the id project and social ecology - takis fotopoulos

7/16/12 1:16 PMAddendum: The ID project and Social Ecology - TAKIS FOTOPOULOS Th…ational Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May 2005)

of 27http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol1/vol1_no3_addendum.htm#_edn2

The International Journal of INCLUSIVEDEMOCRACY, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May 2005)

Addendum:The ID project andSocial Ecology

printable version TAKIS FOTOPOULOS

Far from being unwelcome, anycritical assessment which initiates adiscussion on alternative post-capitalist models is a necessary partof a dialogue, urgently needed today when the multi-dimensionalcrisis (economic, ecological,political, social) engulfing the entireplanet is worsening every day. It isin this spirit that we discussed andcompared the ID project withParecon in these pages[1] to no replyfrom the Pareconists who,presumably, prefer to deal witheasier targets! However, whereas such a responsewas to be expected from supportersof Parecon, given the fundamentaldifferences between ID and theirmodel and particularly the reformiststrategies adopted by MichaelAlbert, Noam Chomsky and theWorld Social Forum (which theyhave wholeheartedly adopted), itwas an unfortunate and sadexperience to see supporters ofMurray Bookchin’sCommunalism/Social Ecology being

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol1/vol1_no3_addendum_PRINTABLE.htm

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol1/vol1_no3_addendum.htm#_edn1



involved lately in a process ofdowngrading and misrepresentingthe ID project, as a convenient wayof promoting their own model. First, Eirik Eiglad,[2] in a recentlypublished article in Communalism,notes that «several radical theoristshave tried to ground the struggle fora democratic politics on “socialimaginaries” (Castoriadis) or a“democratic relativism”(Fotopoulos), but their categoriestend to dissolve into the subjectivistarbitrariness of postmodernism, andthey fail to explain why we shouldchoose certain “imaginaries” orpolitical approaches over others». Next, Peter Staudenmaier,[3] asocial ecologist of the ISE, in a Znetdebate with Michael Albert not onlystresses that he prefers Parecon «inseveral significant respects» (whichhe does not specify) to the IDproject but also presents the latter,in the ad to an «Alternatives toCapitalism» seminar he organizedrecently in New York,[4] as just «anattempted synthesis of Bookchin andCastoriadis»! Of course it is MrStaudenmaier’s privilege to expresshis encouragement for an implicitlystatist model like Parecon (althoughthe authors of it, presumably foropportunistic reasons, are silentabout the state, despite the factthat the vast bureaucracy theyenvisage could only function within(or lead to) a state organization —aswas aptly pointed out by an AnarchyStudies reviewer).[5] However, itwas really interesting to see MurrayBookchin not dissociating himselffrom supporters of social ecology







who are so encouraging of implicitlystatist projects, which are supposedto be achieved by explicitlyreformist strategies. Particularly so,when he himself in the past felt itnecessary to resign from the D&NAdvisory Board, because of thesupposed similarities of the IDtransitional strategies toBernsteinian evolutionary socialdemocracy! [6]

Still, what is clearly not MrStaudenmaier’s privilege is todistort the ID project in such ablatant way, by presenting itsproposal for economic democracy asan attempted synthesis betweenBookchin’s proposal for a «moraleconomy» based on a post-scarcityeconomy and Castoriadis’ workers’council model based on a realmarket, at the very moment whenthe foundation of the ID projectitself consists of a form of economicdemocracy which explicitly rejectsthe basis of both these models! This,quite apart from the fact that sucha «personalisation» of the InclusiveDemocracy project is unacceptable,particularly coming from asupposed libertarian! It is a seriousmisconception of the ID project toidentify the synthesis it hasattempted with particularpersonalities. Irrespective of howimportant Castoriadis’ andBookchin’ contributions may havebeen to the autonomy/democracytraditions and the libertariansocialist traditions respectively,they cannot, surely, be identifiedwith them! Since its very first issue,back in 1992, Society & Nature (asD&N was then called) clearly stated




that the liberatory project itsupported was seen as «a dialecticalsynthesis of three tendencies thatare expressed in correspondingpolitical traditions and movements:the autonomous-democratictradition (which includes thefeminist movement), the libertariansocialist and the radical greenmovements». The non-mentioning ofany names was not accidental but adeliberate decision not to identifythe attempted synthesis with anydogmas or gurus, since suchidentification would surely not becompatible with the very nature ofthe new liberatory project. This is not to deny, of course, theinfluence that parts of Castoriadis’autonomy project and Bookchin’slibertarianmunicipalism/communalism havehad on the ID project, or, similarly,the strong influence of Kropotkin’sor Arendt’s work —among others—on Bookchin and Castoriadisrespectively. However, apart fromthe fundamental philosophical,political and economic differencesbetween the ID project and theautonomy project which I haveconsidered elsewhere,[7] as well asthose between the former and socialecology/communalism which I amgoing to consider here, the analysisof the ID project on modernity, itsperiodisation, globalisation and thepresent crisis completelydifferentiates it from both theCastoriadian and Bookchinistconceptions. No wonder that theproposed way out of the crisis interms of an Inclusive Democracy ingeneral and an Economic Democracy




in particular differs fundamentallyfrom a workers’ councils economybased on a real market (earlyCastoriadis) or a «moral economy»based on post-scarcity (Bookchin). Itis, therefore, clear that the IDproject represents not just asynthesis but also a transcendenceof the two major historicaltraditions —the socialist and thedemocratic ones— as well as of theradical currents in the «new» socialmovements (the feminist andparticularly the ecological —ofwhich social ecology is the mostimportant radical component).

The ID project andpostmodern subjectivismand relativism Anyone with even a cursoryunderstanding of the ID projectknows that it has nothing to doeither with postmodernism orsubjectivism and the kind ofgeneralised relativism adopted bypostmodernists! The postmodernistconception has been unequivocallyrejected in my D&N article «Themyth of postmodernism»[8] andthere is no reason to repeat my longargument there for the benefit ofEirik Eiglad. Furthermore in my bookTowards An Inclusive Democracy[9] Irejected not only objectiverationalism —a version of which is«dialectical naturalism» supportedby Communalists— but alsogeneralised relativism andsubjectivism, as being incompatiblewith democratic rationalism. Thus, in a separate section of my





book entitled «Beyond“Objectivism”, Irrationalism andRelativism», I stressed that :

Still, the fact that theproject of autonomy isnot objectively groundeddoes not mean that«anything goes» and thatit is therefore impossibleto derive any definablebody of principles toassess social and politicalchanges, or to develop aset of ethical values toassess human behaviour.Reason is still necessaryin a process of derivingthe principles and valueswhich are consistent withthe project of autonomyand, in this sense, arerational. Therefore, theprinciples and valuesderived within such aprocess do not justexpress personal tastesand desires and in fact,they are much more«objective» than theprinciples and values thatare derived fromdisputableinterpretations of naturaland social evolution. Thelogical consistency of theformer with the projectof autonomy could beassessed in anindisputable way, unlikethe contestable«objectivity» of thelatter.[10]

In the same book, afterdistinguishing between political and




distinguishing between political anddemocratic relativism on the onehand and philosophical relativism onthe other, I rejected the latter (i.e.,that all traditions have equal truthvalue, in the sense of their all beingaccepted as equally true or false) asbeing in contradiction withdemocratic relativism itself (i.e.,that all traditions, theories, ideas,etc., are debated and decided uponby all citizens).[11] This is why Iexplicitly pointed out that «the typeof general relativism, which isadopted by post-modernism, simplyexpresses the latter's abandonmentof any critique of theinstitutionalised social reality and ageneral retreat to conformism».[12]

Furthermore, as I stressed inanother passage, «once we havemade a choice among the maintraditions, in other words, once wehave defined the content of theliberatory project in terms of theautonomy tradition, certainimportant implications follow at theethical[13] level, as well as at theinterpretational level» —somethingthat rules out the kind ofsubjectivist arbitrariness for whichEirik Eiglad uncritically accuses me. Last, in the final section of the bookentitled «Conclusion: toward ademocratic rationalism» I stressedonce more the philosophical basis ofthe ID project which is not«democratic relativism», as EirikEiglad misrepresents it, butdemocratic rationalism —a muchbroader concept than the former.Here is the relevant passage:

To conclude,«objectivism», as well as






irrationalism, do not haveany role to play in theprocess that will move ustowards an inclusivedemocracy. As I tried toshow in this chapter,democracy isincompatible with «objectivist» types ofrationalism, similar tothe ones we inheritedfrom the Enlightenment.Furthermore, democracyis even less compatiblewith irrational systemsclaiming esotericknowledge, whether frommystical experience,intuition, or revelation.Democracy is onlycompatible with ademocratic rationalism,namely, a rationalism founded in democracy asa structure and a processof social self-institution,as we defined itabove. Therefore, if ouraim is to reach asynthesis of theautonomous-democratic,libertarian socialist andradical green andfeminist traditions, Ithink that our startingpoint should be the factthat the social imaginaryor creative element playsa crucial role withrespect to social change.This implies that theproject for democracymay be grounded only onour own conscious choicebetween the



heteronomous and theautonomous tradition. Ithink that this way ofthinking avoids the trapsof both objectivism andrelativism. Thus, it doesnot fall into objectivism because the liberatoryproject is not«objectivized»:democracy is justified notby an appeal to objectivetendencies with respectto natural or socialevolution, but by anappeal to reason in termsof logon didonai, whichexplicitly denies the ideaof any directionality asregards social change.Furthermore, it avoidsrelativism because itexplicitly denies the viewthat all traditions, as inthis case the autonomyand heteronomy ones,have equal truth values.In other words, taking forgranted that autonomyand democracy cannot be«proved» but onlypostulated, we valueautonomy and democracymore than heteronomybecause, although bothtraditions are true, still,it is autonomy anddemocracy which we

identify with freedomand we assess freedom

as the highest human

objective.

It is clear, therefore, that althoughthe choice for the autonomytradition is indeed axiomatic



tradition is indeed axiomaticbecause it is identified withfreedom itself, contrary to whatEirik Eiglad argues, there is nothingarbitrary about this choice. As Istressed in my D&N article onliberatory ethics’,[14] the autonomyproject (or what Bookchin callsanalogously «the legacy offreedom»)[15] turns up repeatedly inHistory, despite the fact that theheteronomous tradition has beenhistorically dominant:

[T]he fact that ademocratic societyrepresents a consciouschoice does not meanthat this is just anarbitrary choice. This isclearly implied by thevery fact that theautonomy project turnsup in history again andagain, particularly inperiods of crisis of theheteronomous society.Furthermore, the factthat heteronomoussociety has been thedominant form of socialorganisation in the past isnot indicative of itsintrinsic superiority overan autonomous society.Heteronomous societieshave always been createdand maintained throughviolence (military,economic) and/or indirectforms of control (religion,ideology, mass media) byprivileged elites, whichaimed at theinstitutionalisation ofinequality in the





distribution of power.

Philosophicaldifferences between IDand Communalism/SocialEcology As Eiglad rightly stresses,communalism «contains not only alibertarian politics and a non-hierarchical social analysis but alsoa philosophy that give communalismits developmental and ethical thrust—namely, dialectical naturalism». However, as I attempted to showelsewhere,[16] the project for ademocratic society cannot begrounded on an evolutionary processof social change, either ateleological one (such as Marx’sdialectical materialism) or a non-teleological one (such as Bookchin’sdialectical naturalism).[17] Αlthoughdialectical naturalism is explicitlydescribed as a non-teleological viewof natural and social evolution, still,it does assume a «directionality»towards a democratic ecologicalsociety —a society that may neverbe actualised because of«fortuitous» events. Τhus, Bookchin,after explicitly acknowledging thatsocial evolution is profoundlydifferent from organic evolution,characterises social change as aprocess of Progress, defined as «theself-directive activity of History andCivilisation towards increasingrationality, freedom».[18] In thesame theoretical framework, societyis seen as developing both incontinuity with nature and as its






continuity with nature and as its

antithesis «until the two aresublated into "free nature", or"Nature" rendered self-conscious, ina rational and ecologicalsociety».[19]

Yet, although the hypothesis abouta rational process of naturalevolution may not be groundless,the hypothesis about the existenceof a rational process of socialevolution, i.e. the view which seesHistory as a process of Progress, theunfolding of reason —a view whichassumes that there is an evolutiongoing on towards autonomous, ordemocratic, forms of political,economic and social organisation—is, to my mind, both untenable andundesirable.[20]

It is untenable because SocialEcology’s view of History is hardlysupported by History itself! Historydoes not justify the view of anevolutionary process of Progresstowards a free society, in the senseof a form of social organisationwhich secures the highest degree ofindividual and social autonomy atthe political, the economic and thesocial levels: what we may define asan inclusive democracy. Althoughthe historical attempts to establishautonomous forms of political,social and economic democracy didnot, of course, appear ab novo,they cannot, nevertheless, be fittedinto any grand evolutionary process.This is clearly indicated by the factthat such attempts took place inspecific times and places and as abreak with past development, ratherthan in several societies at the samestage of development and as a





continuation of it. Therefore,although the ideals of freedom mayhave expanded over time, the last25 years or so notwithstanding, thisexpansion has not been matched bya corresponding evolution towardsan autonomous society, in the senseof greater participation of citizensin decision taking. In fact, theundermining of communities, which was intensified by the emergence ofthe market economy 200 years agoand has been accelerated by thedevelopment of the presentinternationalised market economy,as well as the growing privacy andself-interest of individualsencouraged by the consumersociety, are clear indications of atrend towards more heteronomousforms of society rather than theother way round. And it is undesirable, not onlybecause it creates unintentionallinks with heteronomy (since itimplicitly or explicitly rejects thefundamental fact that History iscreation) but also because it mayeasily lead to inadvertent affinitieswith intrinsically anti-democraticeco-philosophies. Thus, the attemptto establish a directionality insociety might easily createundesirable affinities with deepecology. Although such affinities areutterly repugnant to socialecologists, they are, nevertheless,implicit in the fact that both deepecologists and social ecologistsadopt a process of evolutionaryunfolding and self-realisation andground their ethics in scientificobservations about the naturalworld, in natural «tendencies» or



directionalities. This fact, as Ipointed out elsewhere[21] could go along way in explaining the varioushybridised approaches ofsocial/deep ecology developed by,among others, John Clark[22] andPeter Marshall.[23]

I will only add here that it is ironicindeed that, although Bookchinjustifiably feels the need to attackClarks’ anti-democratic views,[24] itis the very philosophical groundingof democracy on dialecticalnaturalism, so cherished by bothBookchin and Clark, which creates agap between social ecology and thedemocratic tradition. This isbecause democracy, as a process ofsocial self-institution, implies asociety which is open ideologically —namely, one which is not groundedon any closed system of beliefs,dogmas or ideas. «Democracy,» asCastoriadis puts it, «is the project ofbreaking the closure at thecollective level.»[25] In fact, onemay add here that committingoneself to a closed system of ideas,like dialectical materialism (ordialectical naturalism for thatmatter) is not that different fromcommitting oneself with respect toa closed set of religious or irrationalbeliefs and dogmas. This fact alonecould go a long way in explainingthe present convergence of thethought of some Marxists withreligion, or of several anarchists(like John Clark) with various formsof irrationalism (Taoism, New Ageetc).[26] It is, therefore, not accidental thatClark is particularly attracted by









Clark is particularly attracted by

those elements in social ecologywhich are alien to the democratictradition, i.e. the supposedly«objective» grounding of theecological society on the process ofevolutionary unfolding and self-realisation which dialecticalnaturalism offers. Nor is itaccidental that his attack againstsocial ecology is centered on thoseof its elements which are closest tothe democratic tradition, i.e. itsdemocratic politics. In other words,there is a significant degree ofconsistency between Clark’sphilosophical and political views.Unfortunately, the same could notbe said with respect to socialecology. Still, the fact that no grandevolutionary schemes of Progressare supported by History does notmean that we should overemphasisethe significance of the «socialimaginary» (in the Castoriadianterminology) at the expense of the‘systemic’ elements. As I tried toshow elsewhere,[27] this type ofapproach could easily lead to seriouserrors: for instance, blaming thewidening gulf between the Northand the South on the «imaginarysignifications» that had developed inthe latter rather than on the world-wide spread of the growth economywhich had destroyed the traditionalself-reliant communities of theSouth. On the other hand, the view ofHistory adopted by the ID project,setting aside the grand evolutionaryschemes which depend on specific(supposedly «objective»)




interpretations of natural or socialchange, sees History as thecontinuous interaction betweencreative human action and theexisting institutional framework, i.e.as the interaction between the«imaginary» and the «systemic»elements, the outcome of which isalways unpredictable. It is in thissense that the democratic society isseen as a rupture, a break in thehistorical continuity that theheteronomous society hashistorically established. The differences between the projectof inclusive democracy and that ofsocial ecology concerning the philosophical grounding ofdemocracy, have importantrepercussions on the respectiveconceptions of democracy itself.Thus, Bookchin is right when hestates that Clark is going «beyond»the political realm when heattempts to make cooperativeinstitutions (seen by Bookchin asparts of the social realm, not thepolitical) into central parts of hisapproach to social change. AsBookchin puts it, Clark includes inthe public sphere producer andconsumer co-ops, land trusts etc,«even the workplace —replete with“bosses, co-workers andtechnologies”— thereby scatteringthe concept of a public sphere as apolitics like chaff in a wind».[28]

However, Clark is right inattempting to expand the narrowpolitical realm, although he isabsolutely wrong in the way heattempts to do so, i.e. bypersonalising the political realm anddiscarding the Bookchinist notion of




the citizen as the nuclear unit of anew politics. Clearly, the narrow conception ofthe public realm envisaged byBookchin could and should beexpanded, if our aim is to transcendthe limited conception ofdemocracy which first flourished inclassical Athens. Thus, to develop anew conception of inclusivedemocracy we may start bydistinguishing between the two mainsocietal realms, the public and theprivate, to which we may add an«ecological realm», defined as thesphere of the relations between thenatural and the social worlds. Thepublic realm, contrary to thepractice of many supporters of therepublican or democratic project(Arendt, Castoriadis, Bookchin et al)includes in this conception not justthe political realm, but also theeconomic realm, as well as a«social» realm, in other words, anyarea of human activity wheredecisions can be taken collectivelyand democratically. The political realm is defined as thesphere of political decision-taking,the area where political power isexercised. The economic realm is defined asthe sphere of economic decision-taking, the area where economicpower is exercised with respect tothe broad economic choices that anyscarcity society has to make. Finally, the social realm is definedas the sphere of decision-taking in the workplace, the education place



and any other economic or culturalinstitution which is a constituentelement of a democratic society. I think that the extension of thetraditional public realm to includethe economic, ecological and«social» realms is an indispensableelement of the inclusive democracyconception and offers significantassistance in defining its constituentelements: political, economic,ecological and ‘democracy in thesocial realm’. Thus, political,economic and democracy in thesocial realm may be defined,briefly, as the institutionalframework that aims at the equaldistribution of political, economicand social power respectively, inother words, as the system whichaims at the effective elimination ofthe domination of human being overhuman being. Correspondingly, wemay define ecological democracy asthe institutional framework thataims at the elimination of anyhuman attempt to dominate thenatural world, in other words, asthe system which aims toreintegrate humans and nature.[29]

Economic Democracy vs.Communalism’s «moral»economy In an Inclusive Democracy,therefore, any type of decision(political, economic, social, relatingto the environment) which can betaken collectively, should be part ofthe democratic decision-takingprocess. This is not obvious in the




process. This is not obvious in the

case of social ecology, whichcentres its conception of democracyon the political realm, at theexclusion of the other realms. Nowonder that economic democracy isnot part of the socio-ecologicalconception of democracy. Instead,social ecology adopts thecommunistic fiction of a post-scarcity society in which noeconomic-decision taking about theallocation of resources is, in effect, required. All that is required in thisvision is, basically, a set of moralprinciples guiding sharing.[30] This iswhy the Social Ecology project, incontrast to the autonomy project,Parecon, and the InclusiveDemocracy project,[31] does notpropose any mechanism for theallocation of resources and Bookchinhimself insists instead that in acommunistic post-scarcity society«the very idea of an economy hasbeen replaced by ethical (instead ofproductive) relationships; labourunits, Proudhonian contracts,Rawlsian justice, and the like wouldnot even be relevant».[32]

However, there is a crucial negativeimplication to be drawn from SocialEcology’s conception of ademocratic society: it presupposesthe existence of materialpreconditions for freedom. Theentrance to the realm of freedomdepends on «objective» factors, likethe arrival of the mythical state ofaffairs of material abundance. But,the level of development ofproductive forces that is required sothat material abundance for theentire population on Earth can beachieved, makes it at least doubtful






achieved, makes it at least doubtful

that such a stage could ever beachieved without seriousrepercussions on the environment —unless, of course, «materialabundance» is defineddemocratically (and not«objectively») in a way which isconsistent with ecological balance. Therefore, the communist stage ofpost-scarcity is, in fact, a mythicalstate of affairs, as it presupposes an«objective» definition of needs andscarcity, and reference to it couldsimply be used (and has been used)to justify the indefinitemaintenance of state power andpower relations and structures. Evenif it was possible to define basicneeds objectively, it is certainlyimpossible to define objectivelysatisfiers, i.e. the means to satisfythem, let alone non-basic needs,which have become increasinglyimportant in today’s advancedsocieties. So, the fulfilment of apost-scarcity society is not just amatter of redistribution of wealth,as it is naively assumed by manylibertarians and social ecologistswho argue that «the promise ofpost-scarcity… has not beenfulfilled, not because thetechnology is base but because thesocial arrangements that use it arebase».[33]

Clearly, within the problematique ofthe inclusive democracy project,the link between post-scarcity andfreedom should be broken. Theabolition of scarcity, andconsequently of the division oflabour, is neither a necessary nor asufficient condition for democracy.




sufficient condition for democracy.

Therefore, the ascent of man fromthe kingdom of necessity to thekingdom of freedom should be de-linked from the economic process.Still, from Aristotle, through Lockeand Marx, to Arendt and Bookchin,the distinction between the «realmof necessity» (where naturebelongs) and the «realm offreedom» always has beenconsidered to be fundamental.However, although this distinctionmay be useful as a conceptual toolin classifying human activities, thereis no reason why the two realmsmust be seen as mutually exclusivein social reality. Historically,anyway, there have been severaloccasions when various degrees offreedom survived under conditionsthat could be characterised asbelonging to the «realm ofnecessity». Furthermore, once wecease treating the two realms asmutually exclusive, there is nojustification for any attempt todominate Nature —an importantelement of Marxist growth ideology— in order to enter the realm offreedom. On the other hand, in the IDconception, there are no materialpreconditions for freedom nor theentrance to the realm of freedomdepends on a massive change ofconsciousness through the adoptionof some form of spiritualisticdogma, as some deep ecologists andother spiritualistic movementspropose. Therefore, neithercapitalism and socialism, on the‘objective’ side, nor the adoption ofsome kind of spiritualistic dogma, onthe «subjective» side, constitute



the «subjective» side, constitute

historical preconditions to enter therealm of freedom. In other words,the democratic principle is notgrounded on any divine, natural orsocial «laws» or tendencies, but onour own conscious and self-reflective choice between the twomain historical traditions: thetradition of heteronomy which hasbeen historically dominant, and thetradition of autonomy. Inclusive Democracy is therefore amuch broader conception than theusual libertarian conception of afuture society (proposed byBookchin and other writers)expressed in terms of directdemocracy plus a municipalised «moral economy» based on a post-

scarcity society. This is so, not onlybecause Inclusive democracyincorporates political and economicdecisions taken by confederatedcommunity assemblies, as well asdecisions taken by assemblies at theplace of work, education etc. But,even more crucial, because theeconomic decisions taken in aninclusive democracy involve crucialdecisions about the allocation ofscarce resources and not just,basically, administrative decisions ina society where machines do mostof the work, as social ecologistsmaintain, assuming thattechnologically we have alreadyreached a post-scarcitypotential.[34]

All this implies that for anyliberatory project to look realisticand not just a utopia it has toinclude a visualisation of theinstitutions, which would allow a




institutions, which would allow a

democratic decision-taking in thecontext of a scarcity society. It istherefore utterly inadequate for arealistic liberatory project just to beinvolved in wishful thinking abouthow a moral economy will solve,more or less automatically, alleconomic problems (if the term isappropriate) of a mythical post-scarcity society.[35] It is now obviousthat if an alternative to thepresently universalised marketeconomy form of social organisationis to inspire today’s demoralisedpeoples, the feasibility of such analternative society has to be clearlyshown. This means that the crucialissues related to the allocation ofscarce resources in a new societywhich will meet the basic and non-basic needs of all citizens have to bedealt with, first in theory, and thenin everyday practice, in theeconomic democracy which has tostart being built here and now by anew massive antisystemicmovement.[36]

As regards theory, an economicdemocracy based on a scarcitysociety is perfectly feasible and, as Ihave attempted to showelsewhere,[37] it is indeed possibleto develop a model of economicdemocracy which shows thefeasibility of democratic decisiontaking, not in the framework of amythical post scarcity economy butin that of a real scarcity society. Asregards practice, the need forbuilding such a new massiveantisystemic movement is nowimperative if we wish to stop thepresent catastrophic descent ofhumanity into a new barbarity.






humanity into a new barbarity.

T.F.

May 1st, 2005

[1] Takis Fotopoulos, "PARECON: Has thehour arrived for a WSF model?" IDNewsletter # 1 (15 September 2004) and"Participatory Economics (Parecon) andInclusive Democracy", The InternationalJournal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY,Vol.1, no. 2 (January 2005).[2] Eirik Eiglad, "Bases for CommunalistPrograms", COMMUNALISM, issue 6(March 2005). [3] Peter Staudenmaier, "Rejoining Albert2" (December 27, 1999).[4] Alternatives to Capitalism, Seminar,New York City (April 23-24, 2005). [5] John Crump aptly characterises thehighly bureaucratic structure of Pareconas "participatory bureaucracy" which,together with the multiplicity ofproposed controls to limit people’sentitlement to consume, “would lay theground for the perpetuation orreappearance of the state"; John Crump“Markets, Money and Social Change”,Anarchist Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring1995), pp. 72-73. [6] see J. Biehl & M. Bookchin AdvisoryBoard Resignation Letter and theEditorial Board’s response in Democracy& Nature, Vol. 3 No. 3 (1997).[7] see Takis Fotopoulos, "Towards ademocratic liberatory ethics", Democracy& Nature, Volume 8 Number 3, (November 2002) and "On a DistortedView of the Inclusive DemocracyProject", Democracy & Nature Vol. 5, No.1 (March 1999).[8] See T. Fotopoulos, "The myth ofpostmodernity", Democracy & Nature,Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2001). [9] Takis Fotopoulos, Towards AnInclusive Democracy (London/New York:

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol1/vol1_no3_addendum.htm#_ednref1

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/newsletter/vol1_no4_prin_parecon.htm

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/newsletter/vol1_no4_prin_parecon.htm

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol1/vol1_no2_IDvsParecon.htm


http://www.communalism.org/Archive/06/bcp.html


http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/18582


http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=05/04/19/1222247&mode=nested&tid=7



http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol3/biehl_bookchin.htm

http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol3/editorial_response.htm


http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol8/takis_ethics.htm

http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol5/fotopoulos_distorted.htm


http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol7/takis_postmodernism.htm


http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/fotopoulos/brbooks/brtid/brtid.htm



Inclusive Democracy (London/New York:Cassell/Continuum, 1997), ch. 8. [10] ibid. p.345. [11] ibid. pp 347-8. [12] Ibid. p. 348. [13] ibid. see also, Takis Fotopoulos,"Towards a democratic liberatory ethics",Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No.3 (November 2002).[14] ibid. [15] See M. Bookchin, The Ecology ofFreedom, (Montreal: Black Rose, 1991),ch. 7. [16] T. Fotopoulos, Towards An InclusiveDemocracy, ch. 8. [17] See, M. Bookchin, The Philosophy ofSocial Ecology, (Montreal, Black Rose,1995).[18] Ibid. p. xii.[19] Ibid. p. xi. [20] See T. Fotopoulos, Towards AnInclusive Democracy, pp. 328-340. [21] T. Fotopoulos, Towards An InclusiveDemocracy, p. 330.[22] See e.g. John Clark, "The Politics ofSocial Ecology: Beyond the Limits of theCity", Democracy & Nature, Vol. 5, No.3 (November 1999).[23] Peter Marshall, Nature's Web(London: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p.426.[24] Murray Bookchin, "Comments on theInternational Social Ecology NetworkGathering and the “Deep Social Ecology”of John Clark", Democracy & Nature, Vol.3, No 3, pp. 154-197.[25] Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy,Politics, Autonomy, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991) p. 21.[26] See T. Fotopoulos, "The Rise of NewIrrationalism and its Incompatibility withInclusive Democracy", Democracy &Nature, Vol. 4, No. 2/3 (1999).[27] Takis Fotopoulos, "Castoriadis andthe democratic tradition", Democracy &Nature, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 157-163; see,also, "Towards a democratic liberatoryethics".[28] Murray Bookchin, "Comments," p.

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/fotopoulos/brbooks/brtid/brtid.htm














http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol5/abstract_clark.htm



http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol3/bookchin_comments.htm



http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol4/fotopoulos_irrationalism.htm


http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol4/fotopoulos_castor.htm




[28] Murray Bookchin, "Comments," p.159.

[29] See T. Fotopoulos, Towards AnInclusive Democracy, ch. 5.[30] Janet Biehl, The Politics of SocialEcology: Libertarian Municipalism,(Montreal: Black Rose Press, 1998), chs10 & 12.[31] See for a proposed mechanism ofallocating resources in an economicdemocracy, Takis Fotopoulos, TowardsAn Inclusive Democracy, ch. 6.[32] Murray Bookchin, "Comments", p.185.[33] Janet Biehl, The Politics of SocialEcology: Libertarian Municipalism, p. 98.[34] Janet Biehl, The Politics of SocialEcology: Libertarian Municipalism, p.132-37.[35] Ibid. See, also, pp. 111-120.[36] See Takis Fotopoulos, "Transitionalstrategies and the Inclusive Democracyproject", Democracy & Nature, Vol.8, No. 1 (March 2002).[37] See T. Fotopoulos, Towards AnInclusive Democracy, ch. 6.










http://www.democracynature.org/dn/vol8/takis_transitional.htm


the id project and social ecology - takis fotopoulos

Documents