, you'll see there a reference to what

Ms. Justice Laffoy had to say and that was a reference

again to O'Keeffe and the threshold that would apply,

Judge. This is quintessentially that sort of issue.

It's a factual issue to be assessed by a planning

authority. It doesn't matter what any other expert

thinks in that regard. I don't mean that in an

O'Keeffe narrow sense that if you have a stamp before,

you can't ask a question. That's not what I'm saying.

It goes to the nature of the jurisdiction being

exercised by a planning authority and that's what

Ms. Justice Laffoy is saying there. Then, just to take

up what the Court is saying, what the President says

echoing the Court's last comment at the bottom of page

13:

"Thus, I am not concerned as to whether the conclusion

arrived at by the Respondent that the dwelling under

construction is significantly different from that for

which planning permission was granted is correct: that

is a matter which can only be determined, it seems to

me, in plenary proceedings or in proceedings under Part

VIII of the Act of 2000. My function is to review the

manner in which the decision was arrived at and

determine whether or not the same accords with the

requirements of Section 42."

He comes back to this later, Judge. The third case he

refers to then is the Supreme Court decision in Garden

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Village Construction Company, Judge. You may recall

that was where Mr. Justice Geoghegan in the High Court

was reversed by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blayney

giving the main decision. Nothing really arises in

relation to that decision in our case apart from the

reference to the 'particular permission'.

Then the last point, Judge, and this echos what the

President was saying this the previous paragraph.

This is at page 14.

"The Issue for Determination

The Planning Authority having concluded (the

correctness of that conclusion not being a matter for

my consideration) that the development being undertaken

was not in compliance with the particular planning

permission were they entitled to have regard to that

conclusion and on the basis of the same refuse to

extend the duration of the planning permission? The

Respondents argument is that they have notwithstanding

the wording of section 42 of the Act of 2000 and the

decisions to which I have referred a residual

discretion which they were entitled to exercise and

refuse the extension. They argue that it would be

illogical for them to extend the duration in the light

of their conclusion as a development when completed

would not be in compliance with the planning

permission. There are a number of factors which

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militate against my accepting this view:

1. The wording of section 42 is clear. It provides

that if the Planning Authority are satisfied on certain

matters the Planning Authority must grant an extension.

It is clear on the authorities that to take into

account any other matter, fact or circumstance is ultra

vires.

2. Where a development is being carried out but not in

compliance with the relevant permission a Planning

Authority has conferred upon it wide powers pursuant to

Part VIII of the Act of 2000. Section 42 is contained

within Part III of the Act. I am satisfied that in

refusing the extension of duration in this case the

Respondent was seeking to utilise Part III of the Act

of 2000 for the purposes of Part VIII of the Act of

2000."

I will just pause there, Judge. What then follows is

the reference to improper purpose. You're using one

section for the purposes of another. And that's why,

enforcement or compliance is absolutely irrelevant to

the question the Planning Authority has to consider

under Section 42 and the extension.

He refers to:

"In Re Thomas Crowley 1964 I.R. 106 the Solicitor

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applied for a practising certificate and this was

refused pursuant to the provisions of the Solicitors

Act 1954 Section 49(1) which permitted the Incorporated

Law Society of Ireland to refuse a practising

certificate in specified circumstances: one of the

circumstances listed is the failure to give a

sufficient and satisfactory explanation. In the

circumstances of that case the Supreme Court held that

the power under Section 49 was in fact being operated

in circumstances where the disciplinary provisions of

the Act (in that case the provisions of the Solicitors

(Amendment) Act 1960) were appropriate. In short the

provisions were being operated for an improper

purpose."

That's the reference to improper purpose that I refer

to.

"Again in Kennedy -v- Law Society of Ireland Supreme

Court 20th December 2001 the Court considered that the

Society had operated its powers to appoint an

investigating accountant where the dominant purpose of

so doing was outside the purpose for which those powers

were conferred - to ascertain whether the accounts

regulations had been complied with. In this case I am

satisfied that the primary object of Section 42 of the

Act of 2000 is to enable a development already

commenced to which a planning permission relates to be

completed."

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182

Judge, that's what I've said to you from the beginning

of this submission that time and time again, when you

look at Section 4, and all of the iterations of Section

42, as Mr. Justice Finnegan says in this case, the

primary object of Section 42 is to enable a development

already commenced, to which a planning permission

relates it is not permissible to use this section to

prevent the completion of a development to which the

planning permission relates to be completed.

"It is not permissible to use the section to prevent

the completion of a development to which the planning

permission relates which the Planning Authority has

concluded does not comply fully with that permission.

What the Planning Authority must consider is whether

the development relates to the permission and not

whether it is in full compliance with the same. It is

not permissible to use a statutory power conferred for

a particular purpose for some other purpose."

Then if I could ask the Court to go down to about ten

lines and beginning with "I am satisfied":

"I am satisfied from a perusal of the plans that the

development is that contemplated by the planning

permission. I am further satisfied that the true

effect of Section 42 is that the Planning Authority

must therefore consider the application in that light

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19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

15:55

15:55

15:55

15:56


183

having regard to the matters enumerated in the section

and those matters only. This it has failed to do by

taking into account a matter not specified in the

section that is compliance with the planning

permission."

Obviously that's something we say, Judge, that has been

urged upon the matter here which is not relevant.

He then refers to the case of White -v- Dublin

Corporation which Your Lordship will know was a

bifurcated decision; constitutional challenge combined

with an administrative law challenge. Effectively

Mr. Justice Fennelly held that the planning official,

Mr. Rose in that case, asked himself the wrong question

when a house was being developed beside another house

and whether or not it would look on in terms of

neighbours, et cetera. Mr. Justice Finnegan refers to

it here. Then over the page, Judge, he cites

Mr. Justice Fennelly's judgment which dealt with the

administrative law judgment in that case.

"Fennelly J. considered that the planning official had

asked himself the wrong question. That, I am satisfied

is what happened here. It is not the Planning

Authority's function pursuant to Section 42 of the Act

of 2000 to enquire as to whether the development

insofar as it had been completed was in compliance with

planning permission and on the basis of its conclusion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

15:57

15:57

15:57

15:57


184

on that enquiry to decide on the application: rather it

is confined to the matters specified in Section 42 in

reaching its decision. The Planning Authority having

reached a conclusion on compliance did not proceed to a

consideration of the matters on which Section 42

requires it to be satisfied and indeed determined that

its conclusion in relation to compliance precluded it

from considering the matter further."

That's why I say, Judge, that what Mr. Healy is urging

on the Court is completely incorrect, in my respectful

submission. When we come to look at

Section 42(1)(a)(ii)(IV), the factual matters that were

before the Planning Authority address the matter in

terms of the report I've just read out to the Court.

But also the legal interpretation is that as set out in

McDowell. So the Planning Authority had no choice,

Judge, in my respectful submission, both as a matter of

fact - which is not being seriously contested in these

proceedings - but also as a matter of law in terms of

the approach they had to take.

Then the conclusion, Judge:

"I am satisfied that the Planning Authority

misconstrued the scope of their function under Section

42 of the Act of 2002. They took into account their

conclusion that there was non-compliance with the

planning permission and relied upon such non-compliance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

15:58

15:58

15:58

15:59

15:59


185

simpliciter as the reason for their refusal. This they

were not entitled to do and the decision accordingly

was ultra vires. The decision to refuse accordingly

must be quashed."

Can I tell you that decision was not appealed and in

fact was given endorsement. We'll come to - it will be

in the morning now - what Ms. Justice Irvine had to say

about it. But if I could just ask you to look at tab 9

and I'll be very brief, Judge. Mr. Binman, this is a

decision of Mr. Justice Gilligan. Again, I just want

to refer to one aspect of that decision, Judge. You'll

find it at page 29 of the report under paragraph 48.

"Furthermore..."

And it's the short sentence I'm relying on:

"Furthermore, it appears that the Respondent is

attempting to use one statutory provision to circumvent

another and by virtue of this to circumvent the

fundamental principle of the European Community (the

freedom of goods). McDowell -v- Roscommon County

Council stated that: 'It is a clear principle of

administrative that a power may not be exercised for a

purpose other than that for which it was concerned'."

You'll see, again, Judge, in the Frank Harrington case

about a quarry, a case against An Bord Pleanála, again

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

15:59

15:59

15:59

16:00

16:00


186

a very short reference to it but nonetheless important,

page 6:

"Section 34(2) does not include within the ambit of

matters to be considered, the issue of determining

whether development is authorised. In this regard the

Applicant cites the case of McDowell -v- Roscommon

County Council. This case was decided under a

different legislative provision (Section 42 of the

Planning and Development Act 2000). Nevertheless, it

is relevant insofar as it shows that matters which An

Bord Pleanála may consider are only those matters with

the Oireachtas prescribed in legislation."

Judge, I won't be terribly long in terms of the other

authorities, Judge, but I think it's 4:00 o'clock. I

don't know what the Court wants to sit in the morning.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: You tell me.

MR. HAYDEN: I was just going to suggest that, Judge.

We were getting concerned on our side of the fence over

here about the time. We have to finish tomorrow.

MR. BRADLEY: He has a concern about me going on too

much. I'll endeavour to be quick. Does 10:00 o'clock

suit the Court?

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Sure.

MR. HAYDEN: I don't mind the 10:00 bit it's when they

finish is what I'm more interested in.

MR. BRADLEY: I have only started. Mr. Hayden --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

16:00

16:00

16:01

16:01

16:01


187

MR. HAYDEN: I'm not trying to cut my Friend short, to

I get an idea what time Mr. Simons and myself would get

tomorrow.

MR. BRADLEY: Judge, I'll be finished by lunchtime.

MR. SIMONS: I'll be an hour.

MR. HAYDEN: About 45 minutes, half an hour/45 minutes.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Sounds like we are getting out

early then tomorrow.

MR. HAYDEN: Then there is the right of reply.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Oh yes, of course. All these

rights.

MR. BRADLEY: I missed that, Judge.

MR. HAYDEN: Given that Mr. Healy is complaining about

not being heard.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Just a right of reply. We can

start earlier.

MR. BRADLEY: I can start whatever time you want,

Judge.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: Shall we start at 9:00?

MR. HEALY: I'm in some difficulty at 9:00.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: If Mr. Collins is here, does that

work for you?

MR. HEALY: He can be here.

MR. JUSTICE BARRETT: 9:00 o'clock tomorrow.

THE HEARING WAS THEN ADJOURNED TO WEDNESDAY, 18TH

OCTOBER 2017 AT 9:00 A.M.

'

'acquisition [1] -

94:4

'affected [1] -

104:10

'any [1] - 32:23

'be [1] - 160:21

'bright [1] -

108:7

'consent' [4] -

32:3, 39:3, 39:12,

40:4

'have [5] - 148:5,

148:6, 148:14,

148:17, 155:3

'having [3] -

152:2, 152:6,

152:8

'it [1] - 185:24

'maybe [1] -

149:14

'particular [1] -

179:6

'precautionary

[1] - 73:22

'project' [5] -

32:4, 32:6, 33:4,

33:9, 33:19

'projects' [1] -

32:16

'scientific [1] -

73:23

'Section [1] -

176:11

'the [6] - 31:29,

50:26, 108:14,

108:22, 171:17,

176:29

'well [2] - 69:26,

161:5

'zone' [1] -

105:16

1

1 [33] - 6:25,

7:11, 7:12, 13:12,

14:5, 17:23,

17:29, 20:22,

25:4, 26:11,

26:12, 29:20,

29:22, 54:14,

77:24, 92:2,

93:21, 99:19,

100:2, 103:19,

104:9, 138:10,

139:6, 139:21,

141:2, 141:4,

141:16, 141:17,

158:13, 162:25,

163:3, 173:27,

180:3

1(2 [4] - 31:17,

31:24, 32:7,

33:19

1(2)(a [1] - 30:4

1(2)(g)(iv [1] -

64:14

1(2)(g)(iv).. [1] -

63:25

1) [1] - 139:19

10 [5] - 3:16,

3:22, 4:12, 68:17,

120:6

104 [2] - 52:22,

52:26

106 [1] - 180:29

10:00 [2] -

186:24, 186:27

11 [9] - 27:2,

27:9, 32:18,

63:16, 69:3,

120:8, 159:29,

160:2, 174:26

111 [1] - 104:9

113 [1] - 122:15

116 [1] - 109:11

116.. [1] - 109:9

118 [2] - 26:16,

26:22

12 [8] - 1:3, 24:1,

24:2, 63:21,

70:28, 71:6,

77:24, 99:20

12(h [1] - 164:16

123 [1] - 141:5

124 [3] - 55:11,

55:19, 146:26

126 [2] - 56:10,

63:10

127 [2] - 57:21,

121:17

128 [2] - 57:29,

58:21

12th [2] - 71:12,

170:12

13 [23] - 24:5,

26:12, 26:17,

27:17, 27:22,

27:29, 30:8,

30:12, 30:21,

31:12, 32:22,

32:29, 34:11,

34:23, 35:8,

35:20, 35:24,

36:14, 36:19,

57:23, 79:28,

178:15

13(a [2] - 30:2,

30:3

130 [1] - 59:8

132 [1] - 60:11

134 [1] - 61:14

136 [1] - 62:7

138 [1] - 58:19

14 [3] - 4:27,

24:9, 179:10

14km [1] - 71:28

15 [26] - 37:2,

37:4, 95:7,

117:21, 120:4,

126:28, 139:3,

139:4, 139:6,

141:1, 141:10,

141:13, 141:27,

142:1, 142:16,

142:23, 145:10,

145:25, 146:18,

146:21, 150:3,

150:4, 152:5,

161:25, 162:10

15th [3] - 164:4,

164:10, 164:19

16 [3] - 21:4,

21:5, 53:10

16th [8] - 122:1,

122:5, 123:14,

124:11, 162:18,

164:6, 164:10,

164:20

17 [4] - 37:2,

37:16, 68:18,

68:20

17TH [2] - 1:25,

3:2

17th [1] - 170:23

18TH [1] -

187:26

18th [1] - 170:25

19 [1] - 117:21

1930 [1] - 42:16

1947 [1] - 37:7

1954 [1] - 181:3

1960 [1] - 181:12

1964 [1] - 180:29

1980 [1] - 135:3

1982 [13] - 47:6,

156:3, 157:4,

159:17, 160:2,

160:16, 168:4,

174:11, 175:23,

176:9, 176:11,

177:5, 177:11

1991 [2] - 37:8,

38:24

1992 [1] - 104:9

1993 [2] - 41:22,

41:25

1994 [2] - 104:9,

104:25

1997 [1] - 37:19

1998 [6] - 20:26,

45:7, 45:8, 45:11,

46:18, 53:11

1999 [6] - 53:14,

54:25, 55:5,

55:25, 55:29,

169:27

19th [2] -

155:24, 156:18

1:00 [1] - 109:23

1st [2] - 54:17,

170:24

2

2 [18] - 4:26,

13:16, 14:4,

16:28, 18:2,

29:22, 47:1,

49:20, 92:23,

93:1, 99:19,

103:21, 104:25,

158:14, 159:14,

163:4, 180:10

2(1 [2] - 39:3,

56:26

2) [1] - 14:2

2.1 [1] - 28:26

2.2 [1] - 171:22

2.6 [1] - 172:10

20 [3] - 50:22,

104:26, 117:14

20(3 [1] - 73:1

2000 [17] -

20:28, 21:13,

22:16, 24:20,

68:4, 118:7,

121:17, 159:18,

175:24, 177:17,

178:23, 179:22,

180:13, 180:17,

180:18, 181:27,

183:27

2000) [1] -

186:10

2001 [4] - 60:15,

155:10, 174:29,

181:20

2002 [1] - 184:27

2004 [21] -

42:16, 43:4, 45:9,

45:26, 45:29,

46:20, 122:1,

122:5, 122:8,

123:14, 169:5,

170:12, 170:21,

170:23, 170:24,

170:27, 171:4,

171:13, 171:14

2005 [2] - 20:19,

21:11

2006 [2] - 54:26,

55:25

2007 [4] - 36:3,

60:17, 155:24,

156:18

2007/2008 [1] -

9:7

2008 [3] - 54:14,

54:20, 54:27

2010 [5] - 7:3,

8:18, 8:20,

155:22, 155:23

2011 [5] - 27:10,

63:18, 77:23,

78:5, 79:7

2011/92/EU [1] -

27:5

2013 [1] - 71:12

2014 [3] - 63:6,

71:10, 74:8

2015 [2] -

126:29, 141:24

2015" [1] - 141:8

2016 [4] -

143:28, 144:23,

144:25, 162:18

2017 [6] - 1:25,

3:2, 7:4, 144:6,

163:19, 187:27

2017/344JR [1] -

1:5

2018 [1] - 144:6

2020 [1] - 144:2

2050 [3] -

140:18, 140:25,

143:7

207 [1] - 96:4

20th [1] - 181:20

21 [1] - 26:20

216 [3] - 43:18,

44:6, 44:8

217 [1] - 44:15

21st [3] - 169:5,

169:27, 171:13

22 [1] - 54:20

22nd [2] - 71:9,

74:8

24 [6] - 26:15,

26:22, 27:4, 69:4,

71:1, 135:28

25 [2] - 37:19,

71:6

25th [5] - 122:1,

122:7, 123:14,

124:11, 170:27


1

26 [4] - 31:9,

31:13, 53:14,

71:22

27 [2] - 54:11,

71:26

27th [1] - 171:4

28 [7] - 7:1, 7:2,

7:3, 72:8, 104:26,

148:7, 156:11

28th [1] - 21:11

29 [4] - 72:16,

72:23, 104:26,

185:13

2:00 [1] - 111:3

2nd [2] - 163:19,

166:1

3

3 [25] - 7:9, 15:5,

18:17, 20:14,

20:17, 26:9,

26:10, 30:24,

40:29, 44:5,

49:19, 63:29,

64:15, 67:17,

67:18, 103:24,

104:9, 134:5,

139:17, 141:3,

141:4, 163:6,

170:1, 173:26,

175:1

3(1 [2] - 140:12,

140:24

3(1) [1] - 140:10

3) [2] - 14:29,

158:14

30 [1] - 47:18

30th [1] - 170:21

31 [1] - 60:17

316 [1] - 134:12

32 [4] - 35:21,

36:9, 36:16,

135:3

321 [1] - 102:11

323 [1] - 103:5

325 [1] - 104:3

327kg [1] -

89:14

328 [1] - 107:18

34(2 [1] - 186:4

34(4)(g [1] -

14:15

34(4)(g) [1] -

14:13

353 [1] - 104:9

364 [2] - 4:28,

4:29

369 [2] - 130:6,

130:9

37 [3] - 50:26,

92:24, 132:21

372 [1] - 131:15

38 [4] - 4:27, 5:1,

47:1, 47:2

39 [1] - 53:6

4

4 [19] - 6:25, 7:1,

16:11, 16:16,

19:25, 47:5,

103:25, 157:4,

157:8, 158:15,

160:4, 163:7,

166:13, 169:3,

174:10, 175:1,

175:23, 177:11,

182:4

4(1 [9] - 156:2,

157:19, 159:17,

160:16, 160:20,

168:3, 168:11,

176:8, 176:11

4(1)(c [1] - 177:4

4(2 [3] - 27:15,

27:18, 32:15

4) [1] - 16:10

4.. [1] - 139:27

4.3 [1] - 121:22

40 [10] - 17:11,

17:16, 17:17,

17:26, 17:29,

18:28, 19:3, 54:7,

127:7, 175:1

41 [1] - 18:23

42 [139] - 6:2,

6:8, 6:9, 6:12,

6:21, 6:23, 7:1,

7:4, 8:17, 11:16,

13:11, 18:19,

19:2, 19:3, 20:1,

20:13, 20:28,

20:29, 21:12,

21:20, 21:21,

22:16, 23:7,

23:13, 23:18,

23:26, 24:20,

25:4, 25:17,

25:19, 25:22,

26:6, 26:7, 33:29,

34:4, 34:19,

35:28, 36:7, 36:8,

39:26, 40:16,

41:10, 46:9,

47:29, 48:15,

49:13, 49:16,

56:20, 66:5, 66:6,

81:5, 82:15,

82:28, 84:12,

84:16, 84:26,

84:27, 84:29,

85:5, 85:26, 86:1,

86:6, 86:8, 86:11,

89:2, 89:22,

90:28, 91:9,

97:20, 101:21,

116:20, 119:27,

123:1, 125:17,

126:3, 126:14,

134:14, 136:20,

138:6, 145:11,

145:13, 145:17,

148:7, 149:22,

151:2, 151:3,

151:21, 152:13,

153:25, 153:27,

153:29, 154:8,

154:9, 154:13,

154:21, 156:1,

156:11, 157:2,

157:5, 157:8,

157:19, 157:20,

159:18, 159:23,

162:3, 164:13,

164:14, 164:28,

165:15, 165:16,

165:22, 166:5,

166:16, 167:12,

167:18, 174:11,

174:12, 174:14,

175:3, 175:18,

175:24, 176:27,

177:16, 178:26,

179:22, 180:3,

180:13, 180:25,

181:26, 182:5,

182:6, 182:28,

183:26, 184:2,

184:5, 184:27,

186:9

42(1 [1] - 89:2

42(1)(a [1] -

167:18

42(1)(a)(ii [1] -

154:10

42(1)(a)(ii)(I [1] -

156:12

42(1)(a)(ii)(IV [4]

- 154:18, 162:11,

164:23, 184:13

42(1)(a)(ii)(IV)

[1] - 157:28

42(1)(b [2] -

154:10, 167:19

42(1)(c)(iii [1] -

21:16

42(1)(d [1] -

176:2

42(a [1] - 127:9

43 [5] - 15:12,

41:3, 44:5, 44:8,

54:16

433 [1] - 102:11

44 [3] - 20:17,

38:19, 38:20

442 [1] - 103:5

445 [2] - 109:12

45 [2] - 39:1,

187:6

451 [1] - 104:3

456 [1] - 107:15

458 [1] - 107:15

46 [8] - 38:18,

39:6, 39:29, 41:7,

44:16, 44:18,

73:19, 175:4

460 [2] - 107:18,

111:24

461 [1] - 111:26

463 [1] - 112:27

466 [1] - 113:25

467 [1] - 114:14

47 [4] - 38:19,

39:17, 96:3,

175:1

471 [1] - 115:24

472 [1] - 116:13

48 [4] - 45:2,

96:3, 96:16,

185:13

49 [2] - 45:22,

181:9

49(1 [1] - 181:3

4:00 [1] - 186:16

4th [1] - 171:14

5

5 [5] - 7:21, 17:1,

139:23, 163:11,

168:24

5.2km [1] - 72:1

50 [2] - 12:20,

134:5

54 [1] - 37:24

55 [2] - 7:9,

121:20

57 [1] - 156:16

5th [1] - 172:24

6

6 [11] - 17:8,

19:2, 63:20,

63:21, 66:25,

68:1, 68:8,

129:24, 163:15,

186:2

6(3 [1] - 66:8

6.. [1] - 140:2

60 [1] - 36:29

61 [1] - 38:16

62 [3] - 122:25,

123:8, 123:10

63 [1] - 123:18

65 [1] - 128:13

66 [1] - 58:18

67 [2] - 49:20,

53:3

68 [3] - 49:20,

49:22, 155:9

69 [2] - 30:25,

158:29

6th [1] - 165:19

7

7 [3] - 19:14,

52:1, 95:6

7(1 [1] - 155:7

70 [1] - 47:18

730 [1] - 37:4

75 [1] - 72:22

78 [1] - 121:21

7th [2] - 165:18,

166:7

8

8 [11] - 1:25,

15:25, 42:17,

42:25, 43:4,

43:10, 45:25,

45:29, 46:20,

138:10, 159:27

8.4 [2] - 169:13,

170:2

81 [1] - 74:29

82 [1] - 122:25

84 [6] - 73:1,

92:29, 94:14,

96:19, 97:12,

159:1

85/337 [6] -

31:17, 32:7,

32:14, 33:5,

33:20, 39:4

85/337... [1] -

31:25

85/337/E.E.C [1]

- 46:16

87 [2] - 94:1,

159:1

8A [3] - 63:17,

63:18

9

9 [10] - 74:7,

82:7, 98:23,

98:26, 110:1,

110:7, 159:27,

161:17, 165:27,

185:9

90 [1] - 135:4

91 [1] - 135:5

9:00 [4] -

187:19, 187:20,

187:24, 187:27

A

a) [2] - 7:11, 8:15

A.M [1] - 187:27

AA [7] - 66:10,

66:13, 88:27,

90:29, 91:1,

156:21

ability [9] -

12:19, 14:22,

14:24, 39:26,

39:27, 65:21,

78:27, 101:18,

115:6

able [7] - 10:2,

20:4, 20:5, 21:15,

70:1, 75:26,

113:10

above-named

[1] - 1:29

abreast [1] -

149:25

absence [4] -

33:16, 35:5,

36:11, 135:24

absent [2] -

49:12, 49:13

absolute [1] -

127:10

absolutely [14] -

14:21, 27:6,

35:19, 43:22,

47:13, 76:8,

76:23, 99:14,

137:14, 166:4,

166:22, 177:22,

180:23

abstract [1] -

114:4

accept [6] -

25:22, 47:14,

49:8, 75:4, 144:9,

164:19


2

accepted [3] -

90:11, 112:18,

166:8

accepting [2] -

24:28, 180:1

accepts [1] -

166:12

access [1] - 3:28

accommodatio

n [2] - 134:18,

135:24

accompanied

[1] - 90:19

accord [2] -

105:14, 114:10

accordance [6] -

17:13, 23:21,

57:10, 65:22,

106:22, 169:29

Accordingly [2]

- 32:2, 39:19

accordingly [2] -

185:2, 185:3

accords [1] -

178:25

account [11] -

25:8, 60:3, 92:13,

93:26, 94:22,

110:12, 112:20,

145:22, 180:7,

183:3, 184:27

account.. [1] -

93:23

accountant [1] -

181:22

accounts [1] -

181:24

achieve [3] -

140:16, 143:18,

143:23

achieved [1] -

143:6

Achonry [3] -

122:6, 122:19,

123:20

acknowledge

[1] - 80:7

acknowledged

[1] - 77:28

acknowledges

[2] - 98:24, 107:5

acknowledging

[1] - 147:15

acquire [10] -

93:3, 93:9, 93:15,

93:22, 94:3,

94:15, 94:17,

99:27, 103:8,

103:15

acquisition [8] -

94:9, 102:16,

106:10, 112:21,

114:11, 114:28,

115:29, 116:6

Act [76] - 7:3,

20:28, 21:13,

22:16, 24:20,

38:23, 41:22,

41:25, 42:16,

43:4, 45:25,

45:29, 46:20,

47:6, 84:19,

85:21, 92:29,

93:6, 94:1, 96:19,

113:29, 117:29,

118:7, 121:17,

126:29, 138:11,

138:14, 139:3,

139:21, 140:18,

141:8, 141:10,

141:24, 141:27,

143:6, 146:29,

147:2, 147:7,

148:7, 151:16,

153:6, 155:2,

155:8, 155:10,

155:23, 156:3,

156:7, 157:4,

159:1, 159:17,

160:2, 160:16,

168:4, 174:11,

175:23, 175:24,

176:9, 176:11,

177:5, 177:11,

177:17, 178:23,

179:22, 180:13,

180:14, 180:16,

180:17, 181:3,

181:11, 181:12,

181:27, 183:26,

184:27, 186:10

Act.. [1] - 160:4

acted [6] -

12:26, 12:27,

12:29, 117:16,

121:24, 167:27

Action [2] -

126:29, 141:7

ACTION [1] -

1:24

action [11] -

1:29, 6:18,

114:26, 122:12,

140:6, 147:8,

147:9, 149:17,

150:1, 166:20

actions [1] -

151:26

actively [1] -

123:21

activities [2] -

45:14, 78:6

activity [9] -

50:27, 51:18,

52:10, 52:14,

77:17, 77:18,

78:8, 78:15,

78:16

activity.. [1] -

52:4

acts [1] - 133:12

Acts [5] - 42:6,

79:6, 107:5,

126:13

actual [3] - 3:11,

111:25, 135:11

adaptation [8] -

139:9, 139:10,

139:21, 139:29,

140:1, 140:22,

142:5, 142:6

adapting [1] -

139:14

add [2] - 14:8,

105:26

added [1] -

49:10

adding [1] -

117:8

addition [4] -

5:14, 29:14, 49:3,

113:16

additional [18] -

7:20, 22:18,

25:23, 34:5,

49:12, 75:28,

85:17, 92:5,

120:4, 120:7,

120:14, 120:16,

120:22, 120:25,

120:26, 124:7,

174:18, 176:3

additionally [1] -

94:26

address [9] -

26:5, 64:26, 70:1,

120:28, 147:7,

147:22, 161:15,

164:26, 184:14

addressed [8] -

3:19, 3:24, 45:20,

70:15, 70:22,

104:20, 155:5,

170:27

adduce [6] -

72:12, 73:19,

75:28, 76:5, 76:6,

76:11

adduced [3] -

83:27, 87:12,

128:20

adduces [1] -

52:9

adequate [4] -

14:6, 14:19,

56:14, 63:13

adherence [1] -

149:28

adjoining [3] -

163:16, 169:13,

170:2

ADJOURNED

[3] - 44:1, 111:5,

187:26

ADJOURNMEN

T [1] - 43:27

adjudicated [1] -

86:24

adjudication [3]

- 83:26, 91:11,

137:20

administration

[1] - 13:14

administrative

[7] - 61:21, 113:6,

133:12, 148:25,

183:13, 183:21,

185:25

admission [1] -

171:18

admits [1] -

121:28

admitted [1] -

85:28

adopt [6] -

49:12, 105:12,

105:16, 144:10,

152:26, 165:14

adopted [4] -

59:17, 100:7,

145:12, 165:15

adopting [1] -

142:19

adoption [4] -

39:12, 40:5,

44:24, 144:23

ADRIENNE [1] -

1:7

advance [1] -

81:15

advanced [8] -

83:7, 84:2,

111:20, 123:10,

128:15, 128:17,

131:18, 132:5

advancing [2] -

74:4, 133:14

advantage [1] -

120:19

adversarial [1] -

73:10

adverse [21] -

28:7, 32:26, 33:6,

66:10, 71:3, 71:4,

82:10, 97:26,

106:7, 108:19,

108:22, 108:25,

109:19, 109:24,

109:25, 110:10,

111:14, 113:24,

116:23, 126:7,

152:23

adversely [7] -

97:23, 97:24,

102:5, 105:2,

106:3, 116:18,

148:16

adverted [1] -

82:24

advice [1] -

132:6

advisers [1] -

169:1

Advisory [1] -

138:22

Advocate [9] -

37:1, 49:22,

50:21, 53:4, 55:8,

56:21, 61:5, 63:7,

64:6

aeroplane [1] -

150:16

aeroplane's [1] -

150:16

affect [11] -

82:10, 97:26,

98:1, 103:9,

105:2, 106:2,

107:9, 107:17,

108:1, 113:24,

114:9

affected [19] -

96:18, 96:23,

96:25, 97:24,

98:6, 98:10,

100:10, 100:18,

101:12, 101:14,

102:5, 102:16,

102:21, 102:25,

103:14, 105:15,

112:7, 116:18,

148:16

affected." [1] -

112:11

affecting [2] -

42:21, 107:7

affection [1] -

106:12

affects [1] -

98:12

affidavit [13] -

71:8, 74:6, 74:7,

75:7, 76:24, 77:1,

77:21, 161:26,

163:22, 163:25,

164:15, 172:2,

172:12

affidavits [2] -

66:21, 75:27

afford [2] -

99:29, 171:10

afforded [11] -

82:27, 83:13,

85:20, 92:1, 95:2,

101:21, 106:21,

107:12, 115:15,

124:5, 126:8

affords [2] -

101:27, 108:16

afoot [1] - 147:5

aforementione

d [1] - 54:13

afraid [1] - 26:24

AFTER [1] -

111:7

against..." [1] -

9:27

AGENT [1] -

2:15

ago [3] - 21:21,

44:18, 90:25

agreement [1] -

143:27

agreements [1] -

114:25

ahead [2] - 51:9,

51:12

aided [1] - 86:22

aimed [3] -

62:10, 140:4,

140:6

air [1] - 53:29

aircraft [2] -

150:22, 163:9

airline [1] -

143:22

Airport [11] -

5:9, 36:1, 38:12,

87:24, 98:19,

101:24, 107:8,

128:21, 129:1,

129:8, 151:13

airport [9] -

9:18, 9:21, 36:4,

38:8, 99:6, 106:1,

163:7, 163:12,

163:16

AIRPORT [2] -

1:17, 2:17

albeit [1] - 159:9


3

alia [5] - 32:13,

42:18, 43:3,

56:29, 117:6

alive [1] - 149:27

all.. [1] - 21:28

alleged [3] -

111:26, 126:25,

128:25

alleges [1] -

122:12

alleging [1] -

118:17

Allen [1] - 67:14

allow [10] - 3:22,

6:12, 31:4, 31:6,

31:20, 45:12,

46:14, 65:15,

67:11, 121:25

allowance [1] -

120:10

allowed [3] -

36:4, 100:19,

108:3

almost [2] -

80:9, 128:1

alone [1] - 45:12

alter [2] - 66:7,

150:4

alteram [2] -

105:24, 123:16

alterations [4] -

33:10, 33:17,

35:6, 36:12

alterations" [1] -

36:12

alternative [2] -

144:11, 150:20

ambit [1] - 186:4

amenable [1] -

110:8

amended [5] -

42:16, 46:17,

121:29, 157:19,

157:20

amendment [2] -

8:18, 8:19

Amendment [4]

- 42:15, 155:23,

156:7, 181:12

amendments [1]

- 159:18

amount [4] -

48:16, 104:28,

120:11, 145:16

amounting [1] -

106:24

analogy [1] -

106:9

analyse [1] -

110:10

analysed [2] -

103:15, 113:28

analysis [5] -

75:6, 92:26,

109:17, 109:28,

148:27

anchors [3] -

57:14, 58:14,

58:19

ancillary [2] -

36:5

AND [3] - 1:19,

1:20, 44:1

annex [1] -

27:14

Annex [26] - 4:8,

26:23, 26:29,

27:1, 27:17,

27:22, 28:5, 28:8,

28:25, 28:27,

29:3, 31:12,

32:14, 32:22,

32:24, 34:11,

34:23, 35:9,

35:20, 36:19,

48:17, 57:23,

79:28

anomalous [1] -

136:27

answer [5] -

33:27, 34:16,

36:17, 53:1,

102:24

anticipated [1] -

41:29

apart [5] - 105:7,

114:4, 120:20,

136:27, 179:5

apologies [4] -

26:27, 70:23,

129:15, 141:17

apologise [1] -

132:11

appalling [1] -

16:14

apparent [6] -

41:26, 55:19,

57:23, 59:12,

112:13, 157:26

appeal [13] -

37:18, 85:11,

97:19, 106:21,

117:19, 117:26,

121:17, 122:7,

122:27, 123:23,

123:29, 125:10,

125:22

appealed [2] -

166:25, 185:6

appealing [1] -

76:1

appear [5] -

58:17, 81:14,

81:23, 107:20,

175:26

APPEARANCE

S [1] - 2:2

appellant [2] -

2:32, 123:24

Appendix [3] -

162:21, 162:25,

162:27

applicable [5] -

55:20, 77:28,

88:29, 117:28,

132:23

applicant [23] -

8:29, 9:29, 20:28,

21:8, 21:11,

21:25, 22:24,

73:2, 76:10,

98:14, 118:12,

121:24, 122:9,

122:11, 122:12,

123:10, 123:19,

123:26, 124:2,

124:5, 125:1,

125:5

Applicant [23] -

9:26, 52:9, 62:18,

69:6, 69:7, 69:10,

71:8, 72:11,

72:26, 73:11,

73:15, 73:19,

73:26, 74:2, 74:4,

74:13, 74:16,

75:2, 110:23,

117:4, 160:17,

186:7

Applicant's [1] -

23:3

Applicant.. [1] -

74:10

applicants [8] -

41:13, 103:13,

114:11, 114:17,

114:24, 115:5,

115:27, 116:9

APPLICANTS

[2] - 1:12, 2:4

Applicants [52] -

4:18, 16:13, 17:6,

22:2, 23:15,

33:29, 36:18,

40:28, 41:12,

50:1, 72:19,

77:20, 81:14,

81:25, 82:5,

82:11, 82:19,

82:26, 84:16,

85:13, 86:15,

91:20, 95:29,

96:6, 96:13,

97:11, 98:3,

98:16, 98:28,

99:6, 99:25,

102:3, 102:14,

103:15, 104:10,

109:29, 110:16,

110:19, 111:1,

111:26, 115:18,

116:21, 116:26,

128:5, 131:28,

132:4, 158:12,

168:27, 169:28,

170:12, 171:10,

171:13

Applicants' [12]

- 81:21, 82:2,

82:16, 83:24,

84:22, 86:20,

97:29, 103:8,

110:19, 111:21,

116:16, 126:19

applicants’ [3] -

112:2, 112:6,

112:10

Application [1] -

170:8

application [54]

- 7:14, 11:27,

15:10, 15:13,

15:14, 15:24,

22:17, 47:5,

47:29, 48:11,

48:15, 53:10,

55:22, 67:22,

68:6, 72:25, 74:2,

74:23, 81:28,

84:29, 85:11,

85:29, 87:22,

89:12, 90:20,

91:12, 99:4,

105:12, 109:16,

117:13, 118:1,

121:29, 123:29,

125:22, 144:11,

161:21, 162:4,

164:9, 164:13,

164:27, 165:8,

166:26, 167:8,

169:25, 170:17,

170:21, 172:1,

174:16, 175:4,

175:7, 177:16,

182:29, 184:1

applications [4]

- 42:2, 124:15,

160:4, 160:13

applied [4] -

20:23, 101:3,

124:24, 181:1

applies [7] -

11:29, 19:16,

65:24, 107:27,

119:13, 160:7,

174:11

apply [13] -

22:12, 22:15,

48:29, 52:29,

62:9, 65:10,

65:21, 72:21,

78:5, 145:15,

166:13, 177:15,

178:3

appoint [1] -

181:21

appreciate [3] -

6:26, 41:10,

109:22

appreciation [1]

- 120:21

approach [11] -

47:22, 48:21,

65:13, 79:3,

143:14, 144:7,

144:10, 165:14,

169:24, 177:23,

184:21

approaches [4] -

131:14, 131:26,

132:1, 143:25

approaching [1]

- 3:15

Appropriate [1] -

119:7

appropriate [34]

- 7:20, 11:28,

12:5, 14:4, 16:19,

16:25, 18:3,

18:16, 18:19,

19:18, 22:18,

48:2, 62:14,

66:18, 68:8,

78:11, 81:6,

86:24, 88:22,

90:18, 90:19,

99:29, 106:5,

121:25, 136:2,

142:11, 143:17,

156:21, 162:14,

168:8, 168:14,

174:17, 181:12

appropriately

[2] - 22:10, 167:24

approval [4] -

42:4, 48:14,

138:14, 140:20

approvals [1] -

41:21

approve [1] -

109:8

approved [17] -

48:25, 49:4,

79:27, 109:13,

110:10, 139:8,

139:9, 139:10,

139:21, 139:22,

139:26, 139:29,

140:1, 142:3,

142:5, 142:6,

176:20

Approved [1] -

139:25

approves [1] -

109:11

approving [2] -

38:27, 39:20

April [1] - 169:27

archaeological

[3] - 41:20, 41:27,

42:11

architects [4] -

169:5, 169:24,

170:28, 171:9

area [20] - 10:26,

11:1, 11:14,

11:24, 11:28,

60:19, 69:17,

69:18, 71:14,

71:23, 71:29,

77:8, 78:9, 87:1,

87:5, 87:18,

87:28, 98:22,

117:8, 131:3

areas [7] - 60:2,

69:14, 71:5, 72:6,

77:14, 105:17

argue [3] -

24:23, 48:8,

179:25

argued [3] -

23:19, 72:11,

117:16

argues [1] -

122:18

argument [18] -

24:19, 27:26,

27:28, 43:17,

48:14, 75:3, 76:8,

76:18, 83:7,

122:26, 123:10,

123:18, 124:25,

165:10, 174:4,

174:6, 179:21

arguments [11] -

23:23, 41:11,

41:13, 62:18,

65:9, 66:15,

122:22, 136:25,


4

156:14, 159:9,

165:1

arise [8] - 47:10,

66:18, 79:18,

80:20, 90:23,

120:12, 171:25,

173:4

arisen [2] -

52:13, 59:23

arises [11] -

11:19, 42:13,

46:4, 55:23,

64:27, 65:18,

66:5, 78:29,

112:19, 135:7,

179:4

arising [3] -

46:1, 52:28,

92:28

arm [1] - 137:12

arose [3] - 59:4,

60:28, 63:2

arrive [1] - 112:1

arrived [3] -

168:15, 178:18,

178:24

ARTHUR [1] -

2:20

article [2] - 64:1,

64:15

Article [27] -

27:14, 27:18,

29:20, 29:22,

30:4, 31:17,

31:24, 32:7,

32:15, 33:19,

39:3, 56:26,

63:17, 63:18,

63:25, 64:14,

66:8, 66:25, 68:1,

68:8, 121:22,

122:15, 127:7,

132:21, 134:14,

136:20

articles [1] -

127:7

articulated [5] -

79:11, 79:14,

79:18, 80:21,

81:23

AS [4] - 3:2, 3:8,

44:1, 111:7

asbestos [2] -

89:14, 162:1

ascertain [1] -

181:24

ascertaining [2]

- 129:27, 137:10

ascertainment

[1] - 130:8

ascribed [1] -

43:13

aside [4] - 66:17,

88:15, 96:27,

133:24

aspect [13] -

11:10, 33:10,

33:18, 35:6,

82:14, 90:27,

98:1, 116:14,

116:15, 116:17,

160:17, 160:18,

185:12

aspects [5] -

55:13, 98:18,

116:17, 160:12,

176:12

Asphalt [1] -

80:5

ass [1] - 60:4

assault [1] -

68:15

assert [1] -

127:3

asserting [1] -

133:3

assertion [5] -

66:23, 71:2, 74:6,

74:8

assertions [3] -

66:20, 75:14

assess [1] -

111:29

assessed [4] -

62:12, 67:25,

158:22, 178:5

assesses [2] -

112:27, 164:14

assessing [3] -

99:16, 100:2,

123:18

assessment [62]

- 12:5, 12:6, 48:2,

48:9, 52:13,

53:12, 55:28,

56:7, 56:8, 56:13,

56:18, 56:26,

57:2, 58:5, 58:24,

58:28, 59:1, 59:6,

59:10, 59:16,

59:26, 60:6,

60:16, 60:27,

61:17, 61:26,

62:9, 63:13,

66:18, 68:8,

73:24, 78:11,

78:17, 78:23,

78:26, 86:13,

87:23, 88:10,

88:22, 88:23,

90:18, 90:19,

90:23, 92:2,

98:20, 99:5,

152:17, 156:20,

156:21, 156:22,

158:3, 158:25,

160:26, 161:12,

162:14, 162:15,

166:6, 177:7

Assessment [4]

- 53:7, 119:6,

119:7, 122:3

assessments

[7] - 12:6, 81:6,

81:7, 88:23,

119:2, 158:10,

162:15

asset [11] - 93:3,

93:10, 93:23,

94:2, 94:9, 94:10,

94:12, 94:18,

94:25

assets [3] -

97:14, 99:27,

113:17

assets.. [1] -

93:17

assigned [2] -

140:10, 170:21

assist [1] -

155:16

assistance [2] -

41:1, 175:23

Assistant [1] -

170:22

associated [5] -

94:16, 96:7, 97:3,

163:12, 163:17

assume [1] -

149:2

assumed [2] -

60:15, 129:6

assumption [2] -

150:24, 150:26

assure [1] -

135:9

AT [1] - 187:27

attach [1] - 14:5

attached [1] -

112:17

attack [5] - 66:1,

68:27, 91:22,

97:1, 97:5

attempt [1] -

167:15

attempting [1] -

185:20

attention [25] -

6:27, 7:17, 7:26,

8:4, 8:19, 9:14,

19:14, 20:1, 21:3,

21:23, 24:9, 41:5,

46:28, 55:13,

57:9, 59:3, 65:11,

65:20, 66:28,

66:29, 68:18,

76:26, 117:26,

121:16, 170:22

ATTORNEY [2] -

1:19, 2:22

Attorney [2] -

128:13, 130:25

attractive [1] -

104:18

attribute [1] -

110:9

audi [2] -

105:23, 123:16

August [10] -

45:9, 71:12,

155:24, 156:18,

170:12, 170:21,

170:23, 170:25,

170:27, 171:4

authorisation

[2] - 34:25, 41:20

authorise [3] -

34:4, 34:5, 34:8

authorised [20] -

6:17, 20:8, 28:5,

29:4, 29:8, 29:9,

29:11, 30:14,

30:16, 30:17,

30:20, 32:25,

34:6, 35:10,

35:13, 35:23,

35:24, 35:29,

36:13, 186:6

authorities [34] -

20:11, 20:12,

25:7, 26:3, 26:8,

32:1, 40:20,

81:10, 81:16,

92:19, 105:15,

120:4, 120:6,

120:8, 120:11,

120:14, 120:17,

120:22, 120:25,

120:26, 134:27,

136:29, 138:11,

141:11, 141:28,

145:26, 149:25,

155:15, 155:18,

156:26, 159:2,

167:4, 180:6,

186:16

Authorities [7] -

6:25, 14:17,

20:15, 26:9,

26:11, 125:20,

155:14

Authority [88] -

5:9, 6:12, 7:15,

7:27, 10:12, 11:4,

11:5, 11:15,

11:25, 13:20,

15:7, 16:1, 16:3,

20:3, 23:8, 24:12,

25:5, 25:6, 36:1,

38:13, 50:13,

85:6, 86:21, 87:2,

87:11, 87:24,

87:26, 88:17,

88:19, 89:17,

89:23, 91:12,

91:14, 92:4,

92:15, 97:15,

98:19, 98:25,

101:17, 101:21,

101:23, 101:24,

107:8, 141:10,

141:27, 143:20,

143:27, 144:5,

144:18, 148:10,

151:13, 157:25,

158:2, 158:4,

158:5, 158:11,

158:18, 158:22,

159:5, 160:19,

160:21, 160:26,

161:2, 161:3,

161:13, 162:6,

165:4, 167:20,

168:13, 173:21,

175:5, 176:13,

176:21, 177:1,

177:7, 177:9,

179:14, 180:4,

180:5, 180:12,

180:24, 182:14,

182:16, 182:28,

184:3, 184:14,

184:17, 184:25

AUTHORITY [2]

- 1:17, 2:18

authority [53] -

6:7, 7:21, 9:19,

9:21, 10:27, 14:5,

15:11, 15:13,

15:17, 15:23,

16:24, 19:19,

22:8, 22:17,

22:22, 22:28,

23:1, 31:3, 31:4,

31:6, 31:20,

31:29, 36:4,

36:24, 38:9,

46:27, 61:7,

63:23, 78:15,

78:22, 83:7,

83:11, 89:18,

92:6, 116:25,

116:27, 129:16,

132:5, 134:2,

142:2, 142:26,

142:29, 145:12,

148:18, 148:19,

155:5, 156:25,

162:3, 164:25,

174:18, 178:6,

178:11

Authority's [4] -

50:10, 99:3,

164:12, 183:26

automatically

[1] - 27:19

available [5] -

77:9, 93:7, 114:3,

125:4, 125:18

availed [2] -

85:13, 119:28

avers [1] - 172:2

Aviation [1] -

143:16

aviation [14] -

128:23, 142:26,

143:1, 143:13,

143:19, 143:23,

144:2, 144:7,

144:20, 144:25,

147:3, 147:4,

147:6, 151:19

avoid [1] - 68:2

avoidance [1] -

93:15

aware [5] - 17:4,

65:1, 65:2,

123:27, 165:28

awareness [1] -

5:25

B

background [2]

- 55:9, 168:26

Baine [18] -

27:25, 28:16,

29:14, 30:10,

30:24, 34:3,

34:14, 36:24,

47:20, 47:21,

47:23, 48:23,

49:10, 57:29,

62:25, 62:26,

62:28, 79:23

balance [2] -

124:22, 137:23

balanced [2] -

61:21, 127:10

balancing [1] -

106:5


5

bald [2] - 66:20,

75:14

bank [18] - 93:3,

93:10, 93:17,

93:23, 94:2, 94:9,

94:10, 94:12,

94:18, 94:25,

95:9, 95:14,

95:23, 99:27,

113:12, 114:27

bank's [1] -

96:29

banking [1] -

113:12

banks [4] -

94:24, 95:19,

99:28, 114:20

bar [1] - 26:8

Barberstown [1]

- 163:5

BARRETT [64] -

1:24, 6:29, 7:5,

26:19, 26:24,

26:28, 27:2, 27:5,

27:8, 27:13,

34:12, 34:27,

43:20, 43:23,

69:21, 70:5,

70:11, 70:25,

77:11, 80:26,

89:6, 89:13,

95:23, 98:5,

101:10, 102:9,

111:2, 121:2,

121:8, 121:12,

126:22, 132:9,

132:12, 137:2,

141:15, 141:19,

141:22, 144:27,

146:13, 147:29,

149:2, 150:7,

150:14, 151:6,

151:29, 152:7,

153:7, 153:19,

161:18, 161:24,

164:3, 164:8,

164:18, 165:28,

166:17, 177:20,

186:18, 186:26,

187:7, 187:10,

187:15, 187:19,

187:21, 187:24

Barrow [4] -

69:17, 71:13,

71:17, 71:27

based [6] -

74:24, 85:29,

143:14, 143:24,

143:29, 151:4

basement [3] -

169:14, 170:14,

173:27

basis [17] - 3:16,

24:17, 69:24,

73:22, 77:3, 77:5,

77:20, 79:2, 79:8,

89:27, 107:24,

125:26, 133:13,

145:24, 172:13,

179:19, 183:29

bear [2] - 3:19,

62:29

bearing [2] -

124:28, 176:12

became [1] -

41:26

become [3] -

17:4, 55:19,

58:23

becomes [1] -

157:26

beg [2] - 26:29,

112:18

begin [1] -

159:29

beginning [9] -

15:27, 15:28,

18:26, 76:17,

115:9, 123:22,

153:23, 182:2,

182:23

begins [2] -

141:25, 175:19

behalf [7] - 5:9,

5:25, 7:14, 33:28,

81:25, 130:24,

165:1

behind [2] -

159:14, 168:24

Belgium [4] -

30:28, 30:29,

31:3

below [1] -

165:26

benefit [4] -

134:19, 153:8,

171:26, 173:5

bereft [1] - 84:18

beside [2] -

56:22, 183:16

best [1] - 81:8

between [30] -

1:6, 12:25, 13:2,

13:4, 34:2, 41:11,

45:18, 47:9,

49:27, 50:5,

50:12, 51:22,

55:4, 58:10, 61:2,

62:22, 70:17,

74:1, 95:18,

100:28, 104:20,

106:11, 108:8,

113:1, 124:22,

128:22, 129:2,

129:6, 137:23,

175:26

beyond [19] -

8:28, 9:26, 10:1,

34:6, 34:21,

34:22, 35:22,

36:2, 69:27,

79:21, 79:23,

79:27, 86:8,

86:14, 132:3,

132:4, 144:3,

147:13, 147:27

bifurcated [1] -

183:12

Binman [1] -

185:10

biomass [1] -

67:12

bit [9] - 16:12,

42:13, 65:5,

69:27, 154:2,

157:29, 168:26,

186:27

bitter [1] -

135:20

BL [7] - 2:5, 2:8,

2:13, 2:19, 2:23,

2:24, 2:27

Blackwater [1] -

71:15

blasting [1] -

37:10

Blayney [1] -

179:3

Board [5] -

117:25, 118:17,

118:21, 118:28,

119:1

bodies [7] -

78:6, 78:20,

104:22, 105:12,

139:5, 139:19,

151:20

bodily [8] -

127:4, 127:22,

130:26, 134:23,

135:4, 135:6,

135:11, 137:5

body [11] -

25:16, 78:7,

102:25, 105:29,

112:5, 112:9,

114:19, 137:11,

138:18, 139:6,

147:5

Bog [1] - 67:14

bogs [3] - 68:26,

69:15, 74:15

book [35] - 6:25,

14:16, 17:18,

17:20, 17:21,

17:23, 20:17,

25:23, 26:9,

26:10, 26:11,

26:12, 30:23,

30:24, 30:25,

36:29, 40:29,

41:4, 44:5, 47:1,

49:19, 58:18,

67:4, 94:15,

134:5, 138:10,

141:2, 141:4,

141:5, 141:16,

141:17, 159:28

Book [11] - 4:26,

7:9, 20:14, 26:9,

26:11, 49:20,

53:4, 77:24,

92:23, 155:14

booklet [1] -

63:5

books [5] - 5:1,

17:17, 26:17,

26:22, 134:4

Books [1] - 6:25

Bord [26] - 3:12,

3:15, 3:18, 4:14,

34:7, 38:10,

45:21, 51:3, 55:2,

67:1, 67:11,

72:14, 73:13,

73:14, 74:18,

78:14, 78:23,

78:24, 85:11,

116:28, 120:1,

135:3, 185:29,

186:12

borne [5] - 4:6,

4:7, 31:23, 50:20,

61:12

borrower [1] -

94:11

borrower's [1] -

102:19

borrowers [2] -

94:27, 114:9

bottom [5] -

130:9, 141:6,

162:9, 171:3,

178:14

bought [1] -

168:27

bound [1] -

68:22

Bows [1] -

127:25

Bows-Larkin [1]

- 127:25

box [2] - 157:23,

158:24

box-ticking [2] -

157:23, 158:24

Boyne [2] -

69:18, 71:15

BRADLEY [17] -

2:13, 153:14,

153:16, 153:20,

161:20, 161:25,

164:6, 164:11,

164:21, 166:3,

166:19, 177:22,

186:23, 186:29,

187:4, 187:12,

187:17

branchs [1] -

137:24

Breach [1] -

121:21

breach [7] -

23:25, 113:13,

117:17, 123:14,

123:15, 125:6,

128:24

breached [1] -

128:8

break [1] - 43:24

Brennan [2] -

168:24, 174:3

Brexit [2] -

148:1, 153:17

BRIAN [1] - 2:18

bridge [1] -

106:1

brief [3] - 75:21,

123:27, 185:10

BRIEFLY [1] -

44:1

briefly [10] - 5:3,

6:10, 7:10, 36:29,

64:25, 77:23,

79:10, 119:29,

128:3, 130:5

bring [4] - 65:19,

68:23, 117:25,

124:19

bringing [1] -

167:11

brings [1] -

125:29

broad [1] - 57:26

broader [1] -

150:28

brought [7] -

13:25, 67:8, 76:2,

81:25, 84:26,

155:23, 156:19

build [1] - 117:5

building [6] -

41:19, 42:7, 42:9,

91:29, 150:22,

165:6

buildings [2] -

163:8, 163:10

built [4] -

101:13, 101:15,

101:19, 127:24

bulletin [1] -

146:15

Bunbeg [1] -

20:26

bundle [1] -

103:24

burden [6] -

69:6, 70:29,

72:20, 73:16,

118:20, 119:17

business [12] -

112:2, 112:3,

112:6, 112:10,

112:27, 113:8,

113:20, 113:24,

114:21, 145:29,

148:21, 148:26

businesses [2] -

95:3, 115:15

BY [10] - 1:24,

2:6, 2:10, 2:15,

2:20, 2:25, 2:29,

3:8, 81:1, 153:14

Byrne [1] -

164:14

Byrne's [2] -

161:26, 163:22

C

C-C [1] - 169:17

cabling [1] -

163:12

cannot [18] -

11:15, 22:25,

33:16, 34:4, 35:5,

36:11, 56:7, 57:2,

59:28, 66:12,

86:7, 90:13, 91:4,

98:15, 104:28,

105:5, 114:4,

150:24

canvassed [1] -

81:10

capable [8] -

10:15, 11:25,

19:27, 83:26,

100:17, 102:15,

102:24, 109:4


6

capitals [1] -

12:2

capping [1] -

144:1

captures [1] -

30:21

car [1] - 117:7

Carbon [3] -

126:29, 141:8,

141:24

carbon [4] -

138:16, 140:12,

140:16, 140:26

carefully [1] -

79:14

Carrickmines

[1] - 41:16

carried [25] -

3:12, 5:24, 12:7,

14:26, 30:15,

32:4, 42:23,

46:14, 49:27,

51:24, 54:25,

55:5, 57:13, 58:6,

58:28, 59:23,

62:23, 78:22,

78:24, 78:25,

88:24, 89:3,

162:16, 163:23,

180:10

carries [1] -

73:15

carry [6] - 51:25,

53:24, 57:17,

66:13, 78:7,

78:10

carrying [10] -

9:1, 10:4, 10:11,

10:18, 34:5,

42:19, 50:12,

61:2, 73:23,

86:17

case [190] - 4:4,

6:6, 6:9, 7:9, 8:4,

11:17, 12:15,

18:8, 18:12,

18:22, 18:25,

19:15, 19:22,

19:24, 19:25,

19:26, 19:27,

20:2, 20:15,

20:23, 22:1,

23:11, 23:12,

23:17, 24:1, 24:3,

25:14, 25:15,

25:17, 26:7,

27:25, 30:10,

30:27, 31:20,

33:22, 33:29,

34:3, 36:18,

36:24, 36:25,

36:28, 37:3, 38:7,

39:25, 40:13,

40:15, 41:4, 41:8,

41:11, 41:14,

41:15, 41:16,

43:18, 45:5,

45:18, 45:19,

47:2, 47:4, 47:6,

47:8, 47:11,

48:29, 49:18,

49:25, 50:2,

50:19, 51:2,

54:29, 59:4, 60:9,

60:22, 60:23,

61:2, 62:4, 62:20,

63:8, 64:27, 66:4,

66:19, 67:16,

70:21, 71:3, 72:4,

72:20, 74:26,

75:7, 75:14,

75:24, 76:25,

77:29, 79:16,

80:5, 80:19,

80:24, 81:4, 82:5,

83:28, 84:27,

86:7, 88:29, 89:1,

90:1, 90:3, 91:26,

96:28, 99:8,

105:18, 107:15,

109:8, 113:1,

113:2, 117:3,

118:24, 119:19,

119:29, 121:10,

121:16, 121:24,

122:26, 123:19,

125:5, 125:8,

126:8, 128:1,

128:17, 129:18,

130:4, 131:6,

132:15, 132:16,

133:23, 134:5,

137:19, 138:1,

141:20, 144:28,

146:5, 150:7,

150:9, 150:10,

152:1, 152:29,

154:11, 155:2,

155:7, 155:19,

155:28, 156:2,

157:1, 157:13,

159:7, 159:8,

159:15, 160:7,

161:1, 162:7,

164:29, 165:2,

165:4, 165:21,

165:24, 166:18,

167:13, 167:14,

168:24, 174:6,

175:5, 175:8,

176:7, 178:28,

179:5, 180:15,

181:8, 181:11,

181:25, 182:5,

183:10, 183:15,

183:21, 185:28,

185:29, 186:7,

186:8

case-law [7] -

6:6, 6:9, 11:17,

20:2, 25:17, 26:7,

132:16

cases [15] - 6:5,

6:6, 44:12, 66:10,

69:22, 73:12,

79:22, 104:17,

107:11, 128:11,

134:24, 137:20,

157:3, 167:3,

167:11

Castle [1] -

41:16

caught [2] -

30:8, 52:23

caused [5] -

37:13, 42:4, 57:3,

91:27, 106:12

caution [2] - 8:7,

129:26

CC [1] - 169:26

cease [2] - 18:6,

19:5

ceased [1] -

38:28

central [3] -

106:20, 107:10,

114:16

centre [1] -

20:25

centuries [1] -

135:19

certain [11] -

22:20, 25:5, 72:6,

86:1, 133:4,

139:5, 146:18,

146:21, 148:22,

149:19, 180:4

certainly [16] -

3:22, 3:26, 7:4,

13:5, 23:20,

26:21, 27:4,

27:10, 27:28,

39:27, 64:21,

91:6, 120:21,

134:24, 137:8,

149:20

certainty [1] -

12:27

certificate [2] -

181:1, 181:5

certify [1] - 1:27

certiorari [1] -

67:20

cetera [4] -

92:14, 145:29,

148:28, 183:18

challenge [16] -

12:19, 17:5,

34:15, 62:4,

89:19, 90:14,

91:3, 91:5, 91:21,

99:2, 118:29,

158:13, 158:14,

158:15, 183:12,

183:13

challenged [3] -

23:15, 105:21,

165:21

change [42] -

11:12, 13:20,

14:23, 28:4, 28:7,

28:21, 28:25,

28:27, 29:3, 30:5,

30:7, 30:12,

30:19, 32:23,

33:2, 34:15,

34:18, 34:20,

37:27, 37:28,

48:16, 104:27,

110:1, 110:8,

115:4, 127:15,

128:19, 129:3,

129:5, 129:10,

138:2, 138:11,

138:15, 139:3,

139:14, 142:4,

142:20, 145:10,

147:10, 150:2,

150:27, 151:3

Change [5] -

138:22, 141:23,

147:7, 153:6,

155:2

changed [9] -

49:4, 49:14, 58:3,

59:15, 59:27,

87:13, 124:26,

145:12, 148:13

changes [13] -

10:23, 11:20,

29:16, 32:8,

52:11, 57:24,

57:25, 60:2,

61:27, 86:27,

105:2, 105:5,

110:18

changing [1] -

111:16

Chapter [1] -

175:1

characterise [1]

- 50:2

characterises

[1] - 37:26

Charter [2] -

81:16, 132:21

check [5] - 87:5,

87:10, 87:28,

88:6, 148:12

Chief [8] - 43:19,

44:7, 44:8, 44:16,

44:29, 45:2,

95:26, 101:8

CHIEF [1] - 2:25

child [1] -

129:20

choice [3] -

97:13, 100:7,

184:17

chooses [1] -

149:11

chose [2] -

89:26, 94:17

chosen [1] -

51:25

CHRISTIAN [1] -

2:23

Christian [1] -

130:22

chronology [1] -

123:28

CIARáN [1] -

2:23

circa [2] - 71:28,

72:1

Circuit [1] -

129:18

circulated [2] -

25:23, 122:10

circumscribed

[1] - 125:27

circumstance

[5] - 25:8, 28:2,

36:26, 52:12,

180:7

circumstances

[43] - 4:13, 8:11,

9:22, 12:13,

12:23, 12:25,

12:29, 13:3,

23:19, 25:20,

27:21, 34:8,

39:13, 44:25,

47:15, 51:26,

56:19, 58:9,

58:13, 60:8,

61:28, 62:21,

63:2, 75:17,

78:12, 78:13,

78:19, 78:21,

80:2, 80:19, 85:1,

90:2, 96:12,

101:4, 107:28,

124:1, 135:8,

143:12, 149:18,

181:5, 181:6,

181:8, 181:10

circumvent [2] -

185:20, 185:21

cite [1] - 131:24

cited [2] -

104:23, 157:1

cites [2] -

183:19, 186:7

citizen [3] -

129:28, 134:8,

134:28

citizen's [1] -

127:17

citizens [3] -

132:25, 134:19,

135:18

City [1] - 47:4

Civil [1] - 143:16

civil [2] - 118:1,

135:16

claim [12] -

81:24, 83:2, 83:3,

83:17, 84:10,

91:27, 103:13,

127:8, 127:9,

127:13, 131:19

claimant [2] -

106:13, 106:14

claimed [1] -

83:24

claims [4] -

81:13, 81:16,

81:21, 81:22

CLARKE [1] -

2:6

class [2] - 19:22,

82:6

classified [2] -

33:18, 35:7

clear [27] - 4:22,

4:24, 6:7, 13:19,

16:16, 25:4, 25:7,

30:5, 30:9, 33:22,

36:17, 36:21,

40:9, 45:5, 62:21,

74:21, 80:10,

83:28, 99:14,

130:1, 146:26,

151:29, 160:17,

173:17, 180:3,

180:6, 185:24

clearly [17] -

4:13, 5:24, 7:27,

8:23, 15:1, 15:6,

15:28, 16:28,


7

57:10, 73:15,

79:24, 86:19,

97:25, 118:6,

130:15, 146:28,

162:2

cleverly [1] -

136:16

CLG [3] - 1:12,

2:8, 3:5

client's [1] -

98:23

clients [2] -

76:1, 131:19

climate [20] -

127:15, 128:19,

129:3, 129:5,

129:9, 138:2,

138:11, 138:15,

138:17, 139:3,

139:14, 140:5,

140:16, 140:26,

142:4, 142:19,

143:15, 147:10,

150:27, 151:3

Climate [7] -

126:28, 138:22,

141:7, 141:23,

147:7, 153:5,

155:2

close [1] -

167:29

closed [1] -

60:15

closely [2] -

104:21, 108:24

cloud [2] -

80:10, 80:13

Co [2] - 20:26,

23:14

code [2] - 79:7,

105:3

cogent [2] -

75:6, 75:13

cognisable [1] -

134:16

coherent [1] -

131:2

Coillte [3] - 78:7,

78:13, 171:6

COLGAN [1] -

1:7

Coll [4] - 20:15,

20:17, 159:4,

159:7

collaborative [1]

- 143:14

collateral [3] -

66:1, 68:26,

91:22

colleague [1] -

26:1

Collins [2] -

76:20, 187:21

COLLINS [1] -

2:5

combat [1] -

147:9

combined [1] -

183:12

coming [8] -

11:10, 19:20,

115:22, 148:14,

155:22, 156:8,

168:18, 175:11

commence [1] -

89:20

COMMENCED

[1] - 3:1

commenced

[37] - 12:4, 12:26,

13:1, 18:9, 18:12,

23:25, 41:19,

85:1, 88:21,

88:26, 89:5, 89:7,

89:10, 89:18,

89:24, 89:28,

119:14, 119:16,

158:19, 161:19,

161:20, 162:13,

162:18, 162:26,

163:1, 163:28,

164:5, 164:6,

164:19, 165:19,

166:1, 166:6,

166:7, 166:12,

170:19, 181:28,

182:7

commenceme

nt [11] - 9:1, 10:4,

10:10, 10:18,

86:16, 90:14,

91:3, 91:5, 91:13,

91:17, 165:17

comment [7] -

98:6, 98:14,

106:18, 107:4,

122:11, 123:13,

178:14

commentators

[2] - 136:9, 137:8

commenting [2]

- 98:4, 130:10

comments [1] -

121:26

commercial [9] -

8:27, 9:25, 86:14,

95:11, 95:13,

96:9, 98:19,

113:14, 114:20

Commercial [1]

- 76:11

Commissioner

s [2] - 104:2,

104:8

commissionin

g [1] - 148:27

common [1] -

100:22

communicate

[1] - 171:8

communicated

[1] - 172:24

community [1] -

90:22

Community [1] -

185:22

companies [3] -

94:16, 97:3,

97:23

company [2] -

53:10, 54:10

Company [1] -

179:1

compared [2] -

59:15, 60:5

compatible [3] -

55:23, 114:22,

126:15

compensation

[1] - 106:10

Compensation

[1] - 38:23

competence [4]

- 40:20, 87:11,

88:18, 147:14

competent [4] -

31:20, 31:29,

61:7, 63:23

competing [2] -

124:23, 127:11

complaining [1]

- 187:13

complaint [1] -

118:11

complete [5] -

33:27, 36:17,

49:3, 125:21,

153:2

completed [21] -

7:23, 8:12, 18:13,

21:16, 22:20,

22:23, 24:25,

50:11, 92:8,

92:12, 157:7,

157:12, 159:22,

170:14, 170:18,

170:19, 177:10,

179:27, 181:29,

182:10, 183:28

completed.. [1] -

174:20

completely [3] -

58:6, 147:13,

184:11

completeness

[7] - 17:25, 19:15,

52:21, 63:4,

64:27, 65:18,

65:26

completion [8] -

13:22, 13:25,

14:7, 14:19,

42:22, 65:17,

182:9, 182:13

complex [3] -

10:14, 117:5,

158:9

compliance [26]

- 5:14, 24:15,

24:26, 139:18,

160:15, 160:19,

162:5, 164:16,

165:5, 165:8,

165:9, 165:13,

171:9, 171:12,

173:25, 179:17,

179:28, 180:11,

180:23, 182:18,

183:4, 183:28,

184:4, 184:7,

184:28, 184:29

compliant [1] -

172:9

complied [10] -

7:24, 8:1, 8:3,

15:12, 21:14,

22:20, 59:19,

165:16, 176:2,

181:25

comply [4] -

43:11, 168:10,

175:9, 182:15

compound [1] -

163:3

comprehensiv

ely [1] - 79:15

comprised [1] -

162:24

compulsory [3]

- 64:18, 106:10,

106:15

conceded [1] -

130:24

concept [5] -

31:24, 32:6,

44:11, 57:25,

133:18

concern [4] -

49:28, 98:9,

171:9, 186:23

concerned [14] -

4:21, 16:12, 22:2,

42:3, 42:26, 50:1,

50:4, 105:10,

108:16, 108:26,

110:26, 129:18,

178:17, 186:21

concerned' [1] -

185:26

concerning [10]

- 50:27, 52:3,

81:5, 100:1,

103:3, 108:1,

116:8, 128:20,

128:22, 134:6

concerns [13] -

3:24, 3:26, 3:29,

4:17, 45:19,

61:12, 72:25,

82:15, 106:21,

116:16, 122:27,

125:9, 171:11

concession [1] -

158:17

conclude [3] -

124:2, 125:1,

125:2

concluded [4] -

24:12, 111:11,

179:14, 182:15

concludes [3] -

126:18, 138:7,

153:5

conclusion [20]

- 24:13, 24:17,

24:25, 47:8,

52:23, 63:24,

63:27, 64:13,

112:1, 115:27,

120:29, 178:17,

179:15, 179:19,

179:27, 183:29,

184:4, 184:7,

184:23, 184:28

Condition [5] -

82:7, 98:23,

98:26, 110:1,

110:7

condition [8] -

23:25, 49:15,

82:7, 86:12,

87:16, 98:24,

99:1, 110:8

conditioning [1]

- 31:3

conditions [27] -

6:13, 13:20, 14:6,

14:8, 14:18,

14:23, 20:4,

23:21, 37:24,

38:3, 38:11,

38:26, 38:27,

39:20, 39:21,

39:27, 39:28,

44:19, 49:14,

52:10, 58:2,

79:26, 85:24,

85:28, 86:4,

96:10, 160:15

conduct [1] -

68:8

conducted [4] -

53:11, 88:27,

91:1, 144:24

conferred [5] -

136:2, 136:4,

180:12, 181:24,

182:19

conferring [1] -

114:1

confers [1] -

176:13

confine [1] -

120:5

confined [2] -

86:5, 184:2

confirm [1] -

121:14

confirmed [1] -

163:28

confirms [1] -

162:29

conforming [1] -

65:4

congestion [2] -

117:9, 117:11

conjunction [2]

- 17:16, 19:3

CONLETH [1] -

2:13

connected [4] -

52:12, 104:21,

108:24, 138:23

connection [2] -

42:21, 70:8

conscious [6] -

53:5, 70:2,

135:29, 142:26,

143:1, 146:27

consensus [7] -

131:20, 131:21,

131:23, 132:6,

132:26, 132:28,

133:25

consent [59] -

6:3, 6:8, 12:17,

12:18, 28:14,

29:21, 31:7,

33:23, 33:26,

35:17, 36:28,


8

38:1, 38:4, 39:15,

39:29, 40:11,

40:13, 40:24,

41:23, 42:18,

44:11, 44:24,

44:27, 45:6,

45:15, 45:27,

46:18, 48:1, 48:9,

48:19, 49:15,

50:3, 50:4, 50:6,

50:15, 54:18,

54:28, 55:5,

56:17, 56:21,

57:7, 57:12,

57:15, 57:16,

58:12, 58:16,

58:27, 60:9, 61:3,

62:24, 62:26,

63:1, 64:2, 66:9,

79:4, 79:5, 79:25,

156:17

consent" [2] -

57:10, 58:20

consent'... [1] -

39:23

consent.. [1] -

40:6

consent... [1] -

43:15

consents [1] -

41:21

consequence

[7] - 11:9, 11:11,

11:21, 60:18,

95:1, 108:15,

114:28

consequences

[4] - 3:28, 4:15,

74:14, 111:1

consequential

[2] - 81:7, 128:25

consequently

[4] - 52:28, 58:23,

59:28, 168:7

conservation

[14] - 69:13,

69:14, 69:18,

69:19, 71:5,

71:14, 71:24,

71:29, 72:6, 77:8,

77:14, 77:15,

77:16, 78:9

Conservation

[2] - 71:16, 74:18

consider [26] -

13:10, 19:7, 23:3,

89:14, 89:16,

96:16, 99:26,

102:13, 102:27,

105:26, 120:13,

120:28, 130:29,

144:6, 145:9,

145:29, 146:11,

148:10, 148:15,

151:16, 151:20,

152:20, 180:24,

182:16, 182:29,

186:12

considerable [3]

- 87:9, 94:16,

94:19

consideration

[28] - 24:14,

59:11, 89:1, 89:4,

92:17, 96:27,

102:18, 111:23,

119:24, 122:24,

126:27, 142:11,

147:2, 147:10,

147:11, 147:25,

149:18, 150:19,

152:16, 153:1,

153:3, 157:22,

162:6, 168:6,

168:18, 177:12,

179:16, 184:5

considerations

[18] - 4:10, 8:27,

9:25, 10:9, 10:15,

10:16, 12:14,

86:13, 90:28,

92:27, 97:7,

116:8, 141:3,

145:21, 149:26,

168:12, 177:14,

177:15

considered [35]

- 5:10, 6:3, 12:15,

32:9, 39:22,

44:12, 48:13,

48:16, 53:29,

84:20, 88:11,

90:11, 90:13,

91:4, 103:27,

111:24, 113:25,

114:7, 119:3,

123:3, 124:9,

125:12, 125:13,

125:17, 129:13,

145:10, 146:19,

146:21, 172:2,

172:5, 172:8,

172:17, 181:20,

183:23, 186:5

considering [12]

- 10:13, 42:24,

61:12, 84:21,

92:6, 112:20,

116:10, 123:3,

147:27, 168:16,

175:24, 184:8

considers [12] -

7:21, 22:19,

82:25, 89:2, 93:4,

93:28, 94:18,

104:1, 107:15,

110:3, 146:27,

174:18

consistent [15] -

10:28, 11:13,

13:23, 19:9, 23:6,

25:11, 25:13,

47:21, 49:10,

65:3, 65:12,

65:15, 82:28,

87:3, 169:24

constitute [4] -

33:4, 38:1, 39:22,

45:27

constituted [2] -

31:7, 43:14

constitutes [1] -

31:16

Constitution

[24] - 81:14,

81:22, 82:26,

83:4, 83:15,

83:20, 106:26,

126:16, 127:8,

127:9, 129:22,

129:29, 130:16,

131:27, 132:3,

132:8, 133:27,

134:14, 135:16,

135:26, 136:4,

136:8, 136:13,

136:18

Constitution..

[1] - 43:5

constitutional

[26] - 65:7, 65:25,

81:21, 81:24,

81:26, 83:2, 83:8,

83:10, 83:12,

83:17, 84:3,

103:13, 106:23,

126:3, 126:25,

127:4, 131:17,

134:10, 134:21,

134:23, 135:1,

135:6, 135:10,

135:26, 138:3,

183:12

constitutionalit

y [1] - 136:3

constitutionall

y [4] - 103:20,

103:22, 104:29,

105:6

constructed [9]

- 3:23, 6:15, 20:6,

23:15, 23:20,

170:2, 170:15,

172:8, 173:28

constructing [1]

- 171:18

construction

[23] - 3:26, 3:27,

4:11, 4:19, 4:21,

5:21, 9:10, 23:14,

29:24, 30:6,

30:14, 54:21,

105:29, 162:17,

170:16, 171:26,

172:19, 173:1,

173:5, 173:11,

173:25, 175:18,

178:19

Construction [4]

- 24:6, 162:19,

162:24, 179:1

construe [1] -

91:4

construed [1] -

17:12

construing [1] -

175:24

consultant [1] -

71:9

consultation [5]

- 22:10, 106:4,

124:4, 124:19,

144:24

consultative [1]

- 124:8

consulted [1] -

22:24

contact [2] -

169:19, 171:6

contained [1] -

180:13

contains [2] -

63:19, 128:21

contemplated

[5] - 75:29,

100:25, 106:23,

107:21, 182:26

contemplation

[1] - 130:15

contend [1] -

91:21

contends [2] -

73:28, 76:6

content [6] -

52:13, 56:14,

63:14, 88:12,

100:29, 108:9

contention [2] -

72:12, 73:20

contentious [1]

- 124:14

contents [1] -

84:12

contested [2] -

147:20, 184:19

context [40] -

4:9, 13:18, 14:21,

28:24, 53:29,

57:28, 59:5,

60:28, 61:4,

62:17, 63:1, 65:5,

65:25, 75:25,

85:9, 92:28, 97:7,

107:13, 114:5,

115:19, 115:20,

116:2, 123:11,

125:18, 142:12,

145:26, 145:28,

147:8, 148:9,

150:28, 152:5,

152:6, 152:7,

152:10, 152:18,

154:5, 164:27

continue [4] -

31:5, 31:7, 31:21,

34:2

CONTINUED [1]

- 111:7

continued [3] -

45:22, 60:16,

169:28

continues [2] -

45:3, 176:25

continuing [2] -

42:7, 144:19

continuous [1] -

157:6

continuum [1] -

174:9

contour [1] -

169:9

contours [4] -

128:7, 133:18,

137:13, 137:18

contract [1] -

95:18

contractors' [1]

- 163:3

contracts [1] -

96:8

contractual [1] -

103:24

contrary [4] -

57:5, 90:20,

90:25, 136:29

contrast [1] -

39:25

contravention

[1] - 43:5

contribution [2]

- 142:27, 158:8

control [10] -

8:28, 9:26, 86:15,

95:2, 143:13,

144:7, 144:20,

151:18, 151:21,

160:25

controls [1] -

147:5

controversial

[1] - 41:15

Convention [1] -

81:15

conversation [1]

- 68:2

convince [1] -

47:26

Conygar [3] -

37:7, 38:22,

39:22

copies [2] -

67:5, 159:26

copy [4] - 121:7,

121:9, 121:15,

171:4

COPYRIGHT [1]

- 2:30

core [3] - 95:11,

101:7, 113:14

corner [1] -

26:15

corporate [1] -

149:13

Corporation [5]

- 157:1, 157:16,

157:17, 176:8,

183:11

correct [10] -

4:3, 56:20,

101:22, 102:18,

126:4, 135:28,

151:7, 161:12,

173:24, 178:20

correctly [1] -

58:25

correctness [2]

- 24:13, 179:15

correlation [1] -

128:22

correspond [1] -

169:14

corresponding

[1] - 55:21

Costello [2] -

104:24, 105:19

Coughlan [1] -

171:29

Council [45] -

1:15, 2:13, 3:6,

7:8, 14:23, 14:25,


9

19:10, 23:12,

23:16, 23:17,

23:20, 24:5, 24:7,

35:29, 41:17,

42:21, 46:16,

47:4, 81:28,

82:13, 85:18,

90:11, 111:10,

119:12, 125:19,

126:27, 138:22,

139:2, 140:29,

141:4, 145:20,

147:14, 147:25,

148:2, 149:4,

154:4, 154:22,

161:18, 161:20,

165:2, 165:28,

166:26, 185:24,

186:8

Council's [3] -

82:15, 119:12,

149:10

counter [1] -

118:5

countries [1] -

133:4

country [3] -

8:21, 9:6, 70:9

County [31] -

3:5, 7:8, 23:12,

23:16, 24:4, 24:7,

34:16, 41:17,

42:20, 67:13,

81:28, 82:13,

82:14, 90:11,

111:9, 119:11,

119:12, 125:19,

126:27, 139:2,

140:29, 141:4,

145:20, 147:14,

147:25, 149:10,

154:4, 165:1,

185:23, 186:8

COUNTY [2] -

1:15, 2:13

couple [2] -

159:26, 166:10

course [43] -

3:24, 4:1, 8:18,

11:8, 16:12,

28:11, 29:11,

34:17, 35:13,

37:28, 41:26,

43:22, 57:28,

61:24, 70:14,

70:16, 70:20,

77:26, 79:5, 80:6,

80:21, 103:2,

105:10, 112:13,

116:2, 119:8,

119:11, 129:13,

131:26, 132:15,

132:17, 132:22,

148:15, 148:20,

148:21, 156:3,

158:26, 164:17,

173:25, 174:5,

175:21, 176:28,

187:10

courses [2] -

54:1, 54:3

court [19] -

31:11, 35:2,

38:20, 40:9, 44:7,

45:5, 45:7, 45:24,

55:27, 69:29,

80:10, 80:13,

111:29, 112:1,

112:4, 112:16,

119:19, 121:6,

130:1

Court [165] -

3:10, 4:26, 5:29,

7:10, 12:15,

13:18, 16:14,

20:2, 20:13,

20:18, 21:21,

24:6, 25:12,

25:18, 25:19,

25:21, 25:28,

25:29, 26:10,

26:18, 27:21,

27:23, 29:19,

30:10, 30:25,

31:8, 31:9, 33:8,

33:22, 36:20,

36:25, 37:26,

37:29, 41:1, 41:2,

41:4, 41:9, 41:13,

44:4, 44:6, 44:17,

45:22, 46:24,

47:17, 47:22,

48:22, 49:1,

49:11, 49:21,

50:22, 52:22,

53:6, 62:29, 65:1,

65:2, 65:8, 66:3,

66:4, 66:25,

68:22, 68:24,

69:21, 69:25,

70:27, 72:25,

75:6, 75:27, 76:4,

76:11, 76:16,

77:4, 77:6, 77:18,

79:17, 79:19,

79:22, 80:4,

80:11, 82:25,

86:6, 95:6, 99:10,

99:12, 99:16,

99:19, 99:24,

102:10, 103:29,

104:4, 104:7,

104:23, 108:11,

108:14, 109:8,

109:12, 110:7,

115:16, 120:5,

120:13, 120:27,

120:28, 122:24,

125:24, 126:20,

128:14, 129:14,

129:17, 129:19,

129:23, 130:5,

132:29, 133:2,

133:16, 133:25,

134:11, 137:17,

138:10, 139:4,

141:2, 141:3,

141:18, 153:6,

154:29, 155:5,

155:12, 155:14,

155:16, 156:9,

156:10, 156:14,

157:3, 159:12,

159:14, 159:27,

159:28, 161:22,

165:3, 165:25,

166:5, 166:23,

166:24, 166:29,

167:21, 167:26,

168:22, 168:27,

175:19, 178:13,

178:29, 179:2,

179:3, 181:8,

181:20, 182:22,

184:11, 184:15,

186:17, 186:25

COURT [2] - 1:1,

1:3

court's [1] -

49:21

Court's [11] -

17:20, 21:3,

46:28, 65:20,

80:23, 81:17,

92:27, 97:7,

99:21, 121:16,

178:14

courts [8] -

70:18, 107:25,

130:8, 133:28,

134:16, 136:18,

137:20, 137:25

Courts [4] -

73:2, 74:26,

101:2, 133:23

courts.ie [1] -

70:7

covenants [1] -

113:14

covered [2] -

29:12, 122:2

covers [2] -

29:7, 57:24

COX [1] - 2:20

cracking [1] -

37:13

created [1] -

117:7

creates [1] -

98:12

creating [1] -

140:7

creation [1] -

150:25

credible [2] -

112:5, 112:9

credit [2] -

95:14, 99:28

criteria [11] -

55:16, 86:1, 92:2,

94:20, 99:4,

100:2, 100:8,

101:25, 110:25,

151:5, 152:12

criterion [1] -

130:21

critical [4] -

33:13, 34:26,

35:25, 152:22

critically [1] -

22:7

criticised [1] -

158:1

criticism [2] -

9:15, 12:10

cross [2] -

169:17, 169:27

Crowley [1] -

180:29

crucial [3] -

6:11, 35:19,

109:7

crucially [1] -

43:7

crushing [1] -

37:12

crux [2] - 115:10

culminating [1] -

159:3

culture [1] -

150:2

cumbersome [1]

- 61:23

cumulative [2] -

60:5, 60:13

curious [2] -

50:24, 52:18

current [3] - 7:4,

96:10, 137:16

cut [4] - 118:21,

119:18, 169:15,

187:1

cutting [1] -

118:18

D

d) [2] - 154:11,

167:19

DAA [2] -

162:17, 162:29

DAA's [2] -

81:28, 152:17

DAC [2] - 1:22,

2:27

daily [1] - 149:26

DAMIEN [1] -

2:27

date [13] - 10:27,

18:26, 52:24,

61:27, 64:1,

76:12, 76:15,

87:2, 87:20,

90:13, 142:2,

155:24, 170:13

dated [2] -

121:29, 170:27

David [2] - 71:8,

74:7

DAY [2] - 1:25,

3:2

days [5] - 54:17,

89:11, 128:13,

131:28

De [1] - 136:16

deal [19] - 32:18,

43:25, 60:25,

62:24, 64:24,

76:14, 77:23,

80:23, 96:7,

126:25, 147:12,

147:16, 165:12,

167:8, 167:12,

167:22, 170:23,

171:11, 175:1

dealing [23] -

11:20, 19:10,

19:11, 35:2, 51:1,

56:16, 56:18,

58:9, 65:20,

81:13, 121:22,

124:23, 135:14,

154:14, 156:16,

157:2, 162:3,

164:12, 164:22,

166:26, 167:3,

175:18, 177:4

deals [8] - 8:11,

17:26, 27:17,

72:17, 156:12,

164:13, 165:17,

166:5

dealt [14] -

62:25, 65:29,

68:19, 76:26,

79:14, 81:3, 81:4,

81:5, 156:17,

161:25, 164:15,

167:22, 167:23,

183:20

dearth [1] -

128:16

debate [1] -

86:23

decade [1] -

8:21

December [8] -

20:26, 53:10,

162:18, 164:4,

164:7, 164:20,

166:1, 181:20

decide [7] -

13:19, 31:4,

46:25, 61:7,

101:18, 112:16,

184:1

decided [7] -

64:8, 76:1, 91:15,

101:23, 102:3,

102:13, 186:8

deciding [2] -

78:25, 93:22

decision [220] -

6:2, 6:21, 6:24,

9:16, 15:7, 15:14,

15:18, 15:24,

16:2, 16:4, 16:19,

17:2, 17:4, 17:5,

17:10, 17:12,

17:14, 19:18,

20:18, 20:29,

21:1, 21:8, 22:25,

22:26, 22:29,

23:8, 23:16,

23:26, 24:5,

25:25, 25:27,

26:1, 28:16,

29:14, 30:10,

30:24, 30:26,

31:6, 31:11,

31:16, 31:19,

31:29, 34:6,

34:14, 34:19,

34:28, 36:25,

36:27, 37:20,

37:29, 38:5,

38:10, 39:19,

39:20, 41:2, 41:5,

41:8, 44:3, 45:10,

45:21, 47:20,

49:13, 49:22,


10

50:10, 54:11,

55:2, 55:17,

55:24, 56:20,

58:11, 59:17,

60:26, 62:5,

62:15, 62:27,

64:2, 66:28, 67:1,

67:2, 67:5, 67:11,

84:16, 84:17,

84:20, 85:27,

86:3, 86:21,

88:15, 89:16,

89:19, 89:23,

89:27, 92:15,

96:18, 96:23,

97:24, 98:2,

99:14, 99:16,

99:21, 99:27,

100:2, 100:4,

100:6, 100:7,

100:11, 100:18,

100:20, 100:21,

100:26, 102:1,

102:5, 102:10,

102:16, 102:25,

102:28, 102:29,

103:6, 103:8,

103:14, 104:1,

104:10, 105:14,

105:29, 106:8,

106:24, 107:7,

107:22, 107:29,

108:19, 108:22,

108:25, 109:19,

110:10, 110:14,

110:15, 110:17,

110:26, 111:16,

112:21, 114:12,

115:10, 115:11,

115:19, 115:23,

115:29, 116:6,

116:10, 116:15,

117:9, 118:2,

121:28, 123:5,

124:14, 124:18,

124:20, 124:21,

124:29, 125:15,

125:19, 126:7,

130:6, 130:8,

136:1, 138:5,

139:1, 142:12,

145:11, 145:15,

145:17, 145:24,

146:10, 148:16,

148:17, 148:20,

148:24, 148:25,

148:26, 149:6,

149:7, 151:16,

151:17, 151:24,

152:11, 152:15,

152:26, 153:24,

153:26, 154:3,

154:19, 155:29,

160:18, 161:28,

162:2, 164:24,

166:7, 166:23,

167:5, 168:12,

172:1, 172:13,

172:15, 172:28,

175:6, 175:8,

178:24, 178:29,

179:4, 179:5,

183:12, 184:3,

185:2, 185:3,

185:6, 185:11,

185:12

Decision [7] -

82:3, 83:21, 85:8,

97:16, 98:26,

102:6, 151:4

decision-

maker [6] - 86:3,

100:7, 102:29,

105:14, 151:16,

151:17

decision-

making [2] -

148:20, 152:26

decision... [1] -

114:29

decisions [34] -

24:21, 25:18,

25:21, 25:28,

38:26, 39:1,

39:12, 39:19,

40:5, 40:29,

44:24, 45:8,

45:11, 45:12,

62:29, 63:29,

64:14, 78:28,

79:24, 104:20,

104:22, 105:12,

105:18, 123:5,

145:20, 145:28,

149:22, 150:6,

152:23, 153:29,

166:24, 175:22,

179:23

Decisions [1] -

105:21

DECLAN [1] -

1:9

declaration [4] -

67:22, 67:28,

68:6, 99:24

declarations [1]

- 43:3

declaring [3] -

129:27, 130:1,

130:17

DEEGAN [1] -

1:8

deemed [2] -

94:12, 165:9

default [1] -

114:24

defeat [1] -

13:26

defendant [7] -

41:22, 42:5,

42:19, 42:29,

43:9, 45:28,

46:12

define [1] -

128:7

defined [6] -

18:16, 30:13,

31:24, 137:19,

143:6, 151:4

definitely [2] -

9:21, 137:26

definition [2] -

30:1, 32:6

definitively [1] -

114:6

degradation [1]

- 127:23

degree [5] - 8:7,

10:8, 70:19,

107:12, 131:7

DEIGHEN [1] -

1:8

delay [2] - 5:22,

5:27

delays [2] - 4:24,

5:11

deliberation [1]

- 124:13

deliberations [1]

- 151:27

delivered [3] -

44:7, 47:19,

99:13

delivering [1] -

43:19

Dellway [17] -

92:20, 92:24,

92:28, 92:29,

97:7, 99:12,

110:29, 111:12,

111:22, 113:1,

115:11, 154:14,

154:15, 154:27,

158:27, 158:28

democratic [1] -

130:22

demolition [3] -

163:7, 163:11,

163:15

demonstrate [1]

- 132:5

demonstrated

[1] - 114:1

demur [2] -

146:5, 146:9

denial [1] -

125:11

denied [3] -

118:19, 123:12

DENIS [1] - 2:22

depart [3] - 26:1,

146:6, 146:8

departure [3] -

146:11, 152:28,

153:1

depended [1] -

101:4

dependent [2] -

100:26, 127:5

deprived [2] -

95:29, 96:6

derive [2] - 83:9,

137:12

derived [2] -

118:1, 127:5

Derries [2] -

71:23, 71:29

describe [1] -

40:10

description [1] -

135:25

deserving [1] -

134:20

design [1] -

170:17

designate [1] -

105:16

designated [1] -

74:15

desirable [2] -

93:5, 94:19

desire [2] -

13:23, 80:9

DESMOND [1] -

1:10

desperately [1] -

14:11

detail [11] -

79:12, 79:19,

84:13, 85:6,

103:28, 127:26,

131:1, 142:21,

147:28, 152:3,

154:2

detailed [2] -

136:13, 147:2

details [1] - 5:8

detained [1] -

134:26

deterioration [1]

- 68:3

Determination

[1] - 179:12

determination

[1] - 24:8

determinative

[1] - 56:27

determine [8] -

40:20, 53:18,

53:22, 54:9,

61:17, 62:13,

68:28, 178:25

determined [2] -

178:21, 184:6

determining [6]

- 38:26, 39:20,

58:29, 101:2,

107:26, 186:5

develop [1] -

149:11

developed [3] -

11:7, 52:15,

183:16

developer [8] -

32:1, 85:3, 86:20,

91:12, 91:13,

124:7, 160:25,

176:16

developers [1] -

171:17

Developer’s [1]

- 122:7

developing [1] -

131:2

development

[148] - 6:3, 6:8,

7:22, 8:11, 9:1,

10:3, 10:11,

10:24, 10:25,

10:28, 10:29,

11:12, 11:14,

11:22, 11:23,

12:4, 12:16,

12:18, 12:26,

13:22, 13:24,

13:25, 14:8,

14:19, 18:8,

18:10, 18:12,

18:13, 21:16,

22:14, 22:19,

22:23, 23:4,

23:19, 23:24,

24:14, 24:25,

28:14, 29:21,

31:6, 31:7, 33:23,

33:25, 35:17,

36:27, 38:1, 38:4,

40:24, 41:26,

43:15, 44:11,

45:6, 45:12,

45:27, 46:7,

46:10, 46:17,

48:1, 48:9, 48:19,

48:25, 49:15,

49:28, 50:3, 50:4,

50:6, 50:14,

54:28, 55:5,

56:17, 56:21,

57:12, 58:11,

59:27, 60:9, 61:3,

62:23, 62:26,

63:1, 64:2, 66:8,

67:11, 68:11,

68:29, 79:4, 79:5,

79:25, 85:2,

85:10, 86:17,

86:28, 86:29,

87:3, 87:4, 87:6,

87:12, 87:17,

87:18, 87:27,

88:2, 88:3, 88:7,

88:21, 88:26,

89:6, 90:21,

91:28, 92:7,

92:12, 98:22,

105:16, 148:13,

157:7, 157:11,

158:19, 159:21,

160:24, 162:13,

163:28, 165:17,

165:19, 165:20,

166:6, 166:7,

166:12, 169:29,

172:17, 172:19,

172:20, 172:29,

174:19, 176:16,

177:3, 177:10,

179:16, 179:27,

180:10, 181:27,

182:6, 182:9,

182:13, 182:17,

182:26, 183:27,

186:6

Development

[16] - 11:6, 21:13,

84:19, 118:7,

122:6, 122:19,

123:20, 126:13,

126:29, 141:8,

141:24, 156:7,

158:8, 174:29,

175:23, 186:10

development..

[1] - 46:2

developments

[2] - 13:28, 177:4

dialogue [1] -

143:20

dicta [2] - 73:12,

74:24

differ [1] - 98:11


11

differed [1] -

99:15

difference [3] -

70:17, 95:18,

113:1

differences [1] -

175:25

different [37] -

7:6, 17:20, 23:29,

27:7, 45:10,

56:19, 58:12,

60:22, 69:7,

78:19, 78:26,

78:28, 79:3,

88:12, 89:21,

89:29, 97:11,

97:12, 107:9,

114:18, 115:17,

118:15, 125:9,

133:8, 133:9,

133:10, 135:18,

143:21, 143:23,

145:19, 155:28,

171:19, 172:18,

173:1, 173:12,

178:19, 186:9

differentiate [1]

- 13:4

differentiated

[1] - 74:1

difficult [7] -

10:14, 77:19,

104:18, 106:20,

107:24, 120:2,

124:2

difficulty [3] -

40:10, 120:26,

187:20

dignity [1] -

135:9

diminution [6] -

100:23, 105:8,

105:27, 107:1,

110:2, 110:4

direct [13] -

47:9, 47:12, 48:7,

49:5, 97:4, 98:3,

107:17, 109:2,

113:24, 115:12,

129:5, 136:7,

150:1

directed [1] -

96:18

directions [10] -

42:23, 42:25,

42:28, 43:9,

43:14, 45:9,

45:13, 45:25,

46:19, 139:17

directive [2] -

40:3, 44:23

Directive [60] -

4:8, 6:4, 26:12,

26:14, 26:19,

27:3, 27:5, 27:7,

29:19, 31:17,

31:25, 31:27,

32:3, 32:7, 32:14,

32:16, 33:5,

33:20, 34:10,

39:4, 39:9, 41:24,

43:13, 46:16,

47:9, 48:2, 48:3,

48:18, 52:24,

52:29, 55:20,

55:22, 55:24,

56:1, 56:8, 56:12,

56:27, 57:11,

57:24, 59:17,

59:19, 63:6,

63:12, 63:16,

63:19, 64:25,

65:10, 65:11,

65:28, 66:6,

67:25, 68:1, 68:9,

69:10, 72:21,

75:8, 75:18,

79:28, 90:21

Directive.. [1] -

69:8

directive... [1] -

39:7

Directive....and

[1] - 43:11

Directives [2] -

48:7, 49:5

directly [13] -

68:10, 96:22,

96:24, 97:25,

100:18, 108:23,

116:18, 122:27,

127:16, 129:9,

137:24, 147:1,

149:21

disadvantageo

us [1] - 96:12

disagree [1] -

161:6

disagreeing [1] -

3:17

disappear [1] -

176:1

discern [3] -

84:3, 99:13,

107:24

discernment [1]

- 83:29

discharge [4] -

72:20, 73:26,

118:20, 118:25

discharged [1] -

119:17

disciplinary [1] -

181:10

discloses [1] -

123:29

disconnect [2] -

51:21

discount [1] -

167:7

discreet [1] -

111:18

discretion [40] -

22:8, 22:27,

22:28, 23:1,

24:22, 82:13,

82:15, 85:5, 86:3,

86:4, 86:11,

88:16, 92:10,

92:11, 92:13,

94:16, 94:19,

97:11, 97:15,

98:14, 101:20,

110:22, 112:20,

112:24, 112:25,

115:20, 123:4,

124:29, 125:14,

125:18, 126:8,

126:11, 157:24,

158:26, 158:28,

159:6, 167:20,

176:18, 176:19,

179:24

discretion" [1] -

157:23

discretionary

[4] - 89:4, 98:2,

102:2, 116:19

discuss [1] -

153:25

discussed [2] -

84:7, 122:22

discussion [4] -

86:23, 130:13,

130:24, 131:15

dismissive [1] -

145:5

dispute [3] -

114:5, 148:6,

164:8

distinct [2] -

41:23, 79:7

distinction [9] -

12:25, 13:2, 13:4,

33:22, 34:26,

100:28, 104:20,

106:11, 108:8

distinctly [1] -

98:20

distinguish [1] -

79:7

distinguishing

[1] - 41:7

distributed [1] -

137:25

disturbance [1]

- 68:3

divining [1] -

133:1

doctrine [2] -

82:27, 129:12

document [1] -

38:9

documentation

[1] - 85:17

documents [3] -

74:3, 74:15,

74:19

dominant [1] -

181:22

done [17] - 17:6,

18:5, 36:18,

38:28, 47:7,

66:13, 71:19,

96:13, 106:12,

118:27, 119:15,

128:8, 130:4,

142:14, 151:18,

151:24, 167:25

Donegal [4] -

20:26, 65:6,

65:13, 82:25

double [1] -

120:10

doubt [8] - 10:1,

73:9, 79:19,

79:20, 80:14,

80:15, 80:18,

93:15

doubt' [1] -

73:23

down [17] - 8:16,

13:16, 14:29,

15:19, 32:19,

42:8, 45:1, 54:16,

56:26, 70:10,

93:26, 101:2,

107:25, 130:9,

133:13, 135:22,

182:22

downstream [1]

- 74:13

draw [18] - 6:27,

7:17, 7:26, 8:18,

9:14, 19:14,

19:29, 21:3,

21:22, 24:9,

46:28, 55:13,

57:9, 65:11,

66:28, 76:26,

108:6, 121:16

drawing [3] -

41:5, 68:18,

121:13

drawings [1] -

169:11

drawn [2] - 40:8,

66:29

draws [1] - 59:3

dread [1] - 95:25

drew [1] - 8:4

Dublin [11] -

34:16, 36:1,

38:12, 87:23,

98:19, 101:23,

107:8, 129:1,

129:8, 151:13,

183:10

DUBLIN [3] -

1:2, 1:17, 2:17

due [3] - 137:7,

156:3, 164:17

duly [2] - 15:10,

170:19

Dun [8] - 7:8,

41:17, 42:20,

156:29, 157:16,

159:13, 176:7

Dunne [3] - 41:2,

41:13, 44:4

duration [25] -

12:17, 17:27,

17:28, 18:29,

19:11, 21:10,

22:9, 24:18,

24:24, 28:13,

33:23, 33:25,

34:1, 35:17,

40:17, 62:25,

64:20, 66:14,

171:24, 173:3,

175:2, 176:14,

179:20, 179:26,

180:15

Duration [1] -

5:4

during [6] - 3:24,

16:12, 18:9,

18:12, 51:17,

85:19

During [1] -

41:25

Duties [1] -

139:5

duty [10] - 9:19,

15:17, 16:3, 65:3,

65:11, 73:28,

78:10, 119:12,

129:27, 130:16

dwelling [8] -

170:15, 171:18,

171:25, 172:8,

173:4, 173:11,

173:24, 178:18

E

e.g [1] - 143:21

early [2] -

144:25, 187:8

earn [2] - 97:2,

103:23

earth's [1] -

140:5

east [1] - 72:1

East [3] - 65:6,

65:13, 82:25

Eating [2] -

144:29, 145:2

echoes [1] -

48:21

echoing [1] -

178:14

echos [1] -

179:8

ECHR [1] -

132:16

ecological [1] -

73:24

economic [17] -

8:28, 9:5, 9:22,

9:25, 86:14, 87:1,

99:5, 133:28,

134:19, 135:17,

136:12, 136:16,

136:19, 136:27,

137:10, 149:29,

158:9

economics [1] -

10:8

economy [3] -

138:18, 138:27,

140:17

economy" [1] -

140:27

Education [2] -

134:3, 134:15

education [5] -

134:7, 135:15,

136:14, 136:20,

136:28

EEA [2] - 144:9,

144:16

effect [28] -

17:13, 18:6, 19:5,

24:4, 38:29, 47:9,

47:12, 48:7,

48:15, 49:6, 60:4,

64:12, 65:7,


12

76:13, 81:17,

98:15, 100:28,

101:1, 104:27,

108:8, 108:9,

111:13, 116:23,

120:10, 169:1,

170:6, 176:29,

182:28

effective [2] -

61:20, 126:7

effectively [12] -

83:3, 84:17,

110:13, 115:2,

138:29, 147:13,

155:16, 157:29,

158:14, 158:20,

170:5, 183:13

effectiveness

[3] - 39:6, 40:3,

44:22

effects [34] - 9:9,

28:7, 32:26, 33:6,

56:29, 57:3, 57:6,

58:3, 58:25,

59:14, 59:29,

60:5, 60:13,

62:11, 67:23,

69:16, 102:29,

103:16, 103:19,

103:21, 103:24,

103:25, 105:13,

106:7, 106:15,

109:5, 109:25,

111:25, 112:2,

114:4, 116:5,

116:9, 139:14,

142:19

efficient [1] -

150:22

efforts [1] -

143:20

EIA [57] - 3:11,

4:4, 4:9, 5:24,

6:4, 26:12, 26:14,

27:19, 27:20,

28:1, 29:1, 39:9,

41:23, 43:11,

45:20, 47:8, 48:1,

48:18, 49:27,

50:6, 50:11,

50:13, 51:22,

51:24, 51:26,

52:6, 53:23,

53:25, 54:25,

55:1, 55:4, 55:19,

55:29, 56:12,

56:17, 56:27,

57:11, 57:12,

57:18, 57:24,

58:6, 58:10,

59:23, 61:2,

62:22, 62:23,

63:12, 63:27,

64:10, 64:20,

65:10, 66:4,

66:16, 78:21,

88:26, 90:20,

90:29

EIA/AA [1] -

98:29

eight [1] - 16:2

either [7] - 8:29,

79:26, 86:3,

86:16, 114:27,

126:4, 127:29

elapse [1] - 88:4

element [5] -

92:10, 98:2,

98:13, 120:23,

131:11

elements [7] -

84:18, 98:6, 98:8,

98:9, 116:19,

142:16, 147:15

elevate [1] -

136:6

eligible [9] -

93:3, 93:10,

93:17, 94:2,

94:10, 94:12,

94:18, 94:25,

99:27

elimination [1] -

73:22

ELIZABETH [2] -

1:7, 1:9

Elliott [2] - 80:5

elsewhere [1] -

97:22

embark [2] -

45:29, 105:29

embarked [1] -

176:16

embellish [1] -

167:15

emerge [1] -

106:16

emerging [2] -

131:20, 131:22

emission [1] -

143:23

emissions [33] -

127:14, 129:2,

129:3, 139:14,

140:6, 142:19,

142:24, 142:27,

143:1, 143:13,

143:19, 144:1,

144:7, 144:8,

144:13, 144:15,

144:20, 146:25,

147:7, 147:13,

147:17, 147:19,

147:22, 149:8,

149:12, 150:8,

150:9, 150:17,

150:21, 150:24,

150:26, 151:19

Emissions [1] -

150:23

emphasise [2] -

20:3, 65:17

emphasised [3]

- 44:29, 74:12,

116:4

emphasises [1]

- 159:16

empowers [2] -

14:16, 160:2

enable [10] -

7:22, 22:19, 92:6,

130:4, 157:6,

157:10, 159:21,

174:19, 181:27,

182:6

enabling [1] -

140:15

enacted [3] -

8:22, 126:3,

135:27

enclose [1] -

172:28

encountered [1]

- 131:2

Encyclical [2] -

153:18, 153:21

encyclical [1] -

131:24

end [10] - 19:5,

45:2, 76:2,

121:12, 124:8,

124:19, 140:18,

143:6, 155:18,

168:29

endeavour [1] -

186:24

ended [2] -

176:19, 177:20

endless [1] -

16:15

endorse [1] -

108:10

endorsed [2] -

166:24, 167:2

endorsement

[2] - 130:21, 185:7

endorses [1] -

177:23

ends [2] -

109:13, 109:14

enforce [1] -

38:7

enforceable [4] -

128:2, 132:20,

132:24, 137:18

enforced [1] -

137:15

enforcement [6]

- 6:18, 38:5,

135:7, 162:4,

166:20, 180:23

engage [8] -

66:25, 82:4,

146:14, 146:16,

146:17, 148:26,

157:25, 159:5

engaged [20] -

34:24, 66:26,

82:2, 82:22,

84:22, 85:3, 99:8,

103:3, 118:25,

119:25, 125:24,

125:25, 126:5,

126:6, 126:9,

153:25, 155:1,

158:10, 158:22,

169:1

engagement [7]

- 119:22, 146:26,

150:10, 150:11,

151:9, 154:21,

161:29

engages [4] -

147:3, 154:18,

154:27, 159:8

English [1] -

132:17

enhance [2] -

113:17, 113:21

enhancing [1] -

140:7

enjoy [6] -

81:26, 82:6,

82:19, 85:13,

97:6, 99:6

enjoyed [2] -

83:19, 96:28

enjoyment [6] -

101:1, 108:10,

109:6, 109:26,

110:2, 110:18

enjoys [2] -

21:25, 125:15

enquire [1] -

183:27

enquiry [1] -

184:1

ensure [2] -

15:23, 67:4

entails [1] -

109:28

entered [2] -

17:2, 95:19

entertain [2] -

133:25, 166:27

entertaining [1]

- 124:25

entire [4] - 18:9,

20:20, 54:29,

117:3

entirely [9] -

47:21, 49:9,

56:22, 89:21,

89:29, 126:15,

137:17, 166:27,

167:25

entirety [2] -

84:21, 114:8

entitle [1] -

103:10

entitled [19] -

12:23, 12:24,

13:4, 23:18,

24:16, 24:22,

81:27, 91:9,

99:25, 102:26,

103:6, 108:26,

124:11, 124:13,

124:27, 129:20,

179:18, 179:24,

185:2

entitlement [1] -

22:24

entitles [1] -

32:1

enumerated [1]

- 183:1

enumerates [1] -

160:12

enumeration [1]

- 131:17

ENVIRONMEN

T [2] - 1:12, 2:8

Environment

[19] - 3:5, 41:3,

41:14, 44:5,

53:11, 54:12,

54:20, 67:10,

71:12, 83:3,

83:18, 84:2, 84:7,

104:25, 126:24,

127:3, 127:20,

127:27, 128:17

environment

[27] - 28:7, 33:6,

45:20, 56:29,

58:4, 58:26,

59:15, 62:11,

83:19, 84:5,

126:26, 127:2,

127:6, 127:18,

127:29, 131:29,

132:19, 133:1,

133:5, 133:6,

133:17, 133:26,

137:11, 137:15,

137:29, 138:4,

138:8

environment...'

[1] - 32:27

Environmental

[3] - 48:12, 53:7,

119:6

environmental

[38] - 12:5, 41:29,

45:15, 46:1, 47:7,

48:10, 48:26,

51:1, 53:12,

53:13, 54:13,

55:17, 55:25,

56:25, 57:2, 58:2,

58:5, 58:24,

58:29, 59:10,

59:16, 59:18,

59:26, 59:29,

60:16, 60:27,

61:26, 71:9,

75:28, 81:6,

88:22, 90:17,

127:22, 131:19,

151:10, 156:19,

156:20, 162:14

environmentall

y [3] - 138:17,

140:17, 140:26

envisaged [2] -

4:25, 54:4

envisages [1] -

57:11

equally [5] -

48:29, 72:21,

127:21, 176:27,

177:15

equivalent [1] -

20:27

erect [1] - 22:13

erection [1] -

20:24

erroneous [2] -

162:5, 165:14

erroneously [2]

- 155:27, 167:27

error [1] - 167:9

erudition [1] -

153:8

escaped [1] -

136:19

especially [2] -

61:23, 143:4

essential [2] -


13

87:5, 142:9

essentially [8] -

9:20, 87:29,

88:12, 114:23,

130:7, 135:5,

148:11, 159:5

establish [7] -

68:2, 73:27,

100:24, 105:28,

128:18, 129:5,

138:18

established [13]

- 10:17, 33:8,

82:27, 99:7,

107:20, 128:5,

128:10, 128:12,

128:25, 131:5,

134:22, 138:3,

150:13

establishes [3] -

6:6, 73:15,

134:25

establishing [3]

- 73:16, 100:26,

107:22

establishment

[3] - 133:26,

143:29, 163:3

estimated [1] -

5:21

et [4] - 92:14,

145:29, 148:28,

183:18

ETS.. [1] -

144:11

EU [17] - 11:10,

81:7, 81:15,

90:25, 132:16,

132:21, 143:22,

144:6, 144:8,

144:11, 144:18,

147:8, 150:23,

154:22, 159:9,

167:16

EU's [1] - 144:19

Europe [2] -

64:4, 80:8

European [23] -

5:15, 11:17,

13:18, 14:22,

20:2, 20:11, 26:5,

31:8, 36:20,

37:29, 40:22,

41:9, 47:22,

48:22, 52:25,

65:5, 65:15,

65:22, 79:22,

147:6, 148:2,

151:28, 185:22

evaluation [2] -

160:27, 177:8

evening [1] -

120:28

event [7] - 9:5,

36:27, 56:1,

70:12, 70:22,

77:29, 108:18

events [1] -

123:28

eventualities [1]

- 29:12

evidence [35] -

5:29, 52:10,

66:24, 72:12,

73:19, 75:13,

75:26, 75:28,

76:4, 76:6, 76:12,

76:15, 76:27,

77:3, 77:5, 77:17,

83:27, 87:12,

111:20, 112:5,

112:9, 112:17,

112:24, 115:23,

128:14, 128:15,

128:16, 128:18,

128:20, 129:7,

133:2, 133:14,

150:13

evidenced [1] -

110:20

evidential [4] -

69:6, 70:29,

72:20, 150:29

exact [1] - 34:2

exactly [2] -

27:16, 166:28

examination [1]

- 134:24

examine [3] -

31:15, 58:23,

61:25

example [8] -

9:11, 36:1, 78:7,

105:3, 131:6,

143:15, 149:8,

149:10

Excavation [1] -

46:18

exceeded [1] -

52:25

exceeding [2] -

7:21, 92:5

exception [2] -

134:14, 135:14

exchange [1] -

153:16

exclude [2] -

92:16, 108:5

excluded [2] -

77:21, 102:19

excluding [1] -

120:13

exclusion [1] -

121:18

excuse [1] -

75:5

executed [12] -

28:5, 28:6, 29:4,

29:5, 29:9, 30:16,

30:18, 32:25,

32:26, 35:10,

35:12, 35:14

execution [3] -

29:11, 29:24,

34:8

Executive [1] -

163:27

exempted [1] -

68:29

exercise [13] -

22:8, 24:22,

101:1, 104:17,

108:10, 109:5,

109:26, 115:5,

157:23, 158:24,

167:4, 168:8,

179:24

exercised [13] -

22:10, 22:29,

37:18, 82:13,

97:12, 112:25,

129:26, 158:26,

158:29, 168:11,

177:13, 178:11,

185:25

exercising [2] -

96:14, 102:26

exhaustive [2] -

94:20, 125:20

exhibit [1] - 77:6

exhibits [1] -

71:10

exist [7] - 61:1,

105:7, 133:7,

133:8, 147:16,

151:21

existed [1] -

130:15

existence [5] -

50:5, 76:26,

134:22, 134:27,

136:26

existing [24] -

30:27, 31:2, 32:8,

33:15, 34:1, 35:4,

35:8, 35:9, 36:10,

39:11, 40:4,

40:11, 40:17,

44:23, 49:15,

50:5, 58:10,

60:14, 84:27,

113:4, 150:4,

163:11, 163:13,

163:15

exists [7] -

84:17, 86:12,

88:9, 102:6,

133:9, 133:17,

151:22

expansion [1] -

128:22

expect [2] -

67:19, 75:3

expectation [4] -

95:13, 95:24,

100:9, 113:4

expected [2] -

95:10, 113:18

expeditiously

[4] - 15:8, 15:15,

15:18, 16:4

expended [1] -

85:3

expenses [1] -

149:11

experienced [1]

- 8:21

expert [5] - 9:17,

75:6, 77:10,

158:1, 178:6

expertise [2] -

161:6

expiration [3] -

8:13, 18:3, 18:5

expire [2] -

12:18, 12:19

expired [4] -

12:21, 35:12,

95:14, 113:5

expiry [2] -

95:15, 113:11

explain [1] -

133:16

explained [2] -

102:13, 136:14

explaining [1] -

133:18

explains [1] -

37:5

explanation [2] -

120:12, 181:7

explicit [3] -

130:2, 130:20,

168:7

exploration [1] -

134:21

express [5] -

94:11, 134:15,

134:17, 135:24,

143:9

expressed [5] -

3:27, 25:12,

25:13, 102:23,

176:11

expressly [4] -

56:12, 63:12,

146:26, 158:5

expropriation

[2] - 97:4, 115:13

extant [1] - 8:8

extend [30] -

6:14, 7:19, 7:28,

14:25, 16:19,

16:25, 17:10,

19:18, 20:5, 22:8,

22:17, 24:18,

24:24, 28:13,

34:29, 47:6,

66:14, 85:29,

92:4, 115:19,

116:7, 168:8,

168:9, 168:14,

174:17, 175:6,

176:14, 177:13,

179:20, 179:26

extended [9] -

19:6, 20:27, 21:9,

35:16, 35:17,

52:8, 54:25,

101:13, 159:20

extending [2] -

14:4, 35:22

Extension [8] -

82:3, 83:21, 85:8,

97:16, 98:26,

102:6, 151:4,

170:9

extension [53] -

13:29, 16:29,

19:26, 19:27,

22:13, 22:15,

24:23, 25:6, 28:4,

28:8, 28:12,

28:13, 28:21,

28:25, 28:28,

29:3, 29:16, 30:6,

30:7, 30:13,

32:23, 33:3,

33:23, 33:24,

33:25, 36:1,

40:17, 48:17,

81:29, 85:27,

89:12, 90:19,

91:29, 123:5,

138:5, 145:24,

164:9, 165:9,

166:26, 170:12,

170:20, 171:24,

172:2, 172:21,

172:25, 172:29,

173:3, 175:2,

175:4, 179:25,

180:5, 180:15,

180:25

extensions [4] -

16:15, 19:23,

32:8

extensive [3] -

85:16, 85:20,

97:18

extent [11] -

6:14, 8:5, 14:26,

20:6, 41:27,

62:14, 114:10,

117:23, 119:4,

120:17, 123:7

external [4] -

5:12, 5:22, 5:27,

92:13

extra [3] -

120:27, 150:15,

150:16

extracting [1] -

67:23

extraction [6] -

29:27, 68:9,

68:26, 68:29,

69:15, 74:14

extraordinarily

[1] - 101:22

F

face [2] - 88:1,

135:19

facilities [2] -

99:28, 113:5

facility [2] -

36:5, 95:14

fact [50] - 8:19,

13:1, 20:3, 23:7,

25:8, 35:22,

41:22, 50:19,

52:24, 60:14,

62:26, 66:26,

76:27, 80:14,

88:25, 88:27,

88:28, 89:5,

89:25, 89:28,

90:4, 91:18,

97:19, 102:15,

105:26, 107:1,

113:11, 124:9,

150:15, 155:6,

157:26, 158:3,

158:18, 158:23,

161:4, 161:15,

165:11, 165:20,

165:23, 166:11,

166:12, 166:23,


14

167:24, 168:4,

177:27, 180:7,

181:9, 184:19,

185:7

factor [3] -

92:13, 148:15,

154:3

factors [13] -

5:12, 24:27, 59:4,

93:25, 123:2,

125:12, 125:16,

126:28, 148:22,

157:24, 158:21,

167:14, 179:29

facts [15] - 37:3,

47:3, 52:23,

60:21, 60:22,

60:29, 62:21,

66:19, 70:21,

81:4, 89:9, 92:29,

170:9, 174:2,

176:20

factual [6] -

157:21, 159:5,

160:23, 177:6,

178:5, 184:13

failed [7] -

47:26, 67:29,

72:11, 73:19,

73:26, 73:27,

183:2

failing [2] -

117:17, 121:25

failure [6] -

43:10, 72:19,

75:5, 135:27,

146:14, 181:6

fair [30] - 81:26,

82:1, 82:4, 82:19,

83:10, 83:12,

84:22, 99:7,

99:21, 100:3,

101:3, 106:21,

107:27, 108:2,

108:16, 108:26,

109:27, 117:17,

121:21, 122:18,

123:11, 123:15,

124:21, 124:22,

125:2, 125:6,

125:10, 125:23,

125:25, 126:20

fairly [3] - 56:4,

150:11, 151:12

fairness [3] -

76:19, 101:5,

107:29

fall [3] - 29:16,

75:18, 82:6

falling [1] -

167:9

falls [2] - 75:2,

84:5

familiar [11] -

11:5, 69:28, 70:1,

70:13, 70:24,

92:24, 132:18,

132:26, 168:27,

174:4

far [4] - 77:4,

89:4, 112:4,

115:12

farm [2] - 69:22,

163:15

FARRELL [1] -

1:9

fashion [1] -

124:25

favour [1] -

137:14

fear [2] - 132:9,

132:12

feature [1] -

75:24

features [7] -

6:28, 20:1, 27:24,

41:28, 42:11,

147:19, 147:21

February [7] -

54:14, 54:17,

122:1, 122:5,

123:14, 124:11,

163:19

feelings [1] -

124:16

fell [1] - 172:1

felling [1] -

163:4

fellow [1] -

97:10

fence [1] -

186:21

fencing [1] -

163:6

Fennelly [13] -

99:12, 101:9,

102:11, 103:29,

104:13, 106:29,

108:29, 110:6,

111:24, 113:26,

115:2, 183:14,

183:23

Fennelly's [3] -

103:6, 115:24,

183:20

FERGUS [1] -

1:8

few [3] - 44:17,

54:17, 156:26

FIE [1] - 141:17

fifth [1] - 84:4

file [1] - 171:14

filing [1] - 76:12

fill [2] - 53:25,

169:16

filling [1] - 20:25

filth [1] - 137:4

final [6] - 50:27,

51:1, 51:16, 52:3,

53:13, 126:23

finalised [1] -

142:7

Finally [1] -

133:21

finally [2] -

125:29, 137:28

financial [2] -

114:3, 158:9

financially [1] -

75:4

Fingal [21] - 3:5,

9:16, 9:19, 39:26,

81:27, 82:13,

82:14, 90:10,

111:9, 119:11,

119:12, 125:19,

126:27, 139:1,

140:29, 141:4,

145:20, 147:14,

147:25, 149:10,

154:4

FINGAL [2] -

1:15, 2:13

Fingal's [1] -

9:15

finish [3] -

165:25, 186:22,

186:28

finished [2] -

169:12, 187:4

Finnegan [7] -

23:29, 96:11,

113:28, 165:13,

167:1, 182:5,

183:18

FINTAN [1] -

2:19

fire [3] - 163:7,

163:12, 163:16

firm [1] - 16:22

firmly [2] -

133:27, 133:29

First [4] - 67:28,

68:7, 72:10, 74:2

FIRST [1] - 1:17

first [52] - 3:14,

8:24, 20:22, 25:1,

27:24, 28:19,

40:29, 41:1,

41:21, 42:5,

42:18, 42:29,

43:9, 45:28,

46:12, 49:21,

50:17, 55:28,

70:3, 70:4, 74:23,

77:26, 79:12,

82:1, 84:13,

84:25, 86:12,

97:11, 102:17,

108:11, 110:3,

110:12, 117:27,

119:12, 122:15,

126:24, 128:6,

142:3, 142:4,

143:18, 144:6,

153:28, 156:6,

156:25, 156:26,

157:9, 158:13,

159:12, 173:26,

176:7, 177:29

firstly [15] -

7:10, 21:25,

36:28, 45:28,

81:24, 83:24,

84:10, 86:12,

125:22, 127:28,

130:10, 133:7,

146:27, 150:12,

150:29

Firstly [2] -

21:27, 111:20

fit [1] - 96:8

five [2] - 18:25,

92:5

Flanagan [3] -

170:22, 170:24,

171:14

flicking [1] -

70:7

flights [2] -

144:8, 144:15

flood [4] - 87:23,

88:10, 99:4,

152:17

floor [6] -

169:12, 169:14,

169:15, 170:1,

173:26, 173:28

flora [1] - 69:14

flow [1] - 130:22

flowing [1] -

106:7

focusing [1] -

92:22

follow [2] - 8:24,

25:21

followed [1] -

159:19

following [16] -

1:28, 7:24, 8:2,

31:9, 41:5, 41:20,

42:2, 45:24, 48:9,

61:27, 94:6,

104:24, 108:21,

135:5, 162:29,

170:28

following.. [1] -

172:3

FOLLOWS [4] -

3:2, 3:8, 44:1,

111:7

follows [12] -

9:5, 14:11, 33:2,

81:24, 82:1,

108:12, 160:14,

169:6, 171:15,

172:15, 172:26,

180:20

follows.. [1] -

175:27

foot [1] - 12:29

FOR [7] - 2:4,

2:8, 2:13, 2:17,

2:22, 2:27, 111:5

force [1] -

155:24

forced [1] -

37:13

foregoing [4] -

73:12, 113:29,

116:2, 173:17

foreign [2] -

133:2, 133:14

form [17] - 6:24,

7:4, 10:8, 17:20,

21:15, 59:11,

78:17, 88:12,

91:6, 92:1,

100:21, 108:4,

130:26, 134:19,

147:21, 164:9,

170:19

formed [1] -

172:10

former [4] -

33:25, 163:7,

163:12, 163:16

forming [2] -

10:15, 11:25

forms [1] - 151:3

forra [1] - 143:21

forum [1] -

143:17

forward [5] -

64:28, 100:19,

108:3, 120:25,

167:6

four [3] - 8:24,

103:16, 141:1

FOURTH [1] -

1:22

fourth [8] - 84:1,

85:23, 90:8, 91:2,

93:19, 98:28,

99:1, 146:24

fourthly [2] -

88:21, 133:13

FP [1] - 2:10

frame [1] -

170:16

framed [1] -

125:17

framers [1] -

130:15

framework [10] -

135:10, 139:10,

139:22, 140:22,

142:5, 147:16,

154:12, 174:8,

174:9

Frances [1] -

137:3

Frank [2] -

170:22, 185:28

freedom [2] -

135:9, 185:23

freestanding [1]

- 83:8

fresh [2] - 57:17,

117:25

Friday [14] -

3:10, 3:19, 17:19,

25:23, 25:24,

27:27, 30:26,

40:19, 63:5,

68:19, 77:26,

87:8, 120:25,

162:18

Friend [15] -

75:22, 76:19,

84:7, 86:7, 87:7,

89:10, 92:21,

120:14, 127:20,

129:15, 131:14,

146:5, 147:20,

167:15, 187:1

Friend's [1] -

76:21

FRIENDS [2] -

1:12, 2:8

Friends [27] -

3:5, 67:9, 67:15,

67:17, 69:11,

70:2, 70:15,

70:23, 70:29,

71:11, 72:28,

83:2, 83:17, 84:1,

84:6, 85:29,

87:11, 116:29,

126:24, 127:2,


15

127:20, 127:27,

128:17, 132:20,

138:29, 146:12,

150:19

Friends' [1] -

152:27

front [1] - 111:23

fuel [2] - 67:23,

163:10

fulfil [2] - 45:26,

67:29

fulfilled [1] -

101:24

fulfilment [1] -

152:17

full [2] - 126:5,

182:18

fully [7] - 49:8,

85:14, 108:10,

123:21, 123:27,

124:3, 182:15

function [5] -

130:18, 168:5,

178:23, 183:26,

184:26

functions [8] -

139:7, 141:13,

142:1, 145:22,

146:2, 148:18,

148:21, 152:19

functions,will

[1] - 149:9

fundamental [7]

- 37:27, 37:28,

95:18, 101:5,

107:28, 130:19,

185:22

Fundamental [1]

- 132:22

Fundamentally

[1] - 118:11

fundamentally

[7] - 91:8, 98:11,

101:19, 114:18,

115:9, 115:11,

137:21

furnished [4] -

122:20, 171:5,

171:7

furtherance [2] -

139:11, 142:17

furthermore [2]

- 59:26, 185:19

furthermore.. [1]

- 185:15

future [9] - 4:3,

4:15, 19:27, 38:8,

51:4, 51:5, 130:8,

137:20, 144:6

G

Galway [1] -

47:4

Gannon [5] -

7:7, 8:6, 25:15,

176:9, 176:28

gap [9] - 49:26,

50:5, 50:12, 55:3,

55:4, 58:10, 61:1,

62:22, 64:5

Garden [6] -

24:6, 25:12,

159:3, 168:21,

168:22, 178:29

GARRET [1] -

2:18

gas [13] -

127:14, 129:2,

129:3, 139:13,

142:19, 142:24,

142:28, 143:2,

146:25, 147:17,

147:19, 147:22,

149:8

gases [1] -

128:23

gateway [2] -

132:10, 132:13

general [12] -

11:27, 83:27,

103:2, 104:23,

105:12, 109:16,

120:20, 125:29,

134:8, 134:28,

151:12, 176:24

GENERAL [2] -

1:19, 2:22

General [9] -

37:1, 50:21, 53:4,

55:8, 56:21, 61:5,

63:7, 64:6,

128:13

General's [1] -

49:23

generalised [1] -

128:21

generality [2] -

15:21, 93:21

generally [5] -

127:29, 141:12,

141:29, 152:6,

152:7

generated [2] -

51:6, 74:15

genius [1] -

153:9

genuflected [1] -

136:16

Geoghegan [1] -

179:2

Gerard [1] -

136:14

Gillespie [1] -

20:23

Gilligan [1] -

185:11

GILLIGAN [1] -

1:8

Given [1] - 125:3

given [33] - 5:10,

12:17, 14:18,

36:3, 45:9, 45:16,

45:21, 48:9,

57:16, 66:9, 88:4,

94:17, 94:19,

94:26, 94:27,

107:16, 118:5,

120:27, 121:6,

121:9, 122:20,

124:17, 124:29,

125:1, 130:14,

139:17, 158:4,

158:5, 159:21,

169:25, 175:3,

185:7, 187:13

glad [2] - 70:8,

155:15

Glencar [2] -

155:5, 155:7

goods [1] -

37:11

goods) [1] -

185:23

govern [2] -

56:12, 63:12

governed [2] -

19:25, 79:5

government [4]

- 105:11, 137:24,

138:26, 150:1

Government [8]

- 138:15, 139:23,

139:26, 140:1,

140:20, 155:8,

155:10, 175:22

grant [6] - 18:26,

25:6, 58:11, 64:2,

75:10, 180:5

granted [29] -

12:8, 12:28,

13:25, 14:1,

16:29, 18:2, 19:5,

19:23, 19:26,

34:7, 35:29, 37:8,

38:8, 55:5, 68:25,

69:24, 73:17,

83:15, 87:21,

88:25, 90:24,

123:4, 162:17,

171:20, 172:11,

172:19, 172:22,

173:13, 178:20

granting [3] -

14:17, 68:23,

99:24

gravity [1] -

116:22

great [2] -

147:24, 152:2

greater [2] -

41:28, 142:20

greenhouse [14]

- 127:14, 128:23,

129:1, 129:3,

139:13, 142:18,

142:24, 142:28,

143:2, 146:25,

147:17, 147:19,

147:22, 149:7

GREG [1] - 1:9

Greystones [1] -

144:28

Griffner [1] -

171:6

ground [11] -

30:19, 117:6,

137:22, 145:13,

158:13, 163:8,

163:13, 163:17,

169:14, 170:13,

172:12

grounded [1] -

131:29

grounds [8] -

47:7, 48:8, 73:16,

93:11, 105:22,

117:10, 158:11,

172:26

grounds.. [1] -

73:3

Group [6] -

122:6, 122:19,

123:20, 123:24,

123:27, 124:2

guaranteed [2] -

106:25, 129:22

Guideline [1] -

88:9

guidelines [6] -

10:26, 11:7,

11:21, 87:19,

88:5, 152:14

Guidelines [8] -

87:29, 88:1,

145:1, 145:2,

148:9, 148:11,

152:13, 152:16

GWEN [1] - 1:31

H

habitat [1] -

73:21

habitats [2] -

68:3, 69:13

Habitats [11] -

64:24, 65:11,

65:28, 66:6,

67:25, 68:1, 68:9,

69:10, 72:21,

75:7, 75:18

Habitat’s [1] -

48:3

half [1] - 187:6

halt [1] - 124:12

halted [1] - 42:1

Hamilton [1] -

5:8

HAND [1] - 1:9

hand [11] -

26:15, 26:25,

38:9, 38:10,

53:25, 67:2, 67:3,

67:9, 70:17,

116:25, 155:13

HANDED [2] -

67:2, 155:17

handed [9] -

17:18, 25:24,

63:5, 116:29,

117:1, 120:3,

120:7, 132:10,

132:13

Handed) [1] -

129:17

hang [1] - 26:28

hard [4] - 99:13,

120:18, 136:19,

163:13

harm [1] - 17:25

harmful [1] -

140:5

harmonious [1]

- 132:1

Harrington [6] -

12:15, 66:3,

72:14, 73:5, 73:6,

185:28

Haughey [1] -

107:17

HAYDEN [7] -

2:27, 186:20,

186:27, 187:1,

187:6, 187:9,

187:13

Hayden [2] -

17:21, 186:29

heading [7] -

5:4, 21:26, 53:7,

55:14, 134:15,

141:7, 141:23

headings [2] -

103:16, 160:22

headnote [11] -

41:10, 41:17,

92:25, 93:1, 94:6,

95:6, 99:17,

99:20, 110:13,

129:23

Healey [3] -

71:9, 74:7, 74:20

health [2] -

128:15, 134:26

Healthy [2] -

144:29, 145:1

healy [1] - 23:23

HEALY [6] - 2:4,

75:22, 76:19,

120:16, 187:20,

187:23

Healy [28] - 3:18,

6:27, 8:3, 9:16,

34:13, 46:29,

55:12, 91:20,

92:21, 98:22,

100:14, 153:20,

154:1, 154:20,

156:15, 157:27,

157:29, 158:15,

160:10, 161:5,

166:9, 166:28,

167:6, 167:25,

174:5, 175:15,

184:10, 187:13

Healy's [3] -

3:14, 154:14,

165:3

hear [3] - 70:6,

132:11, 155:15

heard [17] -

22:26, 67:7,

100:3, 100:25,

102:28, 103:10,

105:28, 107:21,

108:5, 108:6,

110:5, 110:23,

110:24, 115:28,

124:3, 187:14

HEARD [1] -

1:24

HEARING [5] -

3:1, 44:1, 111:5,

111:7, 187:26

hearing [10] -

3:4, 76:15, 81:23,

105:15, 107:11,

111:9, 114:10,

116:13, 125:2,


16

129:19

Heathrow [1] -

128:20

heavily [1] -

158:23

heavy [1] - 37:11

hedgerow [1] -

163:4

height [1] -

165:6

held [6] - 99:24,

104:9, 135:10,

165:13, 181:8,

183:14

HELEN [2] - 1:8,

2:15

HELENA [1] -

1:7

help [2] -

142:27, 143:2

helpful [1] -

99:15

Hempenstall [1]

- 104:25

Henchy [1] -

135:3

herewith [1] -

172:28

hesitate [1] -

169:19

HIGH [1] - 1:1

High [14] -

25:18, 25:28,

25:29, 75:27,

76:4, 104:4,

104:7, 104:23,

108:11, 109:8,

128:14, 166:23,

166:24, 179:2

high [5] - 83:28,

97:28, 124:16,

148:27, 163:11

higher [1] -

64:22

himself [2] -

183:15, 183:24

historical [1] -

132:1

historically [1] -

143:15

history [1] -

136:21

honest [1] -

145:6

hope [4] - 75:26,

80:10, 92:20,

169:17

hopefully [1] -

70:15

hour [2] -

153:28, 187:5

hour/45 [1] -

187:6

hours [1] - 77:13

house [8] -

23:14, 37:12,

37:13, 163:9,

169:8, 169:15,

183:16

housing [2] -

9:11

hugely [2] -

13:12, 15:28

human [1] -

140:4

hypothesis [1] -

102:20

I

I" [1] - 28:26

I) [1] - 28:8

i.e [2] - 103:19,

103:22

I.R [5] - 104:9,

104:26, 135:3,

180:29

ICAO [5] -

143:22, 143:28,

144:21, 144:22,

144:23

ICAO's [1] -

144:10

idea [2] - 16:5,

187:2

identifiable [3] -

100:27, 104:21,

107:23

identified [4] -

51:3, 94:2, 135:4,

135:15

identifies [11] -

15:1, 24:2, 24:7,

36:26, 50:23,

59:8, 59:22,

61:11, 61:20,

62:1, 67:18

identify [4] -

19:9, 49:24,

67:14, 80:17

identifying [2] -

62:10, 131:8

identity [1] -

129:20

IDO [1] - 37:8

if" [1] - 8:5

II [19] - 10:21,

10:23, 26:23,

26:29, 27:1,

27:17, 27:23,

31:12, 32:14,

32:24, 34:11,

34:24, 35:9,

35:20, 36:19,

48:17, 57:23,

79:28

ii [3] - 8:16,

67:20, 168:17

III [3] - 11:19,

180:14, 180:16

iii [3] - 67:28,

168:17, 177:8

illogical [2] -

24:24, 179:26

illustrating [1] -

162:26

imagine [1] -

97:3

immaterial [1] -

117:13

immediately [3]

- 8:13, 21:2, 55:1

immense [1] -

137:3

immune [1] -

135:11

Impact [4] -

48:12, 53:7,

119:6, 122:3

impact [34] -

12:5, 42:1, 48:10,

53:12, 53:13,

54:2, 54:13,

55:17, 55:25,

56:26, 58:5,

58:24, 59:1,

59:10, 59:16,

59:18, 59:26,

60:16, 60:18,

60:27, 61:26,

66:11, 66:22,

71:4, 81:6, 88:22,

90:17, 92:14,

128:29, 149:7,

149:8, 156:19,

156:20, 162:14

impacting [2] -

106:3, 129:9

impacts [5] -

4:16, 51:2, 53:27,

90:22, 116:21

impairment [1] -

113:23

impermissible

[1] - 145:23

impinge [1] -

127:16

impinges [1] -

137:4

implemented [1]

- 41:25

implications [1]

- 148:1

importance [4] -

17:1, 100:5,

110:15, 110:26

important [31] -

11:3, 13:17,

14:11, 16:11,

19:29, 29:13,

37:2, 95:21,

116:14, 119:24,

124:16, 131:11,

135:17, 137:7,

137:8, 154:3,

154:11, 154:13,

155:25, 156:14,

157:21, 158:27,

162:1, 164:11,

164:21, 164:24,

165:22, 170:10,

174:8, 175:17,

186:1

importantly [2] -

46:6, 142:12

impose [6] -

14:17, 39:26,

39:27, 78:19,

105:14, 134:17

imposed [2] -

16:3, 160:18

imposed.. [1] -

37:20

imposes [1] -

15:6

imposing [2] -

15:17, 168:5

impossible [1] -

53:24

impressive [1] -

136:28

improper [4] -

167:12, 180:21,

181:13, 181:16

improve [1] -

149:28

impugn [2] -

68:25, 158:12

impugned [1] -

105:6

inadequate [2] -

56:7, 145:4

inaudible [2] -

149:1, 149:16

include [5] -

12:24, 57:5,

104:16, 125:14,

186:4

included [6] -

25:24, 28:8, 63:6,

100:4, 162:27,

168:4

includes [2] -

32:22, 154:10

including [11] -

28:28, 29:27,

44:12, 85:9,

109:5, 109:25,

140:6, 143:24,

144:9, 163:4,

163:9

inclusive [1] -

175:1

income [1] -

103:21

incompatible [2]

- 113:19, 146:29

inconsistent [6]

- 11:22, 16:5,

16:6, 65:23,

87:17, 88:2

Incorporated [1]

- 181:3

incorrect [5] -

28:18, 118:28,

119:2, 173:24,

184:11

increase [6] -

127:14, 127:15,

128:19, 138:1,

138:6, 150:27

increased [3] -

51:7, 60:19,

128:23

increases [1] -

144:3

incumbent [2] -

64:17, 129:29

indeed [9] -

4:17, 9:8, 14:24,

65:10, 78:8,

94:21, 97:16,

135:17, 184:6

independent [1]

- 73:24

independently

[1] - 115:7

index [1] - 120:4

Indian [1] -

136:8

indicated [3] -

40:19, 160:15,

169:17

indicates [1] -

169:10

indicating [1] -

22:14

indirect [1] -

108:15

indirectly [1] -

68:10

individual [7] -

104:22, 105:28,

106:4, 107:6,

107:7, 107:18,

135:9

individuals [2] -

105:13, 152:23

industry [3] -

9:10, 143:14,

143:22

inevitable [1] -

124:18

inferring [1] -

136:26

influence [2] -

110:21, 117:24

influenced [1] -

31:11

influences [1] -

140:5

information [4] -

54:5, 125:4,

169:25, 170:26

informative [1] -

64:21

informed [1] -

99:25

informs [1] -

130:7

infringed [3] -

84:23, 104:16,

126:9

infringement [7]

- 91:26, 91:27,

104:29, 111:21,

115:23, 128:6,

128:10

infringes [1] -

83:21

inherent [2] -

126:12, 127:7

initial [4] -

41:29, 90:24,

123:28, 129:18

initiated [1] -

51:18

initiative [2] -

144:21, 144:23

injunctive [1] -

42:2

injurious [1] -

106:12

injury [1] -

135:12

insert [1] -

136:17

inserted [4] -

8:17, 156:11,


17

156:13, 156:15

inserts [1] - 7:3

insofar [8] -

4:21, 22:1, 83:9,

90:27, 106:15,

110:25, 183:28,

186:11

inspected [2] -

163:19, 170:25

inspection [2] -

163:23, 163:28

inspector [3] -

5:3, 5:5, 5:17

inspector's [3] -

71:11, 71:26,

74:16

Inspector's [4] -

4:22, 4:24, 5:2,

71:22

Inspectorate [1]

- 54:20

installations [3]

- 29:25, 30:6,

32:13

instance [4] -

5:8, 79:13,

143:18, 171:17

instances [1] -

105:1

instant [1] -

113:1

instead [2] -

91:23, 132:3

institution [5] -

93:4, 93:10,

93:16, 94:3, 94:8

institutions [2] -

114:3, 132:24

INSTRUCTED

[6] - 2:6, 2:10,

2:15, 2:20, 2:25,

2:29

insufficient [1] -

139:1

integrated [3] -

54:21, 59:12,

59:20

integrity [6] -

127:4, 127:22,

130:27, 135:4,

135:6, 137:5

integrity" [1] -

134:23

intend [1] -

154:23

intended [3] -

4:2, 130:16,

143:5

intensified [1] -

60:13

intensify [1] -

60:5

intention [4] -

22:12, 22:15,

99:26, 102:27

inter [6] - 32:13,

42:18, 43:3,

56:29, 117:6,

144:8

inter-EU [1] -

144:8

interest [14] -

42:27, 82:2, 82:6,

83:13, 98:3,

98:16, 98:24,

101:26, 102:4,

102:19, 104:23,

111:21, 116:22

interested [3] -

116:18, 126:6,

186:28

interesting [1] -

141:22

interests [21] -

61:20, 82:16,

91:16, 96:17,

96:24, 96:29,

97:22, 98:19,

100:17, 100:22,

101:14, 102:15,

102:20, 102:24,

103:9, 106:6,

108:2, 110:8,

116:7, 116:16,

124:23

interfere [7] -

6:13, 20:4, 42:26,

77:18, 108:23,

109:19, 110:11

interfered [3] -

108:18, 109:18,

109:29

interference [10]

- 42:3, 42:6,

100:27, 106:24,

107:22, 108:24,

109:3, 109:24,

111:14, 115:14

interferes [1] -

40:22

interfering [1] -

137:23

interminable [1]

- 124:4

internal [5] - 5:1,

134:12, 141:5,

159:27, 169:3

international

[17] - 131:22,

132:5, 132:26,

132:28, 133:19,

133:24, 143:13,

143:19, 143:21,

144:1, 147:5,

147:9, 151:13,

151:19, 151:20,

151:22, 151:27

International [1]

- 143:16

internet [3] -

70:8, 70:10, 77:9

interpret [3] -

65:6, 65:14,

65:22

interpretation

[13] - 25:17, 65:4,

65:12, 82:28,

84:3, 108:21,

117:24, 131:17,

131:27, 156:10,

156:23, 184:16

interpreting [1] -

130:10

interpretive [1] -

132:6

intervention [1]

- 140:4

interventions

[6] - 29:26, 30:7,

33:9, 33:17, 35:5,

36:11

intoxicating [1] -

105:5

introduce [2] -

9:8, 64:19

introduced [3] -

31:1, 42:17, 64:6

intrusion" [1] -

135:12

invalid [4] -

43:4, 43:10,

105:6, 122:13

invalidity [1] -

105:7

invest [1] -

113:20

invested [1] -

113:17

investigating [1]

- 181:22

invite [1] - 61:8

invoke [2] -

102:7, 108:26

invoked [1] -

47:13

invoking [1] -

100:6

involve [4] -

45:13, 62:15,

79:26, 137:19

involved [3] -

144:19, 151:9,

158:9

involvement [2]

- 175:14

involving [7] -

29:27, 33:9,

33:17, 35:6,

36:12, 110:22,

144:28

IPPC [3] - 68:25,

127:25, 128:21

Ireland [6] -

89:8, 89:13,

144:19, 144:24,

181:4, 181:19

IRELAND [2] -

1:19, 2:22

Irelands [1] -

144:21

IRISH [2] - 1:12,

2:8

Irish [17] - 3:5,

26:7, 40:28,

46:27, 67:9,

71:12, 80:5, 83:4,

83:18, 84:2, 84:6,

104:2, 126:24,

127:3, 127:20,

127:27, 128:17

Irish.. [1] -

138:18

irrelevant [6] -

56:22, 76:5,

76:21, 80:1,

117:12, 180:23

irrevocably [1] -

127:16

Irvine [9] - 47:8,

47:14, 47:23,

49:9, 155:26,

155:29, 167:2,

177:25, 185:8

issue [46] -

11:19, 11:24,

11:26, 11:27,

19:15, 23:17,

24:7, 33:3, 41:8,

42:24, 46:4,

47:10, 49:25,

50:14, 59:22,

60:25, 60:29,

61:3, 62:24,

64:26, 66:1, 66:5,

66:7, 66:16,

66:17, 68:19,

68:29, 70:28,

72:17, 75:18,

79:10, 79:19,

80:19, 105:4,

121:15, 130:19,

133:22, 147:23,

154:19, 155:4,

166:15, 169:3,

174:2, 178:4,

178:5, 186:5

Issue [1] -

179:12

issue' [1] - 50:28

issued [15] -

11:21, 37:19,

41:21, 42:28,

43:14, 53:13,

54:18, 54:21,

54:28, 55:25,

55:28, 60:9, 64:7,

87:19, 87:20

issues [14] -

13:18, 45:15,

46:1, 46:24,

77:22, 80:24,

90:23, 98:15,

111:18, 117:10,

145:9, 146:16,

162:1, 174:2

issuing [1] -

145:28

iteration [4] -

157:9, 157:10,

174:12

iterations [1] -

182:4

itself [21] - 6:9,

47:22, 48:22,

61:8, 85:21, 97:4,

98:17, 99:17,

104:28, 109:27,

110:4, 110:7,

111:29, 119:27,

123:24, 129:1,

132:3, 138:11,

148:7, 154:9,

170:15

IV [4] - 4:8, 12:2,

154:10, 156:12

iv [1] - 68:6

J

J. [1] - 130:20

J.'s [1] - 130:21

JAMES [1] - 1:8

James [2] -

80:4, 80:5

January [4] -

54:20, 54:27,

71:10, 74:8

JERRY [1] - 2:4

JIMMY [1] - 1:9

John [1] -

171:29

JOHN [1] - 2:8

join [1] - 78:8

journal [2] -

27:9, 27:11

judge [2] - 96:8,

99:14

Judge [140] -

3:11, 25:29,

26:26, 27:12,

38:9, 38:15,

49:20, 70:14,

75:12, 76:19,

81:3, 90:6, 92:19,

92:23, 98:8,

101:22, 109:22,

111:11, 111:22,

120:2, 120:16,

121:5, 121:6,

121:14, 122:26,

125:8, 125:29,

128:12, 129:13,

132:11, 134:3,

134:5, 141:6,

141:21, 146:26,

147:19, 148:6,

150:12, 150:19,

150:28, 152:9,

153:5, 153:10,

153:16, 153:20,

153:23, 153:27,

154:8, 154:11,

154:17, 154:26,

154:29, 155:12,

155:18, 155:22,

155:25, 155:28,

156:2, 156:13,

156:25, 157:15,

157:28, 158:6,

158:27, 159:2,

159:6, 159:15,

159:28, 160:6,

160:29, 161:7,

161:17, 161:21,

161:28, 162:9,

162:21, 163:22,

164:6, 164:11,

164:21, 164:29,

165:18, 165:23,

165:24, 166:3,

166:9, 166:15,

166:19, 166:21,

167:1, 167:5,

167:11, 167:13,

167:27, 167:29,

168:21, 168:26,

169:3, 170:5,

170:9, 171:3,

171:22, 172:6,


18

172:15, 173:15,

174:1, 174:3,

174:8, 174:22,

174:24, 175:11,

175:17, 175:29,

176:5, 176:18,

176:22, 176:25,

177:19, 177:26,

177:27, 178:4,

178:28, 179:1,

179:8, 180:20,

182:2, 183:7,

183:19, 184:10,

184:18, 184:23,

185:10, 185:12,

185:28, 186:15,

186:16, 186:20,

187:4, 187:12,

187:18

judged [1] -

114:4

judgment [56] -

20:20, 20:22,

21:4, 24:2, 24:3,

31:10, 35:21,

36:10, 36:17,

36:20, 38:15,

38:17, 38:18,

41:7, 44:7, 44:18,

47:18, 47:19,

50:17, 50:22,

52:22, 53:21,

67:17, 69:29,

72:13, 72:16,

72:22, 80:7, 96:3,

96:22, 99:11,

99:13, 103:12,

104:4, 104:24,

110:6, 111:12,

113:28, 114:6,

115:25, 129:16,

130:13, 130:20,

130:29, 131:11,

132:10, 132:13,

134:11, 144:27,

145:4, 159:28,

167:29, 176:28,

183:20, 183:21

judgments [3] -

101:7, 104:7,

177:21

judicial [21] -

17:5, 22:29,

23:16, 62:5,

67:22, 68:6,

68:23, 73:2, 73:9,

73:17, 73:25,

74:4, 83:29,

105:21, 106:4,

131:7, 131:12,

135:7, 145:14,

150:5, 150:15

judicially [2] -

85:23, 89:27

judiciary [1] -

130:18

July [3] - 20:19,

53:14, 54:25

jumping [1] -

155:16

June [3] - 37:19,

169:5, 171:13

jurisdiction [6] -

40:16, 47:28,

68:24, 68:28,

167:3, 178:10

jurisdictions [1]

- 132:17

jurisprudence

[3] - 131:3, 157:2,

177:23

jurisprudential

[1] - 131:21

justice [59] - 7:7,

8:6, 22:4, 24:3,

25:14, 25:15,

47:7, 47:14,

47:23, 49:9, 67:8,

67:18, 68:23,

72:13, 73:6, 73:7,

74:24, 76:9,

76:20, 80:6,

99:11, 100:13,

101:8, 101:9,

102:11, 103:6,

103:29, 106:23,

106:29, 108:29,

110:6, 110:13,

111:24, 113:26,

115:24, 117:23,

123:2, 125:2,

125:13, 125:26,

134:11, 137:25,

155:26, 155:29,

161:8, 167:1,

167:2, 176:9,

176:28, 177:25,

178:2, 178:12,

179:2, 179:3,

183:14, 183:18,

183:20, 185:8,

185:11

JUSTICE [64] -

1:24, 6:29, 7:5,

26:19, 26:24,

26:28, 27:2, 27:5,

27:8, 27:13,

34:12, 34:27,

43:20, 43:23,

69:21, 70:5,

70:11, 70:25,

77:11, 80:26,

89:6, 89:13,

95:23, 98:5,

101:10, 102:9,

111:2, 121:2,

121:8, 121:12,

126:22, 132:9,

132:12, 137:2,

141:15, 141:19,

141:22, 144:27,

146:13, 147:29,

149:2, 150:7,

150:14, 151:6,

151:29, 152:7,

153:7, 153:19,

161:18, 161:24,

164:3, 164:8,

164:18, 165:28,

166:17, 177:20,

186:18, 186:26,

187:7, 187:10,

187:15, 187:19,

187:21, 187:24

Justice [24] -

20:18, 21:5,

21:23, 23:29,

31:9, 43:19, 44:7,

44:9, 44:16,

44:29, 45:3,

68:18, 69:4,

72:17, 76:25,

77:2, 79:17, 80:4,

95:27, 101:8,

104:13, 115:2,

130:6, 182:5

justifiable [1] -

100:22

justified [1] -

5:10

K

Keane [1] -

130:6

KEANEY [1] -

2:27

Keegan [1] -

161:10

KEELING [1] -

2:23

keep [2] - 37:14,

149:25

Kelly [1] -

106:18

KENNEDY [1] -

2:18

Kennedy [2] -

154:25, 181:19

KENNY [3] - 2:8,

120:2, 121:5

Kenny [15] -

27:27, 27:29,

28:11, 28:18,

30:26, 77:25,

77:27, 77:29,

120:24, 130:20,

130:21, 131:18,

131:21, 155:15,

157:10

Kenny's [1] -

155:2

key [3] - 14:21,

40:1, 153:29

kids [1] - 121:13

kilometres [4] -

28:27, 36:2,

66:22, 72:5

kind [10] - 4:8,

10:9, 12:14,

12:24, 28:29,

57:18, 66:24,

76:11, 78:20,

78:28

KINGSTON [1] -

2:24

Klohn [2] -

119:29, 121:7

knowing [2] -

53:26, 53:27

knowledge [1] -

86:19

known [4] -

77:11, 118:4,

131:16, 138:18

knows [1] -

76:16

Kokott [1] -

56:22

Krizan [7] -

40:26, 40:27,

49:18, 50:8, 63:2,

63:8, 64:7

L

L0092 [1] -

27:11

L26 [1] - 27:9

lack [1] - 75:12

Lackagh [5] -

47:2, 155:26,

155:27, 155:28,

159:8

Laffoy [5] - 24:4,

25:14, 161:8,

178:2, 178:12

laid [3] - 56:26,

101:2, 107:25

Lancefort [1] -

73:14

land [6] - 52:11,

78:8, 105:17,

106:12, 106:13,

106:16

Landfill [1] -

59:16

landfill [16] -

30:28, 31:2,

31:20, 33:3,

33:16, 35:4,

49:25, 53:12,

53:26, 53:28,

54:2, 54:22,

55:20, 60:1, 60:4,

60:14

landing [1] -

51:7

landscape [1] -

29:26

Lane [1] - 163:5

lane [1] - 37:11

language [21] -

8:1, 8:3, 9:14,

28:10, 28:15,

28:19, 30:2, 30:4,

35:3, 35:8, 35:20,

35:21, 35:24,

36:8, 36:9, 36:14,

63:9, 79:27, 91:7,

100:13, 118:16

Laoghaire [6] -

7:8, 41:17, 42:20,

157:17, 159:13,

176:8

Laoghaire/

Rathdown [2] -

156:29, 157:16

large [4] - 93:25,

98:17, 101:26,

105:16

largely [1] -

134:6

Larkin [1] -

127:25

last [9] - 8:21,

17:19, 23:23,

27:22, 63:5,

79:10, 157:10,

178:14, 179:8

lastly [1] -

154:29

latest [1] - 157:9

latitude [3] -

120:7, 121:3

latter [1] - 33:26

law [46] - 6:6,

6:9, 11:10, 11:17,

14:22, 20:2,

25:17, 25:22,

26:5, 26:7, 38:12,

40:16, 40:22,

50:23, 50:24,

50:26, 51:27,

52:19, 55:21,

65:14, 65:15,

65:20, 65:22,

80:10, 80:13,

81:4, 81:5, 83:28,

84:27, 88:29,

89:1, 90:25,

104:27, 106:8,

107:16, 118:1,

132:16, 133:2,

133:14, 154:22,

157:13, 167:16,

183:13, 183:21,

184:20

Law [3] - 167:11,

181:4, 181:19

LAW [1] - 2:15

lawmakers [1] -

149:2

lay [4] - 69:23,

69:24, 70:17,

70:19

layout [2] -

171:5, 171:7

lead [6] - 34:15,

34:18, 34:20,

83:25, 127:13,

127:15

least [9] - 5:26,

86:24, 108:23,

114:2, 114:9,

114:27, 116:21,

120:13, 147:15

leave [6] - 64:9,

68:23, 69:1,

69:23, 69:27,

73:17

leaves [1] -

75:22

leaving [4] -

66:17, 88:15,

96:27, 133:24

LEE [1] - 2:29

leeway [1] -

70:19

left [7] - 13:26,

13:28, 46:12,

53:25, 62:3,

62:13, 97:15

left-hand [1] -

53:25

legal [20] -

12:27, 73:28,

74:9, 92:26,

95:15, 96:27,

96:28, 100:29,


19

104:16, 105:1,

106:25, 107:23,

108:9, 109:3,

113:11, 133:9,

133:10, 133:15,

174:2, 184:16

legality [1] -

68:27

legally [3] -

70:18, 132:19,

137:28

legislation [12] -

30:29, 31:1,

51:19, 105:4,

105:19, 133:12,

136:2, 137:16,

147:8, 148:13,

174:27, 186:13

legislative [2] -

105:10, 186:9

legislature [12] -

9:7, 12:13, 12:22,

13:3, 13:6, 15:1,

64:4, 64:8, 64:17,

78:18, 79:2, 84:5

legitimate [1] -

100:9

legitimately [1] -

125:27

lending [2] -

113:8, 113:12

length [1] -

40:21

less [4] - 104:18,

137:2, 169:16

letter [10] -

37:20, 169:28,

169:29, 170:27,

171:1, 171:4,

171:6, 171:13,

172:25, 173:8

level [22] - 3:12,

11:8, 125:3,

125:4, 125:14,

148:27, 148:29,

151:9, 151:12,

151:23, 152:26,

169:12, 169:13,

170:1, 170:2,

170:3, 170:5,

173:26, 173:27,

173:28

levels [2] -

144:2, 170:1

levies [1] - 158:8

liable [2] -

103:14, 108:1

Liam [1] - 20:23

licences [3] -

68:25, 68:27,

105:5

lie [1] - 135:16

lifespan [2] -

95:10, 113:18

light [8] - 24:24,

56:5, 124:21,

161:11, 161:21,

170:10, 179:26,

182:29

lighting [1] -

163:11

likelihood [1] -

144:5

likely [11] -

48:10, 56:28,

57:6, 69:16,

95:15, 112:2,

112:6, 112:10,

113:10, 114:25,

116:6

limit [6] - 16:28,

17:28, 18:28,

19:10, 76:2,

92:10

limited [22] - 4:5,

23:8, 64:19,

82:12, 82:21,

85:4, 86:4, 87:10,

88:17, 97:16,

101:22, 110:27,

115:20, 117:23,

123:4, 123:6,

125:18, 126:8,

126:11, 150:11,

158:25, 159:6

limits [1] - 15:7

line [2] - 108:7,

133:29

line' [1] - 108:7

lines [1] - 182:23

link [4] - 112:13,

129:2, 129:4,

129:5

liquor [1] - 105:5

list [2] - 32:22,

159:2

listed [7] - 28:4,

28:25, 29:3,

32:14, 32:24,

162:25, 181:6

listened [1] -

153:16

literal [1] - 132:1

litigant [4] -

69:23, 69:24,

70:17, 70:18

litigants [1] -

70:20

litigate [1] -

110:24

Littondale [2] -

24:4, 25:14

Littonvale [4] -

161:9, 168:22,

177:19, 177:29

live [1] - 137:3

livelihood [2] -

97:2, 103:23

load [1] - 145:6

loan [5] - 94:12,

94:15, 96:8,

113:13, 114:25

loan-to-value [1]

- 113:13

loaned [1] - 2:31

loans [10] -

95:13, 95:16,

96:29, 103:8,

103:15, 113:14,

113:16, 113:18,

114:8, 115:29

local [2] - 20:29,

124:16

Local [3] -

155:8, 155:9,

175:22

located [2] -

71:28, 72:1

location [7] -

51:17, 51:23,

51:25, 53:22,

54:10, 54:26,

57:1

location.. [1] -

53:19

locations [1] -

162:26

locus [1] - 21:25

lodged [2] -

123:23, 169:27

logic [1] -

136:21

LOGUE [1] -

2:10

long-standing

[1] - 144:21

look [100] - 4:6,

4:7, 4:9, 4:14,

4:23, 6:5, 6:8,

6:9, 7:10, 8:10,

8:23, 9:17, 10:21,

11:17, 14:1,

16:10, 16:11,

20:2, 25:27, 26:8,

26:10, 27:21,

28:10, 28:17,

28:18, 28:23,

28:24, 29:13,

29:20, 30:2, 31:8,

31:13, 36:28,

37:4, 37:16,

38:15, 38:16,

40:26, 41:9,

41:16, 44:15,

47:17, 47:23,

49:21, 50:17,

50:21, 53:6,

55:11, 58:13,

63:20, 64:7, 71:5,

77:16, 79:20,

79:21, 79:23,

87:26, 102:2,

111:25, 117:14,

120:18, 123:27,

124:27, 153:28,

153:29, 154:2,

154:4, 154:8,

154:12, 154:20,

154:26, 155:10,

155:25, 156:9,

156:22, 157:3,

157:15, 157:17,

158:7, 158:19,

158:21, 158:27,

159:2, 159:7,

159:12, 159:27,

160:7, 162:7,

165:23, 165:26,

167:17, 174:12,

177:27, 182:4,

183:17, 184:12,

185:9

looked [11] - 7:7,

26:5, 26:6, 30:1,

30:23, 31:12,

51:9, 51:12,

57:28, 132:2,

132:3

looking [20] -

3:11, 4:28, 4:29,

6:4, 8:4, 20:12,

26:15, 26:16,

26:17, 27:13,

38:5, 39:29, 44:3,

49:22, 51:4, 54:7,

57:10, 88:16,

94:14, 132:4

looks [15] - 3:23,

15:5, 18:29,

28:15, 28:16,

35:3, 35:19,

35:20, 40:15,

50:20, 66:20,

156:14, 157:27,

158:11, 159:25

loose [1] - 67:3

Lordship [6] -

154:20, 155:6,

159:25, 159:29,

161:29, 183:11

loss [1] - 117:6

lost [3] - 8:3,

124:3, 170:5

low [5] - 9:28,

138:16, 140:12,

140:16, 140:26

Low [3] -

126:29, 141:7,

141:24

lower [3] - 98:1,

171:22, 172:10

Ltd [1] - 73:14

lunch [2] -

111:1, 111:11

LUNCH [2] -

111:5, 111:7

lunchtime [1] -

187:4

M

Macken [3] -

100:14, 101:9,

110:13

MacPharthalai

n [2] - 104:2,

104:8

main [8] - 3:24,

4:17, 33:4, 38:22,

39:13, 44:25,

62:19, 179:4

maintain [2] -

51:16, 149:26

maintained [1] -

47:28

maker [12] -

86:3, 100:7,

102:29, 105:14,

118:2, 123:5,

124:19, 124:29,

125:15, 125:19,

151:16, 151:17

Malone [3] -

1:27, 2:30, 2:32

MALONE [1] -

1:31

man [1] - 137:2

manage [1] -

115:6

management [1]

- 163:10

Manager [1] -

149:11

mandatory [4] -

61:6, 160:19,

168:5, 176:11

manifestly [1] -

30:9

manner [11] -

2:31, 22:29,

45:10, 46:13,

109:18, 126:4,

160:10, 168:12,

175:15, 177:14,

178:24

manufacture [1]

- 170:18

map [1] - 162:25

March [8] -

54:11, 122:1,

122:7, 123:14,

124:11, 165:18,

165:19, 166:7

MARGARET [1]

- 1:8

marginal [2] -

17:1, 17:28

mark [1] -

137:13

market [4] -

96:9, 96:10,

143:24, 143:29

MARTIN [1] -

2:27

mast [1] -

163:11

mate [1] - 165:1

material [15] -

9:18, 52:12, 75:6,

82:9, 83:13,

91:16, 97:29,

98:3, 98:16,

100:18, 102:4,

108:2, 109:5,

116:22, 119:2

materiality [1] -

171:12

materially [5] -

97:24, 101:11,

101:14, 126:6,

172:17

materials [2] -

3:19, 170:18

matter [52] -

10:1, 22:27,

24:13, 25:8,

38:12, 46:17,

46:19, 82:8,

86:19, 86:20,

88:25, 89:18,

89:21, 89:22,

89:29, 91:11,

93:28, 101:4,

101:19, 102:14,

105:11, 107:12,

107:13, 107:28,

122:13, 122:18,

133:3, 133:16,

135:27, 154:29,


20

155:22, 158:18,

160:3, 161:15,

164:24, 165:20,

165:22, 167:1,

167:16, 170:24,

171:29, 176:3,

178:6, 178:21,

179:15, 180:7,

183:3, 183:8,

184:8, 184:14,

184:18, 184:20

matter.. [1] -

113:6

matters [50] -

5:13, 13:13, 25:6,

38:27, 39:21,

43:25, 75:29,

86:6, 88:6, 88:27,

98:20, 102:2,

126:23, 137:20,

138:23, 141:12,

141:29, 146:18,

154:22, 154:23,

156:18, 157:21,

158:6, 159:4,

159:6, 160:22,

160:23, 161:1,

161:4, 161:14,

162:6, 166:27,

167:21, 168:6,

168:16, 168:18,

172:5, 176:22,

176:24, 177:6,

177:12, 180:5,

183:1, 183:2,

184:2, 184:5,

184:13, 186:5,

186:11, 186:12

maximum [1] -

40:23

MBM [2] -

143:29, 144:10

McCoy [10] -

7:8, 8:4, 8:6,

24:2, 25:15,

156:29, 157:16,

159:3, 159:13,

176:7

McDonald [37] -

2:22, 3:8, 3:10,

7:2, 7:6, 26:21,

26:25, 27:1, 27:4,

27:6, 27:10,

27:16, 34:18,

35:1, 43:22, 44:3,

69:28, 70:8,

70:12, 70:27,

76:7, 76:23,

77:12, 81:3,

81:20, 82:24,

84:11, 84:25,

85:14, 87:7, 88:8,

88:29, 97:14,

153:12, 154:1,

154:24, 175:29

McDonald's [2] -

81:9, 144:28

MCDONELL [1]

- 1:9

MCDONNELL

[2] - 1:7, 1:7

McDowell [19] -

20:15, 23:11,

86:7, 155:19,

159:3, 159:7,

161:1, 161:28,

162:2, 162:7,

164:23, 165:23,

168:23, 168:24,

174:3, 174:6,

184:17, 185:23,

186:7

McGee [2] -

128:15, 130:11

McGovern [2] -

76:9, 76:20

McKillen [8] -

94:15, 95:19,

97:2, 97:5, 97:23,

113:24, 114:17,

115:15

McKillen's [3] -

95:3, 102:20,

113:20

McMahon [3] -

123:2, 125:13,

125:26

Meadows [1] -

161:11

mean [16] - 9:29,

11:12, 35:2,

82:28, 104:15,

121:2, 125:22,

145:4, 149:10,

152:5, 155:3,

155:4, 161:9,

164:19, 176:29,

178:7

mean.. [1] -

104:11

meaning [13] -

29:15, 31:16,

32:3, 32:16, 33:5,

33:19, 34:10,

39:3, 43:13, 48:1,

56:8, 140:9

means [9] -

18:20, 29:21,

29:24, 106:5,

139:25, 139:29,

140:4, 145:2,

145:8

means...a [1] -

139:22

meant [1] -

28:23

meantime [3] -

42:15, 58:2,

61:28

measures [5] -

68:2, 147:12,

149:29, 156:19,

157:18

mechanical [1] -

117:29

mechanism [2] -

105:20, 143:29

medical [5] -

128:15, 134:9,

134:18, 134:29,

135:25

meet [2] -

118:17, 145:20

meeting [1] -

148:2

member [3] -

99:12, 123:20,

123:26

Member [8] -

27:19, 28:1,

62:13, 64:9,

64:12, 64:18,

64:19, 144:18

members [1] -

83:20

membership [1]

- 144:22

memorandum

[1] - 171:14

mention [2] -

65:17, 132:21

mentioned [3] -

105:19, 142:23,

146:5

mere [14] -

33:15, 35:3,

36:10, 39:11,

40:4, 40:10,

44:23, 66:23,

100:23, 105:26,

106:7, 107:1,

108:14, 110:4

merely [10] -

45:13, 91:23,

98:16, 102:6,

104:18, 119:27,

132:23, 145:27,

150:1, 176:13

MERRIMAN [1] -

1:7

Merriman [12] -

4:27, 22:2, 81:25,

82:16, 82:19,

82:26, 84:10,

97:10, 115:18,

126:19, 141:2,

141:16

method [2] -

84:2, 131:17

methods [2] -

150:5, 150:21

metres [4] -

169:13, 170:2,

171:22, 172:10

MICHAEL [1] -

1:7

middle [2] -

70:6, 170:1

might [17] -

36:27, 43:23,

60:13, 100:8,

107:8, 108:15,

109:18, 110:11,

112:13, 114:28,

128:12, 130:22,

130:23, 137:14,

150:20, 159:25,

165:24

militate [2] -

24:28, 180:1

militated [5] -

8:29, 9:27, 10:10,

10:18, 86:16

militates [1] -

10:3

mind [14] -

12:14, 15:2, 15:3,

31:23, 50:20,

57:13, 61:12,

62:29, 109:23,

124:28, 148:14,

148:22, 151:29,

186:27

mindful [1] -

124:22

minds [3] -

137:26, 149:24,

149:27

mine [2] - 27:4,

95:25

mineral [1] -

29:27

minimal [1] -

110:22

minimum [2] -

25:29, 40:23

mining [3] -

38:25, 39:15,

44:27

Minister [15] -

11:21, 41:3,

41:14, 42:24,

42:25, 43:14,

44:4, 87:19, 93:7,

104:25, 134:3,

139:18, 140:19,

160:2, 175:12

Ministerial [7] -

87:29, 88:1, 88:9,

148:8, 148:10,

152:13, 152:16

ministerial [2] -

45:25, 46:19

Ministry [2] -

53:11, 54:11

minutes [4] -

43:24, 99:11,

187:6

mischaracteris

ed [1] - 40:27

misconstrue [2]

- 36:19

misconstrued

[1] - 184:26

mispronouncin

g [1] - 116:28

missed [1] -

187:12

mistake [1] -

164:28

mistaken [1] -

45:8

mistakes [1] -

165:2

mitigating [4] -

139:13, 142:18,

142:24, 147:18

mitigation [9] -

139:8, 139:25,

139:26, 140:4,

140:21, 142:4,

142:28, 143:3,

146:25

mix [1] - 137:9

model [2] -

113:20, 114:21

modification [4]

- 39:11, 40:4,

40:11, 44:23

Modifications

[1] - 42:9

modified [1] -

100:29

modifies [1] -

108:8

modify [2] -

46:6, 46:10

moment [7] -

7:26, 11:11,

21:21, 28:17,

28:24, 40:26,

64:24

moments [2] -

44:18, 156:26

monies [1] -

85:4

month [1] -

12:20

months [1] -

170:20

monument [3] -

42:4, 42:6, 42:21

Monuments [3] -

42:5, 42:15,

42:16

monuments [1]

- 42:27

morning [4] -

51:3, 175:29,

185:8, 186:17

MORRIS [1] -

1:9

mortgagor [1] -

96:14

most [9] - 83:27,

106:20, 131:10,

132:18, 132:25,

133:11, 139:8,

139:9, 145:27

motorway [1] -

106:1

move [1] -

124:13

movements [1] -

37:11

moves [2] -

136:9, 147:4

Moving [1] -

135:22

moving [1] -

136:23

MR [159] - 1:24,

2:4, 2:5, 2:8,

2:13, 2:13, 2:18,

2:18, 2:19, 2:22,

2:23, 2:23, 2:27,

2:27, 3:8, 3:10,

6:29, 7:2, 7:5,

7:6, 26:19, 26:21,

26:24, 26:25,

26:28, 27:1, 27:2,

27:4, 27:5, 27:6,

27:8, 27:10,

27:13, 27:16,

34:12, 34:18,

34:27, 35:1,

43:20, 43:22,

43:23, 44:3,

69:21, 69:28,

70:5, 70:8, 70:11,


21

70:12, 70:25,

70:27, 75:22,

76:7, 76:19,

76:23, 77:11,

77:12, 80:26,

81:1, 81:3, 89:6,

89:8, 89:13,

89:16, 95:23,

95:25, 98:5, 98:8,

101:10, 101:16,

102:9, 102:10,

111:2, 111:11,

120:2, 120:16,

120:24, 121:2,

121:5, 121:6,

121:8, 121:11,

121:12, 121:14,

126:22, 126:23,

132:9, 132:11,

132:12, 132:14,

137:2, 137:6,

141:15, 141:17,

141:19, 141:20,

141:22, 141:23,

144:27, 145:8,

146:13, 146:18,

147:29, 148:5,

149:2, 149:6,

150:7, 150:12,

150:14, 150:18,

151:6, 151:15,

151:29, 152:5,

152:7, 152:9,

153:7, 153:10,

153:14, 153:16,

153:19, 153:20,

161:18, 161:20,

161:24, 161:25,

164:3, 164:6,

164:8, 164:11,

164:18, 164:21,

165:28, 166:3,

166:17, 166:19,

177:20, 177:22,

186:18, 186:20,

186:23, 186:26,

186:27, 186:29,

187:1, 187:4,

187:5, 187:6,

187:7, 187:9,

187:10, 187:12,

187:13, 187:15,

187:17, 187:19,

187:20, 187:21,

187:23, 187:24

MS [2] - 2:15,

2:24

multilateral [1] -

143:14

Murphy [1] -

134:11

Murray [4] -

44:7, 44:16,

95:27, 101:8

must [66] - 2:31,

4:9, 8:6, 17:2,

25:6, 30:12,

37:28, 38:11,

39:22, 55:9,

56:27, 57:5,

57:25, 58:5,

58:28, 59:10,

61:16, 61:21,

62:9, 66:9, 66:24,

83:29, 84:20,

97:7, 108:17,

108:22, 108:24,

109:23, 109:28,

111:13, 116:15,

116:17, 116:26,

118:2, 118:4,

118:13, 118:14,

118:18, 118:25,

124:7, 124:19,

124:22, 126:2,

127:10, 128:7,

141:15, 145:9,

145:20, 145:21,

146:9, 148:10,

148:22, 152:12,

152:18, 152:20,

152:28, 168:10,

177:1, 177:9,

180:5, 182:16,

182:29, 185:4

muster [1] -

161:9

N

NAMA [45] -

92:29, 93:3, 93:4,

93:9, 93:15,

93:22, 93:26,

93:28, 94:1, 94:3,

94:14, 94:17,

94:18, 94:21,

95:2, 95:9, 95:15,

96:12, 96:18,

96:20, 96:23,

97:13, 97:17,

99:26, 100:1,

102:16, 102:17,

103:10, 103:14,

112:3, 112:19,

112:28, 113:10,

113:14, 114:1,

114:2, 114:8,

114:10, 114:17,

114:18, 114:23,

115:10, 115:28,

116:9, 159:1

NAMA's [1] -

114:22

name [1] - 171:6

named [3] -

1:29, 104:21,

133:5

Named [1] - 68:7

namely [1] -

22:21

narrow [4] -

87:25, 109:4,

110:25, 178:8

national [34] -

40:20, 42:4, 42:6,

42:21, 42:26,

51:8, 52:19,

55:21, 55:27,

65:14, 95:21,

139:8, 139:9,

139:11, 139:21,

139:25, 140:9,

140:19, 140:21,

140:22, 140:24,

142:4, 142:5,

142:17, 142:25,

142:29, 143:3,

143:5, 147:21,

149:24, 149:29,

151:23, 167:16

National [7] -

42:5, 42:15,

42:16, 71:16,

74:17, 146:23,

147:18

Natura [1] - 68:4

natural [10] -

29:26, 30:8, 68:3,

69:13, 106:22,

117:23, 127:3,

129:20, 129:21,

137:21

naturally [1] -

70:3

nature [32] -

8:28, 9:26, 41:27,

57:1, 67:12, 74:1,

82:4, 86:14,

100:4, 100:5,

101:29, 110:14,

110:17, 110:21,

111:16, 119:26,

126:11, 130:22,

131:8, 153:26,

154:19, 157:22,

158:1, 158:8,

158:28, 165:11,

165:20, 167:3,

176:22, 178:10

NCRP1) [1] -

162:19

near [1] - 168:29

nearly [1] -

90:24

necessarily [1] -

93:5

necessary [21] -

4:6, 4:23, 20:19,

22:11, 22:13,

23:5, 25:26, 26:2,

31:15, 45:26,

46:14, 53:1,

58:23, 59:1,

61:18, 61:25,

68:2, 86:25,

94:18, 112:3,

128:26

necessity [1] -

131:11

need [17] - 10:7,

29:17, 37:29,

60:1, 64:22, 77:9,

77:25, 80:1,

101:3, 107:26,

120:17, 125:2,

126:1, 129:7,

131:16, 133:13,

133:15

needs [4] -

29:20, 38:7, 65:1,

129:12

needy [1] -

134:20

negative [4] -

102:5, 135:5,

160:17, 176:12

negatively [1] -

129:9

neighbouring

[1] - 60:2

neighbours [1] -

183:18

never [5] - 76:7,

76:8, 101:2,

104:1, 107:25

nevertheless [3]

- 56:25, 137:6,

186:10

new [42] - 30:29,

31:1, 34:9, 34:24,

34:25, 35:25,

35:28, 36:4,

36:27, 38:1, 38:3,

38:4, 38:26, 39:1,

39:20, 39:21,

39:23, 39:26,

39:27, 40:13,

49:14, 52:12,

52:13, 57:17,

63:6, 63:16,

63:17, 63:19,

79:26, 105:3,

105:4, 106:1,

124:10, 129:14,

131:8, 155:15,

155:17, 156:11,

156:16

news [1] -

146:15

next [18] - 5:17,

10:21, 21:22,

22:3, 23:11,

32:19, 36:24,

38:16, 51:14,

58:14, 59:22,

62:1, 64:7, 69:3,

121:4, 148:3,

161:17, 165:24

nice [1] - 169:2

nine [1] - 89:11

NO [1] - 1:3

NOEL [2] - 1:8,

1:8

noise [1] - 51:6

Nomarchiaki [1]

- 58:18

non [10] - 93:16,

94:20, 165:5,

165:8, 165:9,

165:13, 171:12,

172:9, 184:28,

184:29

non-

compliance [7] -

165:5, 165:8,

165:9, 165:13,

171:12, 184:28,

184:29

non-compliant

[1] - 172:9

non-

exhaustive [1] -

94:20

non-

performing [1] -

93:16

none [2] -

132:18, 175:13

nonetheless [2]

- 105:11, 186:1

Nore [4] - 69:17,

71:14, 71:17,

71:27

normal [4] -

113:8, 113:11,

146:1, 148:21

normally [3] -

100:24, 105:27,

145:15

North [4] -

34:15, 87:9,

162:18, 162:24

north [5] - 72:1,

127:13, 127:23,

128:18, 128:26

note [5] - 8:1,

17:28, 138:25,

152:19, 156:10

noted [4] -

34:12, 61:16,

98:22, 142:7

notes [11] - 1:29,

71:27, 141:10,

141:27, 142:2,

143:20, 143:27,

144:5, 144:18,

144:21, 144:22

nothing [12] -

34:29, 35:14,

36:6, 36:7, 40:21,

110:18, 121:12,

124:10, 149:5,

151:12, 151:24,

179:4

NOTICE [3] -

1:17, 1:20, 1:22

Notice [2] -

20:23, 72:11

notice [9] -

15:23, 21:10,

22:12, 22:14,

102:27, 121:27,

122:8, 123:23,

150:15

notices [1] -

107:16

notification [2] -

173:8, 175:8

notify [1] -

117:17

noting [1] -

142:14

notion [2] - 80:3,

118:1

notwithstandin

g [6] - 13:29,

24:19, 87:20,

88:13, 154:21,

179:21

NPWS [1] - 77:7

NRCP1 [1] -

162:25

number [21] -

17:21, 17:22,

24:27, 44:12,

51:6, 59:3, 61:11,

72:5, 93:25, 95:6,

107:10, 113:29,

133:4, 133:6,

133:29, 150:12,


22

152:11, 156:18,

158:6, 177:27,

179:29

numerals [1] -

167:19

O

O'Carroll [1] -

106:18

O'Carroll-Kelly

[1] - 106:18

o'clock [5] -

109:23, 111:3,

186:16, 186:24,

187:24

O'CONNELL [2]

- 1:9, 2:6

O'CONNOR [1] -

1:10

O'Donnell [2] -

5:9, 80:6

O'Keeffe [5] -

73:13, 161:10,

161:11, 178:3,

178:8

O'NEILL [1] -

2:15

O'Neill [4] -

72:13, 73:6, 73:7,

74:24

O'SULLIVAN [1]

- 2:13

O'T [1] - 129:17

obiter [6] -

47:15, 48:5, 49:8,

130:7, 156:4,

159:10

object [5] -

13:27, 94:8,

94:24, 181:26,

182:6

objected [3] -

20:29, 21:1,

74:23

objection [5] -

94:11, 94:27,

105:21, 120:16,

142:25

objections [1] -

22:26

Objective [2] -

146:24, 147:18

objective [19] -

11:7, 15:22, 16:1,

56:25, 58:28,

95:11, 113:15,

113:19, 139:12,

139:13, 140:9,

140:19, 140:25,

142:18, 142:23,

142:29, 143:4,

143:5

objectives [21] -

10:24, 10:25,

74:18, 77:7,

77:15, 77:16,

77:19, 86:28,

86:29, 87:6, 87:8,

87:13, 114:19,

114:27, 139:2,

143:10, 146:1,

146:8, 146:27,

146:28, 151:25

objector [1] -

124:26

objectors [1] -

124:17

Objects [1] -

71:17

obligation [19] -

57:17, 65:19,

105:14, 134:9,

134:10, 134:17,

134:25, 134:29,

135:1, 138:26,

148:8, 149:17,

152:20, 152:21,

152:22, 152:25,

176:14, 176:21

obligations [4] -

52:28, 67:29,

140:29, 147:27

obliged [8] -

38:23, 68:7, 93:9,

114:25, 117:25,

121:6, 149:23,

153:10

observance [1] -

105:23

observation [5]

- 49:8, 56:4, 78:2,

80:6, 124:12

observations

[16] - 3:13, 8:5,

41:8, 48:29,

50:20, 58:19,

63:7, 66:3, 70:16,

72:4, 72:18,

117:18, 117:27,

122:9, 123:25,

159:14

observe [2] -

101:3, 107:26

observed [1] -

38:12

observer [1] -

123:26

observes [1] -

5:17

observing [1] -

77:3

obtained [1] -

170:26

obvious [2] -

9:4, 38:2

Obviously [1] -

50:8

obviously [30] -

9:4, 11:24, 11:26,

12:16, 12:19,

13:22, 17:3, 19:8,

19:24, 21:19,

22:1, 25:11,

40:12, 46:4,

47:10, 47:12,

48:21, 61:7, 62:3,

62:17, 64:4,

65:21, 81:7,

95:20, 109:16,

120:6, 125:8,

151:20, 166:20,

183:7

occasion [2] -

61:25, 124:15

occasions [4] -

110:25, 133:22,

133:29, 150:13

occur [2] -

68:10, 127:23

occurred [3] -

11:20, 61:28,

119:8

occurring [1] -

151:27

October [8] -

21:11, 45:6,

60:17, 143:28,

144:23, 170:24,

171:14, 172:24

OCTOBER [3] -

1:25, 3:2, 187:27

oddity [1] -

51:13

OF [3] - 1:12,

2:8, 3:2

off-setting [1] -

144:2

Offaly [1] - 67:13

offended [1] -

125:3

OFFICE [1] -

2:25

office [1] -

169:19

official [4] -

27:8, 27:11,

183:14, 183:23

often [1] -

135:19

Oireachtas [11] -

82:20, 84:20,

86:24, 92:16,

123:4, 123:6,

125:16, 126:2,

130:18, 156:17,

186:13

OISIN [1] - 2:5

old [5] - 21:19,

38:25, 39:15,

44:27, 90:20

older [1] - 60:27

omission [1] -

135:28

omissions [1] -

83:22

ON [2] - 1:25,

3:1

once [6] - 4:16,

16:20, 57:16,

129:4, 176:20

one [102] - 3:23,

8:20, 8:21, 11:3,

11:16, 12:29,

13:20, 13:27,

15:4, 15:5, 16:16,

16:27, 18:29,

20:21, 21:20,

22:9, 22:21,

23:22, 25:25,

25:26, 25:27,

26:8, 26:25,

28:15, 28:16,

28:23, 29:7, 29:8,

29:10, 29:13,

29:19, 33:3, 35:2,

35:12, 35:19,

35:20, 37:29,

38:17, 40:15,

44:19, 46:27,

48:2, 50:20,

61:25, 65:6,

65:13, 66:20,

66:24, 67:9,

67:19, 69:22,

70:15, 70:17,

70:22, 75:24,

77:9, 77:15,

77:23, 78:2,

79:23, 80:2,

83:14, 85:13,

88:17, 91:20,

92:22, 97:3, 97:5,

97:28, 99:7,

102:1, 102:24,

110:22, 124:22,

124:27, 124:29,

125:2, 132:18,

133:28, 137:18,

137:19, 144:10,

146:8, 150:14,

150:15, 150:16,

155:17, 155:22,

157:2, 157:27,

158:11, 159:25,

160:8, 165:11,

167:17, 176:19,

180:21, 181:5,

185:12, 185:20

One [2] - 124:23,

136:18

ones [1] - 150:1

only.. [1] - 16:20

onus [5] - 73:10,

73:26, 118:17,

118:25, 160:16

open [20] - 6:10,

23:5, 26:3, 27:26,

44:20, 49:23,

58:17, 77:25,

95:26, 111:22,

117:3, 119:29,

123:8, 126:1,

128:27, 131:16,

132:24, 141:2,

176:19

open-ended [1]

- 176:19

opened [16] -

6:26, 20:13,

30:26, 44:17,

46:29, 53:5,

55:12, 71:1, 86:7,

88:29, 98:28,

132:9, 132:12,

154:1, 159:13,

165:26

opening [4] -

21:20, 92:19,

120:19, 134:5

opens [2] -

120:3, 134:11

operate [2] -

33:16, 35:4

operated [5] -

95:21, 126:3,

181:9, 181:13,

181:21

operation [10] -

4:1, 4:11, 4:18,

19:20, 30:28,

31:5, 51:5, 54:22,

95:3

operations [2] -

37:10, 37:12

operators [2] -

31:2, 37:18

opinion [17] -

36:29, 49:23,

50:21, 50:27,

51:1, 51:16, 52:3,

52:6, 53:4, 53:13,

54:13, 55:11,

57:19, 58:18,

64:6, 94:9, 94:24

opportunities

[1] - 85:23

opportunity [18]

- 16:7, 82:11,

90:4, 91:24,

97:18, 99:29,

110:24, 115:16,

118:5, 119:4,

120:20, 122:21,

123:13, 124:3,

124:5, 125:15,

171:11, 175:12

opposed [2] -

63:1, 152:3

opposite [3] -

4:29, 54:29,

166:28

opposition [1] -

135:20

oral [4] - 81:23,

83:6, 85:16,

116:13

Order [1] - 73:1

order [10] - 10:8,

11:15, 23:13,

30:12, 37:3,

67:19, 106:15,

128:27, 135:8,

174:16

orders [5] -

68:22, 69:1,

132:25, 133:9,

133:15

ordinarily [1] -

102:26

ordinary [2] -

96:8, 148:20

Organisation [1]

- 143:17

original [13] -

6:19, 34:19,

34:22, 34:23,

38:6, 45:21, 60:6,

86:8, 89:2, 90:10,

102:7, 121:28,

122:2

originally [3] -

119:5, 119:9,

169:16

otherwise [1] -

80:10

ought [5] -

101:18, 107:16,

122:10, 122:19,


23

173:28

out" [1] - 10:19

out.. [1] - 74:27

outbuildings [1]

- 163:15

outcome [3] -

98:7, 98:10,

109:7

outlined [3] -

97:15, 126:28,

153:11

outside [4] -

69:1, 117:11,

118:6, 181:23

overall [5] -

84:25, 99:16,

119:27, 124:28,

142:28

own [8] - 99:13,

105:20, 106:8,

118:6, 145:28,

151:29, 169:1,

171:17

owners [1] -

38:22

P

pace [4] -

127:15, 128:19,

138:2, 150:27

Package [2] -

162:19, 162:25

page [74] - 4:27,

4:29, 5:1, 20:22,

21:4, 21:5, 24:1,

24:2, 24:5, 24:8,

26:15, 26:16,

26:19, 26:21,

26:22, 27:2, 27:4,

37:4, 38:15,

43:18, 44:6, 44:8,

44:15, 45:2,

47:18, 63:16,

63:21, 67:17,

68:17, 69:3,

70:27, 71:5,

72:16, 72:23,

93:1, 95:7, 96:3,

99:20, 102:11,

103:5, 104:3,

107:18, 117:21,

121:20, 122:25,

129:23, 130:6,

130:9, 131:15,

134:12, 141:7,

146:26, 159:27,

161:17, 161:25,

162:10, 162:22,

165:27, 169:3,

171:3, 172:6,

174:26, 176:5,

177:28, 178:14,

179:10, 183:19,

185:13, 186:2

pagination [12] -

5:1, 5:2, 26:14,

26:16, 26:17,

26:22, 29:18,

37:4, 134:12,

141:5

paid [2] - 95:12,

113:16

palaver [2] -

145:6, 153:9

palaver" [1] -

147:24

papal [1] -

131:24

Papal [2] -

153:18, 153:21

paper [3] -

121:13, 141:20,

155:13

para [1] - 38:20

paragraph [99] -

5:17, 7:11, 8:10,

8:15, 8:16, 9:23,

10:21, 11:29,

15:21, 21:5,

21:22, 27:22,

29:22, 30:21,

31:9, 31:13,

33:13, 35:3,

35:21, 36:9,

36:16, 37:4,

37:16, 38:17,

38:19, 39:2,

39:29, 40:1, 41:6,

41:7, 44:8, 44:16,

44:17, 44:18,

45:2, 45:22,

46:23, 47:18,

49:24, 50:22,

50:26, 52:1,

52:21, 52:26,

53:6, 54:7, 54:16,

55:11, 57:21,

58:18, 58:21,

59:8, 59:22,

61:14, 62:1, 62:7,

63:10, 63:20,

63:29, 64:15,

67:18, 68:18,

68:20, 69:3, 71:1,

71:6, 72:22, 74:7,

94:6, 101:7,

102:11, 103:5,

104:3, 109:9,

109:11, 109:12,

110:12, 111:24,

111:26, 112:27,

113:25, 114:14,

115:24, 116:13,

117:14, 117:21,

121:20, 122:25,

123:8, 141:25,

161:17, 165:26,

167:29, 177:28,

179:9, 185:13

paragraphs [11]

- 13:11, 31:10,

37:2, 38:18, 96:3,

99:19, 107:15,

168:16, 168:19

parallel [7] -

34:2, 41:11,

42:13, 43:17,

45:18, 53:18,

54:9

parameters [2] -

68:22, 69:1

pardon [1] -

26:29

parent [1] -

129:21

parking [3] -

117:6, 117:7,

117:10

Parks [2] -

71:16, 74:17

part [25] - 3:18,

4:10, 14:22,

14:24, 22:3,

46:29, 64:29,

78:9, 80:9, 80:12,

91:2, 92:1, 98:24,

108:11, 119:25,

136:17, 137:9,

147:16, 147:17,

147:21, 149:24,

149:26, 150:2,

150:28, 151:3

Part [8] - 18:3,

156:16, 175:1,

178:22, 180:13,

180:14, 180:16,

180:17

partem [2] -

105:24, 123:16

participate [2] -

21:27, 101:27

participated [2]

- 85:15, 123:21

participating [4]

- 93:4, 93:16,

94:8, 99:28

participation

[31] - 15:2, 16:6,

60:26, 61:6, 61:9,

61:13, 61:18,

61:22, 62:2,

78:27, 81:8,

82:11, 83:4,

83:14, 84:11,

85:10, 85:20,

97:18, 97:21,

102:8, 107:5,

119:23, 123:7,

124:27, 125:4,

125:16, 125:21,

126:12, 126:19,

160:9, 160:10

particular [48] -

7:19, 19:22,

21:22, 23:4,

24:15, 28:1,

29:17, 41:6,

53:27, 53:29,

59:28, 63:2, 65:7,

69:24, 71:4, 82:5,

82:7, 82:16, 84:4,

88:15, 89:9,

92:23, 93:6, 93:9,

93:22, 100:21,

106:2, 106:28,

108:4, 114:5,

116:7, 121:15,

123:12, 123:15,

127:29, 128:10,

135:11, 159:7,

159:20, 160:12,

160:23, 168:9,

168:15, 174:17,

176:29, 177:26,

179:17, 182:20

particularity [1]

- 168:3

particularly [1] -

101:8

particulars [1] -

175:3

parties [23] -

5:25, 16:8, 42:10,

47:10, 71:19,

76:13, 76:14,

80:9, 80:12,

81:11, 82:18,

83:13, 86:23,

89:25, 89:26,

91:9, 91:17,

92:16, 98:10,

101:26, 118:3,

120:5, 120:27

Parties [1] -

72:11

PARTIES [1] -

1:20

parties' [2] -

108:17, 109:26

parts [1] -

111:12

PARTY [2] -

1:17, 1:22

Party [1] - 20:23

party [12] - 2:32,

47:11, 108:16,

108:25, 117:18,

117:26, 118:13,

118:16, 121:27,

123:24, 166:20,

175:14

party's [6] -

21:10, 108:15,

109:24, 111:14,

122:8, 126:4

pass [4] - 8:14,

106:28, 114:6,

161:9

passage [11] -

21:3, 21:4, 37:22,

55:12, 92:22,

104:24, 109:8,

109:11, 109:13,

175:17

passages [2] -

20:21, 92:21

passed [2] -

76:13, 171:29

past [3] - 37:12,

57:5, 125:15

PATRICIA [1] -

1:8

pause [4] -

43:20, 138:25,

176:18, 180:20

pausing [1] -

28:26

PD/98/1221 [1] -

173:2

Peart [5] - 20:18,

21:6, 21:23, 22:4,

68:23

peat [8] - 67:12,

67:23, 68:9,

68:25, 68:28,

69:15, 74:14,

74:15

people [3] -

69:29, 106:2,

107:10

per [2] - 5:8,

145:17

perceived [1] -

151:11

perception [1] -

173:18

perfectly [6] -

12:12, 12:21,

38:2, 60:8, 60:21,

78:18

performance [8]

- 139:6, 141:13,

142:1, 145:22,

148:18, 149:9,

152:19, 160:24

performing [3] -

93:16, 113:12

perhaps [1] -

132:18

perimeter [1] -

163:6

period [49] -

3:22, 4:3, 4:5,

4:13, 5:21, 7:20,

7:28, 9:6, 12:17,

12:20, 14:4,

15:25, 16:19,

16:25, 18:4, 18:6,

18:9, 18:13,

18:14, 18:16,

18:20, 18:22,

18:23, 18:25,

19:6, 19:18,

22:18, 35:12,

37:10, 40:23,

40:24, 50:26,

51:17, 51:22,

52:8, 87:9, 92:4,

92:5, 135:19,

144:3, 159:20,

168:8, 168:10,

168:14, 170:20,

174:17, 174:18

permissible [5] -

36:7, 121:18,

182:8, 182:12,

182:19

Permission [1] -

170:9

permission [138]

- 2:32, 5:4, 5:7,

5:10, 6:14, 6:15,

6:16, 6:19, 6:20,

7:19, 7:22, 9:2,

9:29, 10:5, 10:27,

12:7, 12:28, 13:1,

13:24, 14:9,

14:17, 14:27,

17:11, 17:27,

17:29, 18:2, 18:8,

18:22, 18:26,

18:29, 19:4,

19:11, 20:5, 20:7,

20:8, 20:9, 20:24,

21:10, 22:9,

23:22, 23:26,

24:16, 24:18,

24:27, 34:20,

34:22, 34:23,


24

36:3, 37:7, 37:24,

37:27, 37:28,

38:6, 38:8, 38:25,

38:28, 39:15,

40:18, 40:21,

47:6, 48:12,

50:14, 66:14,

80:23, 81:17,

82:8, 82:12,

85:24, 86:5, 86:9,

86:18, 87:2,

87:21, 88:11,

88:24, 90:24,

91:21, 92:7,

97:19, 98:12,

101:12, 101:20,

101:25, 102:8,

117:4, 138:4,

145:24, 157:11,

159:20, 159:21,

160:23, 162:16,

165:7, 168:9,

168:15, 168:28,

168:29, 169:2,

169:26, 170:6,

170:13, 171:10,

171:19, 171:25,

171:27, 172:9,

172:11, 172:18,

172:20, 172:28,

172:29, 173:2,

173:4, 173:6,

173:12, 173:26,

174:17, 174:20,

175:2, 176:15,

176:23, 177:2,

177:13, 178:20,

179:18, 179:20,

179:29, 180:11,

181:28, 182:7,

182:10, 182:14,

182:15, 182:17,

182:27, 183:5,

183:29, 184:29

permission" [1]

- 44:27

permission' [2] -

176:29, 179:6

permissions [1]

- 177:3

permit [14] -

33:15, 34:1, 35:4,

36:8, 36:10,

51:18, 54:21,

55:20, 59:12,

59:20, 61:24,

99:10, 133:12

permits [1] -

119:28

permitted [10] -

34:21, 34:23,

68:27, 94:14,

94:28, 118:27,

122:29, 123:1,

163:17, 181:3

person [7] -

70:3, 100:3,

100:6, 100:17,

102:24, 148:16,

163:23

person's [1] -

100:10

personal [4] -

83:19, 129:6,

129:28, 135:15

personally [4] -

69:28, 70:12,

70:23, 137:14

persons [5] -

42:3, 104:22,

105:15, 121:25,

134:26

perspective [4] -

3:16, 4:4, 164:12,

164:22

persuaded [1] -

80:11

persuasive [2] -

132:16, 132:17

pertain [1] - 88:5

pertained [1] -

102:7

pertains [1] -

107:4

perusal [1] -

182:25

PETER [1] - 1:7

Pezinok [2] -

59:27, 60:14

phase [3] - 15:3,

124:12, 124:14

PHILIP [1] - 2:29

philosophical

[3] - 131:14,

131:23, 137:7

photocopied [1]

- 2:31

phrase [2] -

161:3, 177:1

physical [6] -

30:19, 33:10,

33:18, 34:15,

34:18, 35:6

pick [1] - 20:20

picks [1] -

169:22

picture [1] -

124:28

pile [1] - 137:3

place [15] -

53:23, 55:1,

84:29, 85:8,

90:13, 91:14,

91:15, 91:18,

135:29, 143:21,

147:7, 147:12,

147:15, 153:2,

156:2

placed [2] -

132:29, 133:2

places [1] -

177:27

Plaintiff [1] -

128:16

plaintiff [2] -

43:3, 45:7

Plaintiffs [1] -

96:28

plan [15] - 10:24,

31:3, 42:9, 112:3,

112:28, 139:8,

139:25, 139:26,

139:29, 140:1,

140:21, 142:4,

149:13, 171:5,

171:8

Plan [2] - 11:7,

158:8

planes [1] - 51:6

planned [3] -

48:25, 52:10,

52:14

Planner [3] -

163:24, 163:27,

170:22

Planner.. [1] -

163:20

Planning [98] -

6:12, 7:14, 7:27,

10:12, 11:4, 11:5,

11:15, 11:25,

13:19, 14:16,

15:7, 16:1, 16:3,

20:3, 21:13, 23:7,

24:12, 25:5, 25:6,

38:23, 50:10,

50:13, 79:6,

84:18, 85:5,

86:21, 87:1,

87:11, 87:26,

88:17, 88:18,

89:17, 89:23,

91:11, 91:14,

92:4, 92:15,

97:15, 98:25,

99:3, 101:17,

101:21, 101:23,

107:4, 118:7,

125:20, 126:12,

141:10, 141:27,

143:19, 143:27,

144:5, 144:18,

148:9, 156:7,

157:25, 158:2,

158:4, 158:5,

158:10, 158:18,

158:22, 159:4,

160:19, 160:21,

160:26, 161:2,

161:3, 161:13,

162:5, 164:12,

165:4, 167:20,

168:13, 173:21,

174:29, 175:5,

175:22, 176:13,

176:21, 177:1,

177:6, 177:8,

179:14, 180:4,

180:5, 180:11,

180:24, 182:14,

182:16, 182:28,

183:25, 184:3,

184:14, 184:17,

184:25, 186:10

planning [131] -

6:13, 6:15, 6:16,

6:19, 9:2, 10:5,

10:26, 10:29,

11:13, 11:23,

12:27, 13:24,

14:5, 14:27,

15:11, 15:13,

15:17, 15:22,

16:24, 17:27,

19:4, 19:11,

19:19, 20:4, 20:7,

20:9, 20:24,

21:10, 21:27,

22:8, 22:9, 22:16,

22:22, 22:27,

23:1, 23:21,

23:25, 24:15,

24:18, 24:26,

34:19, 37:24,

38:7, 38:26,

40:18, 40:21,

48:11, 50:14,

55:16, 66:14,

78:14, 78:22,

82:8, 82:12,

84:19, 85:9,

85:11, 85:15,

86:5, 86:9, 87:4,

87:16, 87:18,

87:27, 88:3, 88:7,

88:11, 91:21,

97:19, 98:12,

98:21, 101:12,

101:19, 102:8,

105:3, 105:15,

117:4, 117:19,

124:14, 125:21,

138:4, 142:2,

142:25, 142:29,

148:12, 161:27,

162:3, 164:25,

165:7, 167:4,

168:28, 168:29,

169:2, 169:9,

169:11, 169:17,

169:26, 170:13,

171:10, 171:13,

171:27, 172:9,

172:11, 173:2,

173:6, 173:12,

173:26, 174:16,

175:2, 176:15,

176:23, 178:5,

178:11, 178:20,

179:17, 179:20,

179:28, 181:28,

182:7, 182:10,

182:13, 182:26,

183:4, 183:14,

183:23, 183:29,

184:29

plans [11] -

59:27, 85:10,

86:28, 105:16,

138:14, 139:10,

142:6, 142:7,

145:29, 146:22,

182:25

plant [7] - 20:26,

67:12, 67:13,

67:24, 69:16,

71:28, 72:2

play [2] - 162:4,

167:14

PLC [1] - 1:17

pleadings [4] -

4:27, 66:21,

89:10, 141:16

Pleanála [25] -

3:12, 3:15, 3:19,

4:14, 34:7, 38:10,

45:21, 51:4, 55:2,

67:1, 67:11,

72:14, 73:13,

73:14, 74:19,

78:14, 78:23,

78:24, 85:11,

116:28, 120:1,

185:29, 186:12

pleased [2] -

70:6, 134:4

plenary [1] -

178:22

plot [1] - 168:28

point [64] -

27:17, 27:22,

27:29, 30:2, 30:3,

30:8, 30:12,

30:21, 31:12,

32:18, 32:29,

34:11, 34:23,

34:27, 35:8,

35:20, 35:24,

36:2, 36:14,

36:19, 50:19,

56:23, 57:23,

75:22, 77:26,

77:29, 85:4,

85:10, 85:26,

85:27, 90:8,

91:10, 91:20,

92:25, 96:22,

97:28, 98:11,

98:13, 99:22,

103:3, 107:10,

114:16, 115:22,

117:13, 118:9,

118:27, 119:1,

119:16, 120:8,

121:27, 122:27,

124:18, 125:10,

125:11, 125:29,

129:8, 129:24,

142:9, 147:1,

150:18, 152:27,

154:14, 179:8

Point [2] - 32:22,

79:28

pointed [2] -

88:8, 96:11

points [3] -

69:25, 110:29,

177:5

policy [7] - 84:4,

136:8, 144:19,

147:9, 149:11,

149:25, 151:26

political [1] -

135:16

Pope [1] - 137:3

population [1] -

127:21

portfolio [2] -

96:7, 113:21

posed [2] -

34:13, 104:13

posing [1] -

102:16

position [13] -

11:4, 51:27,

52:18, 64:28,

77:2, 82:18,

97:10, 111:15,

114:23, 115:5,

115:17, 115:18,

177:26


25

positive [5] -

15:17, 16:2,

136:26, 160:18,

176:12

possibility [4] -

4:25, 5:26, 59:28,

108:14

possible [11] -

15:8, 15:15,

15:18, 16:4, 58:4,

58:25, 79:16,

83:22, 91:6,

114:5, 151:26

possibly [4] -

27:27, 60:17,

61:24, 97:3

potential [7] -

5:11, 5:22, 90:23,

103:9, 110:1,

114:9, 116:23

potentially [1] -

82:10

power [18] -

22:7, 45:28, 46:6,

46:9, 46:12,

67:12, 67:24,

69:16, 71:28,

72:1, 96:14,

168:8, 176:13,

177:12, 181:9,

182:19, 185:25

PowerPoint [1] -

85:18

powers [10] -

95:2, 95:9,

102:26, 114:1,

114:2, 114:19,

137:23, 180:12,

181:21, 181:23

pp [2] - 104:26,

135:4

practical [2] -

109:5, 109:25

practice [1] -

113:13

practising [2] -

181:1, 181:4

pre [4] - 49:15,

50:5, 58:10,

84:27

pre-existing [4]

- 49:15, 50:5,

58:10, 84:27

precedent [1] -

131:5

preceding [2] -

11:29, 53:3

precise [6] -

109:16, 114:3,

128:24, 128:29,

130:26, 164:26

precisely [5] -

76:29, 77:1,

165:3, 165:10,

166:14

precluded [1] -

184:7

precludes [3] -

98:25, 168:5,

177:11

predicated [1] -

127:5

predominantly

[1] - 131:21

prefaced [1] -

94:21

preferred [1] -

106:5

prejudice [3] -

15:21, 18:4,

93:21

prepared [1] -

74:20

preproduction

[1] - 170:17

Presbyterian [1]

- 137:6

prescribed [7] -

46:15, 46:20,

151:4, 157:24,

158:23, 170:19,

186:13

prescribes [1] -

40:23

prescription [1]

- 160:9

presence [1] -

136:20

present [30] -

8:14, 17:6, 19:24,

19:25, 19:26,

22:4, 32:19, 34:3,

39:25, 41:12,

45:5, 45:19, 51:2,

56:19, 58:13,

60:22, 61:2,

64:21, 67:6,

67:16, 68:15,

71:3, 71:20, 72:4,

72:20, 75:14,

85:18, 123:19,

149:24, 151:11

presentations

[1] - 85:18

presented [2] -

17:17, 84:16

preserve [1] -

42:10

President [13] -

165:13, 166:23,

166:29, 167:10,

168:23, 169:22,

173:15, 174:13,

175:19, 177:24,

177:26, 178:13,

179:9

press [1] -

147:24

pressing [1] -

166:29

presumably [1] -

67:13

presume [1] -

74:20

presumed [1] -

126:2

prevent [2] -

182:9, 182:12

previous [5] -

31:27, 39:2,

60:18, 166:18,

179:9

previously [17] -

12:28, 17:18,

19:4, 29:8, 29:9,

29:10, 30:16,

30:17, 34:6,

35:23, 49:4,

49:27, 53:6,

88:10, 98:28,

103:27, 107:15

primarily [6] -

89:1, 90:29,

107:7, 157:20,

158:29, 161:1

primary [3] -

138:25, 181:26,

182:6

principal [5] -

45:6, 45:14,

81:29, 103:16,

117:28

principle [16] -

3:29, 8:8, 12:27,

26:2, 65:6, 65:24,

82:25, 101:5,

103:2, 107:29,

109:17, 128:1,

131:2, 132:23,

185:22, 185:24

principle' [1] -

73:22

principled [2] -

107:24, 111:23

principles [5] -

62:9, 117:23,

124:24, 136:7,

145:14

print [1] - 27:7

priority [1] -

73:21

prism [2] -

154:15, 154:27

prisons [1] -

134:26

privacy [1] -

131:7

private [1] -

106:6

Pro [18] - 27:25,

28:16, 29:14,

30:10, 30:24,

34:3, 34:14,

36:24, 47:20,

47:21, 47:23,

48:23, 49:10,

57:29, 62:25,

62:26, 62:28,

79:23

Pro-Baine [18] -

27:25, 28:16,

29:14, 30:10,

30:24, 34:3,

34:14, 36:24,

47:20, 47:21,

47:23, 48:23,

49:10, 57:29,

62:25, 62:26,

62:28, 79:23

probability [2] -

10:2, 177:9

problem [3] -

40:12, 108:21,

151:10

problems [2] -

131:1, 151:14

procedural [1] -

5:13

procedure [18] -

51:17, 51:18,

51:23, 53:18,

53:22, 54:3, 54:9,

54:26, 58:4, 58:7,

61:23, 61:24,

73:9, 100:7,

101:28, 122:28,

122:29, 160:3

procedures [26]

- 5:14, 81:26,

82:2, 82:4, 82:20,

83:10, 83:12,

84:22, 99:7,

99:21, 100:3,

101:3, 106:22,

107:27, 108:17,

109:27, 117:17,

122:18, 123:11,

123:15, 124:21,

125:6, 125:10,

125:23, 125:25,

126:20

procedures" [1]

- 121:21

procedures' [1]

- 108:27

proceed [9] -

9:21, 10:2, 32:1,

45:13, 46:14,

52:14, 67:13,

124:20, 184:4

proceeded [4] -

9:12, 13:7, 57:4,

76:17

proceedings

[22] - 33:4, 38:22,

39:13, 41:12,

44:25, 61:21,

67:6, 67:7, 67:8,

68:14, 68:15,

68:24, 71:20,

73:11, 73:25,

76:10, 76:16,

165:29, 166:8,

178:22, 184:20

process [25] -

3:14, 3:25, 5:26,

21:28, 28:6, 29:4,

30:18, 32:25,

35:14, 45:11,

82:12, 84:19,

85:2, 85:9, 85:15,

122:28, 123:21,

124:1, 124:4,

124:8, 124:13,

124:19, 144:24,

153:25, 153:28

processes [1] -

125:21

procured [1] -

170:18

procurement [1]

- 5:14

produce [2] -

129:16, 133:14

produced [1] -

87:23

production [1] -

128:23

Professor [2] -

127:25, 136:14

profitable [1] -

113:11

progress [1] -

142:2

project [52] -

4:11, 4:25, 5:11,

5:20, 5:27, 28:13,

28:23, 28:27,

28:28, 29:7, 29:8,

29:10, 29:20,

29:24, 30:1,

30:13, 30:14,

30:15, 30:17,

31:21, 33:24,

34:9, 34:24,

34:25, 35:9,

35:15, 35:25,

35:28, 43:12,

46:15, 46:21,

47:29, 48:11,

48:14, 48:17,

48:27, 49:4,

52:29, 53:12,

53:25, 55:21,

57:4, 58:3, 58:26,

59:12, 59:15,

60:1, 66:7, 66:9

project' [2] -

32:2, 35:7

projects [14] -

27:14, 27:18,

28:4, 28:25, 29:3,

29:15, 29:16,

30:4, 31:2, 32:8,

32:23, 32:24,

56:28, 57:24

Projects [1] -

27:17

projects' [1] -

32:9

projects... [1] -

28:21

prolong [2] -

55:24, 130:29

prolongation [2]

- 56:16, 56:17

prolonged [3] -

54:12, 56:14,

63:14

prolonged.. [1] -

56:2

prompted [1] -

106:9

promulgate [1] -

175:13

proof [3] - 73:11,

73:16, 73:26

proper [11] -

10:29, 11:13,

11:23, 87:4,

87:18, 87:26,

88:3, 88:7, 98:21,

115:15, 148:12

properly [4] -

67:24, 77:27,

84:5, 125:17

properties [4] -

96:11, 103:19,

103:22, 115:7

property [27] -


26

95:4, 96:7, 96:17,

96:24, 97:1, 97:4,

100:23, 103:20,

104:28, 104:29,

105:2, 105:8,

105:27, 106:3,

106:7, 106:11,

107:2, 108:1,

110:2, 110:3,

110:4, 110:18,

110:19, 111:17,

113:17, 115:6,

115:13

proportionatel

y [2] - 82:20,

126:10

propose [9] -

6:5, 81:17, 84:12,

103:28, 117:2,

122:16, 127:26,

153:27

proposed [11] -

14:7, 48:10,

68:11, 77:17,

94:8, 97:25,

100:1, 100:10,

130:21, 144:1,

169:8

proposes [1] -

94:2

proposing [1] -

95:26

proposition [4] -

6:7, 38:2, 49:11,

83:8

prospective [1] -

48:26

protected [8] -

66:11, 66:22,

75:15, 75:16,

103:20, 103:22,

104:29

protection [1] -

77:14

prove [4] - 10:1,

91:13, 116:26

provide [12] -

76:27, 77:17,

97:20, 124:6,

134:9, 134:17,

134:29, 138:14,

138:23, 138:26,

146:9, 175:14

provided [10] -

5:8, 7:23, 8:2,

22:16, 22:20,

22:28, 42:18,

70:19, 97:22,

176:1

provides [12] -

17:2, 25:4, 36:17,

49:10, 50:26,

89:22, 92:2, 94:1,

105:20, 138:12,

139:17, 180:3

providing [3] -

85:15, 126:14,

160:3

provision [32] -

7:7, 8:17, 8:22,

9:8, 12:11, 12:12,

12:24, 13:8,

13:17, 13:23,

14:25, 16:27,

17:26, 29:17,

42:17, 47:27,

51:29, 56:28,

63:9, 63:17,

63:19, 73:5,

87:25, 94:11,

100:15, 117:7,

156:6, 156:13,

174:13, 185:20,

186:9

provisions [26] -

11:6, 13:11, 15:5,

15:29, 19:8,

21:19, 33:2,

65:14, 65:23,

69:7, 74:25,

113:29, 114:6,

126:15, 134:16,

135:14, 136:13,

141:1, 156:8,

158:7, 168:3,

174:23, 181:2,

181:10, 181:11,

181:13

proviso [1] -

62:12

proximity [1] -

72:5

Public [2] -

104:2, 104:8

public [46] -

15:2, 16:6, 17:3,

17:4, 17:5, 21:2,

22:11, 42:27,

60:26, 61:6, 61:8,

61:13, 61:17,

61:22, 62:2, 62:3,

62:15, 78:6, 78:7,

78:20, 78:27,

81:8, 83:4, 83:14,

84:11, 85:9,

85:20, 97:18,

102:25, 104:23,

105:11, 105:29,

106:3, 106:5,

106:8, 107:5,

123:7, 126:12,

126:18, 141:11,

141:28, 148:18,

149:25, 149:28,

160:9

publication [1] -

105:20

publish [1] -

22:12

punched [2] -

67:3, 116:27

purchase [1] -

106:15

purported [1] -

128:6

purports [1] -

120:14

purpose [29] -

6:20, 42:7, 57:25,

84:26, 138:16,

138:26, 140:15,

149:3, 149:4,

150:3, 157:4,

157:6, 157:7,

157:8, 159:16,

159:19, 159:22,

167:12, 174:10,

174:22, 180:21,

181:14, 181:16,

181:22, 181:23,

182:20, 185:26

purposes [15] -

6:4, 8:14, 22:4,

32:19, 41:23,

43:7, 46:16,

59:19, 64:21,

67:25, 93:6,

108:6, 167:8,

180:17, 180:22

purposive [1] -

132:2

pursuance [1] -

114:26

pursuant [18] -

9:2, 10:5, 14:26,

18:5, 18:23,

41:21, 42:28,

43:9, 49:13,

56:27, 68:1, 68:8,

86:18, 96:18,

177:16, 180:12,

181:2, 183:26

pursue [2] -

138:27, 140:15

pursued [1] -

79:13

pursuing [1] -

138:16

put [19] - 9:18,

62:18, 64:22,

64:28, 66:24,

75:5, 76:22,

89:10, 100:19,

106:14, 108:3,

120:24, 124:11,

147:12, 147:14,

148:22, 152:1,

152:4, 167:6

puts [1] - 114:17

putting [1] -

16:14

Q

qualification [1]

- 109:7

quality [1] -

104:16

Quarries [4] -

47:2, 155:26,

155:29, 159:8

quarry [3] -

38:24, 39:4,

185:29

Quarry [3] -

37:7, 38:22,

39:22

quarrying [1] -

37:8

quashed [3] -

21:9, 117:10,

185:4

queries' [1] -

169:20

questions [10] -

102:23, 112:23,

126:21, 153:6,

157:26, 158:3,

158:23, 164:26,

170:10

quick [1] -

186:24

quickly [1] -

155:20

Quinn [1] -

136:14

quintessentiall

y [1] - 178:4

quite [17] -

16:16, 30:5,

41:15, 62:21,

70:9, 73:25, 83:5,

86:18, 89:21,

92:24, 97:11,

99:15, 137:25,

148:28, 162:2,

166:17, 173:17

quote [2] -

168:1, 176:25

quoted [4] -

32:29, 108:12,

109:11, 162:11

quotes [4] -

44:16, 73:5,

172:15

quoting [1] -

110:13

R

raise [2] - 22:26,

69:25

raised [3] -

126:24, 154:24,

164:26

raising [1] -

45:15

rake [1] - 38:3

range [1] - 10:13

rate [1] - 106:6

Rathdown [2] -

41:17, 42:20

rather [19] -

38:6, 40:23,

41:24, 84:19,

87:24, 89:26,

91:28, 106:4,

107:17, 119:3,

119:15, 122:29,

130:18, 135:16,

145:21, 151:22,

169:14, 176:14,

184:1

ratio [1] - 125:8

rationale [1] -

99:5

Re [1] - 180:29

re [1] - 16:15

re-extensions

[1] - 16:15

reached [4] -

83:29, 129:8,

143:28, 184:4

reaching [1] -

184:3

read [8] - 5:3,

17:16, 19:3,

95:26, 100:14,

120:18, 145:5,

184:15

reaffirmation [1]

- 155:19

real [5] - 96:17,

96:25, 108:17,

109:24, 111:13

reality [1] - 97:1

really [19] - 3:25,

5:28, 11:19, 19:6,

24:8, 25:1, 36:23,

38:17, 46:23,

49:19, 51:10,

52:17, 67:15,

70:14, 151:12,

151:24, 154:18,

166:10, 179:4

reason [14] -

43:10, 50:18,

82:6, 83:21, 91:8,

96:19, 99:14,

115:14, 123:6,

126:13, 152:28,

173:9, 173:17,

185:1

reasonable [7] -

5:20, 21:17,

22:23, 108:2,

113:4, 118:5,

177:10

reasoning [4] -

145:16, 145:25,

148:29, 152:25

reasons [16] -

27:24, 45:24,

51:3, 70:20,

80:17, 82:21,

95:21, 100:19,

108:3, 122:13,

146:6, 146:9,

152:14, 152:24,

153:11, 175:6

receive [2] -

134:8, 134:28

received [1] -

48:14

recent [8] -

63:24, 64:13,

70:5, 131:24,

139:8, 139:9,

143:27, 174:12

recite [1] -

151:25

recognise [1] -

137:17

recognised [5] -

84:2, 132:29,

136:4, 143:12,

143:16

recognition [1] -

135:7

recommenced

[1] - 42:28

reconsideratio

n [1] - 46:1

Record [1] - 1:5

record [1] -

100:14

recovering [2] -

95:12, 113:15


27

REDMOND [2] -

1:7, 1:7

reduce [1] -

150:24

reduced [1] -

115:7

reducing [4] -

104:27, 140:5,

140:6, 150:21

reduction [2] -

142:26, 143:1

reduction) [1] -

143:25

reductions [2] -

143:18, 143:23

reenacted [1] -

155:9

reenforced [1] -

30:9

reevaluated [1] -

60:1

refer [10] -

36:25, 52:17,

119:21, 120:11,

136:7, 149:14,

156:6, 174:5,

181:16, 185:12

reference [30] -

4:26, 27:9, 28:12,

32:15, 57:14,

58:15, 58:20,

71:22, 79:17,

80:2, 80:3, 80:8,

80:11, 80:20,

135:24, 162:10,

163:24, 164:2,

169:9, 173:2,

174:26, 177:19,

178:1, 178:2,

179:6, 180:21,

181:16, 186:1

referenced [2] -

141:12, 141:29

referenda [1] -

135:28

referred [33] -

6:20, 22:21,

24:21, 27:14,

27:18, 32:23,

39:1, 48:17,

63:24, 63:29,

64:13, 64:14,

65:3, 74:3, 77:26,

90:27, 94:4,

112:29, 119:21,

127:24, 130:19,

131:14, 140:18,

146:23, 155:27,

157:10, 157:12,

157:18, 161:23,

168:23, 175:21,

176:23, 179:23

referring [1] -

167:10

refers [14] -

24:3, 24:5, 33:9,

71:26, 147:11,

156:1, 167:10,

173:2, 176:28,

177:26, 178:29,

180:27, 183:10,

183:18

refined [1] -

81:23

refusal [5] -

172:24, 172:26,

173:18, 175:7,

185:1

refuse [12] -

23:18, 24:17,

24:23, 145:13,

145:23, 172:28,

175:6, 175:8,

179:19, 179:25,

181:4, 185:3

refused [5] -

23:13, 47:4,

101:25, 117:4,

181:2

refusing [1] -

180:15

regard [71] -

4:12, 5:27, 17:25,

24:16, 31:23,

39:11, 40:4,

44:23, 60:1,

61:16, 73:28,

81:21, 82:10,

87:19, 88:3, 90:8,

93:5, 102:29,

111:16, 116:5,

116:10, 117:12,

128:29, 129:27,

139:1, 139:7,

141:1, 141:12,

141:29, 142:13,

143:9, 144:29,

145:1, 145:2,

145:3, 145:4,

145:5, 145:7,

145:8, 146:3,

146:7, 146:22,

147:29, 148:4,

148:5, 148:6,

148:8, 148:14,

148:17, 149:4,

149:9, 149:12,

149:14, 149:15,

149:23, 151:17,

151:25, 152:2,

152:6, 152:8,

152:12, 155:3,

155:7, 167:24,

169:8, 175:25,

177:2, 178:7,

179:18, 183:1,

186:6

regards [8] -

7:19, 15:13, 18:6,

60:4, 144:20,

168:9, 168:14,

174:16

regime [3] -

95:20, 95:21,

143:15

regional [5] -

10:25, 11:8,

86:29

register [2] -

17:3

registered [1] -

38:25

REGISTRAR [2]

- 3:4, 111:9

regret [1] - 134:2

regulate [1] -

46:13

regulation [4] -

45:14, 47:27,

175:3, 175:4

regulations [12]

- 15:12, 77:28,

78:5, 78:10, 79:3,

105:3, 105:19,

160:3, 160:14,

175:13, 181:25

Regulations [9]

- 77:24, 78:5,

78:29, 79:8,

160:8, 174:29,

175:1, 175:9

regulatory [1] -

154:12

REILLY [1] - 1:8

reiteration [1] -

118:15

rejoinder [1] -

132:15

relate [4] - 4:10,

4:18, 74:13,

116:15

related [5] -

3:29, 67:10,

97:25, 99:27,

172:20

relates [12] -

3:14, 7:23, 17:12,

18:9, 92:7, 116:4,

174:20, 181:28,

182:8, 182:10,

182:14, 182:17

relating [4] -

75:28, 105:4,

136:28, 177:3

relation [52] -

3:25, 3:27, 6:19,

11:19, 13:21,

17:11, 18:22,

21:1, 23:4, 23:13,

25:19, 26:8,

35:15, 42:19,

51:4, 53:25,

62:20, 65:9, 66:5,

66:15, 66:16,

72:19, 72:21,

75:18, 77:7, 78:2,

78:6, 78:20, 79:4,

87:8, 87:21,

136:13, 138:15,

142:3, 142:23,

142:24, 159:15,

159:19, 160:4,

160:14, 160:22,

160:24, 164:16,

164:24, 165:4,

174:10, 176:8,

176:15, 176:24,

177:8, 179:5,

184:7

relationship [2]

- 113:12, 114:21

relatively [1] -

9:28

relevance [6] -

19:7, 46:24,

123:3, 166:4,

166:22

relevant [50] -

4:13, 6:23, 7:28,

8:13, 11:6, 11:9,

13:12, 15:28,

19:24, 21:2, 22:4,

23:22, 25:2,

27:26, 32:18,

49:23, 50:10,

50:13, 50:23,

52:23, 53:1,

54:10, 54:18,

54:28, 62:20,

62:23, 62:28,

68:26, 70:28,

75:25, 77:7, 78:1,

79:1, 88:9, 93:28,

100:8, 105:18,

123:25, 139:6,

139:18, 145:15,

149:18, 149:19,

149:21, 151:19,

176:7, 180:11,

183:8, 186:11

relied [6] - 74:3,

74:8, 74:25,

81:16, 132:6,

184:29

relief [7] - 21:26,

42:3, 67:14,

67:16, 68:13,

68:14, 75:10

reliefs [1] - 74:4

relies [1] - 71:8

relies. [1] -

72:13

rely [13] - 41:6,

48:5, 66:2, 75:26,

81:18, 84:8,

95:15, 113:10,

113:13, 114:24,

117:2, 120:15,

131:19

relying [3] -

21:19, 69:7,

185:17

remain [3] -

6:16, 20:8, 20:9

remained [2] -

48:26, 87:6

remaining [2] -

13:10, 80:24

remains [2] -

6:17, 98:26

remarks [1] -

128:22

remedial [2] -

156:20, 156:21

remedy [1] -

83:25

remember [2] -

134:6, 145:27

remembered [1]

- 123:18

remind [1] -

145:26

remit [1] -

114:22

removal [3] -

89:14, 163:4,

163:13

rendered [1] -

104:17

renew [1] -

95:14

renewable [1] -

52:8

renewal [3] -

33:15, 35:3,

36:10

renewed [1] -

113:5

reopen [2] -

81:9, 92:20

reopening [2] -

88:6, 92:20

repeat [4] - 58:6,

61:17, 81:9,

103:17

repeated [3] -

155:8, 159:17,

160:29

replace [3] -

39:14, 39:28,

44:26

replaced [2] -

44:19, 117:29

replaces [1] -

114:19

replied [1] -

171:4

reply [6] - 118:9,

120:29, 124:7,

169:28, 187:9,

187:15

Report [3] -

4:22, 4:24, 5:2

report [14] -

44:15, 71:11,

71:23, 71:26,

74:16, 128:20,

128:21, 161:22,

161:27, 162:9,

184:15, 185:13

reported [1] -

171:15

reports [3] -

127:25, 128:27,

148:28

representation

s [6] - 85:19,

96:20, 102:28,

116:5, 116:8,

121:19

represented [1]

- 70:18

representing [1]

- 25:22

represents [1] -

58:25

reproduced [1] -

2:31

reputation [1] -

103:25

request [4] -

52:9, 54:10,

56:13, 170:23

requested [2] -

170:26, 171:8

require [13] -

27:19, 28:1,

28:29, 48:18,

105:23, 107:5,

114:10, 120:5,


28

135:8, 145:12,

148:23, 152:2,

152:13

required [25] -

4:14, 7:28, 12:6,

21:15, 31:1,

42:19, 47:29,

61:13, 78:11,

82:26, 88:23,

88:28, 100:3,

110:9, 112:19,

112:24, 116:13,

121:3, 145:9,

145:16, 147:26,

153:3, 160:26,

162:15, 177:7

requirement [7]

- 15:29, 61:6,

66:13, 78:20,

109:2, 141:28,

146:2

requirements

[16] - 5:15, 7:24,

7:29, 8:2, 15:11,

21:12, 22:20,

41:24, 45:26,

55:22, 55:29,

59:18, 124:21,

141:11, 160:13,

178:26

requires [15] -

34:25, 55:21,

66:8, 73:2,

109:17, 119:25,

143:13, 146:18,

146:21, 147:10,

152:11, 160:20,

168:7, 175:5,

184:6

requiring [4] -

14:6, 14:18, 48:2,

169:16

requisite [4] -

7:21, 22:19, 92:6,

174:19

reserved [2] -

38:27, 39:21

resident [1] -

20:29

resident's [1] -

127:17

residential [1] -

117:5

residents [1] -

92:14

residual [2] -

24:21, 179:23

resilient [3] -

138:17, 140:17,

140:26

resourced [1] -

75:4

resources [4] -

29:28, 76:3, 93:6,

137:21

respect [33] -

13:20, 28:17,

55:27, 68:9,

68:25, 73:16,

76:7, 81:18, 83:5,

84:4, 84:6, 87:16,

88:8, 98:18,

98:29, 99:21,

106:29, 110:29,

115:29, 116:19,

119:6, 119:22,

121:26, 122:15,

122:25, 126:1,

126:18, 127:2,

134:25, 150:6,

152:14, 166:3,

166:19

respectful [20] -

28:14, 33:26,

34:26, 36:16,

47:20, 62:27,

72:18, 75:17,

120:9, 147:26,

149:20, 155:4,

157:5, 158:2,

161:5, 161:12,

167:17, 167:23,

184:11, 184:18

respectfully [9] -

3:17, 9:28, 10:7,

10:12, 25:16,

25:20, 36:21,

80:18, 147:23

respects [2] -

103:12, 168:10

respond [1] -

124:6

RESPONDENT

[1] - 1:15

respondent [7] -

2:32, 21:9, 21:14,

47:26, 121:28,

124:6, 124:9

Respondent [16]

- 34:14, 68:7,

71:13, 72:10,

73:27, 74:23,

74:25, 117:5,

117:16, 121:24,

169:6, 171:8,

172:24, 178:18,

180:16, 185:19

respondent's

[1] - 122:12

Respondent's

[2] - 71:10, 71:26

Respondent..

[1] - 173:19

Respondents

[4] - 24:19, 67:29,

117:12, 179:21

response [3] -

122:6, 122:8,

123:23

responses [1] -

144:20

responsibilitie

s [1] - 5:12

rest [5] - 84:18,

109:29, 119:13,

158:20, 166:13

resting [2] -

73:11, 73:27

restraint [2] -

131:7, 131:12

restricted [1] -

57:3

restricting [1] -

107:24

rests [2] -

153:12, 154:22

result [4] -

60:14, 68:11,

117:7, 150:25

resulted [2] -

37:10, 89:1

resulting [1] -

105:8

results [1] -

169:15

resume [2] -

38:24, 144:11

Resume [1] - 3:4

resumed [2] -

37:9, 111:9

RESUMED [2] -

3:8, 44:1

resumption [1] -

37:10

retail [1] - 117:5

retaining [1] -

170:14

return [1] -

87:14

reveal [1] -

118:19

reversed [1] -

179:3

review [21] -

17:5, 23:17,

55:28, 62:5,

67:23, 68:7,

68:24, 73:2,

73:10, 73:17,

73:25, 74:4,

85:24, 85:27,

86:21, 89:27,

105:22, 106:4,

145:14, 150:5,

178:23

reviewed [1] -

78:16

reviewing [1] -

124:20

revised [2] -

161:11, 171:5

RICE [1] - 1:8

right-hand [1] -

26:15

right.. [1] - 96:1

rights [63] -

61:22, 62:3, 65:8,

81:7, 83:24, 84:1,

91:27, 96:17,

96:24, 97:1,

97:26, 100:10,

100:29, 101:1,

102:7, 102:15,

103:14, 103:20,

103:24, 104:15,

104:17, 105:1,

105:27, 106:24,

106:25, 108:9,

108:10, 108:16,

108:18, 108:23,

109:3, 109:6,

109:25, 109:26,

110:2, 110:4,

110:18, 111:14,

111:17, 111:26,

115:6, 118:25,

126:5, 127:4,

127:11, 129:6,

129:12, 129:28,

130:9, 130:14,

130:17, 131:8,

132:7, 135:15,

135:18, 136:1,

136:3, 136:12,

136:17, 136:27,

176:23, 187:11

Rights [1] -

132:22

rights' [1] -

104:10

rights....has [1] -

134:22

rigid [2] - 101:2,

107:26

rise [1] - 36:27

risk [13] - 75:15,

76:28, 87:23,

88:10, 96:11,

96:17, 96:25,

99:5, 108:17,

109:24, 111:13,

127:21, 152:17

River [10] -

69:17, 69:18,

71:13, 71:14,

71:15, 71:17,

71:27

road [11] - 21:2,

41:19, 42:7, 42:9,

45:12, 46:2, 46:7,

46:14, 46:17,

169:13, 170:3

Roads [2] -

41:22, 41:25

roadway [1] -

42:22

robust [1] -

124:25

Rock [1] -

155:28

role [3] - 85:4,

119:23, 162:4

roman [1] -

167:19

ROONEY [1] -

1:10

Rooskey [1] -

168:28

Roscommon [6]

- 23:12, 23:14,

165:1, 168:28,

185:23, 186:7

rose [1] - 183:15

Ross [1] -

106:18

routinely [1] -

113:5

rule [3] - 73:1,

105:23, 123:16

ruled [4] - 59:29,

66:12, 75:29,

76:21

rules [5] - 101:2,

106:10, 106:11,

107:26, 120:5

Rules [2] - 73:1,

74:25

run [1] - 124:16

running [2] -

4:16, 37:11

runs [1] - 83:11

runway [27] -

3:23, 4:1, 4:2,

4:16, 4:19, 28:26,

28:28, 36:2, 36:5,

51:5, 51:7, 66:23,

72:6, 101:13,

101:15, 101:17,

101:18, 127:13,

127:23, 128:18,

128:26, 138:1,

150:8, 150:22,

150:25

Runway [3] -

87:9, 162:19,

162:24

runways [1] -

51:8

RYAN [1] - 1:9

Ryan [2] -

128:13, 130:10

RYANAIR [2] -

1:22, 2:27

Ryanair [1] -

150:20

S

SAC [3] - 71:15,

71:17, 71:27

SACs [2] -

76:27, 76:28

safeguard [1] -

11:3

sake [1] - 65:26

SALAGEAN [1] -

1:9

sale [1] - 96:14

salient [1] -

96:22

SAME [2] - 67:2,

155:17

satisfaction [1] -

169:18

satisfactory [3] -

13:22, 14:7,

181:7

satisfied [24] -

5:13, 22:22, 25:5,

45:24, 55:29,

63:23, 73:25,

74:6, 75:10,

108:14, 161:2,

161:3, 161:14,

177:9, 177:15,

180:4, 180:14,

181:26, 182:23,

182:25, 182:27,

183:24, 184:6,

184:25

satisfied' [1] -

160:21

save [4] - 83:27,

120:17, 131:4,

131:16

saw [3] - 23:6,

53:21, 110:12

says' [1] - 69:27

SC [7] - 2:4,


29

2:13, 2:18, 2:18,

2:22, 2:23, 2:27

scale [3] - 48:27,

151:9, 151:10

schedule [1] -

94:3

schedule') [1] -

94:4

scheme [12] -

22:12, 22:15,

97:21, 100:5,

101:29, 110:15,

110:22, 117:28,

118:7, 119:26,

119:28, 144:13

Scheme [1] -

150:23

schemes [3] -

9:11, 29:25,

158:9

scientific [1] -

131:20

scope [8] - 6:14,

14:25, 20:6,

33:24, 117:11,

127:28, 133:7,

184:26

scopes [1] -

133:8

screening [7] -

78:10, 78:16,

78:17, 78:23,

78:25, 90:18,

91:1

SCULLY [1] -

1:8

se [1] - 145:17

SECOND [1] -

1:20

Second [14] -

67:28, 69:6, 71:8,

72:10, 72:26,

74:2, 74:3, 74:9,

74:13, 74:16,

74:24, 75:2,

121:27, 122:18

second [17] -

21:5, 21:8, 26:29,

82:18, 83:2,

84:29, 91:2,

93:13, 97:17,

100:15, 116:25,

122:8, 122:16,

122:25, 123:10,

123:23, 126:26

secondly [14] -

16:2, 20:5, 22:7,

27:26, 40:11,

46:15, 83:26,

86:27, 110:7,

128:5, 128:9,

133:8, 151:2,

157:15

Secretary [2] -

37:19, 44:13

Section [119] -

6:2, 6:7, 6:9,

6:12, 6:21, 6:23,

7:1, 7:4, 8:17,

11:15, 13:11,

19:2, 19:3, 20:1,

20:13, 20:28,

20:29, 21:20,

21:21, 25:17,

89:2, 92:29, 94:1,

94:14, 96:19,

97:12, 146:21,

148:7, 149:22,

150:3, 150:4,

151:2, 151:3,

151:21, 152:5,

152:13, 153:25,

153:27, 153:29,

154:8, 154:9,

154:10, 154:13,

154:18, 154:21,

155:7, 155:9,

156:1, 156:2,

156:11, 156:16,

157:2, 157:4,

157:5, 157:8,

157:19, 157:20,

157:28, 158:29,

159:1, 159:17,

159:18, 159:23,

159:29, 160:2,

160:4, 160:16,

160:20, 162:3,

162:11, 164:13,

164:14, 164:23,

164:28, 165:15,

165:16, 165:22,

166:5, 166:13,

166:16, 167:12,

167:18, 168:3,

168:11, 174:10,

174:11, 174:12,

174:14, 175:18,

175:23, 175:24,

176:27, 177:4,

177:11, 177:16,

178:26, 180:13,

180:25, 181:3,

181:9, 181:26,

182:4, 182:6,

182:28, 183:26,

184:2, 184:5,

184:13, 184:26,

186:4, 186:9

section [137] -

6:23, 6:29, 7:2,

7:29, 12:20,

13:27, 14:13,

14:15, 14:16,

15:5, 15:10,

15:12, 15:24,

16:24, 17:10,

17:11, 17:16,

17:17, 17:26,

17:29, 18:19,

18:23, 18:28,

19:2, 19:3, 21:12,

21:15, 22:16,

23:7, 23:13,

23:18, 23:26,

24:20, 25:4,

25:19, 25:22,

26:6, 33:29, 34:4,

34:19, 35:28,

36:7, 36:8, 39:26,

40:16, 41:10,

42:17, 42:25,

43:4, 43:10,

45:25, 45:29,

46:9, 46:20, 47:5,

47:29, 48:15,

49:13, 49:16,

56:20, 65:22,

65:24, 66:5, 66:6,

81:5, 82:15,

82:28, 84:12,

84:16, 84:26,

84:27, 84:29,

85:5, 85:26, 86:1,

86:6, 86:8, 86:11,

89:2, 89:22,

90:28, 91:2, 91:9,

97:20, 101:21,

116:20, 117:25,

119:27, 121:17,

123:1, 125:17,

126:3, 126:14,

126:27, 126:28,

138:6, 139:3,

139:4, 139:21,

139:23, 139:27,

140:2, 140:10,

140:12, 140:24,

141:1, 141:10,

141:11, 141:13,

141:27, 141:28,

142:1, 142:16,

142:23, 145:10,

145:11, 145:13,

145:17, 145:25,

146:18, 156:12,

167:9, 168:5,

169:17, 169:26,

169:27, 176:8,

179:22, 180:3,

180:22, 182:8,

182:12, 183:1,

183:4

section.. [1] -

19:20

sections [3] -

174:24, 175:26,

176:2

sector [3] -

147:3, 147:4,

147:6

sectoral [4] -

139:10, 139:29,

140:1, 142:6

security [4] -

13:21, 14:6,

14:18, 163:6

seduced [1] -

80:3

see [61] - 4:15,

8:23, 11:5, 13:23,

15:5, 17:27,

19:16, 20:18,

20:21, 22:2, 23:6,

24:1, 27:29,

29:22, 31:10,

37:1, 41:4, 41:16,

43:1, 43:18, 44:8,

44:29, 50:24,

51:13, 51:23,

51:29, 52:22,

52:25, 53:4, 53:8,

54:16, 63:20,

64:8, 64:10, 67:6,

67:16, 67:17,

67:20, 68:17,

72:16, 72:22,

73:6, 79:23,

95:23, 112:23,

136:25, 152:3,

156:6, 156:17,

159:29, 160:8,

160:29, 161:8,

162:21, 163:22,

166:11, 171:22,

174:9, 177:24,

178:1, 185:28

seek [8] - 21:26,

38:26, 75:27,

76:11, 99:1, 99:2,

132:14, 143:18

seeking [1] -

180:16

seeks [3] - 21:8,

21:26, 62:18

selection [1] -

97:14

selectively [1] -

94:15

self [1] - 78:17

self-

assessment [1] -

78:17

sell [1] - 95:3

Senior [4] -

163:19, 163:24,

163:27, 170:22

sense [5] -

57:26, 96:16,

106:25, 136:3,

178:8

sensible [2] -

16:27, 124:24

sensitive [1] -

60:4

sentence [7] -

20:22, 22:3,

32:20, 51:14,

58:14, 64:8,

185:17

separate [8] -

60:25, 66:12,

69:8, 79:6, 98:20,

102:14, 137:16,

141:1

series [1] -

25:26

serious [2] -

72:25, 136:25

seriously [3] -

125:3, 165:21,

184:19

serve [1] - 94:3

service [3] -

163:7, 163:12,

163:16

Service [3] -

2:32, 71:16,

74:17

services [3] -

134:10, 135:1,

144:25

Services [2] -

1:27, 2:31

SERVICES [1] -

1:32

set [26] - 7:29,

32:6, 64:10,

64:12, 92:27,

93:1, 103:12,

125:26, 133:29,

137:26, 139:2,

142:20, 148:23,

154:13, 154:25,

157:24, 159:15,

162:21, 164:14,

164:15, 168:16,

171:1, 172:12,

172:25, 177:5,

184:16

sets [12] - 4:8,

4:17, 26:13,

38:11, 67:7,

146:28, 162:2,

172:5, 172:12,

174:23, 175:3,

176:2

setting [2] -

18:28, 144:2

settled [1] -

73:12

seven [2] -

95:11, 113:18

several [1] -

49:26

sewerage [2] -

20:25, 106:1

shall [16] -

15:14, 15:22,

15:23, 16:19,

16:24, 17:11,

18:3, 22:17,

51:16, 63:23,

92:4, 94:3, 139:6,

140:19, 174:16,

187:19

shall" [2] - 7:17,

7:27

shall... [1] - 7:15

sharp [1] - 108:7

SHEELAGH [1] -

1:9

shock [1] - 9:5

shopping [1] -

20:24

SHORT [1] -

43:27

short [15] - 21:4,

37:9, 75:2, 95:29,

96:6, 97:4,

109:22, 114:23,

124:26, 165:24,

168:1, 181:12,

185:17, 186:1,

187:1

short-changed

[1] - 124:26

shortage [1] -

9:10

show [3] -

114:8, 118:13,

133:15

showing [5] -

111:21, 112:28,

118:20, 118:26,

119:18

shown [3] -

102:14, 105:7,

169:11

shows [1] -

186:11

shut [2] - 37:14,


30

118:12

side [2] - 150:29,

186:21

sides [1] - 118:4

SIDNEY [1] - 1:9

significance [6]

- 11:16, 41:20,

59:5, 61:4, 62:17,

135:27

significant [28] -

4:2, 4:10, 10:23,

11:12, 12:10,

13:2, 25:16, 28:7,

32:26, 33:6,

49:26, 50:12,

50:18, 55:3, 55:4,

56:28, 58:3,

58:25, 59:3, 61:1,

61:11, 62:10,

62:22, 69:16,

76:3, 86:27,

110:5, 124:3

significantly [9]

- 10:14, 27:25,

98:1, 112:7,

112:10, 171:19,

173:1, 173:11,

178:19

SILE [1] - 1:9

similar [6] -

65:24, 68:14,

71:2, 72:4, 75:12,

174:4

similarly [1] -

48:14

SIMONS [2] -

2:18, 187:5

Simons [2] -

154:25, 187:2

simple [5] -

88:27, 89:5,

148:29, 166:14,

166:17

simpliciter [1] -

185:1

simply [30] -

7:12, 9:24, 10:3,

17:1, 18:28,

19:10, 26:2, 27:6,

38:3, 40:17,

66:18, 78:1, 83:5,

85:29, 87:28,

88:4, 89:21, 90:3,

90:12, 119:3,

119:15, 127:26,

133:3, 133:16,

145:8, 146:2,

148:19, 161:4,

161:14, 165:12

simulator [1] -

163:9

single [1] -

131:10

sinks [1] - 140:7

sit [1] - 186:17

site [25] - 22:14,

30:28, 33:3,

33:16, 33:18,

35:4, 35:7, 41:19,

41:28, 54:22,

60:15, 66:11,

71:13, 71:14,

73:20, 74:19,

163:6, 163:19,

163:27, 169:10,

170:25, 171:5,

171:7

site.. [1] - 33:10

sites [4] - 32:13,

66:22, 68:4,

75:16

sits [1] - 133:15

sitting [1] -

165:6

situation [5] -

13:27, 54:24,

55:1, 97:17,

114:18

situations [1] -

29:7

size [3] - 5:11,

5:20, 57:1

skipped [1] -

21:20

slab [1] - 170:14

slightly [3] -

17:20, 79:3,

84:14

slope [2] -

165:6, 169:16

slotted [1] - 67:4

Slovak [3] -

50:23, 50:26,

51:27

Slovakia [2] -

52:25, 54:4

slow [1] - 25:29

small [1] - 35:11

smoke [1] -

163:9

social [5] -

134:10, 134:29,

135:25, 136:6,

136:8

societies [1] -

135:19

Society [4] -

167:11, 181:4,

181:19, 181:21

socio [7] -

133:28, 134:19,

136:12, 136:16,

136:19, 136:27,

137:10

socio-

economic [7] -

133:28, 134:19,

136:12, 136:16,

136:19, 136:27,

137:10

sold [1] - 96:12

sole [3] - 90:15,

91:26, 131:23

solely [7] -

65:17, 65:25,

79:5, 81:13,

91:11, 92:11,

145:25

Solicitor [1] -

180:29

SOLICITORS [5]

- 2:6, 2:10, 2:20,

2:25, 2:29

Solicitors [2] -

181:2, 181:11

sometimes [3] -

10:13, 65:3,

108:7

somewhat [2] -

7:6, 142:20

somewhere [1] -

67:13

sorry [18] - 8:14,

14:1, 26:26,

26:28, 35:11,

38:15, 38:20,

44:20, 49:19,

63:17, 67:3,

70:14, 121:9,

121:11, 121:14,

134:3, 141:5

sort [1] - 178:4

sought [22] -

5:4, 5:7, 43:3,

50:2, 65:9, 66:16,

67:15, 67:16,

67:19, 68:13,

75:10, 80:17,

98:28, 117:9,

156:15, 158:12,

166:9, 166:10,

166:11, 170:12,

170:20, 172:25

sounds [2] -

145:6, 187:7

source [1] -

67:24

sources [2] -

5:22, 5:28

south [1] - 71:28

spaces [2] -

117:6, 117:8

spatial [1] - 87:1

speaking [1] -

34:13

speaks [1] -

176:21

special [14] -

42:17, 69:14,

69:17, 69:18,

71:4, 71:14,

71:23, 71:29,

72:6, 77:7, 77:13,

77:14, 78:9,

160:13

species [3] -

66:11, 68:4,

75:16

specific [7] -

9:20, 51:19,

59:11, 83:25,

100:27, 107:23,

114:1

specifically [2] -

51:11, 128:8

Specifically [1] -

122:11

specified [9] -

18:23, 86:1, 86:6,

105:17, 127:28,

129:29, 181:5,

183:3, 184:2

specify [2] -

32:7, 129:14

spend [4] -

65:29, 77:12,

131:27, 154:17

sphere [1] -

135:17

spheres [1] -

149:19

spot [2] - 152:1,

152:4

stability [1] -

95:22

staff [1] - 149:12

stage [8] - 15:4,

16:6, 34:24,

45:20, 90:5,

124:8, 151:28,

159:26

stages [2] -

45:10, 107:6

stamp [1] -

178:8

stand [3] -

45:11, 121:4,

124:27

standalone [1] -

84:17

standard [4] -

9:28, 75:3, 132:1,

145:14

standi [1] -

21:26

standing [2] -

84:6, 144:21

standings [1] -

163:14

start [6] - 38:19,

153:17, 155:12,

187:16, 187:17,

187:19

started [3] -

8:12, 85:2,

186:29

stasis [1] - 9:9

STATE [1] - 2:25

State [33] -

37:19, 42:10,

47:11, 47:13,

64:29, 65:8, 76:4,

76:5, 82:8,

102:17, 110:3,

110:16, 120:4,

120:10, 130:23,

134:17, 134:25,

134:29, 137:9,

137:12, 139:15,

140:15, 142:20,

144:18, 146:15,

149:28, 153:12,

156:29, 157:15,

159:3, 159:13,

161:10, 176:7

state [3] - 73:3,

134:9, 162:17

State's [1] -

111:15

State.. [1] -

44:13

Statement [1] -

48:12

statement [10] -

42:1, 48:5,

108:11, 108:22,

109:4, 109:13,

109:14, 128:29,

147:24, 156:4

states [1] -

122:9

States [7] -

27:20, 28:1,

62:13, 64:9,

64:12, 64:18,

64:19

station [1] -

20:25

status [2] -

136:2, 136:12

statute [8] -

65:6, 83:15,

88:16, 97:20,

98:25, 148:23,

149:23, 156:23

statutory [53] -

5:12, 22:11,

47:27, 85:12,

87:10, 88:16,

92:1, 92:11, 95:2,

95:9, 97:21, 99:4,

100:5, 101:24,

101:27, 101:29,

102:26, 110:14,

110:21, 110:25,

114:18, 114:19,

114:22, 114:26,

115:20, 119:11,

119:26, 119:27,

142:3, 142:5,

142:6, 147:27,

148:15, 150:4,

151:5, 152:10,

152:14, 152:18,

152:24, 154:5,

156:6, 156:9,

159:16, 159:19,

159:22, 174:8,

174:9, 174:10,

174:13, 174:22,

182:19, 185:20

stay [1] - 92:25

stays [1] - 15:27

steeper [1] -

169:11

stenographic

[1] - 1:29

Stenography [3]

- 1:27, 2:31, 2:32

STENOGRAPH

Y [1] - 1:31

steps [1] -

165:11

still [6] - 8:8, 9:9,

30:18, 58:24,

60:27, 64:1

stop [1] - 126:5

stopped [1] -

37:9

storm [1] - 70:6

straightforwar

d [2] - 166:15,

167:14

strange [2] -

51:21, 54:24

stranger [1] -

82:9

strangers [1] -

89:8

strategy [2] -


31

87:1, 147:21

stream [1] -

103:21

strength [1] -

111:29

strict [2] - 15:6,

165:16

strictly [1] -

47:15

striking [2] -

124:22, 174:3

strong [3] - 48:8,

48:14, 97:1

struck [3] - 9:9,

42:8, 133:12

structure [1] -

57:11

structures [1] -

163:8

struggling [1] -

101:10

sub [6] - 15:5,

19:2, 160:22,

167:19, 168:16,

168:19

sub-headings

[1] - 160:22

sub-

paragraphs [2] -

168:16, 168:19

sub-roman [1] -

167:19

sub-section [2] -

15:5, 19:2

subject [14] -

17:13, 27:20,

46:17, 46:19,

57:1, 62:12,

66:10, 95:20,

96:9, 101:4,

107:28, 109:6,

144:24, 157:11

Subject [1] -

18:2

subject... [1] -

14:9

SUBMISSION

[2] - 81:1, 153:14

submission [56]

- 9:23, 13:6,

28:14, 33:12,

33:27, 34:26,

36:16, 47:21,

50:3, 62:19,

62:28, 66:17,

66:23, 71:11,

72:18, 74:18,

75:17, 76:22,

76:23, 78:1,

79:20, 81:27,

83:9, 90:10,

90:17, 90:27,

90:29, 91:7,

91:24, 98:17,

102:18, 117:26,

118:12, 118:16,

118:18, 119:4,

119:9, 120:9,

122:5, 122:7,

124:12, 125:23,

147:1, 147:26,

149:21, 155:4,

157:5, 158:3,

161:5, 161:12,

167:17, 167:23,

182:3, 184:12,

184:18

submissions

[59] - 15:4, 16:8,

16:13, 23:4,

28:12, 33:28,

74:9, 74:12,

80:25, 81:9,

81:18, 81:20,

81:29, 83:6, 84:8,

85:16, 88:28,

89:25, 90:4,

90:15, 91:10,

91:23, 97:6,

97:25, 97:29,

98:18, 98:29,

99:2, 100:1,

110:16, 110:20,

115:16, 116:15,

118:6, 121:20,

121:26, 121:29,

122:20, 122:21,

122:28, 123:1,

123:6, 123:13,

123:22, 123:25,

123:27, 124:10,

125:11, 126:15,

126:18, 128:14,

132:21, 133:3,

138:7, 153:5,

154:26, 155:27,

175:21

SUBMISSIONS

[1] - 3:8

submit [7] - 9:4,

13:17, 25:16,

31:2, 79:1, 127:6,

140:20

submits [1] -

69:14

submitted [6] -

21:12, 43:11,

48:13, 76:4,

118:4, 176:20

subparagraph

[3] - 15:8, 15:19,

160:20

subparagraphs

[2] - 8:24, 160:15

subsection [26]

- 7:11, 7:12,

13:12, 13:16,

14:2, 14:5, 14:29,

16:10, 16:11,

16:16, 16:28,

17:8, 17:29, 18:2,

18:17, 19:2,

19:14, 19:25,

29:22, 92:2,

93:13, 93:19,

93:21, 139:17,

139:19, 168:6

Subsection [1] -

17:1

subsequent [11]

- 48:13, 49:28,

50:6, 53:23,

54:27, 58:10,

62:27, 87:29,

88:5, 97:19,

166:24

subsequently

[5] - 6:18, 20:27,

42:8, 131:1,

151:23

subsidiary [1] -

64:28

substance [11] -

39:14, 39:28,

40:6, 40:13,

44:20, 44:26,

49:14, 88:10,

109:3, 116:12,

145:11

substance" [1] -

45:1

substantial [15]

- 9:2, 45:15,

52:11, 82:3,

86:17, 89:3,

89:15, 90:14,

91:5, 100:29,

108:9, 115:4,

115:13, 116:22,

119:14

substantially

[11] - 6:26, 8:12,

8:29, 9:27, 10:3,

10:10, 10:17,

75:2, 81:15,

86:15, 137:22

substantive [3] -

97:13, 111:12,

142:16

substantively

[1] - 89:19

substitute [3] -

30:3, 38:3, 56:7

substituted [1] -

156:16

subtitle [1] -

170:8

succession [1] -

25:28

suffered [1] - 9:6

suffice [3] -

100:24, 105:27,

148:1

suffices [3] -

112:4, 142:13,

150:11

sufficient [9] -

60:28, 66:24,

98:15, 107:2,

114:10, 131:3,

148:29, 161:7,

181:7

sufficiently [5] -

9:17, 61:27,

62:12, 82:3,

128:24

suggest [24] -

4:4, 9:16, 9:28,

10:7, 11:3, 12:11,

12:13, 13:13,

16:5, 25:20,

27:24, 36:21,

49:11, 65:12,

66:25, 75:12,

76:28, 79:12,

80:14, 80:18,

87:12, 134:27,

135:29, 186:20

suggested [5] -

28:11, 76:9,

165:29, 169:24,

175:15

suggesting [5] -

10:12, 23:24,

45:8, 56:20,

167:26

suggestion [6] -

3:15, 3:17, 16:7,

57:16, 57:18,

79:11

suit [2] - 111:3,

186:25

suitable [1] -

84:3

suite [2] -

156:18, 157:18

summarised [3]

- 81:20, 82:1,

101:28

summarising [1]

- 111:13

summary [1] -

169:2

Superior [2] -

73:1, 74:26

supplementary

[1] - 58:29

supplemented

[1] - 58:5

supplied [2] -

2:31, 123:25

supplying [1] -

69:15

support [6] -

49:10, 72:12,

73:20, 75:14,

127:24, 131:23

supported [2] -

72:10, 85:17

supports [1] -

177:25

suppose [5] -

40:8, 49:24,

61:11, 63:6,

70:16

Supreme [24] -

24:6, 25:12,

25:19, 41:2, 41:4,

44:4, 69:21,

69:25, 95:6,

99:12, 99:16,

99:19, 99:21,

99:24, 104:4,

104:7, 115:16,

129:17, 129:19,

155:5, 178:29,

179:3, 181:8,

181:19

surely [1] - 89:3

surprising [1] -

59:14

surrounding [1]

- 90:22

surroundings

[2] - 29:26, 30:8

survey [1] -

169:9

sustain [1] -

75:3

sustainable [12]

- 10:29, 11:14,

11:23, 87:4,

87:18, 87:27,

88:7, 98:21,

138:17, 140:17,

140:27, 148:12

SUZANNE [1] -

2:24

sworn [2] - 71:9,

74:7

synopsis [4] -

71:13, 71:15,

74:19, 174:1

synthesis [1] -

101:7

system [8] -

50:9, 51:8, 51:11,

51:12, 132:18,

140:6, 163:10

systems [3] -

132:19, 133:10,

133:19

T

T.D [1] - 134:3

Tab [21] - 4:27,

6:25, 7:1, 7:9,

17:23, 20:17,

26:12, 26:17,

30:25, 36:29,

38:16, 41:3, 44:5,

47:1, 47:2, 49:20,

49:22, 134:5,

138:10, 141:2,

141:4

tab [10] - 23:11,

38:16, 53:3,

58:18, 77:24,

92:24, 159:14,

168:24, 185:9

Taisce [2] - 67:1,

67:9

talks [1] - 44:19

target [1] -

149:29

targets [2] -

149:12, 151:17

task [1] - 77:19

tasks [1] -

170:17

taxpayer [2] -

95:12, 113:15

technical [3] -

8:28, 9:25, 86:14

technologies [1]

- 52:14

technology [1] -

143:24

temptation [1] -

80:12

ten [10] - 4:5,

5:7, 5:10, 43:23,

55:6, 90:24,

95:11, 99:10,

113:19, 182:22

term [7] - 6:11,

33:8, 36:21,

76:17, 113:20,


32

114:21, 114:23

terms [44] -

3:28, 6:16, 7:6,

13:8, 17:13, 20:7,

23:7, 38:5, 39:14,

40:6, 44:26,

56:14, 63:14,

83:28, 98:9,

99:15, 112:29,

127:21, 130:2,

135:5, 145:15,

154:3, 156:9,

156:19, 158:25,

160:20, 161:13,

161:15, 162:1,

162:4, 165:15,

165:16, 165:21,

166:15, 167:14,

167:20, 168:10,

176:12, 176:22,

177:29, 183:17,

184:15, 184:20,

186:15

terms.. [1] -

170:28

terribly [5] -

26:26, 38:20,

154:3, 175:17,

186:15

test [16] - 78:11,

78:17, 100:9,

110:10, 116:20,

119:11, 146:7,

148:5, 148:6,

148:14, 148:17,

148:19, 161:7,

161:10, 161:11

tests [1] - 150:4

text [4] - 14:1,

132:2, 136:19,

136:21

THE [12] - 1:1,

1:12, 1:19, 2:4,

2:8, 2:15, 2:22,

3:1, 44:1, 111:5,

111:7, 187:26

theme [1] -

157:2

themselves [5] -

9:17, 32:9,

104:15, 115:18,

120:6

THEN [1] -

187:26

theologians [1] -

137:8

theological [1] -

131:22

theoretical [1] -

85:12

there'd [1] -

150:8

there'll [1] -

150:9

thereafter [2] -

57:17, 170:25

therefore [23] -

7:27, 12:21,

22:25, 31:15,

35:25, 36:9,

47:12, 52:29,

58:27, 91:2,

92:16, 102:1,

102:19, 117:8,

137:22, 148:4,

149:13, 168:13,

169:12, 171:25,

172:21, 173:4,

182:29

therein [3] -

134:16, 138:23,

177:6

thereof [1] -

32:15

thereto [1] - 18:5

thermal [1] -

67:24

thinks [2] - 8:20,

178:7

third [23] - 16:8,

82:18, 83:13,

83:17, 83:28,

85:8, 86:23,

87:16, 89:25,

89:26, 91:9,

91:17, 92:16,

97:22, 101:26,

117:18, 126:4,

129:23, 132:28,

146:23, 175:14,

177:28, 178:28

THIRD [1] - 1:20

Thirdly [1] -

133:9

thirdly [1] -

82:24

Thomas [1] -

180:29

THOMAS [1] -

1:8

thorough [1] -

123:29

threatened [1] -

135:11

three [11] - 5:21,

29:7, 29:12, 36:2,

50:28, 51:9,

51:12, 160:22,

170:1, 170:20,

175:21

threshold [2] -

83:29, 178:3

throughout [1] -

157:12

Thursday [5] -

23:23, 27:28,

30:27, 100:14,

148:3

ticking [2] -

157:23, 158:24

tied [1] - 112:23

ties [2] - 16:27,

90:9

TIM [1] - 2:13

timber [1] -

170:16

time" [1] - 21:17

timeframe [4] -

64:10, 64:19,

64:20, 143:4

timeframes [1] -

64:12

title [2] - 138:12,

138:25

TO [1] - 187:26

to' [8] - 148:5,

148:6, 148:14,

148:17, 152:2,

152:6, 152:8,

155:3

today [3] - 4:18,

113:28, 153:28

together [3] -

19:8, 67:7,

112:23

TOLAND [31] -

2:23, 81:1, 81:3,

89:8, 89:16,

95:25, 98:8,

101:16, 102:10,

111:11, 120:24,

121:6, 121:11,

121:14, 126:23,

132:11, 132:14,

137:6, 141:17,

141:20, 141:23,

145:8, 146:18,

148:5, 149:6,

150:12, 150:18,

151:15, 152:5,

152:9, 153:10

Toland [7] -

80:23, 120:3,

120:18, 154:24,

155:1, 161:23,

161:29

tomorrow [4] -

186:22, 187:3,

187:8, 187:24

took [15] - 47:22,

48:22, 53:23,

55:1, 61:5, 85:14,

87:7, 88:11, 91:7,

120:8, 147:7,

158:7, 165:4,

165:7, 184:27

top [2] - 26:15,

71:5

totally [1] -

165:14

toto [1] - 87:26

touch [1] - 79:10

towards [5] -

141:6, 142:27,

142:28, 143:2,

143:3

town [1] - 59:27

Trading [1] -

150:23

trading [1] -

144:13

traditionally [1]

- 70:19

traffic [2] -

117:8, 117:11

training [5] -

163:8, 163:9,

163:13, 163:16

transcript [1] -

1:28

Transcripts [1] -

2:30

transfer [2] -

114:8, 114:16

transition [15] -

138:16, 138:27,

139:11, 140:9,

140:13, 140:16,

140:19, 140:25,

142:17, 142:25,

142:29, 143:2,

143:3, 143:5

Transition [2] -

146:24, 147:18

travel [1] - 131:6

trawling [1] -

77:13

treat [1] - 133:21

treated [2] - 8:6,

26:7

treatment [3] -

20:25, 134:18,

135:25

tree [1] - 163:4

trespass [2] -

86:8, 154:23

trespasses [1] -

137:24

TREVOR [1] -

1:7

trial [2] - 141:2,

141:4

trigger [3] -

106:8, 110:5,

138:6

triggers [1] -

98:17

true [4] - 70:11,

134:20, 176:27,

182:27

try [3] - 80:13,

143:22

trying [2] -

121:14, 187:1

TUESDAY [2] -

1:25, 3:1

turn [25] - 6:2,

20:11, 24:1,

26:13, 30:23,

43:18, 44:6,

52:21, 64:24,

65:28, 68:17,

69:3, 70:27,

72:16, 92:23,

99:19, 111:17,

111:22, 112:27,

122:22, 126:23,

126:26, 127:15,

140:12, 154:8

turned [1] -

111:25

turning [3] -

84:10, 92:26,

103:5

turns [1] - 63:4

twice [1] -

157:20

two [29] - 3:13,

12:20, 13:3,

15:29, 19:8,

20:12, 20:21,

26:13, 27:23,

37:2, 38:17, 40:8,

40:28, 47:19,

48:22, 52:8, 67:7,

74:19, 75:21,

77:22, 110:29,

120:7, 122:13,

126:23, 127:24,

143:9, 146:22,

156:8, 175:26

type [3] - 46:18,

102:2, 147:11

types [1] -

105:17

U

Uchtála [1] -

135:3

ultimately [3] -

79:22, 80:7,

127:16

ultra [5] - 25:8,

42:8, 168:19,

180:7, 185:3

UN [1] - 143:15

unable [1] - 9:21

unacceptable

[1] - 76:10

unauthorised

[2] - 165:10,

165:12

unbound [1] -

116:27

unchanged [1] -

87:7

uncompleted [3]

- 13:26, 13:28,

176:15

unconstitution

al [1] - 82:29

under [100] - 5:3,

6:15, 11:15,

12:20, 14:4,

14:13, 14:25,

15:10, 15:12,

15:24, 16:24,

17:10, 18:2, 20:6,

20:27, 21:26,

22:11, 23:13,

23:18, 34:15,

36:7, 37:8, 38:23,

39:25, 41:22,

42:5, 42:25,

45:25, 45:29,

46:9, 46:19, 47:5,

48:3, 49:16, 50:9,

51:19, 51:27,

52:18, 53:6,

78:10, 78:29,

81:13, 81:22,

82:15, 83:4,

83:20, 85:5, 86:5,

86:11, 86:12,

87:22, 90:28,

91:9, 97:12,

101:21, 103:16,

110:9, 114:24,

117:7, 117:29,

119:11, 121:17,

121:21, 130:24,

134:15, 137:22,

139:23, 139:26,

140:2, 140:12,

141:7, 141:23,

145:13, 148:7,

151:16, 153:25,

153:26, 153:29,

158:29, 160:4,


33

160:22, 164:14,

164:27, 166:16,

170:8, 171:26,

172:19, 172:29,

173:5, 173:11,

174:13, 178:18,

178:22, 180:25,

181:9, 184:26,

185:13, 186:8

Under [1] -

22:15

undergone [1] -

52:11

underline [2] -

37:22, 106:29

underlines [1] -

113:23

underlining [1] -

115:2

underlying [6] -

8:7, 70:21, 101:5,

103:19, 107:29,

113:17

undermine [3] -

39:6, 40:3, 44:22

understandabl

e [12] - 9:7, 12:12,

12:22, 13:5, 13:6,

56:4, 60:8, 60:21,

70:20, 78:12,

78:18, 124:15

understood [3] -

57:26, 151:6,

151:8

undertake [1] -

36:4

undertaken [3] -

24:14, 49:13,

179:16

undoubtedly [1]

- 73:10

unduly [1] -

130:29

unenforceable

[1] - 136:18

unenumerated

[13] - 83:18, 84:1,

127:17, 128:11,

129:12, 129:15,

129:21, 130:9,

130:14, 130:25,

131:4, 132:7,

134:21

unequivocally

[1] - 131:5

unfairness [2] -

118:17, 120:29

unfortunately

[3] - 17:19, 29:18,

47:1

Union [3] -

52:25, 132:23,

147:6

unique [1] - 11:4

uniquely [2] -

155:1, 158:4

unjust [4] -

108:5, 118:21,

118:26, 119:18

unlawfully [1] -

121:25

unleaded [1] -

149:15

unless [4] -

54:1, 105:6,

126:20, 153:6

unlike [4] - 51:2,

97:17, 128:10,

133:11

unnecessary [1]

- 131:28

up [23] - 4:16,

26:21, 26:25,

38:9, 38:10,

61:27, 63:5, 64:1,

64:9, 91:13,

91:14, 106:14,

110:29, 111:23,

114:20, 116:25,

121:4, 132:10,

132:13, 133:22,

155:14, 169:22,

178:13

up-to-date [2] -

61:27, 64:1

updating [5] -

58:27, 59:5,

61:16, 62:9,

62:15

urged [4] -

125:13, 160:10,

167:21, 183:8

urging [2] -

165:3, 184:10

uses [1] - 60:3

utilise [1] -

180:16

utility [1] -

117:28

utterly [6] -

56:18, 58:12,

60:22, 65:23,

78:26, 78:28

V

VALENTINE [1] -

2:19

Valentine [1] -

66:29

Valera [1] -

136:16

VALERIAN [1] -

1:8

validity [12] -

18:4, 50:27,

51:16, 51:22,

52:3, 54:12,

55:16, 55:24,

56:1, 56:13,

63:13, 64:13

valuable [1] -

104:18

value [3] - 105:8,

112:1, 113:13

values [6] -

100:23, 104:28,

105:2, 106:3,

106:7, 107:2

various [12] -

42:2, 42:10,

81:10, 95:1,

107:6, 127:7,

131:26, 133:8,

133:9, 143:24,

153:11, 174:23

vary [1] - 14:8

varying [1] -

98:25

vehicle [2] -

95:10, 112:28

vehicles [1] -

37:11

verbatim [1] -

1:28

version [2] -

29:19, 63:17

vicissitudes [1]

- 96:10

videos [1] -

85:17

view [27] - 5:20,

10:8, 10:15,

11:25, 12:23,

21:15, 21:25,

22:25, 23:29,

24:28, 45:7,

45:11, 61:5,

112:4, 114:16,

124:9, 125:24,

128:9, 129:26,

152:29, 158:1,

164:3, 165:5,

165:7, 166:2,

172:10, 180:1

viewed [1] - 97:8

views [2] -

25:11, 25:13

VIII [3] - 178:23,

180:13, 180:17

Village [6] -

24:6, 25:12,

159:3, 168:21,

168:22, 179:1

vindication [1] -

125:9

vires [6] - 25:9,

42:8, 105:22,

168:19, 180:8,

185:3

virtue [2] -

56:29, 185:21

vista [1] - 16:14

vital [1] - 76:6

W

walked [1] -

95:24

walls [1] -

170:15

wants [2] - 78:7,

186:17

warrant [1] -

108:25

warranting [1] -

73:21

WAS [1] -

187:26

water [3] -

53:29, 54:1, 54:2

ways [3] - 133:6,

143:23, 167:13

WEDNESDAY

[1] - 187:26

weeks [1] - 16:2

weeks.. [1] -

15:25

weigh [1] -

111:29

weight [1] -

112:16

welfare [3] -

134:18, 135:25,

136:7

well-

established [1] -

82:27

well-settled [1] -

73:12

Wells [8] -

36:25, 36:28,

41:5, 41:9, 44:12,

44:18, 62:28,

79:23

Wells' [2] -

37:12, 37:13

Westin [1] -

73:13

Wexele [2] -

116:25, 116:28

whatsoever [4] -

36:13, 73:20,

83:14, 86:4

whence [1] -

47:28

whereas [7] -

38:6, 45:13,

75:25, 76:5, 77:4,

95:14, 113:10

which....

replace [1] - 40:5

whilst [3] -

107:6, 130:7,

132:15

White [8] - 67:8,

67:18, 68:18,

69:4, 72:17,

76:25, 77:2,

183:10

whole [6] - 38:3,

39:23, 63:4,

78:27, 123:21,

150:23

wholly [5] -

86:19, 86:20,

87:10, 88:18,

89:18

Wicklow [2] -

24:4, 24:7

wide [2] - 10:13,

180:12

widely [1] -

136:1

wider [3] -

107:9, 127:21,

147:8

wildlife [1] -

69:13

Wildlife [2] -

71:16, 74:17

wind [1] - 69:22

windows [1] -

37:14

wish [8] - 9:8,

36:24, 55:13,

75:23, 76:6, 91:3,

118:9, 121:16

wished [4] -

3:13, 38:24, 76:5,

91:23

wishes [1] -

120:11

withhold [1] -

136:1

won [1] - 135:18

wonder [3] -

43:20, 145:3,

145:7

word [5] - 7:17,

7:26, 29:15, 30:4,

147:23

wording [4] -

24:20, 25:4,

179:22, 180:3

words [13] -

16:22, 45:1, 57:9,

57:15, 58:15,

58:16, 58:20,

58:27, 91:4,

106:14, 119:19,

131:20, 175:29

work-out [2] -

95:10, 112:28

workings [1] -

37:13

Works [4] - 42:1,

42:27, 104:3,

104:8

works [58] - 9:2,

10:4, 10:5, 10:11,

13:1, 14:26, 20:8,

29:24, 30:6,

30:19, 33:9,

33:17, 34:5, 34:9,

35:5, 35:10,

35:11, 36:11,

37:8, 41:19,

41:26, 42:4, 42:7,

42:20, 42:23,

42:26, 46:13,

46:18, 49:12,

68:10, 79:26,

85:1, 86:17, 89:3,

89:15, 89:17,

89:20, 89:24,

89:28, 90:12,

90:14, 90:15,

91:5, 106:1,

119:14, 160:24,

161:19, 161:20,

162:17, 162:24,

162:26, 162:29,

163:4, 163:17,

164:4, 164:6,

166:1, 170:13

works....

constituted [1] -

43:12

Worldport [2] -

25:24, 26:3

worth [2] -

20:12, 150:16

writing [2] -

145:3, 169:8

written [9] -

2:32, 52:9, 71:11,

74:9, 81:18, 83:6,


34

84:8, 85:16,

132:20

wrote [1] - 169:5

X

XA [1] - 156:16

Y

year [11] - 3:16,

3:22, 4:5, 4:12,

5:7, 5:10, 5:21,

59:17, 140:18,

143:7, 144:27

years [15] - 7:21,

18:25, 37:9,

47:19, 48:22,

49:26, 50:28,

51:9, 51:12, 52:8,

55:6, 90:25, 92:5,

95:11, 113:19

yesterday [3] -

70:7, 70:9, 77:11

yield [1] - 150:16

Z

zoning [3] -

105:3, 105:18,

107:9

‘

‘consent’ [2] -

31:16, 31:24

the high court dublin court no. 12 between: helena ... · gwen malone stenography services ltd. 5...

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