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The Hormuz Strait Dam Macroproject— 21 st Century Electricity Development Infrastructure Node (EDIN)? Roelof D. Schuiling* Faculty of Earth Sciences Utrecht University P.O. Box 80.021 3508 TA Utrecht THE NETHERLANDS e-mail: [email protected] Viorel Badescu Candida Oancea Institute of Solar Energy Faculty of Mechanical Engineering Polytechnic University of Bucharest Spl. Independentei 313 Bucharest 79590 ROMANIA e-mail: [email protected] Richard B. Cathcart Geographos 1608 East Broadway Suite #107 Glendale, California 91205-1524 USA e-mail: [email protected] Piet.A.L.C van Overveld Volker Wessels 1

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The Hormuz Strait Dam Macroproject— 21st Century Electricity Development Infrastructure Node (EDIN)?

Roelof D. Schuiling*Faculty of Earth Sciences

Utrecht UniversityP.O. Box 80.0213508 TA Utrecht

THE NETHERLANDSe-mail: [email protected]

Viorel BadescuCandida Oancea Institute of Solar Energy

Faculty of Mechanical EngineeringPolytechnic University of Bucharest

Spl. Independentei 313Bucharest 79590

ROMANIAe-mail: [email protected]

Richard B. CathcartGeographos

1608 East BroadwaySuite #107

Glendale, California 91205-1524USA

e-mail: [email protected]

Piet.A.L.C van OverveldVolker Wessels

P.O.Box 5253440 AM Woerden

THE NETHERLANDSe-mail: [email protected]

*Corresponding author

1

Abstract

Ocean gulfs offer a means of artificially creating a depression, which can be used for a regionally significant hydroelectric macroproject. We examine here the case for a dam at the Strait of Hormuz that blocks a large gulf situated in an arid region. A 35 m evaporation of this concentration basin will reduce its watery surface area by ~53% and allow generation of ~2.050 MW (or possibly ~ 2.500 MW) of electricity. Our conclusion is that the proposed Electricity Development Infrastructure Node (EDIN) is a feasible and desirable macroproject. If the macroproject starts in the near-term future, it would require a significant change in the logistics of oil and gas transport from this region. Alternatively, it can be considered as an attractive future solution for the energy requirements of the region after the exhaustion of its oil and gas reserves.

1. Introduction

“Noah’s Ark”, millennia ago, was caulked with tar mined from the ground’s surface to

make it a waterproof lifeboat capable of enduring “Noah’s Flood” (Olson, 1967). Today,

petroleum is pumped from beneath the same desert region where putatively “Noah’s Ark”

was assembled. “Edin” is the Sumerian word for “plain”; the “Garden of Edin”, planted

by God as man’s first home, is speculated to have been located somewhere on the trough-

like alluvial plain situated north of the Strait of Hormuz, some of which has become

seafloor while another part has become covered by river-borne sediments shifted from the

Tigris-Euphrates watershed. “Edin” was a paradise, the cradle of mankind, according to

Sumerian myths (Hamblin, 1987). Is there a possibility that 21st Century Macro-

engineering may make the arid region north of the Strait of Hormuz more livable?

We think that a technically and economically feasible dam emplaced in the Strait of

Hormuz, could cause social progress amongst the region’s peoples. A renewable

electricity-generating facility there may foster a 21st Century Electricity Development

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Infrastructure Node, or EDIN, that, in purely geographical terms, removes seawater from

a large area of the seafloor, exposing an area of new land. We propose that EDIN’s

realization will instigate a basin-wide habitat that can harmoniously accommodate

humans and wildlife simultaneously.

2. Geologic history of region

Extending westward and towards the north from the Strait of Hormuz, the shallow gulf

rests entirely on the Arabian Tectonic Plate. The Gulf is underlain by continental crust

that is currently colliding with the Eurasian Tectonic Plate along the Zagros Thrust. The

Strait of Hormuz has a complex tectonic and climatic history, which is not yet fully

comprehended (Uchupi et al., 2002). Circa 14000 yr BP, the “…Strait of Hormuz

opened up as a narrow waterway and by about 12,500 years ago the marine incursion into

the Central Basin had started. The Western Basin flooded about 1,000 years later.

Momentary stillstands may have occurred during the Gulf flooding phase at about 11,300

and 10,500 yr BP. The present shoreline was reached shortly before 6,000 yr ago and

exceeded as relative sea level rose 1-2 m above its present level, inundating low-lying

areas of lower Mesopotamia” (Lambeck, 1996)..

3. Conditions at the Strait of Hormuz

The Gulf, a semi-enclosed marginal sea connected to the Arabian Sea through the Strait

of Hormuz, occupies an area of ~233,100 km2. Two main sources of water affect its

volume (~8630 km3, with an average depth of ~35 m) and its material and biotic contents:

seawater from the Arabian Sea steadily flows into the gulf to replace seawater evaporated

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from the Gulf’s surface (~326 km3/yr) and ~37 km3 of freshwater enters the Gulf via the

Tigris-Euphrates and their confluence known as the Shatt-al-Arab. Separating the

Arabian Peninsula from Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest, is ~50 km wide

(Subba Rao, 2000). Both inflow, occurring at depth of 0-50 m, and outflow, occurring at

depth of 50-100 m, traverse a sill ~100 m below sea-level. From data cited above, we

calculate ~1.4 m evaporation/yr; however, we have selected a net evaporation rate over

the gulf of ~2 m/yr (Johns et al., 2003).

Maps of the gas and oil fields in and around the Gulf, tanker terminals and gas and oil

pipelines adjacent to, or lying beneath, illustrate vividly a networked production, storage,

processing and shipping infrastructure of great technical complexity and economic value.

Fortunately for the EDIN macroproject’s planners, there are no obstructive pipelines,

terminals or oil and gas production platforms situated in the Strait of Hormuz itself that

might hinder its realization. More importantly, oil and gas exports from the Gulf will

start to decline as a consequence of depletion, as can be seen from the graph of the

Association for the Study of Peak Oil, reproduced here as fig.1 (ASPO, 2004).  By the

time the Hormuz Dam is nearing completion, exports from the Gulf will have dwindled,

making most of the existing infrastructure obsolete. These forecasts underline the need

for a local alternative energy resource for the Gulf’s people.

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4. Macroprojects planned/built before EDIN

Circa 1970, M. Ali Kettani and L.M. Gonsalves proposed a macroproject that would use

a steady inflow of seawater into an artificially closed Dawhat Salwah, a small gulf

located between Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The regulated inflow was planned to

spin hydroelectric turbines installed within the enclosing dam (Kettani and Gonsalves,

1972). Their macroproject was never built. However, a 25 km-long causeway, existing

since 1986, connects Saudi Arabia and Bahrain via Umm Nasan Island and Bayn Island

(van Tongeren, 1986).

A complicating factor in evaluating the economy of the Hormuz Dam project is the

construction of a series of tourist attracting offshore artificial islands in Dubai, with broad

beaches to be emplaced in the Gulf (Stecklow, 2002) which will lose considerably in

value if in the future these properties will no longer be luxury islands in the Gulf, but

small hills in a dry country. One island was completed in 2003. Two islands are under

construction—“The Palm Jumeirah” (to be finished by 2006) and “The Palm, Jebel Ali”

(completion slated for 2007)—that rest on the Gulf’s seafloor in depths of ~4 m, and the

islands will rise ~4 m above the present-day Gulf sea level. The construction cost is

estimated to be ~2.5 billion Euro. The islands increase the length of Dubai’s coastline by

~120 km. A fourth island, named “The World” since it will replicate a map of the

Earth’s continents and islands, is planned for the near-term future (Hoffman, 2004). All

of these islands would, of course, become hills when the Gulf’s sea level is reduced.

5

L. Vadot recommended a dam be installed in the Strait of Hormuz that would be followed

by evaporation of the seawater isolated in the Gulf and, thereby, create a power-head

(Vadot, 1954). Vadot feared that a hydro-solar macroproject emplaced there could have

several drawbacks: (1) the increasing salinity of the tail-water (i.e., the areally smaller

Gulf) and (2) distance from electrical power markets. However, he foresaw intriguing

economic possibilities for electro-chemical processors and desalination of water supplies

in 1954.

By 1961, El Sayed Mohamed Hassan presented a similar plan for a dam (and associated

infrastructure) suitable for isolating the Red Sea from the Arabian Sea at Bab el Mandeb

(Hassan, 1961). Hassan’s dam was designed for emplacement at a selected place with a

depth to seafloor of approximately 27 m with the dam’s crest situated at an elevation

above sea-level of ~9 m. It would have a total width of ~405 m, including a crown

roadway ~9 m wide. Of course, a Strait of Hormuz dam, the most important enabling

feature of our EDIN regional development macroproject for the Gulf, would be bigger

and have a shape fitted to the tectonic and climatic conditions obtaining when it is

undertaken. In a sense, it would simply be a “linear” artificial island that is connected to

the mainland at both ends, more or less imitative of the on-going macroprojects being

undertaken by Dubai! If a detailed survey shows this to be possible, its trajectory would

preferably run from the Musandan peninsula (Oman) in a north-easterly direction across

the island of Qeshm, in order to preserve the open connection of the important Iranian

harbor of Bander Abbas to the Arabian Sea (see fig.2).

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If seawater from the Arabian Sea were continuously passed through a powerhouse ~35 m

below the Arabian Sea’s level (into a reduced sea-level Gulf), ~2.050 MW may be

generated, which may be increased to approximately 2.500 MW by some special

measures; reduction of the Gulf’s sea level by ~35 m would (at the same time) elevate the

world’s sea-level by less than 2 cm, a small but not completely negligible global

elevation of the ocean. The Gulf’s surface area would be reduced to ~47 % of what it was

before the emplacement and operation of the Hormuz Dam.

5. Particulars of Hormuz Dam

The magnitude of the annual mean deep outflow of Gulf seawater through the Strait of

Hormuz is approximately 0.20 Sv, implying a net Gulf evaporation rate of ~2 m/yr; a

Hormuz Dam powerhouse, drawing from a head-pond (i.e., the Arabian Sea) can, thus,

take advantage of this difference in sea levels within a timeframe of only several years.

What sort of impermeable physical barrier must be erected to harvest so much kinetic

energy? We envision a solid material obstruction bigger than the proposed Red Sea

Dam. We will not discuss any consequences for the Arabian Sea of a cut-off of the very

saline seawater mass nowadays entering that segment of the Indian Ocean.

Built of crushed rock transported towards the dam site or from uplifted carbonate rocks

(see Section 6), a Hormuz dam might total 2 km3. According to the globalized cement

industry, 21st Century constructors pour >6 km3 of concrete every year. And,

furthermore, it has been alleged, “The total earth moved in the past 5000 yr [by humans]

would be sufficient to build a 4000 m-high mountain range, 40 km wide and 100 km

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long”. (Hooke, 2000). (Recalculated, that is ~8 x 103 km3, if we imagine the mountain

range to have a triangular cross-section).

6. Prospects for “Geochemical Macro-engineering”?

The sediments underlying the Strait of Hormuz, in front of the Musandan Peninsula are

predominantly shallow-water carbonates. This particular geologic constellation in the

Strait of Hormuz allows us to envision an unusual method of dam construction. The

following is a brief summary of the principle, and the results obtained thus far. For a

more extended description of the technology, the reader is referred to Schuiling, 2004 .

Sulfuric acid reacts readily with limestone and water to carbon dioxide and gypsum.

CaCO3 + H2O + H2SO4 CaSO4.2H2O + CO2

limestone (36.9 cm3/mol) gypsum (74.7 cm3/mol)

The molar volume of the precipitated gypsum is twice that of the dissolved limestone.

This means that the injection of industrial waste sulfuric acid into subsurface limestone

causes a large expansion of the in situ rock. This expansion can only be accommodated

by surface uplift. This “Geochemical Macro-engineering” (Schuiling, 1988) method was

developed, supported by a grant from The Netherlands Technology Foundation (de

Graaff et al., 2000) and is considered a viable process to discard waste sulfuric acid at all

conceivable pressures, because even at moderate acid strength the equilibrium CO2

pressures are extremely high. Thermodynamic data show that gypsum is stable below

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500 C, down to a depth of ~1 km at normal geothermal gradient. At higher temperatures

and greater depth, gypsum transforms to the less voluminous anhydrite (45.9 cm3/mol).

The flaring of natural gas is being phased out in the countries to be directly affected by

our Hormuz Dam. This will result in the stockpiling of huge quantities of native sulfur,

from the desulphurization of gases containing H2S. If this sulfur is converted to sulfuric

acid, and injected into limestone in the subsurface at the Hormuz Strait, it should be

possible to start raising some segments of the intended Hormuz Dam construction site at

modest monetary cost. Less crushed rock will need to be emplaced if the foundation

upon which the Hormuz Dam rests is uplifted via geochemical macro-engineering.

7. Power generation optimization

To evaluate the power produced at the Hormuz plant one shall use the procedure

proposed in Kettani and Gonsalves (1972) and Kettani and Scott (1974) and bathymetry

data for the Persian/Arabian Gulf (Fig.2). One denotes by the volumetric flow rate

of evaporated seawater and by the volumetric flow rate of fresh water

entering the Persian/Arabian Gulf by rivers. At steady state the volumetric flow rate of

seawater entering the Persian/Arabian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman must balance the

previous flow rates, i.e.

(1)

The volumetric flow rate of water coming by rain was neglected. The volumetric flow

rate of evaporated seawater depends of course on the surface area of the active basin by

(2)

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where is the seawater evaporation rate. The hydraulic head provided

by the Hormuz dam is shown in Fig. 3. The surface area of the evaporative basin

decreases as the head increases. When the hydraulic head is zero, reaches its

maximum value . When is a maximum (say ), one could believe that there

will be no seawater left and . However, because is not a vanishing quantity

(unless the Shatt-al-Arab is used for irrigation of the new coastal areas), keeping balance

between the three quantities entering Eq (1) requires a non-vanishing evaporative surface

area of at least 19.000 km2. The maximum associated hydraulic head is . The

bathymetry of Figure 2 was used to produce a rough estimate of the dependence ,

shown in Fig. 4.

The potential energy of the seawater flow transferred from the Gulf of Oman to

the Persian/Arabian Gulf is transformed into mechanical power collected at turbine

shafts. The following simple relationship applies:

(3)

Here Eqs (1) and (2) were also used. In Eq (3), is gravitational

acceleration, is the density of the falling seawater and is the

efficiency of the hydraulic turbine. The dependence of the power on the hydraulic head

is shown in Fig. 4.

Two different scenarios could be envisaged about the power plant at Hormuz

Dam. In the first scenario a rather small hydraulic head could be used (say ).

This has the advantage that the evaporative basin is still large (its surface area is

) and the Persian/Arabian Gulf keeps its main present futures. The power

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provided by the plant is in this case. Because of the low head the

hydropower plant should be provided with Kaplan turbines.

The second scenario emerges from Fig 4, which shows that there is an optimum

hydraulic head (i.e. ), for which the power is a maximum (i.e.

). The associated optimum surface of the evaporative basin is, however,

less than half of its present value (i.e. ). This maximum power plant is

our choice in the following. Due to the medium hydraulic head, Francis or even Pelton

turbines should be envisaged in this case.

The period necessary to reach a 35 m hydraulic head at an annual evaporation rate of 2 m

is about 18 years. It is not an unreasonable period to wait. It is of course possible to

commence power plant operations as soon as the dam at the Strait of Hormuz has been

closed, but at a power rate less than the maximum possible. Note, however, that the

minimum head for proper operation of Francis and Pelton turbines is 20 m and 30 m,

respectively. The consequence is that power plant operation should normally start at least

10 years after Hormuz Dam construction. The critical element in the Strait of

Hormuz/EDIN macroproject is the Hormuz Dam. It is larger and more ambitious than

any dam which has so far been constructed anywhere on Earth, similar in approach but at

a vastly larger scale than the “Afsluitdijk” completed in the Netherlands in 1932 to close

off the Zuiderzee. The electricity produced by the powerhouse of the Hormuz Dam will

probably be by the demand and not by the energy available, unless excess energy is used

for example for desalination or for the production of hydrogen. Another possibility would

be to establish a magnesium industry near the Dam, as the two major ingredients,

concentrated brine and cheap electricity are available. The overall average over several

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years of consumption should equal the average energy capacity of the facility. This kind

of power generation affords, therefore, a unique means of storing solar energy and

leveling out its diurnal and seasonal variations.

The Hormuz Dam powerhouse must have a finite design and working lifespan,

just like any other macroproject ever built. After many years of evaporation, salt

deposition would eventually fill the Gulf completely until no seawater surface remains

for solar evaporation. A simple calculation shows that it would take thousands of years

for the Gulf to be filled with salt to its optimum head level. Once the Gulf’s isolated

water is saturated with salt—as it currently is in a region lying between Qatar and Saudi

Arabia—the amount that will precipitate yearly is equal to the quantity of new salt

introduced that year. A column of seawater of 2 m depth, with a cross-section of 1 cm2

normally contains 200 cc of seawater with a salinity of about 3.5 0/00. Consequently, it

contains about 7 g of salt, that will be deposited on 1 cm2. The density of salt being 2240

kg/m3, this means that once salt deposition begins, a new layer of about 3 cm thickness

will form annually, in line with the observed thickness of annual rhythms in evaporite

deposits elsewhere. Assuming a maximum gulf depth around 120 m and a hydraulic head

of 35 m, the final salt layer will be 85 m thick. This means the Gulf filling time with salt

would be about 2830 years. We will not discuss here in detail the complications arising

from the isostatic rebound related to the rapid 35 meter drop in Gulf level, nor the

isostatic sinking of the residual Gulf when it is loaded with precipitated salts (Van der

Belt and de Boer, in prep.), but if precipitation of salt is allowed to proceed, a residual

basin depth of 50 m will be converted into a 125 m thick layer of halite by the effects of

isostatic compensation.

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It may be possible, however, to prolong the life of the Gulf-Hormuz Dam system

indefinitely and avoid ending up with a huge Gulf salt pan by pumping very saline

bottom water through a tube in the base of the Hormuz Dam back into the Arabian Sea

(see fig.3). This will, of course, cost energy, but as only ~ 10% of the inlet water must be

pumped out (inlet water 3.5% salinity, outlet water 35%), and does not have to be raised

to the top of the dam, the energy costs are limited, and are partly compensated, because

the volume of inlet water can also be increased by 10%. The removal of the brine can

even be carried out without any energy expenditure by extending the outlet tube in the

Arabian Sea to a depth (see Fig. 2) of more than 215 meter. As soon as the condition is

fulfilled

(4)

the brine from the closed Gulf will spontaneously flow down the outlet tube, without

requiring any additional pumping. For a brine concentration of 30% (density 1.230

kg/m3) this solution holds for Hbrine>180 m, i.e. for any depth of the outlet of the tube

greater than 215 m. Such a depth is encountered in the Arabian Sea at a distance of appr.

100 km from the projected site of the Hormuz Dam.

If the Shatt-al-Arab is used to irrigate and desalinize the newly emerged coastal areas, a

positive contribution to potential energy production would come from the reduced inflow

of fresh water into the Gulf, as most of the fresh water will be lost by evaporation and

evapo-transpiration. A reduced inflow from the Shatt-al-Arab can be compensated by an

increased inflow of water from the Arabian Sea, thereby increasing the energy

production. At the conditions assumed (a 35 m drop of Gulf level, and a reduced Gulf

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area of 110.000 km2), a reduction of the annual inflow of fresh water by 30 km3 would

increase the potential energy production by ~15%.

Another modest increase of power production could be obtained by the construction of a

shallow basin along the crest of the dam. The bottom of this basin should be situated at

low-tide level. By letting the water in from the Arabian Sea at high tide, and using this

stored water at low tide for power generation, it is possible to bridge the production

minimum at low tide (= lowest head). The present tidal range is around 2.5 meter* and is

likely to increase if the entrance to the Gulf is closed.

Table 1 presents several proposals of heliohydroelectric (HHE) plants. The power

provided by the Hormuz Dam HHE is comparable with that of Qattara depression power

plant.

*note: This tidal range caused some problems for Alexander the Great, during his conquest of India.

Arrianus, in his book on Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire gives the following account:

When they had anchored there, the tide changed, as happens in the oceans; it became ebb, leaving their

ships on land. Alexander’s troops had never experienced tides, and were very terrified. But their fright even

increased when after some delay the water came back, and lifted their ships. Ships that were caught in the

mud were lifted again undamaged. Ships, however, that were left on dry land in precarious equilibrium

collided with each other when the waves returned, or were smashed on land and destroyed. Alexander, as

best as he could repaired the damage.

8. Spin-offs consequent to gulf lowering

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A major potential source of income, as well as the largest economic uncertainty is the

value of the newly emerging land. If it can be used for agriculture, the value of the

~120.000 km2 of new land is tremendous. To achieve this, simultaneous with the Hormuz

Dam’s construction, a canal ought to be dug approximately along the present-day

coastline, diverting the waters from the Shatt-al-Arab. This canal, or aqueduct can serve

to irrigate and desalinize at least part of the new coastlands emerging from the Gulf,

making them suitable for agriculture and habitation. It stands to reason that Iraq (and

Iran?) should be compensated by the Gulf States for making the water from the Shatt-al-

Arab available. From a consideration of the bathymetry of the Gulf, it appears that Saudi-

Arabia and the Arab Emirates acquire most of the new, arable land area. How the land

should be distributed between the riparian states must be sorted out by international

agreement. In order to avoid legal hassles, the Gulf States should create a supranational

body that will be responsible for all legal, financial and organizational aspects of the

Hormuz Dam; an option is that this body delegates the operational aspects of running the

power station to Iran and Oman, the two states at both ends of the Hormuz Dam, as these

states will have the formal jurisdiction over the area occupied by the Dam.

The resulting international legal issues and the implication of emergence of new coastal

regions need examination by competent international law experts trusted by the nations

involved. It is worth noting that international law is only just now beginning to seriously

address the international legal problems of land submergence that might be caused by a

prospective global sea-level rise!

9. Estimate of Costs and Benefits

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The major costs of the project are the capital expenditures for dam construction,

power plant installations and the irrigation canal. The major economic benefits are the

capital income from the reclaimed land and the annual revenues of the power plants and

the irrigation water. A rough estimate (2004 price level) with an uncertainty of +30/-20%

is given in Table 2.

The largest uncertainty is in the price of the new land. If it is possible to irrigate 50.000

km2 by the use of an irrigation canal derived from the Shatt-al-Arab, this land should

fetch about 3 eurocent/m2 to cover the capital cost of the irrigation canal, assuming that

the non-irrigated land has no value.

The annual revenues from the power production (a plant of 2.500 MW produces 22

billion Kwh) will be in the order of 3.3 billion Euro, if an electricity price is assumed of

15 eurocent/Kwh, about halfway between the price for large industrial users and for

households.

Although it is unclear what price the water from the Shatt-al-Arab will fetch when used

for irrigation, it will probably be in the same order of magnitude as the revenues from

power production.

It is clear that from a strictly economical point of view, this project will have a too long

return on investment, unless some of the cost estimates used above are unduly

pessimistic. The project will only be adopted when the countries involved are convinced

that the project is necessary for their development, c.q. their survival as a modern state.

The urgency will grow as the oil and gas reserves of the Gulf region are depleted.

10. Ecological Impact; the ethical Dilemma

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Hydro-electric power generation systems are sustainable and produce no greenhouse

gases. If the power generation as foreseen for the Hormuz Dam were generated by coal-

powered plants, this would lead to an emission of about 23.8 megaton CO2 annually. So,

a Hormuz Dam hydro-electric project will lead to a significant reduction of greenhouse

gases. The negative ecological aspects, however, are considerable. In ways as yet

unfathomable, the whole Gulf region’s hydrogeology, and probably its climate as well

will be affected. If the large tracts of uncovered sea floor are vegetated, this may be

reflected in increased precipitation. Macro-engineering will profoundly affect the ecology

of the region. Sea becomes land, and vegetation and wildlife will be affected in dramatic

fashion. This will cause many persons to oppose such large interventions. It probably

comes only as a small consolation that most of the Gulf was in fact land some 12.000

years ago, so in a sense the Hormuz Dam macroproject only restores the original

constellation of the Gulf.

Jihan Seoud, environmentalist in Beirut has phrased some of her ecological objections

against the Hormuz Dam macroproject in the following way:

1. Changes to the marine environment due to pumping such vast quantities of sea water

will be drastic, not to mention irreversible: the coastal marine ecosystem, and maybe

even the deep ocean ecosystems maybe altered.  Potential changes may have

consequences as severe as those that occurred in the Aral Sea.

2. As a consequence to the changes in the marine environment, particularly with respect

to the coastal environment, dramatic changes in other inter-dependent natural

17

ecosystems may occur, such as changes in bird migratory patterns, living and mating

patterns of turtles or other coastal breeding animals.

3. The increase in the coastline may increase land available for agriculture, but it is

highly likely that this land would require large amount of fertilizers to be arable, and so

that would increase run-off to the sea, among other negative ecological impacts.

Furthermore, the cost of increasing such land mass is likely to be too high to be cost-

beneficial.

4. The tourism industry would be affected significantly, especially in a city like Dubai

which is pumping millions of dollars into it's tourism sector, particularly along the

coastal area in projects like the Palm Islands, World City, etc.  These projects would be

dried out totally by reducing the sea level.

5. The cost, both economically and environmentally, of rerouting pipelines is expected to

be very high.  Who would bear these costs?

6. Lastly, and of course not least of all, changing public opinion towards the use and

need of renewable energy, particularly of those people living in oil-rich Gulf countries, is

a difficult task as is, let alone trying to convince them of the need for such a drastic

macroproject.

 The questions about the tourist industry, the cost of rerouting pipelines and the future fate

of the oil reserves have been dealt with in previous sections, and an Aral Sea disaster can

be avoided by brine recirculation into the Arabian Sea. The ecological questions remain.

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Marine and most of the coastal wildlife will indeed disappear, and migratory patterns for

birds are likely to be affected. These are the dilemmas that every macro-engineering

intervention faces. There are only a few, and not always satisfactory answers. The

projected reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is an important positive factor. As far as

the future ecology of the region is concerned, dramatic changes will sometimes

surprisingly rapidly create new and valuable ecological systems. As a trade-off for the

ecologies that are destroyed by the macroproject, some of its income should be diverted

to finance the creation of new, or the preservation of existing nature reserves.

In the end, the overriding question will be, are similar macroprojects justified for the

future survival of the region and its peoples?

11. Closing Remarks

It is likely that ~2.500 MW will be generated at one place in EDIN’s realm. Cheap hydro-

electricity production, combined with efficient and inexpensive electricity transmission,

makes the fresh-water shortages of the Gulf ecosystem-states (Yang et al., 2003) solvable

with a distributed factory-scale desalination industry (Alspach and Watson, 2004). After

the Gulf is blockaded by the Hormuz Dam, reducing its elevation by ~35 m and

increasing its salinity, it will assume an aquarium-like status as a seawater body.

Undoubtedly, nautical archeology will discover and recover many once hidden historic

time capsules (preserved shipwrecks). Some of the uncovered lowlands may even be

planted with salt-tolerant crops able to grow when irrigated only with seawater (Glenn et

al., 1998). Biologists think the Earth-biosphere—and its sub-regions—will be both

monitored and transformed by small organisms with altered DNA (Macalady and

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Banfield, 2003). Genetic engineering that allows the transfer of genes across taxonomic

boundaries enables the production of new products and permits the development of new

hazards for life. It is not too far-fetched for us to imagine the aquarium-like EDIN-

operated gulf greatly changed by microscopic and macroscopic forms of life (Azam and

Worden, 2004). We imagine simply because the transformed gulf will be a totally new

physical reality.

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Mr.J.de Nie of the Rotterdam Harbor for drawing our attention to the

impending decline of oil and gas production. Miss Jihan Seoud, Beirut is thanked for

pointing out some of the severest ecological consequences of the building of the Hormuz

Dam; in doing so, she has forced us to recognize the ethical dilemmas associated with

Macro-engineering. Poppe de Boer and Pieter Kleingeld of the Utrecht University are

thanked for resp. the discussion on isostatic compensation and the calculation of the

reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Marieke Schuiling is thanked for digging up the

reference to Arrianus.

References

Alspach, B and I. Watson, “Sea Change”, Civil Engineering 74: 70-75 (February 2004).

ASPO the Association for the Study of Peak Oil; (2004).

Azam, F. and A.Z. Worden, “Microbes, Molecules, and Marine Ecosystems”, Science 303: 1622-1624 (2004).

Bassler, F. Solar depression power plant of Qattara in Egypt, Solar Energy, 14, 1972, 21-28

Belt, F.J.G. v.d. and de Boer, P.L. “Saline Giants: isostacy as a critical factor in their formation” (in prep.)

Glenn, E.P. , J.J. Brown, and J.W. O’Leary, “Irrigating Crops with Seawater”, Scientific American 279: 76-81 (August 1998).

20

Graaff, J.W.M de, Speck, P.J.H.R. and Zijlstra, J.J.P. Method for locally elevating the ground: some aspects of sulfuric acid injection into subsurface limestone. Final project report, Netherlands Technology Foundation, 2000, 59 p.

Hamblin, D.J. “Has the Garden of Eden been located at last?”, Smithsonian 18: 127-135 (1987).

Hassan, E.S.M.“Power from the Sea”, Journal of the Power Division, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers 87: 21-27 (1961).

Hoffman, C. “Conspicuous Construction”, Popular Science 264: 54 (April 2004)

Hooke, R.L.“On the history of humans as geomorphic agents”, Geology 28:845 (2000).

Johns, W.E. et al., “Observations of seasonal exchange through the Straits of Hormuz and the inferred heat and freshwater budgets of the Persian Gulf”, Journal of Geophysical Research 108: 3391 (2003).

Kettani, M.A. and L M Gonsalves, Heliohydroelectric (HHE) power generation, Solar Energy, 14, 1972, 29-39.

Kettani, M.A. and R E Scott, A Red Sea heliohydroelectric (HHE) plant, Rev. Internat. Heliotechnique, 2e semestre 1974, p 19-25

Macalady, J. and J.F. Banfield, “Molecular geomicrobiology: genes and geochemical cycling”, Earth and Planetary Science Letters 209: 1-17 (2003).

Lambeck, K “Shoreline reconstructions for the Persian Gulf since the last glacial maximum”, Earth and Planetary Science Letters 142: 43-57 (1996).

Olson, W.S.“Has science dated the Biblical Flood”, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 2: 272-278 (1967).

Schuiling, R.D. “Palk Strait: Repairing Adam’s Bridge with Gypsum?”, Current Science, 86, no 10 (2004).

Schuiling, R.D. Method to artificially raise the level of the land. 1988.Utrecht University, Dutch Patent Application no 8800838.

Stecklow, S. “Dubai Is Putting New Resort on Map in the Persian Gulf”, The Wall Street Journal CCXL: A1 and A15 (18 November 2002).

Subba Rao, D.V. “Arabian Gulf” in C. Shepard (Ed.), Seas at the Millennium, Volume II, Chapter 53 (2000).

Tongeren, H.van “Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Causeway”, Land + Water International, no 57: 19-28 (1986)

Vadot, L. “Les centrales hydro-solaires”, La Houille Blanche 9: 557-568 (1954).

Uchupi, E., S.A. Swift and D.A. Ross, “Tectonic Geomorphology of the Gulf of Oman Basin” in P.D. Clift, D. Kroon, C. Gaedicke, and J. Craig (Eds.), Tectonic and Climatic Evolution of the Arabian Sea, Geological Society of London Special Publication #195, p. 37-69 (2002).

Yang, H. et al., “A Water Resources Threshold and Its Implications for Food Security”, Environmental Science & Technology 37: 3048-3054 (2003).

21

LEGEND TO FIGURES

Figure 1. Scenario for past and future global oil and gas liquids production.

Figure 2. Persian/Arabian Gulf bathymetry (meters), and location of the proposed dam.

Figure 3. Dam at Strait of Hormuz. - seawater hydraulic head; - volumetric

seawater flow rate, Qbrine - volumetric brine flow rate, Hbrine - brine hydraulic head; sw

and brine - seawater and brine density, respectively.

Figure 4. Dependence of the surface area of the evaporative basin and plant power

on the hydraulic head . The maximum evaporative basin surface area is

and the maximum head is .

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Table 1. Proposals of heliohydroelectric (HHE) plants

Quantity Unit Dawhat Salwah area

(Kettani and Gonsalves, 1972)

Bab Al Mandab Strait

(Kettani and Scott, 1974)

Qattara depresion

(Bassler,1972)

Hormuz Strait

(this work)

Dam length Km Not available 22 Not necessary 50Maximum dam height M Not available 205 Not necessary 100Basin actual surface km2 28000 437969 19500 234000Basin active surface km2 12000 133000 12100 110000

Evaporative rate m/s 3.5 2 1.7 2Volumetric flow rate m3/s 255 8470 650 5803

Hydraulic head M 14 500 275 35Hydraulic Power MW 34 38300 1000 to 4000 2053

Time until full power Years 3.5 250 0 18Operation time Years Not available 1880 Not available 4250

Dam construction 44.200.000.000 EuroPower Plants 3.350.000.000 EuroIrrigation Canal 14.270.000.000 EuroTotal capital costs 61.820.000.000 Euro

Table 2. Overview of capital costs

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Utrecht, September 8, 2004

To the Ambassador of OmanMrs. K.H.S.Al-LawatyKoninginnegracht 27Fax 070 360 5364

Excellency,

Together with an American, a Rumanian and another Dutch colleague I have written a paper entitled “the Hormuz Strait Dam Macroproject – 21st Century Electricity Development Infrastructure Node”. This paper deals with the proposal for a future closure of the Strait of Hormuz with a dam. Because the Gulf area experiences a very dry climate with an evaporation excess of 2 meter/year, the sealevel in the Gulf will drop by 40 meters in about 20 years after Dam construction. By then allowing an amount of seawater from the Arabian Sea, equivalent to the quantity that evaporates annually, to pass through powerhouses situated in the Dam, it will be possible to generate about 2.500 MW. In view of the dwindling world oil reserves, we think it is important for the region to dispose of a large alternative energy resource. This will also be very important when the region wants to diversify its economy in order to be less dependent on oil and oil-related industries.We realize, of course, that our proposal is very audacious, and likely will meet stiff resistance from parties in the countries surrounding the Gulf. Because Oman, in more than one aspect, will play a key role in its eventual realization, we feel that we should inform your Government ahead of publication. The Dam will be anchored at the tip of the Musandan Peninsula, and run across the Strait of Hormuz by way of the island of Qhesm to a point on the Iranian coast just West of Bander Abbas. From the legal point of view, this means that Oman and Iran will have the primary jurisdiction over such a dam.If your Excellency shares my view that this issue deserves the attention of the Government of Oman, I will be very happy to discuss the proposal further in the Hague.For your information, my name is Prof.Dr.R.D.Schuiling. I was full professor of Geochemistry at the Utrecht University, where I continue to do my research. I can be reached by e-mail [email protected] , telephone 030-253 5006 or fax 030-253 5030.

Respectfully yours

Prof.Dr.R.D.Schuiling

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Utrecht, October 19, 2004

To the Ambassador of OmanMrs. K.H.S.Al-LawatyKoninginnegracht 27Fax 070 360 5364

Excellency,

On September 8 I have sent you some information concerning an audacious plan to close

off the Gulf at some time in the future, when oil reserves in the region become depleted,

in order to provide for a large alternative source of energy in the form of hydropower. I

send you herewith the complete draft of the paper that we have submitted to the journal

“Marine Georesources and Geotechnology”.

In my fax message I have stressed the fact that Oman will play a key role if this project is

going to be implemented, and I would appreciate a reaction from your Government. You

realize, of course, that this is a long-term endeavor, and preparing the minds and planning

the project will probably take more than a decade.

I can be reached by e-mail [email protected] , telephone 030-253 5006 or fax

030-253 5030, but I will be in Turkey until October 29.

Respectfully yours

Prof.Dr.R.D.Schuiling

Encl. Copy of paper “ The Hormuz Strait Dam Macroproject— 21st Century Electricity Development Infrastructure Node (EDIN)?

Utrecht, December 14, 2004

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To the Ambassador of IranDuinweg 202585 JX den Haag

Excellency,

Together with an American, a Rumanian and another Dutch colleague I have written a paper entitled “the Hormuz Strait Dam Macroproject – 21st Century Electricity Development Infrastructure Node”. This paper, of which I include a copy, deals with the proposal for a future closure of the Strait of Hormuz with a dam. Because the Gulf area experiences a very dry climate with an evaporation excess of 2 meter/year, the sealevel in the Gulf will drop by 40 meters in about 20 years after Dam construction. By then allowing each year that an amount of seawater from the Indian Ocean, equivalent to the quantity that evaporates annually, passes through powerhouses situated in the Dam, it will be possible to generate about 2.500 MW. In view of the dwindling world oil reserves, we think it is important for the region to dispose of a large alternative energy resource. This will also be very important when the region wants to diversify its economy in order to be less dependent on oil and oil-related industries.We realize, of course, that our proposal is very audacious, and likely will meet stiff resistance from parties in the countries surrounding the Gulf. Because Iran, in more than one aspect, will play a key role in its eventual realization, we feel that we should inform your Government ahead of publication. The Dam will be anchored at the tip of the Musandan Peninsula (Oman), and run across the Strait of Hormuz by way of the island of Qhesm to a point on the Iranian coast just West of Bander Abbas, leaving this important harbor accessible from the Indian Ocean. From the legal point of view, this means that Iran and Oman will have the primary jurisdiction over such a dam.If your Excellency shares my view that this issue deserves the attention of the Government of Iran, even though its eventual realization is not foreseen for the near future, I will be very happy to discuss the proposal further in the Hague.For your information, my name is Prof.Dr.R.D.Schuiling. I was full professor of Geochemistry at the Utrecht University, where I continue to do my research. I can be reached by e-mail [email protected] , telephone 030-253 5006 or fax 030-253 5030.

Respectfully yours

Prof.Dr.R.D.Schuiling

Encl: Hormuz Dam paper

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