Pontifical Mission SocietyHuman Rights OfficeDr. Otmar Oehring (Editor)Postfach 10 12 48D-52012 AachenTel.: 0049-241-7507-00Fax: 0049-241-7507-61-253E-Mail: humanrights@missio.de© missio 2008

ISSN 1618-6222missio-Bestell-Nr. 600 290

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Anne SchreiberThe human rightssituation in Myanmar/Burma.First political stepsof a minority church

MenschenrechteDroits de l’HommeHuman Rights

A military dictatorship has been in power in the Union of Myanmar for the past forty years. Peoplelive in a climate of fear. The suspension of the constitution in 1988 means they have no legalsecurity. The Christian churches, which are a small minority in the country, suffer restrictions,surveillance and oppression. Their members belong almost without exception to the ethnicminorities. This means the churches are minority churches twice over.

In September 2007 the political situation in Burma came to a head. Peaceful demonstrations ledby Buddhist Theravada monks were violently suppressed. The generals sought to seal the countryoff from the outside world.

The following text is based on a shorter 2004 study entitled “On the human rights situation inMyanmar/Burma. The Church under military dictatorship”, which has been extended to cover thepolitical events of September/October 2007, with the focus on the role of religions and theirpolitical involvement. In addition, attention is drawn to challenges and prospects for supportthat can encourage and assist the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace and freedom.

Status: 5 February 2008

Anne Schreiber has a sound knowledge of Asia and of the local churches in South Asia and Myanmaras a result of her training, numerous visits to Asia, and her current work. She lives in Germany andworks in the field of intercultural philosophical and theological dialogue.

24 Interfaith Endeavours for Peace in West Papua (Indonesia)in German (2006) – Order No. 600 277 in English (2006) – Order No. 600 278in French (2006) – Order No. 600 279in Indonesian (2006) – Order No. 600 280

25 East Timor Faces up to its Past – The Work of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in German (2005) – Order No. 600 281 in English (2005) – Order No. 600 282in French (2005) – Order No. 600 283in Indonesian (2005) – Order No. 600 284

26 Asylum for Converts? On the problems arising from the credibility test conducted by the executive and the judiciary following a change of faith in German/in English/in French (2007) – Order No. 600 285

27 Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China – Changes in Religious Policy?in German (2008) – Order No.600 286 in English (2008) – Order No. 600 287 in French (2008) – Order No. 600 288

28 The human rights situation in Myanmar/Burma.First political steps of a minority churchin German (2008) – Order No.600 289 in English (2008) – Order No. 600 290 in French (2008) – Order No. 600 291

29 Zimbabwe: Facing the truth– Accepting responsibilityin German/in English/in French (2008) – Order No. 600 292

30 Defamation of Religions and Human Rights in German/in English/in French (2008) – Order No. 600 293

All publications are also available as PDF files.http://www.missio.de/humanrights

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Contents

2 Burma/Myanmar: facts and figures

3 1. Introduction

4 2. The political situation in Myanmar5 2.1 The military and the Sangha – a symbiotic relationship6 2.2 The “Saffron Revolution”7 2.3 Violence against peaceful demonstrators

9 3. The attitude of the churches during the events of September/October 20079 3.1 Relations between religions in Myanmar

10 3.2 The state and religious minorities11 3.3 The Catholic Church’s commitment to peace11 3.3.1 Tactic of restraint has its problems13 3.3.2 Are the Catholic clergy entitled to engage in political activities?15 3.3.3 New political engagement by Catholics in local church

16 4. Support for democratization17 4.1 Challenges for international policy17 4.1.1 Economic sanctions18 4.1.2 Regime change in Myanmar19 4.1.3 Challenges for the ASEAN nations19 4.1.4 Challenges for the European Community (EC)20 4.1.5 Challenges for the Federal Republic of Germany21 4.2 The task of the Church in Myanmar22 4.3 Challenges for aid agencies

23 5. Closing remarks

24 6. Bibliography24 Monographs25 Articles and reports in periodicals25 Electronic references

29 Notes

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1. Introduction

Birma, Burma or Myanmar8 is the country of the golden pagodas which old Sri Lankan sources refer to as the “Golden Land” (suvannabhumi)9 and whose inhabitants are called “Buddha’s favourite people”10. But the golden façade isdeceptive, and in September 2007 we were exposed to horrifying news and pictures that catapulted the normally little heeded country into the headlinesof the world press. The generals’ bloody suppression of peaceful demonstrations,whose victims were mainly Buddhist monks, nuns and lay people, shocked theworld. Although the generals blocked Internet and e-mail server links to the out-side world, they could not cover up what was happening in the country. Backin 1988 we had also received, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2007, media reportsof student protests being bloodily suppressed by the military. Since then therehas been an information and media explosion – a fact of which the generals probably took as little account as they previously took of the possibility ofnationwide protests. The opening of the country to tourism and the new free-doms created by Internet and e-mail made it impossible to totally seal off thecountry from the outside world overnight. The globalization of the media hadborne fruit. Pictures of the demonstrations and their violent suppressionwere to be found on the front pages of even minor local newspapers inWestern countries. The pictures clearly revealed the popular discontent in thecountry and bore witness to the generals’ disregard for basic democratic rights.If in the past those who wished could find out about the military regime’scountless violations of human rights from specialist publications, in September2007 it was no longer possible for anyone to close their eyes to what the military regime was doing. Photos of demonstrators being beaten and shotwent round the globe. One photo made clear that a Japanese journalist hadbeen shot not, as the generals maintained, by accident, but deliberately.World indignation at the generals ran high. New sanctions were imposed, whilevarious governments issued declarations and warnings to Burma’s rulers. Eventhe government of Burma’s big neighbour and friend, China, could hardly refrainfrom calling upon its comparatively small partner and protégé to adopt peacefulmeasures. Nevertheless the Chinese and Russian governments remained loyal andprevented the UN Security Council from passing a resolution on the familiargrounds of “internal affairs”.11

Name of country Union of Myanmar (also called Birma or Burma)Area 678,500 sq km, of which 657,740 sq km are land2

Number of inhabitants 50,519,0003

Population Myanmar is a multinational state. The largest ethnic group is formed by the Burmans4 (68%). Other ethnic groups are the Shan (9%), the Karen (7%), Rakhine or Rohingya (4%), Chinese (3%), Indians (2%), Mon (2%), and smaller ethnic minorities (5%).

Population growth The growth rate is 0.815%.Life expectancy 62.49: Women 64.83 years, men just under 60.Languages The official language is Burmese. The ethnic minorities each

speak their own language.Literacy rate The illiteracy rate among women (13.6%) is considerably higher

than that among men (6.1%).5

State Previously there was a Socialist Republic with a constitution dating from 1974. After a military coup in 1988, the “State Law and Order Restoration Council” (SLORC) took power. Since 1997 the executive has been in the hands of the 19-member “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC), which evolved from SLORC. The capital is Yangon (formerly Rangoon). The country is divided into seven states and seven administrative districts.

Capital, seat of Yangon government In 2005 the seat of government was moved to Naypyidaw.Supreme A 485-member parliament (National Assembly) was elected inconstituional body 1990 but was unable to take up its duties. The constituent

assembly is the National Convention which was appointed in 1993 with 700 members (600 of whom were appointed by the army). It broke down in 1996 and was reconstituted in 2003. In September 2007 the National Assembly ended after drawing up principles for its future work.

Head of state The head of government (Prime Minister) has been Thein Sein since 18 May 20076. The former head of state and government and Chairman of the SLORC, Than Shwe, assumed the newly created office of president on 23 April 1992. The voting age is 18, and the last election was held in 1990.

Religions 90% of the population are Buddhists (Theravada Buddhism), principally Burmans; 6% are Christians (among whom the Baptists far outnumber the Catholics), most of whom belong to the various ethnic minorities; 4% are Muslims who belong to the Rohingya/Rakhine people; 1% are followers of so-called nature religions; and 2% are of other religions, such as Hindus, who are mainly Tamils, originally from India.7

Burma/Myanmar: Facts and figures1

. .

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Yangon; of foreign criticism of the SPDC; of foreign military intervention, andby the necessity of a more central location for the SPDC, enabling it to takemilitary action against outbreaks of ethnic unrest on the eastern border.”18

As the recent past has shown, the government was unable to avert at leastthe first two of the above-mentioned “dangers” with the relocation. As for thereal reasons for the relocation of the government many Burmese are agreed thatit was not a rational calculation, but the generals’ belief in astrology and numerology that was responsible for the new city.19 The man at the top, GeneralThan Shwe, “a sick man in his mid-seventies, who seldom shows himself in public” and is said to be uneasy in company, placed most of his trust inastrologers in finding a site for the seat of government. Pyinmana Naypyidaw(also: Nay Pyi Taw) means “Seat of Kings”.20 With the relocation the generals cutthemselves off definitively from the people of Myanmar. “Civilians and foreigners are strictly forbidden to enter [the city].”21

By their self-isolation and reign of terror the generals have finally severedtheir links to the people and lost contact with reality. This was made evident bythe effects of a political miscalculation they made in August when fuel priceswere raised by up to 500%. It was the last straw that broke the camel’s back –reactions and actions were triggered that the generals had clearly not reckonedwith, especially as they came from an unexpected quarter.

2.1 The military and the Sangha22 – a symbiotic relationship The monks and nuns of Theravada Buddhism are people who have withdrawn fromthe “worldly” life in order to devote themselves to seeking the road to redemption.Normally this has nothing to do with a secular let alone a political commitment.Nevertheless, in at least some of the countries with a Theravada Buddhist majori-ty – besides Burma one might mention Sri Lanka – the political influence of Budd-hist monks can be documented.23

That political Buddhism in Burma has a tradition, i.e. that the monastic community or individual monks have acted politically in the past, has beenshown exhaustively by Heinz Bechert.24 Hans-Bernd Zöllner writes: “The role ofthe monk as rebel has a long history in Burma.”25 Even today the monk U Wisara is revered as a national hero and the first martyr of the Burmese independence struggle against the British. Although the military regime has repeatedly stripped the monks of their robes since coming to power in 198826

and has imposed long prison sentences on some,27 there has been what one mightcall a symbiotic relationship between the Sangha and the military regime. As the

The following text is based on a short 2004 study entitled “Human rights in Myanmar/Burma. The Church under military dictatorship”12 and extends it tocover the political events of September/October 2007, with the focus on the roleof religions and their political involvement. In addition, attention is drawn tochallenges and prospects for support that can encourage and assist the peoplein their quest for peace and freedom.

2. The political situation in MyanmarBurma has been ruled by the military since 1962.13 Today it is one of the poorestand most underdeveloped countries in the world.14 The military junta that has ruledthe country since 1988 keeps the population of the country in check with pover-ty and lack of education. In a country rich in natural resources 25% of the popu-lation live below the poverty line.15 Human rights violations of every kind are theorder of the day. This is well known to Amnesty International, Human Rights WatchReport and other organizations that document and publish human rights violationsworldwide.16 The only elections to take place under the military dictatorship – in1990 – were not recognized by the country’s rulers, as the opposition party, head-ed by the later Nobel Peace Laureate of 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi, had clearly won.The constitution of 1978 was suspended in 1988. In 2003 a National Assembly wasset up by the generals as the first of seven steps towards what they call a “discipline-flourishing democracy”, which closed in September 2007 without any mention ofa timetable for the six further steps.17 One thing that the National Convention didmake very clear, however, was that the generals want to secure their position of powerfor the future. For that reason the opposition party, which won the elections of 1990,will not be involved in the drafting of the new constitution. For the people of Burma,however, the continuing lack of a constitution has meant 20 years without legalsecurity, which opens the door to arbitrariness and corruption at all levels of thehierarchy.

By proceeding in this manner the generals have become more and moreremote from the cares and problems of their people. That this alienation is deliberate is clearly shown by the transfer of the seat of government. In November2005 the government relocated from the capital Yangon to a city specially constructedfor this purpose in the middle of the jungle.

“No official justification was offered for the surprising move, but it appearsto have been mainly motivated by the fear of possible civil protests in

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The fact that during the 2007 demonstrations donations from members ofthe military had not been accepted by the monks must have dealt a severe blowto the government, as it thereby lost the blessing of the monastic community.

“The Burman word for ‘to strike’, literally translated, means ‘to turn the almsbowl upside down’. For if monks accept no more donations, they deny the donorthe opportunity of winning spiritual favour. They excommunicate him in asense, exclude him from the Buddhist community, deprive him of the basis forproving and preserving his life in the cycle of rebirths. Political and religiousstrikes in Burma are thus [...] inseparably intertwined with one another.”33

After the drastic rise in the price of petrol many Burmese found they couldno longer afford so much as a bus ticket.34 On 5 September monks taking partin a demonstration in Pakkoku suffered injuries at the hands of military personnel.

“Even if the protests that took place before 5 September were important eventsin the history of Burma [...], 5 September, when hundreds of Buddhistmonks took to the streets of Pakokku, marked a turning point […]. The decision of the monks to join in the protests was of great significance, asmonks in Burma enjoy high moral esteem and had repeatedly stood at thecentre of political uprisings since the end of the colonial period.”35

An apology from the government for its disproportionate action againstthe monks was not forthcoming. “And as in the colonial period the conflictescalated when the dignity of the monks was assaulted.”36 The Burma expertHans-Bernd Zöllner writes:

“The economic misery of the population, for which those in power areresponsible, and the dignity of the monks, who stood side by side with thepopulation, are inseparably interlinked in Burma. A monk can only pursuehis calling of providing spiritual and pastoral care for the population if thelatter in turn gives him material support. Thus Buddhism can only flourishin a flourishing economy. This also means, however, that if harm is doneto the dignity and hence the integrity of the monks, harm is done to thehuman dignity of the laity too.”37

2.3 Violence against peaceful demonstrators38

The readiness of military governments in Myanmar to use violence to crush demon-strations has been known since 1988 at the latest. When the students rose up in

generals like to pose as the benefactors and supporters of Buddhism, they couldhardly have expected such a massive protest on the part of the monks.

Buddhism came to Burma in the 5th/6th century A.D.28 and has “the longesttradition” of the “world religions represented” in Myanmar today. Buddhists alsomake up the great majority of the population. These two facts may explain whyBuddhism is the religion preferred by the military government. “However, thereare far more cogent realpolitik reasons for the military regime to lean towards Buddhism and to be seen to be doing so. Even dictators need some support amongthe population if they are to maintain their position for any length of time. By‘paying homage’ to Buddhism, i.e. supporting monasteries, building pagodas,etc., Myanmar’s generals are following an old tradition of rulers acting as patronsof Buddhism. But the people follow those who protect Buddhism.”29 The prefer-ential treatment of Buddhism, however, must not blind us to the fact that therelationship between the military government and the Buddhist community isambivalent. This ambivalence shows itself mainly in relation to the Buddhistclergy, which the regime seeks to bring under its control.30 Although the stategrants Buddhism a clearly preferential position, the Sangha are still kept understrict control. Under the “Sangha Organization Law” of 1990 all organizationsof monks apart from the nine monastic orders recognized by the state were banned. These nine orders are subject to the authority of the state-supported StateMonk Coordination Committee (“Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee”) that isindirectly elected by the monks.31 This committee also controls the two state-sponsored Buddhist universities in Yangon and Mandalay, where Buddhistmonks are trained. Monks who refuse to comply with the rules laid down by themilitary must expect severe sanctions. According to the International ReligiousFreedom Report, 26 monks were arrested in 2003 and stripped of their robes. In2004 they were sentenced to prison terms ranging from seven to 18 years be-cause they had refused material donations from the government.32

2.2 The “Saffron Revolution”Although most of the Buddhist monks in Burma wear red robes, the term “Saffron Revolution” is now widely used, especially in English-language publications, for the events of September 2007, in which thousands of monks(and nuns) took part in peaceful demonstrations. Even before the rise in the priceof petrol there had been demonstrations by members of the “88 Generation Students’ Group” – also known as the “88 student generation” – an oppositiongroup of former student leaders. Some of the monks who demonstrated in September also belonged to the 1988 generation, i.e. the group that had sharedresponsibility for or organized the protests on that occasion.

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police allowed a procession of demonstrators to go to the home of the oppositionleader, Aung San Suu Kyi, where she was – and still is – being kept under housearrest. This encounter of the highest symbolic value was seen as a sign that thegenerals were ready to enter into negotiations with the opposition. A few days laterthe generals struck.

3. The attitude of the churches during theevents of September/October 2007In the past the Catholic Church of Myanmar has adopted a “policy” of non-intervention vis-à-vis the military junta. In individual dioceses bishops evenmaintain “friendly” relations with the local authorities, which gives them a certain freedom in the exercise of their duties and not a few privileges. The twomain arguments justifying why neither individual bishops nor the Bishops’ Conference in Myanmar raised their voices against the unjust situation and themany human rights violations in the country were, firstly, the fear of personal consequences and, secondly, the fear of losing the relative freedom and tran-quillity that the Catholic community enjoyed.45

The tactic of restraint was the first to be applied by Christians during thedemonstrations of September 2007. Reports appeared to the effect that “theChristians in the north of Burma are showing remarkable restraint”, “althoughthe protests of the monks in Burma against the high-handedness of the militaryjunta are escalating”.46 This report refers to the Baptists in Kachin State, who havethe largest Christian church, although the same could be said of the Catholic com-munity too. Since the “saffron” demonstrations, however, a change is becomingevident in the attitude of the Catholic Church of Myanmar. In public commentson the political situation in the country the tactic of non-intervention has beenat least partially abandoned.

3.1 Relations between religions in MyanmarThe conclusions of the 2004 study47 regarding the relations between the variousdifferent religions in the country continue to apply. There are constant disputes between the adherents of the various religions and between the Christian de-nominations themselves. And it is still the Muslims in Burma who are subjectedto the severest restrictions, discrimination and persecution. The InternationalReligious Freedom Report states, for example, that the term “Muslim” on thegovernment-issued ID cards that every citizen and permanent resident must

1988 to demonstrate against the dictatorship and the economic decline it hadbrought about, the protests were bloodily suppressed. The universities were relo-cated from the towns to the countryside and divided up into the smallest possibleunits with a lower educational level. There were no longer to be any large, centrallysituated universities that could act as breeding grounds for educated “insurgents”.However, the military regime never really succeeded in dousing the flame of the“1988 student generation”, whose leaders inspired the demonstrations of 2007.

In 1987, after the people of Myanmar “had been suffering for decades fromrestrictions on their political rights and economic mismanagement”, the devaluation of the currency and the “abolition of controls on rice prices” inautumn 1987 were only the “trigger for political protests”.39 Although the then partyboss, Ne Win, after ruling for 26 years, stepped down first as general, then as self-appointed president, and finally as the top political figure40 in the face of persis-tent protests in July 1988, this failed to bring about the democratization of the country. During the 17-day “reign” of Ne Win’s successor, Sein Lwin, who wasknown for “his cruel measures against demonstrating students”, an estimated 3,000peaceful demonstrators were killed.41 When Lwin was also forced to resign, therewas a brief period when the democratization movement in the country seemedto be successful.42 “In many places Students’ and Monks’ Committees took overthe disintegrating administrative apparatus. Thousands of people joined in ageneral strike demanding the immediate resignation of the government and itsreplacement by an interim administration.”43 Then, on 18 September 1988, amilitary putsch led by General Saw Maung brought the predecessors of the pre-sent military junta to power, the “State Law and Order Restoration Council”,thus dashing the dreams of a democratization of the country.

“[In 1988] demonstrators were shot during military operations on the streetsof Rangoon, monks and medical personnel being among the victims. Therewas no official investigation, but according to credible estimates about3,000 people were killed during the crushing of the demonstrations in Sep-tember 1988. In the country at large 10,000 people were killed between Marchand September 1988.”44

In September 2007 the generals hesitated before resorting to violence againstthe demonstrators. This hesitation initially gave rise to hope. Many assumed thatthe generals could not afford to use violence against peaceful protests, especially protests led by Buddhist monks. The loss of face would not only beenormous in the eyes of their own population, but also of other Asian countrieswith large Buddhist communities. After all the monks enjoy the highest esteem.On 21 September 2007 hopes of a peaceful solution were boosted when the

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The Christians in Myanmar are a minority in a double sense. On the onehand they belong almost without exception to the ethnic minorities, while onthe other they are clearly a minority anyway, as they make up a low percentageof the population. Furthermore, Christians complain that they are regarded asstrangers in their own country, both by the Buddhists and the government, andare often described as such. The argument is that, unlike Buddhism, the variousChristian denominations only arrived in the country in the recent past and onthe backs of the colonial powers to boot.58 The burden of the colonial legacyis one that Christians have to bear not only in Burma, but in other Asian coun-tries as well.

3.3 The Catholic Church’s commitment to peaceAlthough the Catholic Church of Myanmar has traditionally adopted an apolitical attitude, it resorted to its most characteristic methods in order to doits bit for peace and reconciliation in the country. Every year since 2003 the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and the Protestant Myanmar Council of Churcheshave held an ecumenical week of prayer for peace and reconciliation from 28September to 4 October in Yangon.59 In autumn 2007 the bishops in Myanmar werestill insisting that next to social commitment for the people of Burma prayer wasthe only way of contributing to peace and democratization in the country. Thisemerges clearly from an interview with two Burmese bishops in Rome which wasreported by AsiaNews on 27 November 2007. When asked “what contribution canCatholics make to the cause of peace and democracy?” Archbishop Charles MaungBo of Yangon and Bishop Po Ray of Mawlamyine both referred to prayer. BishopRaymond Saw Po Ray said: “Prayer is the only thing we can offer to those who puttheir lives on the line fighting for democracy and respect for human rights.”60 Arch-bishop Bo said he was “convinced that the September incidents [were] partly theoutcome of a long campaign of prayer for peace in which the Burmese Church [had]been engaged since 2005 in all its dioceses”.61

3.3.1 Tactic of restraint has its problemsBo’s last sentence may seem cynical, though it surely was not meant to be. Forit can be interpreted as meaning that because of Christian prayers adherents ofanother religion can be motivated to let themselves be killed on the streets ortortured in prison in the struggle for a better and more humane future for thecountry. The insistence on prayer and social commitment as the only coursesof action available is justified by the following argument: “As a minority we cannot speak our mind openly, since the government is determined to crack down

carry with him at all times often results in harassment by the police or immigrationauthorities.48 The numerous repressions that the Muslims in Burma are exposedto are set out in detail in the report. The other religious communities in thecountry generally show no solidarity with the Muslim population, which is stigmatized as being radical and fundamentalist.49

But relations between Buddhists and Christians are also constantly placedunder strain as a result of attacks on the Christian minority. In some cases theharassment and discrimination meet with the approval of the Buddhist clergy.50

As late as January 2007 Christians complained “of monks co-operating with themilitary government. In Chin State 300 monks are supposed to have been sentout by the government to convert Christians to Buddhism using violent methods,and in the village of Koh Kyi in Rakhaing State a monk is said to have burneddown the village church allegedly with the support of the military.”51 There arealso constant reports of adherents of the religious minorities being used as forced labour to build a pagoda or other Buddhist monument. The site of theBuddhist building is often that of a previously destroyed structure belonging toanother religious minority.52

3.2 The state and religious minoritiesThe attitude of the military junta to the religious minorities, which are also thecountry’s ethnic minorities, seems to be hardening rather than softening. InJanuary 2007 the Sunday Telegraph carried the headline: “Burma ‘orders Christiansto be wiped out’.”53 In October 2007 AsiaNews featured the headline: “Myanmar juntaattempts to ‘cancel’ Christians and Muslims”.54 The Sunday Telegraph article reported on a secret document headed “Programme to destroy the Christianreligion in Burma”,55 which may have been leaked from a government ministry.The text of the document begins with the words “There shall be no home wherethe Christian religion is practised”56 and calls for anyone caught evangelizing tobe imprisoned. The Sunday Telegraph supposes that the document, which was passed on to it by human rights groups, “may be the work of a Buddhist groupworking in tandem with the military government”. Although the governmenthas denied authorship of the document, it made no public efforts to refute orreject its contents. AsiaNews reported there was a fear that the military regimewas aiming to restrict the rights of the religious minorities, “starting with theright to vote”. Thus members of the religious minorities have difficulties in get-ting an ID card. Some express the concern “that the government perhaps meansto exclude us – if we are not allowed to register, we are practically non-existent,which in turn could lead to serious difficulties in exercising the right to vote andgaining access to the public health service”.57

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3.3.2 Are the Catholic clergy entitled to engage in political activities?Since the emergence of Latin American liberation theology in the second halfof the last century the debate within the church on the political engagement ofclerics has intensified. There is now a discussion as to whether and to what extentthe Catholic clergy should or must become politically active.

The nature of the relationship between church and state is also a matter ofcontroversy in Asia. An example of the view taken by some Asian bishops andtheologians that direct interference by the church in state affairs must be absolute-ly rejected may be seen in a talk given by a Vietnamese bishop, Paul Bui Van Doc,at a Misereor conference65 held in co-operation with the Vietnamese Academyof Social Sciences (VASS) at Hanoi in October 2007.66 In order to demonstrate therightness of his view, the bishop quoted from Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical “Deuscaritas est”, which says: “A just society must be the achievement of politics, notof the Church.”67 Bishop Van Doc goes on to stress:

“The church is increasingly coming round to the realization that her task isof a pastoral and not a political nature. She does not intend to interfere inthe internal affairs of any country. The church is organized to meet the reli-gious needs of the faithful, while the political community creates rela-tionships and structures that serve the common good on earth.”68

Bishop Van Doc is right to assert that the task of the church is a pastoral one,but it does not follow from this that the responsibility of the church is in no waypolitical. For the question arises as to what responsibility the local church of acountry bears – not only in a pastoral but also in a political sense – if the govern-ment fails to attend to the common good, and no external political efforts areable to put an end to this unjust situation. The following passage cited by thebishop from the encyclical gives no satisfactory answer: “The church cannot andmust not take upon herself the political battle to bring about the most just society possible. She cannot and must not replace the state. Yet at the same timeshe cannot and must not remain on the sidelines in the fight for justice.”69 Theaction to be taken by the Church, according to Pope Benedict XVI, is to deploy“rational argument” as part of the “struggle for reason” and to arouse “spiritualforces”. Under an unjust regime rational argument by itself – especially if con-ducted in public – can be a political act resulting even in political persecution.This applies to Myanmar as much as to other dictatorships. Furthermore, we have seen in Myanmar that the regime is not open to rational argument in the service of justice and the common good and simply does not permit a “strugglefor reason”. Also, in many situations involving political repression it is not aquestion of taking the political battle on oneself, but of assuming political

on any form of dissent. We want to continue to exist as a community and therefore must keep a low profile and be very careful.”62

Although there are reasons for a tactic of restraint, it must not be overlookedthat it acts as a stabilizer for one of the world’s most cruel dictatorships. Thosewho remain silent in the face of the harshest repression and flagrant injustice areindirectly assenting to the actions of the dictators and make themselves guiltyby association. Furthermore, since September 2007 the restraint argument has lost its cogency, even if it is obvious that the Christian community inBurma wants to survive – which is harder for it as a minority than it is for the Buddhist majority – as it is now clear that even the Buddhist clergy is notimmune to persecution by the regime. And as we know from painful experience,silence or restraint in a dictatorship is one of the best guarantees for a long periodof repression. Even if the Buddhist majority in Burma is not so easy to bring to heelas the religious minorities, a Buddhist is not safe from persecution either. Those whowere killed, beaten and thrown into prison in September were mainly Buddhists.

Archbishop Bo’s explanation that “the problem is that we must keep a lowprofile across the board if we want to continue our work. For this reason Iencouraged every diocese to join in prayer rather than take to the streets. We are a small minority and must keep this in mind”63 is not altogether convincing. There can be no question of “must”. The Church is not forced to takeits decisions. The reference to the minority status must not become an excuse forinaction, however self-deprecating. In addition, the Church might perhaps “haveto” concern itself less with matters of welfare, education and health if the statewere to get another government.

Naturally it is easier for outsiders to pass judgement and call for action thanit is for those who by so doing might make themselves targets of repression anddiscrimination. In this sense outside criticism is always unjust. In no way shouldthe power of prayer be denied. But even if the Catholic Church still insists onprayer as the sole possibility of action, its attitude is changing. The very fact thatthe two bishops gave an interview (cf. 3.3) bears witness to that. In it they spokefrankly and clearly about the situation in the country, thus criticizing the military regime. They also expressed their respect and recognition for the actionof the Buddhist monks. Said Archbishop Bo: “They became people's spokesmen”and he added “in our hearts we were close to the Buddhist monks”, an expres-sion of solidarity which is by no means a matter of course among the religionsin Myanmar.64

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responsibility for the good of the community and the Church. For such casesCatholic canon law does afford the clergy possible courses of political action.

Can. 285 §3 of the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church forbids clerics“to assume public office whenever it means sharing in the exercise of civilpower”.70 At the same time “clerics are always to do their utmost to foster amongthe people peace and harmony based on justice”.71 The following paragraph ofcanon law makes clear what restrictions apply to this. Can. 287 §2 states thatpriests “are not to play an active role in political parties or in directing tradeunions”. But political work is not restricted by allegiance to a party or trade union.In any case, if a Christian church in a country like Myanmar speaks up loud and clear on the subject of the unjust situation created by the military regime,strictly speaking this is already an act with strong political dimensions. Interestinglyenough, the general prohibition quoted above is given a remarkable qualification.After the words “directing trade unions” the sentence continues:

“unless, in the judgement of the competent ecclesiastical authority, thisis required for the defence of the rights of the Church or to promote thecommon good.”72

If looked at in a positive light in relation to the situation in Myanmar, thiscan mean that the bishop of a diocese is perfectly entitled to allow a priest tobe active in the opposition party so as to promote the common good which iscompletely disregarded by Burma’s rulers. Such a possibility is also expressly con-firmed by the “Münster Commentary on the Codex Iuris Canonici”. Section 6of the Commentary on Can. 287 § 2 states: “[...]‘exceptional cases’ [which canlead to a priest engaging in party-political activity may be deemed to exist] ‘ifantidemocratic forces were to threaten the public space necessary for the exer-cise of human rights or prevent – albeit covertly – the preaching of the gospeland no lay people were available to take action’.”73 That these are not the only“exceptional cases” and that priests can engage in political activity even whenthere is no shortage of lay people is made clear by the Commentary when it citesas an example the priests who were politically active (if not necessarily in a party-political sense) “in many communities, districts, etc., of the former GDR (“German Democratic Republic”) after its collapse”…“whose participation in the‘round tables’ was not necessitated by the absence of lay people, but was due tothe fact that they were among the few people who inspired confidence”. On thebasis of such examples the Commentary concludes: “Exceptions to the afore-said prohibitions may be indicated for various reasons.”74 If, however, direct poli-tical engagement by the clergy is protected under canon law under certain con-ditions, how much more justified are “indirect” political activities, such as

publicly stigmatizing the abuse of power. Pope Benedict XVI acted politicallyon 30 September 2007 when in the face of the bloody suppression of nation-wide demonstrations in Myanmar he addressed a clear appeal to those inpower in Myanmar to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. In a sense the highest dignitary and office-holder of the Catholic Church joined in an appealwhich the Archbishop of Yangon had issued some days earlier.

3.3.3 New political engagement by Catholics in local church There were also outward signs of a change in the attitude or tactics of theCatholic Church of Myanmar in the face of an unjust regime. This was madeclear, for example, by the public comments on the political events of September2007. Furthermore, in these joint comments the Christian churches showeda rare degree of solidarity, unity and unanimity.

At the beginning of October, UCA News (Union of Catholic Asian News)reported that a letter had been sent by the Archbishop of Yangon, Charles MaungBo, who is also General Secretary of the Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar, and Arch-bishop Samuel Mahn San Si Htay, President of the Myanmar Council of Churches,to the head of state, General Than Shwe.75 The letter contained an appeal to: “treatthis case with paternal love and by peaceful means so as to ensure stability, peaceand non-violence, which is also the wish of the people.” Even if the appeal of thetwo archbishops on behalf of all Christians living in the country sounds extremelycautious, it must not be overlooked that the two men were going out on a limb,which in Myanmar can always entail personal consequences.

The archbishops’ letter of 28 September 2007 had been preceded two daysearlier by an appeal of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Myanmar to allmembers of the Church to pray for their country.76 This letter, signed by theGeneral Secretary, Archbishop Bo, and the Chairman of the Bishops’ Conference,Archbishop Paul Zinghtung Grawng, in which the bishops make clear the posi-tion of the Catholic Church of Myanmar with regard to the present situation inthe country, states:

“3. In accordance with the Canon Law and Social Teachings of the Catho-lic Church priests and religious believers are not involved in any party politicsand in the current protests.

4. Catholics, as citizens of the country, are free to act as they deem fit. Theclergy and religious believers can give proper guidance.”77

On 6 October 2007 the British Catholic weekly The Tablet reported that theArchbishop of Yangon was tear-gassed by troops dispersing a crowd of protesters:“Archbishop Charles Maung Bo, his eyes streaming, was forced to flee from SulePagoda in central Rangoon when troops fired tear gas on the crowds in an attempt

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to disperse them.”78 As we have already quoted the archbishop more than onceas being clearly opposed to clerics taking part in demonstrations against the regi-me, we may assume that Charles Bo was not present at Sule Pagoda as a demonstrator. Yet it is also clear from the article in The Tablet thatthe archbishop had not gone out of his way to avoid political demonstrations either. Otherwise he would hardly have fallen victim to the military’s tear gas.This shows a degree of courage and personal commitment that gives sufficientgrounds for hope for the future of the Church in Myanmar to outweigh theconstantly repeated arguments dictated by tactics and fear that are intendedto justify the restraint and indeed the passivity of the Catholic Church.

The fact that Bishop Bo is finding support in his own ranks for his new “poli-cy” of courage is made clear by a report in AsiaNews to the effect that Catholicsand even a few priests went along with the monks and other demonstrators.79 Localsources reported, according to AsiaNews, that Catholic schoolchildren and studentshad joined in demonstrations in Yangon and Mandalay. Priests had apparently visited monks to express their support for them.

4. Support for democratizationIf the people of a country set out to improve their own situation, if a church hasthe courage not to keep out of it, but to express clearly its solidarity with thosewho are making a stand, these people should receive all the assistance they canget from the outside world to achieve their aims, at least in the longer term. Forthe events of September 2007 have shown that although the initiative to bringabout changes may come from within Burma itself, the forces of change in thecountry are not sufficient to achieve it. Outside assistance is necessary to thedemocratization process in the country. It is immaterial if people in Myanmarprobably hope in the first instance for more peace, a higher standard of living,enough to eat, etc., instead of for more democracy,80 as such things are more like-ly to be attained in a democracy than under the present military dictatorship,which uses the poverty of the population as an instrument to retain power. Furthermore the word “democracy” has an exotic ring for people who often havelittle education and have spent much or even all of their lives in a dictatorshipcompletely cut off from the rest of the world.

If the lives of the people in Myanmar are ultimately to change in the direction of more freedom, justice and a greater share in shaping their destiny,a democratization process is needed which forces inside and outside the countrymust strive to promote, support and implement.

Given the scale of the present study it is only possible to list some of the chal-lenges and recommendations formulated by politicians and experts. The focushere is on the Catholic Church of Myanmar and the aid agencies that support it.An exhaustive account of the international reactions to the violent suppressionof the peaceful protests as well as of the challenges presented in Myanmar by themilitary regime, the opposition, etc. has been provided by the International Crisis Group.81

4.1 Challenges for international policyIn September 2007, Human Rights Watch published an extensive catalogue ofrecommendations containing concrete proposals for the UN Human RightsCouncil, the European Union, the Association of South-East Asian Nations(ASEAN), and individual governments. Human Rights Watch justified this step,which was unusually indirect for it as an organization, by referring to “dozens ofgood faith recommendations to the government that have been systematicallyignored”.82

One proposal made by Human Rights Watch is to impose comprehensivesanctions designed to hit the military regime and the forces in the country that support it. But the advisability of economic sanctions, which often just make the situation of an already impoverished population even worse, remainsa matter of doubt.

4.1.1 Economic sanctions The 2004 study pointed out what consequences economic sanctions would

have on a population like Burma’s, which was living on or below the povertyline.83 Such boycotts could only be effective if Myanmar’s great friend andneighbour China and other countries like India84 went along with them,85 butthere is no sign of that happening, especially in the case of China. In an inter-view for the German newspaper taz the Myanmar expert Hans-Bernd Zöllner dis-misses as “completely unhelpful and counterproductive” the “reflexive” resortto sanctions as a reaction to political events in Myanmar,86 saying: “I never metanyone in Burma who thought sanctions would do any good – and I didn’t speakto a single friend of the regime.” Zöllner’s opinion is confirmed, for example, byan article in Der Spiegel, in which Jürgen Kremb reports on a meeting in Yangonorganized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. None of the Burmese guests, whoincluded members of the opposition, spoke in favour of economic sanctions. DerSpiegel quotes a Burmese as saying: “They [the EU and U.S.] must throttle the gener-als with mobile phones, the Internet and trips abroad.”87

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Asked what concrete action was to be taken if economic boycotts would nothelp, Zöllner replied: “Anyone who wants to show solidarity with Burmashould find out about it, go there, hand out cash to the right people, and thenreport on their impressions.” Zöllner’s judgement is harsh when he says: “Ourpoliticians should also begin by finding out about it. Our politicians haven’t aclue.” Zöllner is right to recommend abandoning the “visa boycott against juntagenerals”. Even if one proposal sounds naïve – inviting the generals to Germanyand the U.S. to show them “how well democracy works and how to managean economy”88 – it is not without a certain logic. If sanctions do not help, ifUN Security Council resolutions are repeatedly blocked or “watered down” byRussia and China, if the economic interests of countries like India and Chinasupport the regime indirectly or directly, new avenues will have to be explored,however naïve they may sound.

4.1.2 Regime change in MyanmarHow fast it is feasible or desirable to bring about political change in Myanmar isa question to which answers vary. At the moment military intervention from out-side would probably be the sole possibility of bringing about an immediate or rapidchange in the political situation. However, such a solution is not desirable, as theU.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown. The alternative is slowand peaceful change, which must be supported by and required of the democraticforces within Burma itself and all governments and organizations outside Burma.This, however, will be a democratization process that will require staying poweron the part of all concerned. In the above-mentioned interview Zöllner made thefollowing comment:

“The only rational [future] scenario is for the ruling ‘bad guys’ to get theopportunity to go through with their road map, i.e. draft a constitution andhold a referendum that has nothing to do with democracy, but will facili-tate a certain stability and a measure of legal security. In this way things mayget a bit better in 10 to 15 years, perhaps, if domestic and external forcesco-operate. I don’t like the scenario, but I see no other realistic way.”89

The opinion that changes in Burma are only possible with the military isalso shared by other Burma experts, such as Yang Razali Kassim of the Centrefor Political Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang University.90 Furthermore, the opposition, and especially its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, must face the fact thatprocesses of change will initially only be possible with the “enemy”, i.e. thegenerals. It’s already clear that this is going to be a difficult balancing act. On

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the one hand there is the danger of being taken over by the generals, at leastas far as appearances are concerned. On the other hand, if one tries too hardto keep one’s distance there is a danger of this resulting in unproductive“non-co-operation”.

The scenario outlined by Zöllner may sound pessimistic, but it seems to bethe only realistic one if our aim is to conduct a democratization process peace-fully and successfully. After all democracy in Burma first has to be “learned”. Theopposition in the country has had no opportunity of gaining any practical experience of democratic governance. This is one of the great challenges facingthe reform movement: how to prepare itself for democratic politics in such a waythat after the change of regime the country does not end up plunged into newchaos or in the grip of a different kind of dictatorship.

4.1.3 Challenges for the ASEAN nations91

A major responsibility to the people of Burma is borne by the Association of South-East Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member. An important step wouldbe for the ASEAN nations to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar and upholdit. In addition, Burma should be forced by the other member states to complywith the charter that the ASEAN nations adopted at their 13th summit inNovember 2007.92 Even if this charter has disappointed some politicians of themember states, such as Indonesia’s foreign minister Alatas, who has describedit as “watered down”,93 it must be ensured that its requirements, such as they are,are adhered to. There is to be a human rights commission, for example. This isan important step for the region, even if no sanction mechanisms are in placeto deal with violations any more than there is a time frame for setting up thecommission.94 In order to lend emphasis to the requirements of the charter, Burmamust not only be threatened with expulsion from the Association in the event of violations, but the threat must also be carried out. This is only anindication of the many possibilities – so far little used – which the ASEANnations have of exerting more influence on the military regime in Myanmar.

4.1.4 Challenges for the European Community (EC) The “EC-Burma/Myanmar Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013)”, which was pub-lished in 2007, mentioned education and health as “focal sectors”. In justifyingtheir choice of priorities the authors write: “Taking into account the political situation, good governance should be treated as a cross-cutting issue and the Commission’s assistance programmes must systematically integrate the promotionof democracy and human rights.”95 One can only hope that despite the political

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events of autumn 2007 the EC will stick to its strategy of critical promotion and,indeed, intensify it.

4.1.5 Challenges for the Federal Republic of GermanyDuring her visit to India in late October 2007 Chancellor Angela Merkel calledupon the military regime in Burma to introduce democratic reforms and othermeasures.96 The fact that she did this while in India says something for her diplo-matic tact, as India had been one of the countries that had been supplying Bur-ma’s generals with arms until just a few weeks before.97 Furthermore, Merkel’s actionmade clear that it is not only necessary to address oneself to those in power inMyanmar, but also to talk to those governments which directly or indirectly sup-port the regime there, e.g. through economic relations. However, Merkel wouldhave to repeat her demand for the democratization of Myanmar anywhere andeverywhere before it ultimately bore any kind of fruit. A single remark cannotachieve anything. A policy of constant nagging directed also at Myanmar’sallies assumes, however, that the paramount political imperatives are not confined to the economic welfare of one’s own country. Only if one is willingto accept disadvantages for one’s own economy in order to champion the causeof a ravaged nation can one avoid becoming too dependent on economicinterests and susceptible to their influence or even blackmail. It should be addedthat it is not only the politicians that have to step up, but the people at large.For the requisite attitude is “unpopular” and can only be maintained by a govern-ment that has popular backing at home. But how prepared are the Germans topay an economic price to help the people of another country? The nurturingof a willingness to pay such a price in order to support a largely unknown nationrequires many years of lobbying not only by the government, but also by thevarious aid and other agencies in Germany, with the focus on young people.The creation of such an attitude must therefore start in the schools.

How difficult it is to enter into dialogue with dictators is shown by an initiative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. This “German mediation initiative”was reported by the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung as “ruffling feathers” in theEuropean Union (EU) even before it took place. The Foundation works togetherwith the Myanmar Institute for Strategic and International Studies, which is attached to the Burmese Foreign Ministry, and this was the third time the twoinstitutions had brought together representatives of Myanmar and the EC. “Theaim was to overcome the inability to engage in dialogue and explore ‘ways ofcreating a new basis of trust’.”98 This time a perfectly sensible initiative was doomed to failure as the fear that Myanmar’s rulers would instrumentalize sucha meeting proved to be justified. Under the headline “Friedrich Ebert Foundation

falls into junta’s propaganda trap”, Spiegel-Online for 9 October 2007 describeshow “difficult it is to deal with dictators”.99 The previously reached agreementthat “nothing shall appear in the press on the content of the talks”, was nothonoured by the generals. Both the evening news and the following day’s edition of the junta’s official organ, New Light of Myanmar, reported on the meeting in such a way that, according to Spiegel, one can only wonder “why theSocial Democrats and their guests did not simply stand up and walk out”.100 Inspite of what happened, members of the opposition in Yangon defend the initi-ative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which had invited them to a meetingin Yangon’s Savoy Hotel. “This regime will be brought to its knees by openness,not isolation,”101 said a member of the opposition in defence of the work of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Myanmar. What cannot be defended, however,are the remarks of the leader of the delegation, Christian Hauswedell, a formerAsia Co-ordinator of the German government,102 who told Der Spiegel about theSavoy meeting: “The media are dramatizing this to some extent.” Hausweddel’snext sentence was reported by Jürgen Kremb as follows: “The generals [had] onlyused violence with extreme restraint.”103

4.2 The task of the Church in MyanmarIf one wants to turn people who have spent much or all of their lives under amilitary dictatorship into responsible citizens, i.e. to prepare them properly for lifein a democracy, one must help them to experiment with democratic structureson a small scale. This is where the Catholic Church of Myanmar can play its partby examining its own organizational structures to see whether they encouragea sense of shared responsibility among the laity or whether the latter are kept ina state of dependence by priests and members of religious orders so that they areunable to practise either responsibility or democracy in the ecclesiastical field. Theelection of parish councils and officials in all parishes, for example, would be animportantstep towards enabling the laity to exercise responsibility and pro-mote their capacity for independent action. Also, the training not only of priestsand monks but of lay people in the fields of political science, peace studies, conflict-management, overcoming trauma, etc. would be an important steptowards preparing the Church’s own members for the democratization process andpossibly enabling them to take an active part in it.

The work of Caritas (“Karuna Myanmar Social Service”) and the Justitia etPax Commission in Myanmar will be measured by the contribution they make tothe training and consciousness-raising required to build up a democratic civilsociety.

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As regards the direct or indirect political commitment of the Church ofMyanmar, as represented by the Bishops’ Conference and individual bishops andpriests, the following should be said:104 A church or religion whose founder violated the commandments of his religious community for the sake of humanity105 must always be prepared to face the challenge of deciding which ofits own rules and commandments it is prepared to violate in order to help fore-stall a grave injustice. This also applies if in most situations its own religiousprohibitions and commandments have a rational and/or religious justification.

Fear is usually a poor counsellor, especially when it comes to standing up forjustice and peace. This also applies to those who prefer to continue living in theirpresent circumstances, which they regard as tolerable if unsatisfactory, than totake the risk of working for a more humane future.

4.3 Challenges for aid agenciesThe careful handling of donated funds requires that the staff of the aid agencies operating in Myanmar should be intimately familiar with the situationthere. The extent of the oft-cited “administrative costs”, including such itemsas travel expenses, must not be used as an argument against that. Knowledge of the facts is essential to competent counselling and the processing of projectapplications. Local churches especially, working as they do in difficult political,social or cultural circumstances, sometimes require outside help in seeing theirway to adopting new perspectives, possible courses of action, problem-solvingstrategies, etc. Relief organizations can only provide this sort of assistance if theyhave experts available for the purpose. Moreover, in conducting a dialoguewith ecclesiastical or secular partners in Myanmar they must be able to set aside their own expectations and standards wherever necessary and possible soas not to demand too much from their partners and make allowance for theircapacities. This also means training their partners – or arranging for their training– in project administration, setting up systems of application processing andreporting, and financial administration.

Another proposal that should be mentioned concerns South-South or South-North encounters. It is the responsibility of the local church – and also of the aidagencies – to facilitate encounters with the local churches of other countries whichhave had to – or are still having to – face comparable political challenges and mayhave come up with some solutions. These encounters should be arranged not onlyamong the clergy, but also among selected lay people in order to develop visionsfor another Burma. Such encounters will also involve facing up to inconvenientquestions and challenges, communicating, listening to others describe their ownexperience, and applying the lessons to one’s own situation.

5. Closing remarks

Even now, some six months after the bloody suppression of the peaceful protests of September 2007 “over 700 demonstrators [are] in jail, and others arearrested almost daily”. And “the Internet is subject to ever stricter control.”106

Many Buddhist monasteries have been more or less abandoned, while importantsocial institutions formerly run by Buddhist monks have been closed down.

In the long term we can help the people of Myanmar by not leaving themin the lurch and doing what we can to help facilitate a peaceful and long-termdemocratization process at all levels – and by still being at it in a year’s time.

To date many countries have pursued a policy of sanctions and exclusiontowards the military junta. How dangerous it can be to attempt a new tactic ofrapprochement is shown by the example of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Butsince twenty years of exclusion and sanctions have brought no improvementin the situation of the people of Myanmar, the time seems to have come to pursue other strategies, perhaps involving a policy of positive incentives, andmore especially a tough but real dialogue with the generals and with China. Aspart of this dialogue we should, as Zöllner rightly points out, try to talk to theyounger generation: “As far as the younger generation is concerned, we mustnot forget that the military academies are the best universities in the country,and that some of the generals have experience of other Asian countries.”107 Theimportance of such a dialogue is underscored by the International Crisis Group:

“The most important means for the long-term promotion of peace, demo-cracy and comprehensive development is critical dialogue with the regimeand other groups, which, however, both the West and regional forces havefailed to engage in.”108

The International Crisis Group is absolutely right when it argues that thegenerals’ isolation can only be broken down by means of critical dialogue so asto give them the confidence to think of new ways forward.

Developing new strategies is the task of the international community and ofindividual governments. This will involve visiting Myanmar, whether as a politi-cian, a church representative, or simply as a tourist, and then to report on and discusswhat one has seen and experienced. This is the time for church aid agencies to makea great effort to offer counsel to the various ecclesiastical denominations in Burmaand give them unbureaucratic, rapid and sustained assistance.

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Codex des kanonischen Rechtes (Codex of Canon Law)Latin-German edition with index. Published by: Ecclesia Catholica, [auctoritate Ioannis PauliPP. II. promulgatus] for the German and Berlin Bishops’ Conferences ... German translationand index done for the German Bishops’ Conference by the following group of translators appointed by it: Winfried Aymans .... 3rd revised and expanded edition. Kevelaer, 1989.

Heinz Bechert 1995“Das Lieblingsvolk Buddhas”: Buddhisten in Birma (“Buddha’s favourite people: Buddhists in Burma”), in: Der Buddhismus: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Buddhism Past and Present). Published by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich, 2nd unrevised edition, Munich, 169-189.

Heinz Bechert 2000Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada-Buddhismus. Band II: Birma, Kambodscha, Laos, Thailand. (Buddhism, state and society in the countries of Theravada Buddhism.Volume II: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand.) New edition with supplements and index of names and subjects. Göttingen. (Publications of the Seminar für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde, University of Göttingen 8).

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Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2008Zahlen, Fakten, Daten. (Figures, facts, dates.) Edited by Eva Berié, Christin Löchel, Gero von der Stein, Thomas Steinhoff. Frankfurt a. M., 2007.

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Münsterischer Kommentar (Münster Commentary) 1996Heinrich J. F Reinhardt. Friedensförderung, Parteien und Gewerkschaften (Peace promotion, parties and trade unions, 287/1-4, in: Münsterischer Kommentar zum Codex Iuris Canonici. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtslage in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz (Münster Commentary on the Codex Iuris Canonici. With special reference to the legal situation in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Published by Klaus Lüdicke. Essen, 1985. Vol. 2 (cann. 204-459). Book II (Das Volk Gottes [The People of God]). Part I (Die Christ-gläubigen [The Christian Faithful]), Supplement 26 to the CODEX, November 1996.

Susanne Prager 1994Myanmar/Birma, in: Handbuch der Dritten Welt. Volume 7 (Third World Handbook): Süd-asien und Südostasien (South Asia and South-East Asia). Published by Dieter Nohlen, Franz Nuscheler. 3rd fully revised edition, Bonn, 259-286.

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Paul Bui Van Doc 2007Building Social Justice According to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church. Talk given on 16 October 2007 at the international Conference on “Social Justice, Social Responsibility and Social Solidarity”. Organized by MISEREOR, Aachen, Germany, and the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15-16 October 2007, Hanoi, Vietnam.

Articles and reports in periodicalsAngela Köckritz 27 September 2007

Die Waffen der Friedfertigen (The Weapons of the Peacemakers), in Die Zeit, No. 40.

Robert Mickens 6 October 2007Burma. Benedict XVI urges peaceful solution for Burma, in The Tablet, 30.

Hans-Bernd Zöllner 26 September 2007Macht der Ohnmächtigen. In Burma basiert die Gesellschaft auf einer Gemeinschaft von Mönchen und Mächtigen (The Power of the Powerless. Society in Burma is based on a Community of Monks and Power-holders), in Süddeutsche Zeitung.

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Jochen Buchsteiner 21 November 2007Gipfeltreffen. Zwist in der “Asean-Familie” (Summit. Discord in the “Asean family”), in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~ED32185A1DFBF4F5BB3C34A2EDAB2D014~ATp|~Ecommon~Scontent.html?rss_aktuell [22 November 2007].

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Jürgen Kremb 9 October 2007 15:19Burma: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung tappt in Propagandafalle der Junta (Friedrich Ebert Foundation blunders into junta’s propaganda trap), in SPIEGEL ONLINEhttp://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,510327,00.html [11 October 2007].

Kate MacGeown 9 October 2007 10:44What Burma wants from the world, in BBC News.http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/7033911.stm [10 October 2007]

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Mizzima News 12 December 2007India, Burma to sign MoU for IT enhancement centre.http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/News/2007/Dec/29,%20Dec,%202007.html [13 December 2007].

Wai Moe 27 November 2007India Suspends All Arms Sales to Burma, in: The Irrawaddy.http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_page.php?art_id=9432 [28 November 2007].

Peter Mühlbauer 6 October 2007Mönche und brennende Moscheen. Die Rolle des organisierten Buddhismus in Myanmar und sein Verhältnis zum Staat (Monks and burning mosques. The role of organized Buddhism in Myanmar and its relations with the state), in Telepolis.http://www.heise.de/bin/tp/issue/r4/dl-artikel2.cgi?artikelnr=26349&mode=print [29 October 2007].

Bernd Musch-Borowska 22 October 2007 18:09Militärregierung wirbt für Kompromissbereitschaft. Wie kann es weitergehen in Burma? (Military government appeals for compromise. What next in Burma?), in Tagesschau.http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/birma300.htlm [22 October 2007].

Bernd Musch-Borowska 31 January 2008 14:19Ein halbes Jahr nach den Massenprotesten in Burma. “Das Morden muss aufhören” (Half a year after the mass protests in Burma. “The murdering must cease”), in Tagesschau.http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/birma322.htlm [31 January 2008].

Peter Pattisson 21 January 2007 12:02Burma “orders Christians to be wiped out”, in Sunday Telegraph.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=NGI0X1IKEQIODQFIQMFSFGGAVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2007/01/21/wburma21.xml [3 January 2009].

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Notes1 Based on the following sources: CIA – The World Factbook 2007 – Burma; Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2008.2 Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, 341 gives the area as 676.52 sq km.3 2005 figure. Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, 341. CIA – The World Factbook 2007 – Burma, 3 gives a figure

of only 47,373,958.4 “Burmans” throughout this text refers to the ethnic majority in Burma. The word “Burmese”, on the other

hand, means all inhabitants of Burma. The adjectives “Burman” and “Burmese” are used likewise.5 2007 figures6 Cf. e.g. also: Auswärtiges Amt – Myanmar 2007. Homepage of the Military Government in Yangon7 The figures correspond to those issued by the government. Cf. International Religious Freedom Report 2006:

Burma, 1. Divergent figures are given in CIA – The World Factbook 2007 – Burma, 4, where Christians and Muslims are just given 4% each. See also: Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, 341, which gives the proportion ofChristians as 5.6% and that of Muslims as 3.6% (1992 figures).

8 The difficulties of describing a country that has not only been forgotten by the world but also had to endure thehardships of decades of military dictatorship begin with the name itself. “No matter what name one chooses, theeffect is dissatisfying. ‘Burma’ was the name given to the country by the Portuguese on the basis of the term ‘Mbirma’ which they had taken from the language of the Mon. The British colonial masters spoke of ‘Burma’, whichwas derived from ‘bama’, a term commonly used in India. Since 1989 the country has officially been called Myan-mar. The government thus meant to emphasize ‘the country’s own identity as against the name bequeathed bythe colonialists and its cultural variety.’ [Klemens Ludwig: 1997, 11] For Myanmar is a multinational state. But ‘thenon-Burman peoples and many members of the opposition, in particular, reject this change of name, which theyregard as eyewash. Furthermore, linguists derive ‘Myanmar’ from ‘Bama’, which still only applies to the Burmans.’[Klemens Ludwig: 1997, 11] So as neither to obey the military diktat nor to avoid the official name altogether, bothBurma and Myanmar are used to refer to the country in this text, even though ‘Burma’, the term used by the for-mer British colonial power, is unpopular within the country.” Anne Schreiber: 2004, 3f.

9 Heinz Bechert: 1995, 16910 Cf. Heinz Bechert: 1995, 169

3130

11 “Because of the resistance of China and Russia” the UN Security Council was not even able to agree on a “sharp condemnation of the human rights violations committed by the military junta in Burma”. Instead “afterdays of wrangling” it “merely issued a watered-down declaration” on 11 October 2007. Frankfurter Rundschau,12 October 2007 09:57. See also United Nations Security Council SC/9139 11 October 2007.

12 Anne Schreiber: 200413 International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 114 Cf. e.g. World Development Indicators, World Bank 1 July 2006, World’s 50 Poorest Countries – Infoplease 2007,

Human Development Report 200615 CIA – The World Factbook 2007 – Burma, 816 Cf. e.g. International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma; Human Rights Watch World Report 2007. Asia.

Burma; Burma. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2006; Amnesty International. Annual Report2007; Amnesty International Annual Report 2007 – Myanmar; Religious Freedom World Report. Burma2004; DAGA Dossier 2001; Homepage of the Free Burma Coalition; Homepage of the Free Burma Net

17 The Irrawaddy, 3 September 200718 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007. Asia. Burma19 Cf. e.g. Aung Zaw: 5 October 2007, 8 or Angela Köckritz: 27 September 200720 Angela Köckritz: 27 September 200721 Angela Köckritz: 27 September 200722 In Theravada Buddhism sangha, Sanskrit and Pali “crowd, host” refer to the community of monks and, where

applicable, nuns23 Cf. Bechert: 200024 On the Buddhist tradition in Burma and political Buddhism, its ideology and cultural policy, see the work of

Heinz Bechert: 2000. Cf. e.g. also Aung Zaw: 5 October 2007, and Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200725 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200726 It is not possible to proceed against monks without first depriving them of their status. The military thinks it

can do this by stripping the monks of their robes and dressing them in normal clothes27 It is presumed that up to 300 monks have been arrested and sentenced since 1988. Cf. Aung Zaw: 5 October 2007, 128 Cf. e.g. Emanuel Sarkisyanz: 1965, 5f. and Heinz Bechert: 2000, 3f29 Anne Schreiber: 2004, 530 Cf. e.g. International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 2ff31 International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 232 International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 233 Cf. e.g. Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200734 Cf. e.g. Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200735 Human Rights Watch, December 2007, 28f36 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200737 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 26 September 200738 A detailed account of the events of September 2007 in Burma may be found in Human Rights Watch,

December 2007. See also the account in International Crisis Group, 31 January 2008.39 Susanne Prager: 1994, 26540 CIA – The World Factbook 2007 – Burma, 241 Cf. Susanne Prager: 1994, 265. See also Amnesty International. Annual Report 1989, 325-33242 Cf. Susanne Prager: 1994, 26543 Susanne Prager: 1994, 265 44 Human Rights Watch, 25 September 2007, 245 Cf. Anne Schreiber: 2004, 21f46 kachinnews, 20 September 200747 Anne Schreiber: 200448 International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 449 Cf. e.g. Schreiber: 2004, 6f50 It cannot be excluded that excesses are also committed by Christians against Buddhists51 Peter Mühlbauer: 6 October 2007, 352 Cf. e.g. International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Burma, 6 and Peter Mühlbauer: 6 October 2007, 253 Peter Pattisson: 21 January 2007 12:0254 AsiaNews, 27 October 2007 11:1955 Peter Pattisson: 21 January 2007 12:0256 Peter Pattisson: 21 January 2007 12:0257 AsiaNews, 27 October 2007 11:1958 Cf. e.g. Anne Schreiber: 2004, 8ff59 Cf. UCAN MY03483. 1465, 1 October 200760 Marta Allevato: 27 November 2007 15:2061 Marta Allevato: 27 November 2007 15:2062 Marta Allevato: 27 November 2007 15:2063 Marta Allevato: 27 November 2007 15:2064 Marta Allevato: 27 November 2007 15:2065 Aachen-based charity founded by the German bishops in 1958 “‘to combat hunger and disease in the world’

under the name of MISEREOR”. Cf. MISEREOR

66 An example of the church interfering in the affairs of the state may be seen in the statements of the CatholicChurch of India on the position of the Christian Dalits in the state. Dalit, a participle from the Sanskrit rootdal, means “burst”, “split up”, “destroyed” and is the term used by those formerly known in India as “Untouchables” – i.e. those right at the bottom of the cast hierarchy – to describe themselves. Another recentconcrete example of political engagement on the part of a Catholic church in Asia may be seen in the comments of the Pakistan Bishops’ Conference on the political situation in Pakistan in November 2007. In apublic statement the bishops demanded an end to the state of emergency, the restoration of the constitutio-nal order, and the release of political prisoners. Fidesdienst, 27 November 2007.

67 Benedict XVI: 2005, section 2868 Paul Bui Van Doc: 2007, 1469 Benedict XVI: 2005, section 2870 Code of Canon Law, 285 – § 371 Code of Canon Law, 287 – § 172 Code of Canon Law, 287 – § 273 Münsterischer Kommentar 1996, 287 / 3f74 Münsterischer Kommentar 1996, 287 / 475 Cf. UCAN MY03483. 1465 1 October 200776 UCAN MY03461.1464 26 September 200777 UCAN MY03461.1464 26 September 200778 Robert Mickens: 6 October 200779 AsiaNews, 28 September 2007 14:1280 Cf. e.g. Kate MacGeown, 9 October 2007 10:4481 International Crisis Group, 31 January 200882 Human Rights Watch December 2007, 11283 Schreiber: 2004, 3484 According to the India External Ministry bilateral trade between India and Burma amounts to US$ 1 billion. On

12 December 2007 Myanmar and India signed a “Memorandum of understanding for setting up a centre for devel-opment and sharing of the two countries’ information technology skills”. Mizzima News, 12 December 2007

85 Cf. also International Crisis Group, 31 January 2008, 28f86 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 30 October 200787 Jürgen Kremb: 9 October 2007 15:1988 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 30 October 200789 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 30 October 200790 Bernd Musch-Borowska: 22 October 207 18:0991 On this paragraph see also the recommendations in Human Rights Watch, December 2007, pp. 124f92 Cf. ASEAN, 200793 Cf. e.g. Jochen Buchsteiner: 21 November 200794 Cf. e.g. Nicolas Glass: 22 November 200795 EC Strategy Paper for Burma/Myanmar (2007-2013), 2296 Cf. e.g. Frankfurter Rundschau, 31 October 2007 10:3797 At the end of November India ceased all sales of arms to Myanmar. Cf. Wai Moe: 27 November 200798 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 2007, 299 Jürgen Kremb: 9 October 2007 15:19100 Jürgen Kremb: 9 October 2007 15:19101 Jürgen Kremb: 9 October 2007 15:19102 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 2007, 2103 Jürgen Kremb: 9 October 2007 15:19104 Lay people have not been mentioned here as their opportunities for direct political engagement are not doubted

by the official church.105 Cf. e.g. Gospel according to Saint Mark 2, 27f., 3, 1-6106 Bernd Musch-Borowska: 31 January 2008 14:19107 Hans-Bernd Zöllner: 30 October 2007108 International Crisis Group, 31 January 2008, 27

32

Current/Planned Publications

1 Human Rights. Religious Freedom in the People’s Republic of Chinain German (2001) – Order No. 600 201 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 211 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 221

2 Human Rights in the DR Congo: 1997 until the presentday. The predicament of the Churchesin German (2002) – Order No. 600 202 in English (2001) – Order No. 600 212 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 222

3 Human Rights in Indonesia.Violence and Religious Freedomin German (2001) – Order No. 600 203 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 213 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 223

4 Human Rights in East Timor – The Difficult Road to Statehoodin German (2001) – Order No. 600 204 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 214 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 224

5 Human Rights in Turkey – Secularism = Religious Freedom?in German (2002) – Order No. 600 205 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 215 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 225

6 Persecuted Christians? Documentation of an International Conference Berlin 14/15 September 2001in German (2002) – Order No. 600 206 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 216 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 226

7 Female Genital Mutilation – Evaluation of a Survey Conducted among Staff Members of Catholic Church Institutions in Africain German (2003) – Order No. 600 207 in English (2003) – Order No. 600 217 in French (2003) – Order No. 600 227

8 Female Genital MutilationA Report on the Present Situation in Sudanin German/in English/in French (2002) – Order No. 600 208

9 Human Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.Religious Freedomin German (2002) – Order No. 600 230 in English (2003) – Order No. 600 231 in French (2003) – Order No. 600 232

10 Human Rights in Sri Lanka.Church Endeavours for Peace and Human Dignityin German (2002) – Order No. 600 233 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 234 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 235

11 Human Rights in Zimbabwe.in German (2002) – Order No. 600 236 in English (2002) – Order No. 600 237 in French (2002) – Order No. 600 238

12 Human Rights in South Korea.in German (2003) – Order No. 600 239 in English (2005) – Order No. 600 240 in French (2005) – Order No. 600 241

13 Human Rights in Sudan.in German (2003) – Order No. 600 242 in English (2004) – Order No. 600 243 in French (2004) – Order No. 600 244

14 Human Rights in Nigeria.in German (2003) – Order No. 600 245 in English (2003) – Order No. 600 246 in French (2003) – Order No. 600 247

15 Human Rights in Rwanda.in German (2003) – Order No. 600 248 in English (2003) – Order No. 600 249 in French (2003) – Order No. 600 250

16 Human Rights in Myanmar/Burma.The Church under military dictatorshipin German (2004) – Order No. 600 251 in English (2004) – Order No. 600 252in French (2004) – Order No. 600 253

17 Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Cambodia.in German/in English/in French (2004) – Order No. 600 254

18 Human Rights in Laosin German/in English/in French (2004) – Order No. 600 257

19 Human Rights in Egyptin German (2004) – Order No. 600 260 in English (2004) – Order No. 600 261in French (2004) – Order No. 600 262

20 Turkey on the road to Europe – Religious Freedom?in German (2004) – Order No. 600 264 in English (2004) – Order No. 600 265in French (2004) – Order No. 600 266

21 Opportunities for Christian-Islamic co-operation in upholding human rights and establishing civil societiesConference in closed session 11/3/2002 – 14/3/2002, BerlinVolume 1in German (2004) – Order No. 600 268 in English (2005) – Order No. 600 269in French (2004) – Order No. 600 270

22 Opportunities for Christian-Islamic co-operation in upholding human rights and establishing civil societiesConference in closed session 11/3/2002 – 14/3/2002, BerlinVolume 2in German (2004) – Order No. 600 271 in English (2004) – Order No. 600 272in French (2004) – Order No. 600 273

23 Human rights in Liberia: A dream of freedom – the efforts of the Catholic Church for justice and peacein German (2005) – Order No. 600 274 in English (2005) – Order No. 600 275in French (2005) – Order No. 600 276