the iconicity of embodied meaning

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The iconicity of embodied meaning. Polysemyof spatial prepositions in the cognitive framework

Fieke Van der Gucht, Klaas Willems * , Ludovic De CuypereDepartment of General Linguistics, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent University,

Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium

Received 12 October 2006; received in revised form 12 December 2006; accepted 13 December 2006

Abstract

This paper examines the concept of polysemy which serves as the basis of the principled poly-semy model of spatial prepositions proposed by A. Tyler and V. Evans in a number of recent

publications [Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2001. Reconsidering prepositional polysemy networks:The case of over. Language 77, 724765; Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2003a. The case of over. In:Brigitte Nerlich, Zazie Todd, Vimala Herman, Clarke, David D., (Eds.), Polysemy. Flexible Patternsof Meaning in Mind and Language. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 99159; Tyler,Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2003b. The Semantics of English Prepositions. Spatial Scenes, EmbodiedMeaning and Cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. After situating the polysemyproblem in a historical context (its roots can be traced back at least to Leibniz discussion of Lockessemantic account of particles), some merits of Tyler and Evanss model are pointed out. Tyler andEvans support a moderate polysemy view by distinguishing more carefully between an items usesand senses than was previously done in the radical polysemy hypothesis advocated by authors work-ing in the BrugmanLakoff tradition. The paper then focuses on Tyler and Evanss criteria to pos-tulate a list of 15 distinct senses of a linguistic item, viz. the preposition over. An analysis of thecovering sense of over, which according to Tyler and Evans should be considered as a distinct sensebecause it cannot be pragmatically inferred, shows that Tyler and Evanss argument is not conclu-sive. This observation leads to the question whether the view that over is a polysemous word with axed number of distinct senses is valid beyond the cognitive model Tyler and Evans propose. Build-ing on E. Coseriu, we argue, rstly, that the cognitive model in general erroneously conceives of

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Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 9 33 12 953.E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Willems).

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

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prepositional meanings in terms of lexical rather than instrumental meanings, and that the allegeddistinct senses of the preposition over Tyler and Evans postulate are in fact utterance meanings of entire phrases and clauses; this explains the still high number of distinct senses attributed to the prep-ositional item. Secondly, we attempt to illustrate that the main reason why a battery of senses is pos-

tulated in the rst place derives from a non-linguistic criterion we term the iconicity of embodiedmeaning. This criterion prompts the linguist to accept as many distinct senses as there are prototyp-ical common sense experiences commonly associated with (or, reected by) the use of a specic lin-guistic item in various instantiations.

2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Cognitive semantics; Semantic network analysis; Polysemy; Prepositional meaning; Embodimentpostulate; Context dependent uses versus distinct senses of words; Iconicity in language; Locke vs. Leibniz;Coseriu

0. Introduction: Lockes problem and Leibniz solution

It has long been observed that words take on different senses in different contexts. Alreadyin the 17th century, this observation led several scholars to consider the question how thesemantic variation of a single linguistic item was to be accounted for. Essentially, two majorapproaches can be distinguished, which, interestingly, can also be traced back to the verybeginnings of the linguistic debate about meaningandsemantic variation in the 17th century(Coseriu, 2003, p. 213). The rst approach, arguably the most obvious one, can be found in

Book III (Of Words) of John Lockes famous Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689). For Locke, words are means to record Thoughts (or Ideas) ( Locke, 1689, III, 2,2). Locke emphasises apparently for the rst time in the history of Western thought(Coseriu, 2003, p. 206) that the meanings of words differ from language to language andthat, accordingly, words of divers languages are intranslatable (III, 5, 8). Moreover, Lockedistinguishes between words which are names of ideas in the mind and words that are madeuse of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one withanother (III, 7, 1). The latter kind of words he calls Particles, obviously because theyare functional items whose meanings are not straightforwardly assessed, unlike the mean-ingsof names which stand for simpleorcomplex ideas, e.g., motion , light or parricide and gratitude (Locke, 1689, III, 4, 810 and 5, 612). Because of the peculiar function of par-ticles (they show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts, III, 7, 3), Locke engagesina brief but revealing discussionof the meaningsof the word but in English, a particle, nonemore familiar in our language (III, 7, 5). He writes:

[But] seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several proposi-tions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable. First, But to say no more:here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite tothe end of it. Secondly, I saw but two planets; here it shows that the mind limits thesense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other. Thirdly, You pray; but it is

not that God would bring you to the true religion. Fourthly, But that he would con-rm you in your own. The rst of these buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be: the latter shows that the mind makes a directopposition between that and what goes before it. Fifthly, All animals have sense, but

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a dog is an animal: here it signies little more but that the latter proposition is joinedto the former, as the minor of a syllogism ( Locke, 1689, III, 7, 5).

Locke stresses that the ve meanings he mentions are merely a selection of all the mean-

ings but may assume in speech, for a great many other signications of this particle(Locke, 1689) might be added. Moreover, and more importantly still, he has serious mis-givings about an approach in which all these different meanings are considered manifesta-tions of a single more abstract meaning: I doubt, Locke writes, whether in all thosemanners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discretive, which grammarians giveto it (III, 7, 6).

Clearly, Lockes approach is informed by the view that meanings in use are not to bedismissed as simply variants of one underlying meaning grammarians may consider invari-ant, but that words may as well be polysemous in the rst place. Shortly after the publi-cation of Lockes Essay , his account of the meanings of but was made the subject of a no

less illuminating critical inquiry in the Nouveaux essais sur lentendement humain by Gott-fried Wilhelm Leibniz. In this treatise, Leibniz strictly fol lows the order of chapters inLockes essay and contrasts Lockes views with his own. 1 First, Leibniz observes thatLockes particles are not the only words which combine ideas or propositions; other wordswith similar functions being prepositions, conjunctions and even adverbs ( Leibniz, 1765,III, 7, 2). Second, and more important, Leibniz takes issue with Lockes claim that a par-ticle such as but has a great number of meanings instead of one meaning. Leibniz readilyadmits that it is not always possible to nd a general meaning (or: formal meaning) thatexplains all the instantiations of a particle on particular occasions (III, 7, 4). However,one should at least try to reduce all instantiations to a determinate number of meanings(un nombre determine de signications, Leibniz, 1765), Leibniz argues, obviously assum-ing that a mere taxonomic description of the many senses of a particle (or whatever kind of word) is unsatisfactory. 2 Remarkably, Leibniz writes that it would not be sufficient to takerecourse to a mere abstraction (une explication abstraite, III, 7, 5) of the particles mean-ing. From Lockes reference to the concept of discretive grammarians have attributed tobut in English, it may be assumed that here Leibniz too calls for caution as to the claims of grammarians. Instead, Leibniz argues, one ought to seek for a paraphrase (une peri-phrase) which can substitute the word on every occasion, like a denition should be ableto replace the dened expression ( Leibniz, 1765). Leibniz then goes on to apply thismethod to four of Lockes example sentences in which but each time has an allegedly dif-ferent meaning (see the quotation above). The semantic differences Locke refers to shouldnot refrain one from formulating a paraphrase which applies to all example sentences, andLeibniz claims that upon closer investigation but can be felicitously rephrased by using theformula non plus ultra, soit dans les choses, soit dans le discours ( Leibniz, 1765). More-over, according to Leibniz, the word but expresses an endpoint, a limit of a course orprocess (un terme de la carrie re, Leibniz, 1765). However, this explication is proposedas a conjecture by Leibniz, and he concludes the discussion by pointing out that, in this

1

For a number of reasons, Leibniz text was not to be published until 1765, more than 60 years after theNouveaux essais were written.2 Coseriu (2004, pp. 6371) has convincingly shown that this reasoning, which aims at going beyond the context

dependent uses of linguistic items when considering their true meaning, can be found for the rst time in Westernhistory in the writings of Aristotle.

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case like in others, language use is so variable, that in order to choose the right paraphraseall instances of the linguistic item have to be carefully analysed.

In his succinct account of Leibniz solution to Lockes problem, Coseriu (2003, pp. 212 213) points out that Leibniz method of replacing a linguistic item by an analyticparaphrase derives from a methodological principle which modern linguistics has failedto recognise. According to Coseriu, it is imperative in semantic analysis not to equatethe variable senses (or interpretations) of a word in language use with the knowledge of the meaning conveyed by the word itself. In fact, such an equation would render semanticanalysis pointless. Note, however, that Leibniz, in his criticism of Lockes treatment of thevarious meanings of but , does not a priori hypothesise that a general meaning of theparticle exists, nor does he deny that the particle takes on various senses in differentsentences. On the contrary, the observation that words have many different senses inactual speech is the starting point of Leibniz hypothesis that these senses do not constitutethe words meaning or meanings proper. The spearhead of Leibniz criticism is that oneought to seek to cover as much semantic variation of a word as possible under a singleparaphrase which renders the instances of the word in different sentences and on differentoccasions transparent.

The reason why we have started this paper by reviewing a widely forgotten chapter inthe history of semantics is that some present-day accounts of the semantics of words (lex-ical items as well as function words such as prepositions and conjunctions) appear to bevery similar to Lockes account discussed above. From our discussion, however, it mayhave become clear that such an account is in need of further clarication and that its seem-ing naturalness leaves a number of questions unanswered or, better still, unaddressed.

In this paper we advance the hypothesis that current cognitive treatments of semanticvariation largely correspond to the stance taken by Locke. Moreover we believe that thequestions raised by Leibniz vis-a -vis Locke are perfectly legitimate and also apply, mutatismutandis, to current cognitive analyses of the meaning of words. After discussing some of the problems raised by the Lockean-cognitive approach to word meanings, we would,therefore, like to advance an alternative view on semantic variation by reintroducingthe point of view advanced by Leibniz. As we saw, this point of view calls for a reductionof the various senses of a word to a limited number of meanings and, ideally speaking, to asingle unitary meaning if this is feasible. Linguists who, in the course of the last two cen-turies, subscribed to the latter view include Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ferdinand de Saus-

sure, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, and Eugenio Coseriu (see Van de Walle et al.,2006 for some discussion). In order to line up with the subject of Lockes controversialtreatment of linguistic meaning and of Leibniz alternative view, we will restrict our discus-sion to the semantics of prepositions, more specically the semantics of over, on which asubstantial (and ever increasing) body of literature already exists.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the concepts of polysemy andmonosemy in current semantic research. Section 2 zooms in on the radical polysemyhypothesis and discusses some of its drawbacks, which explain why polysemy is soughtto be attenuated in recent years. In Section 3, the moderate polysemy hypothesis proposedby Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003a,b) is briey discussed. In Section 4, it is rst explained inwhat respects the radical and the moderate hypothesis are similar to and differ from eachother. Then we focus on a key example of the moderate polysemy hypothesis, the analysisof English over by Tyler and Evans, and we demonstrate that the covering instance of over is not a distinct sense of the preposition but rather a context dependent use. In



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Section 5 we argue, drawing on Coserius work, that prepositions are not to be dened interms of lexical meanings, which are semantically self-contained, but in terms of instru-mental meanings which rely on combinations with lexical meanings. In Section 6 we sub-stantiate the view that there is a link between the embodiment postulate underlying thecognitive semantic framework on the one hand and the view in favour of polysemy (viz.distinct senses stored in semantic memory) on the other. Lastly, in Section 7, some nalconclusions are drawn.

1. Polysemy versus monosemy

Any linguist acquainted with cognitive semantics will immediately recognise the strikingsimilarity between one of its main tenets and Lockes account of the meanings of the wordbut discussed in the introduction of this paper. Like Locke, cognitive semanticists are scep-tical about the possibility, or better still the desirability, to explain the semantic variationof a linguistic item in terms of a general meaning which is instantiated in various co- andcontexts. To cognit ive semanticists (most) linguistic items are inherently polysemous, espe-cially lexical items.3 In other words, their semantic variation is a prerequisite of the exi-bility with which they are instantiated in language use, rather than a consequence of it. Inthe cognitive approach to the lexicon, polysemy is usually dened as a variety of lexicalambiguity in which the distinct senses associated with a single lexical form are semanticallyrelated (Brugman, 1997, p. 4 ). However, the distinct senses of a linguistic item referred toin Brugmans denition should be distinguished from an items context dependent uses.Whereas the former are supposed to be stored in the speakers semantic memory, the latterare a combination of the meaning of the item with additional contextual knowledge.Unlike distinct senses, context dependent uses nee d not be stored in memory and are,therefore, not regarded as evidence for polysemy. 4 In the LockeLeibniz controversythe distinction between distinct senses and context dependent uses of words is not explic-itly addressed. However, this distinction implicitly plays a role in Leibniz observation thatthe ultimate aim of any semantic enterprise is to reduce the various instantiations of aword to as small a number of meanings as possible, and, ideally, to one single meaning(Leibniz, 1765, III, 7, 2). Thus, Leibniz, unlike Locke, is aware of the fact that not all usesof a word are equally candidates for being selected as its meanings (as opposed to mere

senses in context).In the cognitive approach, polysemy is traditional ly taken to be a natural and seeminglyself-evident characteristic of (most) linguistic items. 5 In a number of recent publications,however, an interesting turn may be observed. Whereas early cognitive research e.g.,

3 Cf. Langacker (1988, p. 50) . Whether polysemy applies to all linguistic items or not is a matter of considerablecontroversy within the cognitive linguistic framework. As a rule, lexical items are generally taken to polysemous,whereas some grammatical items are said to have a non-polysemous, unitary meaning (see Taylor, 1999, p. 33 ).

4

Taylor (1999, p. 20 and p. 41, note 2) , however, notes that there is no clean cut-off point between storedunits and ad hoc constructed units.5 In this paper we will not discuss the relation between linguistic items and other form/meaning pairings, e.g.

constructions, which cognitive linguists generally also consider to be polysemous (cf. Goldberg, 1995, 2006; Croft,2001; and Croft and Cruse, 2004 ).



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Lakoff (1987, p. 378), Langacker (1988, p. 48 and 53), Taylor (1988, p. 300) , among others focused on the structure of the polysemous items, thereby taking polysemy for granted,more recent cognitive research e.g. Taylor (2002, Chapter 6), Taylor (2003, p. 647ff.),Taylor et al. (2003, p. 2), Taylor (2006) has turned its attention to the polysemyhypothesis itself in an effort to substantiate the postulate. Although the polysemous natureof lexical items is still the main view adhered to, polysemy is no longer considered self-evi-dent. Tuggy (2003), for instance, offers an explicit defence of the polysemy hypothesis,defending it against the monosemy hypothesis. The debate on the nature of polysemyhas, moreover, resulted in a shift from a radical view on polysemy to a more moderateone. The latter can, e.g., be found in Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003a,b) who stress theimportance of drawing a distinction between context dependent uses and distinct sensesof a lexical item and who explicitly point out the dangers of what Sandra (1998) has calledthe polysemy fallacy (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 3839 ), i.e. the danger to exaggeratethe number of distinct senses of a linguistic form vis-a`-vis the mental representation of a native speaker (cf. also Taylor, 2006, p. 52 who observes that rampant polysemy isnot compatible with the storage demands of language users). The continuum point of view (e.g. Geeraerts, 1993a and, more recently, Zlatev, 2003) may also be regarded asan instance of this moderate view, as the conceptual boundaries between homonymy,polysemy and monosemy are no longer regarded as clear-cut but, rather, as intrinsicallyvague. Finally, a moderate view on polysemy is also held by Allwood (2003), who alsoleaves some room for monosemy.

It should be kept in mind that although moderate interpretations of polysemy are oftenconcerned with the explanatory value of the polysemy postulate, the radical monosemy

hypothesis advanced by a number of European structural semanticists is apparently notconsidered as a possible alternative by the proponents of the moderate view (with theexception of Taylor, 1999 ; see below). In recent history, this hypothesis has been mostprominently articulated in the work of Eugenio Coseriu (see Coseriu, 1966, 1970, 1977,1985, 1987, 1992a,b, 2000, 2003, 2004, among other publications). In Sections 4 and 5we will support the view that the radical monosemy approach too deserves to be taken intoaccount in the current discussion about the achievements and limits of the polysemyapproach. Contrary to mainstream linguistic thinking about meaning, Coseriu arguesfor a new interpretation of the isomorphic one-to-one relation between linguistic form(signiant ) and linguistic meaning ( signie ) in the Saussurean sense. One of his central

claims is that, normally, semantic variation can be relegated to two non-systemic levelsof semantic competence, i.e. the level of language use or actual speech ( parole ) and thelevel of traditional, conventionalised discourse practices ( norme ). The main point of Coser-ius argument is, much in the spirit of Leibniz, that the semantic variation of an item inboth parole and norme do not affect the general unity and homogeneity of the signie atthe level of the language system (syste me or langue ), cf., e.g., Coseriu (1992a, 7) andCoseriu (2000, p. 30).

One of the few papers that seriously take into consideration Coserius theory of mean-ing from the cognitive perspective is Taylor (1999) . Altho ugh a noteworthy exception,Taylors discussion suffers from a number of misreadings. 6 In particular, Taylor seems

6 Some recent discussions of Coserius semantic theory against the (Aristotelian and Humboldtian) backgroundof his general theory of language are Kabatek (2000) , Willems (2003) and Van der Gucht (2005, Chapter 2, 1) .



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to believe that for Coseriu, rstly, meanings ( signie s) inhabit an idealist world, distinctfrom the world in which and of which language is used ( Taylor, 1999, p. 35 ); secondly,that Coserius semantic theory aims at arguing away polysemy (p. 33); and, nally, that itis not necessary to postulate unitary meanings ( signie s) for lexical items if one recognisesthat speakers have mastered the usage norms of words (p. 3435). We will not explorethese aspects of Taylors interpretation in detail here, for lack of space, yet a few observa-tions are warranted. Taylors rst claim is erroneous and applies to cognitive semanticsrather than Coseriu. Taylor takes pains to emphasise that according to cognitive linguistslanguage is not used in order to refer directly to things in the world but, rather, to men-tal projections of the world ( Taylor, 1999, p. 25 ), a view rejected by Coseriu and which,by the way, equal ly holds as idealist as long as no independent evidence for mental con-cepts is provided. 7 Taylors second claim too is mistaken, because Coserius distinctionbetween systematic meanings ( signie s), usage norms and discourse senses is, from its veryconception, conceived as a means to explain the ubiquitous and indisputable semantic var-iation of linguistic items (lexical as well as grammatical ones) in speech, instead of justdescribing them in a taxonomic, objectivist way. Thirdly, the well-known and occasionallyreiterated Wittgensteinian reasoning that word meanings are in fact identical with the con-ventionalised uses of these words, is circular and explains nothing: rst the meaning of alinguistic item is explicitly identied with its readily apparent polyvalence ( Coseriu,2004, pp. 6869), then, in a second move, this demonstrable polyvalence i.e., the fact thatone meaning ( signie ) can take on various (theoretically: an innite number of) senseswhen applied to different referents is declared to be, by at, the meaning (or meanings)of the linguistic item under consideration. As it stands, this reasoning merely reiterates the

question how it comes that me anings (signie s) have a wide range of application, withouthowever providing an answer. 8

Faced with the current trend towards moderate polysemy in a number of recent publi-cations as well as with some misunderstandings about the monosemy approach, this paperstrives to explore the boundaries of polysemy even further. Our main claim is that even themoderate view assumes more distinct senses than strictly necessary. We will focus on twoaspects of the polysemy approach in semantic theory to substantiate this view. Firstly, byfocusing on a key example of the moderate polysemy hypothesis the analysis of Englishover it will be demonstrated that the so-called covering instance of over is not a distinct

7 On the theory of conceptual space, which is foundational to cognitive linguistics, see Croft and Cruse (2004,p. 32ff. and p. 318ff.). For a discussion of the way meaningful linguistic signs apply to referents without assumingan additional otherworldly realm of concepts, see in particular Coseriu (1992b, 2003, 56, 2004, 23) (in thetwo latter publications Coseriu develops his point of view as part of his interpretation of Plato and Aristotle).

8 Note, moreover, that Taylor (1999, p. 34) simply supposes that speakers have learned to use words in theirfull range of established readings (e.g., the verb climb). However, the bulk of Coserius argument in his 1990paper ( Coseriu, 2000 is the English translation) is that exactly this supposition is fallacious, because the essentialstep in the mastery of a language semantic theory should be able to explain is not the step from one use of a wordto another use and so on until all uses are covered, but the acquisition of the knowledge which is the very

precondition that makes these successive steps possible in the rst place. In other words, the essential step is notthe inference of the general features of class membership but the intuition of the words universal meaning(Coseriu, 2000, p. 39 ). As a consequence, claiming that searching for the meaning of a word is a futile exercise,once we take account of the contexts in which the word is used ( Taylor, 2006, p. 63 ), is based on a circularreasoning.



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sense of the preposition as suggested by Tyler and Evans (2003a,b) , but rather a contextdependent use. This begs the question whether polysemy is as natural as is often assumed,even in moderate approaches, and how one can draw the line between polysemy andmonosemy. Secondly, we will argue that the bias towards polysemy, even in its moderateform, stems from an underlying idea that the meaning of prepositions is similar to themeaning of lexemes. We would like to challenge this view. Our position is that preposi-tional meanings are of an instrumental kind and thus different from the lexical meaningswith which they are combined in phrases and clauses. All too often, an alleged distinctsense of the preposition over in Tyler and Evanss account turns out to be a complex utter-ance meaning of an entire phrase or clause in which over happens to appear. Finally, andmost importantly, we will argue that the view on the polysemy of prepositions Tyler andEvans advance in their work is based on a deeper epistemological premise which is derivedfrom the cognitive embodiment postulate, but which we believe to be seriously awed for anumber of reasons. In particular we want to question the assumption that linguistic mean-ings essentially reect, iconically, clear-cut bodily and, more specically, visual experi-ences of human beings.

2. The radical polysemy hypothesis

Since the 1980s, cognitive linguistics has become increasingly interested in the radialnetwork analysis as an alternative to structuralist theories of semantics in which meaningswere conceived of as highly abstract, yet homogenous and discrete entities. Especially theradial network analysis of English over by Lakoff (1987), inspired by Brugman (1981), is

now considered a key example of the cognitive semantic analyses of polysemy. On Lakoffsview, the polysemy of lexical items is best represented by means of a motivated semanticnetwork, which is structured by a so-called centre-periphery schema:

One subcategory is the center; the other subcategories are linked to the center by var-ious types of links. Non-central categories may be subcenters, that is, they may havefurther center-periphery structures imposed on them ( Lakoff, 1987, p. 287).

Each node of the semantic network represents a distinct sense (in its turn represented as animage schema) of the lexical item in question. The centre of the network is occupied by the primary sense of the lexical item, also called basic sense or central sense. As a rule, the

primary sense of lexical items is assumed to be essentially spatial, as cognition or meaningis said to be embodied (cf. the embodied mind model suggested by Lakoff and Johnson,1980, 1999 and Johnson, 1987 , among others). Semantic structure is grounded in the wayhumans typically experience and perceive extralinguistic reality, and space is quintessen-tial to meaning (cf. Fauconnier, 1994 ).

Secondary or non-central senses , mostly temporal or abstract in nature, are derived fromthe central sense and can only be understood indirectly. These senses are connected to thecentral sense by various types of links, such as metaphorical links, instance links, metonym-ical links, similarity links, etc. (cf. Lakoff, 1987). Crucially, derived senses are not predict-able from the central sense. Instead, they are motivated, conventional extensions thathave to be learned one by one ( Lakoff, 1987, p. 116). However, Lakoff does not suggestany criterion to neatly distinguish between simple uses and distinct senses of an item. Essen-tially, it appears, it suffices to nd some link between two or more instances to prove thatthe instances are distinct and, moreover, that the item is polysemous.



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3. A moderate view on polysemy

In a series of recent publications, Tyler and Evans suggest to reduce polysemy by draw-ing a clearer distinction between context dependent uses or contextualized interpretationsof a preposition (also termed on-line meaning constructions, cf. also Croft and Cruse,2004) and its distinct senses. In the case of over, Tyler and Evans argue that taking intoaccount certain differences in dimensionality of the LM (e.g., a horizontally extendedLM versus a vertically extended LM) as distinct senses in the semantic network of overis a questionable move ( Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 99 ; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp.3842 and 5557), and they propose to drop the former radical polysemy hypothesis infavour of a more moderate version which they call the principled polysemy model.

Two criteria are proposed to distinguish between a distinct senseanda constructed mean-ing, or context dependent use, of an item. First, a difference in meaning is said to correspondto a distinct sense if it involves a meaning that is not purely spatial in nature and/or in whichthe spatial conguration between the TR and LM is changed vis-a -vis the other senses asso-ciated with a particular preposition ( Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105 ). The second criterionsays that there must be instances of the sense that are context-independent, instances inwhich the distinct sense could not be inferred from another sense and the context in whichit occurs (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105 ; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, Chapter 4 , passim ).

In the case of over, the central sense (called protoscene or protoscenic sense, Tylerand Evans, 2003, p. 110; Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 6568 ) conceptualises a spatial con-guration between TR and LM with the TR higher than the LM, within reach of the LM,and smaller than the LM, and the LM within the sphere of inuence of the TR. 10 The pro-

toscene is furthermore typically perceived from an offstage vantage point ( Tyler andEvans, 2003a, p. 105; Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 81 ).Now we turn to the analysis of some of the distinct senses Tyler and Evans discuss in

more detail. In order to show that the covering instances of over involve a distinct sense of the preposition, Tyler and Evans offer examples such as the following:

(4) The tablecloth is over the table.(5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceili ng .(6) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the wall. 11

In all three sentences, the rst criterion is met: in the semantic interpretation of the uses of over in sentences (4)(6) there is always a non-spatial element, a covering aspect, that addsa new, unpredictable semantic aspect to the protoscenic relation between TR and LM:

10 The latter feature, the LM being within the sphere of inuence of the TR, is dropped in some accounts of Tyler and Evans protoscenic description, yet it is essential, e.g., to distinguish over from above (cf. Tyler andEvans, 2003b, Chapter 5 ).

11 Taylor (2006, p. 63) is right in warning about the dangers of recycling invented examples taken from the

literature instead of citing attested data. However, a search on Google suggests that the use of over in the coveringsense in phrases such as the substance is over the pipe, mulch is over the roots, the sweater is over the chair seat, thebig hand is over the little hand, I spread out a frayed white cloth over the table, the sheet is over the opening, he glued the plate over the whole in the box, she tapes the foil down over the whole in the cap etc. is quite ubiquitous (Googlesearch, December 5, 2006).



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That is, the meaning associated with over appears that of covering, such that the hole , theLM is obscured from view by the TR ( Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105 ). To see whether thesecond criterion is met, we have to nd out whether the covering aspect can be inferredfrom the context or from another sense of the preposition. According to Tyler and Evans,the covering aspect in sentence (4) should not be considered as a discrete sense. For in thissentence the covering aspect can be perfectly explained by recurring to the protoscenic sensein combination with a specic cognitive principle on the one hand (i.e. a different way of viewing the spatial scene) and the human inferential capability to interpret that protoscenicsense in a meaningful way on the basis of encyclopaedic knowledge on the other. As a mat-ter of fact, the basic ground of the protoscenic sense has not been altered in sentence (4)which, recall, represents a spatial conguration between a TR ( tablecloth ) higher thanand within reach of a LM ( table ). Still, two important elements have changed. Firstly,the TR ( tablecloth ) is typically larger than the LM ( table ) and secondly, a shift in vantagepoint, which departs from the default offstage vantage point, has taken place. Adult humanbeings typically view tables from above the top of the table so that both the table and table-cloth are lower than our line of vision: This being so, the vantage point is not that depictedin the default representation of the protoscene, in which the viewer/construer is offstage.Rather the vantage point has shifted so that the TR is between the LM and the construeror viewer (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 133 ; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 9092 ). The shiftin vantage point the perception of the tablecloth from above the top of the table com-bined with our encyclopaedic knowledge that tablecloths are usually larger than tabletops,readily prompts the conclusion that the table is hidden from view by the tablecloth and thatwe perceive the tablecloth as covering (a part of) the table.

One could expect based on the analysis of example (4) that the covering aspect of over has to be considered as a context dependent use, not as a distinct sense. However,Tyler and Evans (2003a, p. 133) claim that, through the ages, [t]he covering implicaturehas been reanalysed as distinct from the spatial conguration designated by the proto-scene (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 91 ). Through a process of pragmatic strengthening(cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 5861 ) the covering use has obtained the status of a dis-tinct sense. This can be proved, according to Tyler and Evans, by invoking the senses of sentences like (5) and (6) above containing a context which cannot explain the coveringaspect through a combination of the protoscenic sense and contextual inference:

Assuming that the primary sense of over involves a spatial conguration between aTR and LM and that this conguration involves some sense of the TR being higherthan the LM, we see no way in which the covering meaning component associatedwith over in (5) and (6) can be derived from context ( Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 106 ).

Such an inference [the contextual inference of the covering aspect as in sentence(3)] is not possible in (5) as the spatial relation holding between the TR and theLM is one that would normally be coded by below (i.e. the board is below the holein the ceiling ), rather than by over, given the typical vantage point ( Tyler and Evans,2003a, p. 106).

As noted with examples (5) and (6), when over prompts for a covering sense, the

TR need not be construed as being located higher than the LM; hence, the coveringsense must exist independently in semantic memory ( Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 133 ).

According to Tyler and Evans, in (5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling theboard has to be situated in a lower position than the ceiling. On their view, the



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extralinguistic situation referred to would be expected to be described as Joan nailed theboard BELOW the hole in the ceiling . Tyler and Evans assume, moreover, that the coveringaspect in (5) cannot be considered as a context dependent use of the protoscenic sense (asis the case in (3)) because the TR ( the board ) is lower than the LM ( the hole in the ceiling ),whereas in the protoscenic sense the TR is higher than the LM. Consequently, the coveringaspect cannot be explained as a combination of the protoscenic sense on the one hand andinferred encyclopaedic knowledge on the other. Hence, according to the authors, the cov-ering use is a genuine distinct sense of over, not simply a context dependent use.

4. Polysemy and the embodiment postulate

The distinction which Tyler and Evans seek to draw between uses and senses of a lexicalitem is a valuable counterpoise to Lakoffs radical polysemous analysis of over, in partic-ular against a possible and undesirable effect of Lakoffs model, namely that a lexical itemmay assume a virtually innite range of novel senses in relation to different contexts and/or cognitive construals. Tyler and Evans, on the other hand, acknowledge that languageunderdetermines the interpretations language users assign to utterances (see Tyler andEvans, 2003b, p. 229). Indeed, not all aspects of meaning construal in language use canbe accounted for on the basis of purely linguistic semantic structures; non-linguisticaspects (encyclopaedic knowledge, pragmatics, and inference) are also involved in theprocess of interpretation. In this respect, we agree with Tyler and Evans. However, wealso believe that their analysis is still biased towards polysemy in a way that is open to dis-pute. However, our problem with their analysis is of a far more fundamental nature and

concerns one of the key tenets of the cognitivist paradigm, namely the embodimentpostulate.Like Lakoff, Johnson and most other cognitive linguists, Tyler and Evanss semantic

reasoning is theoretically informed by the embodied theory of cognition. The latter viewmay be described as follows:

To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily interactions withthe world. From this point of view, cognition depends on the kinds of experiencesthat come from having a body with particular perceptual and motor capacities thatare inseparably linked and that together form the matrix within which memory, emo-

tion, language, and all other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary notion of embodied cognition stands in contrast to the prevailing cognitivist stance which seesthe mind as a device to manipulate symbols and is thus concerned with the formalrules and processes by which the symbols appropriately represent the real world(Thelen et al., 2001, p. 1).

On the embodied view on cognition, language is similarly thought to be determined by therelation between our bodies and the world, or, more precisely, the projected world asrepresented in the human conceptual system ( Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 20, 23, 230 ; cf.Taylor, 1999 ). We would like to show that, even with a moderate polysemy hypothesis

as a starting point, the embodied meaning postulate can lead to assuming unnecessarypolysemy.

Tyler and Evans (2003b, p. 80) propose an analysis of the multiple meanings of overalong the lines of the following semantic network of over (Fig. 2):



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Within the connes of this paper it is not possible to deal with all of the 15 distinct sensesTyler and Evans suggest for the preposition (particle) over (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003a p.

48). In the remaining part of this section, and by way of example, we challenge Tyler andEvanss analysis of over in sentences (5) and (6). There are two major reasons why weobject to the view that the covering instance of over should be considered as a distinctsense.

Tyler and Evanss assumption that Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling canalways (and even should) be coded as Joan nailed a board BELOW the hole in the ceiling is not warranted. It is true that the board can be situated in a lower position with regard tothe ceiling and that one perceives the board and either nothing of the hole (i.e. the hole iscompletely covered by the board) or only a part of it (i.e. the board leaves some part of thehole uncovered). However, from another point of view the board can also be situatedhigher than the ceiling; for example, when the board covers the hole in the ceiling (entirelyor partially) at the upper side of the ceiling. In this case the speaker would only perceivethat part of the board that is visible due to the cut-away of the hole in the ceiling. Thisinterpretation is nevertheless neglected in Tyler and Evanss reading which suggests that

Fig. 2. The semantic network of over (Tyler & Evans, 2003b, p. 80 ).



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their interpretation of (5) is the only one possible. Joan nailed a board over the hole in theceiling is thus ambiguous between these two readings:

(a)-reading: the board is situated in a lower position with regard to the ceiling, (b)-reading: the board is situated in a higher position with regard to the ceiling.

The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for sentence (6) Joan nailed a board over the hole in thewall .

More importantly, however, the ambiguity between both readings does not necessarilyentail that over is polysemous, i.e. is realized in a distinct, unpredictable sense in sentence(5) (just as in (6)). For in both the (a)-reading and (b)-reading the prepositions meaningproper merely expresses that the board is situated in relation to a lower reference point. Inboth examples (5) and (6) this reference point is the LM: ( the hole in ) the ceiling and (thehole in) the wall . In the case of the (a)-reading the linguistic conceptualisation parallelswhat one could legitimately call the most obvious and most common sense experienceof the scene referred to. In the case of the (b)-reading, however, the kind of visualisationconcerned deviates considerably from the point of view involved in the (a)-reading,although the (b)-reading too is still within the purview of common sense experienceand, as far as we can judge from all our informants, easily comprehensible and perfectlynatural. In reference to research on linguistic deixis, one can explain the differencebetween both readings by distinguishing a focal from a disfocal perspective (cf., e.g., Jans-sen, 1997, pp. 126133). Let us again consider sentence (5) Joan nailed a board over the holein the ceiling. Interpreting the scene from a focal perspective means that one interprets the

meaning of over from the own point of view of the speaker ((a)-reading). By contrast, inter-preting the scene from a disfocal perspective implies that one takes the point of view of theboard or, by way of extension, the point of view of another speaker who is to be located atthe attic or another room above the ceiling ((b)-reading). In either case, however, it is clearthat both points of view are non-linguistic steering mechanisms of interpretation whichpresuppose one and the same sentence and, consequently, one and the same prepositionover . It is, to be sure, denitely not the case that two different senses of the prepositionare involved which would emerge from opposing points of view.

It is important to bear in mind that the linguistic relation between TR and LM, as it isconceptualised through English over, is identical in both the readings (a) and (b). Yet in

psychological, experiential terms, there appear to be two possible congurations betweenthe extralinguistic entities referred to by the concepts TR and LM, which happen to cor-respond to a single linguistic conceptualisation. In other words: over, being a means toconceptualize the relation between a spatially superior TR and an inferior LM and con-ceivable as a semantically invariable meaning bearing linguistic item, can be said to displaya structured polyvalence (or: polyreferentiality) at the experiential level, i.e. at the level of interpreting extralinguistic reality, which is perfectly explainable. We stress that the item ispolyvalent in a structured way, because the linguistic meaning constraints the range of interpretations in a principled fashion, due to the fact that over invariably expresses thatone object is situated in a specic relation to a lower reference point. Therefore, to assessthe relation between the invariable meaning proper and the polyvalence of over, it isimperative not to interpret the specic conguration which holds between the TR andLM in a single call it prototypical way, excluding other possibilities which then haveto be accounted for by invoking polysemy or certain kinds of extension. By using over in



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the case of (b) we express, just as in the case of (a), that the hole in the ceiling is in an infe-rior relation to the board and not the other way around. The case of (b) may correspondto a less frequent experience in statistical terms and it can readily be admitted that the(b)-reading rates lower on an embodied meaning scale than the (a)-reading, because tak-ing the point of view of the board itself or of another human being in an adjoining roomdiffers considerably from the way we normally perceive the world. However, our analysisreveals that it would be a mistake to project this normal experience, i.e. the most frequentperception of or most common interaction with the projected world, directly and withoutfurther qualication onto language and assume that linguistic structures reect this kind of experience. This is, however, what Tyler and Evans do when they claim that in sentence (5)Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling the protoscenic sense (i.e. the TR beinghigher than and within reach of the LM) is no longer valid. But if one considers the abovecriticism and takes into account the disfocal interpretation of the sentence, the TR is stillsituated in a higher position than the hole in the ceiling and in this sense the protoscenicsense is perfectly valid. As a consequence, there is no reason to reanalyse the coveringaspect as another distinct sense of over. Or, in more general terms, there is a conictbetween the polysemy postulate and what the linguistic evidence is actually telling us.

This example informs us that a distinction needs to be made between, on the one hand,the meaning proper of over and the relation it refers to on the other. Strictly speaking, theitem over only expresses a specic relation between an entity Y (e.g., the board ) and anentity X (e.g., the hole in the ceiling ), and our discussion shows that this relation has tobe distinguished from the relation in extralinguistic reality which can be perceived andexperienced by the speaker in various ways. We will return to this point in the last section

of the paper, where we suggest an important and as yet implicit epistemological linkbetween Tyler and Evanss analysis of the covering sense of over and the way linguisticmeaning is supposedly an iconic reection of embodied categories.

5. The nature of prepositional meanings

From our discussion of the alleged distinct covering sense of over two additional con-clusions may be drawn, one on the nature of prepositional meanings and another on thecognitive embodiment postulate on which the multiple sense analysis offered by Tyler andEvans (as well as others) is ultimately based.

It follows from the discussion that it is highly problematic to conceive of a preposition likeover in terms of lexical semantics. No matter how many distinct senses one eventually pos-tulates, if one conceives the different senses of a preposition in what might be called a lexi-cally self-contained way, one is prone to believe that prepositions are words with meaningssimilar to the meanings of verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs, i.e. that prepositions are lin-guistic items with autosemantic value. Consider, apart form the covering sense, senses of the preposition over such as the following (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 80106 ):

higher and within reach (protoscene), on-the-other-side-of ( Arlington is over the Potomac River from Georgetown ), above-and-beyond ( The arrow ew over the target and landed in the woods ), completion (The game is over ), transfer (She turned the keys over to the janitor ), focus of attention (She thought over the problem ),



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control (She has a strange power over me ), preference (I would prefer tea over coffee ) etc.

What is left unaccounted for in dening the meaning (i.e., enumerating the senses) of over

in this way is the fact that the preposition does not mean what the paraphrases suggest asan isolated word. Rather, the suggested paraphrases render the readings of over as a partof utterances, i.e. they are concerned with readings in context, in particular with the wayover is conventionally interpreted in combination with other words in phrases and clauses.This focus on utterances constitutes a major bias in the analysis of the preposition over.

Like articles and conjunctions, prepositions are instrumental items, not lexical items.Whereas the latter possess lexical meanings which are conceptually self-con ta ined, prepo-sitions only have instrumental meanings (cf., e.g., Coseriu, 1987, p. 149).12 As the termitself suggests, instrumental meanings are relational, i.e. they necessarily rely on grammat-ical combinations with other words and arrive at semantic self-containment only togetherwith these other words. If one considers the contribution of prepositions to grammaticalconstructions (in particular phrases and clauses) from this angle, Tyler and Evanss anal-ysis of the many instantiations of over in sentences such as the ones just cited comes acrossas circular. For claiming that the preposition under analysis means above-and-beyond in,e.g., The arrow ew over the target and landed in the woods , or focus of attention in, e.g.,She thought over the problem , is equal to neglecting that meanings such as above-and-beyond and focus of attention are not to be attributed to the preposition itself but tothe grammatical combinations of the preposition together with the other words enteringthe constructions, e.g., y over X (above-and-beyond), think over X (focus of attention),turn X over to Y (transfer), prefer X over Y (preference) etc. We conclude, therefore, thatTyler and Evanss account of the various senses of over is awed by a hysteron-proteron:the meaning that comes about on the basis of the preposition and other words in its imme-diate linguistic context is declared to be the basic meaning of that preposition. Contrary tothis view, we submit

that the meaning of over is an instrumental meaning which can only be instantiated incombination with lexical meanings, 13

that the meaning of the linguistic context should not be projected into the meaning of the preposition,

and that the meaning of over should be conceived of as a general (Leibniz) non-lexicalmeaning which only species a relation between slots that have to be lled by autose-mantic items, e.g., Noun over Noun, Noun BE over , Verb over Noun etc.

In this connection, we refer to Van der Gucht (2005, Chapter 4) on the preposition over inDutch, where it is argued that all productive uses of over in Dutch can be subsumed undera general instrumental meaning which can be paraphrased, in the spirit of Leibniz, as fol-lows: positioning of X vis-a-vis a reference point Y which is inferior to X. Whether this

12

Or, as Peirce rightly observes, prepositions belong to a class of words which assert nothing ( Peirce, 1932, p.164).13 Of course, it is theoretically always possible that an instrumental meaning itself assumes a lexical meaning

function, e.g., if it is transferred into an autosemantic category. In most languages, however, this is ratherexceptional (compare, for instance, ups and downs , the in and out , the over and over etc.).



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paraphrase also suffices to dene the instrumental meaning of over in English remains tobe seen, but our conjecture is that Dutch and English differ only marginally on this point.We do not consider the argument that general instrumental paraphrases, such as the onewe propose for Dutch over, are too abstract (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 82, n.11 as wellas Taylor, 1999, p. 32ff.) to be a valid counterargument against a semantic analysis alongthe lines of Leibniz and Coseriu (apart from the fact that the discussion between the poly-semy and monosemy approach is rendered particularly difficult because th e crucial distinc-tion between lexical and instrumental meanings is usually neglected). 14 Instrumentalmeaning is bound to be more abstract than lexical meaning, for the simple reason thatinstrumental meanings depend on the combination with other, i.e. lexical, meanings.Therefore, the claim that the meaning of over is more abstract than that of plane, yard,think etc. is self-evident.

Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that in English over X systematically (i.e., paradig-matically) differs not only from its antonymic expressions, under X and below X , but alsofrom on X , above X and beyond X , thus necessitating different general paraphrases for eachone of these combinations that are able to motivate, albeit from an analytical meta-level,their different and highly exible uses in discourse. Furthermore, the proposed paraphrasefor Dutch over makes use of linguistically delimited and strictly dened terms that are notto be confused with their counterparts in ordinary language. For example, positioning isto be understood as involving a certain kind of dynamic process (so as to oppose, e.g., overX to on X ), not as a spatial act of locating, placing etc. Likewise, the term inferior refersto a scale which is not restricted to space (cf. He hopped over the fence ), nor to the verticaldimension (cf. the non-vertical dimension in He lives over the hill ); the term equally

applies, e.g., to the axis of time ( The g am e is over) and also motivates largely idiomatic usessuch as She thought over the problem .15

6. The iconicity of embodied meaning

To conclude this paper we would like to uncover the descriptive strategy which informsTyler and Evanss principled polysemy model in order to elucidate why their analysis nec-essarily favours those 15 distinct senses of over which supposedly constitute the semanticnetwork of over (cf. Section 4). We believe that it is important to semantic theory in gen-

eral to understand the underlying line of reasoning behind the cognitive semantic analysisTyler and Evans, among others, promote. This will also clarify why we cannot agree with

14 This is also the case in, e.g., Ruhl (1989). For an extensive discussion of Ruhls monosemy model, see Van derGucht (2005, Chapter 2, 2) .

15 We consider the view put forward by Tyler and Evans (2003b, p. 37) that psycholinguistic experiments offerstrong evidence in favour of the polysemy approach of linguistic items and against the monosemy approach (cf.Sandra and Rice, 1995; Rice et al., 1999 ) as invalid, for two reasons. Firstly, we consider it to be an error toequate contextual meanings with meanings created on-line, and systematic meanings in the language system withdistinct meanings represented in memory ( Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 37 ). Distinct meanings represented inmemory are also created on-line. Secondly, not everything that is available in semantic memory is linguistic

meaning (cf. Willems, 2005, pp. 398400). The psycholinguistic experiments mentioned refer to what speakersknow about traditional uses of linguistic items (norms in the terminology of Coseriu, 1992a, pp. 297300 ), by nomeans to linguistic meanings ( signie s). Being set up to prove the existence of the vast domain of semanticmemory in a psycholinguistically valid and readily elicitable sense, psycholinguistic experiments do not sayanything about linguistic meanings proper ( signies ).



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their analysis from a point of view which takes seriously both the assertion that a contextdependent use of a linguistic item is to be distinguished from a distinct sense, and the asser-tion that language itself radically underdetermines the rich interpretations regularlyassigned to naturally occurring utterances ( Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 229 ).

It appears that there are basically two motivations for Tyler and Evans to posit 15 dif-ferent senses for over. First of all, Tyler and Evans regard these senses as being distinctbecause they would not be inferable from context or other instantiations of the preposi-tion. This suggests that the 15 senses are likely candidates for being memorized as separate(psychologically real) concepts which are straightforwardly distinguishable from anembodied point of view. Secondly, the 15 distinct senses are essentially 15 distinct waysin which one can experience or visualise the concept over in the context of utterances(cf. also Deane, 2005, pp. 245271); if there are more ways to experience the concept, theseare said to be inferable from pragmatic and encyclopaedic knowledge or from combina-tions of the already established senses of the preposition. Both motivations are thus basedon psychological assertions. But are these 15 senses also supported by what the linguisticevidence is telling us? We believe that the answer to this question is negative. Tyler andEvanss analysis draws exclusively upon entire utterances in the form of phrases andclauses, not on the single linguistic item over the meaning of which the authors claim todescribe. Accordingly, the psychological extrapolation of the contexts of phrases andclauses associated with over is the true basis for Tyler and Evanss claims concerningthe distinct senses of the preposition.

Let us briey return to our analysis of the covering sense proposed by Tyler and Evansto illustrate the line of reasoning we are referring to. In Section 4 we saw that Tyler and

Evanss statement that a speaker would normally rephrase the situation referred to in(7) The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling

as

(7) The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling ,

is only valid if the (b)-reading (the board is situated in a higher position vis-a -vis the ceil-ing) is excluded and the (a)-reading (the board is situated in a lower position vis-a -vis the

ceiling) is regarded as the only possible interpretation. This conclusion, however,appeared to be unwarranted. But even if we would accept the (a)-reading as the only pos-sible interpretation of sentence (7), this would still not demonstrate that speakers normallyexpress (a) by saying The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling instead of The board isOVER the hole in the ceiling . In Tyler and Evanss account the equivalent of normallyspoken means that The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling captures the speakersexperience of extralinguistic reality somehow better than The board is OVER the holein the ceiling . Better in this context means in a manner that parallels the way in whichthis experience can be conceptualized most transparently iconically through language.This view is in line with a strong version of the cognitive embodiment postulate in seman-tics: language mirrors underlying conceptual structures, which in turn are determined bythe typically human experiences of human beings vis-a`-vis extralinguistic reality (cf. Tylerand Evans, 2003b, p. 23 ). The expression The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling , then, isconsidered less normal because it comes across as less natural than The board is



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BELOW the hole in the ceiling . The latter sentence has, so to speak, a higher embodiedmeaning potential than the former because its iconic value is higher.

Yet, rst of all, it is doubtful whether speakers refer to the scene mentioned above morefrequently by using below than over. Observe, moreover, that by way of analogy, sentence(6) The board is over the hole in the wall , in which the TR is situated next to the wall insteadof above it, would have to be more felicitously coded as The board is NEXT TO the hole inthe wall which is clearly not the case. Secondly, no linguistic evidence is adduced thatlinguistic meanings ought to be dened according to the kind of transparency the humanbodily and visual systems engender. It suffices to take a look at the variations in thesemantics of languages cross-linguistically to convince oneself that naturalness is a rela-tive, ultimately useless concept when comparing meanings in different languages with oneanother: One language is never more natural than another language, and the range of resources different languages make use of is notwithstanding many recent efforts toestablish universal or primitive constraints on linguistic meanings virtually innite.

Tyler and Evanss line of reasoning concerning the competition between over and belowwith regard to sentence (5) holds, mutatis mutandis, for the entire list of 15 distinct senseswhich constitute their semantic network of over. We believe that this kind of reasoning isbased on what we propose to call the iconicity of embodied meaning. With this term werefer to the idea that various instantiations of a single lexical item are considered distinct,memorized senses of that item within a continuous semantic network when these instan-tiations are actually inferred iconically from the specic ways humans experience and con-ceptualize the world, bodily and above all visually (for a more extensive critique of thevisual paradigm in cognitive linguistics, see Willems, 1997). Although there can be no

doubt about the anthropomorphic anchoring of natural language in man, the naturalpolysemy view mixes up linguistic meanings proper, which are language-specic, and psy-chological inferences individual language users may draw when processing the meanings of linguistic items in context. These psychological inferences are basically associative insofaras they relate general language-specic meanings to non-linguistic scenes which are expe-rientially relevant to humans. Indeed, it not only means a lot for us humans to be able todistinguish between conceptual construals such as above-and-beyond, on-the-other-side-of, transfer, preference etc., such construals are also conceptually readily available. Tond them associated with a nite set of sentences in which a single preposition ( over) playsa more or less important role, can lead one to postulate an intimate link between the con-

ceptual construals and the linguistic item under analysis. While we concede that such a linkexists and that it has to be analysed from the point of view of linguistics, it is denitely notthe meaning of over.

7. Conclusions

In order to locate the object of this paper in the history of the language sciences, westarted off with a reminder of Lockes and Leibniz different approaches towards semanticvariation. Locke subscribes to a polysemy view ante litteram on linguistic meaning, whileLeibniz maintains that meaning variation does not exclude the possibility of constructingsemantic paraphrases which aim at understanding the determinate number of meanings oreven the single unitary meaning of linguistic items. In the last decade, polysemy is lesstaken for granted than it was in the 1980s, and there is also a growing consensus that thereis a limit to the number of meanings a word may take. In this paper the polysemy postulate



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was scrutinised based on Tyler and Evanss (2003a,b) moderate view on polysemy, in par-ticular their analysis of English over. Against mainstream cognitive accounts, we adducedevidence that the monosemy approach in the vain of Leibniz, which was most stronglyadvocated in modern linguistics by E. Coseriu, might be protably applied to the meaningof over. We focussed in particular on Tyler and Evanss treatment of the coveringinstance of over and showed that it is not a distinct sense, i.e. meaning, of the preposition,but rather a context dependent use. We additionally argued that a distinction, which wealso adopt from E. Coseriu, should be made between lexical meanings, which are seman-tically self-contained, and instrumental meanings of, e.g., prepositions, which rely on com-binations with lexical meanings. This distinction is important not in the least because itrefutes the argument that a monosemy approach necessarily leads to meanings whichare too abstract. Finally, we tackled Tyler and Evanss semantic analysis of over for beingbased on purely psychological and common sense readings of the phrases and clauses inwhich over is used, rather than on language-specic grounds (i.e. the linguistic meaningof over stricto sensu).

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