The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 6 | Issue 11 | Nov 01, 2008

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The Hokkaido Summit as a Springboard for GrassrootsInitiatives: The "Peace, Reconciliation & Civil Society"Symposium

Lukasz Zablonski

The Hokkaido Summit as a Springboard forGrassroots Initiatives: The “Peace,Reconci l iation and Civi l Society”Symposium

Lukasz Zablonski and Philip Seaton

In recent years, the G8 Summit has gonebeyond being simply a gathering of worldpolitical leaders. The Summit is an occasion fora wide variety of NGOs, activists and civicgroups from across the globe to congregate anddiscuss a multitude of issues. When the locationof the 2008 G8 Summit was announced, it wasclear that the environment would be a keytheme under discussion. As the HokkaidoToyako Summit (7-9 July 2008) drew closer,rising fuel and food prices and their devastatingeffects, particularly on the world’s poorestpeople, became an important part of theagenda, too.

But this did not stop numerous other civicgroups from organizing events with themes noton the agenda of the main G8 Summit. Thispaper d iscusses one such event , theinternational symposium “Peace, Reconciliationand Civil Society”, which addressed a perennialtopic in East Asia: the legacies of Japaneseimperialism and war in the twentieth century.The fact that the symposium was heldillustrates the tremendous power of a largeinternational event such as the G8 Summit togalvanize and energize civil society into action.

The international symposium “Peace,

Reconciliation and Civil Society: Toward aSustainable Peace in East Asia and Europe(http://www13.ocn.ne.jp/~hoda/reconciliation.html)” was the brainchild of Oda Hiroshi, anassociate professor at Hokkaido University. InJuly 2007, he suggested organiz ing aconference about the role of civil society groupsin promoting peace and reconciliation in EastAsia to Tonohira Yoshihiko, a founding memberof the Hokkaido Forum for the Recognition ofForced Labour and its Victims (hereafter“Hokkaido Forum”) and head of the East AsiaJoint Workshop for Peace [1]. The ideagenerated interest among activists, but alsoconcerns that the financial and logisticalchallenges of such an ambitious project couldoverstretch the resources of the groupsinvolved. [2] Eventually, a network of civilsociety groups that planned to use the Toyakomeeting as a springboard for voicing their localand global concerns and policy proposals wasestablished. On 9 July 2008, a ful l-dayinternational symposium was held in Sapporo.

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Oda Hiroshi

The central question of the symposium, and itsleitmotiv, was: What can citizens do to createpeaceful future relations among the peoples ofthe world, while also recognizing historicalresponsibility? It was addressed in morespecific terms in four distinct, but connected,thematic sessions (full program in Japaneseh e r e(http://www13.ocn.ne.jp/~hoda/reconciliation.html)): 1) Working for reconciliation in Hokkaido;2) Reconciliation in East Asia and trans-nationalcooperation within civil society; 3) Learningfrom the German organizat ion Act ionReconciliation Service for Peace; and theoreticalapproaches toward 4) Peace, Reconciliation andCivil Society.

In addition to the symposium, several pre-events (held between 26 May and 8 July) andone post-event (10-11 July) were organized. Thepre-events had the additional purpose ofproviding publicity for the main symposium. Thethemes o f the pre -events were : 1 ) apresentation on the “comfort women” issue incontemporary Japan hosted by the Women’sActive Museum (WAM) [3]; 2) personaltestimony about war actions by KanazawaMasao, an Imperial Army veteran and formermember of the Chinese Returnees’ Association[4]; 3) the Etekekampa Association andreconciliation between Ainu and Japanese, 4)the film Urihakyo about the Korean School(Chosen Gakko) in Hokkaido; 5) a film screeningand discussion about forced labour in Hokkaidohosted by the Hokkaido Forum; and 6) aseminar about the activit ies of ActionReconciliation Service for Peace, a civicorganization. The post-event was The East AsiaJoint Workshop for Peace held in Shumarinai.These events were attended by around 300people, in addition to the approximately 300people who attended the main symposium.

War Veteran Kanazawa speaks of his war experiencesat one of the pre-events

The symposium also aimed to bring togethercivic groups and the academy to seek answersand solutions to the problematic legacies of thepast that affect the construction of betterrelationships in the present and future. Theacademic – activist blend on the organizingcommittee and among the speakers at thesymposium was crucial for mobilizing sufficientpersonnel (volunteers) and financial recoursesto organize the event, which was one of thecivic summits within the framework of the 2008P e o p l e ’ s S u m m i t i n H o k k a i d o(http://kitay-hokkaido.net/modules/english/index.php?content_id=4) (Alternative Summit) andwas s imultaneously part of HokkaidoUniversity’s Sustainability Weeks 2008(http://www.sustain.hokudai.ac.jp/sw2008/english/weeks/index.html).

“Reconci l iat ion”: Meanings andInterpretations

The original title of the symposium did notinclude the word “reconciliation” and primarilyaddressed the role that citizens' groups play inthe promotion of peace (shimin ga tsukuruheiwa; literally, “peace produced by citizens”).However, the word wakai (“reconciliation”) wasadded in one of the early meetings of theorganizing committee following a suggestion by

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Kobayashi Hisatomo, a civic activist from theHokkaido Forum and the Japanese – GermanPeace Forum, Hokkaido.

The term became the most complex andproblematic concept discussed during thesymposium. In an interview Kobayashiexplained what “wakai” meant for him:

“Wakai is a very difficult word totranslate and explain in Japanese. In thepast two or three years, a few booksconcerning the problem of reconciliationhave been published in Japan. Theymake it in to two problems. First, theypoint out that the creation of a mutualview of history is needed between bothperpetrators and victims. That is to say,w e h a v e t o c l e a r u p t h emisunderstandings about the past andget to know each other. Secondly, whenit comes to reconciliation, we have tode te rm ine the cond i t i ons f o rreconci l iat ion. In other words,reconciliation is a process of clearinghurdles. However, these discussions take placeprimarily in books in Japan. In thissense, this symposium is a veryinnovative and valuable event. From myown point of view, reconciliation meansthe reconstruction of relationshipsbetween people. I believe that civilsociety has the power to initiate suchdiscussion and appeal effectively to thenational government to issue anapology.” [5]

The word "wakai” in Japanese is consideredsomewhat ambiguous. The Chinese character“wa” stands for harmony or co-existence, but itis also employed to refer to “Japan” (as in wajin,Japanese people, or washoku, Japanese food).Moreover, the character was used frequently inthe rhetoric of Japanese imperialist ideology andtherefore contains connotations contradictory to

the spirit of reconciliation promoted by thesymposium. “kai”, by contrast, means todissolve or clarify. Therefore wakai could betranslated into English as a harmonious actionof clarification or settlement.

Tonohira Yoshihiko discussed the problemssurrounding the term wakai during hisintroductory remarks to the symposium:

“Those involved in organizing thissymposium started using this wordnervously and not without somehesitat ion. The word wakai hasmean ings that a re much moreambiguous than ‘responsibility’,‘apology’, ‘compensation’ and ‘rights’.Historically, for many of the side of theperpetrators – namely the Japanese –this word was often connected with theavoidance of responsibility for pastcrimes, in other words, to forgetting.From the point of view of history’svictims, such as the Ainu people, thesudden popularity and careless use ofthis word has not been viewed withoutalarm.” [6]

During the preparatory stage of the symposium,all these aspects of the understanding andusage of wakai were extensively debated. Thediscussion became quite significant whiledeciding on the logo of the symposium. Theinitial logo was composed of the character “wa”and an owl, which in Ainu culture is theguardian deity of a village. Concerns wereraised about the connotations of the character“wa” and its use within the rhetoric of Japaneseimperialism. However, since the character ispart of both the words ‘reconciliation’ and‘peace’ (heiwa), it was already very ‘visible’ inthe symposium’s title. A compromise wasreached by using an old-style Chinese form thatminimized the association with Japaneseimperialism.

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The SymposiumLogo

These debates over the meanings of “wakai”are not limited to Japanese. The literaturediscussing “reconciliation” in English exhibits anumber of different approaches depending onthe nature of the conflict for which reconciliationis required. [7] By introducing Germanperspectives, and the term Versöhnung (with allthe nuances that term implies following Germanaggression in World War II), there was muchscope for talking at cross-purposes during thesymposium. The symposium narrowed the focusby using the term “historical reconciliation,”that is, the attempt to restore or improverelations among groups (nations, or ethnic,religious and social groups) who experiencedconflict and historical violence, in particularcolonial rule or war. Reconciliation is a linearprocess, which integrates the past, the presentand the future of parties that seek the recoveryof relations among themselves. It can berealized only in relation to others, and does notimply a unilateral peace but a relational peace.

Crucial for historical reconciliation are the

concepts of victim and perpetrator. Typically wewould expect that a prerequis i te forreconcil iation is that the perpetrators(aggressors) make sincere efforts to understandthe grievances of the victims, acknowledge theirroles as perpetrators, and initiate a process ofhealing the wounds of the past. “Addressing thepast” with a view to reconcil iation andsustainable peace has typically centred on threeissues: apologies to the victims, financial orother compensation, and justice in the form ofpunishment of those guilty of aggression. Othermeasures may be required, too, such as theerection of a permanent memorial or museumand the inclusion of the past wrongs in historyeducation, which are key demands of former“comfort women” alongside their demands for asincere apology and official compensation fromthe Japanese government. [8]

The reconciliation process, however, is notcompleted simply by clearing all these hurdles.The reconciliation process can easily be derailedor reversed by subsequent events. Ongoingreconciliation requires measures to ensure thata version of history acceptable to the victims ispassed down to subsequent generations in theaggressor nation via the education system, themedia, museums and the arts. And politiciansrepresenting the aggressor group can negateapologies or damage the perceived sincerity ofapologies by any actions deemed to bedefending or justifying past actions. Thesefactors explain why allowing nationalisticcontent in Japanese school history textbooksand commemoration of Japan’s military wardead at Yasukuni Shrine (which is oftenperceived as exoneration of the war criminalsenshrined there) continue to be such importantdiplomatic and political issues in East Asia.

However, historical reconciliation is never assimple as the theoretical linear processconnecting past, present and future outlinedabove. The reasons for this are clear in theJapanese case. Japan’s wars and imperialism inthe first half of the twentieth century involved

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multiple conflicts of differing natures withmultiple enemies. Japanese war memoriesremain highly contested and no broadconsensus has been achieved within historicalconsciousness of those wars. Within Japanesesociety there are multiple cultural narrativesthat variously stress Japan’s role as victim (suchas in the bombing of Japanese cities, semi-forced migration to Manchuria, or conscriptsoldiers sent to their deaths) and perpetrator, oreven the minority nationalist view that Japanwas the heroic liberator of Asia from Westerncolonialism. [9]

This diversity in war experience and pluralism inJapanese historical consciousness (in bothofficial circles and society in general) create anenvironment that makes reconciliationinitiatives extremely difficult on a national level.[10] Using the simple linear model, one mayargue that because Japan killed thousands ofcivilians during the Nanking Massacre (1937),for example (although one could cite anynumber of atrocities from the “kill all, burn all,loot all” policy to the sexual enslavement of“comfort women”), the onus is on Japan toadmit guilt and initiate reconciliation, startingwith an unequivocal apology. In any case,ideological contestation within Japan createsvocal opposition from the political right to suchinitiatives. Moreover, such initiatives cannot bedecontextualized from the wider war. Japan wasnot alone in committing atrocities, so if theslaughter of civilians in Nanking requires anapology and reconciliation initiatives fromJapan, then most Japanese would argue that thekilling of thousands of civilians in Hiroshima andNagasaki (and many other cities in conventionalbombing) is deserving of a similar apology andreconciliation process initiated by the USA. Thetwo linear processes become entangled, alongwith the many other examples of aggressionand victimhood created during the years ofconflict. Rather than a neat, bilateral,perpetrator – vict im relationship, thereconcil iation process develops into amultilateral competition (in other words,

another conflict situation) to assert claims forrelative victimhood, and thereby the “right” toexpect reconciliation initiatives from othersrather than initiating them oneself.

According to symposium organizer Oda Hiroshi,in the academic and political discourse abouthistorical reconciliation, the theme of “post-warreconciliation” has become predominant, andthe importance of “post-colonial reconciliation”has been marginalized. [11] Both types ofhistorical reconciliation are a matter of publicconcern in Japan. Japan bears responsibility forthe wars in East Asia because it wagedaggressive warfare against several Asiancountries and inflicted suffering on the civilianpopulations of those countries. But the issue ofpost-colonial reconcil iation, and morespecifically those people colonized by Japan whost i l l l ive within the boundaries of thecontemporary Japanese state, have receivedless attention. In Hokkaido, however, issues ofpost-colonial responsibility are of particular localimportance given the colonization of Ainu lands.Ainu – Japanese reconciliation was the first topicdiscussed at the Symposium.

Conference Themes

Ainu – Japanese reconciliation

Post-colonial reconciliation in Japan has specialrelevance in Ainu Mosir, the name given by theindigenous Ainu people to the island now knownas Hokkaido. Ainu means “human being” or“people”, mo means “peaceful” or “calm”, andsir means “the earth” or “land”. There has beenregular contact between the Hokkaido Ainu andWajin (Japanese in Ainu designation) since thefifteenth century and earlier, and from 1593 apermanent Wajin presence was established inHokkaido through the Matsumae fiefdom at thesouthern end of the island. During theseventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Wajininfluence expanded to trading posts aroundHokkaido’s coastline and the requisition of Ainulabour became increasingly exploitative.

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Following the Meiji restoration (1868), the full-scale colonization of Hokkaido became nationalpolicy. [12]

As the symposium’s first speaker, Ogawa Sanaef r o m t h e E t e k e k a m p a A s s o c i a t i o n(“etekekampa” means “let’s join our hands” inthe Ainu language) spoke about the educationaldifficulties faced by Ainu children. Theassociation engages in fundraising to providescholarships to children from families on PublicAssistance for the Poor (seikatsu hogo). TheEtekekampa Association was created about 20years ago and receives support from manyJapanese, both in the form of volunteerism anddonations. The group has mainly helped Ainuchildren gain access to high school educationthat otherwise would have been denied to them,but it also has ambitions to expand universityadvancement rates for Ainu young people.

During post-event activities on the two daysfollowing the main symposium, Ainu activist andhistorian Ogawa Ryukichi conducted a fieldworksession through the East Asia Joint Workshop forPeace. The purpose was to discover little-knownbut important sites in Ainu history. The tourstarted with the charnel house (nokotsudo) ofAinu people at the Hokkaido University campus.This site is a reminder of the ignominious role ofHokkaido University professors and other Wajinanthropologists in grave-robbing and the use ofAinu remains for social Darwinist studies of theAinu aimed at “proving” their racial inferiority,and thereby justifying the colonization of Ainulands and discriminatory treatment of Ainupeople. [13] The tour then proceeded to amonument near Ebetsu and a cemetery inEbetsu. The latter two sites commemorate theforced removal and relocation of Karafuto Ainufrom Sakhalin Island to Hokkaido in 1875. Them o n u m e n t n e a r E b e t s u , h o w e v e rcommemorates Hokkaido “reclamation”(kaitaku) from a Japanese perspective andmakes no mention of Ainu settlement in thearea.

The fieldwork session of Ogawa Ryukichi

Given the Japanese Parliament’s adoption of aresolution that, for the first time, recognises theAinu as an “indigenous people with a distinctlanguage, religion and culture,” [14] theprocesses of reconciliation within Japan andHokkaido in part icu lar assumes newimportance. These issues relating to theposition of the Ainu within contemporaryJapanese society and the implications of theJapanese government’s recognition of the Ainuas an indigenous people are examined in moredetail in ann-elise lewallen’s article, “Indigenousa t L a s t !(http://japanfocus.org/_ann_elise_lewallen-Indigenous_at_last___Ainu_Grassroots_Organizing_and_the_Indigenous_Peoples_Summit_in_Ainu_Mosir_)”. However, in the absence of an apology toAinu people, official or unofficial, the Dietresolution falls short of what many Ainu hadexpected, so the process of reconciliation asdefined above remains a distant goal.

Reconciliation in East Asia

A mutual understanding of history betweenperpetrators and victims is an essential aspectof a reconciliation process. It was essential,therefore, to include specific accounts ofJapanese aggression in the symposium and tolisten to the grievances of victims.

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There were two talks documenting Japaneseaggression. Former Japanese Imperial Armysoldier Ohkawara Kohichi testified to his waractions and his personal role in the killing ofunarmed civilians in China. Ohkawara was amember of the Chinese Returnees Association(Chugoku Kikansha Renrakukai, hereafterChukiren). Around 1000 Japanese soldiers, whohad been interned in Soviet labor camps afterthe war, were transferred to the Fushun WarCriminals Detention Facility in Northeast Chinain 1950. There they experienced unexpectedlyhumane treatment from the Chinese, and overtime the prisoners came to acknowledge theircrimes. After their return to Japan in 1956 theyformed Chukiren and were active in testifyingabout their war crimes as a way of atoning forthe past and promoting reconciliation withChina. With the aging of their members,Chukiren disbanded in 2002, but the torch wastaken up by a new generation of activistsdetermined to preserve the “Miracle ofFushun” (the process of acknowledgement thesoldiers went through thanks to their humanetreatment, and the power of acknowledgementto promote reconciliation). The Continuing theMiracle of Fushun Society (Hokkaido Branch)was heavily involved in the organization of thesymposium and organized one of the pre-events: testimony by another Chukirenmember, Kanazawa Masao, who had taken partin the infamous “three alls” (“kill all, burn all,loot all”) policy in China. [15]

In addition to this testimony by former soldiers,Tonohira Yoshihiko discussed the work of theHokkaido Forum in the return of the remains offorced laborers to their relatives in Korea, aswill be discussed later.

The voices of victims featured in the secondsession of the symposium. One Chinese and oneKorean lawyer active in the movement to gainofficial compensation and an apology from theJapanese government and corporations thatused slave labor outlined their legal battles andgrievances.

Kang Jian from the Beijing Fang Yuan law firmcontrasted the attitude that the Japanesegovernment adopts in seeking better staterelations with China with the endeavours ofJapanese civic organisations and groups thathave helped Chinese victims to bring individualcompensation claims to the Japanese courts.However, in her view, the lack of resolution onthe part of Japanese judges to decide againstthe Japanese government and companies (forexample, in lawsuits against Japanesecompanies that employed forced labour) is oneof the biggest obstacles to reconciliation. Shewas critical of the common practice in suchsuits to accept the defendants’ claims that thestatute of limitations has expired, and to rulethat the defendants are immune from legalresponsibility toward victims. [16]

In the same session, Korean activist andadvocate Park Won-Soon talked about the“comfort women” issue and other historicalproblems existing in Korean-Japanese bilateralrelations. In a similar manner to Kang Jian, heemphasized the discrepancy betweenconscientious Japanese citizens’ groups activeon war responsibility issues and the Japaneseauthorities in the ways they approach the past.Regarding Japan’s attempts to become apermanent member of the United NationsSecurity Council, Park said it was “nonsense” tothink of Japan as a suitable permanent memberof UNSC in the absence of a satisfactory solution

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to the “comfort women” issue, which should beregarded as a crime against humanity. Thegovernment’s attempt to settle this issue viat h e A s i a n W o m e n ’ s F u n d(http://www.awf.or.jp/index.html) (a private fundsupported and largely paid for by thegovernment) was not deemed sufficient.

Both speakers took a conciliatory stance intheir comments about Japanese citizens groupssympathetic to their positions. But ultimately,both speakers demonstrated the limitations ofJapanese c iv i l soc iety in promot ingreconciliation in the absence of cleargovernment policies to assume responsibilityfor Japanese war actions. In one sense,“listening to these views of victims” is anessential component of reconciliation and thesesentiments regarding the necessity of officialapologies and compensation needed to beraised. However, the comments could also beinterpreted as a message to Japanese civilsociety that well-meaning attempts atgrassroots reconciliation without concurrentpolitical pressure on the Japanese governmentto change its position on war responsibilityissues would ult imately not lead to acomprehensive reconciliation process.

Kang and Park missed a critical point, however,by framing the issues bilaterally and neglectingthe broader international context of thereconciliation issue. For example, one istempted to remark caustically that the humanrights abuses committed in the “comfortstation” system would sit very comfortablyalongside the human rights abuses of thecurrent UNSC permanent members. TheUnited States, Russia, China, the UnitedKingdom and France all have major stains ontheir records, not only as major arms exportersand backers of hideous regimes, but in theirown conflicts/repression as colonial oroccupying powers or invaders, includingVietnam, Nicaragua, Panama, I raq ,Afghanistan, Tibet, Malaysia and Algeria. TheUNSC members (despite the often lofty

rhetoric) actually have a vested interest in notencouraging a global legal framework forholding states to account and prosecuting thoseresponsible for state-orchestrated human rightsabuses. There is a clear double standard: theperpetrators of war crimes in “small” nationswho are not key allies, such as Serbia andRwanda, are tried at the International CriminalCourt or other tribunals; meanwhile the world’smost powerful shield such allies as SaudiArabia and Israel (in the case of the UnitedStates) and their own military personnelaccused of war crimes from judgment in TheHague or any other form of internationaljustice system. This helps illustrate why thereis little international pressure on Japan,especially against the political backdrop of the“war on terror ,” coming f rom othergovernments for the payment of additionalcompensation and the pursuit of war criminals.A comprehensive process of addressing warresponsibility by Japan would set too many“dangerous precedents” for nations with apenchant for using their militaries overseas.[17]

As for Japanese apologies, Tessa Morris-Suzukinoted with exasperation in her lecture at theend of the symposium (discussed below) anexample of significant support for Japanregarding its “apologies” from its key ally: theUSA. In 2007, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzoprovoked international controversy by makingremarks deeply offensive to the “comfortwomen” community. [18] The commentscoincided with a trip to the USA and Abe hastilyapologized to U.S. President George W. Bush. Inan extraordinary gesture of support for theunder-pressure Japanese leader that wasgrossly offensive to the “comfort women”,despite the fact that no “comfort women” werepresent during this meeting, Bush bizarrely saidthat he accepted Abe’s awkward and ineffectiveapology!

When the ful l international context isconsidered, and when one considers the

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importance of the Japanese government’sstance for broader reconciliation processes inEast Asia, such instances of staunch support forthe Japanese government from its American allyconstitute a critical factor in understandingJapan’s unsuccessful attempts to date ofadvancing (or, more cynically, its successfulattempts at avoiding) the reconciliation processat an official level.

Germany and Japan

Christian Staffa’s talk about the work of ActionReconciliation Service for Peace and theintroduction of a Germany-Japan comparisonalso highlighted the significant challenges stillfacing Japan. The group Action ReconciliationS e r v i c e f o r P e a c e(http://www.asf-ev.de/en/introduction/) (ARSP)has learned during its 50 years of service inmany European countries invaded and occupiedby Germany dur ing Wor ld War I I thatreconciliation is a long-term project, and aprocess in which progress comes throughconcrete initiatives rather than big words. Inspite of fairly unfavourable conditions for thework of reconciliation in post-war Europe,caused primarily by hostility toward Germansand the complexity of the political situation inGermany and the continent as a whole, ARSPpersisted in its work in victim countries. Whenthe very first group of ARSP volunteers visited avillage in Norway, they were greeted with avolley of stones thrown over their bus. However,nowadays ARSP sends approximately 180 long-term (for 12 to 24 months) volunteers everyyear to countries such as Israel, Poland, theCzech Republic, Russia, and the USA for socialservice and education projects. It also organizesnumerous workshops fo r peace andreconcil iation.

The German government is widely argued tohave adopted the sort of apologetic officialstance that the Japanese government should beadopting. The role of the USA and Europeannations in pressuring Germany into reparationsin contrast to the protection Japan has receivedduring the Cold War and beyond is vital forunderstanding the discrepancy. Furthermore,the hostility faced by many ARSP volunteers[19] is an indication that the official Germanstance, while largely acceptable to manyvictims (with important exceptions, such as theslave laborers who felt that they had not beenadequately compensated, in response to whichthe German government se t up theRemembrance, Responsibility and Future Fundin 2000), is not sufficient on its own to assuageall bitterness. This is where the role of civilsociety becomes most important in pushing thereconciliation process further, even if thismeans enduring considerable hostility.

By contrast, the rhetoric used by Kang andPark indicates that, in the absence of anacceptable official apology, reconciliationattempts led by civil society take on specialimportance because they can be held up asexamples of what the government must do. It isa conspicuous aspect of Japan-China relations,for example, that soldiers guilty of seriousatrocities in China (such as Chukiren membersand other repentant former soldiers like AzumaShiro [20]) have been welcomed back as friends

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if they have confessed and sincerely apologizedfor their crimes, while, or perhaps because,Japanese politicians continue to stir angerthrough actions such as worship at YasukuniShrine.

There is no shortage of citizens’ groups in Japanactive on war and peace issues. However, thisshould not be confused with a large movementpromoting reconciliation. In general, as MariYamamoto points out, grassroots peaceactivism in post-war Japan did not draw itsinspiration from the knowledge of atrocitiescommitted by Japanese soldiers. Many groupshave based their activities on aspects ofJapanese suffering, and many movements tookshape in tandem with other activities topromote democratization, economic growth andhumanitarianism. [21]

In this context, it is important to differentiatemainstream “peace” movements with“reconciliation” organizations. Examples of theformer have typically emphasized Japanesesuffering as the reason why war should not berepeated, as in Japan’s large anti-nuclearmovement, while the latter (including Chukirenand the Hokkaido Forum) have stressed theneed to confront and assume responsibility forJapanese aggression. However, there are formsof accept ing responsib i l i ty that onlygovernments (or corporations in the slavelabour issue) can undertake, such as officialapologies and compensation to the victims andtheir families, and in the case of governments,state-level reparations. All these steps arenecessary for Reconciliation “with a capital R”.By contrast, reconciliation “with a small r”,meaning at a civil society level, has basicallytwo important roles in Japan which cansupplement Reconciliation. Kobayashi Hisatomodescribed them as follows:

“There are two fundamental tasks forcivil society organizations. First, theyshould study history and through these

studies try to learn what real lyhappened. Armed with this knowledgeabout the past, they should try tocontact the victims or their families and,if possible, establish good relationshipswith them, on the basis of historicaltruth. Second, civic groups should putpressure on the Japanese government,or in general on the nation’s politicalelite, to issue an acceptable apologyand pay compensation to the victims.”

Christian Staffa, by contrast, stressed that beingproact ive in addressing the past andapproaching the victim country should be themajor strategy for civic groups to furtherreconciliation. “If civic initiatives are takenseriously in the victim countries, somethingreally important can happen in terms of theimprovement of the relationships betweenperpetrators and victims.” [22] However, thesediffering perspectives must be seen in the lightof the differing levels of responsibility assumedby the German and Japanese states, with thereconciliation process at an official level clearlyfar more advanced in Germany. The Germany-Japan comparison clarifies how an effectiveinternational reconciliation process requiresboth official and unofficial initiatives working intandem. Even then, there will be manyobstacles and difficulties, but the futility ofattempting a reconciliation process without theparticipation of civil society is clear.

Post-colonial reconciliation

The final session of the symposium brought thediscussion back to where the symposium hadbegun: reconciliation between colonizers andindigenous peoples. Tessa Morris-Suzuki talkedabout the apology issued by the Australiangovernment to the Aborigines, and in particularAborigine children forcibly removed from theirfamilies and brought up by foster families.

According to Morris-Suzuki, in the long andarduous process of reconciliation there are twofactors that determine the extent and success

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of the process. First and foremost, there mustbe a pursuit of the historical facts about theatrocities committed. This requires dialoguebetween perpetrators and victims to achieve acommon view of the past.

The second factor is a genuine and effectiveapology. A genuine and effective apology notonly acknowledges how wrong the past actionswere, but also recognizes the inadequacy ofprevious attempts to acknowledge and atonefor the past. In this regard, the apology made bythe Australian government to the Aborigines forthe so-called “stolen generation” was a goodexample of an effective apology: the apologywas given in the Parliament building directly tothe representatives of various Aborigine groups,who were invited as honoured guests. Theapology indicated that the grievances of thevictims had been heard and acknowledged: theknown abuses and past wrongs were listed,thereby becoming a permanent record for theeducation of younger generations about thepast. This effective apology was in markedcontrast to the example of Prime Minister Abe’sawkward and ineffective “apology” to the“comfort women” cited above.

But, as Morris-Suzuki cautioned, the apologywas not the end but merely the beginning of thereconciliation process. The effectiveness of theapology depends on whether other policies andactions contribute to the long-term reduction inanimosity between the reconciling parties. Onlythen can genuine reconciliation be said to havebeen achieved. In particular, the processrequires the empowerment of the victim groupso that reconciliation is a restoration of arelationship between equals (or in some casesthe establishment of such a relationship for thefirst time), and not the gift of the powerful tothe weak.

Morris-Suzuki’s talk had deep implications forthe reconciliation process in Hokkaido betweenAinu and Wajin. It illustrated the extremely longjourney that Japan still has to travel for

domestic, let alone international, reconciliation.And in the particular case of Hokkaido wherethe symposium was held, whereas the Ainuhave at long last been officially recognized asthe indigenous people of Hokkaido, an officialapology including appropriate compensation forvictims is nowhere in sight.

The symposium,panel discussion

Putting Reconciliation into Action inHokkaido

The symposium clarified the importance of civilsociety’s role working together with thegovernment to create a comprehensivereconciliation process. Hokkaido has a numberof local groups active in reconcil iationinitiatives. One reason is that the high numbersof slave labourers who toiled in Hokkaido’smines or on construction projects during thewar and the colonization of Ainu lands havecreated significant local historical responsibilityissues to address alongside the more generalnational issues of responsibility for aggressivewar waged in Asia. This gives Hokkaido much incommon with Kyushu, another region that wasa centre of the Japanese coalmining industryand is today a centre of forced laborreparations work. Comparing Hokkaido andKyushu, William Underwood notes, “Hokkaidohas become a hotbed of similarly energeticredress activities, with a group called the

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Hokkaido Forum forming from other groups in2003 and successfully building coalitions amongcitizen networks.” [23] This final section looks atthe main activities of the Hokkaido Forum andEast Asia Joint Workshop for Peace, as examplesof how citizens groups can take the lead inreconciliation activities and thereby draw thegovernment into participation in a morecomprehensive national effort towardsachieving reconciliation.

The Hokkaido Forum’s main activities arefinding, excavating and returning the remains ofChinese and Korean forced labour victims totheir families. The group also promotesreconciliation between Ainu and Japanese. TheEast Asia Joint Workshop for Peace has similaraims as the Hokkaido Forum, but its activitiesmainly involve bringing students from Japan,South Korea and other countries together todiscuss and study each other’s views on thepast. Usually, there are two workshops a year,in the summer and winter.

One person who is deeply involved with boththe Hokkaido Forum and the East Asia JointWorkshop for Peace is Tonohira Yoshihiko, aBuddhist priest from Fukagawa in Hokkaido. Inthe 1970s he joined a group of Hokkaidohistorians led by Koike Yoshitaka that collectedtestimonies of local people in Hokkaido,especially with regard to forced labour in coalmines and road or dam construction. The firstexcavations of remains conducted by the grouptook place in the 1980s. [24]

Tonohira Yoshihiko

The Hokkaido Forum was founded in 2003. InDecember 2002, the Hongwan-ji SapporoBranch Temple (Sapporo Betsuin) announcedthat it was in possession of the ashes of Koreansand Chinese who had been slave labourers inthe area during the Pacific War. The ashes of101 victims came into the temple’s possessionfrom various corporations that employed forcedlabourers in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the KurilIslands. They remained in the temple’s charnelhouse for almost sixty years. The templeexpressed its wishes to return the ashes to thefamilies. Following this development, inFebruary 2003 the Hokkaido Forum wasestablished by various civic groups that werepreviously concerned with the discovery andreturn of remains.

Through their work, the Hokkaido Forumdiscovered ashes left in various places aroundHokkaido. Numerous boxes of ashes were found

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at Buddhist temples in other cities aroundHokkaido, such as Akabira, Muroran, Nemuro,Bibai, and Kayanuma. Through connections withcivic organisations and government institutionsin Korea, the Forum identified some of thevictims’ families. For example, a group of sevenmembers of bereaved families paid a visit toMuroran in May 2005 to pay their respects, andthe ashes of the victims were transferred towooden boxes.

However, the families refused to take the asheshome with them, arguing that the return of theashes was the responsibility of the Japanesegovernment and the Japanese corporations thatjointly carried out the forced labour enterprise.Additionally, the families reiterated their call forthe government and companies to issue anofficial apology and compensation. From thepoint of view of the families, as well as manyothers in Korea, China, Japan and elsewhere,the Japanese government and corporations hadnot sufficiently addressed their moral and legalresponsibilities to the people of Asia after thewar.

The first meeting of the East Asia JointWorkshop for Peace was held in the summer of

1997 in Shumarinai, Horokanai-cho. During thispioneering event the ashes of forced labourersfrom Shumarinai Dam were excavated. Anotherimportant excavation coordinated by workshopparticipants took place in Asajino, SarufutsuVillage, in August 2006. William Underwooddescribes this one-week-event as the “climax”to an unprecedented, summer-long programfeaturing Korean forced labour reparationsactivities in multiple locations across Japan:

“Two-hundred fifty Japanese, Koreans,Zainichi Koreans, Chinese and Ainujointly excavated a communal grave inan open field containing the unidentifiedremains of Koreans who died during thewartime construction of a nearbyairfield. Remains were recovered of atleast ten suspected forced labourerswho had apparently been cremated onthe spot, according to South Koreanforensic specialist.” [25]

The activities of the Hokkaido Forum and theWorkshop have become to some extentembedded in the bilateral governmentalframework for returning the remaining ashes offorced labour victims to Korea. Indeed, thegrassroots groundwork (in the literal sense ofthe word) clarified the need for specificgovernment action and created a certainmomentum for it. Following Korean demandsfrom Roh Moo-Hyun to Koizumi Junichiro thatthe ashes of conscripted Korean soldiers andcivilian victims of forced labour be returned toKorea, the Japanese government in January2008 returned the ashes of 101 soldiers whichhad been stored in Yutenji Temple in Tokyo. Butover 1,000 (mostly military) remains are stillheld at Yutenji.

In response to the wishes of the victims’families in Korea, the Hokkaido Forum organizeda return of ashes in February 2008. The ashes ofthree victims from Muroran and another fromAkabira were taken to the Korean families.

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Generous public donations supported a visit toSouth Korea by a group of thirty Japaneseactivists, who throughout their journeyrespectfully held the ashes in their arms. InKorea, the Forum was supported by the Sokei-sect of the Houonji Buddhist temple, where amemorial service was held. The Japanese vice-minister of foreign affairs and mayors of localgovernments also sent messages. But “Thegovernment rejected the group’s request for anofficial representative to attend the Muroranmemorial service and for travel expenses,funeral expenses and condolence money to bepaid to visiting relatives – as in the case of theYutenji Temple remains in January.” This“double standard” in the treatment of militaryand civilian victims is characteristic of theJapanese government’s treatment of theremains issue, and does not satisfy either theHokkaido Forum or Korean bereaved relatives.[26]

There i s a l so the i ssue o f corporateresponsibility. The seven bereaved familymembers who had refused to take the remainsback following their trip to Muroran in 2005 laterchanged their position. They agreed to theunofficial return of the remains by the HokkaidoForum fearing that they would never get theremains back if they waited for a change inJapanese government policy or for the companyto take the initiative. These three sets ofremains were returned in February 2008. Thecompany where the labourers worked (nowcalled Shin-Nittetsu, based in Muroran) deniedthat it had any legal responsibility for the returnof the bones because it became a new companyafter the war and therefore has no legalresponsibility for the return of the remains. [27]However, Shin-Nittetsu did send a wreath, aletter of condolence and a condolence gift ofmoney (10,000 yen) to the families. This limitedresponse is a more significantacknowledgement of corporate responsibilitythan many, and some corporations such asMitsubishi, which had thousands of forcedlaborers, vigorously deny responsibility or have

actively resisted citizens’ initiatives to institutea reconciliation process. [28] Nevertheless, theHokkaido Forum’s activities constitute animportant example of how initiatives by citizensgroups can start a reconciliation process thatthe government and corporations eventuallyjoin, indeed, may feel pressured to join, at alater stage.

Post-event workshop led by Tonohira Yoshihiko:Visiting the cemetery of people who died in

Shumarinai

The Hokkaido Forum plans to continue itsactivities in the return of remains as well as toraise the prominence of the issue in publicdiscourse. Tonohira concluded as follows:

“I see our actions as a matter of faith.Our tears in front of the ashes do notconsole the bereaved. We need not onlyan apology, but a lso a commonhistorical consciousness. Japanese andKorean, Japanese and Chinese have tos h a r e a c o m m o n h i s t o r i c a lconsciousness. … We have to get acrossour dark history to young peopleth rough workshops and o thereducational efforts.

The remains of v ict ims becomenameless over time. Even if a templehas been storing the ashes in a labelled

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pot, sometimes the name disappearsfrom the pot with time. Then nobodyknows whose ashes they are, and howthe person d ied. I t i s very sad.Sometimes the ashes are moved tosmaller pots. The ashes belong with thevictims’ families, so we have to returnthem as soon as possible. Before, our organization and activitieswere regarded as anti-establishmentand dangerous . However , theatmosphere in Japan has been changingand gradually our initiatives are beingrecognized. Recently, there has been atendency to support the return of ashes.The Japanese government cannot ignoreour activities. It bears war responsibility,so it must take the initiative. However,practically speaking, civil society groupshave been taking responsibility thusfar.”

Conclusions

I n the l ong and comp lex p rocess o freconciliation, civil society and citizens groupshave a vital role to play in healing the woundscaused by Japanese colonialism and war in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thesymposium and the related activities of groupsinvolved in its organization reveal that there aremany conscientious Japanese who dedicatesignificant portions of their lives to healingwounds caused by actions, which for many,were carried out before they were born. Theseare important aspects of contemporaryJapanese society that are all too easilyoverlooked in the broader criticisms of howJapan as a nation has addressed war andcolonial responsibility issues. Yet surveys ofthese groups’ activities reveal just how muchremains to be done before the achievement ofthe symposium’s aims: reconciliation and asustainable peace in East Asia.

The symposium was also revealing in its relation

to the G8 Summit. It was timed to coincide withthe G8 Summit but ultimately had a verydifferent agenda. However, the symposiumconstitutes a concrete example of certainunintended effects of the Hokkaido Summit thatwas largely overlooked in mainstream mediacoverage and will continue to be significant longafter the Summit has faded in memory. TheSummit gave citizens groups a springboard forfurthering their activities. In the case of thesymposium “Peace, Reconciliation and CivilSociety”, one of the key achievements has beenthe establishment of greater l inks andcooperation between peace and reconciliationgroups in Hokkaido and beyond.

The international media’s coverage of theHokkaido Toyako Summit might lead us tobelieve that it was of marginal long-termsignificance in terms of the policy decisionsmade by G8 leaders to tackle issues such as theenvironment and poverty. But from theperspective of Hokkaido, the Summit stimulatedmany new and continuing initiatives amongcitizens groups whose long-term results haveyet to be fully appreciated.

Lukasz Zablonski is a PhD candidate in theGraduate School of International Media,Communication and Tourism Studies, HokkaidoU n i v e r s i t y . H e c a n b e r e a c h e d a tzablonski@imc.hokudai.ac.jp . PhilipSeaton is an associate professor in theResearch Faculty of Media and Communication,Hokkaido University and author of Japan’sContested War Memories (Routledge 2007). AJapan Focus associate, he can be reached atseaton@imc.hokudai.ac.jp and his webpage iswww.philipseaton.net.

The authors thank Tonohira Yoshihiko, OdaHiroshi, Kobayashi Hisatomo and ChristianStaffa for their cooperation with interviews,and William Underwood, ann-elise lewallen andOda Hiroshi for their comments on earlier

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drafts of this paper.

Posted at Japan Focus on November 30, 2008.

Recommended Citation: Lukasz Zablonski andPhilip Seaton, “The Hokkaido Toyako Summit asa Springboard for Grassroots ReconciliationInitiatives: The ‘Peace, Reconciliation and CivilSociety’ Symposium” The Asia-Pacific Journal,Vol. 48-8-08, November 30, 2008.

Article Series IndexAlternative Summits, Alternative Perspectives: Beyond the 2008 G8 Summit(http://japanfocus.org/_Philip_Seaton-Alternative_Summits__Alternative_Perspectives__Beyond_the_2008_Hokkaido_G8_Summit__)

Philip Seaton

The 2008 Hokkaido-Toyako G8 Summit: neither summit nor plummet (http://japanfocus.org/_Hugo_Dobson-The_2008_Hokkaido_Toyako_G8_Summit__neither_summit_nor_plummet) Hugo DobsonIndigenous at last! Ainu Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous People’s Summit in Ainu Mosir(http://japanfocus.org/_ann_elise_lewallen-Indigenous_at_last___Ainu_Grassroots_Organizing_and_the_Indigenous_Peoples_Summit_in_Ainu_Mosir_)

ann-elise lewallen

The Hokkaido Toyako Summit as a Springboard for Grassroots Reconciliation Initiatives: The “Peace, Reconciliation and Civil Society” Symposium(http://japanfocus.org/_Lukasz_Zablonski__P_Seaton-The_Hokkaido_Summit_as_a_Springboard_for_Grassroots_Initiatives__The____Peace__Reconciliation___Civil_Society____Symposium)

Lukasz Zablonski andPhilip Seaton

The G8 Summit as “Local Event” in the Hokkaido Media (http://japanfocus.org/_Philip_Seaton-The_G8_Summit_as____Local_Event____in_the_Hokkaido_Media) Philip Seaton

Other ResourcesG8 Information Center, University of Toronto (http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/)Official Japanese Government Webpage (http://www.g8summit.go.jp/eng/index.html)Hokkaido Toyako Summit Preparation Council 2008 Webpage (http://www.do-summit.jp/en/about/)Andrew DeWit , The G8 Mirage: The Summit and Japan's Environmental Policies(http://www.japanfocus.org/_Andrew_DeWit-The_G8_Mirage__The_Summit_and_Japan_s_Environmental_Policies)

Notes

[1] Hokkaido Forum is a citizens’ group thattries to promote improved relations with Japan’sneighbours (especially Korea and China) byaddressing Japan’s history of aggression in Asiaat the grassroots level. Its dues-payingmembers engage in citizen-led initiatives toaddress war responsibility. The HokkaidoForum’s activities have featured in other JapanFocus articles: William Underwood, “New Era forJ a p a n - K o r e a H i s t o r y I s s u e s(https://apjjf.org/../../../_William_Underwood-New_Era_for_Japan_Korea_History_Issues__Forced_Labor_Redress_Efforts_Begin_to_Bear_Fruit)”;Kim Yeong-Hwang, “Promoting Peace andReconciliation as a Citizen of East Asia(https://apjjf.org/../../../_Kim_Yeong_Hwan-Promoting_Peace_and_Reconciliation_as_a_Citizen_of_East_Asia__The_Collaborative_East_Asian_Workshop_and_the_Grassroots_House_Peace_Museum)” (Kim served as Korean-Japanese translator forthe Symposium). The Joint East Asia Work Shopfor Peace is described in Tonohira Yoshihiko(2004) Wakamono-tachi no higashi Ajia sengen:Shumarinai ni tsudou Ni-Kan-Zainichi-Ainu(The Young People’s Declaration on East Asia:

Japanese, Koreans, Zainichi Koreans and Ainumeet in Shumarinai), Tokyo: Kamogawashuppan.

[2] Interview with Hiroshi Oda (conducted byLukasz Zablonski, 18 July 2008).

[3] See Nishino Rumiko, “The Women’s ActiveM u s e u m o n W a r a n d P e a c e(https://apjjf.org/../../../products/details/2604)”,Japan Focus.

[4] Kanazawa’s testimony is available inShinbun Akahata Shakaibu (2006) MotoNihonhei ga kataru “Daitoa Senso” no Shinso(Imperial Army Veterans Tell the Truth Aboutthe Greater East Asian War), Tokyo: NihonKyosanto Chuo Iinakai Shuppankyoku, pp.55-58.

[5] Interview with Kobayashi Hisatomo(conducted by Lukasz Zablonski, 18 June 2008).

[6] Symposium Program, p. 6.

[7] The literature on reconciliation fits withinmany fields and offers a variety of perspectivesthat reflect the conflict that concerns theresearchers. For example, Hamber and van derMerwe, with reference to the Peace andReconciliation Commission in South Africa, referto five definitions of reconciliation: thedissolving of racial identities; promoting inter-communal understanding; the religious (in thiscase Christian) process of confession,repentance and forgiveness; a human rightsapproach based on justice; and reconciliation ascommunity building. McKay adopts a genderedapproach to reconciliation and outlines howreconciliation is so often channelled throughmale-dominated power structures that makegender injustice a part of national/male-centredreconciliation. She draws on case studies suchas the “comfort women” and even the offeringof women as brides to former enemies as partof a “reconciliation” process. Van Ness, bycontrast, focuses on reconciliation as process inthe context of Japan and China and offers

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strategies for reconciliation rather thandefinitions, such as “Seize the time”, “Insist onreciprocity” and “Link the past to the presentand future”. John Paul Lederach introduces theimportant concept reconciliation as “a socialspace”. “Reconciliation is a locus, a place wherepeople and things come together.” (p. 29). Thisconstruction illustrates why geographical,cultural and political distances greatly affect thedynamics of reconciliation. Reconciliationbetween aborigines and Australians of Europeandescent, therefore, poses substantially differentgeopolitical challenges to Sino-Japanesereconciliation, because one process occurswithin contemporary national boundaries whilethe other crosses them. Finally, Alan Smith,writing in the comparative education journalCompare, discusses the role of education in theprocess of reconciliation. These brief examplesi l l u s t r a t e t h e d i v e r s e c o n c e p t s o f“reconciliation”, which will only increase givenother linguistic, cultural and religious contexts.

Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe,“What is this thing called reconciliation”,Reconciliation in Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998,online (accessed 15 September 2008); SusanMcKay, “Gender Justice and Reconciliation”,Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 23,No. 5, pp.561-570, 2000; Peter Van Ness,“Reconciliation between China and Japan: thekey link to security cooperation in East Asia”,Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, pp.7-13; John Paul Lederach (1997) Building Peace:sustainable reconciliation in divided societies,Washington D.C., United States Institute ofPeace Press; Alan Smith, “Education in thetwenty-first century: Conflict, reconstruction andreconciliation”, Compare Vol. 35, No. 4,December 2005, pp. 373-391.

[ 8 ] S e e t h e w e b s i t e(http://www.womenandwar.net/english/menu_01.php) of the Korean Council for the WomenDrafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.

[9] Sven Saaler gives a figure of 15-17 percent

subscribing to an “affirmative view of the war”(p. 163). Seaton, meanwhile, using differentdefinitions calculates that conservative andnationalist views on the war account for aboutone third of public opinion, with nationalists asmall minority. Sven Saaler (2005) Politics,Memory and Public Opinion: the HistoryTextbook Controversy and Japanese Society,Munich: Iudicium, p. 163; Philip Seaton (2007)Japan’s Contested War Memories: the “memoryrifts” in historical consciousness of World WarII, London: Routledge, Chapter 1.

[10] Jeff Kingston, for example, writes: “IanBuruma notes that one of the main obstacles toJapan’s reconciliation with its neighbors is thatthe Japanese people are divided over warmemory. Competing narratives about the pastthat divides Japan from Asia sends mixedsignals, muddying war memory, vitiatinggestures of contrition and thus preventingreconciliation based on a shared view of thepast.” Jeff Kingston, “Awkward Talisman: WarMemory, Reconciliation and Yasukuni”, EastAsia (2007) 24: 295-318, p. 316.

[11] Oda Hiroshi, Symposium Programme, p. 16.

[12] “Colonization” remains a debated term inthe context of Hokkaido. Richard Siddle notesthat despite the use of the word takushoku(“colonialism”) into the early twentieth century,the most common term used today is kaitaku(“development”), which masks the violence thatunderpinned the Wajin presence in Ainu Mosir.Siddle criticizes the arguments of Mark Peattiethat Hokkaido was a “settlement colony” andthat the Japanese government was settling “itsown lands with its own peoples”. Instead, hedescribes the incorporation of Ainu Mosir intothe modern Japanese state using the heading“The transformation of Ezochi: from foreign landto internal colony”. However, the symposiumprogramme was implicitly critical of thisinterpretation by citing the position of InoueKatsuo: “It is said that Hokkaido became a‘domestic colony’. But, Ainu people were

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dispossessed of their land. Calling Hokkaido a‘domestic colony’ takes an explicitly Japanesepoint of view. Actually, Hokkaido was a ‘colony’created by Japanese intruders”. This is closer tothe terminology of Brett Walker, who uses theword the “conquest” of Ainu lands. An evenmore forthright argument would be that theassimilationist policies of Meiji Japan, racistSocial Darwinism that almost willed the Ainu tobe a “dying race”, and refusal (until just beforethe G8 Summit) to recognize the Ainu as anindigenous people constituted a national policyverging on cultural (if not actual) genocide.

Richard Siddle (1996) Race, Resistance and theAinu of Japan, London: Routledge, pp. 51-2;Mark Peattie (1984) “Japanese AttitudesTowards Colonialism, 1895-1945” in Ramon H.Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds) The JapaneseColonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton:Princeton University Press, p. 80; Inoue Katsuo(2006) Bakumatsu, Ishin (The End of theShogunate and the Imperial Restoration), Tokyo:Iwanami, p. 234; Brett L. Walker (2001) TheConquest of Ainu Lands, Ecology and Culture inJapanese Expansion 1590-1800, Berkeley:University of California Press.

[13] See lewallen, ann-elise, “Bones ofContention: Negotiating Anthropological Ethicswithin Fields of Ainu Refusal”, Critical AsianStudies 39:4 (2007), 509-540.

[14] The Japan Times, “Diet officially declaresA i n u i n d i g e n o u s(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080607a1.html)”, 7 June 2008.

[15] The establishment of the Continuing theMiracle of Fushun Society is described inKumagai Shinichiro (2005) Naze kagai wokataru no ka: Chugoku kikansha renrakukai nosengoshi (Why Talk of Aggression? A postwarhistory of the Chukiren), Tokyo: IwanamiBooklet No. 659, pp. 58-71; see also DavidMcNeill, “A Foot Soldier in the War AgainstForgetting Japanese Wartime Atrocities(https://apjjf.org/../../../_David_McNeill-A_Foot_so

ldier_in_the_War_Against_Forgetting_Japanese_Wartime_Atrocities)”, Japan Focus.

[16] This stance is understandable coming froma lawyer representing war victims, but itsdemands for an inherently political role forjudges are problematic. The role of judges is notto rule on historical responsibility or historicalconsciousness. It is to rule on the legal validityof the claims presented before them. It is therole of judges to interpret the letter of the law,not to write the law. If the law is inadequate it isthe role of politicians to rewrite it. If there arestatutes of limitations, or if the postwar treatiess igned between Japan and i ts formerenemies/colonies are interpreted as being thelaw of the land, then judges have littlealternative but to rule on the side of thegovernment and reject the plaintiffs’ case. Inmany instances, judges have commented insumming up that the evidence provided by theplaintiffs clearly proved their version of events,but that the accuracy of the Japanesegovernment’s version of history was not thelegal matter under question. For a moredetailed summary of Kang’s arguments, seeWilliam Underwood and Kang Jian, “Japan’s TopCourt Poised to Kill Lawsuits by Chinese WarV i c t i m s(https://apjjf.org/../../../_W_Underwood_and_Kang _ J i a n -Japan_s_Top_Court_Poised_to_Kill_Lawsuits_by_Chinese_War_Victims)”, Japan Focus.

[17] Seaton, Japan’s Contested War Memories,Chapter 3.

[18] See for example, Japan Times, “No new sexs l a v e a p o l o g y : A b e(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070306a1.html)”, 6 March 2007.

[19] By coincidence, Seaton’s interview withVietnam veteran Allen Nelson for the paper“ V i e t n a m a n d I r a q i n J a p a n(https://apjjf.org/../../../_Philip_Seaton-Vietnam_and_Iraq_in_Japan__Japanese_and_American_Grassroots_Peace_Activism)” presents another

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example (although not mentioned in the originalpaper). Nelson had helped to place a youngGerman ASRP volunteer in an old people’s homefor Jewish people in New York. Many still had thetattoos on their arms from their t imeincarcerated in concentration camps. Theirhostility toward the young German volunteerfrequently reduced her to tears. But shepersisted because she said she understood theirpain. When she left at the end of her two years,she was showered with presents by all theres iden t s o f t he home . The work o freconciliation is often long and painful, butultimately rewarding. Interview with AllenNelson (20 February 2008).

[20] Azuma’s story is told in Ian Buruma (1995edn) Wages of Guilt: Memories of War inGermany and Japan, London: Vintage, pp.129-35.

[21] Mari Yamamoto, “Japan’s GrassrootsPacifism(http://www.japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2102)”, Japan Focus.

[22] Interview with Christian Staffa (conductedby Lukasz Zablonski, 10 July 2008).

[23] William Underwood, “Names, Bones andUnpaid Wages (2): Seeking Redress for KoreanF o r c e d L a b o u r(http://www.japanfocus.org/_William_Underwood-Names__Bones_and_Unpaid_Wages__2___Seeking_Redress_for_Korean_Forced_Labor_),” JapanFocus.

[24] This section follows closely Tonohira’sarticle in the Symposium Programme and issupplemented by an interview with TonohiraYoshihiko (conducted by Lukasz Zablonski, 24

June 2008).

[25] William Underwood, “Names, Bones andUnpaid Wages (1): Seeking Redress for KoreanF o r c e d L a b o u r(http://www.japanfocus.org/_William_Underwood-Names__Bones_and_Unpaid_Wages__1___Reparations_for_Korean_Forced_Labor_in_Japan_),”Japan Focus.

[26] William Underwood, “New Era for Japan-K o r e a H i s t o r y I s s u e s(https://apjjf.org/../../../_William_Underwood-New_Era_for_Japan_Korea_History_Issues__Forced_Labor_Redress_Efforts_Begin_to_Bear_Fruit)”,Japan Focus.

[27] NHK Newswatch 9, 22 January 2008. Thisprogramme featured a 10-minute segmentabout the return of the Yutenji remains and theactivities of the Hokkaido Forum, including aninterview with Tonohira Yoshihiko.

[28] William Underwood, “The Aso MiningC o m p a n y i n W o r l d W a r I I(https://apjjf.org/../../../_William_Underwood-The_Aso_Mining_Company_in_World_War_II__History___Japan_s_Would_Be_Premier)”, Japan Focus;“Mitsubishi, Historical Revisionism and JapaneseCorporate Resistance to Chinese Forced LaborR e d r e s s(https://apjjf.org/../../../_William_Underwood-Mitsubishi__Historical_Revisionism_and_Japanese_Corporate_Resistance_to_Chinese_Forced_Labor_Redress)”, Japan Focus; Christopher Reed,“Family Skeletons: Japan’s Foreign Minister andForced Labor by Koreans and Allied POWs(https://apjjf.org/../../../_Christopher_Reed-Family_Skeletons__Japan_s_Foreign_Minister_and_Forced_Labor_by_Koreans_and_Allied_POWs___Japanese_Translation_Available)”, Japan Focus.