The History of the NCO from Post World War II to Vietnam

by

SGM Michael A. Grinston

USASMA Class #56

Group Room: L05

Faculty Advisor: SGM Vaneta J. Vaughn

March 30, 2006

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I. Introduction

A. References

1. Bull, Stephen. 20th Century Anns and Annor

2. Fisher, Ernest F. Guardians of the Republic

3. Hogan, David W. The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corp

4. Nelson, Harold W. The Anny

5. "Non-commissioned officer" Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

B. The research was very informative. I learned more about the Noncommissioned Officer Corp in one month than I have learned in over 17 years in the military.

II. Body

A. Roles of the NCOs and Changes from World War II through Vietnam

1. World War II

2. Korean War

3. Vietnam

B. Heroes

1. Korean War

2. Vietnam

C. Weapons

1. Rifles used by NCOs from World War II to Vietnam

2. Artillery pieces evolution from World War II to Vietnam

D. Training of the Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs)

III. Closing

A. Summary

B. Questions

C. Conclusion Statement

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Works Cited

Bull, Stephen. 20th Century Arms and Armor. New York: Facts of Life Inc., 1996.

Fisher, Ernest F. Guardians of the Republic; A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps

of the U.S. Army. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994.

Hogan, David W., Jr., Arnold G. Fisch Jr., and Robert K. Wright Jr., eds. The Story of the

Noncommissioned Officer Corp; The Backbone of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Center

of Military History United States Army, 2003.

Nelson, Harold W., Bruce Jacobs, and Raymond K. Bluhm Jr., eds. The Army. Arlington: The

Army Historical Foundation, 2001.

"Non-commissioned officer." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 29 Nov 2005, 02:28 UTC. 11

Dec 2005, 22:14 <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Non­

commissioned officer&oldid=29549493>.

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NCO History from 1945 to 1975

The Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corp under went several changes since its inception,

but none was more prevalent than the period between World War II (WWII) and Vietnam. The

NCO Corp produced heroes, modernized weapons and developed training for the Army's

enlisted personnel in this short time period of 30 years. During this period, the Army modeled

the NCO Corp after the European NCOs. European Armies considered their NCOs

"administrative managers, drill masters, and enforcers of camp discipline- the only authority

figures in constant contact with the troops" (Hogan, Fisch, and Wright 2). The Army's NCO

Corp developed into the Corp that the Army had envisioned by the end of Vietnam.

Just like with any war, after WWII the Army went through some alterations. In 1945, the

Army did not consider NCOs professional Soldiers (Fisher 250). This was evident by the fact

that there were almost no traditions for noncommissioned officers. For an example, if an Officer

went into the barracks the first Soldier that saw the officer would call the building to attention.

For the noncommissioned officer that entered the building nothing would happen. Some NCOs

commanded respect and Soldiers would become quiet when certain NCOs came into the

building, but this was not tradition as it was with Officers.

To understand the history of the NCO you must understand the relationship between the

NCOs and Specialists/Technicians. The Army created technicians and the specialist ranks to

satisfy the Army's needs for highly skilled Soldiers. Ernest Fisher (260) stated, "While there

was no problem obtaining qualified men for specialist/technician positions as long as the draft

lasted, there remained, nevertheless, some problems in defining the relationship between them

and the line noncommissioned officers within the command structure." The Army attempted to

solve these problems by regarding technicians as noncommissioned officers. This created instant

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confusion. One officer stated, "All regulations and orders relating to command authority applied

to technicians and specialist in the same manner as to other noncommissioned officers. In some

units the situation bordered on the absurd when, for example, in an infantry division 60% of the

men in its signal company ranks as noncommissioned officer" (qtd. in Fisher 261). There were

not enough Soldiers to pull duties since the majority of personnel were NCOs. The Army later

rescinded this order, but not before it had taken a terrible toll on the NCO Corp. In 1944, the

Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall said this about the NCO Corp "the outstanding

deficiency noted in our divisions is the number of noncommissioned officers who are below

satisfactory standards of intelligence and qualities of leadership" (qtd. in Fisher 270).

The Army created the warrant officer rank as a way to restore some professionalism lost to

NCOs by allowing exceptional NCOs the opportunity to progress to warrant officers. In 1946,

the Army incorporated forty warrant officer occupational areas into the same MOS structure as

the noncommissioned officers structure, raising a question as to the Corps' purpose. The Army

answered this question by using the warrant officer appointment as an incentive to able

noncommissioned officers rather than as a reward. For a time, the Army envisioned the warrant

officer as a capstone rank into which outstanding enlisted personnel could routinely expect to

advance. The original use of the warrant officer grade as a suitable reward for outstanding

noncommissioned officers and the postwar decision to use the grade as an incentive resulted in

its extension into so many areas of mixed utilization that warrant officers became largely

interchangeable with junior commissioned officers or senior enlisted personnel (Fisher 261).

The Korean War created a need for new roles for NCOs in the Army. Until now, the Army

had fought battles with defined enemy lines. The United States was on one side and the enemy

was on the other. However, in the Korean War blurred lines saw a need for small unit tactics.

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This was the first war where the true importance of the NCOs started to emerge. Most of the

engagements were now small engagements ofplatoons, squads and teams. Not like WWII where

thousands of Soldiers faced each other on the battlefield. Officers were not everywhere and the

NCOs had to take charge and maneuver their Soldiers. The Army did not prepare NCOs for this.

At the beginning of the Korean War, the NCOs were not ready to fight, Fisher (272) wrote, "as

Korean Soldiers approached their position a few NCOs began to shout the command of fire, and

began firing. The rest truly could not believe that the enemy was actually trying to kill them and

simply did not fire their weapons." Even though the enemy did not overrun their position, they

found that several Soldiers and NCOs did nothing to defeat the enemy from destroying their

company. This was indicative of the NCOs at the beginning of the War. An officer stated this

about the sergeant at the beginning of the Korean War "Sergeants once chosen to sit at the right

hand of God because of a singular ability to Soldier and make-jar-head privates see things the

Army way-- now shrank from shouting out psychoneurotic yard birds because it might get them

in ajam" (qtd. in Fisher 271). Soldiers during this time simply disregarded their NCOs as rude,

and sent them on their way.

To make the matters worse society demanded less stringent punishment for Soldiers. This did

not help the good order and discipline of the units and it showed in the beginning of the war.

NCOs could not punish Soldiers that had "dismissed" them. One Officer said, "short of court

Martial the company's officer's power to inflict punishment had been reduced" (qtd. in Fisher

272). This also led to a problem of replacing NCOs that were not affective. The Army did not

replace NCOs not prepared to lead Soldiers in combat, which also gave the Soldiers less

confidence in their units and their leadership.

The declining professionalism of the NCO Corp led to frustrated Soldiers. During WWII

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with the large battles, the officers were to blame when something went wrong. In the Korean

War NCOs led more missions. When something went wrong, Soldiers were now blaming their

NCOs instead of their officers. This would create problems for the Corp until after the Vietnam

conflict.

The beginning of the Vietnam Conflict saw another change in the NCO Corp. The Army

started using NCOs to lead patrols, but in Vietnam NCOs led more patrols than officers lead.

NCOs were essential to success of almost every mission. NCOs were up to the task. In the

beginning, NCOs were leading patrols and performing well.

The problem developed because NCOs were dying at an alarming rate. NCOs were often up

front on patrols and the enemy was killing them first. The Army was having a difficult time

keeping good NCOs in the units that needed it; Fisher (324) named the Vietnam Era the "Crisis

of the Noncommissioned officer Corp."

The attrition rate ofNCOs was higher than it had ever been and the replacements were often

substandard. Officers lost confidence in their NCOs. They started bypassing NCOs and talking

directly to the Soldiers. Soldiers saw the problems and targeted their hostilities and frustrations

on the NCOs. By the end of the Vietnam, the role of the Sergeant as the small unit leader had

eroded.

Even with all of the problems within the NCO Corp during this time, the Army had major

milestones for the NCOs. The Army created the position of the Sergeant Major of the Army in

1966. The Army developed the rank of Command Sergeant Major Rank and revamped the

enlisted pay scale to nine pay grades. The Army Chief of Staff in 1969 approved the

development of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. In 1972, congress authorized

the establishment of the United States Sergeants Major Academy.

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The NCO Corp while undergoing major changes and under enormous scrutiny still had its

heroes. One hero and Medal of Honor winner was Sergeant George D. Libby. SGT Libby was

an engineer in the 24th Infantry Division. SGT Libby noticed that some injured artillerymen

were in need of assistance and he came to their aid. He smashed a roadblock south of Taejon,

where the division was fighting for its life. He then loaded the wounded men aboard an M-5

tractor and posted himself "shotgun." Knowing that only his driver could operate the M-5,

Libby positioned himself between the driver and the enemy fire directed at them. They crashed

another roadblock and got the wounded men to an aid station. Libby was the first Medal of

Honor Winner of the Korean War (Nelson 108).

Another hero was Sergeant First Class Webster A. Anderson. The Army awarded the Medal

of Honor to Sergeant Anderson from Alpha Battery 2-320th FA for his actions near Tam Ky,

Republic of Vietnam on 15 October 1967. In addition to directing his battery's defenses against

a determined North Vietnamese infantry assault he personally killed several of the enemy but

above all took care of his Soldiers (Nelson 88).

The weapons that these heroes used during this period evolved as rapidly as the NCO Corp.

The first semiautomatic rifle used by NCOs was the Garand. The Army adopted the M1 in 1936

and by 1941 most of the regular Army carried this rifle. The M1 fired a .30in (7.62mm)

cartridge, and had an eight round magazine. The major problem with the rifle was Soldiers could

not reload the magazine until the clip fell out.

In 1957, NCOs used the M14 as the main rifle. The M14 has a 500m effective range and had

an improved cyclic rate of fire of 700 rounds per minute and an improved magazine. Some units

still use the M14 today as a sniper rifle because of its accuracy and the stopping power of the

7.62mm round.

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In 1969, NCOs began using the M16 instead of the M14. Stephen Bull (100) stated that

Soldiers hailed the M16 as the "miracle weapon." The M16 did not live up to its reputation and

leaders quickly condemned the rifle because of its insufficient range and lethality. The M16 was

also not as resilient as the M14 and Soldiers had to clean the weapons constantly in order for it to

function properly. Makers of the M16 had advertised the weapon as maintenance free that

Soldiers quickly found out was not true.

The Artillery pieces after the World War II also evolved. One of the Howitzers in use after

WWII was the Long Tom. This weapon could deliver a 95lb Artillery Shell 25,700 yards.

Artillerymen used this weapon throughout the Korean War. The Army did not use the Long

Tom much during Vietnam.

During Vietnam NCOs were operating the MI02 howitzer. This howitzer was a towed

105mm howitzer with a range of 11,500 meters. Artillery was not very effective in Vietnam due

to the thick jungle. The Artillery rounds would often explode on the trees having no effect on

the enemy.

NCO training progressed a great deal from 1945 to 1975. The changes were indicative of the

times and extremely necessary. Because the NCO Corp was not a professional association,

leaders felt no need to develop its enlisted leadership. In 1945, the Army trained its NCOs by

on-the-job training. The first NCO academies began in Europe around 1947 (Hogan, Fisch, and

Wright 23). The creator of the Academies in Europe was General Clark. The NCO Academy

was not mandatory and was one course for all NCOs. NCOs in the grade of Corporal to Master

Sergeant would attend the same course. Since the academy was not mandatory commanders

often would not allow their essential NCOs to attend the courses. Since the Army did not

formalize the schools, they lacked uniformity on subject matter and course length. In 1950, the

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Anny even suspended NCO academies because of the start of the Korean War. In 1957, the

Anny finally established the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course. The Army modeled

this course after the Officer Candidate School (OCS), and was the forefront of the

Noncommissioned Officer Education System, which the Army formally established in 1971.

Noncommissioned Officers are professional and well-respected Soldiers throughout the

World because of changes implemented during the period from 1945 to 1974. The Army created

new weapons, implemented a Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), praised its

heroes, and finally established a professional noncommissioned officer. Wikipedia's modem

definition of an NCO summarizes the changes established after WWII, "An experienced NCO

corps is a key component of Western armies: in many cases NCOs are credited as being the

metaphorical "backbone" of their service. By contrast, the weak NCO corps of the modem-day

Russian armed forces, and those modeled after it, is widely blamed for the general

ineffectiveness of those militaries."